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THE FUTURE OF LAND POWER AND U.S. GROUND FORCES

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PANEL 1:

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PANEL 2:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to Brookings. I'm Mike O'Hanlon, and Peter Singer and I are the scholars here who work with the 21st Century Center on Security and Intelligence. Peter runs that center, 21CSI. I'm a senior fellow within it.

Today, we have the pleasure of hosting a great group of Army and Marine Corps specialists on the broad subject of the future of land power and land warfare. And today's news bulletins and the initial leaks on where the Quadrennial Defense Review and where the president's new budget proposal may go are helping us create some obvious links to the importance of this issue because all of a sudden we're hearing that the future of the U.S. Army in particular may be further curtailed with the possibility of even deeper cuts depending on what happens to the budget in the next couple of years.

We also know that from two years ago, the Pentagon put out a Defense Strategic Guidance, which basically argued that the future of land warfare is changing and that large scale stabilization missions of the type the nations recently led in Iraq and Afghanistan are coming to an end, and we've essentially decided this as a matter of policy sitting here in our offices in Washington. And this raises interesting questions about whether we can really so shape the future of the world from the confines of places inside the beltway or not. But more importantly, it raises the question of how does the Army and how does the U.S. Marine Corps, how do these organizations think about their future? What kinds of missions do they need to be ready for? And luckily for us, they've been thinking already about these questions, and they've convened something called a Strategic Land Power Task Force, which is ongoing, and members of which we have with us here, especially on this first panel.

So just to give you a very quick overview and then I'll get right to the discussion and we'll have your questions a little bit later on. We're going to spend one hour with this group and then we will immediately swap without a break, and Peter and I

will change roles essentially and we'll bring on Major General H.R. McMaster and our colleague, Bill Galston in the second panel to talk more generally about the future of land warfare. But today, and in the first panel, we'll hear from the participants in this task force.

And so if I could just very briefly let you know who they are. We have two Army generals and one Marine colonel. The Marine colonel is Jim Zientek, who has recently joined this group, has a distinguished career. He has been part of various Marine Corps doctrine development and future plans and scenario developments for many years. Also, considerable combat experience. Certainly, our generals -- Major General Hix, Major General Haas, have a great deal of combat experience as well. If you read through their bios you'll see that it's not simply confined to Afghanistan and Iraq, but they've also got deployment experience in places ranging from the Sinai to Korea, involvement in Africa command. So their careers have already got them thinking about the future of maybe not necessarily big land wars in all these places, but various kinds of missions that could involve American ground power.

We also know very quickly by way of introduce and to complete the thought, that the U.S. Marine Corps is obviously in many ways a ground force but is in many ways also a naval force. It's part of the Department of the Navy. It thinks of itself very much in an expeditionary model. It's different from the Army. It's not just the smaller second ground force, but it also does great things with the Army on the ground. And therefore, I think it's very appropriate that we have Marines represented with us today.

So what I'd like to do now is just immediately launch into a couple rounds of questions where I want to get some thoughts on the table. We're going to begin with Major General Hix because in a sense, even though he has background as well in special operations, he is sort of the conventional Army representative here today and on the Strategic Task Force as well. So I'm just going to ask him before we get into a second round of more detailed comments, to explain a little bit of what the task force is doing, how it arose, and then we'll just work down the row with the three uniformed officers

before we go to everybody else, including Peter in round two.

So General, and everyone, thank you for being here. And could I ask, what is the purpose of this -- what's your mission with the task force? How long is it supposed to go? How does it feed into things like the new budget we're about to see? Where do you see this heading?

GENERAL HIX: So I think the first thing that's important is this idea originated in dialogue between General Odierno, the chief staff of the Army, and Admiral McRaven, the SOCOM commander. And then later they engaged with General Amos, a commandant. So this has been ongoing for a little over a year, and it really focused on a number of things. First off, we all recognize that we've got to institutionalize, not forget the hard-learned lessons of the last decade of law. And I say that collectively in terms of soft and conventional force interdependence and integration, the way that we have integrated across the formations that operate on land. Although we're all constituted for different purposes, our purposes intersect on land. And so that was a key recognition that we've got to carry on the lessons here and instantiate them going forward because we don't need to relearn those later.

The second key driver was a determination to ensure that we recentered not only our own thinking but the Defense Department's, and eventually, hopefully at groups like this, thinking about the understanding of war and its immutable human aspects. And in fact, we were having dinner last night and my colleague here to my right said, "Well, of course that's true." But if you go through and look at our joint doctrine, if you look at our strategic guidance, if you look at policy statements, you'll see that the word "human," influencing human behavior, changing decisions of leaders, peoples, militaries, et cetera, is absent from much of that guidance and thinking and the frameworks in which we operate. And so that's the second piece that we are undertaking to move forward on.

Another aspect is a recognition certainly over the last 10 years that combat overmatch and tactical excellence does not always equate to the achievement of

strategic outcomes. And so we're going back and effectively doing a post-mortem on where we were successful and where we weren't and understand why so that we can carry that forward.

And then the last area that really drives things is a recognition partly related to this overmatch issue is we've got to collectively move land power into the realm of a strategic instrument that delivers on national and coalition strategic outcomes. And this is particularly, we believe, true, given the environment that we're entering. So this is not all looking backwards. We're taking stock of our experiences collectively, but we're looking very much forward trying to get a better handle on the future operating environment, particularly what we term the velocity of human interaction which is driven by the connectivity I think we are all aware of, but it is particularly pronounced on land where you see this confluence of people, the cyber environment from Google to hackers and everything in between, and the forces that operate on land. So that is a very different environment that speeds the velocity with which events unfold and probably as importantly, if not more importantly, their second and third order effects that drive us to take a better accounting for it.

MR. O'HANLON: That's great. Thank you.

And General Haas, I'm going to ask you to now comment before we go to Colonel Zientek. But I also want to put this already into a little bit of a focal point. Some people are saying, "Listen, the future of warfare is about special operations." You represent that contingent within the Army. It's about drones. It's about cyber. It's about air-sea battle. It's about small, precise uses of force, lethality, precision, et cetera. It's not about the conventional army. Was there anything unnatural about the forcing together of these different groups into this same task force? In other words, some people would say, "Well, listen, it's the conventional army that we all recognize or that some people want to argue is sort of fading from relevance. The Special Forces and maybe the Marines are still there at the forefront. Is there any of that kind of sense going into the task force? Are you partly intellectual competitors within this task force or is it really a

completely unified effort, if you see what I mean?

And I'm not looking for -- I'm not looking to hear about dirty laundry because obviously intellectual tension and debate is healthy. And so I guess what I'm asking is to what extent is that part of the initial mandate of the task force to try to see if Special Forces, drones, cyber can do more and the conventional army do less?

GENERAL HAAS: Well, to address the first part of your question, it has not been unnatural and it has been our agreements on most of these issues or certainly much more than our disagreements. Now, we don't completely agree on all the definitions and we're working through that process today, but we have been sharing the same battle space here for the last decade. So off conventional force operations, you know, from the beginning of OEF and OIF and continued to this day, and the same with our partnership with the Marine Corps. So I think this has been a highly cooperative effort, and as General Hix said, this generated out of discussions between the chief staff of the Army and the SOCOM commander.

From a SOCOM perspective, what we're trying to contribute to this task force I would highlight in basically two main areas, and the first goes to your point which is institutionalizing soft and conventional force integration, interoperability, and interdependence by reviewing and looking at the lessons learned over the last decade of war, where we have shared battle space and fought together. So we are taking a deliberate and focused effort to codify those lessons learned and institutionalize that across hopefully all the services.

We're also very focused on returning to the humans as the centrality of our operations, and so we are spending some time developing the concept of a human domain where individuals, groups, and populations, what are their beliefs and perceptions? So we are helping to contribute to that task force in particularly those two key areas.

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent.

Colonel Zientek, thank you again for joining us. Thank you for a Marine

Corps presence on this panel.

What perspective would you immediately say is unique to the Marines in this effort or that you feel the Marines bring to bear most acutely? In other words, obviously, you need to be involved in this as an institution but is there any particular insight set of lessons from the recent past or broader cultural perspective where the Marines are already offering sort of a different view than the Army? How do you see the Marine Corps role in this task force so far?

COLONEL HAAS: Thank you.

First of all, I'd like to agree with both panelists here, generals, and say that the Marine Corps -- this is the perfect fit for the Marine Corps to be involved in the Strategic Land Power Task Force. We want to capitalize on the cooperation and interoperability that we've utilized with the Army and Special Operations Forces over the last 12 years, and as we move post-conflict, post-Iraq and Afghanistan into the future, we think that the Marine Corps as an amphibious force has special capabilities and characteristics that could add and complement the Army and Special Operations Forces. This is a perfect fit for us. Forward deployed, forward engaged, ready for crisis response is what the Marine Corps is all about, and those are our core competencies. And we don't see that going away any time in the future. And we think those unique capabilities that the Marine Corps brings and offers can complement the Army and the Special Operations Forces in this endeavor.

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent.

So what I'd like to do now is just have one more round finishing with Peter before we go to all of you. And what I really want to do is ask one big question about what the task force is learning or underscoring or relearning. One big lesson that you think is the most important. This country is either in danger of forgetting, maybe we've known it before and now we're starting to forget, or something new you're discerning as you study the future, likely combat environment around the world. You know, what's the one big idea that you think is the most important for people to hear?

And we'll go in the same order, finishing with Peter. But I also would ask Peter to comment in general what he's heard when he gets the chance.

And then the other question is, and I hope you'll cut right to the chase on this if you feel any heartburn about any of the debates you're seeing. What worries you most about what we're doing wrong in our debate right now? Now, some people would say cutting to an army of 440,000-450,000 active duty soldiers as now anticipated from what we hear in the QDR. That's already too low. Personally, that's about what I've been recommending in my written work for the last couple of years, so I'm not as worried about that. I'm more worried about do we have any sense of what the Army is for and what the Marine Corps is for conceptually. Are we deluding ourselves into thinking that these big, large missions can be declared to be over just because we're tired of them? So that may be a question you want to comment on, the basic notion that counterinsurgency is centrally a thing of the past. It seems to be something we declare every 30 or 40 years and then have to relearn later was not so much the case.

