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FAITH, VALUES AND THE ECONOMY:

NEW SURVEY EXPLORES ECONOMIC POLICY, ROLE OF

RELIGIOUS PROGRESSIVES AND CONSERVATIVES

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PARTICIPANTS:

Presentation of Survey Results:

ROBERT P. JONES
Chief Executive Officer
Public Religion Research Institute

Presentation of Report:

E.J. DIONNE, JR.
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

WILLIAM A. GALSTON
Ezra K. Zilkha Chair and Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

LAURA OLSON
Professor of Political Science, Clemson University
Editor-in-Chief, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion

PETER STEINFELS
University Professor Emeritus
Fordham University

REV. ALVIN HERRING
Director of Training & Development
PICO National Network

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DIONNE: I want to welcome everyone here today on this very hot day. I am happy our air conditioning is working, and I'm sure all of you are here simply to get a respite from the heat, and we are very happy to have you. But also I hope some of you are here for a very, very exciting survey. I'm E.J. Dionne. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings and on behalf of our Brookings religion policy and politic's project, I want to welcome you.

We have had the pleasure and good fortune over the last several years to collaborate with our friends at the Public Religion Research Institute. Robby Jones, who's going to present in a moment, Dan Cox, Juhem Navarro-Rivera, and I very much hope this is the beginning of a beautiful, long friendship. Who knew that strong friendships could be formed courtesy of cross-tabs, correlations, and regressions? There's nothing regressive about this friendship, and we are very, very grateful for this partnership.

I also want to thank a few people right at the start on the PRRI staff: Mackenzie Babb, Emily Fetsch, and Joshua Barlow. I also want to thank the folks at Brookings who worked so hard to pull all of this together: Ross Tilchen, Christine Jacobs, Beth Stone, Anna Goodbaum, and Corinne Davis, who does absolutely everything. And we could not have done this without any of them, but particularly without Corinne.

The way we're going to proceed today is that Robby will do one of his patented PowerPoint presentations of the 2013 economic values survey. And then my colleague, Bill Galston, and I will discuss briefly our analysis of the results. And then we have a very distinguished panel to discuss this. What I will do is introduce Robby and Bill, and then when we're done, I will introduce our distinguished panel who will comment

on all of this and no doubt offer searing criticisms of our conclusions.

Robby Jones is the founding CEO of PRRI. He is a leading scholar and commentator on religion values in public life. In addition to his books and numerous peer-review articles, he writes a weekly Figuring Faith column at the *Washington Post's* On Faith section. And as someone long associated with the *Washington Post*, I'm very grateful for that.

My colleague and friend, Bill Galston, holds the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Brooking Institution's Government Studies Program, where he serves as a senior fellow. He is also college part professor at the University of Maryland and a former policy advisor in the Clinton administration and to a number of presidential candidates.

I'm really honored to introduce my friend, Robby Jones. (Applause)

MR. JONES: Thanks E.J. I'm really happy to be here. Let me say welcome to all of you from Public Religion Research Institute team. I have a couple of thank you's I want to offer on my own, and just a little bit of a perspective here.

This makes the, as E.J. mentioned, the third year that we've been doing collaborative projects here with the Brookings Institution and in many ways this project today takes us back full circle to one of the first ones that we did. In 2010 we did a major survey that looked at the Christian Right and the Tea Party Movement, and in many ways the one today is a bookend to that study where we're looking at religious progressives in economic policy today. So we can actually talk about both ends of the spectrum during the Q and A today.

So, I'm very happy to be here and giving, you know, the other part of the rest of the story as it were, to the earlier piece that we did back in 2010. So E.J.'s covered the ground pretty well with the thank you's. I do want to thank the Ford Foundation for making the study possible together with a generous gift from Ariel and

Adam Zarowski as well, without whom the report would not exist. So, thanks very much for that support.

So, most of you should have the report in front of you. I'm going to cover the ground -- it's always a challenge to cover a 20-minute survey with all kinds of analysis that we've been working on for weeks in a 15 to 20 minute window, but I'm going to do my best to do that without talking too fast and moving too quickly.

But first of all, just a little bit about what you're looking at. The underlying survey was a survey of 2,000 Americans, 800 of which were interviewed on a cell phone. The interviews took place between May 30, and June 16th of this year. The margin of error for the general population is plus or minus 2.6 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence interval. So, we have a fairly low margin of error for the survey, and we will be able to break out many, many sub-groups that will hopefully paint a dynamic picture of what's going on.

So, first of all I'm going to start with just priorities. Where Americans -- what are their economic priorities here? There's a lot of little things going on here, but the one to really pay attention to is the J's here in the middle. Let me just call your attention to those first. Those are jobs. Different groups of Americans saying that jobs are the highest priority. We've included the top two responses for the highest priority here. You can see that virtually every group that we looked at cites jobs as one of the highest priorities for the country today. But you can also see a little bit of differences.

The next one I'll call your attention to are the D's, the budget deficit. Republicans are the only constituency to put the budget deficit above jobs. Whites overall ranked them roughly the same, 21 percent and 23 percent saying it's the highest priority.

The next one to draw your attention to are the orange G's here. That's

the gap between the rich and the poor. African-Americans, Democrats, and those with a post-graduate education all ranking those in their top two priorities.

The blue H's there are health care. The rising cost of health care. Some of this will make sense. Those with a high school education or less, and older Americans, the silent generation, that's the very oldest Americans, both saying the rising costs of health care are concerns.

And then the E's, the yellow E's here, are education. So, not surprisingly, millennials, the youngest generation of adults here, are saying that education ranks high. Also, Hispanic Americans saying that education ranks as one of the top two highest priorities in the country today. So that's kind of where people's priorities are set.

One of the, I think striking findings of the survey was pessimism about economic mobility in the country. So, if one of the founding mythologies of American society is, America is an opportunity society and the idea that hard work leads to success; that idea is in trouble a bit in America today.

So, we had a couple of questions where we asked people to both look back at previous generations, and to look ahead about future generations and tell us something about what they thought, whether their generation was going to be better off than their parent's generation, whether they were going to be better or worse off than their children's generation were.

And what we found is that among millennials you could see when they look back saying they're worse off than their parent's generation -- nearly six in ten millennials say that their generation is worse off than their parent's generation is. In fact, the silent generation, the oldest Americans, are the only generation where a real significant minority is saying that they're worse off than their parent's generation. They're

the only generation in fact, who says that they are better off than their parents were.

And if you look ahead, you'll see this generational divide actually disappear as looking forward. When we ask people to say do you expect that you're better off than your children will be -- about half of the country, no matter what generation, says that they are better off than they expect their children to be. All right, so it's a pretty pessimistic view.

We had some other questions that really paint this picture out. Seven in ten Americans say that the gap between the rich and the poor has gotten larger in the last ten years. Americans are relatively pessimistic about the link between hard work and determination and success. So, overall one of the striking things we found is just some general pessimism about the economy and about this idea of upward mobility in the country.

So, let me talk a little bit about capitalism. We had some questions about how well capitalism is working and how well government is working. I'm going to tackle capitalism first.

Overall, the majority of Americans, but not a large majority, 54 percent -- this is in the top bar here -- say that capitalism is working very well or somewhat well. On the other hand, 42 percent, four in ten Americans, say that capitalism and the free-market system are working not too well or not well at all. It's maybe worth noting here that if you look at the polls among all Americans, only 9 percent of Americans say that capitalism is working very well versus 16 percent who say it's working not at all well out there in the polls.

The other thing to notice here, and we see this across a number of questions, is those who have household incomes under $30,000 a year, significantly less likely to say -- maybe perhaps not surprisingly -- that capitalism is working well, than

those who have household incomes of more than $100,000. Two thirds of those who have household incomes of more than $100,000 say capitalism is working somewhat or very well compared to only three in ten who say it's working not too well. But those who have household incomes under $30,000 are basically equally divided. Again, if you look at the intensity, 20 percent not at all well, only 8 percent saying it's working very well in that cohort.

We also had a follow-up question for those who said it was working well or not well to get at why they thought capitalism either was working well or not working well. We actually found quite a bit of parity in the answers to these two questions. If you'll kind of look at the green slices on both first, those who say capitalism is working because it creates wealth -- about one in ten say that. On the other hand, those who say capitalism is not working -- about the same amount say it creates poverty. On the other hand, you can see these paired up. About three in ten say capitalism is working because it provides equal opportunities. On the other hand, about three in ten of those who think capitalism is not working, say it does not provide equal opportunities for all. So a lot of parity here.

Again, about a third say it encourages personal responsibility among those who think capitalism is working, nearly the same number say, on the other hand, it encourages greed among those who say it's not working. The one place where there's not parity is if there's significantly more people among those who say capitalism is working, who say it promotes individual freedom. On this side of things, about one in ten say it creates lasting inequality. So, quite a bit of disagreement really about whether capitalism is working. Why it's working.

One of the more intriguing questions we also had on the survey was about whether capitalism in the free market system were consistent with Christian values

or not. As you can see, the country's fairly divided on this question. Forty-one percent saying it's consistent with the capitalism in the free-market system are consistent with Christian values. Forty-four percent saying, no, no, it is at odds with capitalism with Christian values. And interestingly enough here, there were very few religious differences on this question which is unusual for a question like this. So, we were quite surprised that if we looked at evangelicals and Catholics and mainliners, they were fairly flat and equally ambivalent on this question.

The one thing that seems to make more difference than anything else -- and this is the sort of thing for any of you who are clergy in the room that may keep you up at night -- is the thing that made the most difference in how people theologically evaluated or morally evaluated capitalism was their own socio-economic status. So those at the higher end of the socio-economic spectrum were more likely to say that capitalism is consistent with Christian values, those at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum are more likely to say it is at odds with Christian values. We can mull over that and the implications for that a little bit more in the Q and A section.

So, what about government, the other sort of big institutional block in society? First of all, we did find that there's a fair number of consistency in terms of people's -- the values people want a government to bring as a guide to economic policy. The first three here -- the question was about how important were these values as moral guides to government economic policy. So the top two here are encouraging people to live more responsible lives promoting freedom and equality. On those top two there's actually not huge amounts of partisan differences. For example, among those encouraging people to live more responsible lives, 87 percent of Republicans and 86 percent of Democrats say these are very, very important values. So, not a lot of partisan disagreement.

