THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

DISASTERS, DEVELOPMENT, AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS
TO DISPLACEMENT: INSIGHTS FROM HAITI

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MS. BRADLEY: Good morning, everyone, and welcome. My name is Megan Bradley, and I'm a fellow here at the Brookings Institution, where I work with the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement. Our project works to support the mandate of the U.S. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs -- internally displaced persons -- and to promote the human rights of IDPs worldwide.

It's a pleasure to see so many people out for today's event. We actually have more people than we expected, so conference services will be here in just a moment with some additional chairs. There's actually some spaces at the front for anyone who would like to squeeze in.

As many of you know, natural disasters are a leading cause of internal displacement around the world, with thousands, if not millions, of people being uprooted every year by hurricanes, droughts, earthquakes, et cetera. Responding to these crises is, of course, a critical humanitarian challenge, and one that we expect will become even more important in future years, as disasters that are associated with the effects of climate change become increasingly severe.

But resolving displacement caused by natural disasters is, of course, also a development issue, and there are important implications that this kind of displacement raises for individual well-being, and for the achievement of national development goals. This reality has been, of course, made abundantly clear by experiences over the course of the past four years in Haiti, where more than 1.5 million people were displaced and moved into camps following the earthquake of January 2010.

This camp-based population has now declined to some 147,000 people, and this is, of course, a very dramatic decline, and an important achievement for the humanitarian community and the government of Haiti. And yet it's difficult to determine
the extent to which the uprooted have been able to access truly durable solutions to their
displacement, and what should be done to assist those who do remain in camps today.

It's also clear that the Haitian experience holds important insights for
other countries facing major post-disaster displacement situations. These are the issues
that are at the heart of a recent study by the Brookings Institution and the International
Organization for Migration. They're at the heart of today's event, of course, as well.

We're pleased to be holding this discussion in partnership with the
International Organization for Migration.

You have all the speakers' bios in front of you, and we have a very full
panel, so I won't give detailed introductions, but I'll just give you a quick overview of
where we're going with the event today.

We'll begin with a brief presentation of the report by myself and Lorenza
Rossi from IOM, who is also one of the co-authors of the report. We'll then invite the
other panelists to join us up on stage at the front of the room here.

First, we'll hear from Ambassador Bill Swing, the director general of the
International Organization for Migration, who will address the IOM's role in supporting
durable solutions in the aftermath of disasters.

Second, we'll turn to Harry Adam, the executive director of the Unit for
Housing and Public Buildings Construction with the Government of Haiti, who will
address the role of the government in Haiti in promoting durable solutions for its own
citizens.

Third, we'll hear from Gaetano Vivo, who is a specialist in disaster risk
reduction with the World Bank, and has just relocated to Washington after spending
several years working in Haiti full time.
Last, but certainly not least, we'll hear from Tom Adams, the U.N. Special Coordinator -- rather, the U.S. Special Coordinator for Haiti, who will address the role of the U.S. government in responding to the displacement situation in Haiti, and addressing disaster risk-reduction concerns.

I've asked each of the speakers to limit their remarks to eight minutes, which should, hopefully, preserve some times for questions and answers with the audience.

So, I'll ask Lorenza to join me up at the front. Could I have a colleague from IT help us bring the screen down, as well? Thank you.

So, the main point of reference for the study that you picked up on your way in today is the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, or IASC, Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons. This is a tool that lays out right-paced principles and criteria to inform efforts to support the durable resolution of internal displacement situations -- both in conflict contexts, and also in natural disaster situations.

We'll begin today's presentation with an introduction to the framework, followed by a brief word on the methodology and key findings. Lorenza will then address some of our findings as they relate to the particular criteria laid out in the IASC framework, and then I'll close with some brief reflections on the implications of this case for durable solutions in post-disaster situations, and the recommendations from this study.

So, what do we mean when we're talking about a durable solution to displacement? The IASC framework indicate that a durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have any specific assistance or protection needs that are linked to their displacement, and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement.
So, the framework identifies three so-called "durable solutions," each of which are equally valid.

The first is the idea that displaced persons might return to their communities or homes of origin.

Second, they might locally integrate in the communities where they sought shelter.

And, third, they might settle elsewhere in their country and build a new life for themselves there.

As the framework stresses, the resolution of displacement is a gradual and voluntary process, and it’s one that requires cooperation and coordination amongst a wide range of actors, including, of course, national authorities. There are several key criteria which shape the extent to which a durable solution has been achieved.

The framework indicates that internally displaced persons who have achieved a durable solution should be able to enjoy long-term safety and security, they should have an adequate standard of living, access to livelihoods and employment, and mechanisms to restore housing, land, and property, and opportunities to access or replace documentation that they may have lost while they were displaced.

Clearly, in a very poor country such as Haiti, upholding these criteria is a very tall order. What’s important to stress here is that the framework emphasizes a progressive realization of these criteria, and the importance of non-discrimination -- which is to say IDPs shouldn't be discriminated against on the account of their displacement, they shouldn't be disadvantaged because of being displaced, and, at the same time, communities who were not displaced shouldn't be neglected or disadvantaged in relation to the assistance that's provided to those who were forced from their homes.
What we heard from many partners in Haiti is that this framework sounds great in theory, but it’s very difficult to apply in practice. And yet, from the results of this study, we have seen the importance of thinking about how to better operationalize this framework, because as it stands, we’ve found from our research, that those who were displaced in 2010 continue to fare worse than those who were not. In general, the displaced came from the poorest sectors of society before the earthquake, but displacement has further exacerbated their vulnerability and their impoverishment.

So, by ensuring that the framework conforms the design and implementation of interventions in support of durable solutions, we can help to improve the efficacy of these interventions in relation to resolving displacement.

So, in terms of the methodology, first we conducted a random sample, a survey, of 2,500 households living outside of camps in the Port-au-Prince area. This survey touched people who were and were not displaced, and addressed the living conditions that they experienced before and after the earthquake. We complemented this survey with a series of focus groups, interviews, and site visits.

In terms of the key findings, we found first that the study refutes the common assumption in Haiti that there’s no meaningful difference between the problems that face IDPs and other members of the urban poor population. These populations certainly face many shared and intertwined challenges which have to be address in an integrated manner. But, on a range of issues, from livelihoods to safety, we found that IDPs do face heightened vulnerabilities which need to be taken into account more explicitly.

We also found that while attention has focused mostly on IDPs who are living inside of camps, the disadvantages associated with displacement also affect people
who are not living in camps, and these populations need to be more effectively supported.

Relatedly, the study also underscores that durable solutions to displacement is about much more than leaving a camp. This is an important step, but, in fact, durable solutions to displacement require longer-term support from both humanitarian and development actors, which requires differentiated approaches that take into account the particular geographic situation, needs, and preferences of displaced communities.

MS. ROSSI: Good morning.

So, in terms of key obstacles to the achievement of durable solutions, I think it's important to frame the presentation in terms of the severe obstacles that were faced by Haiti after the earthquake. In a very complex urban environment, these obstacles included the sheer physical destruction of the disaster, and its effect on the preexisting housing shortage, the scale of displacement that emerged after the earthquake, the lack of government resources and capacity after the disaster, chronic problems of urban poverty that preexisted, and also, the structural differences in ideas, goals, and operations that existed between the humanitarian and development organizations and actors.

