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THE WARTIME PRESIDENT: EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE
AND THE NATIONALIZING POLITICS OF THREAT

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PROCEDINGS

MR. JACKMAN: All right, I supposed it’s time to get started. Thank you all for being here today. I want to say thank you to Brookings and also to the Center for Effective Public Management. And, also, thank you to the Center for New Institutional Social Science at Washington in St. Louis. For all the help putting this event together, thank you to Anna for all the help organizing everything.

I’m just going to briefly introduce myself. I’m Saul Jackman. I’m one of the people on that list there. And the two co-authors are also here -- Will Howell and Jon Rogowski -- and we really appreciate a chance to present this work to all of you today and get feedback on it to see where the conversation takes us.

So, I’m going to start off by asking Jon to come up here and just give a few basic thoughts on the book. After that, we’ll have the panelists come up and I’ll introduce all of them then.

Thank you. I’m going to have Jon come up. Thanks.

MR. ROGOWSKI: Good morning. Thank you all very much for joining us here today, and thanks also to Brookings for the invitation. We really are excited about presenting our work with you today.

Our book is concerned with a question that has interested scholars, journalists, policymakers, politicians, and the public since our nation’s founding: Does presidential power increase during war? And if war does produce more power for presidents, what exactly enables presidents to wield influence during war that eludes them during peace?

In answering this question, our focus necessarily shifts to thinking about how political institutions interact with each other. After all, power in the United States is both separated and shared between the branches. So, for instance, both the courts and
Congress have the ability to constrain the actions of the president. So witnessing an expansion of presidential power suggests that some other institution must be comparatively less influential. So, in thinking about the effect of war on presidential power, we ought to think about whether other branches of government might be more willing to approve presidential actions during war that they might reject during peace.

In this book, we focus specifically on how war affects the relationship between presidents and Congress. So, the subject of our examination is whether members of Congress are more likely to support the president’s policy agendas, both foreign and domestic, on whether U.S. fights in large wars. In the book, we examine this question in the context of large wars our country has fought in recent history -- World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War, and then the wars in Afghanistan and Iran that began -- sorry, and Iraq -- that began shortly after 9/11. (Laughter) Yeah, not yet, not yet.

So, the answer to this question would seem to be a resounding yes. Virtually everything that’s been written on war and presidential power converges upon the view that during war presidents wield power that they cannot possibly wield during peace.

For instance, in the Federalist papers, Alexander Hamilton argued that it is the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority, while shortly thereafter Madison wrote that war is a true nurse of executive aggrandizement.

In the 19th century, European observers of the U.S. system agreed. So, Tocqueville wrote that the axiom of science says that war “must almost compulsorily concentrate the direction of all men and the management of all things in the hands of the administration.” Fifty years later, Bryce wrote that while, “the direct domestic authority of the president is in time of peace very small...[in war] it expands with portentous speed.”

After watching the nation’s involvement in two world wars, two of the
most famous 20th century scholars of the president, Edwin Corwin and -- important -- Clinton Rossiter, expanded upon this view, which led Rossiter to conclude that, “Another axiom of political scientists would seem to be this. Great emergencies in the life of a constitutional state bring an increase in executive power and prestige always at least temporarily, more often than not permanently.”

And over the last several decades people such as Arthur Schlesinger have written about how war has contributed to an imperial presidency, which has led people such as John Yoo to proclaim that “War acts on executive power as an accelerant, causing it to burn hotter, brighter, and swifter.”

But there are reasons to wonder about whether this view in fact has it right. The evidence that previous scholars have assembled is weak at best. Political scientists and historians that have written on war and the presidency have written evidence that essentially consists of long narratives that say the presidents have done extraordinary things during war, but there’s no systematic comparison of the things that presidents have done during peace. We know that presidents, too, have accomplished extraordinary things during peace. So, for every extraordinary wartime presidential act, there seems to be some other example of an extraordinary act undertaken during peace.

Another reason to question this view is that war is extraordinarily costly. Wars represent some boon to presidential power, so they must do so in spite of the huge human and financial costs that result from these wars. And of course, our nation’s recent experience is that wars also provide another reason to question the claim. Wars became albatrosses around the necks of Truman, LBJ, and George W. Bush, which might suggest that wars may hurt presidents at least as much as they might help them.

We also recognize that not all wars are created equally, and the difference in the nature of different kinds of wars may have different implications for how they affect presidential power. Just as importantly, wars may have different effects
across different policy domains. So, perhaps, for instance, wars embolden a president’s foreign policy objectives but have virtually no effect on the president’s domestic goals.

Finally, existing literature in political science provides no reason to think that members of Congress are more supportive of the president’s proposals during war than they are during peace, because their roll-call voting behavior has a high level of ideological stability. As political scientists keep pool rates, “once elected to Congress, members adopt an ideological position and maintain that position throughout their careers -- once a liberal or a conservative or a moderate, always a liberal or a conservative or a moderate.” So, if redistricting or retirement or serving different constituencies isn’t enough to induce changes in congressional voting behavior, it would seem that no external event, very much including war, will be able to affect the chosen ideological footings of members of Congress.

So, we used a technique to compare congressional voting records undertaken during war and during peace. We are interested in determining whether the onset of war produces a congress that is more supportive of the president. So, if this is true, when a conservative president takes the nation to war, we ought to observe some shift in congressional voting behavior that moves in the conservative direction.

Here’s our evidence from the 107th Congress, which began meeting in 2001 and 2002. The vote for the authorization for the use of force in Afghanistan occurred in early 2001, so we compare the peacetime voting records -- that is, before October 2001 -- with the wartime voting records after October 2001 for members of the 107th House and Senate. In this plot here, the curves show the distribution of member voting records during peace where larger numbers along the X access reflect increase conservatism.

Here are the wartime estimates. The solid lines here now show the distribution of voting records once the war began. In both the House and Senate, we see
a pronounced shift in the conservative direction toward the general ideological orientation of then President George W. Bush.

So we now look at the individual level shifts in member voting behavior. The X axes here show peacetime voting record estimates for members of Congress, and the Y axes show the wartime estimates for members of Congress. If member voting behavior was consistent before and after the beginning of the war, we would expect to see the points line up along the 45-degree lines shown in the figures, but instead we see that the overwhelming majority of members exhibited substantially more conservative voting records in war than they did in peace.

We used the same general approach to evaluate changes in member voting behavior in earlier wars. In the plot on the left, we show the changes in member voting behavior when the nation goes from peace to war. And this plot shifts to the right, indicating that Congress has moved in the ideological direction toward the president. Here each war provides at least some evidence to think that Congress was more accepting of the president’s proposals during war than they were during peace, but evidence for two wars in particular stands out: World War II and the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here, voting records in Congress shifted dramatically in the president’s ideological direction in both chambers. Contrast this evidence to the wars for Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf where the effects appear much more limited.