The place where there is the most partisan disagreement on this question is about providing a public safety net. There is a 30 point partisan gap on how important this value is for guiding public policy. Republicans are at 47 percent saying that this is a very important guide for guiding government policy. Democrats are at 77 percent. This is the place where there's the more yawning partisan gap. Among these top three there's certainly some partisan disagreement on promoting equality and fairness. Even there, there are about 2/3 of Republicans in agreement with that. So, it really is the public safety net where there's the largest differences.

On another sort of big economic question about just equal opportunity -- one of the biggest problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance in life. This was a paired opposite question. You could pick either one, or it is really not that big a problem as some people have more of a chance in life than others. In the general population 53 percent of the general population says, the first thing, one of the biggest problems is that we don't give everyone an equal chance in life versus 39 percent who say it's not that big of a problem. You can see though that among religious groups here, it divides religious groups fairly decisively, so on the top here we have African-American Protestants, 3/4 of which say this is one of the biggest problems in the country. At the bottom we have White evangelicals, Protestants, nearly half of whom, 47 percent, say it's not that big a problem compared to 42 percent who say it is. And then, we sort of beat this drum a lot in presentations, but the two big divided constituencies, white Catholics, white mainline Protestants right here in the middle, evenly divided pretty much on this question. White main-liners leaning a little more, but still not quite a majority on one side, and then the unaffiliated Hispanic Catholics and African-American Protestants up at the top.

In terms of party, this is also a place where there are huge, huge partisan

differences on this question. The Democrats -- 69 percent of Democrats say it's one of the biggest problems in this country that we don't give everyone an equal chance in life versus only 31 percent of Republicans who say this is a problem. One, Republicans 58 percent say it's not that big a problem if we don't give everyone an equal chance in life. So, real partisan differences on this question.

One other place in terms of government's role here is that there actually is in the general population, considerable consensus -- more than six in ten Americans agree with both of these statements. The government should do more to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, and the general population, 63 percent agree with that statement. This other statement is the responsibility of government to take care of people who can't take care of themselves -- in the general population 62 percent of the population agree with this statement. But as you can see, there's some real partisan differences. Independents look about like the general population. Democrats are closer to the general population than Republicans, but certainly up higher. Republicans significantly up 30 points on this other question from independence on the question whether the government should reduce the gap between the rich and the poor and another 20 points over here about the responsibility of government to take care of people who can't take care of themselves. So, huge partisan divides with Democrats a little closer to Independents and Republicans a little bit more of an outlier.

Finally, what about government itself? One of the big patterns we found on the survey is that there was some agreement about what government should be doing, the kinds of things people wanted the government to do -- reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, provide health insurance, take care of people who can't take care of themselves. However, we also found a very healthy dose of skepticism about whether the government could in fact do these things that people wanted the government to do.

And this seems to be one of the fundamental problems that the survey unearthed is this conundrum of wanting the government to do a certain set of things, and then having deep, deep doubts about whether government could deliver.

So, here's a good example -- a similar question than the one we asked before about whether capitalism is working or not, but in terms of whether the government is working or not, you can see a considerably harsher judgment here than about capitalism. So, in the general population here -- only 31 percent of the general population said that the federal government is either generally working or working with major problems. We had 66 percent, nearly 2/3 of the country saying no, the government is broken, but working in some areas. Or it is completely broken. And here you can see the partisan breakdowns.

The two that sort of stand out are the really high numbers of those who identify with the Tea Party, a majority saying the government is completely broken. And another 35 percent on top of that saying it's mostly broken even if it's working in some areas.

Among Democrats it's also notable -- you know the most probably government friendly party here -- only 41 percent of Democrats say that the government is either working or working, but with some major problems. So, some real doubts about the institution of government itself.

Also some doubts about whether the size of the government is justified or not. This question was a question that said the government has become bigger over the years because either the problems we face have become bigger or it has gotten involved in things that people should be doing for themselves. So, if on the other question Republicans were further away from the general population, on this question Democrats are further away from the general population on this question. In the general

population 59 percent say government's gotten bigger because it is getting involved in things that people should do by themselves, versus 38 percent who say the problems we face have become bigger. You can see these big partisan divides. Again, independents look about like the general population. But these overwhelming numbers among Republicans and Tea Party, you know, up against Democrats who are at six and ten saying it's gotten bigger and for a justified reason because the problems we face have become bigger.

Finally, lest we think it's all about government, we also found a significant number of Americans who want to lay part of the problem at the feet of individuals. So, it's not just government is not up to the task, but perhaps individuals are not up to the task. So this question was an agree/disagree statement. Many people today think they can get ahead without working hard and making sacrifices. A majority of Americans overall agree with this statement -- 56 percent versus only 42 percent who disagree. But, here there are some very, very large differences by race and ethnicity. So, in fact they're basically mirror images of each other. White Americans -- more that six in ten agree with this statement. About six in ten African-Americans and Hispanic Americans disagree with this statement. So, very different evaluations about individuals and a basic work ethic in the country.

So finally, the second thing that we did in the survey, in addition to looking at government capitalism and economic policy, was to look at the religious landscape in the country, and try to create a new way of looking at religious progressives versus religious conservatives. There's a lot of debate about, you know, does this group of religious progressives exist, how big are they? There's been various attempts at doing that. We thought we'd take a stab at doing it. I can talk more about this in the Q and A, but basically what we did, was we realized that there was this fundamental problem that

you can't easily create a group that you might call religious progressives by only looking at theology. You also can't do it by only looking at social issues, and you also can't do it by only looking at economic issues.

So, what we basically did is we built a composite scale that covered all three of those axes and then scored people in a composite way so that people who scored higher on the scale across social, economic, and theological measures were classified as religious conservatives. People who scored lower on the scale across all those three areas were scored as religious progressives, and then we pulled out non-religious Americans as a separate group defined as people who were either self-identified as atheist, agnostic, or said religion was not important at all in their lives. So, we pulled them out. That makes about 15 percent of Americans who fit that definition. The rest of Americans were divided using this scale, and what we found using this composite scale was about one in five Americans can be classified as religious progressives compared to 28 percent who can be classified as religious conservatives, a larger group in the middle, 38 percent and then again, this 15 percent group that we called non-religious Americans.

So I'm going to unpack just a little bit about what these groups look like because it has a lot of implications for what impact these groups have in public.

So, the first thing -- these little pinwheels here are about the religious composition of religious conservatives versus religious progressives. So, I'm just going to start on the one on your left. Take a look at the first three blue slices going around the right side of the pie. Those first three slices are groups of white Christians. So, the first thing to notice here is the difference in how big the blues are there, and how big these purplish blues are on this side. The basic bottom line is that religious conservatives are much more homogenous than religious progressives are. So, religious conservatives for example -- seven in ten religious conservatives are some variety of white Christian

versus only about four in ten religious progressives are some variety of white and Christian.

In fact, among religious conservatives, 43 percent are white evangelical Protestants alone. Add to that another 15 percent who are white mainline Protestants, and another 13 percent who are white Catholics, you get the seven in ten who are white Christian. On this side only 4 percent of religious progressives are white Evangelical Protestants -- so, a very small slice. Nineteen percent are white mainline Protestants, 18 percent are white Catholics, and then I guess the really interesting thing is what's left? So, about six in ten religious progressives are something other than white and Christian.

And there are a couple slices I want to call your attention to -- one is this 18 percent sticking out here which is the next biggest one. Those we've called unattached believers, and this is one of the challenges of progressive religious organizing. These are people who are not formally affiliated with a religious group, but yet say that religion is important in their lives. So, they're not institutionally connected but still say religion's important in their lives. The other big group here is 13 percent are non-Christian religious people. That group includes Jews, Hindus, Buddhists -- it's a large number of people who are religiously affiliated but not Christian.

And then the other thing to call our attention to that I'm sure we'll circle back around to, are the green slices. African-American Protestants are actually about equally represented in both of these groups that make up about 9 percent of religious progressives; they make up 8 percent of religious conservatives. So, that's a pretty complex thing, we will come back to, I'm quite sure, and unpack.

Let me let you look at this the other way. If I flip the axes and I'm now looking at religious affiliation by this religious orientation, you can again see a similar pattern just with the axes flipped. So, basically let's start at the bottom. If you look at

white Evangelical Protestants and you ask, what's the division among white Evangelical Protestants, between religious progressives, religious conservatives and the like. Seven in ten white evangelical Protestants, not surprisingly qualify as religious conservatives. About 25 percent qualify as religious moderates. Only 4 percent of white evangelical Protestants qualify as religious progressives and another 1 percent as non-religious.

On the other hand, if we look at this composite group of Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and Muslims, that group has the highest percentage of religious progressives. Forty-two percent of that group qualifies as religious progressives and again, we can see white Catholics and white mainliners here fairly evenly divided, pretty balanced in terms of their proportions of religious progressives and religious conservatives. African-American Protestants the same thing. A fairly even balance here between the two. Hispanic Catholics stick out for the group that has an overwhelming number of religious moderates who are right in the middle. Seventy percent of Hispanic Catholics qualify as religious moderates.

All right, so let me unpack the implications across a couple of issues and then we'll wrap it up. So, what does this mean? One of the ways to think about this is, what does it mean in terms of world view, what does it mean in terms of policy? I'm going to concentrate on the second question here in the interest of time. The patterns are the same for both of these questions. One question is if enough people had a personal relationship with God, social problems would take care of themselves. So, this is an individualist world view, a bottom-up approach to social problem solving. What we can see here is that 82 percent of religious conservatives agree with this statement versus only 31 percent of religious progressives who agree with this statement. So, very different, just in terms of world view and approach and for where people's dials are set as to what kind of solutions seem tenable and would actually solve a problem.

We can see similar divisions in terms of policies. These are both here -- the government should guarantee health insurance for all citizens, the government should do more to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. So, I'll go ahead and take the first one -- the government should do more to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, only 37 percent of religious conservatives agree with this statement, 88 percent of religious progressives agree with this statement. In fact, religious progressives are more likely to agree with this statement than non-religious Americans are, who are often fairly liberal in their economic policy views. So, you can see huge, huge differences on these policy questions.