So, in the next slides we will address five of the criteria that are identified in the IASC Framework for the Attainment of Durable Solutions, and to see if durable solutions have been achieved.

As we look at the range of services and access to services, and needs, what we found -- both through our qualitative and quantitative research -- is that IDPs were more likely than non-IDPs to report worsening in their living situations when comparing it with the pre-earthquake situation. So, essentially, we found that some of the
socioeconomic distinctions between the two groups preexisted the earthquake. Namely, what has been identified through the research is access to housing, formal jobs, and education -- but that the earthquake exacerbated and further impacted access for the displaced population.

So, in terms of the first criterion that is mentioned in the framework, in terms of access to safety and security, one of the key findings of the study is that 20 percent of the displaced population report that not feeling safe in the present place of residence, compared to 14 percent of the non-displaced population. Also, data not shown here but that you find in the report, show that the displaced population was more likely to report lack of access to security and police, compared to the non-displaced population.

In terms of the second criterion, adequate standard of living, as I said, worsening access to a whole range of services was found in both the displaced and non-displaced population. But, as you can see from the slide, 61 percent of the displaced population reported that, overall, the living condition had worsened, compared to 39 percent of the non-displaced person. Also, data not shown here, in terms of ability to provide for basic needs, found that 82 percent of both the IDP and non-IDP population before the earthquake had the means to provide for their basic needs, but this percentage drops to 57 percent after the earthquake for non-displaced, and to 32 for the displaced population.

In terms of access to livelihood, our research further shows that IDP households face particular vulnerability when it comes to access to jobs and to livelihoods, and that losing job and productive asset is a direct consequence of the earthquake, and impacted more the IDP population. On this slide you can see the difference between IDPs and non-IDPs in terms of, yes, access to livelihood and to
credit. And when we interviewed both IDPs and community members, both of them had strong and similar views on the need for long-term, non-temporary investment in job creation for IDPs -- and yet, there is a lack of clarity by the government and international actors, or internationally-funded job creation schemes, so how to integrate and to include IDPs in these initiatives.

One other criteria is access to means for restoring housing, land, and property. And as you can see from this graph, in our research we found that IDPs, non-homeowners were much more likely than homeowners to be displaced. So, 37 percent of the homeowners were in comparison with 57 percent of the non-displaced. And this population, this percentage dropped only for non-homeowners. So, after the earthquake, the homeowners remained the same percentage, and the displaced decreased. So, basically, issues around land governance, security of tenure, and eviction presented severe challenges to the ability of IDPs to access housing, adequate housing. On top of that, forced eviction, which affected more than 16,000 families, and are threatening thousands more, prevent IDPs from living in peace, dignity and security.

The last criteria that we're going to show today is access to documentation. And survey data showed strong association between displacement and the loss of documentation. And we found that 21 percent of displaced families lost their documentation, and needed some support to recover the lost documentation, compared to 7.7 percent of the non-displaced population -- so 3 times more, the displaced population.

Also, IOM IDP registration or camp-based census data show that between 15 and 20 percent of displaced head of households did not have personal identification documents, and needed access to a replacement. So, incomplete documentation represents an obstacle to increasing access to housing and livelihood
activities, to formal credit or micro-credit mechanisms. And this is a central component of the government strategy to improving the housing option, or access to housing for the population.

So, I'll hand over.

MS. BRADLEY: So, briefly, this study ranges a range of questions about the pursuit of durable solutions in post-disaster urban environments. It's often assumed that supporting solutions to displacement is easier in the aftermath of disasters than in conflict situations -- and I think this study gives us a range of reasons to question that assumption, given the challenges that have been presented in Haiti.

The study also stresses, in particular, the importance of integrating disaster risk-management and reduction activities into efforts to support durable solutions.

There's also a need for more careful thinking about how the resolution of displacement relates to longer-term urban planning processes and, as Lorenza mentioned, to protection concerns, such as evictions.

There's also a need for more careful thinking about durable solutions for renters, who typically make up the majority in urban situations, and yet they aren't really thought about enough, in terms of responses to these disasters.

In Haiti, and globally, we see that even in very poor circumstances, IDPs take the lead in crafting solutions to their own displacement. So, for example, many move out to informal settlements, such as the one pictured here. This is a photo of Canaan. In part, this is driven by the sense that they may have a better opportunity to access land and improved housing in these areas. I think much more careful consideration is needed of how international actors, and also the government, can support the solutions that IDPs are pursuing for themselves to resolve their displacement.
So, in closing, to recommend a few -- to highlight a few of the general recommendations for the study, first, we stress the need to raise awareness of the IASC framework, and also provide training on how it can be implemented in post-disaster contexts.

Second, the study stresses that both governments and donors need to recognize that the resolution of displacement isn't just a humanitarian concern, but a development process that requires long-term investments.

And third, increase advocacy is needed in support of solutions, particularly from donors and U.N. country teams.

In terms of the situation in Haiti, specifically, we recommend enhanced cross-sectoral support for durable solutions. So, this means targeted cooperation to address issues such as livelihoods and documentation, as well as the construction of new homes, and support for the safe expansion of the rental market. And, of course, investments of disaster risk-reduction are also critical in this respect.

Given Haiti’s continued vulnerability to future natural disasters, we also urge that the question of durable solutions and displacement be integrated into national and international plans and policies, particularly as they relate to housing and disaster preparedness.

Third, at this moment, I think it’s clear from the study that differentiated forms of support are needed for IDPs who remain in camps. So, in some cases this may entail continued use of rental-subsidy mechanisms, for example, and in other cases it may be important to consider how camps might be integrated into surrounding communities.

Fourth, interventions in support of durable solutions should be more sensitive to human rights protection concerns, particularly as they relate to evictions.
Fifth, sustainability clearly depends on increased engagement and support for local actors -- which has arguably not been as strong as it should have been up to this point.

And, last, as we’ve stressed, there’s a need for increased efforts to support IDPs’ own durable solution strategies, recognizing and complementing the investments that IDPs make in communities, including informal settlements.

So, our hope is that this study provides some important data and food for thought, in terms of responding to what’s clearly an ongoing challenge.

We will now invite the panelists to join us up at the front, and I'll ask my colleagues in IT to help with hooking everyone’s mics up.

So, thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you very much. We'll now turn it over to Ambassador Swing for his comments.

MR. SWING: Thank you very much. Good morning. What an honor, what a joy to be with you today. Unaccustomed as I am to sitting when I speak, I'll make an effort to do that.

I, first of all, want to thank President Strobe Talbot and the Brookings Institution for both being our host today, but also for giving IOM the honor of doing this study together. It was a great honor for us, and a joy to do this together. Obviously, we owe special recognition to the Government of Canada for their very generous financial support -- and, of course, most of all to thank those who actually did the report, including my colleague on my left here, and both from Brookings and from IOM.