The conclusion of war, however, has almost a uniformly negative effect on presidential success in Congress as the plot on the right shows. In all these wars and almost across all chambers, the members of Congress move away from the president’s ideological orientation once war is over.

The evidence shows here that wars do in fact have an effect on presidential influence in Congress but that not all wars have the same effect. What might explain the wartime effect we observe and what explains these differences across wars?
To explain the general intuition, take a look at some of these war posters distributed during the two world wars. These posters implore Americans to eat less bread, to grow your own fruits and vegetables, be ever mindful of food waste, use carpools to reduce rubber consumption, knit socks for the troops overseas, plant victory gardens, keep a low profile to avoid spilling information to spies, and well before ethanol subsidies became a political issue serve corn at every meal.

These slides capture an important dimension of war. Wars have the potential to nationalize our politics and to shift our attention from our own local concerns to the concerns among the nation as a whole. Former Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill, famously quipped that all politics is local, and surely local interests are an important part of how members of Congress evaluate public policy. But in the book, we argue that policies have implications, both locally and nationally. So, for instance, some trade agreements may have relatively minor effects for the national economy as a whole, but they're hugely beneficial for citrus growers in Florida. And when wars nationalize our politics, when wars demand our efforts as individuals and families and communities to support the work our troops are doing overseas, or when wars pose a grave threat to our national security and our way of life, wars fundamentally alter the ways members of Congress think about the crafting of public policy. Then in these cases, members place greater emphasis on the national implications of policy and less emphasis on the local implications of policy.

In so doing, this advantages the president. First and foremost presidents serve a national constituency, and the whole of the executive branch is designed to help him do so. By matter of design, members of Congress serve their own local constituencies. The nature of these different constituencies suggests that members of Congress are more inclined to support the president's proposals when policy outcomes become nationalized.
The theory I've sketched out here provides some insight into why war could increase presidential influence and why it might do so more in some wars than in others. But it also suggests that we might see different effects across policy domains. So, for instance, the president has a natural advantage in foreign policies, but his domestic proposals are often the source of real conflict with Congress, but if wars nationalize our politics in the way I've described, we ought to see bigger effects for presidential influence for the president's domestic agenda.

So, looking again at the 107th Congress, this is exactly what we see. The shifts in congressional voting behavior are considerably more pronounced in domestic policy than they are in foreign affairs. So, not only do presidents have broad latitude in the conduct of wars overseas, but those same wars also have significant consequences for the policies the president wants to enact at home.

We assembled a variety of other evidence that tells the same story. In the realm of budgetary politics, for instance, we compared presidential budget requests with enacted budgets. We show that presidents' budgets receive a more favorable hearing from members of Congress during war than they do during peace. And, once again, the effects of budgets are larger for World War II and the post-9/11 wars than they are for the other wars. And we again find that the evidence is stronger among domestic agencies that it is for defense agencies.

Other examples from history support our contention that wars nationalize our politics, and when they do, presidents stand to gain from them. Presidents Roosevelt and Bush were able to score legislative victories in Congress that eluded them as peacetime presidents. For instance, in the book we detailed a story of Roosevelt's failed efforts to pass labor reforms early in 1941, but once the nation entered World War II, the president had a distinct advantage in influencing reforms that later historians would argue changed the course of this country's labor policies to vantage unions.
But there are also some other examples that seem to challenge arcane claims. For instance, during his presidency, Eisenhower tried time and again to reform the nation’s education system, but time and again his proposals failed until it is fall, 1957. In October/November the Soviets launched the Sputnik 1 and Sputnik 2 satellites, and virtually overnight support for national education reform had sprung from all corners. In doing so, the president argued, it was imperative to advancing our science and technology so we could keep up with the enemy, and Congress fell promptly in line. War is not the only factor, therefore, that can nationalize our politics in ways that advantage the president.

The story of Lyndon Johnson presents another challenge. We don’t find that the Vietnam War led to a huge boon in Johnson’s success in Congress. In fact, to the contrary. While Johnson was convinced of the necessity of getting involved in Southeast Asia, he also wanted to preserve the elements of his sweeping domestic agenda here at home. Involvement in Vietnam, he reasoned, would fracture support in Congress for his Great Society proposals by providing southern Democrats with the argument that we couldn’t afford his domestic proposals because of the war efforts. Thus, time and again, Johnson downplayed the true extent of the nation’s involvement in Vietnam, insisting before Congress that our foreign policy had not changed, further deliberately misleading the public about his true intentions. And he did so in an effort to save his domestic agenda. But when he could no longer deny that the U.S. was involved in a full-fledged war, he was forced to announce in spring 1968 that he would not be a candidate for reelection.

While the book’s findings center squarely around the effective war and presidential power, we also want to call attention to the various dimensions along which our country’s leaders evaluate policies. Sometimes our nation’s politics are intentionally local and at other times are gazed, affixed primarily at the national level. And when we
shift between one and the other, we have the potential to see dramatic changes in the political outcomes that result.

I'd like to bring our panel up, and we look forward to the continued conversation on the book.

MR. JACKMAN: All right, thank you, Jon.

I would like now to take a moment to introduce our three panelists that we're very privileged to have here today. Starting on the end we have Sarah Binder -- we have Sarah Binder, Tom Mann, and Dan Balz. I'm expecting most of you know these people pretty well. Sarah Binder is a colleague of mine here at Brookings Institution, also a professor at George Washington University.

I'm going to try to keep these short, as I've been instructed by the discussants not to brag too much about them.

Tom Mann, also a colleague here, and a well-known -- both of these two are very well-known scholars on Congress and the American politics in general. And then Dan Balz at the end, a correspondent for the Washington Post. He's been there for, I believe, over three decades, worked at the White House. Can't say enough about all three of these people, and I'm going to now turn things over to them.

I have a couple of question just to kind of start things off, and then I want to really get their feedback on this project.

So, Sarah, if you don't mind, I'd like to start with you. Given your background in legislative studies, my question based on this book is, does the policymaking process in Congress change during times of war, and if so in what ways has it changed?

MS. BINDER: Okay, great -- well, first of all, thanks very much for including me for the authors. They are great.

Let me just start by saying a couple of things that I like particularly about
the book, and then we’ll get to Saul’s question.

First, in terms of its strengths, I see three of them. First this is a thoroughly ambitious, theoretical venture from start to finish and quite faithful to the theory all along and, in part, not just the theory of wartime. As they point out, war is not really in the model. This is really a theory about Congress and the president and their relationship in policymaking particularly in wartime. It was really quite an impressive accomplishment.

Second, the empirical evidence that you got a taste of from Jon here is really very impressive. If you dig into the book, you can see the amount of effort it took to create these pretty unique types of empirical evidence. It goes to say, it knocked my socks off, but somehow I forgot to wear socks today, so if I was wearing socks, I’d say it knocked my socks off. Please don’t tell my mother. Okay -- or my kids.

