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THE STATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

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MR. PICCONE: Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Ted Piccone; I'm the Acting Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Program here at Brookings Institution. Thanks for coming out in this interesting weather we're having today to talk about what is really a hot topic. We're here to talk about the state of the international order which is a chance for us to step back from the daily grind of the headlines and the breaking news and to look at things a little more holistically and pull together some of our top experts to think about what are the main areas of international order and cooperation and conflict in the 21st century. What is it for, why do we have this international order and what should we do to fix it, to improve upon it, to strengthen it. And most importantly what is the role of the United States.

Today we're launching a project on international order and strategy. This is a new project that pulls from the work we've been doing for many years under the theme of managing global order and managing global insecurity which has done a tremendous amount of work looking at issues of diagnosis of problems of international conflict and cooperation and the evolving international dynamics, the rise of emerging powers and the way various crises that have taken place of the last several years have affected the shape of the international order. This project on international order and strategy is really the centerpiece of our work on the broad contours of foreign policy in global order and I think you'll hear in the course of this afternoon what we mean and put some flesh on those concepts and most importantly what it means for Washington.

The main themes of the project as it's going forward will be focusing on as I said America's role in the world in this changing dynamics, engagement directly with emerging powers, the multilateral pivot, new approaches to the global commons, and fourth the future of intervention and stabilization.

I'm going to introduce our panelists, all scholars here at the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. And I'm going to start with Bruce Jones who is directing this project who I believe you have -- I hope -- their bios in front of you so I won't go into
their backgrounds, but Bruce in particular brings an important U.N., New York perspective to some of these questions which is particularly valuable when you think about international systems. So I will actually ask Bruce to start us off and talk a little bit about the U.S. role and particularly in the evolving order and what this project will be done.

MR. JONES: Thanks very much, Ted. And it's exciting to be here on stage today with this great team launching this three-tooled project. As Ted said the precursor called Managing Global Order really focused on the issue of trying to understand the drivers of the foreign policies of the major rising powers and what the implications were for the United States, for the international order and for the prospect for cooperation and for conflict. That work will continue and it's an important -- continues to be an important theme for U.S. foreign policy and for our research. But it seemed to us over the course of the last year or so that watching events around the world, continuing economic malaise in Europe and kind of ongoing chaos in parts of the Arab world, the rise of geopolitical tensions of Asia, that it was time for a broader cut, that there was more at play than just the question of the redistribution of power. And as we've seen in this town a deepening of the debate about the question of whether or not the United States should continue to play the role that it has played over so many years of defending the international system and empower projection and defense of key components of the international order. And so this project is designed to create a platform for debate within Brookings and beyond about those questions and how it is the United States can continue to play some of the roles that it's played in this new context or whether it should play those roles.

We do get this question, what is the international order? What is it supposed to do? People bandy the term international order about and one of the things we're trying to do is put some precision on that. What are the functions of order, what's it supposed to accomplish? And we publish a report called The State of the International Order which tries to answer some of those questions. And I'll give my take. And there'll
be differences on the panel on this. But it seems to me that classically there were three functions of an international order and in the contemporary period we have to go beyond that. The reducible and critical, essential purpose of international order is to manage stable relations between the great powers to avoid great power war. And in the contemporary period of rising tensions once again a critical topic. But it's fine to talk about or to put it in more positive terms to maintain great power peace. Its fine to state that objective but it masks a deep debate about strategy, about whether or not the maintenance of stable relations between great powers is best accomplished through a modern version of what used to be called peace through strength or through some version of iterated and institutionalized cooperation or through some blend of the two. And I think a major debate over the coming years is going to be to what extent does American force projection and power projection constitute a tool for maintaining stability or is it undermining cooperation or some of both, and how are we going to think about that problem. But the maintenance of stable great power relations is still the irreducible component of international order.

It's also traditionally understood to be about maintaining the systems that we have for international prosperity, free trading system, global finance system, global investment regimes, etcetera. And I think here it's not so much that there's a debate about whether that objective should continue. There's no real argument that we should continue to sustain systems for international trade, finance and prosperity, etcetera. But there are two issues that I think we have to come to terms with. One is an American issue. I think in the United States it's still not fully appreciated how much our economy is now integrated into global trade patterns. Somewhere between 25 percent and 30 percent of American GDP is dependent on global trade and that significantly underestimates the exposure of our economy to global financial patterns and the role of our companies in global market share. So in the United States we tend to think of the global economy as something out there. In fact it's closely integrated into the American economy now and we have to understand what the implications of that are. And I think
there's a political challenge sustaining the kind of momentum for reforms in some of the trade rules and finance rules that we started after the global financial crisis but the emphasis of which has dulled as the urgency of the immediacy of the global financial crisis has passed but risks remain.

Then there’s a third and a critical issue which has been the topic of fierce debate which is the traditionally understood in the American perception of the international order, one of its functions was to defend democracy and spread freedom. That's obviously not a matter of consensus internationally. It's not how the Russians think about international order; it's not how the Chinese think about international order. And there’s a huge debate in the United States or there has been about the extent to which we should be willing to use force as a tool for democracy promotion or democracy prevention. And it seems to me that we are going to have to continue to have that debate maybe in my mind recovering older concepts like tyranny; that there is a difference between using force to promote democracy on the one hand and using force to defend against tyranny on the other. And there’s a more selective concept of where we might be willing to use force and various forms of power. But that's going to be a topic I think for a sustained and fierce debate in the contemporary moment.

Those traditionally would have been the major themes. In my mind in the contemporary period we have to think about two more. If we were having this discussion 30 years ago we wouldn't have said that the international order was supposed to do things like help end civil wars and respond to humanitarian crises. But over the past 25 years we've done an awful lot of that and despite a current mood of skepticism when you look at this empirically the international response to civil war in a country in crisis has warped into roughly half of the times it’s been tried and the number of wars in the world has declined substantially, except recently in the Middle East. And so there's a real question mark about whether or not we're going to be able to sustain that effort of responding to a country in crises, of engaging in the management of civil wars and sort of tamping down or reducing threats to human security or whether that will be eroded under
conditions of new greater power tensions. And to me it would be a historic shame if it were allowed to erode under the new circumstances.

And then finally it seems to me to look at where we are now and where we're headed, you can't have a serious discussion about the redistribution of power, about the rise of new powers, about the stable international order without dealing centrally with the question of energy and climate. And if you look at the role that energy growth plays and the trajectories of the rising powers it's a huge strategic issue for them. The need -- not just demand but need for rapidly rising energy growth in China and India and places beyond and the tension between that and the growing pressures to deal with and to (inaudible) climate change in some fashion. And I think we have to grapple with the reality that that is not a technical question or an economic question or a science question, it's a strategic question that in the trajectories of the rising powers it's a central part of their strategy and that we're going to have to come to terms with this tension between on the one hand their energy needs, our new energy role and this challenging question of climate change.

So those are just some of the topics that we'll have to debate and that are going to be central we think to American strategy in the coming period. And this team and others around Brookings will be trying to get into the strategic questions around the balance of approaches here that the United States is going to have to come to terms with.

MR. PICCONE: Thanks, Bruce. I mean you have kind of given us the big picture and some of the highlights of these issues. Now let's try to focus it a little bit on the United States in particular. I want to turn to Bob Kagan in particular. You've argued for robust U.S. leadership in the world. Can you help us make the case for U.S. engagement in this evolving, shifting landscape?