But I don't want to put words in your mouth. Those are my takes. Anything that you want to say about what worries you. Just one last provocation and then I'll turn to you. There was review last summer at the Pentagon in which there was a possibility raised that perhaps the Army would be cut to 380,000 active duty soldiers. This was the so-called Skimmer Review. And as you know, this presumed the possibility of prolonged sequestration. We may still wind up with prolonged sequestration. So it's not clear that the nation is going to be able to sustain more than 380,000. To what extent would that worry you?

Just for perspective, in the Cold War, we typically had about 800,000 active duty soldiers. In the 1990s, we typically had about a half million. We went up to about 560,000 during the wars of the last decade. Now we've already been headed down towards 490, and the new QDR apparently is going to say that should be 440 to 450. So actually, the last 20 years, the movement has not been that huge, but if you start talking about 380,000 or less, it gets to be a little bit bigger.

So what's the one big idea that you want to put on the table that we should be appreciating about land power, and what's your one big worry about where you see signs in the debate that we should probably be a little bit more attentive to that may suggest misguided thinking in this country?

General Hix?

GENERAL HIX: I think the big idea, kind of pivoting off of a trend that I've already noted, which is this velocity of human interaction, if you take what Eric Schmidt has written in his book, The New Digital Age, he talks about the fact that there will be more revolutions more frequently in the future, and I think we're beginning to see the beginnings of that and the power of connections of disparate groups of people who now are able to organize around information collectively, then physically organize, and then in many cases, act in ways and on scales globally, regionally, and locally that we've not seen before.

And so that drives, I think, the forces that operate on land into two areas that are very important. The first is we've got to be engaged around the world. There's more noise, if you will, and if you're not out there engaged with people, and this is something where we are complementary. We'll often say Special Operations has got way more than they can do, and quite frankly, sometimes we expect them to do things where their core competencies are not resin any more than conventional forces would be doing things that are Special Operations core competencies. So there's a complementary aspect to engagement. In fact, you see that in Africa right now, and of course, Chris was commander there. If you aren't engaged, you're not going to be able to separate the signal, the indicators of change, the precursors to instability from the noise of the world and you'll miss it. And then you're trying to react and chase after events, rather than being able to influence them at speed.

And the other piece of that, which General Odierno has highlighted certainly since I came back from Afghanistan over the last two years since I've been in this job, and that is the importance of being expeditionary in our response. And that is,

again, not a, you know, owned by any one of the services and commands represented here on this stage. We all have capabilities that complement each other in that regard. But if you're engaged, the manner in which you respond, informed application of force, rather than just reacting, having more people who have a sense for regions or are better acculturated to the human domain, if you will, and ask the right questions, allows you to more intelligently offer advice at the senior levels, plan more effectively, and most importantly, apply force, whether in violence or in prevention operations to mitigate the effects of change in the world. And I think there's a lot of it, and there are people here that can recount that probably more effectively than I can. So that's I think the big idea.

In terms of worry, I think history always seem to intrude when we think that it's been discarded to the ash bin. So what worries me is that we don't appreciate the fact that, again, there's a complementary set of capabilities and one of the most important things that the United States Army does is prevent really bad things from happening. And I think that there's an under appreciation of that contribution, speaking about particularly the conventional Army, but again, about 70 or 80 percent of Special Operations command or U.S. Army soldiers.

So if you don't want war in Northeast Asia, you must demonstrate the capacity to end it so that the belligerence in that region takes stock of their ambitions and do a cost-benefit analysis because in just one instance, the second, third, and eleventh largest economies in the world would go right down the drain if we had a war on the Korean Peninsula. And that has ramifications for everyone. Similarly, in the Persian Gulf. It's not that we have to maintain a significant footprint, but we have to demonstrate the capacity to respond in an expeditionary manner with forces that are operationally significant that can compel behavior, again, not because we want to but because we have the capacity. Those things don't happen and then you prevent the global gas station, again, from being inflamed with dire consequences to our own interests, and frankly, the entire globe's.

So that aspect of prevention, conventional deterrence is an area that I'm

concerned that we give short shrift to.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

General, same question over to you.

GENERAL HAAS: I think the big idea here is that our national military strategy is asking us to do this, to undertake this endeavor, and to look at and take a rigorous look at why our tactical and operational activities are not always producing strategic success. And so this task force is looking at developing new ways of thinking about how land forces operate, both together in cooperative nature and certainly for the Special Operations community, either independently or in direct support of Joint Force commanders. So I think that is the big purpose.

As General Hix said, we can articulate new, innovative options and recommendations to our policymakers and to our senior leadership. That's really the big idea behind this task force. And I think the risk here is that some would look at some of the recommendations as potentially some high cost to the defense community. Certainly right now I think that there could be some modest investments that would have, you know, significant contributions to the future in the way we operate as land forces. So that's the big idea from our perspective.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

Colonel?

COLONEL ZIENTEK: I think it's incumbent upon us to take the lessons learned from the counterinsurgency fight and roll those into our doctrine to make sure that those lessons are captured and that's not lost. But the way we view land power goes beyond counterinsurgency, stability, operations, or large land power operations. Running the gamut from disaster relief to humanitarian assistance, to middle-to-middle engagement theater security cooperation, all aspects of land power. And something that we can work together very closely with our Army Special Operations Forces partners to further in the future. It's something that we need to make sure that we get right and we're devoted to spending time to the study and development of this human endeavor.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

Peter, thank you for your patience. Let me just say that Peter Singer is best known in recent years for his books on unmanned aerial systems and now more recently on cybersecurity and cyber warfare. But before that, as many of you know, he wrote two very important books on sort of messy ground force operations -- one about child soldiers around the world and one about private military contractors. So he's wrestled very much with the new age but also the on-the-ground messy stuff. And so Peter, any opening thoughts you want to have but also comments on what you've heard so far?

MR. SINGER: Sure. First, it's an honor to be up here with this panel. And then I also realize my role to be the provocative civilian.

So I'll toss one thing, and they know it's coming. We had dinner last night. Both the opportunity and the challenge of the agenda for the Land Power Task Force is it's both important but we need to be careful that we're not bringing together two related but different things. So one is this question of how do we avoid repeating past and very recent strategic level mistakes and not factoring in the human part of warfare sufficiently, which is related but different from a question of how do we wrestle with the new forces and challenges in land warfare today and moving forward in the 21st century?

So my part of it, and kind of you were giving a hint at, is when we talk about this, I think we're right on emphasizing the human but we're wrong on trying to distinguish it as a separate domain. That is when I think about the problems that have been laid out here, and also in the primary document, they're not -- at the strategic level question, they're not specific to land power. You know, whether we're talking about the use of a stone or a drone, political will is still at the center of it. The velocity of human interaction, that's still whatever domain of war you're talking about, even cyber warfare. Stuxnet was an exquisite new digital weapon but it was designed to go after human will. It affected at the end of the day the scientists' will. It challenged their own kind of sense of what they could accomplish.

So when we say -- when we read in the documents and the like that land power is different because it's the human domain, I would argue, no, it's not a separate domain. Again, naval warfare, air warfare, space warfare, cyber, those all involve that central politipart. The second is that challenge of weaving in the human side, and some of the things we've mentioned here aren't specific to today. They cut across history. So the tactical overmatch issue. If we were having a panel in post-Spanish American War, we would have said the exact same thing. If we were having a panel after Vietnam, we would have said the same thing. Gosh, we're winning the tactical fight. How do we do strategy better?

So that's one part. I both applaud the effort to try and make sure we don't lose these lessons of the past, but what I hope is it doesn't get locked into just a land power discussion. It's equally relevant to make sure it's woven into how we're thinking about air-sea battle concept or space warfare, cyber moving forward. That's related but different from the question of how do I deal with those new forces and challenges that land warfare faces? And, you know, just to tick of a couple from the article that got me invited on here is, you know, we have questions of the changing context of land warfare itself. You know, the fundamental shift over the last generation in humans on land is that we've gone from being a rural to an urban species. So I don't know where we're going to be deploying American land forces in the future, and we will be, and I don't know whether it's going to be in humanitarian disaster relief or a COIN or a large combat mission, but I'll take the gamble that it's to an urban zone because we already well over 50 percent urban. That's where much of the conflict is, and we'll move forward in becoming a 60 to 70 percent urban species. And what makes the urban zone different is not just that you're fighting so much within the people, but it's also a space where you face multidirectional, multidimensional threats.

Another challenge moving forward is how do we manage talent, human talent at a time of defense reductions? So we were chatting last night about how on one hand there will be pressures to make a lean force. On the other hand, it may be better

for you to be top heavy so you're not losing some of that knowledge from these past generations of experience.

Another question is are there capabilities in land power that we will need more and more in the future but we veer away from because of our own choices? So an example would be tactical level air and missile defense. We love talking about strategic level, but tactical may be more important moving forward, particularly when we think about proliferation of threat to life. Or another would be the Marines are delighted to work with our partners on teaching them how to do amphibious landings, which may not be exactly what we need in the Pacific moving forward, whereas that skill set that the Army and the Marine Corps actually did a lot more than amphibious landings was coastal defense, which I may want my Pacific partners to get better at versus I want them to hold disputed island chains rather than go out and seize new ones.

Another question is technology. Part of why we had a tactical overmatch is because we've had a technologic overmatch. In the 21st century, that may not be the case moving forward, particularly given our acquisition system. So we'll have land forces using a generation of, for example, IT that may be behind the Google glass that the future insurgent that we're facing out in the field. Forward presence model, it was designed for the last century. Does it apply in this future century?

And then finally, and I don't think anyone here would argue with it, you asked the question of what's the big idea. Well, throughout the history of land warfare, it's not the size of your force, it's not the tools that you have, it's your big idea. It's your doctrine. So what's the new big idea of land warfare in the 21st century? Or is it something that blends together. To me, that's the agenda for moving this forward. Again, there's two separate things here and I want to be sure we don't miss that part in the battle over trying to not lose the lessons of the past. We also have some of these new questions moving forward.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

I'll invite you all to respond to any of that either now or simply to weave

into your responses later. Go ahead.

GENERAL HAAS: So we respectfully disagree on the human domain concept and we believe that it's critically important to add to the body of work, the literature out there, add to the debate about the importance of the centrality of human beings. Again, their beliefs and their perceptions to the domain, to the physical domains that are currently out there.