Anyway, a third -- methodologically -- which we don’t need to go into here.

It’s really that they leave no stone untouched. All right, any objection you might have here they have thought of already, all right? That is, they anticipate the types of objections, and they try to answer them in the text of the book, which is really quite impressive. So, overall, I’m quite enthused about it.

In response to Saul’s question -- so, the question is really, how do I see your findings in relation to my book, which looks at the relationship of Congress and president and their ability to solve problems, right? How do we account for episodes of legislative stalemate or patterns in legislative stalemate over the postwar period?

So, there are really two periods here that stand out from your book where we see this intense nationalization of politics, as Jon pointed to as being critical, right? What are the periods in which members of Congress seem to feel that their local orientations have to be subsumed into a national interest in part because they don’t have
enough expertise to challenge the president?

We can come back to whether we think members actually check their local orientations ever at the door. I’m not so sure. But in terms of the two periods here, certainly World War II and certainly the war post-9/11, World War II is prior to my study. I’m happy to come back to Congress during World War II. To some extent it fits your theory; to some extent it’s a little bit of a challenge but certainly the contemporary period here.

The question is, if we look at patterns of legislative gridlock on domestic policy and patterns on foreign policy, are they really quite similar, right? Do presidents tend, in periods of war -- particularly post-9/11 -- when they succeed on foreign policy, do they also succeed on domestic policy, which is really a shining, empirical finding in your book.

So-so. I give you a so-so. If we look even just at 2001, 2002 and we go back to Y. I say so-so, all right? 2001, 2001 clearly, as you suggest in your book -- 9/11 -- changes the agenda of Congress, right? And that I think is pretty important. Sometimes we don’t quite give enough attention to certainly Patriot Act, authorization for military for economic stabilization, airline rescue bailout in some ways in that period, right? -- all sorts of economic issues that come onto the agenda, as well as security issues. So, yes, war has an effect here on the types of issues that get discussed.

And on those issues, if we take a look at Congress’ record on all the big issues that were put on the agenda in the wake of 9/11, how well did Congress and the president come on those issues? The success rate is something like 95 percent, right? There’s very little left on the table at the end of the day there that Congress wasn’t able to successfully address, which in part, right?, really supports your finding that regardless of what members think in these periods of nationalized focus and security threat they’re willing to vote with the president. So, absolutely.
The only issue here as I look at the rest of the agenda, domestic policy issues in 2001, 2002, even those just in 2002 after 9/11, President Bush didn't fare so well, right? By my metrics, it's about half. Half the issues are left in limbo and gridlock at the end of the Congress. Prescription drug bills, patients' bill of rights, and there was stem cell research, right? A host of domestic and social policies that later saw enactment but not in that original period. So, the question is, why? Right?

How do we account for the differences between your study and mine? Just very briefly, there's a narrow, empirical answer I'm sure, right?, or what we're trying to explain is a little bit different. I'm into problem solving. You have efforts on budgets and voting outcomes.

I think the narrow, empirical answer is probably not that interesting. The broader, theoretical answer I think in part depends on the theories here, right? Yours is an informational model. It has to do with expertise and members' willingness and ability to challenge the president. My models really give a starring role to political parties, which don't really play a starring role in your account.

So, the question is, if we look at the role of impacted parties, whether it's divided party control versus unified party control, if we're looking at parties that have a large bipartisan middle versus parties that are polarized, once we take account of those factors, we tend to see a divorcing in the success rates between domestic and foreign policy such that we might even say that party becomes the decisive factor, all right?, in explaining why my members, at least in this context, are willing to acquiesce for presidents' calls for war.

But there's a good degree of overlap between our two books in approaches. I think probably the question of political parties and their role here, which Dan and Tom probably would love to talk about as well, might provide a different perspective on presidential success in this nationalization of the issues.
But I’ll stop right there.

MR. JACKMAN: Thank you.

I’d like to give each of the discussants a chance to talk before we delve into responding to each other, but, Tom, do you have a general thought you’d like to ask. I have a more pointed question for you, if you’d like, but I’m happy to hear your general thoughts first.

MR. MANN: Okay, I’m never at a loss for words, but that’s not the problem. The problem is the opposite of that.

First of all, congratulations to the authors. I mean, this is a subject -- inner-branch relations, the president, the Congress, and war-making. Marvin Kalb is here and has thought lately about this. My first years at Brookings, way back in the last century, were (laughter) dedicated in part to the issues of the respective sort of powers and responsibilities, and it ended up with a title, a question of balance, just trying to figure it out. And as you point out, Jon, in the presentation, these questions go all the way back to the early period under the Constitution and into the drafting of the Constitution. They are really critically important questions, and over the years -- indeed, the decades and the centuries -- we’ve wrestled with them. I mean, Aaron Wildavsky helped us with this concept of the two presidencies, one on the military foreign side, the other on the domestic, and seeing a sort of sharp difference between the two, but that’s precipitated a lot of subsequent research and challenge, to be sure. But I’m sort of taken by the effort. I think this is, as Sarah, a really ambitious effort to try to understand what the broader impacts are and under what conditions, and the way in which we sometimes separate domestic and foreign policy is really mistaken. The two are linked together. The question is, what’s the form of the linkage?

You know, like Sarah, I am struck and have been struck just because of the nature of the work I’ve been doing on just how important party is and how much party
trumps institutional matters in the period in which we operate now. It's just stunning to see your analysis. Your dataset stopped in about 2006, 2005, and since then it really has been intensified such that at least one would want to ask the question of whether the kind of focus on sort of the informational, theoretical focus, and ultimately the focus on the individual member of Congress is appropriate in a period in which we have team battles. That's something you understand full well and talk about. I'm just raising it as an important issue in trying to grapple with that.

A couple of other questions that occurred to me, just to get you guys to talk about this are: You're looking at the impact on presidential power, but -- I mean, what does that mean? In the short term sort of a little more favorable support in Congress from presidential requests on budgets and on broader issues that elicit ideological response, but wouldn't it be the case that we want to look at what the statutory institutional implications of the war-making periods are that then take on a life afterward that you wouldn't necessarily see reflected in the voting of Congress? That is, what is -- I mean, the Patriot Act just jumps out. I mean, that is the mega-act after 9/11 that constitutes and includes many of the domestic achievements you feel Bush had. Some of those are really quite long-lasting and still under consideration.

So, the question I ask is, what's the best way to understand the strength of the presidency in a war-making period going into war and coming out of war, and should we be looking at sort of these institutional statutory accretions, and are they reversed? Are they lasting? Is this in part what accounts for a general increase in presidential authority? Many of these matters over a long period of time. So, that's one question I would put to to you.

Sort of a second is the national sort of versus the local I think is theoretically very important, but it's sort of sometimes tough to differentiate them. As Sarah said, you know, members of Congress never put their constituencies aside and are
viewing some of these national mobilizations through the lenses that their own constituents are using. But it’s sort of also the case that you are interested theoretically on not just war but other kinds of issues that would prompt this kind of national focus.

