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THE ACCOUNTABILITY REVOLUTION:

NEW APPROACHES TO ADVANCING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

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Introductory Remarks:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PICCONE: Okay. Good afternoon, everyone. Thanks for your patience.

I'm Ted Piccone. I'm the acting vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program here at Brookings, and I'm very happy to have you all here for this event today. I think we'll have a very interesting and lively discussion.

The Development Assistance and Governance Initiative of the Global Economy Development Program has pulled you all together to hear from what I think is a tremendous bank of talent, resource, and experience all in one room. So you're very lucky to have this opportunity because you have people here who come at these issues of democracy, governance, human rights, and accountability from a variety of different angles -- from civil society, from academia, from working at the United Nations, from working inside the U.S. government. It's really a great perspective to focus on this problem. And this problem is a very serious one. It's one particularly for someone like me who comes at it more from a legal background and from a foreign policy background, has always considered it a bit of an outlier in how it gets integrated into the foreign policy agenda. But increasingly, it's become more and more important to the development agenda, and I think that's why we're here today to hear from our speakers and to consider the question of how issues of democratic accountability, participation, human rights becomes much more integrated, becomes elevated as a priority for USAID's strategy going forward.

This occasion is to mark the release of USAID's new strategy on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, which came out earlier this year, and it's really AID's effort, and in particular I think Sarah Mendelson has been so involved in really doing a rethink on how USAID can do a better job at making these issues relevant

to the development outcomes -- not just outputs but actually outcomes. My job is really just to welcome you and to introduce our first speaker, who is Mark Feierstein. Mark is currently serving as the associate administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. He's been fulfilling the duties of deputy administrator while also serving as the assistant administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, which is where I first met Mark many years ago crossing paths at the State Department while he served as a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States. Mark is someone who has a long career, in particular in the field of elections and polling. Having served as vice president of Greenberg Quinlan and Rosner, an international polling firm, and working all over the world, he and I sometimes have bumped into each other at the Miami airport while he was observing or working on some elections in South America. So we're very honored to have him here today. You have his bio and all the bios of our speakers.

After Mark speaks for 15 minutes or so, George Ingram will lead the discussion with our panelists, and he will introduce them in more detail. I think you know George is a senior fellow here in the Global Economy and Development Program, and also wears a couple of other hats. He's a senior advisor to the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition and co-chair of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network. George has spent 22 years on Capitol Hill, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and also has his own experience at USAID, particularly focused on the former Soviet Union, and with AED before that.

So, as I said, you're in very good hands for this discussion, and I appreciate your coming out today. And welcome Mark to the podium.

(Applause)

MR. FEIERSTEIN: Good afternoon. Good to see you all. I know that

when you organize an event like this in mid-December, you invariably are competing with Christmas parties all over town, but you've all chosen to be here with us. To each his own, I guess. But the cookies are pretty good at the very least, and I promise the speech, or at least the panel will be very strong as well.

Thank you, Ted, for the very kind introduction, and thank you for your leadership on issues with regard to democracy, human rights, and governance. I had the privilege of working with Ted in the Clinton Administration when he was instrumental in establishing the Community of Democracies. He later served as analyst and advocate with the Democracy Coalition Project and Club of Madrid. He's been doing some really important work here at Brookings, of course, on democracy and human rights issues. And I understand he's rebuffed entreaties to join the Obama administration, but we'll keep working on him.

I also want to thank another long-time colleague, George Ingram. And Ted spoke about his past a bit. By the time Ted and I arrived in Washington, about a quarter century ago, George was already a fixture here. Not to date you too much, but he's --

MR. INGRAM: I was old then.

MR. FEIERSTEIN: Yeah, but you're young now.

But for 40 years he's been a real leader of the development community in Washington, and I saw him just last week. He MC'd at the Society of International Development's Annual Awards Event. So he's in great demand as a public speaker, and so we're very lucky to have him here, too.

I do want to recognize three of my USAID colleagues. I want to start with Larry Garber. I'm not sure if Larry is here, but we'll recognize him anyway. Larry is in our Policy Planning Bureau, a really important voice in USAID and democracy issues. He's

been a mentor to me and a dear friend for some 30 years, since I attended a presentation of his back in 1985 on the elections in Nicaragua and El Salvador, which took place in '84. Hard to believe 30 years has passed and that the protagonists in at least one of those countries is still the same.

I also want to recognize David Yang. Where is David? There's David. You can move up more. But David is the director of USAID's Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance. He's been a real driver behind this strategy and its implementation. And we worked together as well in the Clinton administration. In fact, when David, Ted, and I joined the administration, none of us were fathers yet. We were just talking about our daughters and sons who are now in college. And now our kids are starting international relations and political science and history and reading about the mistakes that we made 20 years ago. It makes you realize that Google is not such a great thing after all. But we're all wiser now and we're doing our best to make our daughters and sons proud.

And I know Sarah will be introduced later, but if I can say something about Sarah, who is deputy assistant administrator in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Human Rights. No one is more passionate than she is about these issues. No one is more knowledgeable than she is about these issues. She has a much harder role today than I do. I, unfortunately, have to leave after I give my remarks. That means if I say anything dumb she's got to answer for me. So Sara, thank you in advance for that. I very much appreciate it.

Today's topic resonated very much with me given my own background. I came to Washington in 1987 to work at NDI, National Democratic Institute. Couldn't get a job anywhere else but Ken Wollack did agree to hire me. And we were just up the street at the time. It was 1717 Mass. Ave. in a very, very small office. I'd walk by the

Brookings building every day wondering what it took to get an invitation to speak here.

At the time, NDI had 18 employees. Eighteen. All in Washington. I think today they probably have, what, 1,000 maybe? Anybody here from NDI? How many employees have you got? How many?

SPEAKER: Thirteen hundred.

MR. FEIERSTEIN: Thirteen hundred employees. Okay. So from 18 to 1,300. Its budget was $1.8 million for the entire world, 1.8 million. So they didn't operate in too many countries at the time. Obviously, that's a fraction of what their budget is today thanks to the generosity of USAID.

And its survival was threatened, along with that of the NED. And there were critics on the left who saw the whole enterprise as interventionist. There were critics on the right who questioned whether democracy promotion was really in our national interest. They didn't really see the moral imperative to the work either.

And to give you an idea of how much things have changed, the president of one of the core grantees at the NED at that time, in 1988, during the plebiscite on Pinochet in Chile, said that if he were Chilean, he would have voted for Pinochet. He said it was a noble vote. This is the president of one of the core grantees of the institute. So things have changed a little bit since then.

Now, obviously, the democracy promotion business was very much in its infancy. We were just learning, to be honest, figuring out how to most appropriately engage with various actors overseas, getting a sense of what worked, what didn't, who to work with, and how. But they were pretty heady days, too, and things seemed easy in a way, at least in retrospect. We operated in some pretty favorable settings, like Chile. The third wave of democracy was building momentum, had yet to crest. We thought that democracy's advance would just continue and spread across the world easily. We were

really at the end of history some said.