And so we would offer that up rather than know literature or studies on why the human domain is important. Clearly over the last decade we have been not as affected as we should have been in addressing this aspect of warfare. Certainly, we study and understand that warfare is a clash of wills and that humans are important in this, but when it comes to the application of our combat power, our tactics and techniques and procedures, we have not been affected in addressing this aspect. And so therefore, we see adopting this new concept of the human domain will help institutionalize this into our education systems, our professional development, our training, our planning, and then our equipment. So across the DOTMLPF areas that we have. And we discussed this last night. So, and we certainly lose nothing by continuing this pursuit of developing the human domain concept and then get it out there for debate and critique and refine it.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

Well, let's now go to you. Please identify yourselves when you get a microphone.

We'll do two at a time. I'm going to start with the two gentlemen here in the second row, my good friends, and then we'll just take both their questions and then work down the panel.

MR. NICHOLSON: George Nicholson, a consultant of Special Operations and Counterterrorism.

General Haas, good to see you again.

One of the things that -- and General Hix, you could address this also -- the problem we had in Afghanistan and Iraq is we focused almost all of our Special

Forces. So in the past where we had the 3rd Special Forces group focused on Africa. We had the 7th Special Forces group focused on South America. The 1st in the Pacific where you could just develop language qualifications, area familiarization. It's like Stan McChrystal has said, John Allen has said, and Jim Madison, we need to start getting back to learning about religion, politics, and culture in those areas.

What do you see, General Hix, of the Army in the future being able to develop that same kind of capability? And General Haas, with your new hat, taking over Futures down at SOCOM, where do you see us getting back to that traditional capability?

MR. O'HANLON: Then right over to Mark.

MR. JACOBSON: Thank you. Mark Jacobson from the German Marshall Fund. It's wonderful to have you all here today.

One quick comment and then a question. First on the human domain, the Army did learn about this back after the Second World War. The Army and the Air Force spent a lot of time, especially with the creation of the Special Warfare communities looking at this whole idea of warfare psychologically waged. So as you take a look at the lessons learned, as you take a look at history, don't forget to look back at this time when the Army and the Air Force specifically looked to tailor kinetic effects, its organization, its operations to have specific psychological impacts at the tactical and strategic level.

My question is a little bit along the line of George's, and it's about organization. I worry that as you think about these concepts, as you look about the issue of how we fight, what is it we need to do to prevent bad things from happening? I'm worried that the land forces, the Marine Corps and the Army will not address the fundamental issue of organization. And I'm going to point you to another historical example. Go back and reread Robert Comer's book, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing. Or I'm sorry, his Rand Report, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, basically pointing out that we organize in ways that are comfortable to us as well. And I think that even if only to reject, you should consider how the organization of the land services impacts our ability to adapt to a different sort of warfare out there, whether it's urban, network, cyber, what have you.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

Why don't we start with you and work down.

GENERAL HAAS: So as the -- to answer your question, so as our operational requirements in Afghanistan are reduced over time, we are and we have returned to being regional experts and our forces have always been regionally aligned. Unfortunately, based on operational requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq, we did have to divert our forces to the CENTCOM Theater. Well, we are returning to that and we see some great opportunities as the Army looks to develop, employ, and mature the regionally aligned force to have a greater understanding of the regions as U.S., SOCOM, and the Army. So I think we are returning not necessarily to our roots; we are increasing that regional expertise that has eroded due to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Did that answer your question?

MR. HANLON: We'll have other -- so, Colonel, please.

COLONEL ZIENTEK: If I could address the organizational issue that you brought up which I think is a very good point. I think within the Marine Corps, because of the demands and the evolving future environment that we find ourselves in, the Marine Corps is adapting to that. The Marine Corps is forming new organizations within it, like Special Purpose MAGTAF Crisis Response, Special Purpose MAGTAF Africa, Black Sea force rotations, force rotations out of Darwin, Australia, and trying to position ourselves in the best way to meet future contingencies in crisis.

MR. O'HANLON: General?

GENERAL HIX: Obviously, we should have bought your dinner last night.

I'm kidding.

So the first thing I think is important is accept the historical piece about, you know, human and physical. In fact, part of the concept work we're doing right now is the idea of physical objectives not tied to a human objective are irrelevant. We somehow lost our way maybe in the enthusiasm of the '90s with the RMA about the importance of

that connectivity. And so that I don't sound like I'm walking away from the old masters, of course, you know, Clausewitz always talked about the physical and the metaphysical, and that's what we're looking to do, is reconnect those two things, first amongst ourselves because we think it's important that collectively we have a common view, and then from that position of commonality, begin to work with the rest of our sister services and other commands on that issue. And, in fact, to begin that process, we're already in negotiations with the Joint Staff J7 to move this work into the realm of joint concept development so that it takes on a larger focus.

To your question about getting our forces more regionally aware, of course, as General Haas mentioned, we had the regionally aligned force first manifestation is 21 in Africa, and they've done everything from have small groups, handfuls of soldiers in some places working with NCO academies or doing training with conventional forces in a variety of different African states. General Donahue, the Army commander for Africa I think had 96 different operations for them to execute in their time aligned with them. That program is going to expand beyond Africa, obviously.

And I would note, just as Special Operations had to file into Iraq and Afghanistan, we had to do the same thing at the conventional level and you had forces, you know, we have a very large presence in the Pacific and have had, for the last 80 years, and we had to draw those forces into the fight as our sister services and commands did as well. So we'll see a greater regional awareness over time as we build this program out and push forward. And quite frankly, we'll continue to do it because our young leaders demand it. They recognize the importance of understanding the social cultural aspects and also, frankly, the physical terrain and the other aspects of these various regions. And we collectively will only benefit more from that as we go forward.

In terms of the organizational change, of course, we're getting a little help on that with the reduction. I would note while Dr. O'Hanlon wrote about 450, we've spent the last year and a half doing hard analysis to figure out what we thought the right answer was, which conveniently happened to be 45. But we looked very hard at that as a -- it's

not the best in terms of risk, but it is manageable risk, and the force will be able to fulfill its responsibilities without creating unnecessary risk even in the prosecution of a major combat operation.

But these cuts normally come in threes in these periods, so we have to begin anticipating the future. And so we have already undertaken a program called Force 2025 looking at a decade to transition a force to lean it out. That doesn't mean that we're going to pull the leadership, you know, our leader-to-led ratio always goes up in peacetime because you've got to maintain expertise and also capacity because just as we went to 560 this last decade, we've risen for every other conflict. And there are normally several. In a decade of any 10-year period of history, there are three to five that Army and other forces are committed to.

So leaning out, making the right science and technology investments to the extent we can rebalance the tooth and the tail so that we maintain the core capacity of the Army, maintain the expertise and leadership necessary to allow us to expand, but also to educate and train our officers and NCOs in this period of transition. I think one of the things people will miss, we have a very experienced force. That experience is going to disappear in the next three to five years to a great extent, particularly at the lower levels because those young soldiers who are on first term enlistments are going to get out and we'll be back to where the Army was when I came in. My platoon sergeant was a combat veteran, my first sergeant, and the battalion commander. And then later, the brigade commander and the brigade sergeant major, and everybody else was not. And so we've got to maintain that expertise and continue to instantiate those lessons as we go forward.

One of the challenges in terms of this regional piece is getting the social-cultural familiarization for our troops. I won't say we've mastered that but we recognize the problem and we're looking at ways to do it more effectively, and hopefully, more efficiently.

MR. O'HANLON: Peter.

MR. SINGER: Three quick thoughts.

I think our -- maybe this is a debate outside the confines of this panel, but among us the issue isn't human, it's domain. It's whether we consider it separate or not. There's not a push to limit that. So in many ways it feels, you know, it's a little bit like a religious doctrinaire discussion. But that's the part to me, the success ironically of the Strategic Land Power Task Force is when the concept is woven in to the other partners that aren't up here on stage when it's truly joined and is woven into national strategy. That's kind of where I'll leave it. My worry is by putting it within the bucket right now of just land power, we also put a cap on where it can go to next, where the need is.

But to the questions, I would say just two quick things. One, in the regional alignment, again, I can say this, our challenge equally is something beyond the services' control, which is that if we want to figure out regional alignment, we can't have a yo-yo effect of which regions we care about. And so if we -- a couple years back it was Asia, the pivot, the rebalance, and then what was the news story in my email inbox this morning? Defense news, Middle East to be focus of QDR. I mean, you can't -- so that's part of the challenge there. And I put that on other people's shoulders.

Second is a comment on we keep saying "our forces." One of the changes in 21st century land power is who is the "us" here? And you can think about this in three ways -- three challenges. One is every place that we've deployed and every place that we're likely to deploy in the future, we will be incredibly reliant on private contractor forces. Roughly, you know, if you're doing an external analysis you would say, wow, half that land force is private military, so we've got to think about how that's woven in. And that's again true whether you're talking about a large-scale operation to a humanitarian disaster relief to you name it. So are we woven in that?

Second is the coalition side. Again, wherever we're deploying, we're bringing coalition partner. The challenge particularly in the land power component is there does seem to be a far more mixed level of capabilities among our coalition level partners so that we don't have some of the ways we're able to work together in the air

domain. We've got more of a mix within the land domain. I'll kind of leave it at that, but folks know what I'm saying.

And then third, to your point about bureaucracy keeps doing its thing, National Guard and Reserves. And how, I mean, we are seeing right now when it comes to Army aviation, tooth and nail how we're fighting even a modest kind of change, let alone these bigger changes that are there. So when we're talking about the "us," the future of land power, these are three keys that need to be part of that discussion and some we've got to move forward. Others, frankly we have to figure out how do we keep them from changing?

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Let's take two more. Let's see, where can I go next?

Jim Schear over by the far left, and then I'll take the gentleman here in the third row as well after Jim.

MR. SCHEAR: Jim Schear, formerly OSD Policy.

Many thanks to our panelists today. Very interesting presentations.

Quick question. In looking at the human domain, and I strongly support that, I will assert that you are obviously trying to better assess social-cultural environments of the general population as well as the motivations of the adversary. Are they fighting for a cause? Are they fighting for a living? Will they engage in sacrificial violence? That whole domain. Are you looking at how we perturb the target? Because quite frankly, post-OEF/OIF, we have magnetic qualities. We attract some people, we repel others, and when we attract some they don't love us for the right reasons. So we've got to be cautious about that. We can create winners and losers if we're not careful. And as Peter has said, what our coalition partner, recipient country may want isn't what we think necessarily they need, so just a quick question on that.