Well, we’ve had a textbook case of that since the end of your dataset, which is the economy, the global financial crisis and deep recession. This issue has overwhelmed, in a political sense, all other considerations and in foreign policy is very much caught up in the global economy and how it impacts back home here. And that’s the classic issue, I think, in which the local and the national merge. But they combine to push most of the war-making matters off to the side. Maybe it was because we were withdrawing troops, then adding in Iraq, then adding them in Afghanistan but then quickly returning, and so that’s pushed off the agenda, and Benghazi is pushed off the agenda.

So, I’m wondering if in a formal -- since your war period would continue because we’re still involved, but it’s not war that’s driving presidential versus congressional authority; it’s very much the economy, which gets to the final point, which you raised very nicely in the conclusion of the book, which I think is really fertile and important, which is the whole nature of war changing. And will that, over time, alter the way in which we come to understand the impact of war-making?

I mean, you know, we have a difficult time seeing the beginning and the end of wars. We have involvements. We’ve now had two engagements that are the longest in history, but they haven’t been always at war or they’re localized, but without a draft we manage to keep them off of the public agenda.

So, how do we think about war and war-making and periods when war is fundamentally different? It never ends. It’s constant types of interventions and anti-terrorist activities. This of course then invokes all of the questions now surfacing with the NSA and the intelligence community. I mean, does the ongoing existence of the new war give the president, now, strength in the face of congressional concern and anxiety about
a potential overreach with the NSA?

Well, those are some of the questions. There are many more that just naturally emerge from what is a very fertile piece of scholarship.

MR. BALZ: I want to echo Tom and Sarah on saying what a terrific job you guys have done with this book. I mean, it's obviously very timely, and particularly because we're sort of at this moment when there are questions about what are the limits or presidential power and, you know, how effective can a president be in this time, and this is a reminder of this larger reality of the relationship between Congress and the executive and the tension that's built into the Constitution.

I mean, I was struck by this book being a wonderful sort of combination of marrying historical context with empirical research in a way that advances our knowledge about the basic question in a way that is academically rigorous and yet accessible to, you know, the nonsocial scientists like myself, although Appendix A was a little bit funny. (Laughter) For those of you who --

MR. ROGOWSKI: You didn’t get through that whole appendix?

MR. BALZ: Pages 275 through 291 are all equations, and I sort of broke down at that point. (Laughter) But up to then it was terrific. (Inaudible) is the limits of journalists not the problem of social scientists, so.

There are a number of ways we can spin off of this, and Sarah and Tom have pointed to some of them. I mean, one of the things, as I say, that's, you know, a reminder of the tension that has always been there since the founders between presidents and Congress and the degree to which presidents use periods of war or conflict to enhance their power either temporarily or more and more permanently. But as you go through the sort of timeline of conflict, one of the things that's striking to me is the degree to which wars are no longer all-consuming in this country. I mean, if you think of the World War II experience and the posters that Jon put up on the board, I mean, this
was a national effort that consumed the entire country and therefore affected, you know, all citizens, all politicians, and obviously the people who were fighting the war.

Since then, and particularly, you know, in the last half century, when we think of these periods we really do think of them as times for both the country and for presidents in which there was a bifurcation or at least an effort not to allow war to completely subsume everything else. I mean, you talk about LBJ and the Vietnam War and tried to preserve an incredibly robust domestic policy agenda, the Great Society particularly in '65 and '66 by hiding, in essence, the nature of what they were doing in terms of the buildup of the Vietnam war while pointing out, very smartly I thought, the idea that it was important to Johnson to show southern Democrats that he was doing what he could to roll back Communism and this balancing act that he was trying to do and yet to do it in a way that allowed him to -- you know, the famous non-tradeoffs, guns versus butter, ultimately, as you suggest, to his detriment, and the country was torn apart by the war; at the same time, there was the push on the domestic front with the Great Society.

You look at all presidents almost without exception through the '60s, the '70s, the '80s, the '90s. You get to George W. Bush, and the attacks on 9/11, as we know, fundamentally changed his presidency. And so you would say for George W. Bush the attacks of 9/11, and therefore the launch of the war in Afghanistan and in Iraq, were a reflection of the degree to which he had changed his own thinking about the presidency. And yet what we know about the country is that the country snapped back fairly quickly after 9/11. I mean, as Tom points out, the Patriot Act may be the single largest effect of the post-9/11 atmosphere in Congress and the country, and yet we quickly got back to partisanship. The mid-term elections of 2002 were extraordinarily partisan in which the Bush campaign -- no, the Bush team -- used the war to enhance his prospects in the mid-term election, thereby, I would say, heightening the partisan tensions that existed after
that.

What we’ve seen is presidents attempting to advance domestic agendas at the same time they’ve been involved in conflict, and one of the things that I think is useful from the book is, again, to remind people that not all wars are created equal in their impact domestically. World War II, yes, it obviously did have an effect; the Vietnam War not so much. Dessert Storm, which was a very successful military enterprise -- George H. W. Bush put together an international coalition, waged the war very effectively, stopped the war, and yet domestically he was seen as political failure ultimately to the point that he was rejected in reelection in 1992.

You know, Bill Clinton, who fought limited wars, and those are harder to measure in terms of their impact domestically, was -- you know, you could say that while he was waging conflict in Bosnia and Croatia and was certainly not the first president to be dealing with international terror, right? He was dealing with that, too, in the 1980s. But the first in the era we think of as the Osama Bin Laden terrorism era, he was dealing with that, and yet you would have to say he was a domestically-focused president.

President Obama, as Tom said, you know, both wound one war, enlarged another war, then wound down that war. You know, it’s striking when we look at what has happened to him more recently, the question of -- we think of presidents having almost unlimited ability to decide if they want to start a conflict. And what we have just seen with Syria is his effort to say to Congress, I want your approval before we do anything, and being faced with a defeat in Congress until John Kerry kind of miraculously, unexpectedly, and accidentally (laughter) created an exit ramp for him to do that.

There are a couple of things that I was also struck by in the book that I think are worth throwing back to you all for questions. You know, we’re talking about Bush and the powers that he accumulated immediately after 9/11, and the empirical work that you did to look at, overall through a long period of time, the impact on budgetary
requests and appropriations of the president and to show that during wartimes presidents have been more successful.

You raise the issue, rightly I think, of what happened with Social Security, which was the single, most significant domestic initiative of Bush’s second term at a time when we were involved in wars, obviously at a time when there was growing dissatisfaction with Iraq. That was a wholly unsuccessful enterprise domestically. He got nowhere on Social Security, and it raised for me the question of the difference between success in a budgetary sense in which individual policies are not so highlighted. We’re talking about amounts of money and presidents’ success in getting more during wartime for their initiatives across the board domestically and national security-wise versus non-war versus a very big and singular domestic initiative in which the public or the Congress is wholly focused on that as opposed to kind of the budgetary things and whether there is any pattern to that that can be described in terms of the effect of presidential power in wartime activity.