And then two more quick slides to the end here, one is on political affiliations. What does it mean in terms of party affiliation, and one of the things you can see here is a majority of Republicans are religious conservatives, and I began with an allusion to the Tea Party. The other thing we found that reinforces our findings about the Tea Party from three years ago is that six in ten members of the Tea Party are also religious conservatives. That's the group that is by far the largest group of the Tea Party. Independents, evenly divided pretty much, and then Democrats, the other thing to say about Democrats is that Democrats are managing a much more heterogeneous coalition than Republicans are in terms of religious organizing. Democrats have got a much broader spread, have 13 percent of religious conservatives, 28 percent religious progressives, and a very sizeable number of non-religious Americans in the coalition as well, so much more complex setup.

And finally, one slide looking ahead, at least in terms of trying to read the tea leaves from the generational breaks. I have the oldest Americans to your left, baby boomers, then generation X, then millennials here on the right, and this is an area chart showing the breakdown of religious conservatives versus religious progressives and the

non-religious across generations.

And I think probably the first thing that you see is this downward slope of the proportion of religious conservatives in each successive generation. So, certainly one pattern we see in the generational snapshots is a decline in the number of religious conservatives. Religious moderates stay roughly about the same, and then there is a slight increase in the number of religious progressives and in the number of non-religious.

So, the basic pattern is decline of religious conservatives across generational cohorts with an increase in the number of religious progressives and the number of non-religious. So, if you compare the silent generation on your far left to millennials, you'll see the number of non-religious doubles, the number of religious progressives effectively doubles, and the number of religious conservatives is cut by more than a factor of two. So, that's the general pattern looking ahead. And I'm sure we'll tease out or at least make some prognostications about what this might mean for the future of religious organizing in American politics. With that, I will turn it back to E.J. for our next presenter. (Applause)

MR. GALSTON: Well, let me just begin by reiterating what a pleasure it has been for me and for the entire Brookings team to have an opportunity to collaborate with PRRI. I would like to think that we both learned something from the relationship. I know I have, and I'm very grateful for that.

One of the nicest things about this relationship is that while Robby and company have to do all of the heavy lifting, they have to report on everything from soup to nuts, which is tough to compress, E.J. and I are like kids in the sandbox. I was going to use a more vulgar and more southern description of our pleasure, but I decided in the interest of Brookings comedy to suppress it. We get to roam through these data and pull out the pieces that particularly intrigue us, and then we get to report on it. What could be

better?

So, I'm going to focus very briefly on two of the patterns of findings in this report that really intrigued me personally. And to make it easy to follow what I'm about to say, I'm going to refer to two charts with their page numbers. The first one for those of you who have the study is on page 46. It is the survey's findings concerning systemic gender differences on economic values and policies, and here we found a very interesting pattern which at least on the surface seems paradoxical, and I think it's going to take further analysis, both qualitative and regressive, in order to figure out what's really going on here.

But three key findings, first of all in many respects women are more liberal than men, and that's true for both particular policies like the minimum wage, and also for judgments about how things are going. Unequal opportunity is not a big problem. Women are much less likely to endorse that proposition that men, all children have an adequate opportunity to succeed. Women are less likely to endorse that proposition. Capitalism is consistent with Christian values. Women are less likely to endorse that. American capitalism is working very, or somewhat well, and equality and fairness are extremely important for public policy. Women, at least according to their declared preferences, put a much higher value on equality and fairness than men do.

Intriguingly however, there are other respects in which women are decidedly more conservative than men as these things are usually judged. For example, more women than men think that too many people think they can get ahead without hard work and sacrifice. I have to say I was personally surprised by that finding. More women than men think that encouraging personal responsibility is extremely important. Again, you know, personal responsibility you think of as a male trait or preference, as opposed to connection, but that's not the way it worked out in the survey. And family instability

and breakdown is a key cause of economic problems. There, perhaps less surprisingly, women were by not a huge margin, but statistically significant margin, are more likely to endorse that proposition.

Now, I have a theory about this which the lawyers in the room, if there are any, would call an argument against interest. And that is, I can frame all three of these attitudes as women's response to the vagaries of male behavior. If I can expand on that, but I think in the interest of time and also gender self defense I won't, but I can sure parse it that way,

The third important finding about women is that they are on many, many measures more religious than men, more systematically religious, more inclined to think that religion is the most important thing in their lives, more inclined to believe that you can't have morality and good values without believing in God. More inclined to believe that my holy book is the word of God. Somewhat surprisingly, more inclined to believe that God has granted America a special role in human history, aka American exceptionalism, and on PRRI's handy dandy theological conservatism scale, they score higher.

Now, what the relationship is between religiosity on the one hand and the conservatism on attitudes in that second block, I think it will require further analysis to tease up, but it is at least suggestive. So, that's the first thing that I found personally interesting.

Here's the second, and please indulge me by turning to page 41. I call this the Dostoevsky question. Why? Well, in the Brothers Karamazov and Yvonne's famous dream where I think it's Satan who appears to him, although he speaks a lot more like Nicha than Beelzebub. But there is a passage which has been compressed into the proposition, the Satanic proposition, that if God does not exist, everything is permitted. So, this is the Dostoevsky question, how do Americans feel, you know, about

Satan's assertion to poor nighmare-ridden Yvonne, and if you look at the country as a whole, it's split almost down the middle. Fifty-two percent agree in effect that it's necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values, which if you studied freshmen logic, suggests that if you don't believe in God, then there is no particular ground to be moral and to have good values, and you're probably not going to have them.

So, the country is split down the middle, but look at the breakdowns. We've already talked about men and women. There is a steep linear age gradient. The older you are, the more likely to believe it. The more educated you are, the less likely you are to believe it. If you're white you're unlikely to believe it. If you're African-American or Hispanic, you do. No clear regional patterns, more Republicans than Democrats or Independents, but not dramatically so. More, by two to one, conservatives are more likely to endorse the proposition than liberals, a patchwork pattern among religious denominations. Take a look at the breakdown among whites. You know, if you're white working class, 55 percent of you believe it. If you're white, college educated, only 26 percent -- big, big divide.

Look at the economic divide, less than $30,000 a year, 66 percent; 100,000 or more, 27 percent. Not surprisingly, it tracks the theological scale; as a matter of fact it's pretty close to being definitive of theological conservatism and theological liberalism.

And almost as completely, it tracks social liberalism, moderation and conservatism. No relationship with economic attitudes whatsoever. Of course when you put together all of these individual scales into the composite scale, not surprisingly, 74 percent of religious conservatives endorse the proposition, only 29 percent of religious liberals.

Now, I actually think that this disagreement does a lot of subterranean work in American society. If you genuinely believe that if others don't believe in God that they're unlikely to have the right values and good character, well how does that shape relationships among believers and unbelievers? I think that this gap on the Dostoevsky question may explain some of the mistrust in American society. I would bet you that 50 years ago you wouldn't have found anything of the sort; 50 years ago you would have found everybody endorsing some version of Dwight Eisenhower's proposition that he wants everybody to go and worship. He said Sunday, which I could take offense to if I were so inclined, but I won't, but he said everyone should have a religion, and I don't care what it is.

So that was part of the general proposition that as long as you're religious, fill in the blank, then you're likely to have good values and good character and be a good American.

And now I think the country is clearly divided, and if you look at these breakdowns, it's pretty clear that the country is moving toward a rejection of the necessity of the belief in God in order to be of good character and to have the right values. Who knows what kind of society we'll be, but some of you are young enough so that you'll live to see it. (Applause)

MR. DIONNE: Thank you so much, Bill, and thank you, Robby. First, Robby was one step ahead of me, as he always is. I too want to thank the Ford Foundation and Adam and Ariel Zarowski. Without their help we wouldn't be here, and we couldn't have afforded this survey. I specifically want to thank both for giving us all kinds of freedom to do this. They did not tell us what answers they wanted. They encouraged us to ask questions we thought should be asked. And I particularly want to thank Adam and Ariel who are as excited about discovering answers to questions as we

are which is a real blessing.

Secondly, I saw the twitter hashtag up there. Are we being livecast so we are encouraging people to send us questions? My children poke fun at me all the time. I've gotten to love twitter myself. I did gain some cred with one of my daughters when Eva Longoria re-tweeted me once. So, I do enjoy twitter, so if you have questions for us, please tweet them with that hashtag econ values, and when we get to the Q and A, I hope we can ask some of your questions.

I just want to focus briefly on the whole question of religious progressives and religious conservatives. Everybody thinks they know what a religious conservative is. I think there's a lot more confusion about what are the possibilities of a religious progressive movement? Paul Begala once said that many people think of religious progressive as one of those internally contradictory phrases like jumbo shrimp.

And yet I think that what you see in this survey are two things at the same time in terms of religious progressives. On the one hand, if you are measuring this primarily as religious people with strong commitments to social justice, you have the potential of a very broad movement that actually crisscrosses some of the other lines. Many people who fall into the religious conservative category in many ways, nonetheless share a lot in common with people who are social justice progressives.

But there are some contradictions here, and I just want to underscore tensions, I think is a better way to put it. I just want to underscore among people of faith in general there is strong support for greater economic fairness and compassion toward those in need, again, even among religious Americans who are quite conservative in their theological views and in their attitudes toward social issues. 66 percent of theological conservatives, 63 percent of social conservatives support increasing the minimum wage to ten dollars an hour for example.

By margins exceeding 60 percent theological and social conservatives say the gap between rich and poor has widened over the last decade and that promoting equality and fairness should be an important value guiding government policy. They feel similarly about providing a public safety net for people facing hardships.

Smaller but clearer majorities also believe that it is the responsibility of government to take care of people who can't take care of themselves. So, such findings would point to the potential vigor of a broad movement on behalf of social justice.

Yet there are countervailing forces. Three in five Americans, as Robby pointed out, believe the government has become bigger because it has gotten involved in things people should do for themselves. Half think the government is providing social services that should be left to religious groups and private charities. Only a few believe -- it's a really small number -- believe that the government should provide significant help to people like themselves. And although the majority supports a broad program of government activism to promote economic growth and principle, a much larger majority believes the federal government is mostly and completely broken. And I think you saw that in the slides Robby showed. People want the government to do more, and they have great doubts about whether government will do it well.

Politically, it's the religious conservatives we all know who have the louder voice and the greater range of political organization at the moment. And so it's one of the paradoxes of American politics, I think, that as social justice commitments largely unite religious Americans, this potentially progressive constituency does not cohere to the same degree as does the religious movement on behalf of conservative causes.

For many white theological conservatives their strong views on social issues trump their positions on economic issues leading them to an identification with the

Republican Party.