And secondly, what is the level of interagency involvement or buy-in in your work? Because I don't think this task force would want to leave it up to a local U.S. ambassador to say, well, here's what we think. That's terribly important, obviously, and

for steady state situations -- steady state abnormal situations, the ambassador's view is going to be very important. But to what extent are you helping to build an interagency consensus here? Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: We'll take this one right here as well.

MR. FREEDBERG: Sydney Freedberg, Ranking Defense.

To ask an obnoxious question, which is my job, and clearly to put the colonel on the spot for a change -- General Hix can relax for a second -- we see an Army Special Operations two-star, we see a regular Army two-star, we see a Marine Corps colonel. And while colonels can be very smart guys, there is a question about the Marine Corps' level of commitment, and I've seen all sorts of land power events and sessions. The ring core delegation is smaller, lower ranking, and often quieter. Fortunately, not alas in this case.

I also don't see any Army National Guard up there. And while arguably General Hix (inaudible) whole Army, there's a lot of stress and controversy about what the Guard's role is in future missions. So do you, Colonel -- why is an 06 enough on this panel? Or do you wish someone else was here, especially now? And to General Hix, and to RSF as well, how do you bring in the Guard and Reserve component to this discussion and what their place is in this engagement and forward leaning?

MR. O'HANLON: I'm going to say a quick word and then maybe ask the colonel to begin. But let me take a little bit of the blame here because I bear primary responsibility for the way these two panels have been configured. And we chose a date and a time when a Marine general was not available. Not on purpose, but that's how life works out. And thankfully, as you said, Colonel Zientek is anything but a shrinking violet, but I want to take the blame on any kind of issue having to do with representation between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps.

On the Guard Reserve --

MR. FREEDBERG: I believe I'm hearing that again and again.

MR. O'HANLON: Well, okay.

On the Guard and Reserve issue, this is an issue that I think we want to keep talking about, and I'll leave it to anybody that wants to comment further. I do think we have a lot more to learn. I'm just going to voice one very specific request and suggestion to the broader community, which is I think we need a detailed empirical study of what the Guard and Reserve did in the wars of the last decade. That, as far as I'm aware, is not currently being done in a way that I think is needed because I think we actually do need some more data to enter into these kinds of debates, not so much for the current round of cuts but maybe for the next round or the round thereafter if there is such a thing.

So I wanted to volunteer those thoughts. But now we can maybe begin with the colonel.

COLONEL ZIENTEK: Thank you very much.

Just to dispel any myths on this, the Marine Corps is totally involved in the Strategic Land Power Task Force. As evidence, I am now the official Marine member to the Strategic Land Power Task Force and the NCR. Brigadier General Kalea was going to be here today when we thought this was going to be in the afternoon. Unfortunately, he's got a conflict. As a matter of fact, the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, General Paxton, was going to sit on the second panel, but travel had pulled him away.

The bottom-line is that as the Marine Corps, we're much smaller, you know, than the other services, and our people have a lot of commitments, but I can tell you that the commandant of the Marine Corps is committed to this task force and all aspects and continuing to work in cooperation with the Army and Special Operations Forces. So I think you're going to see more Marines present at these get-togethers, and high-ranking as well.

MR. O'HANLON: Are there any comments on Jim Schear's question?

GENERAL HIX: Yeah, I'll take both questions.

The answer to your first question is yes. We have to look at all aspects.

We have to step outside of our problem and not look at it just solely from our perspective, so that collective understanding is part of what we're seeking. What we don't want to do is have another Kerr Report after another major conflict that says that we ignored the generally correct, analytical intelligence that said here are the social, cultural, political problems you're going to trip over when you enter Country X or Y or undertake the following actions. Of course, his other finding was that we invariably accepted technical intelligence at face value even though most of the time it was found to be incorrect at the end of the day. So that's one of the underlying kind of lessons that I think guides us as we go forward.

We have been engaging the interagency and have involved the inner agency in a number of our seminars and experiments to date. We do not yet have participation in the task force, in part because as General Hass noted, we're still arm wrestling a little bit ourselves. We want to make sure we at least have a common view before we bring in others, although we have invited and there is interest from both the Navy and the Air Force in providing participation. Maybe not permanent membership, but participation in our events.

To Sydney, first off, I had the honor of having 27 Marines as one of my subordinate units. I'd also note that from a National Guard perspective, half of my unit in Afghanistan in the south, when I was the only Army colonel there, were National Guard. So I have an appreciation for the capabilities and capacities. And frankly, the commitments of both our Marines and Guardsmen. I'd also note that General Jay Paxton was at our AUSA forum in the fall with the chief and the admiral, and I think that probably was an exception. Probably the first time that's ever happened, to have a panel like that.

And then the third point that I would just make to remind you, Sydney, when you were also participating in one of our limited objective experiments -- and if there are other members of the press, we invite you to do the same thing -- you remember that General Gluck was there and the front table was Special Operations two-star, Army two-star, Marine two-star. So I would say that your perception may be slightly

skewed there.

And the last point, I had the opportunity to be the kind of MC for we had what we call a Board of Directors meeting with the commandant, the chief, and Admiral McRaven. And I have to tell you, I had a little trepidation going into it, but the commitment and unity of thought amongst those three very diverse officers in terms of their experiences and the services that they've come from was very interesting to me, and frankly reassuring. We have at the senior levels the issues that we've raised here. They have a clear understanding of why we're doing this, why we must do it, and where we have to go. How is the part we're still wrestling with?

And in terms of -- last point -- National Guard roles and missions, of course, we're a total force. We can't fight without the Guard and Reserve. Frankly, the United States military at large can't fight without the Guard and Reserve. We provide the depth and endurance for any operation regardless of what the lead is in that regard. And in terms of engagement, one of the key things that we lean on heavily is their state partnership capacity program which is a very unique and hugely beneficial tool in our engagement strategy in all of the theaters, not just say in Africa.

MR. O'HANLON: Any final comments on this?

GENERAL HAAS: If I could just again address the issue of the human domain. Two key points.

Although we have not agreed upon a final definition for it, we are looking at the physical-cognitive information, social-cultural aspects of human behavior, beliefs, perceptions. And getting back to Dr. Singer's point, we don't want in the long term, looking out to the maturity of this concept, for it to be somehow stove-piped within just land power/land domain. The joint forces always seeking to find cross domain synergy and we see the human domain as being able to help in that regard and achieve some of that.

And then with regard to the National Guard, certainly our National Guard forces within the Special Operations community are a little different than the rest of the

Army's in that they almost mirror our active-duty force. So what we change and modify and update within our active force immediately translates into our National Guard forces. So not that significant separation between active duty SOF, SF, and National Guard SF.

MR. O'HANLON: Peter, any comment on this round?

MR. SINGER: No, well, quickly I think the question isn't the value of the National Guard and Reserve. It's to Mark Jacobson's earlier point of how organizations change. And look, we have an active tension right now between the active duty forces and the Guard and Reserve over a relatively small change in the grand scheme of things where -- and this is changing Army aviation -- where we can't even transfer a couple of helicopters back and forth. I mean, that's the way it is right now. And so a question moving forward is when we're talking about these bigger level issues, how we can make that more seamless so that that value continues to be the case.

And then the second is, again, all those things that Jim Schear laid out as problem sets of the use of force and our ability -- you phrased it as act as a magnet both positive and negative and the like. Every single thing that you said would have applied to the air war campaign in Kosovo. So that's, again, I don't want us to just limit it to land warfare. It's maybe where it's most dire, but it also ironically may be where it's least needed cognitively right now because it's most on the brains of the land forces components that challenges the other parts of it.

I just want, again, it's not the human side. It's the idea of how do we make this more ultimately joint in the end. So the dispute isn't over whether it's this Marine or not; it's the fact that this should be -- we should have all the colors, so to speak, represented.

MR. O'HANLON: Given the talent we have on this panel I want to do one quick lightning round so I'm going to invite two very short questions and then sort of 60 second wrap-ups for each panelist and then we'll swap here from panel one to panel two.

Ma'am, here in the fourth row, and then is there -- and then also Ian near

the back.

MS. MONTGOMERY: Elizabeth Montgomery. I'm a graduate student at SAIS across the street.

Gentlemen, Dr. Singer discussed the management of talent within the Armed Forces, especially to go forward in the 21st century. Does this seem like a good opportunity for you all to reevaluate the career track and the plans we've got most officers on right on? If you want to retain unique officers with unique skill sets, is this a good opportunity to reevaluate what those officers need to do in order to progress within the Armed Forces?

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. And Ian, the last question.

IAN: And just to ask whether cyber capability is a part of land power. CYBERCOM is not represented but the way in which the human domains like to be influenced is through digital channels. And given whichever way you answer that question, how does that impact on organizational constructs?

MR. O'HANLON: General, do you want to start here and we'll work our way down? General Haas, you can start if you like.

GENERAL HAAS: Well SOCOM has some service-like responsibilities and we are reviewing the management of expertise within the officer corps, and certainly our senior noncommissioned officer corps, and how do we best manage these regional experts that we are developing on a daily basis? How do we, more importantly, retain them, and then certainly place them in a position where this regional expertise and knowledge that they have developed over their careers as a special operator can contribute to the advice and the planning that we forward up to our national command authority. So we don't see radical change in how we're managing our Special Operations officers and NCOs, but we do see, and this task force will help inform that, how do we modify that management of personnel? And, of course, because we are not a service, we look to certainly the services to help us and assist us in that.

MR. O'HANLON: Colonel.

COLONEL ZIENTEK: Good question. This was a lively debate last night over dinner, but I just want to emphasize that in the Marine Corps, the Marine is our most important asset, whether he's enlisted or officer. So we will closely make sure that we're selecting the right people, training the right people, and continue to develop them, pick out the talent for the future success of the Marine Corps. So that's something first and foremost on our interactions.

MR. O'HANLON: General?

GENERAL HIX: First, I would just note to my colleague, Pete Singer, seamlessness usually comes from a lot of wrestling. So this is not something that's going to happen immediately, but I think over time. I can tell you, it took us a long time to get an 11-page paper out because there was a lot of wrestling. But at the end of the day, the three four-stars, which again, may be unprecedented, signed that piece of paper.

MR. O'HANLON: By the way, for people who want to read that 11-pager, what's the best way to find it?

