THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

THE STATE OF CONFLICT AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN AFRICA

Washington, D.C.

Monday, December 16, 2013

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Good morning, everyone. Thank you for coming. I'm Mike O'Hanlon from the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings and we greatly appreciate your interest in looking now to the new page of Africa as we've honored and commemorated the life of Nelson Mandela and mourned his passing in recent days. Of course, Africa is showing many signs of promise and Mandela's legacy, not only in his own country but more generally, is a positive one. There are a lot of things happening on the continent of Africa that are quite encouraging and I'm sure many of you know this well or have worked or studied at places on the continent that are showing greater signs of movement towards democracy, towards economic reform, greater prosperity. The growth rates in Africa in recent years continent-wide have been higher than in most decades in the past which is admittedly a pretty low bar but it's still a very encouraging trend. There are a lot of countries that, again, are coming out of conflict but today we are talking about problem spots. As you know, Africa continues to have its fair share; certainly many of them are in the news. And what we thought we would do today at Brookings is to find three of four of the countries of greatest concern in terms of severity of their conflict, or the degree to which because of the country's importance that worsening conflict there could be particularly problematic for upsetting some of these otherwise promising trends on the continent and affecting not only the countries in question but potentially their neighbors in the whole continent. So that's the theme, that's the motivation of how we're going to proceed.

I'm joined by three outstanding experts who have a wide range of experiences and who will each begin with one country, but that's not meant to exclude their taking on other countries or you raising other countries in the discussion, although we hope we will focus largely and initially at least on the Central Africa Republic, on Somalia, and on Nigeria. I will speak briefly about the Democratic Republic of Congo in the course of conversation as well but that's not my main job. My main job is to kick off this conversation with these three distinguished panelists. Let me tell you a little about each one and then we'll launch in.

And the basic way we are going to proceed, each will give an opening five to seven minute summary of the country that they're beginning with and a bit on its recent history, a bit on where it is today in terms of its politics and its conflict and potentially to tee up a subsequent conversation we'll have with you for the rest of the hour and a half about what should be done next by the countries in question, by the international community as we look to make a positive difference in these places.

Amadou Sy, immediately to my left, is Senegalese who spent a number of years in Canada studying among other things finance where he got a PhD at McGill University on the subject; worked at the IMF in financial matters including on Congo. So I hope he'll help me in addressing some of the issues with that big country in the center of Africa. But today he's going to begin by looking at the CAR, the Central African Republic, where as you know, in many ways this is the most acute crisis at least in terms of newspaper headlines for the

last few weeks. Now, there are other places that compete such as the placed that both John and Vanda will be speaking about as well, but we're going to begin Amadou's discussion with CAR.

As you know, this is a small country; only five million people. There is an African Union presence right now trying to help stabilize the place. The French have increased their role as well, but there is acute concern about a worsening sectarian strife and conflict in the aftermath of a coup earlier this year against the incumbent president of the time. So this is a real acute worry not only for failed state problem of the CAR but actually of civil warfare.

Vanda Felbab-Brown, my colleague here at Brookings, many of you know is a very accomplished author on looking at problems of weak states, failed states, illicit economies. Her first book published here at Brookings several years ago is called *Shooting Up* and it was about the nexus between narcotics, failed states, criminality, and security problems. She is now writing a book that takes the issues of illicit economies and looks at it from a number of other vantage points, a number of other countries including Somalia which is the country that she'll begin with today. She also is the author of the *Aspiration and Ambivalence*, a very, very good account of the U.S. and international experience in Afghanistan. We will hear from Vanda – in fact she will begin in just a moment. She'll be the first of the three to talk about Somalia.

John Campbell is a career Foreign Service officer now retired and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations where he specialized specifically in Nigeria. Although he writes a blog about Africa, *Africa in*

Transition, but he spent two of his tours in the Foreign Service in Nigeria; the second time as ambassador from 2004 to 2007. He wrote a very good book about Nigeria, *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink* that was republished this very year in its second edition. He is, I know, acutely concerned about the many challenges Nigeria faces, far and away the most populous country on the continent of Africa with some 165 million people. Obviously a centerpiece and anchor of all of West Africa in economic and political and security terms, and yet afflicted by the Boko Haram extremist movement as well as a number of other political and security challenges.

So of the three, Vanda is going first. She may have the best news to report which is an unusual thing to say about Somalia, but I'll let her be the judge as to just how she wants to couch things in terms of where things have gotten to today and our choices now going forward. So without further ado we will begin with Vanda, then Amadou, and then John.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Thank you, Mike. I thought you were going to say, she has good news to report which is unusual about Vanda (laughter). It was interesting how you set it up, Mike, in terms of looking at the trouble spots and (inaudible) of concern, but of course Somalia has at least until the Westgate attack been very much of a success story over the past two years probably to a degree that was not quite justified and that is now starting to be realized more palpably. When I was there in April and traveled throughout the country there was very much a sense of immense optimism. But there was also very much a sense in the country of immense craving on the part of the

population to finally move forward with respect to economic growth and greater political and physical security. And it was quite palpable then – or I sensed at the time that this optimism was misplaced. And then the challenges were as enormous as the reasons for optimism. Nonetheless, there are reasons of optimism and it is undeniable that Somalia is today or has been over the past two years in better security shape and economic shape than it has been for arguably two decades.

There is a government; it is still a provisional government, it's not a permanent government but there is a government that has achieved a lot of international recognition. The United States this year also recognized the government, and just in September the U.S. pledged $2.5 billion in aid to Somalia. There were a series of international conferences Somalia (inaudible) more money. In April the UN partially lifted east (inaudible) the embargo that has been placed on the country for many years in recognition of the successes of the government. Shabaab is much weaker and where three years ago it controlled Mogadishu and large parts of the country, today it certainly doesn't have this control. But here I think we get into the complexities and some of the exaggerated optimism.

AMISOM, the African Union Security Force that had been in the country for several years, about two years ago became more successful as a result of beefed up security and beefed up training from abroad to disperse Shabaab. But this is how we should understand what they did: they dispersed Shabaab in many areas including in the key areas such as Mogadishu, Shabaab

went to the ground and sometimes they've been going home to their houses with their weapons. The Somali national security forces continued to be very weak, very undertrained, plagued by clan division, poor discipline, very much suffering from logistics and other support problems, and really are not capable of providing security in the country. Worrisomely, many former Shabaab fighters were recruited both into the security forces and intelligence services on the basis of extraordinarily poor vetting and even poor monitoring.