Again, I think the chart that Robby showed on priorities on economic issues is very important that more Americans choose the lack of jobs than pick the budget deficit, 26 to 17 percent. And in addition, 15 percent chose increasing the gap between rich and poor.

As I said, there was great support for increasing the minimum wage. Also great support still for increasing taxes on Americans earning over $250,000 a year. And in a way we re-ran the arguments of the last election in this survey, and the results were the same. We gave respondents a choice between two statements and 54 percent preferred to have government spend more on education than nation's infrastructure, and raise taxes on wealthy individuals and businesses to pay for that spending as a way of improving the economy. Only 41 percent preferred to lower taxes on individuals and businesses and pay for those tax cuts by cutting spending on some government services and programs. 54 percent for a kind of stimulus, although we didn't use that word, 41 percent on the tax cutting side.

Basically, it's the same kind of percentages when on a different question, 53 percent said one of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance in life. 39 percent said it is not really that big a problem. Again those 53 and 54 fairly closely match the results of the last two elections.

Yet the strength of these key progressive contentions is counterbalanced by other majorities. Again, you saw it with Robby's slides on government becoming bigger over the years because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves. 59 percent agree with that, and it's against the 39 percent who say government is doing more because the problems have gotten greater. I think this tension is something that I think is going to be part of our discussion.

A couple other things, we produce scales the way McDonalds or Burger Kings produce varieties of hamburgers. I wanted to show you -- Robby did the consolidated scale. If you'll turn to page 26 in your, I felt like saying Bibles, but if you'll turn to page 26 in this report, I just want you to compare the differences among the theological orientation scale on page 26, the economic orientation scale on page 28, and the social orientation scale on page 31.

And these were each created by pulling together a series of questions about -- in the first instance people's theological views on a number of questions, in the second, their answers to a number of economic questions, and then the third to their answers on some of the social questions they had. It's striking how different we are -- the labels liberal, moderate, conservative are quite different, have different allegiances depending on what kinds of issues we are talking about.

And given the centrality of free-market thinking, including a strong dose of libertarianism within the contemporary Republican Party, the survey was notable in finding that among the various brands of conservatism, economic conservatism has the weakest hold on American public opinion. Overall, 38 percent of Americans, as you can see from those charts, gave answers to a variety of survey questions that define them as theological conservatives. 29 percent gave answers that define them as social conservatives, and only 25 percent gave answers that ranked them as economic conservatives.

And I think this points to a difficulty for the conservative movement if it seeks to weaken its commitment to social and religious conservatism while concentrating primarily on economic issues.

It also points to a potential for liberals to convert social conservatives to their cause if the emphasis of liberalism relates to economic and social justice. But

matters are not that simple because there is significantly more theological diversity among political liberals than among political conservatives, and the same is true as Robby noted between Republicans and Democrats. Democrats have a very difficult religious coalition to manage. The larger share of self-identified liberals is, 47 percent of them are non-religious, followed by 29 percent who are theologically liberal, 24 percent theologically moderate, and 10 percent theologically conservative.

Self-identified political conservatives on the other hand, are far more homogeneous theologically, and this is very close to Robby's numbers on Republicans. 56 percent of them are theologically conservative, while only 11 percent are non-religious. And I think this sort of tells us something interesting about the future of politics. In a sense both sides of our ideological divide face grave risks in trying to win converts.

The conservative coalition could fly apart if its emphasis moves too far from the social issues and religion to economics. The liberal coalition could fracture if liberals either ignore religion altogether or make strong appeals to religious voters that begin to offend the large number of non-religious voters in their ranks. And I can tell you as basically a liberal on twitter, I get a lot of push back whenever I tweet with any sympathy on theological subjects. I have started, after I read this survey, and explained what happens on my twitter feed, so thank you for that, Robby, as well.

And so they each have these problems, yet to build majorities, each side needs to reach out to voters whose views might make parts of their coalition uncomfortable. So, I think you can see why there's some discomfort on a lot of these questions on both sides.

A couple other quick points before I turn to our respondents. Republicans have long expressed the hope that the strong religious feelings of African-Americans, which really come across in this survey, might someday incline them to give

the GOP a larger share of their ballots. Yet the party's difficulties in appealing to African-Americans and also to Latinos, clearly transcends issues of particular concern to these groups because both of them so strongly reject economic conservatism where 34 percent of whites gave answers to a variety of issue questions that ranked them as economic conservatives, only 7 percent of Hispanics, and 4 percent of African-Americans gave answers that made them economic conservatives.

I want to close just on this. That the economic pessimism this survey found should disturb us all as Americans, and it should also, I'd like to hope, galvanize us. Confidence in a better future has long defined the American dream and previous periods of American pessimism have almost always given way to the optimism and hopefulness that seems to be part of our cultural DNA.

It seems reasonable to believe that in the United States today there remains a large market for hope. The difficulty is that few Americans see the programs now on offer as a reliable road map to the future they crave. And I think the durability of both political and religious movements in our country will depend in large part on their ability to make hope both concrete and realistic. And no doubt our panelists who are about to come up will give us reason to hope. And so I want to introduce them now, and they will respond.

Speaking first will be Peter Steinfels. He is University Professor Emeritus at Fordham University. Formerly, he was the senior religion correspondent for the *New York Times* where he also wrote Beliefs, a bi-weekly column on religion that many of us still miss, Peter. And in 2009, he along with Margaret O'Brien Steinfels, yes, they are married, founded the Fordham Center on Religion and Culture which they co-directed until July, 2012. That center continues to thrive. They've done extraordinary work. In the interest of full disclosure, I should confess that Peter is a dear friend and

quite literally as Joe Biden would say, one of my very favorite people in the world. So thank you for joining us here today.

Laura Olson is professor of Political Science at Clemson University. She currently serves as editor-in-chief of the *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. So she too agrees that you can find love and friendship in correlations and regressions. Her research focuses on contemporary religion civic engagement at American Politics, and she has placed special emphasis on the political attitudes and the behaviors of the clergy. We are really grateful, Laura, that you could join us today.

And lastly, the Reverend Alvin Herring, who will have a closing prayer on this panel. He is director of training and development for the PICO National Network. He is also executive director of the Working Interfaith Network, otherwise known as WIN, that's a winning acronym. Previously, he was the executive director of the Muhammad Ali Institute for Peace and Justice at the University of Louisville in Kentucky, where he also served as the dean of students and assistant vice president of campus life.

We welcome all of you and, Peter, start us off.

MR. STEINFELS: Many thanks. Many, many thanks to all of those who conducted and analyzed this research and produced so much rich material for our understanding. Thanks to my friends, E.J. and Bill Galston for their shrewd commentary on these findings. And thanks to them and to Corinne Davis, and to anyone else who had a hand in inviting me here today and forcing me to read through all these numbers and to think about their implications.

So, having thanked everyone, I hope, I want to enter a protest. I graduated from college in 1963, 50 years ago, and I spent those previous three years and probably the next ten or twelve in being an active participant for better or for worse in a lot of very noisy political demonstrations and events in Chicago, New York,

Washington, and Paris. So it comes as a shock to me to be labeled a member of the silent generation. (Laughter) A phrase that *Life Magazine* had cooked up for those young people supposedly aspiring to gray flannel suits in the 1950's. It was an image that many of us in the 1960's quite self-consciously defined ourselves against. I enter a plea, therefore, that this label be retired in favor of something more neutral like fossils or relics or woolly mammoths (laughter).

Now I read this fascinating massive material with an eye to two of the researcher's main questions, the views of Americans on economic value structures and the role of government, and the nature and potential of religious progressives. I also read it with an eye toward something which is of a personal interest having to do with the views of Hispanic Catholics, and their differences in relationship to those of white Catholics. I belong to a majority Latino Catholic parish in New York City, and I'm very interested in the process by which Hispanic Catholics go from being outsiders wanting a place at the table, to in effect becoming close to at least, or maybe even the hosts at the table. And of course the views of Hispanic Americans are obviously the greatest interest these days as we debate immigration and Republicans think about their future.

About their findings, I'm not sure whether I will get to those. We can deal with some in the later discussion. About the findings in economic values and views, I am overwhelmingly struck by two things. One is the role of ideology or partisanship, if you will, in perceiving economic conditions. Over the last two years, if we are to believe the reports, the personal, financial situation of 50 percent of white evangelicals has grown worse, while that of only 17 percent of African-American Protestants, and only 10 percent of Hispanic Catholics has worsened. Now this raises an interesting theological question. Why has God been so dramatically smiting the groups that voted against Barack Obama while treating so kindly the groups that overwhelmingly supported him? My point, I think,

is made about the partisanship and ideology and perceiving even one's own personal, financial situation.

The second point that strongly struck me has already been noted. The two-edged character of many of these findings and their potential for supporting very different political positions depends on how the issues are framed. There have been the comparisons between support for guarantee of health insurance versus doubts about Obama Care, the recognition of a need for government aid versus the problem of doubting the government's competence.

That leads me to point to a very telling passage on page 42 of your bibles here where Dionne and Galston write, "While there may be too much emphasis in our political discussions about how issues are framed, it is clearly the case the different ways of framing economic and social justice questions provide each side with opportunities to move opinion."

Let me now turn to the question of religious progressives. The authors rightly point out that they have been much less studied than religious conservatives. They also maintain that religious progressives are a force to contend with for two reasons. First, they represent a potential block on the religious landscape when seen in conjunction with the growing number of non-religious or nones. Second, they are significantly younger than religious conservatives and so represent a kind of wave of the future. Now by the scales that have been devised here, I am probably a religious progressive. But I would like to express some serious doubts about this future potential of religious progressives. I don't doubt their existence of course, which is nicely defined and documented here. What I doubt is whether its specifically religious character can play anything like the motivating, energizing, and organizing force of religion among religious conservatives. And I think that the study does implicitly pose something of a

parallel here.

Let me mention two of the findings that feed my doubts. One is the low percentage of religious progressives who say that their religion is the most important thing in their lives, compared to the high percentage of religious conservatives. Now I'm never quite sure what people mean when they say religion is the most important thing in their lives, but unlike the wishy-washy options of religion is among the important things in my life or religion is somewhat important, the most important response has always seemed to me a good measure of the strength and intensity of religious identity.