I'm particularly pleased to be here today, both because of my attachment and long friendship with Haiti, and every occasion like this that puts Haiti in the public eye.
is a positive thing. The problem with all of these situations is that once the cameras dim or leave, and the media's gone, they sort of drop out of sight and out of mind. And I'll address that a bit later, in a minute, in terms of the challenges we face.

I'm also grateful because we need to give much more attention to how we do our work, to have a durability to what we actually do before we think the job is done and we walk out, and the problem simply comes back to haunt us.

So, we're here today to launch this important joint study. And, as the report says, in a matter literally of minutes if not seconds, an entire country was totally devastated. I was there within a couple of days after this, and having spent five years of my career in Haiti, I have to say that, other than the Haitian people, there was very little I recognized in Port-au-Prince. While I knew where I was before, I simply couldn't tell where I was. It was like -- worse than a lunar landscape.

I used to say, when I was in Haiti, that everything is broken there but the human spirit. Not to be derogatory of Haiti, but to address the difficult history that Haitians have had to endure. And when you use the word "resilience," which is the new buzzword in development circles, Haitian are the quintessential example of resilience. They are survivors. They carry on.

I ran into an old friend of mine in Haiti those first couple days after the earthquake, and he said to me, in a way that only Haitians can put it, he said, "You know, the tragedy is, we lost what we didn't have." That's a bit Haitian humor that makes the point very well. We were, in fact, IOM with others, we were, in fact, still engaged in Gonaïves and other coastal towns in addressing the 2008 flooding -- hadn't even gotten rid of that. In fact, we lost our office and several cars at the time of the earthquake. Very little, very soon after our initial efforts, then you had this very large outbreak of cholera.
So, we’d gone from one disaster to another, and yet the country has continued to be able to cope with all of this.

So this study, I think, is exceedingly important. And I’m very grateful to Brookings and to Canada, and to the authors of this, for having taken the time to tease out for us the lessons we’ve learned from this. Clearly, disasters, if we’re going to have a durable solution, have to be linked to development. Some of the problems there were developmental problems that were made worse by the earthquake.

The whole question of protecting and advancing human rights -- I was just in Tacloban, in the Philippines, after the typhoon there. The women and the children, at a time like this, are absolutely vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence. The same was true in Haiti. And things were going on under our very eyes -- we were so busy doing good, as they say, that there was sexual and gender-based violence going on, terrible examples of that. Children were being trafficked, literally trafficked out of the country by so-called “well-meaning people.” All that was happening, because we couldn’t, I guess, do everything at once. But we have to do better in the future, I assure you.

The densely inhabited character of Port-au-Prince -- now we-this is an unpaid advertisement, but IOM will be convening a major global conference next year on the question of migrants in cities: What’s the impact of IDPs, and migrants, and others on cities? What’s the dynamic, the impact of cities on these persons? We need to look at that much more closely.

Certainly, when I went back, my annual visit to Haiti last year, I guess it was, and when I met with President Martelly, I said, “I have good news, and I have bad news. The good news, a million fewer Haitians are now living in tent cities. But the bad news is, 347,000 are still living there.” And now it’s down to 147,000.
We ran up against the constraints of trying to construct transitional housing quickly -- ran out of money, ran out of time -- went to the rental subsidy, and then the rental subsidy faltered. And the fact that there weren't enough places to rent. And then there wasn't enough land available -- which was a major limiting factor at the time.

So, I'm very pleased about this. I think the country has really suffered too much, too long, and we can't do enough to support it.

One of the main lessons we're learning is that development challenges and displacement issues are interlinked. The study shows that many Haitian IDPs are still in a more vulnerable position in comparison with those who weren't displaced. And that was clear from the study and the charts you've just seen. So we need to tailor our development strategies to the needs of these IDPs.

Let me conclude by stressing a little bit just a couple of points.

The findings and the recommendations of the joint study, that it takes on added importance and urgency when we put this into context today: We are living in a period of unprecedented, multiple, complex emergencies. When I met with Pope Francis recently, he used the phrase "We're now faced with the globalization of indifference."

How do you keep the spotlight on a Haiti? Or a South Sudan? Or the Central African Republic, where I was recently, where you have enthno-religious cleansing going on? And, of course, Syria is taking up much of the resources, as we know. Many other places -- we're still not finished in Libya.

We took a lot of credit for doing a good job in Libya, together with our traditional partner UNHCR. We returned 247,000 migrant workers to 54 countries -- $125 million. Bravo. But what happened? We dropped them off, there were no jobs, there were not enough schools, there weren't enough clinics, and there were no more remittances coming home.
So we did the job halfway. And if we're serious, as governments and international organizations, we have to rethink how we're dealing with disasters.

How do we build the durable solution? I can tell you, it didn't happen in Haiti. We thought we did a good job. We got people into housing. But, as your study shows, they remain very vulnerable.

Now, with all of these multiple complex disasters -- Syria, natural disasters, Haiti, the Philippines, South Sudan, CAR, Mali, Yemen, Libya, et cetera -- either we're going to have -- and I'm very pleased that the Secretary General has called the World Humanitarian Summit for 2016, because we need to ask ourselves a serious question: Are we, as international organizations, and are we, as governments, really geared to address these situations in a serious, responsible manner? Do our parliaments, our congresses understand the humanitarian imperative upon all of us who have means to stay the course in these places?

I've gone a little bit far afield, but I intentionally did that, because I want to place it in the largest possible global context.

And this is the value of this study, that it shows that we have to learn lessons, and we have to do a more holistic and linked-up, cooperative approach than we've done up to now.

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Ambassador Swing.

Mr. Adam, you have the floor.

MR. ADAM: Hi to everyone. I am very pleased to be here, but I will ask you to make an effort -- I will ask my colleague Gaetano to help me in the traduction. I'm
unfortunately the only one official here, and I want to be precise, and to fit more as I can to what I want to say.

Just after -- I'll do my best -- just after the earthquake, the government realized how deep was the problem of housing in Haiti, and to put in place the UCLBB, and I am the leader of that new unit in charge of the relocalization of the people, the building of, the rebuilding of our administrative building that collapsed after the earthquake, and the housing sector. And now we have a policy. And I think it's one of the most important things. Because, before, the situation in Haiti was that no government has in mind how deep was the problem of the housing.

Now I'm going to -- help me --

We developed this national housing policy. I think the most important effort we did, has to be an institutional one. We invested a lot of funds in Haiti, and we've been working very closely with partners and with IOM. We've been providing safe shelter to 90 percent of people displaced by the earthquake. So there is still 10 percent of the displaced people that are living in tents today. This is a little part of those who live in a condition of high vulnerability.

We focus on Port-au-Prince, normally, but this is a situation that we find in many other cities in Haiti that also have this problem of informal settlements. So it will be difficult to find solutions, sustainable solutions to people living in this situation of extreme vulnerability in the neighborhood.

So, one key aspect of delivering sustainable solutions is to invest in institutions, to build institutions. And that, then, in turn, can provide solutions.

We are focusing on an original approach called "Site and Services" that we are piloting now in Haiti. So, it's supposed to provide one house to each displaced family -- with high cost, because it's about $12,000 U.S., more or less, for each new
housing unit. So we will, instead, provide them with land, which can bring services, like sanitation and water. This solution also allows the beneficiary to get titles, and which enables them access to credit, which is a key issue.

