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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. WITTES: Okay. Well, good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

I am Tamara Wittes, the Saban Center's director, and I'm delighted to have you all with us on this sultry Washington afternoon, to talk about not only what's been happening in Egypt and what it means for that country and for the U.S. and the Middle East, but, also, to take a broader perspective on these events -- and focus, in particular, on a question that has become the subject of intense controversy both in Washington and in Cairo, which is, how do we characterize events in which a popular mobilization leads to the military's decision to remove an elected president from office? And what does that set of events and that trajectory say about the prospects for democracy?

And I'm delighted to be joined for our discussion of that today by some really eminent experts on various aspects of this question. Let me start by introducing the gentleman you see on your video screen, the Director of Research at our center in Doha, Shadi Hamid. Shadi, thanks for joining us.

MR. HAMID: Thanks for having me.

MS. WITTES: And for those of you who are watching this

program on our webcast, I just want to let you know that you'll be hearing Shadi's voice, but you won't be seeing his face -- but he is, indeed, with us.

I also want to welcome Ted Piccone, the Deputy Director of Foreign Policy here at the Brookings Institution -- and, also, an expert on democracy and human rights, who has worked on this subject in a comparative perspective, and, also, with specific attention to Latin America over many, many years. So, Ted, thanks for joining us.

And Kemal Kirişci, my colleague in the Center for the U.S. and Europe, who focuses on Turkey and Turkish politics here at Brookings -- and, of course, Turkey has its own history of military engagement and politics, as well as particular interface with events in Egypt over the last couple years -- so a lot to talk about there.

I want to extend a special welcome to Ambassador Mohamed Al-Rumaihi, who's joining us today -- the Ambassador of the State of Qatar -- in Washington. And to all of our distinguished guests, thank you for joining us.

You know, I think just to get us started, there is a set of broader issues provoked by these events. Beyond the policy question, the urgent policy question that Washington is debating right now -- is this a military coup under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act, and does

that, therefore, require that the United States suspend foreign assistance to Egypt until a democratically-elected government is back in place? That's the narrow policy question at play right now.

But beyond that, these events in Egypt, I think, demand consideration of some bigger, tougher questions about democracy, about the relationship between electoral politics and the democratic process, and what political scientists call substantive democracy -- that is, the rules or values that are necessary to make electoral politics fair and sustainable over time.

So, you have a debate about procedural democracy in elections, versus substantive democracy. You also have a debate, I think, about transition, and about what's most necessary for a democratic transition to succeed.

What we saw in Egypt over the last week was a popular mobilization that was outside formal politics. It wasn't led by any political party. It wasn't in the context of an electoral campaign, a debate in Parliament, or any other institutional process. It was, in fact, street politics in protest of the failings of the institutional politics.

And so looking at how you get from popular mobilization outside a political system into institutionalized democracy in a political system, I think, is another one of the big issues at stake in these events.

Now over the last week, as Washington has been focused on the question of, was this a coup, and what does that mean for U.S. policy toward Egypt and U.S. aid to Egypt?

There's been a parallel debate taking place in Cairo, about whether this was a coup. But that debate has nothing to do with U.S. law or U.S. assistance; it has everything to do with the polarization in Egyptian society over this set of events.

And I had hoped to turn to Shadi at this point, to have him recap that Egypt debate for us; it looks like we've lost that connection. Hopefully, we'll be getting back to him soon.

But let me say just briefly that, for those who are supporting President Morsi, the core value, the core concept that they believe they are standing on is electoral legitimacy -- and that these events over the last week were a coup, an overturning of that electoral legitimacy.

Those who oppose President Morsi in the streets and in the halls of this new military-established government are saying this was not a coup; this was a response to popular demand. And if Morsi was elected by a majority of those voting, the millions in the streets protesting his rule legitimately overturned that electoral outcome.

So, that's the nature of the debate in Cairo. And for a little bit of context on this, I'd like to -- and now we have Shadi back with us.