Shabaab itself has gone through a series of blows and weakening, not just those presented by AMISOM, but also internal fighting. Nonetheless, what's left is a Shabaab that's still entrenched, still can operate if not control large parts of the central and south; Shabaab whose leader now, Godane, clearly is a hardline and is clearly in power. He won the internal power struggle and the Westgate attack was of course extremely dramatic and an awful event but it is simply one of a series of attacks abroad and more, in my view, that we can expect for a variety of reasons that we can get into. So I would expect more terrorist activity both internally and externally by Shabaab.

But at the end of the day, I think that the biggest challenge for Somalia is the one that Somalia has suffered since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime and arguably before. And that is governance and how governance is delivered and organized. And the country is still plagued by not just massive corruption, but probably is worse in the world, even worse in Afghanistan which I know intimately and can tell you it's really bad in Afghanistan. And worse yet is it's extremely clan-based and many of the clan exclusionary dynamics are very

much taking place in arguably intensifying and have been intensifying (inaudible) how much the government can develop the capacity and wherewithal to take on the poor governance deficiencies that will – if they are not addressed they really will never allow security to become substantially better than where we are right now. And although security is very much improved compared to Siad four years ago, three years ago, it's pretty much stalled over the past two years. There have been very little gains in that period and I think this is very indicative of the intimate linkages between governance and security and the real governance issues.

And one of the biggest governance issues is the organization of the country to what extended (inaudible) is a federal government, how are states formed. And you have to basis that one outright succeeded Somaliland is not recognized, but nonetheless it claims to be a completely independent entity. Puntland which is sort of in the semi-secessionist mode and Juba which declared statehood under a federal government system in a way that Mogadishu found extremely threatening, did not recognize, ultimately fighting (inaudible) that was suppressed but merely suppressed as a result of external intervention. And there is now an interim deal that Madobe, the warlord in Juba, the president of Juba, is already violating and that's unresolved and simply (inaudible) on an issue that can blow up and massively influence what's happening not just in Juba and southern parts of Somalia but the entire Somalia entity.

And finally, I need to point out in this intro the role of external powers which are complex, if not more complex, in a place like Afghanistan with

acute and intimate involvement - some would say meddling – by countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, as well as broader multilateral international bilateral engagement with the country that can be very good for the country but it can also really zap much energy and deepen and intensify many of the pernicious (inaudible) dynamics that the country is facing.

So there is an adage that Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires and that Somalia is the graveyard of international state building. I find both to be simplistic and perhaps not true, but nonetheless there is an element of truth to the challenges that both countries face and the struggle that the international community has found in meaningfully and helpfully engaging in both places. And that verdict is still out in Somalia. It's not at all clear that the moment of great opportunity will be seized by the Somali government, and not just the national government but also at the subnational level, but also that the international community will have learned from its mistakes of very flawed, very problematic engagement over the past two and a half decades and become a force for more positive developments in the country.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you very much. I think we'll just continue to proceed down the line and then we'll come back and have a discussion here before going to you in a little bit.

So, Amadou, over to you please.

MR. SY: Thank you, it's an honor to be here. So Centrafrique is a former French colony; it used to be the colony of Oubangui-Chari, the names of two rivers. It's larger than France and Belgium together; I think about the size of

Texas probably or even larger. It's a landlocked country with about six neighbors. Historically it has had weak or you could say it has been a failed state. So in the U.S. we haven't heard a lot about this country, maybe perhaps lately because of the U.S. support in the fight against the Lord's Resistance Army, the LRA, in Uganda. So the LRA at some point had some troops going all the way to Central African Republic and some Ugandan troops were present in this country also to fight them. Historically it has had a cycle of coup; only four out of the five presidents since independence in 1960 – I mean four out of the five presidents since 1960 have been toppled through unconstitutional means. They've only had ten years of democratic regime. It has been a very, very unstable country in an unstable region.

Nine months ago a coalition of troops called the Seleka in the local Sango language toppled president Bozizé. And many of the soldiers in this coalition were from Chad or Sudan and the leader of this coalition, Michel Djotodia, proclaimed himself as a president and retained the then prime minister Nicolas Tiangaye. A government of national unity was formed and a national transitional council also. Then with the help of the international community, especially the economic community of the Central African States, a roadmap towards elections and parliamentary and presidential elections in 2015 was established. And to monitor this roadmap, the International Contact Group, the ICG, was formed and included the U.S., France, the UN, the EU, the eastern community of Central African States, and also the IMF and the World Bank as observers.

But pretty soon the situation became uncontrollable. There was infighting among the coalition troops, the Seleka troops. So there was intra-Seleka tensions. President Djotodia quickly lost really the control of these troops. Some of his generals were controlling – this country is very big, as I've said, bigger than France, so he was not controlling the situation. Some generals were controlling part of the country without really paying due attention to the central authority.

On top of that you had villagers who traditionally have been through this cycle of violence, had their own kind of self-defense troops which they called *anti-balaka* – *balaka* means machetes. So you had the anti-*balaka* troops, you had Seleka fighting, you had intra-Seleka tensions. So basically you had unidentified groups and very quickly the situation was uncontrollable. With that came violations of human rights. You have lots of NGOs in this country who have been there for a long time and who have been reported human rights violation. A lot of people had to flee their homes. You had burnings of farms, killing of cattle, deterioration in the humanitarian situation.

So then the international community quickly decided to act. At the African level you had in July the AU Peace and Security Council which decided to augment the number of troops who were already there, mostly troops from this regional community, the Central African community. Then in December 2013 you had the UN Security Council deciding to authorize military action basically through the AU troops but also by authorizing fronts to support these troops.

So really in this environment the French who had already had

troops near the airport – they had about 400, 600 people – were the only troops that had really the logistical support really to move quickly and so they were authorized to support the AU troops. The U.S. decided to have I think $40-60 million, but mostly logistical support. The AU had 50 million euros also in terms of logistical support. So that was the situation up to a few weeks ago but then you had these troops that were loyal to the former president and this *anti-balaka* troops who decided to move very quickly before the French troops intervened and then decided to attach the Seleka but it did not work. But you had a situation where you had mounting interreligious tensions and a cycle of violence and Muslims killing Christians and Christians killing Muslims. And right now the French troops are there deciding – and their mandate is to disarm troops but in this situation where if you are not armed you could be quickly a victim of mob violence. It's very, very sensitive. It's a very fragile situation.