MR. KAGAN: I'll do my best. I mean let me start by just adding, you know, a couple of thoughts about world order in general. One is to say -- and this is relevant to this question -- is that world orders are ephemeral, they are not permanent.
There have been numerous different kinds of order throughout history, you know. There was a Roman order, there was an Egyptian order, there was a European order for two centuries and usually the orders are both created by and reflect the powers that have the capacity to influence the international system. The one -- you know, every international order reflects in a way a kind of distribution of power in whatever system you're talking about. And I think that we sometimes fall into a sort of complacent trap into believing that every aspect of the international order that we currently enjoy -- there's much that we don't enjoy -- but basic elements of how the international economy works, how the international security order works in a sort of sense that this is sort of permanent now and it sort of doesn't matter what happens in terms of the flux of the relations among the powers. For instance if you look at Fareed Zakaria's famous book, *The Post American World*, well if you read that book it's pretty clear that the post American world looks a lot like the American world, I mean only America has declined in power but the order is the same. I actually don't think that that's true. I think that this order was very clearly created not exclusively by but dependent -- was dependent on American power from the very beginning. What we saw in the 1920, '30s and then with World War II was the collapse of the European world order with nothing taking its place. The United States might have picked up the challenge in the 1920s if Americans has chosen to but they deliberately chose not to. After World War II the American people and their leaders beginning with Roosevelt and then Truman actively set about creating an international order that could be stable that would have the characteristics that Bruce talked about. And at that center of that order was American power. So the first thing to be said is it seems to me unmistakably true that were American power in fact declined or Americans to go -- sort of choose not to use their power and influence to uphold this world order we will get a different world order. Or more likely before we get to a different world order we'll go through a period of disorder which is what happened after the European order fell after the British dominated the world and the European balance failed. So that seems to me something we ought to try to avoid because disorder will be a lot uglier than we imagine it
to be. And a lot of our again complacent sense that great powers will never go to war against each other ever again or that democracy is here to stay or that liberal capitalism has simply triumphed, all this Frank Fukuyama *End of History* stuff I think is a myth. And we can go back -- democracy is in fact historically a rare flower. It's only been dominant in the world, you know, for 30 or 40 years in the whole sweep of human history. So we now imagine that it's going to be with us forever, that strikes me as odd.

So the American role continues to be central. The big question of course is whether Americans can or want to continue to play this role. The big debate has been about can. I think that debate has been mistaken. I think that American capacities were never infinite, it was always difficult, we lost more often than we won in some -- in many cases, but I don't think that American capacities are really less than they've been before. And I also don't buy the argument that somehow things have happened out there in the world which have made it harder to exert influence. I think that the challenge that the United States faced during the cold war when the Soviet Union occupied half of Europe was a more difficult challenge than the one that we face for instance with a rising China which I think is a much more manageable kind of challenge. The multi polarity at the level below the United States is actually an opportunity for the United States; it's not a problem of diffused power that is pulled away from the United States. I'm sure others on this panel, Jeremy maybe, will argue with that. That's my view. To me the real question is one of will. And I think here we are facing -- I'll call it a crisis of memory, a crisis of understanding. The American people prior to World War II never wanted to make -- they weren't isolationists, that's a myth, but they never wanted to make permanent and extended commitments around the world to maintaining world order. The great lesson that everyone learned as a result of the '30s, was that the United States sort of had to play that role and Americans I think internalized this and we sort of were living off this strategic lesson of World War II for decades afterwards. But I think naturally, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union the lesson has been gradually forgotten. People have -- we have debates about why we should care about Syria. I think your average American
wonders why we should care about East Asia perhaps, or why we should care what happens needless to say to a bunch of rocks in the South China Sea or why we have allies or why we have a Navy. It's been a long time since anyone has ever sort of explained why any of this world order preservation is necessary. And so I think we now have a gap between what we've been doing and what the American people understand insofar as why we've been doing it. But I think in a way for me the challenge is not to get America's act together in the sort of Richard Haas fashion, I think we are in fact sort of getting our act together. We have a bounty of energy supplies that no one was anticipating. The real challenge is more of an intellectual one and remembering why it was important for the United States to play this role.

MR. PICCONE: That's great. I think that will give us some good room for debate as the discussion goes on. Let me turn to Tom Wright, to my right here who will give us a sense of what's in the report actually that gives us a snapshot of current trends in the world and the state of the international order.

MR. WRIGHT: Thanks, Ted. Yeah, in the report we try to identify different characteristics of the international order today. We didn't want to focus on a sort of megatrend or long term trends that the National Intelligence Council or others look at like population growth or the growth of the middle classes around the world. We wanted to really look at how the institutions and architecture of the order is performing right now. So what it's been like really on two anniversaries. The first is five years since the financial crisis in 2008 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers. And the second of course is over -- just over a decade since the invasion of Iraq. So one very major shock on the economic side and one major event on the security side. And that comes out of the idea that the international order really since the late 1940s has had two components, it's had an economic component, there's an international economic order underpinned by the United States and its allies, and a security order that's underpinned by the United States and its alliances. And so what -- how has that really been functioning in the five years and in the decade since those two events.
And I won’t run through all of the different characteristics; we have 11, they’re in the report. The report should be available so hopefully most people will have it and it’s also on our website. But I did want to identify a couple in those categories of the economic and the security. And on the economic side we try to look at, you know the response to the financial crisis but also how the different sort of components of the global economy have reacted and are performing. And here I think it's important to draw a distinction between the institutions and the architecture of the international economic order and some of the other sort of fundamentals of the economic order that are outside of the institutions. And what I mean by that is, you know, we -- on the institutional side we have the G20, the IMF, the World Bank, other sort of informal configurations of states and cooperation. And they've actually responded pretty well to the financial crisis. In the report we cite Daniel Drezner who has a book coming out, *Good Enough Global Governance*, which says that, you know, really the question is how is the economic order compared to what, what part is it relative to? And relative to the great depression it's actually performed pretty well.

So that's all well and good but on the other side you have some fundamentals so -- what Raghuram Rajan of the Indian Central Bank calls sort of fault lines in the global economy that are quite separate from institutions. You know these are the financial imbalances, these are the financial instruments on Wall Street and elsewhere that could have a destructive power and there's a failure of demand, you know, the Euro crisis, other things that aren't really institutionally based. And so where we come out is that the architecture, the institutions, the organizations responded pretty well to 2008 but many of those fault lines still remain and we actually haven't fixed those fundamental problems in the global economy. So we're doing as well as could be expected but there's still a lot of fragility there. So we don't know if in five years or ten years there'll be another financial crisis either as bad as the one in '08 or more like the one in 1997 in East Asia or maybe there's one in emerging markets this year. So those fragilities are still very much there.
Looking to the different sort of countries and blocks to make up the global economy no one's really doing all that well. In fact the United States is probably doing better than anyone else even though there's lots of problems here in the U.S. economy as well. The Euro Zone is still stuck. It may have come out of existential phase of its crisis and the Euro's still tact but there's a massive lack of demand in the European economy, there's no real prospect of a proper financial and fiscal union to go alongside monetary union. There's no real prospect of a fiscal stimulus throughout the Euro Zone. So there's a real question about whether or not Europe is facing a lost decade or a prolonged period of economic stagnation or if it can come out of that. We sort of trend on the side that Europe -- the -- still very much has something to prove and that it can generate a robust recovery in the years ahead.

On the BRICS this really has been one of sort of big worrisome stories at the moment, the trouble in emerging markets to varying degrees in each individual country, but the period of long growth that they've had, rapidly rising power seems to be at an end and there is -- some of them continue to do well but they all have sort of very deep vulnerabilities and fragilities that could destabilize the global economy s a whole and most certainly pose problems to them. So that's sort of the economic side.