GENERAL HIX: Posted on the TRADOC website.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. So Training and Document.

GENERAL HIX: You can draw it down there or we have the NCR reps here with Tim Heuning and Scott Kendrick, along with Mike, and they'll be happy to come brief you.

MR. O'HANLON: And for the C-SPAN audience, it's called -- what's it called, so if you want to Google directly the title?

GENERAL HIX: Strategic Land Power Winning the Clash of Wills.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

GENERAL HIX: In terms of talent management, we're an institution of people that are enabled by technology. Technology does not define the Army any more than it does the Marine Corps. Technology is tools that you hand a soldier. The same thing is true with our Special Operations brothers. So people are central to what we do.

In terms of how we rethink our development of particularly our leaders,

as we came out of Iraq, particularly now that we're drawing down in Afghanistan, we undertook a program that's called the Army Profession, which sounds very bland. But what we did is we surveyed I think about 44,000 officers, NCOs, warrant officers, and soldiers about what were their views about the United States Army, and they came back to us and said we have to rebaseline our leadership and talent. We're a profession. We've got to get back to the basics. They told us that. So this was a bottom-up piece of this, which I think is very important because they understood the gravity as you come through this period of kind of reasserting and becoming reacquainted with your profession -- unique knowledge, Army doctrine, et cetera. Not unlike -- I won't say we're surgeons, but not unlike being a doctor or a lawyer. These are learned behaviors over a long period of time. It's not just something you come to on a weekend. And so I think that's a key part.

The other thing I would say is that while the Army is often accused of being high bound, I'm an Army strategist which is a very unique and small career field, yet the Army has decided to promote me and a couple of other Army strategists into the general officer corps. So I think it's indicative of the fact that the Army has changed because that would not have happened before. And it's not that we need a lot of people with my skillset and experience and assignments, knowledge, et cetera, but we have recognized as an Army that there are unique capabilities that we have to bring forward all the way through the ranks, both enlisted warrant and the officer corps.

And the last point on cyber. As I mentioned in the beginning, one of the key areas that we're focused on is this convergence of cyber, land, and human, and what does that mean to how we deal with both the "human domain" -- I'll put it in quotation marks for my Marine brother here. But also what does that mean in terms of how conflict unfolds, what that means at the tactical level, et cetera. And I will tell you that one of the challenges that we've levied on the cyber community in our Army concept development is the capability to take local action for local effect and not be reliant on what is currently principally a strategic arm that comes out of Washington and the approval process gets

consumed inside the National Security Council in many respects. So you don't act at the speed of war in cyberspace as your opponents are.

It used to be said it was easier to kill people than spend money in Iraq when we started CERP, and I'd say the same thing is -- it's easier to take kinetic action against people operating in cyberspace than it is to take cyber action in cyberspace that actually has a better and more enduring effect right now. And a big piece of that is capability, not authorities. New tools, you'll have new ways of operating. So that's one of the areas that we're focused on.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

Peter, last word.

MR. SINGER: If there is a human domain battle, to me it's this last question. It's this issue around the talent within the forces today and tomorrow and how do you recruit, and more importantly, retain it. And you can think about the challenges in the space that are somewhat uncomfortable, and they should be uncomfortable in a period of change. If they weren't, you couldn't say that the force is at a transition point. So one, for example, is the issue of how do you build up talent in areas that frankly haven't gotten the attention over the last couple generations. I mentioned tactical air and missile defense where we may be going through a shift in the 21st century where there will be threats at the tactical level that we have, in effect, hallowed out some of our capability within our land forces because of the assumption that the Air Force could control for all of them. I'm talking about, for example, the proliferation of small UAVs, short-range missiles and the like. That's a career field question as well. It's not just how do I build out that force; how do I get top people within it and give them promotion track opportunities?

A similar -- we've got the multiple services up here represented, but they have very different approaches to promoting below the zone or not. Essentially, how you reward meritocracy. Army does. Right now Marine Corps doesn't promote below the zone. Just a fact. So how do we deal with that becomes even more of a challenge when

the force isn't growing in size, but rather, shrinking in size? How do those top talent who may not have some of the promotion opportunities that they have had previously within the Corps, how do you keep them in?

Another links to the cyber question which is, again, it's both the new area, unlike say missile defense, it's sexy, but we've not yet established what the long-term career tracks are for people in that space, and even more so, you have retention problems because of just, frankly, how great paying the jobs are outside of it, and maybe the opportunities to be more operational if you're outside the military because of the problems that the general mentioned here.

Another way of putting this is we're thinking about history. Young officers today will be going through the same kind of questions that Patton and John Kahare did about 100 years ago. Patton was someone who loved horse cavalry. John Kahare did as well. They both went to West Point. Patton chose to go into the tank corps, and it's a good thing for America that he did. Unfortunately, he languished at sort of mid-career ranks for the next two decades. John Kahare stayed within the horse cavalry and rose all the way up to a two-star general. And ultimately, he was arguing to Congress as late as 1939 not one more horse will I give up for a tank. So we've got this same kind of question within our junior officer corps today, which is this talent issue is not just size; it's also how do we find that talent and put them in the best places and make sure they stay within the best places.

And fortunately, to end on, it's a great thing that we have inquisitive minded two-star generals today, rather than some of the, you know, we're not going to repeat some of the mistakes of the past. And that's the difference, is the attitudes that you've seen up here, which to me is really more, at the end of the day, the attitude is the most important thing.

MR. O'HANLON: Well, thank you. And please, as we swap here very quickly, join me in thanking these three distinguished officers. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. SINGER: So if I can ask folks to go ahead and take your seat, we're going to roll right into the next panel here.

So one of the fantastic aspects of this topic which links back to the prior ending point of the last panel is that the human capital issue here is not a problem. We have a wealth of expertise such that rather than having an eight-person panel up here, we've got a second -- we're breaking this conversation into two parts. And we've got some great folks here.

First, we've got H.R. McMaster, who by all definitions of the terms is a true warrior scholar. A 1984 graduate of West Point, he's gone on to serve his nation in places that range from Iraq -- and I should mention in multiple decades there -- as well as Afghanistan and elsewhere. A lengthy list of commendations, including the Silver Star. He's also known as one of the top thinkers in the field, starting with his Ph.D. dissertation, "Dereliction of Duty," which is required reading for anyone in this space, and continuing to be an active writer. And when I get to the question part well speak to this.

He's presently the commander of the Maneuver Center for Excellence at Fort Benning, but he deserves a congratulations on some recent news. Defense Secretary Hagel announced the nominations of four officers for promotion to lieutenant general last week, including H.R., who will become deputy commander of the Army Capabilities Integration Center at TRADOC.

Next, we've got Mike O'Hanlon, who you heard in the last panel. We'll now be able to unleash him on you in a different role. He's senior fellow with us at the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, and also director of Research in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. He specializes in U.S. defense strategy and American foreign policy. He's by far the most prolific writer in this space, including his most recent book, *Healing the Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence while Cutting the Defense Budget*. And if that wasn't enough, he has an upcoming book in May entitled Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S. China Relations in the 21st Century.

And finally, we're joined by Bill Galston, who is the Ezra K. Zilkha chair in

Brookings Institution's Governance Studies programs where he serves as a senior fellow. He's a former policy advisor to President Clinton and a variety of presidential candidates, but most importantly for this discussion, he's an expert on domestic policy and political campaigns and elections.

And so, what I'd like to kick us off is I'll just go down the row here. H.R., you had a very important article recently entitled the pipe dream of easy war. And when you look at the trends out there, but even more so the discussion that we heard both in the first panel but more broadly out there in sort of the media, what concerns you the most? And then how do you connect those concerns to not merely the discussion of the day on the size, but more so the form and function of land forces?

GENERAL McMASTER: Well, thanks. It's a real privilege to be here among so many friends who have lent clarity, I think, to our thinking about national defense, which I think is immensely important, especially in a period of diminishing resources.

What concerns me the most is really that we'll engage in wishful thinking that's motivated mainly by budget constraints. Now, obviously, as a military officer here, our job is to do the best we can with whatever we're provided from the American people. I mean, you get the Army that the people are willing to pay for in a democracy and it's our job to do our best with it. But what I'm concerned is really the emergence of four fallacies about the nature of future armed conflict that I think could set us up for difficulties in the future, either by not having the right balance across our joint forces -- land, aerospace, sea, cyber capabilities -- as part of interdepartmental efforts and multinational efforts. But these fallacies, I think, give us these easy solutions to the complex problem of future war.

The first of these you might call the return of the revolution of military affairs. You know, it's like a vampire. You know, it comes back every 10 years or so, but it's this thinking that really advances communications and information, collection capabilities, precision munitions, and now robotics and so forth, have fundamentally changed the nature of war and warfare. And then, therefore, war can really mainly be

won through the application of firepower onto land from the aerospace and maritime domains. And while these are tremendously important capabilities, they're not a strategy because you interact with the enemy, war is an extension of politics, war is human dimension, the things that were talked about on the first panel.

The second fallacy I would say, you might call it the zero dark 30 fallacy, right, is that really all we need are tremendously capable Special Operations Forces who will conduct raids against discreet targets and essentially, we can solve the problem of future war with something akin to a global SWAT team to go after enemy leaders. Again, an immensely important capability but not really a strategy that can work when applied to the complex problem of future war.

The third thing I would call -- I call it the Marlin Perkins or Mutual of Omaha Wild Kingdom fallacy. Okay, and for those of us who are old enough to remember, Marlin Perkins hosted Mutual of Omaha's Wild Kingdom, but he never really got dirty down with the wildlife. It was Jim. Jim would go down and do all the hard fighting. So under this fallacy, we'll just rely on other armies to do our fighting for us. All we need is an advisory capability. Again, an incredibly important capability but not in and of itself a solution to the problem of future war.

And then the fourth thing that bothers me, I think, is just this idea you can opt out of it. Right? And this is really a narcissistic approach to the problem of war and warfare that really, we can just decide ourselves, and it doesn't give any agency to our enemies, which I think is, you know, is dangerous. And, of course, we would I think engage in that kind of wishful thinking at our own peril.