So, the priority right now is to have peace and I think we are really starting – even if we have peace we are opening a page, a new page, and it will take a long before we are able to really to come to a normal situation in this country because it's about really nation building. This has been a failed state. The security situation is dire. But food security is also an issue. Right now the idea is to have elections before 2015. But beyond that, as I've said, from 1960 up to now you have only ten years of civilian rule in this country. So the idea is really how do you really rebuild this nation when all the leaders so far have been busy extracting rent? So how do you really rebuild this nation? I think the support of the international community will have to be there for a long, long time.

So right now we've seen signs from president Djotodia to have a dialogue between the Christians and the Muslims. Maybe one of the strongest institutions in this country is the religious institutions. And we've seen positive signs with both Muslim and Christian leaders acting together and trying to restore peace. But I think the international community will be there for a long time.

And related to that, I mean, there is a lot of criticism of France being there after having acted in Mali and after having been in Cote d'Ivoire, but I think the real question is how do you build a rapid intervention force in the continent? And there again money is the problem. You need money, you need logistical support for the African troops, and right now I think the idea is there is some thought given to how do you really have some kind of funding mechanism for these African troops to act quickly.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. And as you know, I should have said the two countries that we've talked about so far are countries where the African Union really is the leading security player. And of course Congo, which I'll come to in a minute after we hear from Ambassador Campbell, is a place where the UN has a more classic peacekeeping operation although it's largely manned by African states. But in the cases of the CAR and Somalia we actually have the African Union. The UN is also present, especially in Somalia but a more complex kind of constellation of international actors.

I should also have emphasized that Amadou is part of one of our most exciting new parts of Brookings, the Africa Growth Initiative. It's not actually so new anymore but it's very exciting and dynamic. It's growing fast and

partnering with a lot of think tanks and others in Africa as well as working here in Washington, and as you can see from his excellent presentation beginning with economics but going well beyond also to diplomacy and security issues, it's housed within our Global and Economy Development program, not within the Foreign Policy program but another research unit within Brookings.

Ambassador Campbell, thank you very much for being here, for coming down from New York to be with us today, for your service over the years in Africa and Nigeria specifically. I look forward to hearing from you.

AMBASSADOR CAMPBELL: Thank you very much. Thank you for having me down and I'm delighted to be with you this morning.

Let me start with a few bumper stickers. As any Nigerian will remind you, Nigeria is by far the largest country in Africa, and in fact some demographers maintain that its population is not 165 million, it's 175 million which means it is substantially larger than the Russian Federation. Lagos, with at least 18 million people is far larger than New York, which ringing wet has 11 or 12 million with the most generous of definitions of suburbs (laughter).

The country essentially since independence, whether under the military or under civilians, has been run by elites drawn from the sun, 350 different ethnic groups, that compete with each other but also have cooperated with each other sufficiently to ensure access to oil revenue, which amounts to more than 90 percent of the country's foreign exchange and perhaps 70 percent of total government revenue.

The country is about 50 percent Muslim and about 50 percent

Christian. It is by far the largest country in the world in which neither Islam nor Christianity is the minority religion. But this is new. In 1900 what is now Nigeria was about 27 percent Muslim and about 2 percent Christian. The explosive growth of Christianity has taken place basically over the past 30 years and has had numerous consequences that we can talk about later if you would like.

This session is about security issues and problems. In Nigeria you can look at that question from essentially a geographical prospective. In the north there is a radical Islamic grassroots rebellion against the Nigerian political economy that is labeled Boko Haram. In the middle belt there is ongoing ethnic and religious conflict. It is both ethnic between the House of Fulani and the Burom. It is also over land use; the House of Fulani are herdsman, the Burom are peasant farmers. And it includes a religious dimension. The House of Fulani herdsmen are Muslims; the Christian Burom farmers are Christians. Is a person murdered because he is a farmer, because he is a Christian, or because is a Burom? It very often is extremely unclear, but what has happened in Plateau state has been a remarkable degree of ethnic cleansing in which essentially the city and much of the state is divided in half and the government, both federal and state, has been unable to really bring the violence under control. This is important because it undermines the credibility of the government both in Abuja and also in Jos.

The third focus is the delta, where until 2009 there was an active insurrection associated with MEND, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. In effect, starting with President Yar'Adua, that insurrection was

very largely bought off by enormous payments made to mend warlords. When Goodluck Jonathan became president he incorporated a number of the warlords into his own administration and assured that they got very large contracts indeed. The delta at present is relatively quiet. However, there are elections coming up in 2015 and certain of the warlords have made it quite clear that if Jonathan somehow or another is not allowed to run or is defeated that they will ensure that the delta blows up.

Then finally there is an overall and much harder to pin down issue of the creditability of the government in Abuja. Pretty much straight across the country with the possible exception of the delta, there is the widespread view that the current government is incompetent, that it is feckless, and that it cannot address the fundamental problems of the Nigerian state, and further, that its security forces, particularly in the north, are involved in massive human rights violations some of which have been documented by highly respected NGOs. Amnesty International, for example, produced a report about a month ago.

Against this general background there is a considerable amount of churning going on right now. About two weeks ago Boko Haram using some 500 operatives attacked the international airport in Maiduguri, also attacked an airbase, destroyed air force aircraft. The government had to respond by imposing a state of emergency. But more to the point, what Maiduguri did was it reinforced the view that the government's efforts against the northern jihadists insurrection are not working.

Secondly, last week somebody leaked a letter written by former

president Obasanjo to current president Goodluck Jonathan. It's 18 pages in length; the causation in it is a bit strange to we western secularists because the ultimate causer of events is God, according to Obasanjo, including making Goodluck Jonathan the president of Nigeria. But what is really significant about this 18 page letter is it is a quite accurate catalogue of the shortcomings and failures of Nigerian governance. Further, in the last paragraph of the letter Obasanjo notes that he is sending a copy of it to Ibrahim Babangida, Abdulsalami Abubakar, and Danjuma, all big powerhouses at least in the past.

Then, with respect again to governance and corruption, the governor of the Central Bank, Lamido Sanusi, wrote a letter to the president within the past month or so saying that the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation had somehow or another failed to remit $49 billion in revenue to the Central Bank. $49 billion here; $49 billion there, it all starts to add up.

Finally, oil bunkering has taken off – oil bunkering, oil theft. Best not to get bogged down in how many barrels of oil are being stolen per day; better to think about how much value of oil in terms of revenue is failing to reach the government and the best estimate is 400,000 barrels a day.