Shadi, I was just talking about the debate in Cairo over what it means to say these events were, in effect, a military coup or not. And I wonder if you can talk a little bit about the perceptions of the two sides, if you will -- the two poles of the spectrum in Egypt right now. Go ahead, please.

MR. HAMID: Yeah, sure. Thanks, Tamara.

I mean, Egyptians who are part of this uprising-turned-coup are very sensitive about that word. And there's almost been a kind of campaign to tell the international community, "Stop calling this a coup; it was a revolution. It was our revolution."

Obviously, if you talk to Muslim Brotherhood supporters, you hear a very different narrative, and they say that, no doubt, this is a military coup.

So, on this question, Egypt is divided, just like it's divided on a lot of other things. But in terms of, you know, the academic definitions and the way the word is usually used, there's no doubt that this is a coup. It's, in some sense, a textbook coup in a number of different ways.

And if you look historically, many coups have had broad popular support -- and not only that -- that mass protests have often triggered coups, historically, in a number of regions.

So, Egyptians will say, "Well, millions of people were on the streets." And we have to acknowledge that -- that, you know, masses

were cheering on the military, but that isn't unique to Egypt, per se. And in a lot of coup contexts, you have the masses cheering for the generals to come back.

So, I think, definitively, it's clear, but, obviously, it can be a very sensitive issue when you talk to those who are part of it, because, for them, you know, this was something that they were fighting for, and a coup has a pejorative connotation.

MS. WITTES: Shadi, thanks. I wonder, as we look at where things stand today -- for those who went out into the streets, who were frustrated by the style of governance that President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood represented, who felt excluded -- and many of whom felt, I think, afraid for the future of Egypt's fragile democracy, given that majoritarian style of governance by the Brotherhood -- for those people, they decided, at some level, that it was okay to embrace the military's intrusion into the political sphere -- that that was worth the risk. I wonder if you can talk a little bit about what you see as the danger of this military intervention into politics, and why were these anti-Morsi movements willing to embrace that danger?

MR. HAMID: Well, I think as for why, I mean, we come at it as Western analysts, from a kind of detached, sometimes, academic perspective. If you're on the ground, then it becomes a more existential

thing.

And some of you may have seen this video that went viral. There's an opposition activist, a day before the coup, on TV. It's one of the most remarkable politics rants I've ever seen, and he's, essentially, going on about Morsi, and how terrible he is -- but he starts to shout, and he can't even keep on going. He starts coughing, he buckles down, and the presenters get so worried about his health that they tell him, "You have to stop." Apparently, he has health problems, so they said, "Your heart, your heart; Morsi isn't worth it."

But it's a remarkable thing, if some of you get a chance to see it. And for someone who's in the heat of the moment like that, he doesn't care about academic definitions or what the U.S. thinks; for him, the Brotherhood had to be stopped by any means necessary, because there was a real concern among liberal elites that the Brotherhood was going to change the very nature of the country -- its identity, the role of religion in public life, personal freedoms.

And these are very personal things. It's not hypothetical. These things affect how people live their everyday lives. So, I think it's understandable that it would become so personal.

But if you look on the other hand, the ordinary Egyptians who didn't necessarily have a problem with Islamism -- for them, it was

about economic concerns. They thought that democracy, as they understood it when the revolution happened, would improve their quality of life and their living standards. It didn't; their living standards got worse.

So, we can talk about the theory of people respecting democratic outcomes and electoral process, but, for many, there's an instrumental aspect to it -- that they believe that democracy will -- or, at least, should -- improve their economic wellbeing. And when it didn't do that, they began to lose faith in the entire process.

And, again, that's not unique to Egypt. These are classic conditions for military intervention where you have a breakdown of public order, economic deterioration, and it seems like the country is about to collapse. So, if that is what's at stake, it's a small inconvenience to bring the military in, right? Because you assume that, well, if the military behaves itself, it will return power to the people at some point in the near future. But what we do know is, it doesn't usually turn out that way.