On the security side there is a lot of different sort of things going on. I sort of want to mention two at the outset. The first primarily in East Asia but also more generally throughout the world is really the return of geopolitical competition. And what we mean by that is security competition or positional competition between major states. We haven't seen this really since the cold war ended. For 20 years the working assumption in U.S. grand strategy has been that major powers basically share the same type of interests. And, you know, that may be because the gap between the United States and everyone else is too large so they didn't even try although they would want to try but it wasn't worth their while. Or it may be because they saw their interests aligned and wanted to join the international order. Some of that is still true but in specific regional theaters we're seeing the return of traditional competition. So in East Asia, China is
pursuing a very clever sort of strategy of not outright aggression that would cross the threshold of what we normally recognize as aggression or assertiveness but more of a subtle policy of assertiveness, particularly on the maritime side to try to -- I heard one senior Chinese policy maker describe it, rebalance the status quo. And he said that we will rebalance of our own is to rebalance the status quo in East Asia. So you see that sort of thing and then the reaction on the other side and the nationalism so that generates. In the Middle East we also see the rise of geopolitical competition but for a very different reason. The creation of a massive vacuum and because of the collapse or seeming unraveling of the regional order there which leads to countries trying to hedge against the future. They don't quite know what's going to happen. And then in Europe of course we're seeing events unfold in Ukraine I think to a lesser extent, much lesser extent than in East Asia but still that geopolitical element.

And the second and final sort of point in security side for the moment anyway is on the Middle East which we will talk about at some length and really there because of the unraveling of the order we are seeing huge uncertainty about the future, uncertainty about the U.S. role as well. We often talk about the big debate about U.S. grand strategy or (inaudible) versus engagement. I think that is less true generally or globally but it is true in the case of the Middle East where because of energy developments and because of the developments there there is a -- and because of the potential breakthrough in Iran there's a question mark over some of the fundamental underpinnings of U.S. strategy and that creates uncertainty. But overall what we find I think is that the state of the international order is mixed. There's very positive elements, there's very -- there's elements that give rise for concern. Just to give one sort of final example on the human security side we find that actually there's a massive reduction in civil war and massive reduction in human suffering throughout the world with the exception recently of the Middle East. So that's a pretty big, you know, exception but it does sort of underscore the progress that's been made in Africa and elsewhere compared to some of the catastrophic events of the 1990s. So we, you know, we need to
sort of disaggregate that by region and also by different area because it is a nuance picture.

MR. PICCONE: Great. Thanks, Tom. And the report is full of interesting graphics and statistics that I think we could, you know, spend hours talking about. But I want to come back to the question of the role of the United States again and think a little bit about the downsides and the limits of U.S. power in the current environment, particularly budgetary and other constraints including frankly presidential leadership. Jeremy Shapiro is a Fellow here with our Center in U.S. and Europe and with this project and has spent a couple of years at the State Department working on some of these issues. Can you give us your view on that?

MR. SHAPIRO: Sure. I guess I'm here for the limits. (Laughter) Questionable role but I'll take it on. I think, you know, there is a fairly broad consensus certainly on this stage and I think really in American -- across the American political spectrum that the United States really does, you know, need to engage in the world, that is needs -- has a unique role to play in the world and that it does, as Bob said, play a really important role in structuring world order. But I guess I do believe that we really do have a capability as questioned, that we don't really examine carefully enough. And I don't -- I can partially agree with Bob that I don't think that this is new. We've always had these capabilities questions but I think that they are more starkly opposed today in part because of our recent history but also in part because of changes in the world. It's clear to me I think that the U.S. capacity to structure the world has declined I think in recent years. And this is not principally about U.S. decline, it's much more about the rise of others which is after all a big part of the intention of the U.S. world order and in that sense it's been successful. But it's also diminished our capacity. It just sort of stands to reason if we have less power being a relative concept, if we have less resources relative to others we will have less capacity to structure the world. It's also I think a little bit about decline of U.S. allies as Tom likes to point out. Even if the U.S. is doing quite well I think a lot of U.S. allies -- core U.S. allies are having a great deal of trouble in the world. And I
think thirdly it’s about something that various scholars have emphasized about the sort of rise of political consciousness within the world that we see in popular movements across the world making it a lot harder to sort of deploy state power in deals to create stability in specific regions. So I think the -- we really do need to look a lot more carefully at the capabilities question when we think about U.S. strategy. I think it’s -- this is always basically a little bit stunted in U.S. debate. It’s kind of difficult for U.S. politicians to admit that the U.S. can’t do something. You know in most other countries there’s that sort of broad recognition that the world and in even one’s nation is essentially buffeted by outside sources that you can’t fully control which national leaders simply can’t control. But for the U.S. this is somewhat of a difficult pill to swallow and U.S. presidents don’t like to get up and admit the limits of U.S. power and so they offer other reasons. And you -- and to the extent that people do this the sort of mantra is always, you know, we put a man on the moon we can do anything. I have to tell you honestly sometimes I wish we hadn’t put this guy on the moon (laughter) because it’s become kind of a tough standard and it’s a little bit odd but it turns out that it’s actually easier to strap a guy to a missile and to send him precisely into space than it is to deal with human politics on the earth. I think regardless there is -- regardless of the moon shot -- there is a common view that -- and I think Bob expressed it -- that U.S. abilities always come down to political will and presidential leadership rather than any physical leaders. It’s simply a question of guiding an inward oriented public to understand the real nature of the problem and releasing U.S. capabilities from their domestic political constraints. I think of this notion as the -- well, I call it the can do threat to the American empire. When we look back at how empires have often failed it’s more often in my view because they failed to recognize the limits of their power and overextend rather than that they failed to defend their interests with sufficient aggression. Of course there are examples of both kinds, both failures in history but certainly I would argue the U.S. problem in recent decades in contrast to the 1920s has not been excessive passivity; it has been excessive ambition and excessive activism. And in my view it has not enhanced American credibility to maintain world order or
American power in recent years to take on tasks that we cannot complete, to spend trillions of dollars, thousands of lives and scarce political and diplomatic capital on efforts that we're not capable of fulfilling and which are not necessary for our core interests.

But of course I think it's also very clear that the U.S. still has enormous and unique power to shape the world. So the key issue in my mind becomes selectivity. What do we have to do, what can we do and what can we get others to do. The implication to me of having less relative power is do we have to work out a way to do less and to get others to do more. But of course first we have to accept that fact and I don't think we have. And interestingly accepting it has become I think harder in recent years because of the increasing globalization and increasing interconnections of the world and of course the media exposure of it all. There is now a valid and logical argument about why essentially any global event is connected to U.S. security. We have frankly a broadly accepted doctrine that says that lack of governance, that security vacuums anywhere in the world threatens U.S. security. I recently heard a senior American military officer assert that this feature of modern life meant that we need to do everything. That we need -- and what he meant by that is that we need to be involved and active on every local security problem in the world from the Central African Republic to Venezuela to Thailand. But obviously this is a recipe for overextension and decline. So to me a proper understanding of the limits of our power would imply that we urgently need a capacity for selectivity that takes a realistic account of our capability, that separates the truly necessary from the merely desirable even as it recognizes that everything is connected to everything else and on a certain level there is a security threat to the United States from these local conflicts. But a certain level of threat needs to be accepted if we're not to overextend ourselves. And that a lot of problems will need to be managed rather than solved. It seems to me that this is the debate that we should be having and I think it's the debate that we're going to try to engage in here in the new project on international order and strategy.