All of this against a background of upcoming elections in 2015. There were state elections in Anambra last month that were widely seen as a kind of dress rehearsal for the national elections. They were more or less an unmitigated disaster. Hence, there is now the beginnings of discussion in Nigeria about whether elections should be postponed or not. What actually, in the short term, could actually change things? Principally, I think would be a credible

announcement by Goodluck Jonathan that he is not going to run for the presidency in 2015. I find this almost unimaginable. The people around Jonathan, particularly the people in the delta, particularly his fellow eja will all insist that he runs. If he runs he will almost certainly win because the ruling party, despite certain important defections, will ensure that he is rigged in. If he wins in 2015 the alienation of the north will probably accelerate. If, however, he should fail to win or should he decide for some reason not to run then the delta will almost certainly blow up.

So Nigeria right now is caught between if you like a Boko Haram in the north and a MEND hard place in the south. It is rather difficult right now to be cheerful about the short term outlook for Nigeria.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you Ambassador. Thank you all. These were outstanding presentations and really I think set the stage for our discussion. I'm going to make one brief comment on Congo and then that will lead into a question I have which I'll post to all three of the panelists, they may have a couple of comments or questions for each other then we'll go to you.

First on Congo – actually I should say that in addition to all of us commemorating and mourning Nelson Mandela, those of us who love Congo are commemorating and mourning Tabu Ley, a great musician who passed away about ten days ago himself. I say this not just as a lighter note but because of course it reminds us all of the great joy and the great dynamism and happiness that we find in Africa. We're talking about problem spots but these are countries that have such potential and many other of their neighbors are doing well. Even

Somalia as we heard is showing promise. So there is so much to build on. It's in that spirit that I want to offer one perhaps somewhat out of the box or unusual recommendation on Congo. This may or may not be the exact moment to do this but I'd like to see it part of the mix of U.S. policy discussion and options as we go forward and it comes partly out of my longstanding interest in Congo from when I was a Peace Corps volunteer there but more from my study of the U.S. military, and to get to the point, this is the proposal: that the United States consider participating in the U.S. peacekeeping mission in Congo with combat forces. Or I should say, what regular army units, not in combat so much because this is a peacekeeping mission after all and because the Special Intervention Brigade that's made up of South African, Tanzanian, and Malawian troops has been doing so well in recent months to deal with some of the disturbances in the east.

But this could be a moment when the expertise the Unites States has developed in Iraq and Afghanistan in mentoring, partnering with, and training indigenous forces could be applied to Congo. What I have in mind are the unites that – for those of you who follow this stuff you may have heard these terms before, they are sometimes called Advise and Assist brigades or Security Force Assistance brigades, that was a second permutation on the terminology. They're slightly reconfigured from the main combat brigade structure of the U.S. military – they are designed to have a lot more advisors, they're designed to be able to break up into smaller pieces and go out and work with units in the field, not just at training centers, not just at Fort Leavenworth or places where we bring military officers from all over the world including Africa, but to go out in the field on

deployment and to help people essentially with real time advice, not combat missions per say although if they are attacked and they are part of a unit that's attacked they can of course use their weapons as well but more to be part of the day to day operations of these units.

The Congolese military has a lot of challenges many of them, maybe most of them, have more to do with politics, more to do with institutional weakness than with combat deficiency, per say. And that admittedly has to be part of the equation here. That's why I acknowledge that the specific military technical recommendation has to be woven into a broader construct and it may or may not be exactly the right moment when we can do this.

But I would actually like to see the United States, now that it's downsizing so dramatically from the wars of the last decade and in a sense could consider these options if it wished, like to consider it sending up to several thousand Army and or Marine forces to Congo to help the Congolese military take the next step towards professionalization and the ability to control much of its own territory, and then to essentially back up the broader Special Intervention Brigade work, not so much necessarily as part of those combat missions, but again to help give institutional strength and depth to especially the eastern part of Congo where problems continue and where trouble certainly continued despite the fact that the M23 movement now seems to be on its heels and perhaps willing to make peace with the government.

So that's an idea that then others may wish to comment on. They don't have to, they can if they wish, you may if you wish. But I want to use that

especially as the springboard for my one question to each of the panelists which they can perhaps take in turn as they spoke in the same order, which is essentially the simple question, what should the international community do next. And with regard to Somalia and CAR one could say that we're already seeing the international community take the next steps. There have been increases especially in CAR in recent weeks and the outside military capability. but I guess to tailor each question a little bit to the individual, for Vanda I find her remarks encouraging and hopeful but as she points out there is a long way to go; a lot of fragility in this situation. But for someone like you who studied Afghanistan as well, and you mentioned the terrorist threat for many groups in Somalia, what can the international community really do without getting mired in another Iraq or Somalia like -- or the old Somalia mission, the more recent Afghanistan mission – another mess like that where we wind up seeing foreign troops really at the mercy of Islamic extremists but also just clan warfare that we don't know how to sort out, don't know how to understand. What is the next step? Does it really involve international troops? You didn't say that it should but I'm just trying to put that specific option on the table.

Amadou, you talked about maybe how we need an Africa Union intervention capability but I'm assuming you would agree with me that it's not going to happen soon enough to handle the immediate crisis in CAR, so in that sense do you see the measures that France and other countries like Burundi are taking right now to be adequate? Do you think they're likely to be adequate, and if not what's the next step?

And then finally for Ambassador Campbell obviously the international community is not thinking and not being invited to participate militarily in a problem within Nigeria, but what are the levers that you see that are most relevant for us.

So if I could just ask each of you to comment on my specific question or whatever else you want to put on the policy agenda and then, again, we'll begin to broaden the conversation.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Difficult question, although of course a crucial one. And there are different elements to the answer. Let me start with the terrorism component. The United States is deeply, intimately, and in a very complex way involved in counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa. Camp Lemonier in Djibouti is a very bring (inaudible) base. I think I'm breaking no secrets at this point about that. And the U.S. has presence of some sort at (inaudible) in Somalia. It has traditionally relied on one group, the Darod clan, for its counterterrorism intelligence with in my view often disastrous results and it will be very healthy if our counterterrorism intelligence became far more diversified and conscious of clan dynamics in the country as extremely complex as they are.

I am very concerned at the one outcome of the Westgate attack will be that our broader assistance in engagement in the region will be collapsed to counterterrorism, and that we will drop and lessen our focus on the need to improve governance or promote and push for – emphasize governance as much as we emphasize (inaudible) counterterrorism. And this applies not just to Somalia, this applies to our engagement with a country like Kenya which has

been going through dramatic transition over the past several years, much improvement, much optimism that lots of the old exclusionary corrupt political practices would be reformed; a new constitution, of course a complex situation now with both the president and vice president indicted by the international criminal court. And U.S. now sort of pushing in an important way for improving governance, now, Westgate and how much will that mean that we will drop our focus on governance and be too preoccupied with very narrow (inaudible) and ultimately unsustainable security focus.