And the other question that I would raise is -- it’s obviously difficult to measure, I think, but that is to what extent do military setbacks affect presidential powers and the relationship between presidents and Congress? I mean, when you think of Jimmy Carter and the failed mission in Iran where the helicopters ended up crashed on the dessert, you think of Reagan and what happened with the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1982. We are in an era in which small conflict and, as Tom suggested, constant intervention is more the norm than the big wars, and I think that -- you know, it’s not the focus of your study, but I’d be interested if you guys have any thoughts on the era that we’re now in and how that may affect the relationship.

But, at any rate, I want to commend you on a terrific piece of work.

MR. JACKMAN: Thank you. Thank you, all three of you. So many questions were raised I almost don’t know where to begin. But thread that I felt you all
touched on -- and let’s just kind of push this forward a little further -- is Sarah started off by talking about the role of divided government as opposed to the role of war, and my first response would be, admittedly, the divided government does play a role in the ability of Congress to get bills passed and the ability of the two branches to be able to negotiate with each other effectively, but does one exclude the other? I mean, could war play a role despite the concurrent effect of divided government? When you look at the post-9/11 attacks, we unified government for the first six years, then divided government reappears -- unified government in the previous wars we look at. Even just thinking about post-9/11 -- and this goes beyond our dataset, but you think about, also, Obama then having unified government for the first two years he’s in office and then divided government thereafter, and you think of it as the same war or not, it’s into itself an interesting question, because, as you said, the economy became an issue. And I don’t want to get into two issues at once, but, I mean, what do you guys think about the idea that this role of war is playing an important factor on the art in between the two branches in conjunction with the role of unified government.

Certainly, I know in our models in our empirical studies we try to control for the effect of unified divided government for the number of seats that the president’s party has in the House and the Senate. We try to look a number of different things to see if the effect went away, and we found that that mattered, that it had a huge effect on things, but it did not negate the effect of war. So, what do you think about that, any of you?

MS. BINDER: So -- this isn’t the only answer. I’ll throw one out, and then you guys think. (Laughter) You guys get a chance to look really sharp (laughter), because I’m just, like, (inaudible).

MR. JACKMAN: Thank you, Sarah.

MS. BINDER: There’s a -- again there’s an (inaudible) empirical answer,
but that’s the (inaudible), so we won’t go for the era on empirical one.

So, I guess the question is, if we’re looking at the impact of party control here and for and whether one or the other or both might make a difference here, I think the key issue here is, with apologies for the book of sciency language, language. What’s the causal mechanism under results? Why do we see the relationship, this fusing of congressional and presidential interest, whether in budgets or in policy notes or what-have-you. Why is it -- and you have a very persuasive account about informational costs, right?, And the nationalization here and the president and members willing to subsume their interest in this broader -- because they don’t have expertise to challenge the president, as is clearly part of the story here.

Now, in that story we don’t need to really worry so much about party control. But if there’s another mechanism here, right? -- what if it’s just a story about blame avoidance, right?, that members don’t want to have their hands on the wheel objecting to what the president’s doing, particularly in national times and national threat, and so they go along with the president. Well, then, party control might begin to make a difference, because it provides some variation in parties’ willingness to give up the blame game or to plan the blame game, right? And we see a little bit -- you know, the current period’s a little hard, because we’ve got split commercial control under control here, but we could imagine a scenario -- 9/11 perhaps -- you know, it’s hard to know the Lyndon Johnson period, right? -- we could imagine a scenario where the parties see their exact interest in not challenging the president, because they don’t want to be blamed because of the horrific scale of an attack. Pearl Harbor clearly falls in that episode.

But we could imagine other episodes, perhaps these smaller skirmishes where the opposition party in control of the House and Senate says wait, we are going to stand our ground here; this isn’t such a popular war or such a threat, and we’re going not to subsume our interest here, not to be so supportive. And so I think if we take an
account of perhaps the blame game that’s going on, we might say we need to think about parties. And if we think that the parties are more willing or skittish about being blamed, perhaps as the parties polarize because their intellectual interests differ, perhaps it’s going to play a role, too. Maybe we have to sort of think out why and when they might make a difference. But perhaps the answer here on parties is, well, how has it changed the calculations of leaders?; has it changed the calculations of rank and file?; and whether those calculations differ, first, depending on the security threat as well as depending on relations between the parties.

MR. MANN: I mean, I think Sarah’s right, and I think all of us are seeing and saying some of the same things, and you are, too. There are wars and there are wars. But there’s been nothing like World War I, and most of our wars since then have been very unhappy occasions, have led to clear opposition, developing sort of very quickly. And it becomes so much harder to define or to think through how the politics of war-making actually are able to enhance presidential authority and power beyond the immediate -- and that’s why I keep coming back to the Patriot Act, because most of -- you discuss, very nicely, how some of Bush’s immigration agenda got combined with the Patriot Act and gave them a victory. But he wanted much more, and you mention that as well. As Sarah said, you answer all the “butts.” You know, you don’t leave any of these stones unturned in the book. But the politics of that just overwhelmed his 2007 immigration bill. It was a tremendous setback, and it told us something about the changing character of party polarization, and in particular what was happening within the Republican Party. So that -- I mean, all of these are factors, but of course the answer is it could be both, and there are periods in which elements of war -- 9/11 is the closest, because in some way sort of the nature of the attack got the country’s attention and the Congress’ attention and clearly altered behavior in the short term that allowed Bush -- well, it gave him a 90+ percent approval rating and put him in a position to achieve a lot.
There's just no question about it.

But if you're looking for impact on domestic politics, probably his biggest changes occurred with his tax cut, initial tax cut, before 9/11 and the war, and it's not explained by the war.

MR. BALZ: I'm going to pick up on one thing that Sarah said, which is this notion of blame avoidance and particularly at a moment in which the country is embracing a president's decision to want to wage war. You know, we've seen some powerful examples of that in our lifetimes. I mean, you go back to World War II and the attack on Pearl Harbor. That was obviously a unifying moment after a direct attack. But there have been a couple of other instances where presidents have sought and gotten significant authority to go to war that have been based on deception: Obviously, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which we found, on retrospect, was totally based on deception; and Bush's request for an authorization to go to war in Iraq based on the belief that there were weapons of mass destruction there, which turned out not to be the case. And if you look at the way Congress responded both in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and in particular the resolution in 2002 on Iraq, I think there was a lot of what Sarah describes as blame avoidance, you know, particularly on Democratic side in that case where they might otherwise be opposed to what Bush was trying to do. James Cargill has always said he thought that Hillary Clinton lost the nomination for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008 the millisecond she cast that vote in 2002. And yet we know what the politics were driving that and the inability of members of Congress to really be able to exercise clear and dispassionate judgment at a time when there is a kind of overwhelming political sense.