And obviously now, a quarter century later, you know, much has changed. A lot of it is quite positive. You know, democracy has, in fact, reached regions of the world and countries that it did not reach back then. There's a strong bipartisan consensus in favor of democracy promotion, both for moral reasons and because it's in our national interest. The effort is vastly better resourced. We all have much more experience and knowledge of a better sense of what works and what doesn't, and of course, we have new technologies to take advantage of.

Now, on the down side, the job seems a lot harder in many ways. Environments where we operate today are in many cases a lot less hospitable. There's backsliding in a number of countries, number of regions. And the approaches that seem to work so well two decades ago in certain environments seem to be a lot less effective now.

So within USAID, we realized it was time to craft a new strategy, and the original approach was crafted back in the early '90s during the third wave acceleration. So we needed to adapt our approach to the challenges and opportunities that we are facing today.

And in particular, we want to think about three things. One is how to continue to respond to the opportunities presented by the Arab Awakening. We wanted to figure out how we can help forestall the reverse wave or the democratic recession as Freedom House calls it. We wanted to get a better sense of how we can best take advantage of the global communications revolution.

We also want to understand better the multiple challenges faced by many new democracies -- crime, corruption, conflict, social inclusion, extreme poverty, vulnerability to climate change, and natural disaster. And to be honest, you know, 20

years ago we didn't necessarily think about many of those things as being threats to democracy.

So this past June, as Ted noted, we released our new Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance. And the new strategy contains a few fundamental changes. First, it elevates the role of human rights in our work. So we've renamed the sector Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance. It used to be DG. Now it's DRG. And if you say DG in Sarah's presence, she will slap you down as she often does to me. So be very, very careful. And through this elevation we seek to make clear that USAID will continue to support the promotion of human rights, the protection of citizens form the violation of these rights, and the prevention of future abuses.

The strategy also calls for the integration of the principles and practices of democracy, human rights, and governance throughout every USAID sector and the idea is to help make socioeconomic development more sustainable, because we do know that democracies generally generate superior levels of social welfare.

Now, last year in his State of the Union speech, President Obama called on Americans to help eradicate extreme poverty by 2013. And USAID is increasingly focused on that as a goal, as are other comparable agencies. But we know we can only get there if we also advance in democracy, rights, and governance. And as Dr. Shah said about a month ago, the road map out of extreme poverty is driven by broad-based economic growth *and* clear, transparent, democratic governance.

Now, transparent governance or accountability is the focus of today's panel, and promoting accountability is a key component of our DRG strategy. The strategy states that USAID will "foster greater accountability of institutions and leaders to citizens and to the law."

Now, accountability is, of course the defining concept of democratic

governance; it's only democracies that -- only democracies have the authority that citizens accord to the government limited temporary and subject to the ballot box. Accountability is achieved when citizens can ensure the public officials perform their duties and uphold their responsibilities within the spirit and letter of the law. Accountability requires, above all, free and fair elections, open political space, transparent government operations, the rule of law, and an ethos of public service.

Now, our new strategy seeks to combine two types of accountability mechanisms. There are those that are citizen driven, bottom up, elections, independent media, watch dog groups, and then there were those that operate within the state, parliament, and the judiciary, for example.

So if you read the new strategy section on accountability, you'll find four elements to our approach. First, we will continue to provide assistance to enable citizens to exercise their right to select and replace their leaders through periodic free and fair elections. Elections are, of course, citizens' ultimate check on the government's most senior officials. At USAID, we do a range of things in elections. We provide support for election administration, voter registration education, political parties, domestic observers, international observers, and media reporting.

But our electoral assistance goes beyond the mechanics and traditional political environment issues. In Ukraine, for example, we supported the Chesno movement -- Chesno being honest -- which is a coalition of over 150 NGOs that use crowdsourcing techniques to rate MPs and candidates on specific dimensions of public integrity.

The second area we work in is the support of civil society and independent media, and enable them to provide oversight to government. We know that civil society and media organizations monitor abuses of public power, recognize positive

examples of public service, and call for access to information. USAID supports CSOs to conduct analysis, advocacy, and accountability, and to assess government performance, for example, through citizen report cards. We support independent media through development of investigative journalism and professional reporting on government. In Nigeria, for example, a recent USAID supported radio program on governance issues reached over 20 million people -- 20 million, a quarter of the national audience.

Third, in support of accountability, we will continue to support the institutional independence of judiciaries, legislatures, and auditors-general, and we will strengthen civilian control of the security sector.

Now, I've had a chance to see a number of our rule of law programs around the world and see how they contribute to accountability. I think probably the best example is in Guatemala where under the leadership of an extraordinary attorney general and Supreme Court we supported round-the-clock court dedicated to women who have suffered violence. And in an environment where the judiciary is often overburdened and often infective, this special court is providing effective assistance and justice.

The fourth area where we operate in the area of accountability is with regard to assisting state institutions at all levels to provide public goods and services and to do so transparently. I was in Iraq last week where we have trained more than 7,000 officials in the last four years in strategic planning, budgeting, urban planning, and incorporating the needs of women in public policies. Procurement reforms is an area where we are increasingly providing assistance around the world, and we'll also implement anti-corruption efforts that support the demands for accountability.

Now, on the one hand these are all sectors that USAID has been working on for a long time. What's different is that we're now talking a more systemic approach. We recognize accountability is not the result of isolated standalone

institutions; it's the product of a complex system of institutions spanning the field of elections, civil society, intrastate checks and balances, and the rule of law.

Now, to advance our efforts on accountability, we have launched a multi-donor, global effort called "Making Voices Count," which is designed to boost citizen engagement and government response on this through the application of mobile and web technology. This new initiative was shaped by innovative solutions that we received in response to an open solicitation. It was inspired by the principles of the Open Government Partnership, which President Obama launched at the U.N. two years ago and which has grown from eight founding governments to 62 today. I understand that Sarah Mendelson will speak more about the Open Government Partnership and Making All Voices Count during the panel discussion.

And Making All Voices Count is really emblematic of USAID's new approach to accountability. First, it's multilateral. It takes advantage of the increasing role of other donors and conveys that the effort is a representation of universal values. It's not made in America. Second, it's a public-private partnership. It recognizes the vital role of the private sector in democracy promotion. And third, it recognizes the vast potential of technology to bridge the divide between citizens and government.

So we're confident that with such tools we'll be able to do our part to stem the current reverse wave, initiate a future fourth wave of democracy, and with our new strategy, USAID is stating our aspiration to continue to act as a leader in the international community's efforts to promote human rights and democratic governments for all peoples.

Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. INGRAM: Ted, thank you very much for introducing the program

today. And Mark, for giving us the overview and laying out the four elements of what we're going to talk about today, which is the accountability aspect of the new democracy strategy. Thank you also for both being so concise, keeping to the time, so that the panel and the audience has a full hour to engage -- I plan to engage the panelists for half an hour, and in keeping with open government, leave a half an hour for the audience to engage the panelists.

You have a copy of their CVs in the program, so I'm not going to go into great detail, but at the far end of the panel is David Tolbert, who is a lawyer, who has worked in various capacities in the U.N. system, both as an advisor and the practical experience of a prosecutor in international criminal justice. And he is president of the International Center for Transitional Justice.

Warren Krafchik has experience in the role of parliaments and civil society in the budget process and in international economic development starting in his home country of South Africa. He is the senior vice president at the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities.

And Sarah Mendelson has worked in academia and civil society in democracy and human rights and is now serving as deputy assistant secretary of USAID in the DCHA Bureau, and she was integrally involved in the development of the new strategy.

I'm going to commence the conversation with a specific question to each of the panelists and then follow up with a couple of general questions.

Warren, if I can start with you. You've been involved in budget transparency for years. What is budget transparency? Why is it relevant to accountability? How does it hold public officials accountable?

MR. KRAFCHIK: Thanks. And thank you for inviting me to speak today

about a subject that I've been obsessed with for at least 20 years. And I think there's a good reason for that. Maybe to start answering your question, I could start with a statement. And that is that we already have sufficient resources, sufficient public resources globally to eradicate extreme poverty. The problem is how we collect and manage and distribute those resources. The problem is a public finance or a budget problem.

Just 15 years ago, the global consensus was that best practice public finance was done behind closed doors in secret chambers by a very small coterie of those in the Department of Finance. The logic was that any external intervention in public finance is likely to support very specific interests, unlike the Department of Finance that's completely independent, and also that's likely to frustrate and upset markets. What we've come to learn subsequently is that emerging evidence tells us that more transparent and more inclusive budget processes are likely to lead to budgets that are more equitable, more efficient, and more effective. So we've come almost a 360 degree turn in a relatively short period of time. And we have this new global consensus that's embraced not only by the 62 people in the open government partnership but by the World Bank, by the IMF, by the huge range of institutions that in a sense hold collective wisdom on public finance.

Why is this the case? Let me explain it maybe by just giving you three very quick examples of the type of role that civil society can play -- citizens in civil society can play in budget processes. So an organization called Fundar that we work with very closely in Mexico was taking a look using their analytical tools to take a look at Mexico's $2 billion subsidy program for farmers that suffer a lot as a result of NAFTA. And what they found was that the subsidies were getting out, and in fact, they were getting out to 10 percent of the largest farmers that seemed to have access to 60 to 65 percent of the

subsidies. So what they did is they trolled through government data, they created a web base and a kind of table that people could understand and interact with. They spoke to the media, they spoke to parliamentarians, and a campaign took root. And that campaign encouraged the Mexican government to take another look at the agricultural policy. And in fact, it capped subsidies to large farmers and rapidly expanded those to smaller farmers.

Take a second example from my home country. There's a wonderful coalition called the Treatment Action Campaign that's very active on HIV/AIDS issues. And in the face of the previous South African government's reluctance to respond to HIV, they took the government to court. And the basis of the claim in court was to say the government has sufficient fiscal space within their health budget already to provide anti-retrovirals to all those that are HIV-positive in South Africa. Based on our budget argument, this got assessed and the courts ultimately ordered the government to provide anti-retrovirals to all South Africans with HIV. This has resulted in another 1.6 million people that have access to anti-retrovirals.

And I could go on with many examples of organizations in India and other parts of the world that are able to track government corruption, malfeasance, poor management, and provide information to the government on how to do this better.

So what does civil society do? What's the magic that's involved here? There isn't really much magic. It's really about common sense. It's about the kind of learning that you get from a dialogue that includes a very wide range of people. Civil society organizations are able to raise the voices of the voiceless of marginalized communities in debate where they haven't really been represented before. If you go to a budget hearing in any country around the world, particularly in developing countries, you tend to get tax and insurance houses that stand up and give evidence. It's very, very

seldom, or it's becoming less seldom now, that you have civil society organizations providing a competent, technical voice on these issues from the perspective of marginalized citizens.

The secondary common sense point is that citizens have information that the executive branch doesn't have because they live on the ground. If you want to go to a country and provide a dam for a community, if you don't speak to the women in that community that collect that water, you're going to put the dam in the wrong place. It's just common sense.

And the third, and this is important and I'll close on this, civil society organizations are able to complement the work of formal oversight institutions -- legislatures and supreme order institutions -- that are often challenged in terms of both independence and research capacity. So civil society adds substantial value to public budgeting, but the caution is they can't do it alone. Citizens don't have the capacity or the time to carry the oversight responsibilities for a country. They provide a substantial contribution. And what's really important to link to some of the comments earlier is how do vertical relationships of accountability interact with horizontal relationships of accountability? Our research shows that civil society is likely to be more effective where it works well with legislatures and supreme order institutions.

So the USAID strategy is pinpointing something really important here. If you're interested in accountability, citizens have a critical role to play, but they must do that in a way that's complementary to the work of formal oversight institutions.

MR. INGRAM: Thank you.

Those of you in the back, there are seats in the front, so don't be shy to come down here and join us, even come up on the stage if you want to.

David, you've had at least half a lifetime involved in international criminal

justice at a very practical level as a prosecutor and also at a policy level. What is the role, what is the space for rule of law and accountability? And what is transitional justice which is the title of your organization and what you're really focused on?

MR. TOLBERT: Somehow or another I thought I might get that question. I get it a lot.

But first I'd like to commend the strategy and Sarah and her colleagues. I'm particularly pleased to see that rights come front and center and that accountability is so woven into the strategy because from where I sit and from the countries that we work in and that I've worked in throughout my career, post-conflict countries and post-authoritarian countries, we've had massive human rights abuses, you really can't begin to talk about the rule of law unless you talk about accountability and address accountability and human rights.

So let me reverse the kind of questions a little bit and talk a little bit about transitional justice because it's an often misunderstood term, and I find that it gets tossed around a lot. But if we think about societies that have experienced massive human rights abuses, crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and so forth, the situation that's faced is that you have a breakdown, you have really a breaching of the social contract between the citizen and the state. Essentially, the state has failed to either protect these individuals or has actively abused them. It has actively committed human rights abuses. And we can look around the world today and point to a lot of countries where that is happening.

So how do we begin to break that? We, I think, rightly turn to accountability to begin to repair that social contract so that the state begins to do the job it's supposed to do; that is protect citizens, to provide them with redress. But that is not a simple situation where you have a long history of human rights abuses or a real

breakdown on law and order.