Going back to Somalia, a very important component of learning by the international community has been to understand that not everything has to be shoved through Mogadishu and that perhaps we can have important engagement through local administration. And so about a year ago a London conference established a fund for local stability operations, local engagement. It took two decades for the international community to recognize that there is life beyond Mogadishu and that's a very healthy development. But it's a very complex one because ultimately there are these deep unresolved issues between the center and the local regions.

Amadou, you spoke about nation building and I often bristle when the term is applied to Afghanistan but I would argue in all of the countries that we raised there are two important issues that are interlinked: one is nation building because in many of these countries there is truly not a central nationhood and the local identities are perhaps more important or at least as much contested and on par with the concept of a nation, hence, many of the security and political

troubles. But there is also the issue of state building and often the international community found itself defining or engaging in supposed state building in ways that perhaps encouraged further the non-nation building or undermined (inaudible) identification. And what is also key to all three countries is another word that Amadou raised which is rent. The issue of rent pervades both the concept of nation building and identity but it also pervades the difficulties of state building and institutions. Where the international community, whatever the moral appropriateness or not, has often defined the state in the way that we experience in the west, a public service of or an entity that administers public goods with some sort of legitimacy and buy in from the population. But you could argue that in many parts of Africa, Nigeria being a classic example, the state has been far more of a mafia bazaar, where the purpose of politics is to capture rents that one can distribute to a narrow clique of people, whether this is buying of MEND or buying of other local – or delivering to key local supporters.

And all three countries are grappling with the issue of how rents linked to states and the concept of nationhood and where the rents can be transformed into economic resources to build a legitimate state and in all three countries the issue is unresolved and foreign involvement is complex. And in the case of Somalia, that's my concluding comment, one of the important things the international community needs to do is not to shower Somalia with foreign aid that then becomes yet another rent to be competed for on clan basis or other (inaudible) exclusionary basis and calibrate foreign aid crucial and sorely needed as it is very carefully to what can actually be appropriately and accountably

managed by the government in Mogadishu or local administrations.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, thank you. Amadou, over to you.

MR. SY: So under the current framework the idea is for French troops to support the African Union troops, the MISCA troops, quickly and then hopefully graduate into a UN peacekeeping operation, that's the idea. But this scenario is vulnerable to some risks; it's not very obvious that the French can restore the situation in six months as some think. It's not obvious that by 2015 we can have elections. And even if the peacekeeping operation works out we have the issue of food security; right now the farmers have fled their farms and they need to go back, they need to have seeds – the sowing season will start pretty soon. And agriculture is the engine of the economic growth of this country. So I see a kind of long term involvement of the international community.

But let's look at a few presidents. So the current president Djotodia formed the coalition. He used to be working for the Central African Republic in Sudan so he made some alliances there so his troops have foreigners from Chad from Sudan. The former president himself Bozizé at some point had to ask the Chadians to help him. So Chadian troops were there. When the Seleka troops were coming he called and asked the French troops to help him. France did not help him and he was overtaken. Before him, when he made a coup himself, President Ange Patasse had asked mercenaries from DRC Jean Claude Bemba to come and help him. If you recall Jean Claude Bemba, his case is the first that has gone to the ICC, the International Criminal Court.

So basically you have a succession of leaders with maybe a very

weak institution who have to rely on so called foreigners. So I think really the challenge in this country is to break this cycle, to have a dialogue between all the stakeholders and have some kind of leadership which is able to distribute the rents in an inclusive way, pay the soldiers, and have some fiscal revenues that it can use for basic services. And also what is very sad is the Ambassador mentioned this tension between farmers and herdsmen and traditionally in this country, to my knowledge, the tension between Christians and Muslims were really tensions between herdsmen and farmers. But in this very unstable situation there are lots of temptations to use religious tensions to just stay in power or gain power. And I think most people would agree that the strongest institutions right now are the religious leaders.

So I think the international community should also try to see -- some NGOs are specializing in that – how to really, with the help of religious leaders, have all the stakeholders in this country kind of have a contract, a social contract, and think about a future where the leaders do not rely on foreign assistance, neighboring or mercenaries to just seize power and go ahead. But they will still have to rely on foreign assistance.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Mr. Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR CAMPBELL: Thank you very much.

Foreign, particularly American levers over Nigeria, not much, and it's declining. When I was ambassador there we were importing roughly a million barrels of Nigerian oil per day, that figure now is down to 200,000. Human rights abuses in the north which are really, really gross, they are infecting more and

more units of the Nigerian military because the military units are circulated through the north. That means fewer and fewer of them could pass Leahy vetting which makes any kind of assistance to them illegal.

Evidence of our declining levers, the secretary of state raised human rights abuses in the north in May; the president raised human rights abuses in the north with Goodluck Jonathan on the margins of the general assembly had absolutely no impact whatsoever.

So what do we do? I would suggest that the focus not be on the Nigerian government, but instead there should be a great deal more effort directed towards civic organizations which in some parts of Nigeria are pretty strong. There is something like an opposition that seems to be emerging. There are lots of areas where I think we can do some good work in terms of democracy building but without reference to the government in Abuja. I've seen this general strategy once before. It basically is what we did in South Africa during the last days of Apartheid, and that is that we maintained a formal and correct relationship with the Apartheid government. But that wasn't the big show. The big show was our relationship with South African civil society.

I would also like to take up your invitation to comment on your suggestion about U.S. military participation in the eastern Congo. For me, the greatest difficulty in the idea is I can see absolutely no stomach for it on the part of the American people. I see very little interest on the part of Americans in any kind of military intervention in Africa unless you can dress it up as somehow or another relayed it to al Qaida and Osama bin Laden successors. And you can't

do that in the eastern Congo. Further, in the short term at least, any kind of American engagement in eastern Congo would complicate our relationship with Paul Kagame and Museveni, a relationship which from my perspective in many ways is appalling, but on the other hand it is also useful in terms of short term goals.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. I should invite any others who wish to comment on either that (laughter) or anything else or ask each other questions and then we'll go to you. Thank you.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: I would pick up on the issue of the rapid intervention force and its African tours. To me the bigger problem is really not so much the rapid intervention force, (inaudible) out of Africa, the AU or some other entity or even abroad. The big problem for me, or the big deficiency, is sustained intervention force. We are meeting here to today just a few hours after the second round of parliamentary elections in Mali was concluded and had we had this conversation a year ago the talk would probably be all about Mali and we have not raised Mali until now. And yet what the French intervention accomplished and then subsequent African and international developments was merely to disperse both the Tuareg rebels and the various Salafi groups what were coalescing in northern Mali, and we have seen a slowly but steadily deteriorating security situation; the French losing interest and wanting to get out, the notion of a quick in and out, intervention on the shoestring minimal force that will then hand over to someone, whoever that someone is with whatever level of capacity and training I think is deeply flawed and troubled. And to the extent that

the international community gets in more and more intervention in the continent, often for well-motivated reasons and addressing terrible problems indeed, the sustained component of the intervention needs to be as important as the rapid one, and continues to be deeply unresolved.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Sir?