MS. WITTES: Great, thank you. And I think that's a good point at which to transition to a comparative perspective on this issue. How does it turn out in other cases, and what can other cases tell us about the potential trajectory in Egypt?

Kemal, let me start with you, because many have talked about Turkey as a model for the Arab countries that are undergoing

political transition right now. And, of course, Turkey has not only a history, but, for a long time, it had an institutionalized role for the military in its democratic politics. But, even saying that, I doubt that a military coup to restore democracy was the Turkish model that people had in mind.

So, can you tell us a little bit about the Turkish example, and what Turkish history might indicate?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Well, thanks, Tamara. I feel a little bit embarrassed that I don't have many notes with me.

MS. WITTES: That's because you don't need them.

MR. KIRIŞCI: The way you described Turkey, Tamara, I can't help but suspect that Turkey was a separate chapter in the textbook that Shadi was referring to -- is a country who's had -- I don't know, Ted, what's the experience of Latin America, but probably the largest number of coups -- ironically, in an attempt to keep democracy rolling.

There is a large body of academic work that compares Latin American coups and the Turkish ones. What comes out of it is the way in which, on each occasion, the military would turn over power to the civilians.

However, Shadi was also saying how, for the millions who are out in the squares and the streets of Egypt, to associate what happened with a coup is a very sensitive issue. What is fascinating is that

when you look at the statements that have come out from the Turkish Prime Minister -- and opposition leaders -- is that, across the board, they consider it a coup in Egypt. And I would say there's a consensus over it, too.

And I think the reason for it is that Turkish society, looking back at the experience of a fully-fledged coup in 1960, '71, '80, and then the one in 1997 -- which is sometimes referred to as a postmodern coup, because tanks didn't roll out, the Parliament was suspended -- and then, much more recently, what they call the electronic coup -- the e-intervention -- when a statement appeared on the website of the general staff web for a few days, just before there was to be a presidential election where the current president would have been a candidate.

When they look back at all that experience, I think the one conclusion that is drawn from it is that these coups have not helped advance Turkey's democracy. And this is how they look at the Egyptian experience.

And it's interesting that, for all its ailments, for all its problems, they are pointing at the ballot box. And we must not forget that what happened in Istanbul, in Taksim Square and elsewhere -- all those protests -- had, to a certain extent, common agenda with those who protested against the Morsi government in Egypt -- that the people who

rolled out, at least initially at Taksim Square and elsewhere, were concerned about their liberties, about their private lives -- they felt it was too much intervention into their private lives, and, much more importantly, they were disturbed by this majoritarian understanding of democracy that you made references when you differentiated that with the substantive democracy.

But the moral of the story, I think, today, the way the political leaders are looking at what's happening to Egypt -- and I think the majority of the society is that, in Egypt, a coup took place, and it's highly likely that it is not going to benefit the advancement of democracy.

MS. WITTES: Now we've certainly heard critical statements from senior AKP members -- members of Turkey's ruling party. But are you saying that, across the board --

MR. KIRIŞCI: First of all --

MS. WITTES: -- in Turkey, they judge military interventions into politics as unhelpful in their own context?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yep.

MS. WITTES: Why is that?

MR. KIRIŞCI: A couple of reasons -- first of all, it was always politicians that suffered at the end of the coups. Some lost their lives. They were executed. And, to this day, I think that experience, after

the 1960 coup, remains as a huge black spot on Turkey's political history.

And then there were many politicians on those three occasions that ended up behind bars, and their political careers were undermined -- not to mention their lives being undermined, at times. And then on top of it, civilian people suffered, especially after the 1980 coup.

And it is only in the course of the last two, three years that Turkey, as a society, is revisiting what happened in 1980 -- and even taking the last remaining leader from that coup to the courts coming up.