So how do you have accountability, which I think we'll all accept -- I don't think you'll get too much argument in this room or elsewhere that the rule of law is ultimately essential to get these societies back on track -- how do you manage that? How do you have accountability in a broken society like that?

Well, we've found that this is what transitional justice really does. And it also works -- I think going to your point, Warren -- I hadn't thought there'd be a lot of connection between the two presentations but with respect to civil societies and I'd say broader than that, social movements play a really important role in pushing governments and pushing all of us to ensure that accountability happens. And ultimately, the government has to come to the fore. I hope I'll get a question about the connection between the rule of law, justice, and development in a moment because I think this is an important part of the discussion. But I won't meander too much at this stage.

These two elements, particularly I think civil society, victims' groups, women's groups, marginalized communities, play a really important role in this accountability process. And what we look at is a wide consultation kind of process and engages civil society because it's their country and it's the accountability there that they're looking for.

Now, that being said, there's a wide experience over the last 30 years in dealing -- and beyond -- with societies where you've had massive human rights abuses starting with Germany, and we can go through Latin America, whether it's Guatemala, whether it's Argentina, whether it's the Balkans where I spent a lot of time working, or whether we're talking about -- I don't like to use the term "Arab Spring" anymore, but the situation in the Middle East and North Africa.

And we've seen emerging what we call transitional justice. And that is

accountability, but more than simply criminal accountability. Now, criminal accountability is really an important aspect, and I've spent a lot of my career on that. But ultimately, to take an example like Bosnia, we had 10,000 perpetrators. You're not going to prosecute every perpetrator. The Yugoslavia Tribunal, which up until fairly recently was seen as a pretty successful institution, has prosecuted 121 of those 10,000. National Court, maybe a couple hundred.

So ultimately, criminal prosecutions are important but frequently they're not possible at the beginning. There's too much political instability. It's difficult to indict the leadership. So it frequently comes down the road. But there are other ways to get at accountability, and truth commissions -- there have been some 40 truth commissions around the world over the last couple of decades -- which get at what really happened at the root causes of this conflict or this gross violation of human rights. They can tell a much broader story, and they can also lead to prosecutions of those who are most responsible for the most serious crimes. Reparations programs, which recognize the injuries where the state has failed to protect the citizens, either compensation schemes, whether they're collective or whether they're individual, at least symbolic to show that the individuals' rights have been violated. And then importantly, institutional reforms. That is human rights abusers are vetted out of the police and the military because ultimately what we're trying to do is establish a social contract. We're trying to reestablish civic trust between the individual, the citizen, and the state. Nothing can undermine the civic trust of the victim if she goes to the police station and sees her abuser across the counter.

So these are the elements that we talk about when we talk about transitional justice. And ultimately, I'd come back to my initial point, and that is that if as we see in the strategy the rule of law is ultimately a key element in development -- and I do want to come back to this I think really important question between the linkage of

justice, development and security but I'll restrain from that for just a moment -- accountability has to be an essential element because you can't build a rule of law in the air. At the end of the day, if the perpetrators remain in power, if the institutions remain the same, you are not going to have the kind of civic trust to be able to move from a society that abused rights to one that respects rights.

So I think the strategy is a good one and I look forward to hearing the rest of the conversation.

MR. INGRAM: Thank you.

Sarah, one aspect of what's being called an accountability revolution is the technology revolution. Communications technology that's allowing citizens to communicate and organize among themselves and facilitates communications between government and citizens. I look at this and I see lots of opportunities, but I understand there are risks, too. Tell us about both of those.

MS. MENDELSON: Thank you. Thank you, George, for having us, and Ted, for helping to organize. It's great to be on a panel with both David and Warren.

Before I answer your question I want to draw what is perhaps an implicit link, and I think an under-researched link, between transitional justice and what I think of as the open revolution. It's not true for all the founding countries, but if you look at the core eight, you have Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa. These are countries that all went through extremely violent episodes in their not-too-distant past, and they are countries where governments and civil society have been -- citizens have been on the forefront of the open revolution. So I have to think that there is some connection there between these past crimes and this almost desire or demand and drive for things open which is so interesting.

I also want to acknowledge that without -- I don't want them to stand up

because then you'll see it's half the audience, but there are many, many people in this room that helped build the strategy and are working to implement the strategy every day. There are just teams of people at AID who have really taken this on and their daily dedication to it is what is going to make the difference between business as usual and taking advantage of breakthroughs.

So yes, there are opportunities and risks. Technology is a neutral I'm often reminded by our technology gurus. The opportunities are probably fairly obvious. We have a situation now where citizens are more connected to one another and finding more information than ever before. This has the impact of essentially breaking down sovereignty in some places. Citizens are much more empowered. It's threatening very much so to some authoritarian governments, and I think that that's driving in part what is a backlash. The risks are many. They are physical and they are digital. In terms of physical, for activists themselves, the fact of having the technology means that certain governments are able to find them. Information is not necessarily safe. Donors generally, or people who are supporting organizations, have not always urged or demanded activists to be thinking in terms of their own security, and I think that as we engage -- and we are -- as we engage on the many fabulous things that you get with technology, it's our duty to also be thinking with our partners about security in the round, and we're very grateful that Freedom House not too long ago organized a meeting along these lines. For the sake of security, I won't go into too much more detail on that.

But we're also hearing about strange things, things that I think need to be documented more. For example, I learned yesterday that some governments are using Facebook pages to go onto Facebook and I guess either pretend that they are someone that they're not. They're essentially -- we all know the phenomenon of ghangos. There's a lot of lateral learning that's going on. There's a lot of lateral learning in the open spaces

and there's a lot of lateral learning among authoritarian governments. And then there's the in between. Even governments that are opening up oftentimes may have pernicious laws that they're advancing. So it's the world that we live in at the moment. We don't think it's going to change too soon. We're inundated with information, and the government, it's not as if we're in the 19th century; it's as if we're in the 20th century. And the information that's coming in to us is from the 21st century. And so that's a big challenge that we have.

MR. INGRAM: Good.

Second question for everybody, and that is open government. OGP. The Open Government Partnership is part of this accountability revolution, and to read from the OGP website, it's a multilateral initiative to secure commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance.

Sarah, you were at the OGP meeting in October and represented the U.S. Government. Warren, you've co-chaired the civil society input into it. David, OGP clearly has implications for rule of law. Share with us what the state of OGP is. Is it really moving the ball on open government? And again, this is something that sounds like a no-brainer to me. Why is there pushback? Why are there downsides to this? And Sarah, why don't you start.

MS. MENDELSON: Well, first, I brought something that could be used as a stocking stuffer if you wanted. It is essentially a guide to open government. It's colorful. It's interesting. And for those of you who think I don't really know what this Open Government Partnership is, this handy guide that, again, you can put in a stocking stuffer, would be very helpful. And it was produced by friends, I guess, of the Open Government Partnership.