MR. SY: Just coming back to U.S. interest in the CAR, I mean traditionally this is left to the French but I don't have exact numbers but I remember reading an article about Al-Shabaab financing itself through the use of illegal ivory trades, including some from the CAR. So one key issue is instability in the region is a very risky affair and you cannot really think about all the scenarios where spillover effects will materialize.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. I think what I'll do now is take two questions at a time and then please wait for a microphone, identify yourselves, and pose us a question if you want. Why don't we start over here with the two gentlemen right next to each other and then we'll work our way around the room a bit.

QUESTIONER: My name is Abdel Maliki, I'm from the Global Civil Initiative. Thank you for your presentation. My first comment before my question is –

MR. O'HANLON: Small comment please because we are pressed for time.

QUESTIONER: Yes, small comment. If the trifecta was playing here it's one, a religious factor, the second one is economic factor like all the

mineral resources in those countries, and the third factor is all the key players were fighting each other in different country. So my question to you is on religious factor we were people walking on the field are seeing a growing tension and growing communication between all of those different groups talking to each other and learning from each other a way of doing stuff from the Shabaab to the Boko Haram in Nigeria all the way going to Mali with (inaudible) in the north, what are your points of view –- are we (inaudible) to become another Afghanistan (inaudible) in Africa? Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Lawrence Freeman, Africa desk at *ER Magazine*. I wanted to direct my question to Ambassador Campbell on Nigeria. I read the Obasanjo letter – actually I think, didn't he say in the beginning of the letter that he intended to make this public because the other two letters he wrote were not even responded to?

AMBASSADOR CAMPBELL: No, the words he used was, "I was constrained to."

QUESTIONER: But in that letter he accused President Jonathan of virtually on the brink of destroying the PDP and of introducing a situation that he compared to the Abacha era.

AMBASSADOR CAMPBELL: He did.

QUESTIONER: So on Friday at the African Center for Strategic Studies it was called – (inaudible) said we were entering a red zone. Is this a situation where the military could move in or is it going to wait until the 2015 election? And if Goodluck Jonathan is removed or they change the presidency

my concern is does this really change Nigeria with a hundred million people living on $1-2 a day, no infrastructure, horrible economic conditions I've seen in Kano, Kaduna, Rivers state without an economic development perspective which I think is the other question – Ms. Brown, this is a reference to her – sustained development is not simply counterterrorism. That's a limitation. We should be having massive economic and infrastructure development. In Mali, where I was earlier this year, they haven't gotten hardly any of the $4 billion from Brussels, there is no economic development going on in the north, and the security situation is worsened. So I would like these questions addressed.

MR. O'HANLON: So Mr. Ambassador, why don't we start with you and then Amadou or Vanda if they wish.

AMBASSADOR CAMPBELL: Okay, taking the point about religion, I think here outsiders can do something. Again, I'm referring specifically to Nigeria and that is many religious leaders in Nigeria – I'm speaking here of specifically religious leaders – will use quite horrific rhetoric when they are talking about the half of the country that is Muslim. And it seems to me that their co-religious in this country could urge them to sort of cut back and tone down some of the rhetoric that is used. No doubt, similar kinds of fierce rhetoric is coming out of the Islamic community in the north but there I don't see us as really having any leverage. The leverage that Americans would have would be over the Christian community.

With respect to Nigeria and the possibility of a military coup, the conventional wisdom which I shared up until about a week ago was that a military

coup was highly unlikely because the military has been so weakened over the past ten years and its internal cohesion has been so damaged that it would be unable to mount a coup; it's simply not strong enough.

An analyst from another country in a sense corrected me. What she said was be careful; weak militaries can stage coups too. And that's a very salutary warning because coups in Nigeria up until now have been managed by the upper reaches of the officer corps, there was very little bloodshed, and essentially it was almost a political process as opposed to a violent process. A so called junior officer coup would start in all likelihood as a mutiny against senior officers and could be quite bloody indeed. This is a scenario from which good lord deliver us.

With respect to fundamental change you are absolutely right. If you look at the current Nigeria government and if you look at the emerging opposition groups they are essentially all the same people and essentially what they are doing is rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. None of these political entities have programs that we would recognize as a political platform to bring about the kind of fundamental change that would be necessary to address the realities that you have identified.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Amadou?

MR. SY: I mean, not to be – if you look at the economic situation in Nigeria, I think we should disentangle the inclusive growth part from the growth part, but thanks to high oil prices the country has done well economically at least on aggregate. Of course now how you share the rents again is a different

question. But the departing – like right now if you talk to foreign investors they are a more concerned about the departure of the Central Bank governor Lamido Sanusi, who was seen as having been very successful, reducing inflation, and managing the economy pretty well. So, I think of course the issue of inclusive growth and what is happening in the delta and so on is a different question. But unlike some episodes in the past growth is there. Now what do you do with the growth, what do you do with the (inaudible) and so on is really the challenge, I think. What do you do with that? How do you make it more inclusive?

Or see the other way. If the price of oil has gone down to half of what it is right now it would be a different situation.

MR. O'HANLON: Vanda.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Let me make a few comments on the first question. And my starting point would be to say that the United States and frankly much of the international community does not have the capacity to make sure that what happens in west Africa or other parts of Africa does not replicate Afghanistan. I think we need to be far more realistic about the capacity levers that we have, as Ambassador Campbell identified, in influencing political developments in each of these countries, and in fact in influencing institutional developments. We can assist, we can perhaps put breakers and hampers and we can make sure that we engage in ways that are not ultimately counterproductive, but our capacities are limited and they will be limited even if we engage in many military engagements in the area.

That said, there are a few things that we can do or at least we can

avoid. One is to not treat every single militant or political challenge in the region as linked to al Qaida, Shabaab, Boko Haram, assume they are one unified monolithic actor that needs to be countered everywhere equally in exactly the same way. And not to be blinded by the terrorism threat to other issues in the region, particularly the issues of governance and quality of governance. And so not be making what we assume are security choices over governance which ultimately lies at the core of why these countries are so troubled including in the security domain.