So, this is one example, the Site and Services, of new creative solutions that need to be developed to really being sure to provide durable solutions -- these and working on institutions, such as (inaudible), and others that can provide the policy framework for --

I'm going to conclude in saying a big thank you to the international organization, to IOM who worked with us.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Adam -- and Gaetano for translating for us.

We'll now segue right into your own comments.

MR. VIVO: Okay. Thank you, thank you very much. Thank you, Megan, for inviting me. I hope I didn't do too bad as a translator. I was not prepared.

MR. ADAM: It's not part of your --

MR. VIVO: Thank you.

So, there's one particular aspect that I would like to focus on, and this is the developing -- as Mr. Adam was saying -- solutions that really fit the issues, the challenges that we found in Haiti.

I think the figure is 80 percent -- 24 months after the earthquake, 80 percent of people living in camps were renters. Now, this is an important data, because we see that most of the solutions that were developed in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake by the international community, both humanitarian and long-term donors, were not fitting the needs of this particular group. Renters -- and it's not the case only in
Haiti, it's the case in many other disasters, particularly urban disasters, that renters are often overlooked, and solutions are not really crafted for them. So this is one element.

As I was saying, this is something that, you know, concerned both humanitarian and development donors. Initially, there's been, as in many other post-emergency situations, post-crisis situations, lots of effort down with T-shelters, P-shelters. But then the other solutions that were found like, you know, the house repairs or reconstructions implied that the beneficiary had title, that he or she could show ownership of a piece of land, which was not the case. So, again, we have that staggering figure of 80 percent of, I think it was 800,000 people, or 700,000 in January 12, two years after the earthquake, without a solution, so living in displacement.

So, interestingly, a large organization like the World Bank, it took time to really restructure, re-tune our approach to housing and construction in the context of Haiti. It took about two-and-a-half years, because it was in the summer of 2012 when I think tropical storm Isaac, if I'm not mistaken, hit the Port-au-Prince area, which is where most of the camps were concentrated, that, you know, the situation in camps deteriorated even more from several points of view. Cholera outbreak had happened, there were several cases of violence and crime -- and then the storms.

So it was clear that something needed to change in the approach, and we were requested by the governments -- by that time UCLBP had been established, and this approach of the rental-support cash grant, or rental subsidies was being tested. We were asked to shift and to start delivering solutions that were fitting this particular group -- which is what we did.

So, $25 million out of our $60 million program of housing were restructured, and went into these subsidies. We worked with IOM, and it was really a
joint effort, because there was a good example of partnership between humanitarian, development actors like the Bank, and under the leadership of the government.

And here is another key issue that emerged from the experience, from the post-earthquake reconstruction: It took time to really develop the synergies between these three actors I mentioned -- emergency or humanitarian actors, government, and development. But when that happened -- unfortunately, a bit late -- it did bring results.

So we developed this -- I mean, we did not develop it, but we contributed to this approach that had been piloted UCLBP, and have brought together also other donors in Haiti. And the approach was being quite successful, actually. And it was interesting, because we had, I think it was a year ago, a little more than a year ago, UCLBP presented it to the World Bank at or Fragility Forum, which brings together all the teams working on disasters and post-crisis countries, this approach. And we thought that there was an interest within the Bank urban and disaster-risk management approach for this approach, which was very simple. The approach is nothing revolutionary, it's just a conditional cash transfer, essentially, that is given for renting a unit that fulfills certain criteria. But there was this interest. And this showed again that even among ourselves at the Bank, we lacked these types of instruments.

And so we developed, actually, a manual with UCLBP, in English, that spells out how to do this type of methodology, to apply this approach in situations like the case of Haiti. And this is now being used in the Philippines to inform part of the response of the World Bank to Cyclone Yolanda.

So, maybe just focusing on two or three lessons learned in this experience, and then perhaps we'll continue discussing during the floor discussion.

The interaction, the cooperation, and really articulating the roles and responsibilities of these actors -- humanitarian, development, and government --
happened too late in Haiti. And had it happened earlier, it would have probably made -- it would have helped develop tools, like the one of the rental cash grants, to develop them earlier. And in this respect I must say that UCLBP, this entity in place, really helped a great deal to bring together these actors and produce or work on tools like the one of the cash grants.

The cash grants itself is not the panacea, it's not the ultimate solution. It's one tool. And this is another lesson learned, it's one tool out of a set of different options. And, really, this is something that we should more probably work on options, as opposed to just one, you know, monolithic approach that only focuses on one group of affected people -- in this case, owners. So, really, working together can help develop other tools that go together, that present other options in addition to the rental cash grants, or that can improve the cash grant itself.

One very interesting finding was that 77 percent of the owners that received these grants were investing. The grants, a significant part of the grants -- I think two-thirds -- in improving and expanding their unit, which has tremendous meaning. Because we know how important the rental housing stock is in these countries. And, again, it's not just the case of Haiti. So, we can only imagine the potential of such a tool, if expanded, with other options -- for example, guidelines on how to do this expansion in order for them to be safe and resilient, or legal instruments for tenants -- things like that, very concrete and technical tools that, together with, you know, approaches like the one of the durable solution, which are protection framework, essentially, really can help have sets of these solutions ready the next time we'll need them.

And then, so, finally, really it took time to the Bank, as well, and I'm sure also to other organizations working on different timelines, to retrofit our operations, our instruments, and being able to work on this type of tools. It took time, because our legal
frameworks are not those of -- the Bank cannot do humanitarian relief, cannot provide, by its operational policy. But in this case, you know, working in the context of an emergency, but addressing development issues, there is an argument -- and luckily, we managed. But it took time.

So, really, retrofitting our operational tools, our expertise, getting together, developing this framework to work together, it's helpful for them having these instruments ready before a disaster or a crisis happens. And the opportunity like the recovery framework that is being now developed, it's a global tool that helped inform recovery in country after a disaster, it's critical that this type of examples fit into these global guidelines, because then we have them ready, and we don't have to wait two years, two years and a half to bring them about.

So, for now I'll disappear, and then we'll continue.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Gaetano.

Tom.

MR. ADAMS: Thank you. Thank you very much for inviting me here today. And I, too, want to salute the great work IOM's done down there, and also the great work that you have done, and Patrick Rouzi, and others.

After the earthquake, there were just lots of people with no shelter, nothing. And the first imperative was to get them under a tent -- and under a tent in a safe location, because a lot of the spontaneous camps that sprung up were in low-lying areas that were going to get flooded when the rains came in the fall. And it was very challenging to find that land in Haiti for a lot of reasons that I won't go into.

But, by March, we had 1.5 million people living in tent camps in Haiti. And, in fact, many people came in from the countryside to join the tent-camp dwellers, because there was work in Port-au-Prince, cash for work, and there was none in the
countryside. So, in fact, the opposite of what we wanted to happen. Port-au-Prince is a city built for about 500,000 people, that is now choked with many more times that.