The issue of divided government and party control I think is very important, and I think that in one sense we're dealing with two different eras over the time period that you all are dealing with in your study. You know, Tom and Norm have done
the work on what this new era has presented us with in terms of the conflict between the parties and the role of the Republican Party and the Tea Party faction in effecting polarization in Congress. But we are -- as we know, we are in a more polarized period today, and so the issue of divided government is more significant today than it used to be. And so, again, I think that that's part of how we have to think about the current era as opposed to past eras.

MR. ROGOWSKI: Thank you. I mean, it's all very helpful. One other question that I think marries together one of the comments made by Dan and one of the comments made by Tom: Dan, I really liked your thought about, you know, perhaps the presidential sense is going to be greater in low-salience issues. You suggested maybe the budget would be a relatively low-salience issue in comparison to Social Security, you know, more high-profile events and goals.

I guess the first question I'll ask about that is -- there's a finding we don't actually talk about in the book. It might get a footnote, but it's not the kind of thing that gets much attention. Throughout our datasets on presidential budgetary requests and what's gets passed in the end, we find that if you put in, I guess, a variable that kind of counts how many years a war's been going on, we find that if anything presidents do better as wars go on further. This is true kind of across the whole panel of wars that we consider. It's not a huge effect, but it's certainly not a diminishing -- actually, it's a positive effect.

So, presidents doing better as these wars go on kind of throughout the admittedly shortened Iraq war/post-911 war, because that ends our dataset in 2005, but also Vietnam, Korean War. As we know, these wars are certainly decreasing popularity. Public opinion is hurting them kind of throughout the progression of the war. What is it that you think would allow presidents to continue to do better in those events, in these what you were referring to as kind of low salience, less important events? As we know,
they were kind of struggling, kind of, with these larger events as the wars progressed as public opinion turned against them?

MR. BALZ: It’s a great question, and it was actually one that I had in mind for you all, because it’s totally -- (laughter).

MR. ROGOFSKI: Okay, well.

MR. BALZ: It’s totally contrary to what your assumptions would be, which is that the longer a war goes on and particularly a war that becomes less popular or more unpopular, the less willing Congress would be to go along on some of these things.

MR. ROGOFSKI: Right. Mm-hmm. Yes.

MR. BALZ: The only answer I would offer, and I would defer to everybody else here, is sort of congressional inertia. I mean that once things get built into spending patterns, they stay in spending patterns, and they’re difficult to reverse unless there is some significant, you know, person or (inaudible) or, you know, event that causes that to change. So, I mean, off the top of my head, that’s the only thought I have. But I would welcome you all -- some thoughts on why that is, because it is counterintuitive.

MR. JACKMAN: Will, would you like to make a comment?

MR. HOWELL: I’ll just say something quick, and I want to hear what you all think as well about this. Thank you all for your great comments.

On this point, I think we worried a lot about what is it -- I mean, the sort of core theme of the book is you’re trying to figure out what is it about war that’s generating these effects, these effects particularly that we observe in domestic policy? What is it that’s -- how is it changing our politics? And one story you could tell about war is that it boosts presidential approval ratings. It’s one story to tell. But I actually don’t think it comports with the evidence that we actually find. You don’t see a big bump with the
outbreak of Persian Gulf war for congressional acquiescence to the president in domestic policy. When you do observe a big bump in Bush 41’s approval ratings, you see a big shift when you transition from war to peace in our data, in congressional voting behavior, and yet that isn’t associated with big, immediate shifts in presidential approval ratings. So, I don’t think that’s so much the story. So that’s one line. What you might say is what’s going on with war. Another thing you might point to is this blame avoidance idea that, well, members of Congress are just getting out of the way, because they don’t want to be fingered for blame when we are at war. If that’s true, it seems to me, then then effects should be greater in foreign policy. You really don’t want to get blamed when the president is making decisions that are directly related to the war, and yet what we see are these big effects in domestic policy that are actually greater than those we observe in foreign policy, which is why we’re putting our money on it being about the (inaudible). When you say “war” and you want to think about relevance for presidential power, you should think the nationalization of our politics, right?, the extent to which that happens. That provides, I think, some consistent explanation for why we see the effects that we observe and why we can tie together the post-9/11 period with World War II, even though on so many dimensions these are radically different military ventures, right?, on so many dimensions, but they both have this effect.

I’ll just say this one thing, and then I’ll get out of the way. Looking at trends over the course of a war, because we were actually puzzled by this, you’d think that there would be a big bump initially but you don’t observe it, and then you see it sort of fade out. We simply don’t see it in the data, but I think as a matter of principle we don’t have -- if concerns about domestic policy over the course of a war shift to a set of local parochial considerations, if you see that shift and suddenly debates about education policy have to with the, you know, communities and local needs of kids and public versus private as opposed to how do we keep the country competitive, that’s the thing to
monitor. When you see that shift to the parochial, from the national to the parochial, that’s when presidents are going to have a harder time of it, and we want to argue that it has less to do with whether or not the military venture itself is popular or not, that which you don’t see evidence for.

Saul, I said I’d get out of the way.

MR. JACKMAN: How are we doing on time here? I think we’re -- yeah, we can open up for questions now. Are there -- anyone have questions they’d like to ask? Is that Phil?

MR. WALLACH: Hi. Yes, Phil Wallach at Brookings.

Is it really loud?

So, I was wondering how you distinguish between Congress accommodating what the president wants and the two things that they want just converging. So, how do we know the presidents aren’t tucking in their sales on these budget requests over time as opposed to thinking that Congress is just acquiescing more?

MR. ROGOWSKI: That’s a great question. That’s something that we look into in the book, so in addition to kind of bridging the gap between the president’s request and the enacted budget, we also estimate the president’s request as a function of wartime versus peacetime. And we find that actually, if anything, presidents request more money during wartime, you know, per agency or per program than they do during times of peace. So, if anything, they’re actually -- the president’s pulling further away from where the budgets had been during times of war. Does that kind of address your question?

MR. JACKMAN: Yes, right here.

SPEAKER: Very, very interesting. I have two questions. You seem to suggest that there are differences in congressional response or in public polls or
whatever between what are now called wars of necessity and wars of choice, but the
other question, unrelated and distinctive, I haven’t heard any reference to the nature of
congressional leadership and the skills of the congressional leadership within their own
parties or, for that matter, in bipartisan negotiations and the relationships between the
president and the leaders. That’s the other side of the coin in the bilateral relationship.

MR. ROGOWSKI: Sure. Well, I’ll try to address that question if you guys want to add to it.