And again to pick up on what John said in his comments about Nigeria, if you look at Mali, a key issue is that the elites are simply arranging the chairs. The elections in July brought back to power people who had been in one way or another part of the problem and brought about the situation several years down the road and they are now back in power and we clap the election and say, oh, wonderful that were free and fair elections in Mali, box checked off, we can be moving out. And what the region badly needs, or particularly the places that we have been talking about, I would put Somalia to the side for a moment, is a generation of political elites that comes not from the traditional power elite circles and it is socialized to see politics and the purpose of the state in a different way than the traditional ones. And whether this is engaging with civil society and encouraging a more robust civil society, whether this is working in a different way with diaspora communities, but ultimately the change needs to take place internally and be a founding block for security developments as well.

But all that said, we have to be very modest and very realistic

about what we can do and not rush in and make things worse than they are already.

MR. O'HANLON: First do no harm. Thank you.

Let's go here, ma'am, in the third row. We'll take three in this round.

QUESTIONER: Well, thank you so much. I fell like first do no harm is a wonderful entre to my question in response to your proposal at least in Congo. I'm (inaudible) Woods with Issues for Policy Studies. Clearly many of us following U.S. foreign policy feel that part of the problem is the focus on the military and security side. Again, kind of very much in line with what Vanda has been saying. And the sense that the U.S. -- particularly in the Congo because it's resource rich – the U.S. has been training a battalion; the Chinese have been training a battalion and now you're recommending train more battalions and that's a frightening thought quite frankly. So I think it goes to this question of how to bring real human security particularly in resource rich areas. And I find that is an incredible commonality of all the countries and they are all resource rich and that ends up being part of the problem because the resources aren't serving the needs or the interests of the people. So long term solutions.

And I guess the question on Central African Republic, on U.S. policy in particular, in looking for that long term solution would you recommend a greater role on the diplomatic end for the U.S., particularly through a special envoy or something along those lines? Clearly, there is one for Russ Fangle for DRC which has brought some success, we can talk about that as well but could

that be part of the answer in terms of how the U.S. takes a more comprehensive and longer lens on the CAR.

And then just a quick question on Somaliland, you mentioned it but I would love to hear a bit of your commentary on that as well. Thank you so much.

MR. O'HANLON: This gentleman here and then over to the young lady.

QUESTIONER: My name is Wayne (inaudible) with (inaudible) Magazine. If it's fair, can I bring up Gambia and just ask your thoughts on the Gambian government moving away from international organizations.

MR. O'HANLON: If anybody feels competent to take it on or inclined to take it on they can, if not you'll have gotten your implicit answer that it's not going to necessarily get answered (laughter). So I'll invite anyone to bring it up or not as they wish.

QUESTIONER: I'm Holly Drengeness from the Enough Project. This question is for Amadou about the Central Africa Republic, and it dovetails with the comment that you made earlier about Shabaab's use of ivory. There has been some debate about whether armed groups in CAR have used exploitation of natural resources, mainly diamonds, gold, and ivory as well to sort of drive their activity and if it's a motivation the Security Council Resolution did mention that as an issue that must be addressed, the exploitation of natural resources. Just wondering if you can comment on to what extent you think that actually is, a revenue source for armed groups, and if not what are their main

revenue sources. Thanks.

MR. O'HANLON: I'll begin very briefly and we'll just work our way down on these questions. Appreciate your point and I also appreciate the Ambassador's earlier point. And I guess I would not conclude strongly that now is definitely the minute to do this but I also think we need to recognize that the lack of security in Congo is problem number one. And so, yes, we can talk about a lot of other derivative or associated problems, but the inability to stabilize that huge space is what's caused the estimate of 3 million, 4 million, 5 million people dead. When you see those kinds of estimates about Congo that's not the number of people killed with guns and machetes; it's the number of people who have died of disease that should have been preventable but the state and the economy didn't work because of the breakdown of law and order. So I just want to remind you that's why I'm keeping this in mind. Your point may be right because we don't want to reward a government that's got the wrong kind of priorities; you have to embed this in a broader political strategy in how you're dealing with the leadership of Congo and you may have to do some conditionality before you apply this. But I also hear the Ambassador, and of course he's probably right in his criticism that Americans just don't want to hear this, which is part of why I feel the need to put the idea out there. Because we can do it; we've gotten a lot better at it. The casualty risks are relatively modest and so let's at least be willing to talk about it in this country if there is a moment where it fits into a broader political strategy in a wise way. That's really all I want to do with my suggestion. Amadou?

MR. SY: Maybe the last question first. There have been a lot of reports of this on troops including the Lord's Resistance Army using natural resources to fund their operations. One which seemed to be very present is the illegal logging and there have been a lot of reports of people going through the airport being caught with suitcases full of dollars and then by a customs officer and then a phone call would come from the higher up in the chain and then they would take the plane and leave the country. Some even said Chinese's businessmen are there doing business with everybody. So I think the question is once there will be a legitimate central government to have fiscal revenues and where would these fiscal revenues come from? They should come from the mines, they should come from the legal exploitations of these natural resources and then be redistributed to the citizens, to the men and women in Central African Republic. So I think it's really an issue – if you have a failed state in a country bigger than France it's very difficult for people with (inaudible) to just seize a mine and just control it.

But sometimes it takes even really very quote unquote sordid dimensions. For example, there were troops at some point that took a uranium plant of (inaudible) and not just to take the uranium but to loot everything. NGOs are complaining that their SUVs – if you are an NGO with a new SUV in Bangui it's going to be stolen. Then the borders with Chad are very porous and so it's sometimes not even that strategic; it's really taking everything, anything.

On the other question on the special envoy, that same question was asked last time there was a House Foreign Affairs meeting and the response

by the U.S. diplomats were that they didn't feel that it was necessary that they were acting efficiently right now. I know the embassy is closed. I know they have Mr. Brown who is a representative. So I'm not a diplomat. I think whatever would be the most pragmatic way to deal with this would work but I think a special envoy would maybe bring more attention to the plight of the men and women in CAR. So whatever works really. I'm not a diplomat. I think if it works, why not.

MR. O'HANLON: Mr. Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR CAMPBELL: I'll bite on Gambia (laughter). Because it's an interesting issue I think because Gambia is completely unlike Nigeria, it's not a huge country, it is small. And it's clearly one where outside pressure could have an impact. There I think it might be an opportunity for ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West Africa States, to take the lead. We have an ambassador who is accredited to ECOWAS and it's the kind of thing that we might encourage.