So to the degree to which I think these fallacies gained traction, we would risk, I think, decisions that would imbalance our forces and not give us the kind of capabilities we need to prevent conflict, to deter conflict, to respond to crises. And then really, what do you want the Army to do? I think what we need the Army to be able to do is provide that kind of deterrent, right, to enhance regional and global security and stability, to send a clear message to our potential enemies and adversaries, that it is not

in their interest to take action that threatens the American public or our allies or our vital interests. And then I think we have to be prepared to respond. We ought to respond as part of a joint, multinational force, an interdepartmental effort that integrates all of the elements of national power to defeat enemy organizations and then to get to sustainable outcomes consistent with our vital interests.

And so those are the capabilities we need to build into our future force. We're working very hard on that now. We're consolidating the hard won lessons of 13 years of war, and also making this grounded projection into the future to identify, really based on emerging technological capabilities, some of the things, Peter, you've talked about -- emerging threat, enemy adversary capabilities, and then shifts in geopolitics. So our forces will be ready across our doctrine. How we're going to fight our organizations which are changing. We're modifying them to be even more capable. Our training, which has improved I think immeasurably in the last 13 years. And then a real emphasis on what you were mentioning, Peter, which is leader development and education.

So despite what you hear in the news about diminished resources, it's an exciting time to serve in our Army because we are in this key transitional period as you mentioned, I think analogous to the transitional period in the interwar period between World War I and World War II.

MR. SINGER: Mike, I want to give you the exact same question in terms of the trends out there and how you are looking at it as it connects to both sides but also form and, you know, let you react.

MR. O'HANLON: Thanks, Peter.

Well, I guess the main thing I would drive home at this juncture, in terms of what I worry about and where I think we need to be motivated, I think we need to maintain what I would describe as credible imagination. And what I mean by that is thinking about scenarios that could happen that are not far-fetched, but still require a little bit of mental stretching to come up with. Like, for example, Afghanistan 2001. Who would have thunk it? Who would have predicted it? And yet we did it and we still are

there. And some people would say we never should have gone, but very few people actually ever said that, in the early years anyway. So this was a war that became a war of necessity, to use Richard Haas' phrase, even if later it became more debatable. And at the time we didn't anticipate it.

So what I want to do is get away from saying any scenario you can make up, any poor imitation I could try to fabricate of Tom Clancy, may he rest in peace, is somehow valid. And I don't want to invite people to suggest that we should prepare to use the U.S. ground forces anywhere and everywhere. Thank God, to my mind, for example, just to be provocative, thank God the Ukraine crisis did not involve any consideration of these kinds of tools, at least so far, and I hope it won't. And by the way, that should raise some pretty interesting and tough questions about whether Ukraine and Georgia should ever be parts of NATO, at least under the current formulation. So I'm trying to be provocative here in the sense I think there are some scenarios we do need to be very careful about or even rule out as possible future concerns for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. But, there are a lot of other scenarios that I can imagine that could involve U.S. ground forces, and it's very hard for anyone in uniform or anyone in government to talk about them because they require some degree of political indelicateness.

I'll just give you a couple of very brief examples and then wrap up. One is what if India and Pakistan, heavy forbid, wound up in war again? And potentially, even got to the verge of nuclear war? And this could happen. It was just five years ago that terrorists out of Pakistan attacked Mumbai and I don't think India would show the same restraint if that happened again. And may be a nuclear weapon even gets popped off by each side against the other's air bases that are closest to the border and all of a sudden Pakistan is worried about a general Indian invasion in a very narrow country. Okay, what does the world do in that situation? Let them fight it out? I don't think so. I hope not. I hope India and Pakistan would be willing to ask for help. Not an invasion by the world against one or the other, but perhaps some kind of a trusteeship for Kashmir. Let's say Kashmir was the catalyst to this. And after a certain period of trusteeship there's a

referendum by the Kashmiris on their future as an alternative to seeing this kind of war continue. Or let's say the nuclear talks with Iran do not go well and we do wind up using force to strike some of the Iranian nuclear facilities. Do we really think that's the end of the story? A lot of people seem to say, well, yeah, Iran is going to have to bomb some hotel someplace to show that it's still tough, but after that it ends. I'm not so sure. I think you may enter into a period of prolonged semi-cold, semi-hot war in the broader Persian Gulf in which case some deployments of American battalions and brigades to some of our allies along the Persian Gulf may seem like very prudent investments in deterrence. We could go into any of these in more detail and a lot of others. Syria, a case in point as well. Just because no one wants to be there now, do we really think we can let this place blow up indefinitely? Some kind of an international peacekeeping force should we ever get to a peace deal I think is a distinct possibility. We've got to keep these kinds of credible imagination scenarios in mind as we think about the future of our ground forces.

MR. SINGER: Bill, and I left out one key part of your background specifically for Sydney. You served in the Marine Corps as well.

So more important to this panel, you specialize in domestic politics, and so when you hear these discussions that we had in panel one and then just now on some of the scenarios that Mike's laying out there, where is the American public on this and how should that weigh in?

MR. GALSTON: Well, thanks so much, Peter, for the question, and to both of you for this most unexpected invitation to be on this panel. I have to say when I walked into the briefing room this morning and the sun came through the window and glinted off the brass in the room and just about blinded me, I had what I can only describe as an Admiral Stockdale moment, for those of you who remember the 1992 presidential campaign. You know, what the heck am I doing in this room at this time? But then it occurred to me that I had one thing to contribute to the conversation. I think that setting aside how words are parsed, the idea of the human domain is and ought to be at the very center of our considerations. The most important human domain is the U.S. homefront.

That domain dwarfs everything else that we've earned.

Why is that? Well, you've already heard quoted the classic definition of war as a clash of wills, each side trying to impose its will on the other. Well, will in a democracy has two dimensions, one of which is military. I'm not worried about that. The will of the U.S. military has never been broken and will never be broken. I'm utterly confident of that. But there's also a political dimension of will, and that is a different matter altogether. We did not achieve our objectives, whatever you think of them, in Vietnam, because quite frankly the other side broke our will to continue the fight. And we can pretty much specify when that happened. And I, in preparation for this panel, I read a land power theorist who finished a very interesting article with a short paragraph on land power, the foundation of Pax Americana. And I said, "Wait a minute. We're not wrong. And we never will be wrong." And one indication of that is that time matters.

World War II, our combat participation in World War II from beginning to end lasted three years and eight months. We have been in armed conflict now for almost 12-1/2 years. The American people will never sustain political support for conflict that lasts that long. In wars in the American democracy, time matters. Time is a critical constraint on a viable strategy. Never imagine that time is our friend when it comes to armed conflict. And all of this goes to the question of what the American people are thinking right now. They think that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have not been worth it; that those wars failed their rough and ready definition of a cost-benefit test, and furthermore, they are less and less convinced that we ought to bear any burden, pay any price to maintain our current global role.

Americans are all in favor of robust economic engagement with the world, but the question of whether we should maintain a forward leaning role in the world as the global guarantor of this, that, and the other thing is very much up for grabs. And a sign of that is what's happening on the fiscal front. Because of the republican position on taxes and the democratic position on entitlements, we have stabilized the budget for the short-term by cutting the only other portion of the budget that's left, namely discretionary

spending. Military spending right now is a little bit under 4 percent of GDP. Over the next 10 years, according to the CBO, it is on track to decline to 2.6 percent of GDP. That's where it's going. I don't know of anybody who is comfortable with the idea that we can carry out or defense and our global responsibilities with 2.6 percent of GDP, but that, my friends, is where we are heading, and that is a political question.

One last point. There are political reasons behind many of the fallacies that H.R. McMaster put on the table. Naval power is pretty clean. Air power, the way it is now conducted by the United States, is very clean from the standpoint of the American people. You can hope to do it without incurring a single casualty. Land power is dirty. And the worst phrase in American politics right now is "boots on the ground." And we are -- and this will be my final comment -- we are in a period, which to those with historical memories, reminds me of the immediate post-Vietnam period in 1973. It took us a better part of a decade to get over the psychological and political consequences. And if I'm right that that's where we are now after 12-1/2 years of war in the Middle East, then it seems to me realistic thinking about our defense future ought to take the sentiments of the American people into account. And if you don't like them, figure out how to challenge them and change them.

MR. SINGER: So I can't let that pass without giving you two the opportunity to respond. So why don't we just go back down the row. Mike, and then H.R.

MR. O'HANLON: I want to say two quick things. One is very nice analysis. Hard to disagree. I would say, however, if 13 years ago I had said to you, "Bill, we're about to get attacked in New York and then as a result of that we're going to spend 13 years in counterinsurgency warfare," I wonder how many people in your profession or mine would have predicted that that would have been sustainable. So Americans don't like it but they've actually stuck with it.

And that gets to my second point on Afghanistan, which is we just had a presidential race just over a year ago and both candidates decided to leave the issue untouched because actually -- and this I think largely confirms what you're saying but it

puts it in a different perspective -- neither one of them wanted to be the cut-and-run candidate, but also neither one of them saw any political hay to be made by talking positively about the war. And that may be a reflection of where the American public is. In other words, most of us don't have family engaged. Most of us only have limited direct investment, and what that means is that political leaders, at least for that war, and for managing the broader war on terror, have a little bit of space to do things that they think are needed for the national security of the United States. And they shouldn't talk themselves out of a willingness to do some very modest things because of this conviction that the public has already jumped off the ship. The public is tolerating this. It doesn't like it, but I would say at least for the war we're in now and for the smaller operations around the world, the public is prepared to tolerate this. And I would just caution politicians not to go so far as to think we've got to pull out of everything in order to please the public that's then going to be angrier than heck in three or four or five years when something bad happens as a result of our disengagement.

MR. GALSTON: Can we mix it up, Peter?

MR. SINGER: You'll get a chance to respond. Let's let the general in here.

GENERAL McMASTER: No, I'll just say this is why I think what Brookings is doing today is so important. I think it's important obviously to have this dialogue with the American people, their representatives in Congress, and so forth. And I think that really it is this sort of narcissistic approach that we take to war and warfare that doesn't really allow Americans oftentimes to understand what is at stake broadly in terms of national security or, for example, what's at stake in any particular conflict like that in Afghanistan. How many here today even, a group that's engaged in national security affairs, could name the three main Taliban groups in Afghanistan -- who we're fighting in Afghanistan, what their goals are, what their strategy is, and why they're a threat to all civilized peoples? Probably nobody. And I think -- I mean, not nobody here, but very few could name the enemy. So we don't really even talk about threats, enemies, adversaries,

and then so we don't understand what is at stake.