And, you know, the next step was to try to upgrade from the tent camps to what we call “T-shelters.” And we built 29,000, and I think about 100,000 were built by the international community. These are basically a concrete slab, four plywood walls, with a hurricane strap -- again, safer from earthquakes and from hurricanes.

After that, you needed more durable solutions, and it quickly became apparent that Haiti’s housing needs were not going to be satisfied anytime soon. By some estimates, Haiti needed 500,000 new houses to decently house its population, at a cost of something like $15 billion. The total amount of money pledged for Haiti by all donors, over a 10-year period from 2010 to 2020, is about $14 billion. And Haiti has many other needs than just housing.

So, I think we kind of stumbled upon his rental voucher program by doing two tent camps in Pétionville. And the plan merits some description. IOM, largely, went around to everybody in a tent camp, said, “Where did you live before? What’s preventing you from going back? If we gave you some money, could you fix up your old house? If we gave you a rental voucher, would you move to a T-shelter?” And most people, 90-some percent, said they would take the rental voucher.

Now, IOM didn’t just hand over the cash, it said, “Go find a place.” And, often, it was a room, a dwelling that somebody was living in. They would negotiate with the landlord, IOM would come negotiate with the landlord, inspect it to make sure it would safe. IOM would make the payments. And if -- typically, they were offered $500 for this -- and if they could negotiate a better deal than that, they got to pocket the difference.

So, they drove hard bargains. This was only for one year.
So, what happened after one year? Most of the people -- I think 80-some percent -- managed to pay their second year by themselves, get jobs. This created a market of people improving their houses, building more. So, that's the next step.

But, obviously, there needs to be a further step. The further step is really seen in an area north of town, called "Canaan-Jerusalem," which is kind of next door to one of the more notorious tent camps at Lake Harai. And the word got out that if you homesteaded there you could build your house. And something like 150,000 Haitians are doing that, there are investors who are building six houses, there are people there. It's a hub of activity.

And so one of the challenges that Harry is dealing with, and donors are being asked to help, is to get ahead of, kind of, this self-building -- not in the sense of stopping it, but to try to make sure people build safe houses, and leave space for schools, for health clinics, et cetera, policing, all the things that are needed out there.

So, really, Haitians are solving their own problems, but we can help by doing loans -- in small amounts. You know, these people can build their houses much quicker if they get a few hundred dollars, in many cases. So we are tuning there, towards that.

I think the tent camps will be below 100,000 soon. The island does a count about every six months, I think. Canada has just generously given another $20 million that will help that. And that's basically what it takes, is a lot of money, to remove the tent camps.

Now, the other issue here is that, you know, Haiti was really in trouble even before the earthquake, and since the earthquake, it's not just one disaster, the earthquake, it's a continuing series of hurricanes and other disasters that hit there and cause a lot of problems because of deforestation. Haiti used to regularly withstand direct
hits of category 3 hurricanes as late 12 1985 with no loss of life. But since then, the country's become almost completely deforested.

So, addressing that is difficult. And how do you cure deforestation? Well, I think -- there are a number of suggestions, but the best one is they get the laws of economics to work for you. Haiti's land-tenure issues are notorious. You've all heard of them. And they impede a lot of progress in this area.

There need to be changes in the way land is taxed in Haiti. Right now it's only taxed when it's sold. But they need to tax land the way you and I get taxed: We get a bill every year for our house. That way, five people wouldn't claim to own the same piece of land. There would be more liquidity in land. People would sell it, buy it and sell it. And also rural landowners could be forgiven their tax if they forested their land, and the government would inspect it once a year. This is not my idea, this is an idea from Gregory Mevs, actually.

But implementing that will be difficult. The Haitian parliament has passed almost no laws in the last two years, and there needs to be some political piece there to get the many laws that Haiti needs.

The other thing is they've talked about integration. Integration is very important. You can't just build housing, there has to be jobs. And, actually, of all the things Haiti needs, the thing it needs most, I would have to say, is jobs and economic development so Haitians can fix their own problems.

And, so, a lot of our development is outside of Port-au-Prince. And people say, why is that? The earthquake was in Port-au-Prince, why are you doing that?
Well, we want to decongest Port-au-Prince. Sixty percent of Haitians live in the countryside, and they need -- you know, but they need a good life there. They want their kids to be educated in decent schools, they want to have access to health clinics, access to clean water, have police. There are large areas of Haiti, rural areas, that have no police. Farmers get their crops stolen and have nobody to even complain to.

So, you can't just focus on one of Haiti's many problems. There has to be this integration, this holistic approach. And it's hard to get it all done at the same time. You know, people say in your development in the north, why did you have everything sort of drop into place at the same moment? You know, jobs, housing, and everything. And that's just not possible. But we're getting better.

The things that really need to be done in Haiti -- and I'll stop in a minute because we want to hear your questions -- the areas where we haven't succeeded -- I won't say “failed” -- are in institution building. The institutions, Haitian government, we need to help the government build institutions. They need more Harrys there.

We also need to really help create a better business climate. The business climate in Haiti, you know, the next, the Bill Gates of Haiti doesn't have a chance right now. He can't get a loan. We need to create better credit, better business climate.

Haiti needs lots of new goods and services, and the Haitian government and donors cannot meet those. There has to be a private sector thriving there.

We need to get a political piece there so that these many needed laws -- there's an anti-corruption law, land tenure laws, commercial code, the new criminal code -- all these very important laws have stalled. Haiti has really not been able to do anything
to make it easier to do business in Haiti. Haiti is open for business, but you wouldn't know it by the activities, because there are lots of things to be done there.

I will stop here. I would be glad to talk about emergency preparedness.

A lot has been done there. But the good news there is the Haitian emergency preparedness institutions have been greatly strengthened, and during the last few hurricanes, have performed very well. So that is a good sign.

So, let me stop here, and I think we look forward to your questions.

Thank you very much.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Tom.

Many of the comments that you and the other panelists made actually reflected very much what we heard from displaced persons and other community members in the course of the interviews that were conducted for this study. Many people told us, for example, that between a house and a job, they would always take a job. Because they feel that they can meet their housing needs in a range of ways, and it's a matter of providing the support for economic development -- which is, of course, no easy measure.

But one of the displaced persons that we talked to expressed it in this way. He said that displacement "turned the scar of my poverty into a wound, into an open wound," which I think captures this notion of the work that we have before us, in terms of trying to get that back onto a process of healing so that people can continue to meet their own needs, and rely on their own resilience.

So, we have about half an hour for questions. I'll collect up a few questions from the floor, and then turn it back to the panel.

So -- yes, there's a colleague who will come by with a microphone. If you could also introduce yourselves before you ask your question, that would be great.
MR. COHEN: Thank you. Marc Cohen, from Oxfam America.

And I have a question for the two Adamses --

MR. ADAMS: Adam and Adams.

MR. COHEN: Yes, well, in French it would be the same, right?

And Tom Adams, you mentioned -- and we also saw a picture from the report of Canaan-Jerusalem, or the promised land. So the question I have is --

MR. ADAMS: That wasn't a very good picture. And if you'd seen the other side --

MR. COHEN: I was just there a week ago, so I know what it looks like. And it's described by many people as -- so it's no longer a "camp" it's a "new slum," or a "nouvelle bidonville" in French.