To be in London with over 1,500 people at a summit hosted by the U.K. government where only two years before in New York it was the launch of something, it was truly amazing. I mean, it's one of these enterprises where it was a good idea that was tapping into what is an organic phenomenon out there, this open revolution, and it's just taken off. And so there are over 1,000 commitments by governments. There's such vibrancy around this. It's hard for me to think of any enterprises that has grown at that rate from eight countries to 62, so I think there's a huge moment of needing to consolidate and making sure that what we have is real. There was a lot of discussion about the backlash, that there are a lot of countries that are trying to advance pernicious laws around civil society and the need to be thinking consciously along with civil society and interested governments what more can be done? This is a turning point and a critical issue for OGP if it's going to be real. The thing that's different about OGP is it's not a governmental enterprise. It's not an only civil society enterprise. It's governments and civil society coming together.

But to speak about OGP sitting next to the recently retired --

MR. KRAFCHIK: Demoted.

MS. MENDELSON: -- demoted co-chair of the steering committee is as if to give a lecture in front of your professor. So maybe we turn to Warren who has lived it for many, many years. Before it had a name.

MR. KRAFCHIK: Thanks, Sarah. Right.

You know, OGP is a phenomenal animal, and I don't think that any of us that worked the first conversations in the U.S. at the White House about OGP really quite envisaged what was going to happen. We might have had a few second and third thoughts I think if we'd known that. I mean, I often wonder why we didn't stick with eight countries and really delve very deeply into eight countries and then have additional

countries join something that's proven. But we didn't.

And I think what we have now is quite a unique partnership, and it's unique in a couple of respects. The first one embedded in the core of OGP is this idea of a government's civil society partnership, and that's really in the core. So you have a steering committee with eight civil societies, eight governments, and that's reflected again in each country partnership. You have the very senior leadership, often presidents or administers in the president's office that are taking responsibility for open government within each participating country. That's quite a huge achievement to get that level of buy-in and engagement.

The third is that OGP also has an independent review mechanism. So it's an independent group of scholars who are responsible for judging or evaluating the performance of each country against their commitments, and those evaluations are public and they're put on the website and they are very vigorously discussed at an international level in each country. So those are three factors which I think make this quite a unique partnership at the international level. It's pretty early days. All that's happened so far is the eight first countries have completed their first action plan and there's an independent review of those. We're waiting over the next six to eight months to what has been the performance in the remaining whatever it is, 48 or so countries that have embarked on it, that have done work, and we're waiting to see what they've achieved. So that's pretty early days.

I think that it would be foolish for us to ignore the fact that there's often a vigorous discussion about OGP within civil society, within the countries and internationally. Is this really an equal partnership? How much are we really going to achieve? And one of the issues that civil society continually and correctly puts their finger on is that the participation space that's opened up within each of the 50 -- whatever

it is now -- 62 countries is not really an equal participation space. There are a good number of countries that are pioneering good and better practices around participation. The U.K., Mexico, the U.S. now, are really finding new ways for citizens and governments to work together. That's really good news. But there's a large range of countries which are struggling. They're struggling to find ways to engage with large numbers of civil society organizations. This is not something that comes naturally to countries like Brazil and the Philippines, for example. So there's a lot of good work that needs to be done still. There's a lot of stretching and ambition and challenges to countries to meet this marker. But I think at the very least you're looking at an initiative that in 30 of 62 countries will do a couple of things -- two or three commitments that they'll fulfill which collectively will really advance open government at an international level.

So that's the minimum common denominator, but I think that that's not enough. What we should be doing in the OGP is actually stretching much further than that. If you go to someone's house and they offer you a half a glass of wine, they're not really making you at home. So the question is what does a full glass of wine look like in open government and how to make sure that in as many of the 62 countries as possible practices are really stretching.

Just a last point. I think there is a very serious threat to OGP that's happening at the moment, and that is at the same time as there is considerable and increasing attention to open government, there's considerable and increasing closing space to civil society in a large number of countries around the world. And unfortunately, some of those countries are at the same time part of the OGP partnership. And that is a real challenge to OGP and how do we deal with it?

Two challenges. The first one is how do we deal with countries in OGP that are simultaneously threatening civil society and claiming to support civil society?

OGP is a voluntary initiative. The carrots are much greater than the sticks and it'll always be that case. The sticks are relatively limited. You can force a discussion in the steering committee about the possible suspension of a country, number of qualifications, really, if they backtrack on the eligibility or threshold criteria. That's number one. Or if they receive cumulative, very poor reports from the independent reporting mechanism. Now, there's no way that's easy within those two suspension criteria to fit the issue of threatening the space of civil society. So OGP needs to think seriously about what it does with members that do that. And I think there are a number of options. You can look at the eligibility criteria for civil society engagement. You can expand the eligibility criteria. So in other words, to say the criteria are required to enter OGP might not be sufficient to stay in OGP. You can imagine an annual reporting mechanism that talks specifically about country performance against civil society outside of the OGP processes. So those are some of the options. This idea of a red line. If countries go beyond a red line, should they automatically be suspended? So OGP has got to look at this seriously.

There's a second issue which is related to it that is also a challenge for OGP, which is what is the role of OGP as a community of 62 countries and civil society organizations to promote open government outside of OGP? You've got 62 governments together, you've got their presidents involved, and you've got hundreds of civil society organizations and social movements around the world. Here's a collective action possibility. If you're interested, for example, in influencing the past 2015 MDG goals --

MS. MENDELSON: Bingo.

MR. KRAFCHIK: Bingo. The main problems that are being -- the main challenge to the post 2015 negotiations at the moment is the discussion on is there sufficient political will about open government? There is. You have 62 countries to do it.

But what's the role of OGP to approach countries that are not doing well or are threatening civil society? And here you can imagine there's a very heated debate that will take place in OGP, but it's one that I think we just cannot ignore, and we need to take the time to brief and educate the members of OGP about what the challenge is and to think very creatively about how OGP can use its collective weight to help to reverse what is essentially the biggest threat to the open government movement.

MR. INGRAM: A quick follow-on question.

MR. KRAFCHIK: Yeah.

MR. INGRAM: Which you can assert is unfair.

MR. KRAFCHIK: Sure.

MR. INGRAM: Is there a country that you can go to and three-quarters of a glass of wine? Is there a model country out there? Is there somebody -- one or two countries ahead of the curve?

MR. KRAFCHIK: There are a number of countries ahead of the curve. A large number of countries. Brazil has done incredible things with real-time access to budget data. Several hours after any government minister or bureaucrat signs a check you can see it online. The Philippines has done some incredible work involving civil society to monitor public works' programs and hold governments accountable for where those public works programs don't use funds sufficiently. So those are just some of them. The U.S., U.K., and many others are very much on the cutting edge of open government practice.