What I would suggest is that congressional leaders certainly have a
voice here, and they have their own expertise, but by the nature of our separation of
powers, of our system of government, members of Congress are going to have a greater
interest in learning how policies appeal or don’t appeal to their given districts. So, they’re
going to focus the majority of their attention on what their particular district or maybe their
state or their senator -- what that state thinks, whereas the president’s going to be, you
know, much more concerned about the big picture. Maybe not the entire country -- one
could argue (inaudible) the states that got him elected, you know, you can get a little
more fine-tuned with this. But certainly a much broader picture is what the president’s
going to be concerned with. So, any given time he’s assessing he’s assessing policy on
a different set of criteria, so his expertise as a function of that will be a little bit different by
nature than will be the members of Congress, even the leaders who are, by system
design, going to think much more about local interests and how to earn their own
reelection and appease their constituents.

Would either of you like to add any comments to that?

MR. HOWELL: Yes. In going back to that really quick.

MR. JACKMAN: He’s got a mic for you here.

MR. HOWELL: Oh, sorry. Here I am again. (Laughter)

The claim is not that during the war members of Congress check their
local concerns at the door, that they just utterly abandon them. They care about both. It’s that during some wars they simply place greater weight on national implications, right? So, it’s sort of a shift in priorities but not an abandonment of local commitments.

I really like the point earlier that was raised about the global economic meltdown, right? And I think this is something we’re really open to. In some ways, we want to say wars are special, because they can have the effect of nationalizing our politics. But that’s not the only thing that could do that, right? We shouldn’t think about their being a separate class of wartime politics and a separate class of domestic politics, right? Or peacetime politics. It’s that there are a number of things that could that could generate these effects. We point to and we talk about, in the book, the launching of Sputnik having this effect. But so, too, the global economic meltdown, if that has the effect of encouraging citizens to say “huh,” you know, “the sky is falling and it is falling on all of us as Americans,” and is challenging us to address foreign competition in new and important ways, and if that becomes the terms of the debate, the president’s going to do better. If when the economic meltdown is kicking in and we all say, we’ve got to take care of our communities and we’ve got to recognize our diversity, and we’ve got to -- right?, you could see it could have the shift of actually pointing to parochial concerns. The president’s not going to do so well. And that’s what we suggest is the sort of things to watch.

MR. MANN: You know, that’s fascinating. Think TARP. There’s George Bush, who gets a call from Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke, you know, the globe is melting, the sky is falling, we have to take action, you know, major financial firms are going down, the bubble has burst, you know, we have to take steps. President Bush hates it substantively, but --

MR. BALZ: But engages in presidential blame avoidance. (Laughter)

MR. MANN: I think he engaged in presidential statesmanship and
actually did what was required. But what’s really interesting is how the party and public opinion but also the nature of the problem itself sort of led -- the public didn’t respond in the face of this. Yes, we support our president and the Congress to bail out the banks and the other financial firms and to keep the ship of state afloat, but we’re skeptical pretty early on, and this was -- so, what it took was an amazing combination of the other party coming forward and joining with the president, which left a bad aftertaste in the country and real problems. But the immediate sort of politics were very unusual, cutting against --

MS. BINDER: Look, we had a House vote and it failed, right? But that’s not the end of the story. What happened? How did we get to a successful Senate vote? How did we get to the final sort of coming together on TARP? I don’t know, I think the local story mattered, right? They added Mental Health Parodies Act. Picked up a couple votes. (Laughter) Friends of Obama called members of the National Black Caucus. Appealed to them. The foreclosure mitigation package got a little rounded out, which is local, right? That’s a local issue. And then coming to (inaudible) stock market crash, which I think generated both oppositions, but (inaudible) as well as us recognition that everybody’s 401(k)s or 403(b)s or what have you no longer -- but so then when you got (inaudible). So, it’s a combination, clearly a combination here but trying to push a nationalization with these economic effects but members being moored in these partisan and electoral and different constituencies that make it tough in this particular environment to get the type of nationalization effect.

MR. HOWELL: And when this sense that it’s falling, we as a country are being hit by this, right? We’re all in this together; the economy is falling, what’s to happen to us? I think in the immediate moment with TARP, there was more of that, and then it breaks out not into just the division between Main Street and Wall Street but Main Streets, right? What are we going to do for all these forgotten communities around the
country? We’re hearing more of that in the rhetoric about how do we deal with the economic catastrophe, and that does not bode well for a president when you see that move away. That suggests something.

MR. JACKMAN: I believe you put your hand up a little while ago.

MS. VICTOR: Thanks, Jennifer Victor at George Mason University.

And to follow up on this conversation about the potential of exogenous events to nationalize our politics, I wondered if you could speak to -- what strikes me about both World War II and post-9/11 wars is that they were both preceded by these dramatic attacks on the homeland, so that obviously allows for this nationalization of politics. So, here’s what I’m curious about as another potential exogenous effect and how this might play in your data, not having had the benefit of reading the book yet -- is the draft, right? So, it seems to me that one of the ways that our military actions get nationalized, especially in World War II and wars after that, is the presence of the draft where everybody knows somebody who’s involved in these military actions. Well, after the draft is over and we have this more voluntary military, it seems the potential for exogenous events, in any event, to really nationalize our politics is dramatically decreased. So, I wonder if your data shows anything about the change before and after the draft or mandatory conscription whether or not the ending of that reduces the ability of exogenous events to nationalized politics.

MR. ROGOWSKI: Thanks very much for the question and for coming.

We thought about this issue about stateside attacks being the precipitator of these huge shifts, so unfortunately we relied a lot on the budgetary data for one of our chapters and it’s unfortunate, of course, that there weren’t budgetary requests by the president during World War I, not until 1922, so we couldn’t do that for the World War I era. World War I of course had no stateside attack, per se, so we replicated our roll call voting approach for World War I. We have a little bit less -- well, there’s a bit
more noise in the estimates, however, for going into World War I if you think that a
stateside attack is the thing that sort of rallies the country, members of Congress around
the president then you wouldn’t expect -- sorry -- in effect for going into World War I. But,
in fact, we find there is, in fact, a huge (inaudible) in Congress for members of the House
and Senate during 1917 be more supportive (inaudible) move in the liberal direction are
involved in the war. So, that cuts a little bit against the notion that it’s only stateside
attacks that precipitate these kinds of effects.

We haven’t looked at the draft specifically. We certainly acknowledge
that there are huge differences in how we fight wars now compared with World War II and
previous wars where there was a mandatory draft, et cetera. There’s other work. In fact,
not to be too political science-y, I think there’s a paper coming out by the AJPS now or
very soon that looks specifically at issues of the draft and their effects on local
communities. It seems like maybe sort of thrown around the war alone may not be
sufficient for inducing huge changes in congressional support for the president. But I
think that fundamentally thinking about the nature of war is different now -- particularly
9/11 and the wars that followed bring this issue to the fore -- we stop in the mid-2000s in
the book just because --

MR. HOWELL: We stopped.