So, in that sense, I think Turkey's way behind Latin America in looking back at experience, and drawing lessons, and trying to hold responsible those who perpetrated those. So, these are, I think, important.

And then, you know, if there was time and if there was interest, I could go into the details of it. Let me just give you one little example of the relic of the 1980 coup, and the way in which it is undermining Turkish democracy from progressing.

In 1983, just before the military turned over power to the civilians, they introduced a piece of legislation to govern elections in Turkey. And they introduced a 10 percent threshold. A political party that could not get a minimum of those 10 percent of the votes could not make it into the Parliament. The reason why this was introduced was, stability

was given a higher value than representation in the Parliament.

And although all kinds of political parties, including the one who's in power, have always promised that they're going to revise this threshold, they have not.

And I would argue -- my humble opinion is that one of the reasons why it looked like these protests in Taksim and elsewhere seemed to come out of the blue and caught the government by surprise is that this threshold has prevented the formation of a much more representative political party, where maybe voices for a more inclusive democracy could have been heard on the floor of the Parliament there.

So, I could go on forever, but I risk being chased out of here, you know.

MS. WITTES: Okay. Well, thank you. And I think the Turkish experience is instructive in many ways that I hope we'll be able to come back to in the course of discussion.

But the bottom line is, you're saying, although Turkish democracy has progressed, there are insidious long-term effects --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah.

MS. WITTES: -- that you see, and most Turkish politicians, in retrospect, judge the price to have been too high.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah.

MS. WITTES: And I think it's a challenging question -- you know, *the Wall Street Journal* had a remarkable editorial last week about events in Egypt -- at the end of which, they made a reference to the coup in Chile, and talked about General Augusto Pinochet as having shepherded Chile to democracy -- which I thought was just a fascinating revision of history.

So, Kemal, I want to thank you for putting that lesson back on the table.

And, Ted, let me ask you -- is that at all a legitimate understanding of coups in Latin America?

MR. PICCONE: I don't think most Chileans would agree. And it's worth remembering, in the Chile experience -- which is always a good place to start when you think about Latin America -- is that there was great turmoil in the streets, in Chile, under democratically elected Salvador Allende. It was a very fragmented political situation at the time.

Gas prices were going through the roof. There were food shortages. There was always a question about whether that was manipulated, to put pressure on Allende.

Bottom line is, the civilian politicians who were opposed to Allende invited the military to come in, and clear out the situation, stabilize it, with a view that it would be temporary -- and, 17 years later, you still

had Pinochet.

So, it's a very important reminder, the Chilean story, of how these things evolve over time. Once the military is given that kind of privileged place in government, it's very hard to move them aside. And, you know, we can talk a long time about Chile, but this is a common story throughout Latin America.

Now Chile did have experience with democracy before Pinochet arrived on the scene -- and, in fact, had a very volatile experience with democracy, which led you to Allende and then Pinochet. So, any transition to democracy is going to be full of volatility, street protests, all kinds of problems -- and that's just part of the game. I mean, it has to be managed, and I think that's one of the things that Latin America has learned, through a lot of very difficult experiences on how to do it.

If you think about Latin American history in the modern era and the volatility during the '80s and '90s, in particular, where it looked like, you know, every other day, there was some kind of coup. I mean, Bolivia has the longest history of overturns of civilian government.

But if you now look ahead, in the last 10 years, it has stabilized tremendously. I mean, yes, we have a coup -- a traditional, classic, military coup in Honduras -- and I would say I agree completely

with Shadi that, in Egypt, this is a textbook military coup. I mean, there is just no way around that.

So, when you think about Honduras, that's really an -- the recent case of Honduras -- an exception to the rule of, really, at least 10 to 20 solid years of civilian, democratic control of the military and civilian rule -- and even to the point where a number of military leaders who'd been involved in various episodes of military takeovers and whatnot -- human rights abuses -- are serving jail time.

I mean, there is tremendous improvement in basic rule of law standards and implementation -- independence of the judiciary in actually enforcing some of these rules.