MR. INGRAM: The U.S. would be good if we could pass a budget.

MR. KRAFCHIK: That would be a good start.

MR. INGRAM: David?

MR. TOLBERT: Well, after you follow the expert in this field, I think

maybe I should just change the subject, which I'm going to do. And I think maybe my comment will be somewhat linked to the -- I was going to say the OTP but that's the opposite of the prosecutor to see how out of depth I am on this particular subject.

I do think there is kind of a link to what I talked about a little bit earlier just highlighting, and that is that the -- you mentioned the post-2015 process, and of course, you have the World Development Report and the Millennium Development Goals. And I think there's really a strong link between human rights or justice and development that we have been really missing out on. And I think to the extent that this movement can help us push that agenda, I would hope that it would be picked up because at the end of the day, if we look at the World Development Report, which I think is a kind of ground-breaking document, it highlights the links between development, justice, and security. And I think one of its kind of cardinal conclusions is that justice measures, transitional justice has a signaling effect on those affected communities. So civil society groups, social movement, that if we see a government undertaking a truth telling process, a truth commission holding perpetrators criminally responsible, reparations programs, vetting programs, et cetera, that this signals the society at large that accountability is really going to be on the agenda.

So I think one of the frustrations that we'd experienced kind of on the justice/human rights side is that, of course, in the Millennium Development Goals there was nothing about justice, there was nothing about human rights. And it has led to some pretty difficult issues for us.

So I'll just take one or two examples. One is the case of criminal accountability under their own statute in the International Criminal Court. I know the U.S. is not a member but you're very much -- the U.S. Government is very much supporting the so-called complementarity principle -- the complementarity principle being that the

International Criminal Court is to complement national investigations and prosecutions. It is meant to be a court of last resort. So the principal responsibility for accountability rests with states.

Now, two serious issues emerge. One is that we don't have -- these states or these governments do not have the political will to carry out these investigations and prosecutions. But an even more fundamental issue frequently is they don't have the capacity. Now, I worked extensively in Bosnia setting up the Bosnian state court. There was some political willingness but there was no capacity. Now, in that case we actually had great support. We had very good support from development agencies, but I think that is a one-off kind of experience because if you look at and you have discussions with development agencies -- now, Sarah is an exception on this, but there's another development agency over here on L Street or whatever, I think called the World Bank or something like that. It's very difficult to begin to talk about accountability with them. At the end of the day, development agencies tend to operate in silos and actually accountability efforts can be very disruptive in that country. They can disrupt water projects and school projects and even court management systems. So a lot of work that's done in the kind of traditional rule of law area doesn't get at these accountability issues. So we have a pretty big divide and I had an insight following the Kampala meeting, which was the 10th anniversary of the ICC, the International Criminal Court, how do we begin to get these two groups together? Because ultimately, accountability is not going to happen in countries that don't have the resources and don't have the political will unless we get an engagement on these issues by development actors. And frankly, we've had I think four high-level meetings. We've had some meetings in-country, and we've had some buy-in from the development side. But it's a very difficult conversation because we're talking from two very different angles. If we take the World Development

Report seriously, and there is this strong link between development and justice and security, what the World Development Report posits, which I think is right, ultimately you're not going to have full development or you're going to have much less rapid development than you would hope. Without accountability, we have to begin to square that circle and have development actors onboard.

So I've taken the conversation a little bit to a different subject which I'm a lot more comfortable with, obviously, but I do think it's also important just to come back to your remarks, that I don't think we can under stress or under emphasize the importance of social movements in this process. And obviously, governments need to be on side. But as I think Sarah pointed out, they're frequently, even in countries that have -- some of them relatively new, some of the older -- democratic traditions, there's a lot of hostility between governments and civil society. Some of that is good and to be expected, but that bridge needs to be narrowed to some extent so that you can have a healthy dialogue in a democratic society. So I would make those points in response to the question.

MR. INGRAM: Thank you.

It's now the audience's turn. We have a microphone. Steven, there are three hands over there, so let's take those three hands first. Introduce yourself, be concise.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, George. Will Davis with the UNDP office here in Washington. And obviously, UNDP governance is one of our pillars as well, so we're all on the same page.

But I was just at an event with Sarah, your colleague Cynthia, who runs your Monitoring and Evaluation offices over at USAID, and there was general muttering about the challenges of assessing the impact of governance assistance programs. With development resources becoming scarcer and scarcer, Sarah, or for anyone else that

might want to comment, even you, George, how do you get your hands around this challenge of monitoring the impact of governance assistance programs? Thank you.

MR. OAKLEY: Do you want to take a couple questions?

MR. INGRAM: Yes, please.

MR. OAKLEY: Okay. Hi, hello. My name is Nick Oakley. I work for Partners of Democratic Change. And the question I have is about the role of the private sector in helping to support and promote government accountability. I mean, I was at the OGP event in London myself and there were very interesting couple of sessions that was hosted by World Bank and a number of private sector organizations. But I didn't get the sense that OGP had really worked out, you know, the role of the private sector in this. And this is on a day when as we all know the courts here in the U.S. have ruled unconstitutional the government's approach to surveillance of mobile phone records, and when about a dozen high-tech IT companies' CEOs in the White House and talking to Obama about this, and I'm sure this is going to be a topic of conversation between the two of them. So a lot of contradictions, a lot of tensions. But I think that something that hasn't been mentioned so far is how corporations can use not just corporate social responsibility. There's something at Partners we've been working with a number of corporations on to think of corporate strategic responsibility, how it can use its leverage and influence to work with government to promote what for them at the end of the day is a triple bottom line result but which for civil society is a very real sort of benefit in terms of more open accountable governance.

SPEAKER: Thank you. My name is (inaudible) with the United States of Africa 2017 Project Task Force. Thank you very much for this.

But everything you say in this and what I've heard from you guys on the panel, we stopped talking about it for Africa in the '60s. And we have seen when we look

at this like the lunatic fringe, this is the suggestion I want to make to you. Take 70 percent of all your resources for Africa in terms of Africa and concentrate on making sure you have free and fair elections in Africa. And most of the things that you're concerned with here will be in place. Thank you.

MR. INGRAM: Thank you.

Sarah, I think all three questions were targeted at you, but I think Warren and David may want to weigh in also.

MS. MENDELSON: So you heard mention of Making All Voices Count. This is this public-private partnership, about $55 million over four years. It is investing in innovation and scaling up. There is about a 20 percent chunk that is set aside for not only learning; there's a separate manager for monitoring and evaluation over the entire project. We believe, and we – DFID, CIDA, Sweden, Omidyar Network, Open Society Foundations, and certainly USAID, we need to know what works where, when, and why, and we can't afford not to be organizing ourselves to be able to capture lessons. I think it is, in some cases, an old chestnut, if you will, that you cannot either learn and know what works in terms of advancing democracy, human rights, and governance. I've done it myself. I've done random control trials and the real issue is making sure our partners know how to do it, making sure staff know how to ask the right questions. What is the way in which you -- what's the right question to be able to capture? So I think it's a big focus for us. We're, I think, behind some of the other sectors, and I think that as we are in the 2.0, and you can see it in the strategy, there's a big focus on learning and evaluation. Your methodology depends on what the question is. Sometimes it's going to be quantitative; sometimes it's going to be qualitative.