The second finding feeding my doubts about the potential impact of religious progressives is the finding that 87 percent of religious progressives view religion as a "private matter" that should be kept out of public debate on political and social issues. That view may provide a sort of negative counter to aggressive religious interventions on behalf of traditional, sexual, and personal norms. But it does not provide much ground for religious engagement on the sorts of issues the study puts before us, helping the poor, maintaining the safety net, and opposing inequality.

My doubts are reinforced by a question that may be answered in the study, but answered somewhere I could not find. That is a question about the actual participation of religious progressives and the worship and life of religious communities. One of the most fascinating sections of American Grace, the volume by Robert Putnam and David Campbell, is the chapter certainly counterintuitive to some readers, documenting that religious Americans contribute more time and treasure than nonreligious Americans, not only to personal neighborliness, but also to civic causes, including secular causes.

Putnam and Campbell argue that this is even more true of politically liberal religious Americans than politically conservative religious Americans. However, they do not provide a measure of religious progressivism involving a theological scale, but use a measure of religiosity that does include behavior as well as beliefs. But the really counterintuitive part of their argument is that theology and beliefs have far less to do with any of this than participation in a religious community. Thus, according to them, even an atheist who becomes active in a congregation, say, because he is married to a believing member, is apt to give more time and treasure to civic activities and causes than a devout believer of either conservative or liberal theological views who does not belong to a religious community or join in its worship and activities.

If it is true, despite my suspicions that religious progressives, as defined here, are actually embedded in communal or congregational religious life, then my doubts about their potential impact would be significantly allayed. I do wonder whether the key to the role of religion, especially in regard to these economic issues, might lie with another understudied group, religious moderates. Anyone wishing to undertake such a study would find a great deal, here, of the essential data. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. DIONNE: Peter, I do want to defer to your request, so I will call you a fossil. But your humor and your perceptiveness are not fossilized, so thank you so much, that was wonderful. Laura.

MS. OLSON: Thank you, E.J., thank you Robbie, thank you everyone at PRRI and at Brookings for, not only creating the sand box, but for allowing me to play in it today, I'm deeply grateful. And I'm grateful both as a geek social scientist who does, indeed, find great pleasure in crunching numbers and does, indeed, find friendships as a result of crunching numbers, but also as someone who likes to fashion herself a little bit more broadly as a political observer. And, therefore, I've got, as we continue to enjoy the wonderful innovation of airconditioning for as long as we possibly can here today, I have a couple of quick observations and then some broader thoughts about what all of this that we're learning about today might, in fact, portend.

First, the social scientist speaking. Great effort by PRRI to measure something that we all know is out there, right, and we all know, if you could just kind of get ahold of it, that it's religious progressivism, if we could just get ahold of it and find out where people who are maybe religious progressives are, we could not only study them, but we could figure out why they are so disorganized and so unmobilized. And to PRRI, as well, on a similar note, for recognizing, as has already been noted, that religious progressivism entails quite a

bit more than theological progressivism, right, just like religious conservatism, part of it is theological, part of it is behavioral, part of it has to do with how one views culture, and it's a very kind of mixed up business.

And so, to try to measure it in very careful kinds of terms, I think, is a very, very useful contribution. I, for one, can't wait to disentangle what is really driving what, right? Because, as you sat and you looked at some of the tables and some of the graphs, you probably were thinking, well, that's really ideology at work, or that's really age or generation at work, or that's really partisanship at work. And I, for one, am excited to find out, when we do multivaried analyses of these data, what really is driving what.

Now, the second, the political analyst speaking about something a little bit broader. These data, we know we can trust these data, one, because PRRI does good work, but, two, because they confirm rather clearly some things we already knew going in to today about things such as why President Obama has won two terms, and also, unfortunately for him, seems to be so stymied in his efforts to lead in policymaking. E.J., I think, quite smartly noted, the general sympathy in the aggregate that exists for the general idea of big government. But maybe not in those terms, but the idea that, you know, government's not such a malevolent force, government maybe can solve problems, wouldn't it be lovely if

government could step in in an ideal world, make things better for people who are suffering.

However, these data show also, as people have noted to this point, that we are, as Americans, right now, an awfully pessimistic lot. Now, of course, part of that is just that our economy has been in such bad shape lately, part of it is because the news media have a tendency to emphasize negativity because it sells, right? And that's not implicating anyone in particular, but it's partly also, I think, an indication of how short government seems to be falling in comparison with the kinds of wishes that its people, in this case, Americans, might have about what it could do and what it could provide. In essence, I think Americans are running into something that we all run into, no matter what walk of life we're in, which is having really high hopes and expectations about what could be, and then running smack into reality and getting really disappointed, right.

So, in 2008, Obama's brand, right, this idea of hope and change, was precisely, in a rhetorical sense, what Americans were looking for at that moment. Putting that into motion, however, is an entirely different matter. Another piece is that in '08 and 2012, the Obama campaign successfully micro targeted all sorts of people, here, there and everywhere, not one big cohesive movement of progressives, right. So it might well be that, in the aggregate, Americans seemed to be, you know, maybe a little bit of a majority. Not a huge majority, but a little bit

of a majority of Americans might seem sort of progressive, but that hardly means that everyone is all marching in lock step, far from it.

And so what ends up happening, then, is that, even though there's been this movement of people who have gotten together and voted for President Obama, they are not well organized in making demands of government, they are not well organized in batting a way sort of the dissent that comes along with President Obama's administration. Now, let's think toward the future a little bit, if we can. It seems to me that this survey, like much of the work that PRRI has done to date highlights something that is enormously important and which already has been mentioned, as well, and that is rapidly changing demographics of the United States.

Basic truism is this, right, that changing demographics is going to change the culture, right? That's, usually, culture doesn't change very quickly, right, it often doesn't change at all. But if it's going to change, it's going to change in part because demographics have changed or because institutions have changed. And, in this case, we know, at a minimum, the demographics are changing. So what kinds of changes in culture are we going to see and what ramifications for politics might those changes have?

Millennials, as emphasized by PRRI here today, are, in fact, the leading edge of the demographic change. We know many things about them, they

are less White than previous generations, they are less religious than previous generations. So all of this makes me start to think, and many of you, I'm sure, as well, start to think about how social identity will shape American politics in the future. That is, we're talking about social identity, that little mental list that we all have in our heads of here are the different characteristics of me, and here are the ones, if I list them in terms of how important they are to me that really define who I am, and in the political context, help me understand what I'm for and what I'm against, or which candidates I want to vote for and which candidates I don't want to vote for.

Clearly, we have polarization, that polarization around social identity has made older folks, White folks, rural folks, traditionalist folks, and to an extent, based on these data, less well educated folks increasingly feeling left out, increasingly feeling squeezed, disenfranchised, et cetera, and, of course, that sort of thing often leads to mobilization. And we see that, I think, to an extent, in the Tea Party movement, we see it, to an extent, in the very sharp and profound political divide that exists right now between urban contexts and rural contexts. Meanwhile, the social construction of what it means to be religious has been dominated rather profoundly for really about three decades or more at this point by the religious right.

And that isn't some kind of conspiracy, right, it's just that's the way things have gone for the last 30plus years. In this sense, the culture wars may, in fact, have trickled down in some sort of way to the mass level. And the empirical evidence of that, as both Bill and E.J. noted in their remarks, is evident in the fact that theological conservatism is very tightly correlated with social conservatism, but not with economic conservatism. For me, what that shows is that the religious right, or the pro family movement, if you prefer, has been quite successful over several decades at exercising what we call in the old political science literature as the second face of power.

The second face of power is the ability of an individual or a group to say I am going to constrain the terms of debate to ideas, concepts, narratives that benefit me. And, thus, the religious right, in emphasizing sexual and family sorts of issues, to the exclusion of economic and justice based issues, what they've done is they've managed to mold the narrative in which Americans see religion on the one hand and politics on the other as meaning a marriage of conservatism. And what that's done is, it has batted away, over several decades now, the idea that religion should or could drive social justice.

And, of course, this is, you know, not something that's never been important in American culture, right, witness the social gospel movement of 100 years ago, right. It used to be the case, really, that religious progressives were the

most important voice, the most prominent voice in American politics. Now that's not true. So, but what about this Millennial generation and where they are or might go? The one thing that I wonder about these folks right now is, are they just endangering in a little youthful rebellion, right, are they just saying, well, you know, I don't want anything to do with my grandparents' religious right, and if I'm under 29, I'm used to having a lot of diversity around me, whether that diversity means racial or ethnic diversity, whether that means diversity in terms of sexual orientation, or wherever.

And I understand, perhaps, that maybe the religious right isn't too open to those kinds of diversity, so, you know what, I'm for this, and they're for that, so attitude attribution is what we call this in the political science literature, I'm just going to push that away, I'm not going to have anything to do with it. But, as these folks get a little older, and they have kids, and they start to age, might they then say, as generation after generation before them have, I need to figure out what I think about the meaning of life and what comes after death, and if, in fact, all of these religiously unaffiliated young people decide, at some point, not en masse, but a little at a time, that what I need to do is I need to put myself back into a religious or a spiritual type context.

What context will they choose? Will they be attracted to Evangelical Protestantism, right, will Evangelical Protestantism evolve and find

ways of reaching out to people who are seekers, as it has for a very long period of time. Will the Catholic Church become, in meaningful ways, more progressive and more open to the sorts of things that these Millennials are expressing in terms of policy preferences and ideological orientation in PRRI's data. Or will they just simply remain unaffiliated altogether? We don't know, my crystal ball is broken, unfortunately, we have to just sort of speculate. But that's part of the fun of playing in the sand box, right?

So what will end up happening? Well, we don't know. The one thing that I'm willing to say with great certainty is that, although it seems from PRRI's data that religious conservatism, might, to an extent, be on the wane, it isn't going to disappear entirely. Ever, ever, ever, it isn't going to disappear entirely. And if the number of religious conservatives grows smaller, then basic social science suggests that that is a group that will become more cohesive and perhaps feel more alienated from the culture, and therefore, might not just continue, but lead to sort of a retrenchment of the culture wars.

So one thing I think it's important for us to look for as we move ahead in observing religion and politics, and the intersection between the two, is a question of whether or not American politics, in the decades to come, becomes a battle between what we might call the churched and the unchurched. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. DIONNE: Thank you so much, Laura. That was great. And Reverend Herring is an organizer, so he's going to answer Peter's question about organization, here. Reverend, thank you.