MR. PICCONE: Great. Thanks, Jeremy. I just want to kind of pivot off
of some of the points that have been made and return to a point that Bruce made on what I would call the international democracy and human rights order. When you think about international order the word order is all about some kind of boundaries, some kind of norms that the majority of states adhere to both in rhetorically but also in practice. And I think over the years particularly after World War II an enormous amount of effort has been put in the international system toward creating that order based on a set of norms. And in particular I would point out in the human rights field we have a bevy of not just treaties but other kind of guiding principles and values and normative frameworks that have been developed and that states have bought into across everything from disability rights to indigenous rights to freedom of association, and the list goes on and on and the list continues to grow. The real challenge is living past -- going past this bedrock of norms into questions of implementation. And that's where we see such disparate performance around the world. So in one way it's a good new story, that there's been so much buy in into the international human rights system and I would point out in particular the activity that the Human Rights Council since it was created five years ago in Geneva shows the extent of buy in. When you have 100 percent participation in the universal periodic review process, a peer review system on very sensitive issues of human rights it says something about the order and its health. But there's huge gaps in implementation.

Now I throw in democracy into this construct with some hesitation because there is no international treaty or consensus on democracy as a right of individuals. It's a form of governance that's built on a bedrock of those fundamental human rights that are accepted, but there is a real division around the world about how you actually exercise power in democratic ways. And I think increasing elasticity of the definition being applied by authoritarian states claiming to be democrats and completely twisting the term and what that means in practice. And I think here the United State has a particularly important role to play with its other democratic allies north and south in explaining what we actually mean by democracy. Over the years that's been really the United States and the European Union that have driven that agenda and the Europeans
in particular as a community of democratic states have led the way in demonstrating what it means to buy into a system that's based on human rights and the rule of law.

We've also seen in the last several decades a tremendous growth in democracies that haven't quite consolidated. They are rising -- a number of them -- as powers on the international scene both economically and in other terms. But they've not yet adopted this transatlantic idea that democracy promotion is critical to notions of security, of national security. I was listening to Susan Rice over the weekend on TV talking about Ukraine and other cases and she powerfully made the case yet again that we've heard for administration after administration, republicans and democrats, that enlargement of democracy in the world is in U.S. national security interests. It may not happen overnight and they're short term turbulences but in the long run that's what's good for the United States' standing and security in the world. This is going to remain a heavily contested area of international relations and I think here the United States has a particular burden to lead by example. And some of the I think most important events of just the last year thinking specifically about the Snowden revelations brings it back to the burden that the United States has in trying to lead by example and failing to do so. And I think that's having a blowback on our very values that we care about, everything from internet freedom and privacy and other areas of national security. The way the Brazilians have reacted to this have definitely damaged our relations with this important rising power and it's constraining those countries from joining us in a more global consensus not just a transatlantic consensus in favor of democracy and human rights.

So, Bruce, turning back to you, you connected use of force with democracy promotion. I want you to, you know, come back to that and say a little bit more. How would you actually try to apply that? We have a number of cases currently in front of us, namely in particular Syria that are crying out for some kind of intervention. How would you apply it in that case?

MR. JONES: I think it goes to the issue that Jeremy raised about selectivity. You know we went through a period of time in the 2000s where there was an
assumption that you could promote democracy through the use of force even in places that didn't have institutions and a middle class, etcetera, and I think it's kind of clear that that's a failed experiment, right, that you can't actually instill democracy in Afghanistan by force, you can't instill democracy in Afghanistan in a four year window. These things are not going to succeed and there's not history that suggests that. I think that what happened in that debate was we kind of conflated the question of building democracy, promoting democracy on the one hand versus defense of democracy which is a different thing. You know to be willing to use various forms of American power to respond to the situation in the Ukraine for example I think is a very different thing than the question of trying to instill democracy in Afghanistan. And when you get to the selectivity issue it's -- you know Syria is one of these ones that sits right on the balance it seems to me because it's -- Syria is not a country with deep institutions, it does have a middle class but it does not have the deep institutions that are going to be necessary if we went in and took out the Assad regime. We would not be faced -- it is a situation of stability and not an easy transition to democracy. But in my mind is where I think we -- or at least I would want to come back to an older notion that it's not about using force to promote democracy, in some cases we're using force to defend democracy. That's a very different thing. And in some cases we're using force to meet tyranny. And in my mind the Syrian regime is a tyrannical regime and that we should have been willing to contemplate a variety of forms of power early on to check the hostilities of the Syrian regime to its own population. Three years in the situation is very different. But in the earlier phase I would have been in favor of using more American power to galvanize a broader response. I think the other thing that gets lost in this debate sometimes and others have mentioned it is that I think it's rarely going to be the case when we're using force that we have to be doing that by ourselves. It's very frequently the case that our willingness to use force is part of what turns on the spigot of other people's willingness to do so. And I think one of the challenges for selectivity is what we experience with allies and with others is that the kind of question of getting other people to help or getting other
people to do things. It very rarely is the case that other people are willing to do things where we’re not. It’s much more frequently the case that people are willing to join forces with us to some degree if we’re prepared to act. And so I think what we have to in essence rediscover is the tactics and the techniques of multinational action of a variety of types where we use such power as is necessary to get others to do things. I was one who for example thought that the criticism of the administration’s policy in Libya, the notion that we were leading from behind was foolish. We had the African Union supporting, we had the United Nations supporting, we had allies participating, we had a whole host of capabilities that were not our own. We provided essential through mission critical assets to allow that operation to occur. The fact that lots of other people wanted to participate and we could enable that seemed to be a perfectly good outcome. There was no -- didn’t -- critical. Where I was very critical of the administration was then in not leading the effort to mount a stabilization effort after the deposing of the Gaddafi regime. And it seems to me that this -- we’ve lost confidence in the ability of stabilization to function. That’s a historical judgment. It has functioned in many cases but we’ve lost confidence in it. And when we use force to depose a regime but don’t put in a credible mechanism or stabilization afterwards we end up in the kind of situation we’re in in Libya now. So we have to rediscover I think some of the limits of this but also the fact that it can work under some circumstances and we have to -- so that selectivity that Jeremy talked about can be historically informed. There are times and circumstances in which this can work better than others.

MR. PICCONE: So can I get back to you, Bob, because Jeremy I think focused on some of the limitations on U.S. leadership and I -- he talked about political will and where the American public is but, you know, we also see Secretary Hagel coming out with a new plan for the Pentagon that really downsizes -- maybe right sizes our footprint around the world. Are you concerned that that's going to further erode our capabilities and make it more difficult for us to intervene in cases that really call for -- cry out for engagement?
MR. KAGAN: Totally. I think that, you know, no one in the United States either likes to acknowledge this or even perhaps understand it but the bedrock of the order, unpleasant as this may be for people is ultimately military capacity. What the United States primarily did after World War II was take two major regions of the world that had been engulfed in an endless cycle of war, one in Europe and one in East Asia and effectively put a cork in both those conflicts using those cycles, using its own -- in fact literally by deploying troops on a permanent basis in both regions. Those countries had gone to war over and over and over again and then the cycle ended. And the cycle ended because of a lot of things but primarily because of U.S. military power being projected into those regions on a sustained basis. If we lose that capacity I -- it's very clear in East Asia, less so in Europe, I think Europe has I hope moved into a different phase but any stage it has certainly not moved into a different phase and that the cycle of conflict that we saw before the United States entered to play this role is very ripe for resumption. So I do think that that's a big problem.