So I think really an understanding, a realistic understanding of what are the threats to national and international security, and what sort of force do we need to be able to deter those threats and respond to crises if our vital national interests are threatened.

And so I think what you hear in the dialogue is, of course, the four fallacies I mentioned. But it's largely based on a neglect of really four main continuities in war and warfare, which we neglect our own apparel and have been really talked about in the previous panel and today.

And the first is that war is an extension of politics; right? Actually, from this political competition is where violent conflict emerges from that violent political competition. And what we tend to do though is simply war and to look only at military means, first of all, but then really only look at targeting enemy organizations. Targeting equals tactics equals operations equals strategy equals policy. And I think we saw when we were debating about what to do in Syria, you know, debating whether or not to shoot TLAMs, cruise missiles, and how many to shoot really wasn't a very useful debate to have because really I masked what was most important, which was to understand the nature of that conflict, the degree to which our vital interests were at stake there and humanitarian concerns that are at stake. And then what can be done broadly in that conflict.

The second is what we've talked about. You know, we talked about the human domain and really, war is profoundly human. And I think what's different about threats that are emerging to national security today is that these threats are emerging from the least industrialized places in the world, whereas in the past we were concerned really only with the most industrialized places in the world. And so I think what that means is we're going to have a lot less mourning about the nature of future conflicts. I mean, we saw that with the mass murder attacks on our own country on September 11, 2011, and so we need joint forces that are able to respond quickly that are ready and can

respond quickly to those threats because of a number of factors -- the fact that these threats come from state as well as nonstate actors, and the extension of military capabilities previously associated only with nation states to some of these nonstate actors. And these are particularly destructive weapons that pose a threat to us and also from nation states in the form of long-range ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction. We can talk more about that later.

The third thing that we neglect in terms of continuity is that war is uncertain. And this goes to Michael's point. I mean, our record in predicting the next fight is perfect. It's zero. We've never been able to do it. So one of the important things I think is to understand broadly what potential threats are and then to have balanced joint forces again to deter conflict, and I would say to William we have had extended commitments and have been successful in that connection. I think Korea is an example of that. And so obviously we would want wars to be fast, cheap, efficient, quick, but obviously, based on the nature of the war, it may take longer than we would like. And the war doesn't have to maintain huge numbers over a long period of time with a large number of casualties. I think extended commitments of land forces as part of joint forces to regional security like that to South Korea is an example of an important aspect of land power.

And finally, the fourth kind that we neglect I think is that war is a contest of wills. I agree with William here. This is an important aspect of really the public understanding war and warfare. And, of course, it's important, I think, for especially civilian leaders I think to have this discussion, academic leaders and think tanks. Our role in the military, right, is to give our best advice; right? But not to cross the line between advice and advocacy. Nobody elects generals, right, to make defense policy decisions or decisions in wartime. So we need to give our best advice. I think we can highlight what the stakes are, describe the nature of our enemies and who we're fighting in wars like that in Afghanistan and the connection between these Taliban groups, for example, and Takfirist groups associated with Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda Central and so

forth. But really, it's going to be really for others, for you guys here I think to help educate the public about the enduring nature of war and warfare, threats to national security, and then what we have to maintain in terms of our capabilities to deter and respond to conflict.

MR. SINGER: Can I ask one follow-up question and then give Bill the last response before I open it up?

So in many ways you wear two hats here because you're also a historian. And so you've laid out that you see these series of continuities. And you're a historian who specialized in the parallel that Bill just made to that Vietnam period. So I would argue there's two differences, and I want to get your response to them in terms of that period.

One is the scale of the threat. So as bad as these three Taliban groups, and even a lash up to Al-Qaeda and however we want to say, because it's not industrialized, because it's not a state, what it can do, and more importantly, the way the American public interprets it, is fundamentally different than the Cold War, the Red Army, the Soviet Union, and the like. That's one. Do we see continuity in terms of threat or disconnect?

The second is what your work was truly on, the profession of arms. The different interaction between the American public and its militarian operations is shaped by the fact that we go from a conscript force to a truly professional force. So do you see those as continuities or are these new kinds of disconnects? And how do they manifest themselves?

GENERAL McMASTER: Well, I think there are both continuities and there are changes obviously in the nature of the threats with which we're contending. So I think that what has changed is obviously the importance of nonstate actors, transnational organizations, often that enjoy state sponsorship. And I think that really what that takes oftentimes is an effort to defeat those organizations in context of multinational operations really because these are groups that operate where the writ of a

legitimate state is very weak. And so it's important for then I think land forces to able to operate as part of a multinational effort. I think Mali is an excellent example, and French operations there, of what land forces -- how land forces have to respond to those kind of threats. And so they responded in such a way as to defeat an enemy organization and then get to some sort of a sustainable outcome internal to the country and then also to hand off to multinational forces and so forth.

I think you see other uses of land power in recent months even in the Central African Republic, for example, that also demonstrate the need for us to be able to intervene effectively where there is large-scale communal conflict because I think what these conflicts have in common, and they're different, obviously, but in Syria, in Iraq with a return of large-scale communal conflict, in Yemen for example, in Northern Nigeria, in Central African Republic, the recent operations in Mali, what they have in common is that you have a communal conflict in which communities are pitted against each other in a struggle for power and survival. And then you have outsiders who come in and portray themselves as patrons and protectors of one of the aggrieved parties. And then they advanced their interests by trying to establish control over territory and people through intimidation coercion and perpetuating that communal conflict. I think this is an element of each of these conflicts that I mentioned, and others as well.

The only way to really cope with that effectively is to break that cycle of violence and then to deal with the human dimension of war; right? To understand the tribal, sectarian, and ethnic oftentimes dynamics, and then to mediate some sort of an outcome there that's sustainable and remove support for these extremists, whether it's the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran and their proxy Hezbollah in Syria or if it's ISIS, for example, on the other side, and then to get to some sort of sustainable outcome. You can't do that without land forces. I mean, you can't do it. And so I think that that is an element of discontinuity, maybe, where these conflicts I think more often now place our vital interests at risk, and we have to be adept at coping with those.

I do though also see an element of continuity with those wars of the past

because I do not think we can write off threats from nation states and capable fielded forces of nation states. I think North Korea is an easy example for that, but there are other companies that are developing nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and long-range ballistic missile capabilities. These have, as some have talked about in terms of anti-access area denial, a defensive capability that could keep us and our allies from having access, but I think what we neglect oftentimes is the offensive capability associated with these long-range missiles and how it could place our nation at risk in a way that we have not been at risk in the past. Or at least in recent years since the end of the Cold War.

And so I think this is a threat that is analogous to the V1 and V2 threat to London in World War II, that's analogous to the scud missile threat to Israel from Anbar Province in the 1991 Gulf War, analogous to the long-range rocket threat to Israel from Southern Lebanon in 2006 or from Gaza in --

MR. O'HANLON: Let me intervene there. You just listed examples to allies in the midst of war. If it's 1972, the American public is facing 25,000 nuclear weapons targeting it. So that's where I think in terms of it may be existential to those local actors, but in terms of the American public's viewpoint of that, is it viewed -- that to me is the disconnect because we don't view it as existential.

GENERAL McMASTER: I think that's correct. And so, of course, it's incumbent on the three of you to explain that to the American public.

MR. SINGER: So Bill, you get -- and then we're going to open it up.

MR. GALSTON: Very quickly, first, to my good friend Mike O'Hanlon, who may be regretting having tendered me this invitation.

MR. O'HANLON: This is why we want you. Go for it.

MR. GALSTON: The point I was making does not pertain principally to the wars that we are now in. It pertains to the willingness of the American people over the next decade or so to enter into new wars of that character. And my argument is that whatever reluctance Americans have as kind of a baseline is now much higher. And the

presumption against doing it is going to be harder to rebut over the next decade unless it is a clear response to aggression. Clear response to aggression. That's point number one. And I would say in this connection, please don't shoot the messenger.

MR. O'HANLON: I'm not even disagreeing with you.

MR. GALSTON: I am not any happier about this swing in public opinion than anyone else is up here. I recall the years from 1973 to the early 1980s as an appalling period in American history, and I pray that we don't repeat it, but I fear that we may. So that's point number one.

Here's point number two. I can't believe that a former marine sergeant is entering into a debate with General McMaster, but we were taught to go up the hill against superior forces, and so why should I change now?

GENERAL McMASTER: That's not the best method. We can talk afterwards.

MR. GALSTON: Yeah, well, that's -- nobody said we were the smartest force but we are the toughest force.

The point I was making was not about extended commitments because we have, indeed, demonstrated our capacity to maintain extended deterrence-focused commitments in Korea, in Europe, and in elsewhere. I was talking about extended conflict, and that is a distinction with a difference. Right? The American people can go for months without noticing that we have tens of thousands of troops in South Korea. They can't go for a day without seeing what's going on in Afghanistan. They don't like it. That's the difference.

GENERAL McMASTER: Do they even know really what's going on in Afghanistan? I mean, I think remarkable about Afghanistan is I think it may be the most underreported war in American history and this being the information age. You know, so in terms of the ability I think to gain access to it is inversely proportional to the amount of really meaningful coverage that's available at least in the mainstream media.

MR. SINGER: I think that links to the disconnect between Vietnam and

today is the fact of the draft-based force or not. So media responds to its clients, its consumers, and its interests are elsewhere, and I think it reflects because we don't have that same linkup.

But let's open this discussion up. Please raise your hand and well go from there.

Way in the back.

MR. ULLMAN: I'm Harlan Ullman. Thank you for the interesting discussion. H.R., good to see you.

I'm concerned by this whole session because it seems to me that the military by default is becoming the surrogate to try and solve national or international problems that it alone cannot do. So I'd like the panel to think about two observations.

First, I would argue that the single most interesting issue of the 21st century is the empowerment of individuals and nonstate actors which is challenging the Westphalian state-centric system. And therefore, that has really changed the strategic calculus.

Second, it seems to me that the country with the best Armies, Navies, Air Forces, and the Marines find it hard-pressed to win against enemies who lack those forces. So how would you argue about the future of military power when it seems to me that the nature of the dangers are really changing from state-centric threats -- and we can deal with North Korea, potentially Iran, the list that Michel comes up with -- and we're in a brand new -- I shouldn't say brand new, but a different political environment in which military force may or may not be necessary but it's far from sufficient.

MR. SINGER: We'll just go down again.

General?