MR. HERRING: Thank you, E.J., and I want to thank the Brookings Institute and PRRI for their wonderful work and for the presence they have, both in the city and in the country. If you look at the data, it should be relatively clear for everyone why I have been asked to come and be with you today, and the distinction that I bring to this panel. It should be obvious how I'm different than other folks on the panel; I'm the only one here who is a Southern Baptist preacher. And I've been asked to go last so that I would plead God's mercy for any sins of hyperbole or exaggeration or omission or commission. I'm joking, but I'm awfully glad to be with you and would like to share my remarks, as well.

You know, before I do that, though, what is really significant to me, as we look at something as useful as this survey, is that we, as the American people, are extraordinarily challenged, maybe like never before, to figure out who we are, what we stand for, what matters to us, how we resolve our problems and speak the language of community, and how we invest in one another. Dignity and worth. You might expect that a clergy person would say that.

But I think you could easily also expect that a non clergy person, a Millennial or a Generation Xer, or even folks from my generation or the generation before, that studies such as this, which are extraordinarily powerful and extraordinarily useful help us train our attention for a moment on ourselves, and help us ask very important and complicated questions, and in the end, have our intellect stimulated, and our ideas rejuvenated, and our passion for community greatly added to. So I would say that, at the very beginning, I really appreciate the comments of all my colleagues, and I think, for me, this report indicates that, particularly as we refer to the graph on page 8, that we are at a time of some significant pessimism.

That people are greatly worried about themselves, their family, the world, this country, and are not particularly clear about how things will work out. One of the great challenges and the great opportunity of being involved in community organizing in faith space in America is that you have a chance to listen almost on a daily basis to people in their authentic voice speaking their problems, their worries, their deep concerns, even their hopes and dreams and aspirations. And what that is teaching us in our work is that, even though we are clear that there is a high degree of pessimism, and there is, and in many ways, it can be broken down along generational lines, and I think there's some real truth to that.

That they're nonetheless, though, is a discernible degree of hope, and that for many people, not for all, for many people, they place, they are encouraged to be hopeful by their faith, the religion that they observe, but also by a thing that I think is significantly American, and that is, even in the spaces and the places where we don't define how we feel about how we register on issues as driven by our religion or our faith, there is nonetheless a very powerful driver in terms of the moral values that we still pay attention to and the ethical principles that still matter. And it's extraordinarily difficult to gauge that and to measure that, but in the streets and in the communities and in the churches and synagogues and mosques and temples where we work, it is palpable.

The language of religion and faith gets us quite a bit down the road in terms of shaping and forming our opinions and our perspectives on things like the economy, but then there's a place where we don't necessarily leave them behind, but we are emboldened to walk a little further and not necessarily reference tenets of our faith and religion, but still step into space that is significantly informed by a sense of values and ethical concepts and principles. Again, that's tough to measure, but you'll hear often when you're organizing among young people such as many of the young people organizing today in this campaign for citizenship for 11 million undocumented but aspiring Americans.

You'll hear young people say, quite candidly and quite often, yes, I'm here because of my faith, but I'm also here because of a general principle around what is right, what is fair, what is just. And I think that that is remarkable. I watch, like most of my clergy colleagues, the numbers in terms of whether or not or the extent to which Americans profess a faith and the extent to which they observe that faith, and how many folks are in the pews on Sunday or in the synagogues on Sabbath, and I see that, in many places, particularly in the main line places, that those numbers continue to go rather significantly and steadily downhill. But I don't think necessarily that means that people are any less driven by highly developed sense of moral kind of instruction and commitment or a love for our world and people that is bound up in a general sense of what is good and right and just.

So, to me, that leaves me and others who occupy the space that I do, organizing in faith communities across this country with a great deal of hope and feeling very positive about, not only this moment, but the moments to come. But, if you would, permit me to go, to bring you back to the chart on page 8, and I would ask for you, for the moment, just to look at that and to allow yourself a moment of reflection and interpretation, what might that be saying to us? What might that be saying to us?

As I looked at it for the first time, as I looked at some of the data, here, I thought right away of a young Latina sister from Denver, Colorado, her name is Arielle Gonzales, she is undocumented, has been working for the last year and a half on our citizenship campaign, spends every evening for the last six months, she'll be spending this evening, as well, on the telephone calling faith voters, asking them to support not only immigration reform but citizenship for 11 million people. When ask why she, without the benefit of documents, would spend so much time with folks who have the franchise of citizenship and can vote, why she would be devoting her life's energy to this, she says, without reservation, because my faith commands it, my God commands it, but also because it is just and it is needed of me.

And when you push her further in terms of whether or not she believes she'll be successful in that work, she says, again, without hesitation or reservation that she's absolutely certain that she will be successful, although it may take a while. And even on that measure, she has tremendous hope. It may take a while, but I'm young, I have the time, right? I think that, even as we look at this generational breakdown in terms of pessimism, and I think it is significant, because I could also give you voices of young people that we're working within our work every day, who are feeling that the world is closing in on them, that the horizons

that perhaps their parents aspired to will not be their horizons, and opportunities that were available a generation before them will not be available to them.

Even with those voices that are greatly pessimistic in feeling that there's not nearly as much opportunity as they would like to see or that was available to generations before them, when you ask them, are you then dissuaded from working, are you then inclined to give up, does it send you home, send you packing, scurrying under the bed, to close the curtains and shut the door and give up on working for a better world. What we are experiencing in our work is that those young people are saying, resoundingly, no. Though things look tough, and we believe that we have reason to be pessimistic, we're nonetheless inclined to work, inclined to do our share of making the world a better place.

Now, I remember in 1975, which is a long time ago for many, 1976, in my home community of Louisville, Kentucky, was one of the communities that erupted across the country as we tried to resolve the apartheid reality of public education in our city by adopting a plan that would bus African American students from poor inner city schools, poor in every way, to better appointed schools in mostly White sectors of the city for the sake of delivering for them a better education. And this was a challenge in Louisville, some of you all may remember how much a challenge it was, and much of my orientation towards justice was formed in that experience.

In those early days, it was quite difficult for students, particularly Black students involved in the bussing to feel that it was in any way related to any hopefulness for them that the world would get better because they were getting on those busses early in the morning, driving quite a distance, getting off those busses to angry crowds who were denouncing them and hurling epitaphs at them, sitting in classrooms, strange classrooms very foreign to themselves, and then repeating that on the way home. So I, and some of my colleagues at the university where I attended, these were Black and White students, decided that what we would do was, we would talk about how this connected to us and how we saw the world, and we shared that we thought that the world was bleak and that this would be a failed effort to change the life circumstances of the young people who were most impacted by this social experiment.

We cried a lot, cursed a lot, hung our head a lot, and then organized and worked. And I think that that's one of the lessons that I'm going to predict will happen with young people today. And here's what we did, we decided that we didn't know enough about the underlying policies to create policy change, we decided that we weren't real certain how the wheels of government worked, although we were learning quickly, but that we could respond, our humanity, our faith directed us to respond in a humane way to those persons who were most impacted by this social adjustment, and that was to the young people.

And here's what we did; we decided that, as the young people boarded the busses in the morning, and as they got off the busses in the afternoon, and then reboarded the busses later on in the afternoon, that enough of us would be there in some of the toughest schools to greet the young people, to tell them that we loved them, to express to them our deep determination to not abandon them, to profess our faith in them, and to encourage them. That's what we did, we literally just created a phalanx for them to walk through and regard this experiment as something worthy of their having courage.

And the little ones would stick out their chest and raise their heads as we, you know, told them how proud we were and how much we loved them. Here's the point; the point was that, even though we believed that this was a social experiment that would ultimately fail, that's what we believed. Even though we believed that this experiment was required because our nation had failed in many ways, we were still determined to do something and to act. And I think what I read, when I read page 8, as I read that significantly, then I'm going to close in a moment then I would encourage you to turn to page 16.

On page 16, I think, when asked the importance of equal opportunity, the importance of opportunity, I think we see, I think, remarkable numbers, here, in my personal opinion. When asked one of the big problems in this country that we don't give everyone an equal chance, I think that you can see

that many Americans, the majority of Americans feel that this is a challenge. That if there is an equal chance, if there is equal opportunity, that folks may transcend circumstance and situation and deliver for themselves and for their families a life worth living.

And so, I think this offers us a very powerful place, a very powerful place to begin to think about how we want to occupy this present moment. Many of us, myself included, have spent the last few days responding to the national conversation around race and justice that has been spurred on by the decision in the Zimmerman case, and as we work with clergy from around the country and people of faith around the country who are greatly wounded, to be frank with you, and who are feeling that the justice system, once again, has failed to represent justice for those in the margins and the least among us. Folks, nonetheless, still very much dedicated to the principle that if there is equal opportunity, folks can prosper still in America.

And I'll leave you with, back in the days when I spent a lot of time traveling the currently working with young people on issues of diversity and issues of social justice, we used to do a classroom experiment where we asked the young people to describe the American dream, and they would describe it in much the same way that many of us would; an opportunity for a good job and a career that would matter, a way to be connected to close family and friends, and to have love

relationships and have those love relationships connect them to young people in a vibrant community, to be able to pay their way and pay their bills and get a better education.

When we asked young people what the American ideal was, they were quite able to describe that, and then when we said would you be willing to work for it, they would all say, yes, we would be willing to work for it. In the classroom, we would then ask would you be willing to run for it in this classroom, if the American ideal showed up here in the room, would you be willing to run for it, and they said, yes, we would. And so we would part the aisles in the classroom and we would have someone stand at the head of the class and they would be the American ideal, and we would ask two students to run the race.

And one student would always, we would always choose a young White student who was usually a young white guy, right, you know, who had had, maybe, a lot of instruction around competing for opportunity, and we would say would you like to run this race, and he would always say, bless his heart, yes, I would. And then we would always choose a young person of color, usually an African American person, would you like to run this race, and they, too, brimming with hope and optimism, would say, yes, I would. And we would put them in the back of the room, we said, okay, we're going to race for the American dream, for opportunity. And are you ready, and they would say yes, and then we would say

to the African American opportunity, but hold on a moment, why are you at the same line?

And the student would look in shock, well, I'm going to run this race. This is a fair race, right? And we would then discuss what this means in the American context, this race, and what a fair race is all about. And after a few questions and after a few observations, we would launch the race with the African American student standing a great deal behind his White counterpart, and we would run. And that little young white fellow would run with a guilty heart, but he would run nonetheless. And the young African American student would run his or her feet as fast as she or he could, and would never win. And then we would ask the students, what does this mean, then, as it relates to opportunity in this country?