And I also want to say there is no law of physics that is requiring us to cut our defense budget. It's a political choice. There are -- it is not as anyone who knows anything about our budget problems knows the defense budget is not the leading driver by any stretch of the imagination of our fiscal crisis. It -- the fiscal crisis is being driven by other aspects of our spending patterns and we have just made a choice. And the choice is not driven by fiscal constraints, it's driven by a judgment and the judgment is that this is what is the least important is maintaining this defense capabilities. We've made a judgment that we don't want to play this role. In fact these budget cuts are pursuant to a 2012 national security strategy which says we're not going to be in the business of sustained deployment of troops anymore because we didn't like the experience of the last two wars that we did that. Now the interesting thing about that is that if you look over the past -- by the way interventionism did not actually begin in the 2000s. After 1989 three successive administrations engaged in repeated interventions on an average of once about every two years beginning with the George H.W. Bush
administration, continuing with Clinton, and continuing with the George W. Bush administration. But in this cycle we've gone through this sort of recurrent cycle where you will use a large ground force that has all kinds of unpleasant and expensive elements and the next president says we're not doing that anymore, we're just going to strike from the air. And that's what the Clinton administration -- there was an air -- there was -- and it was use of force through the air, missile strikes, the cruise missile was the great -- was the drone of its day. And then what happens is unfortunately we discover that a lot of problems can't be solved just from the air and then we turned back to using ground forces again. Well, right now we're in the phase of not being happy with the use of ground forces and we want to do everything from the air. You know, if Syria for instance devolves into a situation where Jihadist groups like Al Qaeda are able to establish a major territorial presence as a result of the chaos I predict drone strikes are not going to solve the problem. And the next president is going to be looking -- staring down the barrel of whether we actually have to physically remove them as we did in Afghanistan. So I just want to say, you know, we're not on a straight line projection here, we're on a kind of a wave cycle. Now the only danger is that if we really literally do not have the capacity anymore then we will learn to live with an Al Qaeda base in Syria.

So can I just say one other thing?

MR. PICCONE: Yeah, sure.

MR. KAGAN: Or two or three other things too? (Laughter) But, you know --

MR. PICCONE: Two, two.

MR. KAGAN: -- because the wonderful thing about this organization we've got here is we don't all agree.

SPEAKER: That's always a bad sign when he says that. (Laughter)

MR. KAGAN: I want to say -- well, you know we don't agree. But I also want to say as far as I can think, and I've studied American history as carefully as I think I can, I cannot think of a single case when we have used force for the primary purpose of
installing democracy anywhere. That was not why we went into Iraq that is not why we went into Afghanistan that is not why we went into World War II.

SPEAKER: It's just what we said we did.

SPEAKER: Just what we said we were doing.

MR. KAGAN: No. Only ex post facto.

SPEAKER: There's a gap there between rhetoric and action.

MR. KAGAN: Ex post facto, ex post facto.

SPEAKER: No, at the time, absolutely at the time.

MR. KAGAN: No. But it became the big justification after we didn't find the weapons of mass destruction. That was not a war to promote democracy, I'm sorry. And, you know, what happens of course is that being Americans we think the only legitimate government that we can leave behind is a democracy. And you could argue by the way that there was no way of establishing a Shia tyranny in Iraq that we could have been comfortable with. But in any case let's just keep that in mind.

Now, final points. Because Jeremy raises the key issues and I just think its worth engaging them a little bit which is for one thing you talked about looking out for our core interests. The very nature of interests is what gets complex when you start talking about world order maintenance. Traditional national interests are defense of the homeland, defense of individuals maybe traveling overseas and defense of sort of your economic, your prosperity. The United States has not had a set of traditional interests like that since World War II. After World War II Americans redefined their interests and made them global interests. So it wasn't simply a case of well if the Greeks fall is that going to lead to an attack on the United States. No. If South Viet Nam falls is that going to lead to an attack on the United States? It was a world order challenge and it -- precisely now if we're going to go back to saying is what happens in Syria going to lead to a strike on the United States -- by the way it's more plausible now than it would have been 40 years ago, but setting that aside, then yes we have moved away from world order management to a more traditional understanding of national interest. That's point
one.

Point two; we have been overstretched since the Second World War
Under Eisenhower we had a million troops deployed overseas with a -- from a population
that was half the size of what it is now. Today we have 200,000 troops deployed
overseas. Are we comparatively overstretched compared to the Eisenhower period?
The means ends gap was identified by Walter Lippmann in 1948 or '49.

SPEAKER: Again it's relative to other countries is the issue.
MR. KAGAN: Well, but --
SPEAKER: It's not -- you can't simply compare the United States across
time. You have to look about --
MR. KAGAN: I know but --
SPEAKER: -- the gap -- what the state of the world is.
MR. KAGAN: The gap between us and Soviets was less than the gap
between us and everybody else now. But in any case the second thing to (inaudible) is
our whole -- you could look at our whole foreign policy on the cold war, it was one
disaster after another. It was Korea, it was Viet Nam, it was the Iran Hostage Crisis, it
was this and that. And the paradox is is that for all this leaning forward, for all this being
overstretched, for all us getting involved in all these things, this was the period when the
world order became better and better and better. And that is to me the paradox. It may
be necessary to sustain this world order to engage in these highly unsatisfactory
activities. I'm not sure that that's true but it could be that that's true.

MR. SHAPIRO: That would be a shame.
MR. KAGAN: Well, it would be life.
MR. SHAPIRO: Yeah. Look, Bob, I mean it's slightly confusing to me
that because we have had a series of disasters in the past that we should prescribe as a
foreign policy doctrine a series of disasters going forward. (Laughter) I think that we had
in the cold war and we have now a very strong cushion of security which is, you know,
broadly speaking a huge advantage but it does mean that we can make a lot of mistakes
and not really have anything threaten us at our core. And so to me I still think that there is a wisdom in not making these mistakes and in doing only what we need to do. And when I look back at the Viet Nam War it's hard for me to sort of see the silver lining in what that did for world order. I think that that was a setback for world order. I think we weathered it and we could probably weather a few more mistakes in the future but I'd prefer not to make them.

When I look at the question of world order, when I think about what U.S. maintenance of world order means -- and I do absolutely accept as I think everybody here does, that U.S. has a special role to play in that and that we need to devote some resources to that. But I do think that there are some -- in the new power distribution of the world we have to ask ourselves very carefully what we really can get out of the world order. And if it's -- I think it's the case that currently a lot of the world sees what we talk about as world order as an effort to spread U.S. interests and to spread U.S. ideas and ideologies. And in that case I think that if we present a world order like that, if we present a world order which is full of democratic values and we present a world order which is threatening to other countries' sovereignties and which has this very strong component of intervening in internal affairs that world -- maintenance of that world order will be much, much more expensive. Now you talked about what the United States -- that the military component of world order is an essential feature of what America brought to it and I absolutely agree and I think that we have had a role since 1945 in providing the foundation of world order.

It seems to me to do at core the two things that Bruce put forward in his first two categories which is maintaining essentially great power peace or regionally peace between the regional powers by using the military role you talked about and maintaining open commerce. Essentially lines of communications, command of the global commons. And that's a super important military task and I would agree that if we lost the military capability to do that the world order would be at threat and that wouldn't be worth doing. But I think very often we conflate that with a lot of the other capabilities.
that we've created which aren't fully necessary to those tasks. And when I look at the
military budget and I see what -- when I see what they're cutting -- and by the way this
isn't precisely a cut, it's going back to pre war on terror levels. But nonetheless it is a
reduction in capabilities. It's principally a reduction in ground capabilities which I think we
have an excessive amount for those tasks and we can probably afford. I would also
agree that we have had these cycles of assuming we can do these things on the cheap
and getting ourselves into trouble, assuming that we can use air power which as Eliot
Cohen said a long time ago is sort of the kin to the modern idea of courtship that you can
have fulfillment without commitment. (Laughter) And we've often gone down that path. I
think it's almost always been mistaken and so we've often ended up where you said in
having to use ground forces. But why have we had to do that? We've had to do that
because we committed American credibility, American prestige and probably most
importantly American domestic political fortunes of specific American leaders to these
operations. And therefore we felt like they needed to be finished and wrapped up and the
only way that we could not wrap them up is to change presidents. And so I think that
hopefully there has been some learning on this. And yes I would agree that if we
succumb to the notion that air power could solve these problems and we would be back
in that cycle, but hopefully we've learned that air power actually just leads to the ground
force commitment and so we would need to think about whether we're willing to do that
before we even start.