So, if the two of you could talk about how to keep that from becoming the second Cité-Soleil, or Cité Eternelle, or Bel Air, or Jalousie -- and the site service seems to be part of that.

And then, Harry Adam, also it seems that the existing public housing agency, EPPLS, is not so involved in the discussion. And if you could talk bit about that - - because you do have, within the government, a public housing agency.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you.

At the back, on the left-hand side. My left.

MR. SCHWAB: My name is Ian Schwab. I work with an organization called American Jewish World Service. We also host a group called the Haiti Advocacy Working Group, or the HAWG, as some people like to refer to us.

My question was mostly for the authors of the study but, obviously, for any of the panelists.
I know that you had talked about a lot of the material needs of displaced versus non-displaced. And I was curious if you could talk a little bit if you had done any work on the political voice of the displaced. A lot of money, resources, development ideas, et cetera, obviously were moving into the country after the earthquake. And I was curious if you had had any discussions with them about their ability to have their voice heard in regard to setting the priorities for development, and how that worked out in the post-disaster.

Thank you.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you. We'll take one more question -- at the front.

MR. KRIMGOLD: I'm Fred Krimgold, from Virginia Tech.

I'm interested to know more about what specific investments are being made in disaster-risk reduction, particularly as related to land-use management and construction standards, inspection, and enforcement.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you. We'll turn it back to the panel.

Perhaps, Harry, we'll start with you.

MR. ADAM: Let me start, for the case of EPPLS, as a matter of fact, when the government just took place, and they made a brief evaluation of EPPLS, and they said that no way they would be about to bring an answer to that situation with the EPPLS as it is. So, they put in place the UCLBP, with the mandate to have a reflection about our policy, our housing policy -- but bring also an institutional solution to support that policy.

We're working with EPPLS. There's an evaluation that has been made by the World Bank. And probably, at the end, we will turn EPPLS into an agency, autonomous agency. But more autonomous, because now EPPLS is inside the Ministry
of Affairs Sociales, and it's too from the (inaudible) of decision. That's why we are in charge of the housing sector, so if there is a problem, I can go directly to the prime minister and decide what we're going to do. So EPPLS is part of what we're doing, but except that in the near future they will probably change it into a more powerful institution.

I mean, for Canaan, I don't know if you want to bring an answer. I could say that we are in charge of Canaan also, and we made a study, and we are now in the process of updating that study. We got small fund from USAID, and the government is putting some fund, too. We're going to start a pilot project.

Certainly, the first thing we're going to do is probably put in place the tram, le tram (inaudible), the road, the main road, and displace some people, because they build their houses in unsafe places -- and start working with the community itself. And I'm quite certain, in the next future, this part of Port-au-Prince will become a commune by itself. Because there's a lot of people living there, they've got their own problem.

And that's exactly what you were saying -- when we could every single unit, we realized there was more than $60 million spent. So there is a capacity. All they need is they need to be (inaudible) by the major, so to build safe houses. That's what I can say for now. I don't know if you can --

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you.

Tom, did you want to add to that?

MR. ADAMS: I'd just add one thing. I mean, you're very right, the fear is that it will become another bidonville. It hasn't yet, but it has that potential. I talked to a lady who moved there from Cité-Soleil. She was building a house. She was betting it would be better than Cité-Soleil. Whether that's realized or not, that remains to be seen.
But I think the Government of Haiti appealed to donor at the May CIAD meeting to help support it. Patrick and others did. And we responded with a few million dollars, 3 or 4 million. We're scrubbing our budget to see if we can move some more. They're looking for about $50 million to try to get ahead of the curve at Canaan-Jerusalem, and plan ahead. And it needs to be done.

There are other efforts we're doing in sort of the residual tent camps and cities. Some of them we're just converting into permanent housing with the residents. There's a CARIDO project that's doing that.

There are a lot of solutions. But, again, you know, donor money, which was flush -- one out of every two American families contributed money to Haiti after the earthquake -- there's still a well there that can be tapped. But the money's drying up. And so there need to be other solutions, and low cost.

There's still a pretty good backlog of donor money, though, available that I think will cushion the blow for three or four years. After that, there has to be foreign direct investment taxes, better revenue collection, to take on these really enormous financial burdens.

But the good news -- I mean, there's a lot of good news in Haiti. I don't want us to be pessimistic here. There's been good growth rates. If you go there, you know, you land at the airport, all the tents around there have gone. The rubble's removed. The prime minister's very proud. He told me he has weekly garbage collection meetings. And the city looks a lot cleaner, it really does. And that sends a message.

So, there is a lot of progress in Haiti. But the reality is, is if Haiti has pretty good economic growth -- and they've had it so far, 4 to 7 percent a year of real growth -- they'll be a middle-income country in about 25 years.
And that's the reality. There's a not a quick-fix in Haiti, because countries don't grow 25 percent a year, or whatnot.

Sorry, I went off, and a little long.

MS. ROSSI: No, if I can add on a positive not, again on Canaan, a finding from our study, especially from our qualitative research, report that the population is actually very involved. And this is another example of IDP crafting their own solutions. The population is very involved in making sure that Canaan doesn't become a second Cité-Soleil. And actually, what we found, in our quantitative study we found, unfortunately, that the level of trust apparently has decreased in all the area served, but from the qualitative research, actually, interviews in Cité-Soleil -- in Canaan, showed that the level of trust there, it's actually big. And these people are really working hard to make sure that that place gets its own organization, and it doesn't really leap into another bidonville.

So, of course, there's still support needed. This doesn't happen without money. But the willingness of the population and their own efforts, I think it's a positive, also, finding.

MS. BRADLEY: I think this also speaks to the question that was raised about political participation, which is something that we did look at in the study, but there wasn't time in the presentation to discuss it in detail.

According to the IASC framework that provided the basis for the study, political participation is a criteria for durable solutions, you know, in conflict situations. For example, it's very common that displaced persons will be prevented from being able to vote. That's a dynamic that we didn't really see coming out in the survey research. We see that displaced persons are as likely as anyone else to participate in formal politics.
But, as Lorenza stressed, we saw that they were perhaps more likely than others -- in some circumstances, particularly in the Canaan area -- to participate in political activities at a very local level, in terms of community organization.

The study also looked at elements around process for pursuing a durable solution, in the sense of the opportunity to participate in decision-making. And there were many different ways in which international and local actors in Haiti tried to open up those opportunities. But what we saw, particularly through interviews with people who actually participated in these processes as beneficiaries is that that process was very unsatisfactory. The notion that a solution should be voluntary, that you should have the capacity to make a decision, was -- you know, it existed perhaps on paper, and not much more for many people who are involved in this process. And that's something that I would refer you to the report for more details on.

Ambassador Swing, did you want to speak to the question on disaster risk, or any of the issues that were raised? Or Gaetano?

MR. SWING: I'm not, probably, the right one to do that. I can simply say that, obviously, this was a great preoccupation of the Haitian leadership, has been all along, that how is it possible that we should lose so many people, and you have an earthquake in San Francisco, and the numbers are fewer than a hundred, et cetera.