MR. ROGOWSKI: Yeah, yeah, but, no, I think that’s a hugely important
question for thinking about (inaudible) relations going forward, and maybe -- I don’t know
maybe we’ll do some more research on that. We’ll see. But, you know, other people
certainly should.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks very much. I’m Garrett Mitchell. I write The
Mitchell Report.

Much of what was just posed in that question is what I’ve been thinking
about, but I’ll come at it at a different point of view. For me, the most remarkable moment
in this whole session was looking at those posters and saying that was another country. As a consequence, I mean, you cannot imagine under any circumstances that if we were attacked tomorrow by bees or whatever that there would ever be that kind of national response, and of course we use, as anyone who has read Dan Balz’ magnificent on the 2012 election, it would be Twitter; it wouldn’t be posters.

So, the question is -- I was thinking about, so, okay, so that was that America; this is a new America. What’s changed? Certainly one of the most important things that’s changed is no draft and the extent to which that nationalized the war. I believe that technology is a major player here, and I mean both war-related technology and communications technology. So, I’m wondering whether it is possible to answer the question about whether presidents’ ability to get their agendas accomplished during wartime can be answered historically if the country has changed to the extent that this country has and the new factors, like the draft, like technology, et cetera, I’m wondering how you come to some sort of conclusion like that other than with an answer that says it depends -- it depends on whether we were attacked; it depends on how long the war goes on. I just would stop this stream of consciousness by saying that probably the single greatest criticism that many people have of George Bush was the failure post-9/11 to call on the country to make sacrifices, to do a gasoline tax, to do whatever needs to be done and that if he had his presidency might have had a different arc. There’s a question in there somewhere. I promise you (laughter), comma, what do you think? (Laughter)

MR. JACKMAN: I got it, thank you.

I’m afraid that I feel like I do need to leave you with a “it does depend” kind of answer (laughter), because -- and Will kind of alluded to this a little bit and Jon as well, but in the book we have a chapter that kind of delves into each of these wars and tries to tease out what makes war different and what factors are the same about them? There are so many different ways you can think about differences and similarities in
these wars, you know. You can try to compare the number of casualties; how long was
the war; money spent -- all kinds of different factors -- and try to think about wars
changing over the course of a war or these variables changing and, you know, public
opinion changing, as we talked about earlier. And, you know, the presidents (inaudible)
of the draft, presidents (inaudible) of the stateside attack that precipitates the war, and
some wars have that; some don’t.

No single -- I think we kind of came to in the book, and now I feel bad --
no single factor, you know, a stateside attack, a draft, casualty count can predict the
ability of the president to extract concessions from Congress. It has to be thought of as
kind of a conglomeration of several different factors that build throughout a war. And I
think it’s -- that sets our work apart from others where you might point to a rally around
the flag effect that just when the war starts it’s a war and public opinion kicks in and you
(Inaudible) public opinion and you’ll understand how the president’s doing.

You know, I think in a lot of ways we’re saying it’s a lot more complicated
than that, and you have to look at the full panel of factors that shape each war. That’s
why we find that some wars matter and some don’t. So, it does depend -- the whole
story of our book is that it -- you can’t just say a war will produce this effect, you have to
look at how much it nationalizes politics. So, it very much does depend unfortunately. I
wish we had a stronger (inaudible) answer, but that’s where I would leave it.

I guess I -- there are several hands I thought were going to go first.

MR. McGrath: Thanks. Rob McGrath, George Mason as well.

Do you identify any other sources of variation in this national focus
versus local focus? I’m thinking maybe, like, electoral effects so when Senators are up
for reelection might they behave differently from when they first enter? Do you find
differences in voting patterns, you know, electioneers in the House? Also do you find that
the individual legislator level -- perhaps distinctions between regions, like are legislators
from certain regions more likely to see events as national versus local or, actually the other way around, more likely to see things as local versus national when the rest of the country is seeing it as national?

MR. ROGOWSKI: Can I speak to that?

MR. JACKMAN: Yes.

MR. ROGOWSKI: So, we looked a little bit at -- for members of the 107th Senate and House who were more likely to exhibit the larger shifts in voting behavior? So, for the Senate, we looked at people who were up for reelection in 2002 versus those who were not. We might think there might be different kinds of electoral pressures on those, and we didn’t find any differences with respect to whether or not Senators were up for reelection in 2002. For the House, so we looked at the presidential vote share that President Bush received in their district in 2000. So, for Democratic members of the House we saw that those that were from districts, Bush received the larger percentage of the vote in 2000. They exhibited much larger shifts than Democrats that were from more liberal districts. So, there clearly are sort of electoral incentives that members are responding to here.

And I think, to talk to the issue of how these events can nationalize our politics in electoral campaigns, Dick Gephardt commented in 2002 that of course Republicans are going to do well; the nature of the war has fundamentally shifted the policy agenda in such a way that it advantages the Republicans. So, Democrats are just at a structural advantage to dare defy the president on these things he wants to prioritize.

So, elections clearly do play a role here in inducing changes in member voting behavior. And there is something about the nationalized politics that shift the ways that we talk about political issues and the ways that members of Congress think about the positions they take on various bill proposals that come up. So, elections absolutely are crucial for thinking this through, too.
MR. JACKMAN: I think we’re about out of time. You want one last question? Do we have time for one more question? Then we’ll have to close out.

SPEAKER: Thank you. (Inaudible) National Defense University.

To dovetail my colleague’s question regarding electoral politics, I was wondering if you were tempted to see any kind of spikes during a presidential election year. For instance, I’m thinking FDR, you know, the crowded field; the Huey Long, America First; Lindberg supporting America first. I’m thinking, of course, LBJ and Goldwater and the daisy commercials. These kinds of -- are there any spikes in your data because of the personalities, if you will, involved in an election year?

Thank you.

MR. HOWELL: Let me just -- bar claim about the additional effects of war on presidential power is an (inaudible) sequel claim. It’s that (inaudible) when our politics are nationalized by a war the president should do better. And you might say, yeah, but some presidents are different from other presidents; the economy is different; the draft is different -- and so turning over the rocks, which is boring work but essential work. Like statistically it was an effort to try to try to attend to precisely these sorts of things. So, we include, for instance, in a lot of the analysis -- so, this is a statistical thing - - we include separate identifiers for each president, right? Sort of net out the effect of each individual president and look at changes within presidents. Likewise with members of Congress, or Democrats might be different from Republicans. That’s true, so we’re going to look at changes within Republicans, within Democrats and to try to pin down what we think is an essential part of our politics, which is nationalization goes up, president does better, and the nationalization can be induced by -- it isn’t exclusively induced by but it can be induced by -- at least some wars. And that sort of take-home message we’re hoping people take away from that.

MR. JACKMAN: I think we’re all done. Thank you all very much for
coming here. Thank you, Sarah Binder, Tom Mann, Dan Balz, William Howell, Jon Rogowski. Thank you all for your comments, and have a good day.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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