MR. PICCONE: So we've had a good discussion here about particularly
the military aspects of these questions but I want to come back to Tom whether on these
points or give us a sense of where you think some of the bright spots are going forward in
terms that avoid some of the disaster scenarios we may have experienced in the past
based on the research you've done.

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah. I'd like to come in as well on the debate between
Bob and Jeremy too because I think, you know, no one would disagree, you know, with
Jeremy on the principle that there are limits to American power. I mean clearly there are
limits to anyone's power. I think the concern comes out of, you know, the fact that if you go around the world and say, you know, there are limits to American power and the message is there are massive limits and we need to work within those limits and we've exceeded them in the past. That basically encourages other to test those limits and it means that you're more likely to face a probing and a testing of U.S. power and the international order than would be the case if there was a different strategic message.

And I think it does get to a core sort of question that the next president, whoever he or she is, will have to address which is has President Obama correctly calibrated American leverage or not. You know, does he have the right sort of assessment of how much America can do in the world or is it possible to do more. And when I try to answer this question I look at Syria, you know, as an example. I mean again very few people if any would argue for a ground invasion of Syria but when we had that whole disaster of last August and September, when the President was basically boxed into threatening air strikes and everyone, including his Secretary of State, said they wouldn't be very effective and they'd be incredibly small and, you know, this is going to be very, very limited, two people took it very seriously, Putin and Assad. They gave something that they weren't willing to give before and it turned out that that incredibly small threat actually, you know, was quite significant leverage. And the mere threat of U.S. intervention led to a promise since reneged upon, but a promise at the time of giving up Syrian sort of chemical weapons. And so for me that sort of showed that, you know, it's still true pretty much everywhere in the world that anyone who wants revise the international order that the single most important question in their mind is whether or not an action that they would -- any action that they would undertake would it provoke American intervention or not. That's probably the reason why we don't see more outright conflict in the East China Sea, you know, today. It's probably why Putin has been a little bit cautious, you know, on Ukraine. It's probably why Syria promised to give up their chemical weapons. And if we get rid of that, if that is sort of somehow dramatically lessened, that the idea that the U.S. will be highly concerned if the principles of the order
or the equilibrium of the order is threatened or could be undermined then I think we are in for quite a different world. And then the question is, you know, will the United States be able to insulate itself from that. And there are some people that say yes. There are some people who say the U.S. is very secure, the U.S. has two big moats on either side, it has nuclear weapons and it has a very strong homeland defense. You don't need to have all of this intervention overseas. But that message basically comes down to one slogan which is the U.S. can be safer in a more dangerous world. That if East Asia becomes more dangerous and the Middle East becomes more dangerous that it doesn't really matter. And that debate was settled in the 1940s and maybe now its back, maybe that debate is back. But that's been a fundamental principle of the international order as far as I can tell that it's in the U.S. interest to have a safer world. And that safer world doesn't come about through a concert of powers, it comes about through this, you know U.S. and allied sponsored sort of international order.

And so that doesn't really answer your question about the opportunities but just to say 30 seconds on that, I think with all of the problems in the global economy and all of the instability in the world the U.S. actually has its moment of strategic advantage at the moment. That there is an opportunity to be able to not quite go on the offense but take the initiative, stop being reactive to everything and stop being reactive in the South China Sea and East China Sea or in Europe and start proposing different initiatives, building alliances, building regional order and put those who want to revise the status quo maybe on the back foot a little bit to try to propose a more holistic vision of where we're headed over a 10 or 15 year period. I think that there's been a lot of good signs on that actually over the last sort of couple of months and from the administration, some of the maritime issues. And we've seen -- you know, I think TPP and TTIP and were a good example of that and hopefully they do not go away because of the problems on the hill. But those are examples I think of what that would mean and I think more of that and quicker will be a positive thing.

MR. PICCONE: I mean I'm glad you raised the trade issue because it
seems like that's a classic case where, you know, the American people and their representatives in Congress are in a different place than where this administration would like to go and probably what's best for the United States. I mean what's changed from the debate in the 1940s is incredibly globalized interdependent economy that we benefit from tremendously here in the United States. So the conflict in the East China Seas would not only be a bad thing in its own right but it would be bad for the U.S. economy and U.S. businesses and U.S. jobs here and I think that message often does not come through. The President is working on as we've heard a new national security strategy so this is going to be a really important opportunity to see where he wants to go on some of these key questions.

We've got about 20 minutes left for a dialogue with out all. So I'd like to open the floor. Please identify yourself and we'll get the conversation going. I see this gentleman right here in the hall.

MR. KIM: Yes, hi. Oliver Kim from the Austrian newspaper Die Presse and here in D.C. I have a question about the trade chapter in your report. What good -- how useful are purely trade related statistics today if you want to get an idea of the state of the international economy? Because I think we've seen a far bigger and quicker rise of foreign direct investments. So very simply speaking if BMW builds a factor in the U.S. right, I mean to build BMWs and sell them to the U.S. market, that's not going to show up in the trade statistics if I'm not wrong. It would show up probably in the foreign direct investment statistics. So your judgment that, you know, the West is becoming less relevant and the East is rising, does that hold when you factor in investments as well or did you not look into that question?

MR. PICCONE: Thank you. I want to take a couple more before we come back to the panel. Esther?

MS. BRIMMER: Thank you. Esther Brimmer, George Washington University. I want to commend you on the effort first off on international order and strategy. These are extremely important issues and I'm glad you were looking at them
If I may raise three particular points where you see an intersection of international order questions with current crises and these are situations where the U.S. does have a role. Appreciating the U.S. cannot do everything but I do take very much in point that the U.S. can play -- have important leverage and that indeed if it chooses to act others do come along. And look at three particular situations. The first, one of the elements of international order of course has been the system of alliances of which NATO is the most important for the United States. Can you comment a bit about the challenge for Turkey, a NATO alliance member on the spillover and ongoing impact of Syria on Turkey? And yet as well as Turkey we see unfortunately has (inaudible) foreign member country which has incredible repression of freedom of speech and the press. So the Turkey issue and how that plays an important country for the United States. The second is looking at Egypt. Again one of the great changes of recent years has been the Arab awakening which finally put to rest what someone used to say too often in Washington which was the Arab world didn’t care about human rights. Well, that's ridiculous. The interest in human rights is a universal quest. And so to look at the important role that Egypt's playing, obviously the United States has had a long relationship with Egypt, (inaudible) talked a lot about this, what's the role for Egypt and for the United States dealing with democracy, human rights and the Arab world and how it plays out in Egypt? And finally the third is Iran. Now here is an example where I think international cooperation including the P5+1 or E3+3, again defending a global norm based on the nonproliferation treaty and the challenge of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the challenge posed by Iran. Here we actually do have the great powers working together but this will be one of the most difficult challenges and if we’re not successful that will have huge implications for the MTP treaty and security in the region. Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you. Can we just take one more? This woman right in front of you, right there.
MS. FLOCKHART: My name is Trine Flockhart. I'm currently a Senior Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy and we're working on a similar topic to what you are. So thank you very much for great presentations. What I would like to do is really try to pinpoint some of the change that we're seeing because I think it's very important to look at well how was the international order during the period of unipolarity and what is it we're moving towards in a very different international system where I think the United States whether it is declining relatively or not declining at all it's going to have to get use to working in an international system more as a *primus inter parus* than a power than dictate things. And that gets me to Bruce's point about the three elements of international order and the two new elements. I completely agree with you with the two new elements but I do think that the third one, democracy promotion, is going to be a part of international order that was specific for the period during unipolarity and after the Second World War.