They would say resoundingly that, if the race is fair, if we can make it fair, it's still worth running for this opportunity. And I think that one of the things that a report like this suggests to us is that we may disagree and we may break this down politically and racially and by religious context, but I think that there's still in the American culture a deep investment in opportunity, and I think the challenge for us is to figure out how, even across the various ways in which we might stand different and apart from one another, we can still speak a common language around opportunity. Thank you very much. (Applause)

MR. DIONNE: Thank you so much. We are going to turn immediately to questions. I just want to report two interesting things that have already been Tweeted. By the way, if you have a question, again, it's #econvalues on Twitter. Beth Ann you got a compliment on Twitter. Somebody said, a women named Beth Ann said, oh, how I've missed being in the room with political science professors. And I also love this one from a gentleman called Jorge Rodriguez who Tweeted, I thoroughly enjoy that @RobertPJones is Tweeting about hashtag economic values whilst sitting on the panel, (laughter) so this is very good.

Let's go, Emma, do you have a question for us? We'll start with Twitter, and then anybody, put up your hands and we'll have a mic for you. We have another mic back there, so one of you grab that, the gentleman Emma, you asked a Twitter question, and then that gentleman can come in and we can take a few questions and comments at a time. Thank you, Emma.

SPEAKER: Sure. So we have a question on Twitter from someone named Adam Cath, the question is; what do you make of the similarity between the religious makeup of Republicans and the Tea Party found in the study?

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. Sir, in the back, with the, I think, purple shirt.

QUESTIONER: Yeah. I was most interested in the number that said that 50 percent of White Evangelicals thought that capitalism and Christianity were incompatible. That was very striking, given the voting patterns. I would just like to hear more about what people think that means and whether that's the failure of economic conservatives to imbue their cause with the same religious fervor, and whether that's an opening for progressives.

MR. DIONNE: Excellent question. We were struck by that, too. One more in the back, and we can put them together, and I'm going to add one myself. Was there somebody the gentleman over here in the orange?

QUESTIONER: I have a question on a little bit more fundamental, I know it's a little difficult to read too much into a single survey

MR. DIONNE: We read a lot into a single survey.

QUESTIONER: Right. But point one is that it appears that the questions asked were religious identification as opposed to really intensity of belief and practice, which I think Peter actually raised. And I think, Robbie, you actually hinted at the fact that a lot of the conclusions or a lot of the findings came down along income lines, which tended to be, right, which tended to be explanatory.

Which raised the question to me, I just had a little bit, it's not a perfect analogy, but basically, what you make is where you stand, it seems that that's the conclusion that comes out of it. And with the greatest respect for

you, I don't want you to think that I'm asking, I'm being cynical, here, I'm asking a serious question

MR. DIONNE: You don't have to wrap it up in all that, it's a legitimate question.

QUESTIONER: It makes me wonder, it makes me wonder a fundamental question which is, what are values? Because maybe, and this Bill kind of touched on it, that maybe there is a moral relativism going on, but it's not the moral relativism that we learned about in history across cultures or society, but it's across income levels. And if that's the case, then those aren't values, are they?

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. What excellent questions, and I'm going to piggy back on those three Peter's comment. I just want to throw this at you, Robbie, where I do think that this whole question of can you have a religious progressive movement that includes a lot of people who are not necessarily active in congregations. But I think it's a really good observation, so, Robbie, why don't you take that collection, I'll leave it to other panelists to jump in on any one or more of those questions, as well.

MR. JONES: Well, let me take up the last one first about, that actually comes from Peter. So, Peter, you're right to ask the question so what's the institutional connection of religious progressives versus religious conservatives. We wrestled with this a lot, actually, in creating this scale, because

one of the things that's often done in political science is that religious attendance is taken as a proxy for religious commitment. And that doesn't quite work across the ideological spectrum, right, for one thing, many progressive religious churches only offer one religious service to attend at a given week.

So the category that most political scientists use is once is week or more, right, so in that more than once a week category, you've really got, it's over populated by Catholic parishes and Evangelical churches. I mean, I grew up Evangelical, I was at church five times a week growing up, and that was normal, right. So that's a very different scenario than a main line Protestant church that offers a Sunday morning service, and that's it, and that's kind of what's expected if you're a good committed member, that's kind of what you go to.

So we actually, one of the reasons why we picked kind of religious salience measure, like how important is religion to your life is to get around this challenge of attendance as an asymmetrical measure, kind of asymmetrical proxy for commitment. Now, having said all that, there's considerable differences, and we tried to lay this out in a table so people could make judgments on their own on page 50, but I'll just point to one quick number, here. There is an intensity difference in terms of how important, so you pointed this rightly, among religious conservatives, 54 percent say it is the most important thing in my life; an additional 43 percent say it is one among many important things in my life.

That's 97 percent of religious conservatives that say religion is either the most important thing or one among many important things in my life. Only 11 percent of religious progressives say that it is the most important thing, but nearly 6 in 10, 59 percent say that it is one among many important things to my life. And I would suggest that, rather than sort of making a hard conclusion that this is certainly more and less religiosity, I would suggest that it's worth thinking about and it's a plausible thesis that it's a different kind of religiosity here that I think resonates among main liners in a way that it is a main line, like in many liberal main line Protestant churches, it might be a little bit weird to have religion be the most important thing in your life, it's like actually the orthodox position to have it be one among many important things in your life.

You think about the Wesleyan Quadrilateral, for those of you who are seminary students, right, scripture, tradition, reason, all these things have to be factored together before you come to a kind of proper theological conclusion, right, it's not just about reading scripture and going straight to a conclusion in those traditions. So I think that's one thing to say about it. It's nonetheless true. If you look at attendance patterns, religious conservatives are in churches more than religious progressives are. And I should say this. Religious progressives are in churches or synagogues or mosque, or other kinds of religious organizations, 76 percent of religious conservatives report attending religious services at least once

a month or more, 38 percent of religious progressives report attending religious services once a month or more. So there's considerable difference.

And I think the challenge of finding religious progressives is kind of what you're pointing to here, too, is a real challenge, right? Because you can't just sort of walk into a service and expect to find a bunch of them there, they're much more dispersed. The only other thing I'm going to say real quickly about the other thing about what are values. You know, I said when I got to that slide that this is the kind of thing that will keep clergy up at night, right. And I think it is precisely because there seems to be a degree to which, here, that exactly right that one's social position becomes a kind of blinder or a kind of smoky glasses that really does, or a prism that sort of bends the light in a way so that people's valuations, then, of what's Christian, what's moral get bent by where they sit.

And I think the survey shows that pretty squarely, here, and so it's a real, I think it's a real challenge to sort of unpack, then, interrogate, ask the hard questions about how much of what we hold as values are determined by our race and our class and our income levels. I mean, that's a real thorny question.

MR. DIONNE: Could I just say one quick thing? I think your question goes, also connects to the question about how many people who are Evangelicals turn out to be progressive on one or more measures of economic justice issues. Clearly, some of it is connected to class, but we also have to

remember that, historically, an awful lot of Evangelicals, once upon a time, were on the progressive side. I mean, to pick a really old example, I covered his campaign, William Jennings Bryan, back in 1896 to 1900 married a very conservative theology with a very progressive outlook on so many of these social questions.

There are a third fewer economic conservatives than there are theological conservatives, and so, clearly, some of it is class, but I think some of it is that people who have conservative views on abortion or gay marriage, issues like that, nonetheless hold a series of other views that are not, don't fall into the pigeon hole which we usually put conservatives and liberals.

Anyone else on any of these questions? Yeah.

QUESTIONER: Well, just very briefly, staring at page 50, appendix 3, again, putting my political science hat on for just a minute; if you say that something is the most important thing in your life, and you mean it, then that is, so to speak, a trumping value. And what that translates into is the willingness to vote on the basis of that whenever it comes into conflict with anything else. To say it's one among many important things is to make a very different proposition.

It's a very different proposition about what drives you politically. So I think the fact, one of the single most important facts in this entire survey is that religious conservatives are five times more likely to identify their religious belief and community, and everything that goes along with it, as the dominant,

therefore trumping value, they will vote on this basis. Whether or not religious progressives will vote and act on this basis, I think is a more difficult question. And so all of this is to support at least a measure of Peter's skepticism articulated in his open remarks.

MR. DIONNE: Okay. Laura?

MS. OLSON: Two very quick things. First of all, and I couldn't agree more with what Bill is saying, here, but just to piggy back on to that. First of all, social issues seem, for Americans in recent times, to be much easier to figure out if you're for it or against it, right. With economic issues, it's more complicated, right. Economic issues tend to be more difficult to understand and follow, where as with abortion, well, you know, I either think it's okay or it's not, right, and the same goes for other related issues like same sex marriages, et cetera.

And as to the what are values question, I think, from a cultural perspective, because, for me, it all ends up backing all the way up to the wall to culture. The, of course, cultural sine qua non in the United States is individualism, right, and so we are not necessarily inclined. I think there are plenty of opportunities that people have taken to push this aside, but our sort of gut instinct in this country, I think, is to be individualistic, not to be communitarian. And I think that is what really profoundly gets at this question of the fact that class, perhaps, is guiding, for example, Evangelicals who are skeptical of capitalism.

MR. DIONNE: One more round, and we want to pick up on that Twitter question. John Carr, who, thank you, introduced me to the Reverend Herring, so I'm grateful for that.

QUESTIONER: First of all, great survey, great discussion. It seems to focus primarily on the section between faith and politics. There is another thing that affects both, which is reality. (Laughter) Some of the things you contrast

MR. DIONNE: John, I'm shocked that you are denying the reality of faith, by the way.

QUESTIONER: Wait, wait, wait a minute. Inject a little reality into ideology. For example, as I read the survey, the choices were, do you think we're having economic problems because there's not enough opportunity and fairness, or there's not enough hard work and responsibility? When, in fact, most religions would say you need both, you need to care for the weak and you need to work hard and care for those who belong to you. And anyone who is poor or works with the poor would say two things; there's not enough opportunity and if you're going to take advantage of what opportunity is there, you'd better work hard, go to school and make good choices.

So those, in this survey, were represented as sort of left/right when, in Christianity, it would be both/and, and in reality, it would be damn right.