GENERAL McMASTER: Well, I would just say that military force has never been sufficient in and of itself to prevail in a conflict. And it's always take really the combination of all elements of national power combined in a way that serves to defeat the enemy but also to shape environments and consolidate gains consistent with our

interests. And so I think what is important from Harlan's comment is that there is an increasing threat from transnational terrorist organizations, guerilla-type organizations who are now increasingly connected to transnational organized crime. And so it is immensely important to connect what we're doing militarily to a political strategy -- what we want to achieve overall. And this is what we have to make sure that we take into consideration in all of our planning scenarios and war games and so forth because we oftentimes skip over that and we just look at the application of military force as an end in and of itself.

And so what is immensely important as we look at threats that are emerging from nonstate actors in particular, I think, is that we have to contend on multiple battlegrounds simultaneously. We fight pretty well, I think, extremely well on the physical battleground. But if you look really at what has been difficult for us to consolidate gains or factors have complicated our efforts to consolidate gains in Afghanistan, it's really that our enemies are operating very effectively on other battlegrounds. The battleground of public subversion. Hezbia's Lamba Gobadien is a great example. They have been extremely effective at infiltrating and subverting state institutions and functions in Afghanistan. We don't contend on that battleground as well as we could.

Also, these groups enjoy state sponsorship as well and support safe haven support basis. How well do we do diplomatically to isolate these groups from state support, for example? There also is the battleground of perception, right, and information. And oftentimes we're not very effective on this battleground as well to discredit and criminalize these people. I mean, we're fighting some of the largest criminal organizations in the world who try to cloak themselves in an irreligious ideology. Right? Why don't we expose that? These are mass murders. These are narcotics traffickers. These are people, you know, who are hypocrites, who send their kids to private schools in Pakistan and elsewhere while they blow up schools in Afghanistan.

So I think, to answer your question on what to do, I think it's a better integration of all of our elements of power and contending on multiple battlegrounds. The

biggest area of opportunity for us I think is a greater integration of law enforcement with intelligence and military operations where that's appropriate. And this is, as we look at these networks, we have so many things that we could do I think to weak these networks through effective law enforcement tools, targeted economic sanctions, travel bands, visa denials. I mean, there's a broad range of tools that I think we can apply to these organizations more effectively.

MR. O'HANLON: Harlan, valid question. I would just underscore the obvious, which is this is a panel on the future of strategic land power, so we are allowed to talk about war. But I take your broader point which is that most crises should not, and hopefully will not require the application of American military force. I said earlier I'm very happy that there was no discussion of possible military response in Ukraine, nor should there be in my judgment now, nor in the future in that kind of a crisis in that kind of part of the world.

The book that Peter kindly mentioned that Jim Steinberg and I are finishing is largely about how we tried, to the extent possible, demilitarize much of the U.S.-China interaction going forward. And I'm content, and I heard Army generals today say that they had no objection to the Army getting a little smaller in the next round of Quadrennial Defense Review and the net budget proposal. It causes some angst. It causes some concern. But people are not fighting it partly because of the reasons you mentioned. We need a strong economy. We need strong diplomacy. We need other tools of national power to be effective in this world, and an overly large defense budget or an overly reflects of resort to defense instruments could get in the way. So I take your point. I would simply submit that, in fact, that's what's on all of our minds.

The last point, however, Syria is the case that I did mention. Syria is a place where these worlds we're talking about unfortunately sort of come into a messy mix. Is that a classic problem or is that a new age problem? Is that the individual in power, the jihadist group empowered or is that Assad as the enemy? Maybe it's a little bit of all of the above. And all I'm submitting in this panel on the future of land power is

that there may be a role, whether we like it or not, whether we want to admit it or not in 2014, here in Washington right now. In a year or two there may be a role for an international stabilization force, because the idea of seeing Syria be essentially a sanctuary for jihadists and extremists indefinitely, given its location, is not necessarily one that I can accept over the long term. So I think we may need to have the capability of that kind of a mission should we ever get to a peace deal that might require an international implementation course.

GENERAL McMASTER: Just very quickly, a theoretical point. I would distinguish between two propositions. Proposition one, individuals and nonstate actors and transnational movements can exert more pressure on states now than they could a generation ago. I think that's incontestably true.

Proposition two, that somehow demonstrates the obsolescence of the Westphalian state system. You can believe in the first without believing in the second. I believe in the first; I don't believe in the second.

MR. SINGER: One last point on this notion is also figuring out the match between the threats and your responses to them and distinguishing when it's good for your budget and when it's good for national security. So we've brought up cyber a number of times here and you've seen, for example, recently the Army argue the need for greater cyber capacity but the justification was to help defend American energy companies against attack. I can believe we need greater cyber capacity; I do. But I also believe defending American energy companies against cyber-attack is actually the responsibility of American energy companies, which are not doing enough on it. And so we need to be careful and sort of parallel some of the decade ago discussion of nation building just because the military has the organizational heft in the budget, there are certain roles that in the absence of other actors it sort of moves into it. We have seen the same thing play out on cyber where it's not that it's not important but we need these other tools of government to be matching what DoD is doing in cyber.

But let's give a question in the front.

Yeah, Gary.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks very much. I'm Garrett Mitchell, and I write the Mitchell Report.

I want to take one more swing at Bill Galston's observation about the linkage between American public opinion and the public action -- the actions of its government and argue that for two, if not three reasons, there's a sort of, I fear, an irretrievable break, which I know Bill doesn't, but let me just say, professional army and no constriction means that a statistically insignificant percent of the population has skin in the game from a public opinion point of view. The second issue is the increasing domination of national security decisions of this sort at the White House and the growing irrelevance over time of the Congress in weighing in on those decisions, and I would say even -- I appreciate your distinction between actions that are in response to 9/11 as opposed to actions that we would take with some less impetus than that.

But I'm concerned about -- and that's why I raise the question -- I'm concerned about the fact that there is this break between what American public opinion is about war and the extent to which it can actually play a role in decisions made by the government, by the president, the administration.

MR. SINGER: Bill?

MR. GALSTON: Well, I absolutely agree that the movement to an all-volunteer force has made a significant difference in the relationship between the American people and the U.S. military, and I am on record as having opposed that movement for precisely that reason. I think that from a civic standpoint that trade has been an unmitigated bad. From the standpoint of military efficacy, the arrow points in the other direction. And that raises some deep -- that raises some deep challenges.

With regard to your second point, I guess my reading of history is different. I note for the record that when Bush 41 was organizing the international community's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he saw fit to go to the Congress. He didn't claim that he could do it without going to the Congress. When Bush 43 was on

the verge of going into Iraq, indeed had already decided to go into Iraq in my judgment, he went to the Congress and there was a huge full-scale public debate, and senators of both political parties were required to declare themselves on that question, and that public declaration turned out to be extremely consequential. And so the idea that the White House can just go off on a toot and do what it wants is not consistent with my reading of large military engagements. Can the White House do smaller things on its own? Sure. Up to a point. But I wouldn't overplay that disconnect. I think presidents still understand that they need a solid base of public support to enter into armed conflict. And they're right.

MR. SINGER: Mike and then General. I want to give you -- we're hitting closing time here, so I want to give opportunity for you on last thoughts either on this question or beyond the themes that we've hit.

So Mike, and then we'll give you the last word.

MR. O'HANLON: I think Bill said it extremely well. So in the interest of hearing a grand finale from H.R., I'll thank you for the question and pass.

GENERAL McMASTER: I just thought one thing to highlight is really the importance of land power as part of joint force capabilities to do what we're asked to do in our national defense strategy, which is prevent, shape, and win. And so I don't want us to undervalue really the importance of land power as part of that deterrent force.

The other thing I'd like to just close with is that there is no bigger fan, there are no bigger fans of the United States Air Force and Navy than the United States Army and the Marine Corps for that matter as well. And that's because we recognize that we couldn't even get into a fight or to protect our interests if it weren't for the Air Force and the Navy. But it's important I think to understand something that we've alluded to in the previous panel, what distinguishes war on land from war in the relatively fluid media of the aerospace and maritime domains. I think a few things.

First of all, I think technology gives you a greater advantage because you typically have a bounded or a small number of targets that you can identify and engage

and establish supremacy of those domains. But what's different about war on land is instead of a bounded number of targets on land, you typically have tens of thousands of targets, all of which are trying to avoid being classified as such, right? And so what you have to do is recognize countermeasures to your technological capabilities that are human-based, that are land-based. Because geography complicates things and then our enemies apply countermeasures, dispersion, concealment, intermingling with civilian populations, deception. I mean, there are two ways to fight the United States military broadly; right? Asymmetrically and stupid. Right, and we can't bank on our future enemies taking stupid.

So what's important I think is for us to have a balanced joint force capability that allows us to engage in essentially what is a game of rock, scissors, paper. That's what joint force capability is; right? That's what combined arms capability is. And our enemies will take action to avoid our strengths. Right? I mean, there's never been a silver bullet. You know, you had the submarine, the sonar, the bomber, the radar, the machine gun, the tank, the tank, the anti-tank missile. And there are always countermeasures developed. And Peter talked about some of those that MEs are developing now. We've banked on our network. We've tanked on our strike capability. That is under threat by not just the tactical countermeasures I mentioned, traditional countermeasures, but increasingly technological countermeasures.

So for us to have an effective deterrent capability, the ability to prevent, shape, and win as a nation, we need a balanced joint force. Land power I would say is an essential component of that. And so we have to consider changes in technology, threats, enemies, adversaries in our operating environments, the types of missions we might be committed to, which is the work that Michael is doing as well, but also let's not neglect historical insights, and in particular I think continuities in the nature of war.

So I just want to say thanks to Brookings for putting on an excellent panel. We talked about how many Americans don't study war and warfare in width, depth, and context, and consider these things. What Brookings has done I think to bring

this topic to the American people I think is admirable and it's been a privilege to be on the panel with you guys.

MR. SINGER: Thank you.

So you can see the importance of this topic, and of the effort that the task force is wrestling with by the series of big questions that have all become tied together from land warfare and its past and future to larger scale questions about American strategy to where this lashes up with the American public. And really, I would argue the health of our democracy. And so because of that I want to thank, first, all of you for coming out, but in particular, the panelists up here and also sitting up here in the front row. We very much appreciate both your participation in this but also the work that you're doing on this in the future. So thank you again and please join me in a round of applause.

(Applause)

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