Another change is what Tom was talking about on -- you divided the international order into an economic and a security sphere. And I just wonder what your views on that, whether you would agree with me that what's happening at the moment is perhaps that the economic dimension is somehow becoming more important, certainly in the traditional areas of Europe and East Asia, than the security dimension and that what we're seeing now is perhaps that the trade agreements, the TTIP and the TPP, are somehow taking over the corporation with America's leading part. That perhaps is the new glue of those kind of relationships. Thanks.

MR. PICCONE: Great. Thanks. Why don't we come back to the panel? Why don't we start with this last question in particular about the economic and trade issues as well as the first question on FDI.

MR. WRIGHT: To me?

MR. PICCONE: Also to Tom.

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah. Great questions. I might take the FDI one first just to -- because it's a great point and you know you're right, we didn't really deal with FDI that much in the report. We did try actually to do a similar analysis we did on trade...
for FDI but it turned out that the data available wasn’t sufficient really to try to get the same sort of tran lines or same sort of, you know, hold on what is happening vis a vis emerging powers versus western powers. I think on the trade side I mean you’re right as well that because of the way in which companies are located around the world in multiple places and because of the very complex nature of supply chains that this may tell us a little less than it used to tell us about economic power. And because, you know, we really don’t know where, you know, if something counts in the China side on trade is that really Chinese trade or is that a U.S. company with parts in China. And so there’s a whole series of methodological questions. Nevertheless I think that the data does show sort of one pretty important thing which is that there has been an increase in trade between Asian countries and between developing countries and that that seems to exist independently of sort of the complexity of the supply chains or of FDI. And what the sort of conclusion that we took from that was not that that was a bad thing, that’s actually a very good thing, but just two sort of conclusions out of it. One, the West sort of needs to get its act together on trade too to try to build its share -- its pie and so there’s more, you know, there’s greater activity between the West and then between the West and the East. And we’re seeing that a bit with TTIP and TPP. And the second thing was that it does potentially create some vulnerabilities for very small countries that are very dependent on large countries. So it’s important to have a diversification of trading partners for -- especially when it comes to East Asia.

And on the economic and the security side I think economics is incredibly important. I do think though it’s always been incredibly important. I think it’s probably become more important in the transatlantic relationship then some of the security questions will have to change very quickly. In Asia it’s a very sort of unique case where I think security still is the most important thing but the issue that there is sort of two different hierarchies. There’s the economic hierarchy that’s really organized around China and the security hierarchy that’s organized around the U.S. alliances. And both of those are coexisting and the billion dollar question is whether they will continue to coexist
or the tensions between them will force countries to choose between one or the other which no one wants to do.

MR. PICCONE: Bob, can I turn to you? This cluster of questions on Egypt, Turkey and Iran, what are your thoughts?

MR. KAGAN: Well, I think I'll pass Turkey to somebody else because it's in a region that's complicated for me. But Egypt I can say that I wish the lesson of the Arab spring was that Egyptians cared more about human rights and democracy and I certainly wish it showed that Americans cared about human rights and democracy because our policies would indicate otherwise. The fact is we have right now an absolute crushing of both any notion of democracy and human rights. Americans -- and not only Americans but the American Congress is almost indifferent to this. The administration is indifferent to it. Our policy is driven in part by the American public's -- at least much of the American public's attitude that these are all Islamists and we don't care what happens to them. As Sarah Palin put it, let Allah decide. And an administration I think and a Congress that's more concerned about Israeli security than it is about what's going on in Egypt. So I think the Egyptian story is a depressing one. I also think that our policy is almost designed to create a bigger and bigger -- the Egyptian military is leading us down a downward spiral of repression, violence and increasing terrorism. We have car bombs going off in Cairo now when we haven't had that for years. That is a direct consequence of the military's crackdown on the Muslim brotherhood. And American policy is being dragged sort of passively into this disaster. I think I'll just leave it there.

MR. PICCONE: Okay. Bruce, do you want to comment on Turkey and maybe Iran and the great power cooperation that's working?

MR. JONES: Yeah, a couple of points. In the discussion earlier we talked about the question of what set of capabilities did the United States have and what political will do we have to use them. Of course then there's also the question of what capabilities other powers have and I think we neglect -- there's a question of to what purposes do they intend to use those capabilities, all right. And so the mix of things that
we're looking at is how much power do we have, what will do we have to use it, who else is out there and to what extent are they going to try to challenge this. I very much agree with Tom that where we show hesitation or excess caution people will be probing and testing. But it's not clear to me that the fundamental objective of several of the rising powers here is to overturn the order in lots of different ways and in lots of different places. And there's no question that China in the Asian context is looking to as Tom quoted somebody saying to rebalance the issues. But look broader in China's capabilities to challenge us or to challenge established order is extremely weak in most parts of the world. And one of the important phenomenon that we're experiencing it seems to me is that where it looks like our power is no longer capable of keeping the cork in the issue there's no other power that profits from that. China doesn't profit from an increase in instability in the Middle East. And I think the Iran cases is in that basket of issues where Russia doesn't profit from Iran getting a nuclear weapon, China doesn't profit from Iran getting a nuclear weapon. So there is a -- there are a set of issues in which the underlying interests of the established and the rising powers actually converge. They're not the same but they converge. And so effective diplomacy in that case can build on that and I think that that's essentially what we're seeing in Iran. Now there's still lots of risks. I think that one of the lessons we should remember is that the most dangerous period in any conflict is when a well structured negotiation fails. And when you try genuinely to engage in a negotiation and it fails the two sides conclude not unreasonably that the only alternative is to settle their disputes militarily. All right, so it's sort of -- it's well intentioned to launch into in depth negotiation with Iran but there's a high risk that they will fail and there's a real danger of what happens then.

But the underlying point that I want to bring out is that we are in a situation where there are parts of the foreign policies of various -- of other powers that will challenge the United States and parts of them that have common interests with us. And that's playing out in a number of regions.

Turkey in my mind goes to a slightly different phenomenon which is that
some of our allies -- Tom and Jeremy talked about the fact that some of them are encountering difficulties, that's one aspect. Some of them are also moving in odd directions, that's a different aspect. And so when we look around the world and if we just looked at our allies in their traditional sense we would see some fraying to say the least. On the other hand if we want to think about bright spots there are new actors on the world stage, countries like India, who are not allies but I have to say if you look at American interests broadly they kind of rise of India and the success of India is a net positive in virtually every aspect of what we're going to try to do at least if we handle it well. Turkey is arguably in the other category.

And then last I just wanted to pick up this question about whether democracy promotion was a feature only of the unipolar moment. And I actually -- I don't think that's right. The defense of democracy was the core concept of the American position during the cold war, all right. I mean we were in a titanic struggle against the Soviet Union and putting our power to the defense of democracy around in Europe. My argument was with the methods to the extent that democracy can be installed in places with weak institutions by use of force. And Bob is right, we didn't go into Afghanistan for the purpose of building democracy but we adopted that goal and I think it misled us once we were there. And -- by my bigger concern is that we over-learn from the failures of Afghanistan, that we can't use our power to defend democracy or to defeat tyranny where it -- where we confront it and I think that's an inaccurate understanding of how we can act in these situations. And I don't anticipate that the United States will stop seeking to defend democracy, seeking to counter tyranny. We may not be in a particularly robust moment of that right now. I do not believe that that's going to disappear but it will be a point of serious contention with the great powers. And so we'll get back into this thing that there are places like Iran where our interests overlap and there are going to be place like Syria where our interests diverge. And part of the art of the next period seems to me will be managing simultaneously this reality of divergent and convergent interests between ourselves and the other powers.
MR. PICCONE: I want to come back to Jeremy but let me go back for one more round given how much time we have and I haven't tried this side of the aisle. So please, right here. Yes.