So part of it is how do you factor out what is progressive, what is, in my case Catholic, what is a choice you better make if you're going to make it.

MR. DIONNE: That's a great comment, we'll get to that. This gentleman way in the front, here.

MR. NASWORTH: Napp Nasworth with the Christian Post. I heard E.J. echo Tony Perkins in warning Republicans about jettisoning social conservatives

MR. DIONNE: I don't get accused to do that very often. I did notice that myself, yeah.

MR. NASWORTH: And I heard Laura talk about the significance of the differences between the theological orientation scale and the economic orientation scale. I thought it was interesting that 44 percent of White Evangelicals identified as economic conservatives, it must have been the other race and religious group. So I wondered what this data might tell Republican leaders or what they might be able to learn from it, and also what does it say about the role of religious conservatives in the Republican party.

Sometimes you hear in the media it seems to be like they're sort of the fringe of the Republican Party, or are they sort of more of the base of the Republican party? And also, does the data challenge the “What's the Matter With

Kansas" thesis, you know, that Republicans aren't really representing the interests of rural, White religious conservatives?

MR. DIONNE: Thank you for that question. Last question over here, I'm sorry, that gentleman over there.

QUESTIONER: You have a bunch of 60/40 splits you have a bunch of 60/40 splits in your survey except for one, 80/20 on the minimum wage. Why is 80/20 on the minimum wage versus all the other sort of soft, fuzzy sorts of changes?

MR. DIONNE: I just want to take that because that's always been true on the minimum wage, and the minimum wage combines the two values John talked about, which is social justice and personal responsibility, and it's why the minimum wage almost always wins in referenda by substantial margins. Let me just say one quick thing. When Bill and I were working on our part of the paper and I wrote that sentence, I wasn't thinking of Tony Perkins in particular, but I did realize, as I was writing that sentence that it entered into a real conversation inside the Republican Party.

And I didn't write that sentence for any other reason than the fact that, if you look at these data, and you look at who conservatives are, it turns out that social conservatives loom larger as part of that constituency, and more consistently than economic conservatives do. And so I think there would be

people on, say, the, if you will, the prochoice side of the Republican Party who'd say, yes, we understand that's a problem. But we've got to build ourselves into a majority, that's true, but it runs the risk of blowing up a coalition by going after a very big part of it.

The same is true, as we pointed out, the other way around for liberals, which is liberals have great potential among a significant number of socially and theologically conservative Americans who have a very strong belief in economic justice. But speaking more of their religious language is a difficulty for them, because so many within the liberal camp are disconnected to religion, so it's a challenge to both. But I just think you can't look at that data without seeing how important social conservatism is to the broader cause of conservatives.

And I'll let everybody on the panel close maybe I'll let you go last, Robbie, so you can if I could start with the Reverend and work up to Robbie, and pick up on any of these questions.

MR. HERRING: Well, I think well, they're all juicy questions. I think that the comments about how we discern values, and understand what's important to folks, given their religious frame, even as the religious affiliation and their political affiliation would put, would create some very kind of blurry pictures. I think one of the things that we're learning in the citizenship campaign work that the growing edge for us is in White Evangelical congregations who, if you maybe

query them in terms of their political orientation towards that issue, might register a great deal more conservative than if you query them around the social justice dimensions, or the values dimensions of that, what's the underlying value.

So much of our work is about building coalitional space in the religious context, and what we're finding is that conversations about our political orientation often present barriers to that. But as we really drill down on what are the underlying values I think that's a good example, a good reason why the minimum wage piece normally does have that kind of distribution, is to drill down on the underlying values. And that's what we do in our work, and we're finding that, when you do that, it can often transcend our political orientation in some remarkable ways.

I'll just also say that place matters, and where these issues play themselves out, you know, where they play themselves out and where Americans are as they adjust to these issues makes a great deal of difference, and circumstance matters, as well. It's a little harder to get at, though, in this survey or surveys like it, but I do think that it shows a volatility of values, moral values as contexted against our political orientation and even socioeconomic status.

MS. OLSON: I'll take the Twitter question about the Tea Party and kind of Mary that together with Nap's question about religious conservatives in the GOP. It seems to me that the same sorts of answers would apply in both cases.

The Republicans cannot win without either constituency right now, but increasingly, nationally speaking, at least, they cannot win with them, either. And Mitt Romney learned that, of course, last year, and but, of course, the Republicans are almost certain, at least in the near term, to hang on to control of the House because of gerrymandering. But that's a topic for another day.

It seems to me that, if one were advising the GOP, or thinking about how the GOP might proceed in the years to come, the obvious messages of the 2012 election, of course, would be the need to be more inclusive both in image and in outreach, and it seems like one very obvious path to that would be, perhaps, to be a little bit more inclusive on economic issues in strategic ways with strategic constituencies, much as President Obama was able to cobble together a constituency to vote for him that were not necessarily all one movement, right, by any means, right, through micro targeting. And the other, of course, important opportunity for the Republicans right now is around immigration reform.

And one thing I keep saying over and over again is that, if the Republicans are on the wrong side of history on immigration reform, it's going to be a big, big, big problem for them go for forward. Thanks.

MR. DIONNE: Peter?

MR. STEINFELS: I had mentioned my interest in the findings about Hispanic Catholics and that I didn't explore that unless it became relevant,

and it is relevant, in particular, to the question about the both/and possibilities. It's very interesting compared to White Catholic, Hispanic Catholics are less likely to think that capitalism is at odds with Christian values, they are far less likely to see a growing income gap, and they are relatively more positive about government and its competence and about capitalism and its possibilities for giving people an adequate opportunity.

And it's very interesting that they don't reflect quite, and I think this has a lot to do with the experience of either immigrants or people who are moving from the marginal socioeconomic category, where they are doing better than their parents, and they do think their children may do better than them. They don't deal with these questions in quite the dichotomous terms that many of the other responses reflect. Also, they have more concern for family stability and marriage is a factor in economic success, they stress personal responsibility more. So I think that's just an interesting window into this whole question that was raised about the both/and possibilities, rather than the dichotomies.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. Bill?

MR. GALSTON: Well, let me follow hard on that with three very quick points. First of all, I have increasingly been driven to believe that, today, more than ever, the American dream is sustained by the immigrant experience, because those are the groups, above all, that are experiencing the kind of

improvement that is part and parcel of that dream. And I think, my guess is that, if you did an intensive survey of immigrants, they would be much more likely than even second or third generation Americans to say that, not only are they better off than their parents, but they expect their kids to do better.

So that's point number one. Point number two, you know, John Carr, as always, is right, and we would be guilty as charged if we had, in fact, forced, forced respondents to this survey to choose between not enough opportunity and not enough effort. But we didn't do that, right, we gave them on opportunity to respond to both of those, and you had majorities answering yeah, not enough opportunity, not equally enough distributed and inadequate work and sacrifice. So the majority of the American people, apparently, don't see a stark contradiction between those two propositions. So they're with you, and I think we're not against you.

And

MR. DIONNE: Very biblical.

MR. GALSTON: Yeah, right. And, finally, I do think this distinction among different kinds of progressivism and the difficulties within the progressive coalition does some real work. And as exhibit A, I put the vote on Proposition 8 on the table.

MR. JONES: Thank you. So I want to do two things real quick. First, Peter, thanks for that question, for bringing back up the White Evangelicals' ambivalence on the capitalism compatible with Christianity, it surprised us, too, I think, when we first saw this question. It is interesting to look at, if you look at the economic orientation where we combined up it was six economic questions. Only 44 percent of White Evangelicals consistently came into the economic conservative end of those questions, right, 38 percent of them, nearly as many, were in the economic moderate set.

And I think we do see some ambivalence, here, and there's not that kind of ambivalence on social issues, right, Evangelicals are far more clear about where they stand on social issues and on theology, too, right. Not any ambivalence on theological conservatism or social conservatism, but there is this kind of spread on economic issues that you just don't see on theology or social issues. So I think that's, thanks for bringing that back up.

The last thing I'm going to say to just kind of put the point on the Tea Party and Republican movement, again. It will be great, it will bring us back to 2010 for the

MR. DIONNE: When we started this partnership.

MR. JONES: So, just briefly, if the question on the table is whether the GOP should, in its future, follow religious conservatives or the Tea

Party, meaning religious conservatives on social issues versus the Tea Party and economic libertarianism, it's a nonsensical question, right. It's really clear in the data, the Tea Party is as likely as the Republican Party as a whole to be social conservatives, right. So, following the Tea Party actually does mean maintaining a very strong commitment to social conservatism not party, there's no just daylight there on this question.

So I think the question is fairly easily settled, so just real quickly, if you look at the social orientation scale, Republicans are 48 percent social conservatives, those who identify with the Tea Party are 50 percent social conservatives. If you look at the religious orientation scale, Republicans are 56 percent religious conservatives, the Tea Party is 60 percent religious conservatives. So, you know, there's just no daylight between those groups, and so I think the answer should be fairly simple.

MR. DIONNE: I just want to close in two ways. First, there were several observations and questions on Twitter that I want to call attention to, one was from somebody called Lance McHaskell who asked about regional breaks, and there is an important, which I thought was important. Just very briefly, page the second observation is page 50 has been to this discussion as John 3:16 is to many Evangelical churches. But on page 50, you'll see that, in the northeast,

clearly tilts towards religious progressive, only 12 percent of Northeasterners I'm sorry, of religious progressives in the northeast, 24 let me start over.

Only 12 percent of religious conservatives are in the northeast compared to 24 percent of religious progressives, whereas 44 percent of religious conservatives are in the south, compared to 36 percent. The Midwest tilts a little conservative, the west is just like roughly equal. And so I think that kind of finding is mirrored throughout the study. Secondly, someone who describes themselves on Twitter as a crank theologian made a very interesting observation which is, if you put together the 19 percent who are religious progressives and the 15 percent who are nonreligious, they have very similar views, meaning the pie is essentially cut in thirds.

And I think there's some truth to that observation. The third, I don't have it in front of me, but this is for you, Reverend, somebody said thank God there is one preacher on the panel. (Laughter)

And I just want to thank you all for coming. I want to thank all the participants for being here, I want to thank my colleague, Bill Galston and Robbie in PRRI for this partnership. There is a lot of data, here, and so we've talked a lot about hope, and I just want to end by saying people are still in the market for it, and somebody's got to provide it. Thank you all very, very much. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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