On the special envoy, in theory I was a diplomat for more than 30 years (laughter) and I can tell you career diplomats do not like special envoys. We don't like special envoys because it messes up the chain of command, it messes up the hierarchy. Operationally, what a special envoy does as opposed to diplomats who are working on a particular issue within a normal structure is often very, very difficult to work through. Occasionally it does work. I'm thinking, for example, of Northern Ireland where it did work. So I wouldn't take the tool off the table; I would just say be extremely cautious about when using it.

MR. O'HANLON: Vanda.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Let me start with Somaliland and then make two other comments on points that were raised that I feel are interesting. Paradoxically, the more stable and hopeful Mogadishu and Mogadishu South looks the more complicated the relationship between Somaliland and (inaudible) Somali becomes. Somaliland has been enjoying a considerably greater degree of security as well as economic growth over the past several years precisely because Mogadishu was flawed and destroyed and unable to contest the self-declared independence of Somaliland that no one has recognized. Now that Mogadishu is stronger, troubled but stronger, it is very sensitive to continuing (inaudible) efforts by the Somaliland government to achieve independence, rather recognition. And, for example, it was a very interesting byplay in the London May conference as to who got invited and who didn't or who got invited and declined to come precisely because of these rising sensitivities. I will say that the Somaliland government is deeply concerned that stronger Mogadishu will become far more aggressive and determined in challenging the self-declared independence. And paradoxically, the more difficult politics become in south and central Somalia the more tempting it is for the Mogadishu government to focus on the Somaliland question as a mechanism of shoring up key constituents, such as among the Hawiye tribe and playing into complex (inaudible) Darod relations and other ethnic sub factions in Somaliland. There is a Turkey process going on of Turkey becoming very important, very involved actor throughout Somalia including on the Somaliland issue. So far it's really not produced anything.

But one other comment I would make is a very interesting Chinese dimension now where one of the outcomes of greater security is robust exploration for resources throughout Somalia and particularly in Somaliland which has been far more stable and far more secure. And the card that the Somaliland government is pulling out now as a bargain for recognition is, look, there is the old, poor, decrepit port in (inaudible) and the Chinese would just love to buy this port and then be face to face close to the U.S. bases in the region, in Djibouti, French bases, while do you really want that and if not what can you do for us so that we don't lease it to the Chinese. So interesting international dimensions on that.

Two other comments if I may. On Shabaab and wildlife trafficking. I spent three months in eastern Africa looking at wildlife trafficking and just like you mentioned that Americans are only interested in intervention if you can somehow generate al Qaida connections, there is a tendency now to reach for the international terrorism as a mechanism to generate attention of wildlife trafficking. And I'm a passionate conservationist and I am delighted to see finally focus on wildlife trafficking. But it should not be collapsed to Shabaab and militant groups. There are two unresolved under focused issues on wildlife trafficking. One is Chinese demand and the complicity of Chinese government and many different businesses in wildlife trafficking; and the other is the corruption of rangers and protection forces in Africa. The international militancy is only one slim dimension and unless these two issues are addressed we will be misdiagnosing and mistreating wildlife trafficking problems.

My final comment on conditionality, Mike. It's not important just to impose conditionality, it's even more important to enforce it. And whether this is Nigeria or whether this is Somalia we make conditions, we set them as red lines, and then when they are systematically and all the time violated we say, oh, all right, next time we will really mean it.

MR. O'HANLON: Fair enough, and a good point to end on. Well, I'll tell you what, we'll do with your indulgence one more tiny quick round but this one is going to be really quick questions and really quick answers because we're already at time. The two gentlemen in the back; one with the purple scarf and then the one standing with the black and white scarf. Rewarding good fashion here (laughter).

QUESTIONER: Very quickly, and this might be on the potential solution side of the dialogue. Question number one: to what extent are women and women's NGOs particularly indigenous women in these three nations involved in either nation building and/or development dynamics and can they be more encouraged to do that. The second question is really an observation and that is that as a person of both Muslim and Christian origin, it's very interesting to note that the Muslim/Christian dynamics in Ghana, for example, are radically different than those in Nigeria. They're not contiguous neighbors but they're in the same region of Africa. So I'm wondering whether or not the Ghanaian experience in interfaith dialogue might be useful in any of the other religious conflicts in the three nations we're discussing right now. It's kind of a two-part question.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. And then to finish in the back.

QUESITONER: All right, thank you so much. Mr. Ambassador, I've read a lot of things you've written that are very popular, very highly publicized book about Nigerians. At what extent do you think that the lack of government framework in Nigeria – I'm talking about Nigerian constitution – allows for these kinds of problems that continue to come up in Nigeria. If Goodluck Jonathan decides not to run there is no guarantee that the MEND, the Nigeria delta movement for the emancipation of Niger delta would not be the next Boko Haram? Because our constitution governing framework is very weak.

Number two, what do you think is the end state of Obasanjo's letter? What was he trying to achieve?

Number three –

MR. O'HANLON: Can I stop you there (laughter). Why we don't start with Ambassador Campbell and then we'll go to Vanda and Amadou to finish.

AMBASSADOR CAMPBELL: Women's NGOs in Nigeria they can play an extremely important role and if in fact we were to shift our focus to our relationship to the Abuja government to a greatly enhanced relationship with Nigerian NGOs. NGOs that use and corporate and are run by Nigerian women would be right at the top of my list.

Muslim/Christian dialogue structures in Ghana. Certainly worth looking at from the extent to which it can be transferred elsewhere. The kind of elephant in the living room with respect to Christian/Muslim conflict in Nigeria is

that very often it is stirred up by political figures to advance their own particular agendas. In fact, it has nothing to do with either Christianity or with Islam. That reality may limit the applicability of what has happened in Ghana.

In terms of the constitution, fundamentally I agree with you. The current Nigerian constitution is supposed to be modeled after that of the United States. In fact, it's hundreds of pages long. It is very often internally inconsistent. It never underwent any kind of ratification process; it was essentially imposed by the military after the death of the last military dictator. It was never really looked at as to whether it addressed the governance issues and concerns of Nigeria.

MR. SY: Just on this dialogue. I am from Senegal, I mean, I think it's about 95 percent Muslims. First president was Christian, second president's wife was Christian. First president's wife was Christian. So I think there are lots of examples in Africa where we have really a very positive religious dialogue, the problem is when you have insecurity, when you have certain groups that feel that they are not getting their fair share of the wealth and so on, and then you have now these extremist movements coming from outside that's unfortunate, but I think there are lots of examples in Africa where we've been able to live together.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you all for coming and thank you very much to the panel.

(Applause)

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