MR. WYNE: Hi, I'm Ali Wyne; I'm an associate with the Belfer Center. If you were -- many of the -- all of you actually discussed various sort of flashpoints or hot spots in the world, whether it's the unrest in the Ukraine, unrest in Thailand, what's going on with the Arab awaking, if you were making a ranking of which of those flashpoints -- if you were ranking them by the threat that they pose to vital U.S. national interests what would your ranking be and I would be curious what all of you have to say. And going back to this notion that Mr. Shapiro and all of you touched on about selectivity what would be your criteria for engaging various flashpoints, intervening in certain situations? Are there criteria for intervention or engagement or are there situations where it's best to just sit as a bystander and let developments unfold?

MR. PICCONE: Right here.

MAJOR FAULKNER: Major Faulkner, NDU, Fort Bragg. One of the things you've been talking about is different elements of power but with talking about the world order can you define how you see the U.S. power if you've talked about military, economic? Because it is to provide a stable and flexible order that provides prosperity and preeminence of the U.S., is that something that comes from us being in the lead or does that come something from us where we create the structure that everybody else in the global economy has to work through providing us the ability to command and control the outcomes and be more flexible? Because we've talked about some of these regional conflicts and smaller flare-ups, being able to absorb those in an elastic structure; is that more stable than us being able to go to Turkey, to go to Syria and to try to push our power in a -- I'd say in a reactive sense?

MR. PICCONE: Okay. Good question. And I have one more here, the woman in the middle there.

MS. TURNER: Thank you. I'm Inga Turner; I'm the correspondent for...
Polish Press Agency. I would like to ask you do you think that the current international order can prevent Russia from any military intervention in Ukraine. Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: Okay. Why don't we come back, and Jeremy I think this question about selectivity and also, you know, where would you prioritize -- if there is going to be intervention what would you recommend the President do?

MR. SHAPIRO: Sure, thanks (laughter) for this super easy question. It's always difficult when people ask me to define my terms. Look, I mean I think it's actually useful when looking at these things to actually look at it through the prism of world order. It gives you some sense of criteria. Because when we see something like the crises that are going on in the Central African Republic or Syria or something they have a moral character to them which really pulls at us, especially when we see them on videos. And we have an urge to do something to stop the suffering. And I think that that's a useful urge and one that speaks well of us, but it's not the same thing as world order because of course the world -- within the world order exists all sorts of tragedy and all sorts of unrest. I think if you're going to look at it through the prism of world order and say what do we need to do in terms of intervention in order to sustain the world order that we think we have as imperfect as it is there's a few criteria that you can look at. First do we actually have the capability to do something and I felt in the Syria debates within the U.S. government that I at times participated in they would -- very often people had a lot of trouble making that argument and that was one of the
primary considerations that went into some of the decisions.

Second, I mean what is the threat not just to the particular country in question but also -- but the threat to broader world -- the broader order? And this tends to come down to the question of sort of regional stability and spread. Again it's not nice to talk about things this way but issues that can be contained within a specific place are of a different order of threat to world order. If there's a sense that it will spread out to the neighboring countries and to countries that will have a big effect on the world economy or whatever then it's a different order of problem. And I think we see ourselves considering it in that way even if we don't talk about it in that way. And so you want to think about whether there are other mechanisms that are less expensive that can contain the problem. I think that there's also -- and this is a little bit in contradiction to what I was just saying but it illustrates some of the tensions, there's a sense that -- and I think this gets to Bruce's point that -- and this is something that has very much engaged the U.S. government is the -- there's a sense that there is a moral foundation to world order and that certain acts are so transgressive that they actually threaten that and that that has a demonstration effect which might be difficult to contain. That's obviously difficult to get your hands around in any particular case but I think it's something that engaged us a lot in the U.S. government.

MR. PICCONE: Well, I think we're dealing with it constantly. I mean there are some fundamental crimes against humanity that have been defined and have been pursued in some aggressive ways, not necessarily successfully but there I think are now accountability mechanisms that the international community has agreed to. Often the United States steps back from actually going all the way forward with that. I'm thinking about the ICC, I'm thinking about the report that just came out last week, the Commission of Inquiry on North Korea. This is I think the kind of new activism we're seeing that involves a consensus base, international order base set of rules and an effort to actually at least shine a light on it, find the facts, be transparent about it and we'll see. I doubt that there'll be enough consensus about it to actually move --
MR. SHAPIRO: but I'm talking about something slightly different, Ted, which is whether we actually then as an individual country or as a sort of coalition of countries are willing to act on that when those accountability measures don't -- aren't sufficient. And I think it's very easy and but also necessary to sort of stand up and say, you know, that's wrong, you shouldn't do that, we will someday hold you accountable. But it's an entirely different step and one that needs to have I think a higher burden to then sort of say okay, we are as an individual nation or as a collection of nations going to go in and enforce that because that requires a much greater capability and frankly it requires a much greater moral standing that as individual countries we often don't have.

MR. PICCONE: Anyone else want to come in on any of the questions we've got in front of us? Bruce?

MR. JONES: Sure.

MR. PICCONE: And then we'll wrap up.

MR. JONES: Flashpoints and selectivity. Sort of almost by definition flashpoints that risk direct confrontation between two or more of the powers in my mind rise sort of automatically, right. So Ukraine, East China Sea, North Korea perhaps are intrinsically more dangerous than Venezuela, Thailand. Syria is right in that incredibly hard spot because it's true that there's a moral component, a humanitarian component, etcetera, but there's also I think a genuine risk of the outflow of Syria, seeing what's happened in Iraq, etcetera. It's a broader problem than just Syria itself in my mind. So I would rank it in those terms. And then to the point on selectivity and sort of the criteria I agree with a lot of what Jeremy said. But I think there's another aspect we have to think about which is alliance structure. If we look at the situation we're in one of the things we didn't discuss much is that if we -- despite what I said about weak allies and torn allies and confused allies and strange allies, etcetera, we have a lot of allies and that's an awfully good thing. And there are going to have to be times where we pay attention to their concerns. We get very upset when our allies don't pay attention to our concerns. And it is true that our allies will often want us to do stupid things and try to push us into...
conflicts we don't belong and fight to the last American in defense of their interests, etcetera, but I've been very struck by how dismissive we have been in Syria about our allies' concerns about Syria and in other cases, oh, it's just our allies trying to get us to do stupid things. But these are -- this is genuine threat to some of our allies. And at the very least it seems to me we should have been less dismissive of that and more willing to engage diplomatically and through other forms of power to think hard about what their concerns are. We can't have it both ways. We can't have an awful lot of allies and have that be an important part of our role in the world and not be willing to act slightly differently than we might otherwise have been in response to their interests. I'm not saying we're going to go to war in Syria because Turkey wants us to, but I don't think the threshold of what we are willing to do should be defined only by our interests. It should also be defined to some degree by the interests of our allies and that that's going to have to be part of the calculation.

MR. PICCONE: Final word?

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah. I just want to say one very quick thing about Ukraine. I mean first I think this demonstrates the futility of trying to predict where things are headed, right. Six months ago no one would have predicted this, not that I'd read anyway. And so when we're talking about configuring, you know, the armed forces or, you know, coming up with strategic plans the unpredictable occurs. I think the Ukraine is an example of that but I think it will be attest and the test will be whether or not it's as dominant and malignant force as the Balkans were in the 1990s or we can resolve this over the next sort of few months. And I think it will be -- it is a -- there is an inherently competitive aspect to it with Russia.

MR. PICCONE: Great. Well, thank you all for coming. This has been a great discussion and stay tuned as we continue to work on these subjects. And join me in thanking the panel.

(Applause)
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