I mean, clearly, this is what I think every leader asks after such a disaster. And I think that it's a field now, I think, that's receiving greater attention globally. That's a good thing. Take Cuba, for example. Cuba has one of the best systems available, in terms of addressing the hurricanes, and so on, and clearly that's what -- that was the first think President Préval said to me after I went to Haiti after the earthquake, was that -- he raised this question, "How is it possible we should lose so many?" Well, it
has to do with the way buildings are constructed, and the lack of shelters, and lots of other things.

I know President Clinton, at the time was pushing the idea of some major, huge, huge shelters dispersed along the fault line where these earthquake occur. Simply to say, it's a work in progress, and more effort needs to be given to it.

MR. VIVO: Yes, if I can add to that, the emergency preparedness is definitely a key dimension. And I think the past 10 years in Haiti, in the government and the international community has focused a lot on that, on emergency preparedness and response.

Working on risk reduction, as you were saying, it's obviously an agenda which is much more complex -- in every country, not just in Haiti. And that's really where we see one of the key challenges is the linkages between different sectors. Because that's really where you have to share and integrate data on hazards, and into planning, into decision-making. And that's really, the critical challenge is for every country.

In the case of Haiti, I think the World Bank, together with other donors, what we focused on after the earthquake was like having a good baseline of the built environment. So, probably you will remember the first step was really trying to do a quick assessment of safety, structural safety of this building, and populate a very huge database of this building -- I think it's 400,000 buildings that were assessed, that were inspected and tagged. And this, interestingly, it was useful then for, like, for like the grants, for the rental grants, because this helped determine the eligibility of the units. And many other applications, also -- for removal of debris and others, this map, this consolidated database, geo-referenced database was very helpful. So this was in the beginning.
Then the focus shifted more, again, on long-term prevention. And definitely it was an important achievement I think, to help finish the national building code for Haiti, which was approved a year ago, a year-and-a-half ago. Although building codes are not -- I mean it's not the solution, it's not the only solution. It's not just by the fact of having a code that it means that, you know, it's implemented. That is known. There is lots of training that needs to be done on the code that involves, you know, the different -- from workers to contractors, sectors that need to have their own specifications, et cetera.

But definitely, having a code is a starting point. So now, even for all donors, and for Haitian construction projects, there is this reference that can be used.

Also, there was, on the side of the code, some products that were targeting the informal reconstruction. So, this guideline, simplified guidelines for construction of small buildings, typically the one-story buildings that are constructed without technical supervision. And the same thing for repairs of these houses.

So, really trying to, you know, collect this knowledge and make it available.

The challenge that I see -- and especially for areas, you know, that are developing very fast, like Canaan -- is to make sure that these guidelines, these tools are actually, are received where they are needed -- so, at the local level, at the ground level. So we really, I think we need to do more on that. I mean, I was in Canaan awhile ago, probably seven or eight months ago, but besides from local "antenna" office of the Ministry of Public Works, with the U.N., that was, you know, collecting this knowledge and providing support to people that were constructing with these guidelines, there was not much. And it's a huge -- we're talking about 100,000 people living in this area.
So, there's a need to bring this knowledge, these standards, to the people.

And then, obviously, there's need to give the ministries, the Ministry of Public Works especially, the capacity to oversee, to control, to go and assess the work and approve it. So these are big challenges.

Just to conclude on one important point is the hazard -- understanding what we, at the Bank, we have (inaudible) for understanding risk. It's something that has not been, on which there hasn't been enough emphasis so far. So, really trying to, from a scientific point of view, map the hazard and quantify it.

A lot of the risk assessment in Haiti is done based on participatory evaluation, or in community-driven approach, which is very important, and it's absolutely key to involve the community and to make them aware of the risk that they're living with, but it's sometimes not enough, not sufficient to build large infrastructure projects, or to really make decisions. So you need this scientific information.

And so we started doing it, with the LIDER coverage of, first, the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince that was affected, and now we are expanding to coverage of the country. So, the LIDER is very important, because it helps you then develop digital evaluation models, and understand better the hazards.

But there's lots of other things that need to be done, you know, understand better vulnerability -- integrating the results of the poverty assessment at the National Statistics Institute and the Census, into, you know, combining that with hazard information, and really draw some conclusions on new development.

So, there's lots of work that needs to be done. Again, I think there is will, and I think there is also funds for this. The challenge is really to look at these inter-
sectoral junctions, which are critical, how to share data on hazard, how to share the guidelines with different sectors, with health, with schools, the community.

So, this is critical that we make these connections.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you.

MR. ADAM: I --

MS. BRADLEY: Oh, sorry, you wanted to --

MR. ADAM: I just want to add something -- insist again, on the institutional reinforcement. You were talking about the Ministry of TPTC, which is public works. I think also we have to reinforce the mayor. Because the mayor is the administration who is closer to the people that are building, themselves.

So, if the mayor is not powerful enough to make the people respect those specifications and those guidelines, even if we have all the tools, we'll still be in that situation now. So I want to insist on that.

MR. ADAMS: Decentralization.

MR. ADAM: Decentralization, reinforce the mayor -- that's right.

MS. BRADLEY: Yes -- thank you.

MR. ADAMS: Let me quickly add one thing on the emergency preparedness. We, with DoD, our Department of Defense, and others have spent $34 million to build an emergency operations center in every province in Haiti. And there's a warehouse next to it. We've trained staff for that, and equipped them with everything from chainsaws to canoes, and other things. And that's just one of the things -- also helped build more fire stations.

Again, again, the Haitian emergency operations center and their people have really performed much better. So that part is okay.
The threat to Haiti and the Dominican Republic is still there, this fault line. Tension was relieved around Léogâne. It still exists on the rest -- and particular, I'm told by, you know, the seismic experts, further east into the DR. Now, the DR has better enforcement of building codes, and other things that, you know, give them some protection.

But it's still there. There have been a number of studies funded by the Haiti Reconstruction Fund, and others, north and south emergency preparedness, to kind of do obvious things on roads and rivers, and everything, to mitigate disasters. But there's still a lot more that needs to be done there.

But there has been considerable progress, and it's really due to the efforts of the Haitian government, primarily.

MR. SWING: Can I add just a footnote. There will be, as I think a lot of you know, a major global disaster risk reduction conference in Sendai, Japan, near the tsunami center in Japan, in the spring of 2015. And I certainly hope that Haiti will be well represented, in order to basically get your issue before a much larger audience, and maybe glean from that some further support.

MR. ADAM: Thank you. Okay.

MS. BRADLEY: We'll take a second round of questions.

Shelly.


I have two questions, so you can choose whether you want to answer either or neither.

One is on documentation. I'd really like to follow up on that. It came out in the report as an important issue. It has, obviously, very important implications for
Haitians, not just in terms of titles and deeds, but in terms of birth certificates. And it relates to issues of government capacity, decentralization, incredible amounts of funding requirements.

So if there's any update on where we stand in terms of the government's efforts to provide full documentation to some 2 million or so estimated people without birth certificates, that would be very important.