Private sector, and I know others will have things to say about this, I think that it's a complicated exercise, governments and civil society to begin with, but I

think that you're going to find that as there's sort of broadening and deepening, and we've talked about some of the kinds of things that we need to make sure ODP is doing right collectively in order to deepen and make sure it's real, but I would be surprised if some of the next chairs aren't really interested -- maybe not in big corporations but small and medium enterprises. In a lot of places around the world, small and medium enterprises are actually by definition because of their entrepreneurial aspects, they're extremely -- they're individuals who can be much more interested in rights and progressive politics and I think that that is a cluster that we'll see coming together more and more.

Sir, in terms of your comment about advancing free and fair elections in Africa, I assure you that we have many, many teams working on this, very focused on it, but I've got to push back and say that we've had fantastic leadership from Africa on this. The president of Tanzania, the chair of the steering committee for OGP right now, is a Tanzanian civil society activist. South Africa has been very involved. Many, many Kenyans. I mean, it is, if anything, we came very late to the table, USG. I mean, President Obama launched it along with the president of Brazil, but we're tapping into and recognizing a movement that is coming from the global south in many ways.

MR. INGRAM: Warren, is the private sector absent from OGP?

MR. KRAFCHIK: It is largely absent at this point from OGP.

MR. INGRAM: Is there a space there for them potentially?

MR. KRAFCHIK: The simple answer is I think there's definitely a space. I think everybody is keen. I think it's true that the governments and civil society at the table decided that that relationship would take precedence at the beginning of OGP's discussions. But right from the beginning at least there were big tech firms there trying to engage. I think as Sarah said the question is -- and it's as much a question for OGP as it

is for the private sector, which is what are the terms of engagement and what are the incentives to the private sector to get involved? And what are the incentives for OGP to reach out and bring them in? And I think that's a big, much larger development question that we need to engage with.

MR. INGRAM: Okay, thanks.

David?

MR. TOLBERT: Two comments just on the assessment point that Will raised. By the way, UNDP in this process that I was talking about earlier in terms of development actors working with justice actors has been a real leader in this, and George and Ryan and your folks in New York, we've worked very closely on that.

I think the challenge that we have from our side is the qualitative kind of assessments that you do. It's great to do training but that doesn't -- I mean, we can check a lot of boxes on trainings, but does that produce quality judgments at the end? Does the court produce a judgment that's fair? Does the Truth Commission produce a report that actually gets at the root causes? I think this is one of the real challenges that actors, at least in the field that I work in, human rights more generally, and particularly the justice sector, the fact that you have more results doesn't mean those results are better. It probably indicates the opposite. It probably indicates the trial has not been done very well.

So I think this is an area that we really need to discuss a good bit more, a lot more conversations because how do we measure that? It sometimes gets lost and, of course, we're all on the funding track in one form or the other. I'm not saying that there hasn't been some work on this, but I know it's something that we really struggle with. And particularly when I think about a field like transitional justice or human rights, these are multigenerational processes. Now, if I look at Nazi Germany or if I look at the

German experience, which is perhaps the most successful transition that one can think of, you move from the Nazi period to a democratic society that ultimately had very important trials. Actually, much more important than Nuremberg in the '60s and Frankfort. It has memorialized the crimes in a way that no other country has. The truth has worked its way into the textbooks. This didn't happen in the '40s or the '50s. It began to happen in the '60s and the '70s and the '80s. So I think the timeframe needs to be expanded, too. So I'd have those comments on measuring.

And I would come back on the free and fair elections just to say, yes, I think it's very important, and when you don't have free and fair elections, you can have situations like the post-election violence in Kenya. But it's not only about elections at the end of the day. And elections where minorities are not protected, where you do not have protection for human rights, constitutions are really essential to provide a framework in which human rights are respected. The rule of law is not simply about having a free and fair election. There are a lot of other factors that need to go in there. So I would agree that free and fair elections are sine qua non, but I think there are a number of other elements that have to support free and fair elections because at the end of the day you can have the tyranny of the majority as well. So I would make those comments.

MR. INGRAM: Thanks.

Let's move to the right side. And we have three hands right up here in the front. So let's take those.

SPEAKER: My question is primarily directed to --

MR. INGRAM: And let's keep it concise because we're running towards 3:30.

SPEAKER: Sure. My question is primarily directed to Warren but Sarah may want to weigh in.

What are your thoughts about internationally standardized interoperable budget data? So you articulated the value of budget transparency and creating a budget that would empower civil society, but I've not seen in the OGP and I did not hear in your presentation this visionary perspective of where we need to go. So the international community is doing a good job in other areas, like legislative, XML, the International Parliamentary Union. Close to 100 countries has been pushing it. That's great. ISAB has been pushing XBRL across countries for financial reporting. But so far you get an F in terms of standardized budget data. In the U.S., we've just passed, or are very close to passing the Data Act. It passed the House and it's coming out in the Senate, but that's U.S.-centric, and what we need is an international standard. And it's just not happening. And the Obama administration, which has a very narrow perspective on the Open Government Plan, no more than a two-year perspective, just is not addressing this type of visionary over budget proposal.

MR. MILLER: Paul Miller, Catholic Relief Services. Great panel. Thank you, George, and everyone. Great new strategy, Sarah. Kudos putting in civil society restrictions and the human rights. It's an excellent strategy. We'll also highlight the contradictions with other parts of U.S. foreign policy when you implement it.

The question is about integration. You talk about in the strategy about integrating with the other initiatives of the Obama administration -- Feed the Future, Global Health Initiative, and Climate Change. We had the Treatment Action campaign mentioned. What lessons have we learned in terms of governance and accountability and rights from HIV/AIDS work, from PEPFAR? What have we learned from conflict minerals and land grabs going on now that are applicable to this new policy?

MR. BRENNER: Thanks. Shamus Brenner.

Now, quick question about the justice function of government and how

you can draw lessons from transitional justice perhaps on legitimacy but also on open processes to build trust in the court system for private law as well as government accountability?

MR. INGRAM: Let's start with Warren, and then David and Sarah.

MR. KRAFCHIK: Sure.

You know, I think your open data concerns are right on the mark and they should be included in any discussions and norm building about budget transparency standards.

So for those who aren't familiar with the concept of interoperability, what it would help do is make sure that data that comes out of one local government can be compared to other local governments. The same with provincial data or national data. It also means that you can look at health spending in a country and see in a way that's comparable what's being spent at all the different levels of government. So that's very important.