And it relates to the second question -- which perhaps, Ambassador Swing, you might be able to touch upon -- and that concerns the impact of the disaster on regional migration, to the DR and beyond, leading to situations, obviously, of poverty and statelessness, which is of concern to you.

Thank you very much.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you.

At the back, on the right-hand side.

MR. KATZ: Hi. My name is Jonathan Katz, I'm a journalist and an author. So I also have a quick two questions.

The first, for the panel in general -- I feel like there's been a growing acknowledgment, and in a lot of the comments that are made today, about the inherent fluidity in the living situations in Haiti's cities, in general, and in the (inaudible) in Port-au-Prince, in particular, that existed even before the earthquake -- that, essentially, the distinction between a lot of the informal settlements that were created after the earthquake, and the informal settlements that had always existed, places like Cité-Soleil, is basically academic. And there was sort of an arbitrary decision to decide what was a post-quake displacement camp, and what had just been a preexisting, or a future naturally occurring informal settlement. And I think IOM basically acknowledged this in late 2013, when, seemingly at random, Canaan, Jerusalem, Onaville were suddenly no
longer considered IDP camps, and, you know, whatever the number was, 100,000 people were suddenly taken off the rolls of displaced people because it was decided that these were just new informal settlements.

And so I'm wondering if, in light of that, in retrospect, the members of the panel think that there may have been too much emphasis placed artificially on this idea of IDP camps, post-quake displacement camps. And if you think that that focus may have negatively impacted the effectiveness of the reconstruction in the time after the earthquake?

And, Tom, I'd be remiss if I didn't ask -- you were talking about the importance of the construction of institutions, the rule of law, disaster mitigation. The cholera has been brought up a couple of times.

After three-and-a-half years of silence, the U.S. government has finally weighed in on the big issue of the cholera epidemic which, of course, as everybody in the room knows, the scientific evidence shows almost universally was brought to Haiti by United Nations peacekeepers in October of 2010.

The U.S. has finally weighed in, after all this silence, to say that the United Nations -- basically, that attempts to get compensation for the victims to build these institutions, to build sanitation systems to keep the epidemic in check are essentially moot at this point because the United Nations enjoys absolute immunity from all legal processes, unless it explicitly waives it itself, which, obviously, it's very unlikely to do. But that letter came from the Justice Department.

So I'm wondering, from a diplomatic standpoint, from State, how much harder this makes your job now, and how you see the situation being able to move forward in terms of emphasizing the rule of law and accountability, both on the part of officials and individuals in Haiti, and then, obviously, bad actors outside of Haiti,
including, in this particular case, the United Nations. And how you see being able to resolve that in the future.

MS. BRADLEY: Okay, thank you very much.

Unfortunately, time is very short, and these are some big questions, so I'm just going to turn it back over to the panel for some quick responses.

Ambassador Swing, we'll start with you.

MR. SWING: Good question on the -- I'll take the one on the impact on regional migration. It is significant, as you know. I think you're looking at it globally, if you take just not only Haiti.

There are things that can be done to give some immediate relief, in terms of regional migration after a natural or political disaster. I think far too little credit has been given in the public domain to the Arab states -- take Libya in March of 2011, Tunisia, Niger, Egypt, Algeria -- all of the surrounding countries kept their borders open to allow people to get out, to get to safety. Too little credit's been given to the tremendous impact that the Syrian disaster has had upon Jordan and Lebanon. They're suffering enormously, but they've kept their borders open. That deserves, I think, enormous international recognition. And I think the DR did a lot at the beginning to let people across, and also to try -- I know that President Fernández, at the time, came across, there was a lot of reconciliation going on there.

I think the U.S., with its temporary protective status for Haitians who were already here, or Haitians who wanted to go was important. A number of countries in Europe now are giving TPS to Syrians coming out of the country.

So, there are some things like that that can be done.

One thing that was not done that could be done, I had recommended at the time that banks and other institutions that are charging fairly large costs to transmit
remittances -- up to 9 to 15 percent -- that for one or two years, they charge nothing, zero, so that all the remittance money could go back to help Haitians. It wasn't done, but it's something that could be done for the future.

So it has a big impact, and there are a lot of very practical measures that we could take if we were willing to do so.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you.

Tom, a quick response?

MR. ADAMS: Yes, a couple quick responses.

On IDs, it's a long story. And talk to me afterwards, and I'll give you the blow-by-blow. There was a big push for the last election to get everybody IDS. 90 percent of Haitian adults have an ID after that election. The effort is to try to get the 10 percent, and the start doing children who don't have birth certificates. But a lot of twists and turns in that that I won't bore you with right now due to time limits.

On cholera, I would just say the United States -- you know, it wasn't a lack of empathy that let the Justice Department give its opinion. It's a treaty obligation that the U.N. has immunity. They asked does it have immunity, and we said under our treaty obligations with the establishment of the U.N., it doesn't. So the submission, that submission by Justice was based solely on a legal analysis of the issue of immunity.

Cholera is a problem in Haiti -- although the rates have come way, way down. There's been some success. More Haitians have access to clear water than before the earthquake, but sanitation has deteriorated. So there needs to be an effort to improve sanitation in Haiti, to drive it out, out of the system.

The other thing is, you know, cholera is not the largest killer in Haiti, by far. It's way down the list now. There are lots of other things.
So, I think as you're dealing with health issues in Haiti, you have to take a more holistic approach, and deal with all of them, and strengthen the health system there, which is what we're trying to do. And we're spending about $1.1 billion over five years to strengthen the Haitian health system. Half of all health dollars in Haiti comes from the U.S. The Haitian Ministry of Health is building its capacity.

And that's really the answer. I mean, people bring cholera into this country all the time. Many cases come in here. But we treat it routinely. We have water and sanitation systems. And that's where we need to get to on Haiti. The third pillar of that, the sanitation systems are the biggest need right now.

MS. BRADLEY: All right.

MR. ADAMS: Was there anything else? Oh, there was one other question I just wanted to comment on.

You're right on the Cité-Soleils of the world. We did one big project, and the World Bank's doing the other half of it at Ravine Pintade, where we took a slum area, basically, the traditional cinder block houses near the factories, and negotiated with the residents -- which took forever -- got some of them to agree to have a two-story house so we could move people and widen the roads, have space for schools, bring in water.

And you're right, you're exactly right, that is a very much of a continuing need, is not just to concentrate on the tent-camp dwellers, but the people who live in, really, slums already. There's more work that needs to be done there.

But it can be done, and there are some good examples of it. It's just, again, the resources to do it aren't there to do it entirely, in the entire country.

MS. BRADLEY: On the predominance of the camps, one of the issues that comes through very explicitly in the report is the importance of thinking early about durable solutions, and how a camp-based response can, in fact, undercut that in
important ways. I think that that's one of the main lessons that's been carried forward from Haiti -- although, of course, very difficult to implement in emergency contexts.

I'm afraid we haven't given these questions the attention and justice that they deserve, but time is short. In fact, it's now up.

So, I'm left just to thank the panelists very much for taking the time to join us today, and the audience for your questions. Hopefully, you can chat with the panelists afterwards if you have a moment.

Thank you very much, and have a great day.

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