The opportunity we have is that there is new technology available that can help with these kinds of questions. The constraint we have is that we really have a number of norms and standards in budget transparency, such as the GFS classification. The problem is that many countries are not following these. So I'll just rephrase your question to say that we have a very serious problem with norms around budget transparency standards and we need to address the question from that standpoint.

One problem is the overlapping norms that don't agree with each other. So the World Bank has (inaudible); IMF has their ROSCs; IBP has the Open Budget Index. They're very compatible but they're not quite the same. So you can shop. Countries can shop different norms. Then there's the open data which hasn't been effectively addressed in any of the norms at this point. Parliament and the role of

parliament in budget process hasn't been addressed, nor civil society, nor effectively the role of supreme ordered institutions. So we've got a whole set, a compendium of problems around budget norms that we need to resolve. And what's very important is that we resolve the open data questions within this broader context of norm building.

MR. TOLBERT: Yeah, just on the question of private law. I'd say the way I would look at it from a transitional justice perspective, that's kind of a second order effect in the sense that at the end of the day, if we can reestablish civic trust in the state authorities, if you can begin to rebuild the institutions of the state so that citizens can have confidence in them, then you're going to move towards a situation where private law, where the courts, the judicial system, the rule of law takes effect across the board. And I do think there is a role, and to some extent in the use of private law and traditional justice measures. I don't think it's the principal aim -- the principal tool, if you will, but private actions, either through the civil system, and in some cases private prosecutions are allowed. Recovery of assets and a number of other things can be effectively -- remedies could be effected through the private system.

But I think, first of all, you have to have enough trust in the state, so that has to be reestablished and there has to be enough investment in the judicial infrastructure. And in some cases, there are alternative dispute resolutions. Traditional societies may have other approaches. And I think you see a lot of rule of law actors generally working on these measures to rebuild the civil law systems or the civil law component of national jurisdictions. And that certain is very important, but I do think you have to get at and begin to address those massive human rights abuses in a post-conflict or post-authoritarian society so that other institutions can grow. But ultimately, what I think we're all trying to seek, whether we have development hats on today or justice hats on today is that institutions are built so that not only democratic processes can occur, that

rule of law actually reigns not just in the criminal justice realm but in the civil law realm and beyond. So I think the ultimate objective is the same and there's some role for private law I think in the process, but I think it's more of, as I say, a second order or further down the road kind of thing.

MR. INGRAM: Sarah, how is the strategy being integrated in other things AID is doing?

MS. MENDELSON: So it's interesting. We've talked -- this is obviously a session that has been focused mainly around development objective two, which is the focus on accountability, transparency, rule of law, but we've touched on all four. Number one has to do with inclusive development, and that's where you final all the work on parties and elections. Obviously, civil society runs through all of it. Number three is a focus on protection, advancement of human rights. Number four being the really tough one of integration.

So this is a new area. I think it's too early to talk about lessons learned. I think that there are certain places where it's going to be easier to integrate. I think the examples that you gave, I think there's an easier crosswalk in some ways between health and human rights. There are certain ways in which even agriculture and human rights. We have an excellent team that is thinking through and working with partners and missions, but we're going to have to do this together. And by together, I mean not only people in this room but there are many other development agencies. There are many other countries. This is the next stage. The idea that there's democracy, human rights, and governance work in the rest of development is very, very yesterday's breakfast, too, to quote some of my favorite people. I mean, this is really -- and the open period that we're in is in a lot of ways driving this. The silos are breaking down and we in government have to work towards that.

I will tell you that I think there is, I promise you, somewhere today right now there are transitional justice teams, projects, that are building on the technology, the advancement of the open idea to ask for accountability in their countries. And there are parts of the -- there's a digital divide going on in the human rights community where some are very driven by technology and very much a part of the open revolution, and some of those organizations have ties to Silicon Valley. But not only. And certainly, we see it in Nairobi. We see it in Jakarta. We see it in the Philippines and in Johannesburg. So in some ways why we're so drawn to our second objective and the topic of today is because it's affecting and touching on all parts of the sector. It's transformed in a lot of ways how we think about the sector. And it has certainly provided -- it's great when you go to work every single day and you're learning something and it's partly because there's so much dynamic energy out there. It's an exciting time to be in this business, even if it is also difficult with governments pushing back. That means that we're probably doing something right. So thank you very much.

MR. INGRAM: Well, we're at 3:29. Sarah, all I've heard today is that this strategy is timely and well thought out. And congratulations to you and your colleagues.

As we close the panel, David, Warren, any last comment? Anything you'd really like to see AID do in implementing this strategy?

MR. TOLBERT: I would just like to underline the last point that Sarah made about the importance of technology and how it is revolutionizing justice and human rights across the board. It makes such a difference in our work and you see organizations like Witness and others who are using technology so effectively. And we talk about the fight against impunity and we think about accountability. It's much harder to hide than it was, and I think that's a really good thing. So I'll close with that as kind of

a comment about openness generally, and it's something we should definitely keep our eyes on and actually push because I think the future of accountability measures will turn very much on this issue. I wanted to say that. Thanks.

MR. KRAFCHIK: There is some wonderful work to link budgets and human rights that we should talk about which is really advancing. But I think just one comment about it. It would be really powerful if this already powerful strategy could align even better with some of the other foreign policy work of the U.S. And I'm thinking specifically of a little known clause that sits in the Foreign Operations Act, which says that the U.S. government will not provide aid to countries that don't have transparent expenditure and revenue systems. What happens every year is that the secretary of state signs a whole raft of letters that says this country is important to our national security interest and we'll turn a blind eye to their fiscal practices. And I think it would be -- one start would be really great if State could perhaps start producing a report on budget transparency and fiscal transparency that's the parallel or complementary initiative to the Human Rights Report. And that might both go into those letters to say we notice that we're providing you with aid. We notice your transparency aren't quite up to scratch. Here's a program on how we can improve these together over time, and here's a report that will help to document our improvements.

MS. MENDELSON: Well, as we make our own house better, you should know that we've been very focused on making transparent our overseas development assistance. In two years, we've managed to get 86 percent of it. In a few months, we'll be up to 98 percent. It's a tough slog but we're really committed to it and it's an interesting idea. We'll pass it along to our colleagues at State.

Can I now embarrass my AID colleagues and ask them to stand up so that you can see the people who actually do the work every day? Katie, Scott. Stand up.

David Black, David Young, Claire. Tina walked out. Sarah. Keep going. Come on. Don't be shy.

(Applause)

MS. MENDELSON: Stand up.

MR. INGRAM: Well, it's clear to me that there are some people who believe in open government, and some people who found this panel interesting, because I think only three or four people have left while we were up here talking. So congratulations to the panelists, and please join me in thanking them for being with us today.

(Applause)

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