But it was incredibly difficult. I mean, you even had -- and, again, going back to the civilian role in inviting military in -- sometimes, it is the authoritarian civilians that are undermining democracy in various ways.

In Peru, under Alberto Fujimori, you had a new phenomenon, called the *autogolpe* -- the self-coup -- in which he basically shut everything down -- suspended the constitution, closed the Congress, closed the courts, and said, "I'm now going to rule by executive decree."

And that caused a big uproar, and, eventually, he was forced out of power for a variety of reasons.

So, you do see in Latin America a more modern form of authoritarian democracy, you could call it. And President Hugo Chávez -- former President -- would be emblematic of that kind of leadership.

But I want to point out, in the Venezuela case, something very interesting. When he rewrote the constitution -- and there was a whole constitutional reform process -- they instituted a recall provision, which is unusual in a presidential system. But there's actually an ability for citizens to recall their president in the middle of his term.

So, you deal with -- and there were massive street protests, if you remember, in Venezuela. The energy industry shut down, went on strike. There were big problems.

And then there was a coup, and it was a combination of civilians and military in 2002 that came in, threw Chávez out -- suspended the constitution, closed the Congress, closed the courts -- and it lasted two days -- because the environment had completely changed in Latin America. This was not to be accepted or tolerated. And Chávez came back to power with even more authority and legitimacy.

But, again, you have to go back -- in the Egypt case, in particular. I mean, Morsi was elected through free and fair elections. We have what's called popular sovereignty; that's the essence of democracy.

So, once a government is elected into power, then they

should be allowed to finish their term. Now if there's a political crisis, then there needs to be managed under the rules of the game -- under a constitution that, hopefully, has impeachment provisions, has some way of dealing with these kinds of crises.

And I think for drafters of constitutions, it's really important to think about how to manage those crises.

MS. WITTES: Thank you. I want to come back to the engineering question about, how do you design a constitution or a system that -- if it's not necessarily coup-proof -- at least provides mechanisms for citizens to make their dissent felt.

But I think it sounds as though you were describing situations in which civilian politicians invited in the military in a way that was somewhat extraordinary. One of the things that's, I think, notable about the Egyptian case -- and, also, the Turkish case, the Indonesian case -- is that the military has long played a significant role in public affairs, in the economy.

In the Turkish case, the militaries were always actually enshrined in the constitution and in the country's democratic architecture, if you will. And you're saying, ultimately, that might be judged not to have been a good thing. But it at least prevented a situation where the military felt its own interests were under threat in the process of democratization.

In Indonesia, it took a decade or more before we saw the military really begin to step back.

So, in some ways, the role that the military is playing in Egypt today, given their actual weight in politics, in the economy, in society, maybe it's not that unusual or surprising.

Any thoughts on that?

MR. PICCONE: I would just think of a couple cases in Latin America where the military really has been completely relegated to the barracks, and does not have any constitutionally sanctioned or even popularly sanctioned role in politics.

Argentina comes to mind, in particular -- they were so thoroughly defeated in the Falklands War and lost so much face -- and, on top of that, of course, the Dirty War and the number of human rights abuses -- those prosecutions have gone forward. Military officers are in jail, and you had an assertion of civilian power, not only in general in the government, but over the defense establishment, specifically. And that continues to this day.

Now you take a country like Ecuador, and the military still plays a very important role in the economy and behind the scenes -- and, at various times, has emerged as a more overt player in pushing civilians -- one leader or another aside -- but they still play a very important role

behind the scenes.

MR. KIRIŞCI: And Turkey's experience is somewhat different, I think. We have to appreciate that, in Turkey, the military -- since Ottoman times -- was considered to be a modernizing force, and played an important role, both in the transition from the Empire into the Republic, and then, subsequently, in the following decades.

But the way that Turkish politics evolved is, as you rightly said, the military was always on the present, in that political/institutional setup -- on the right. It was written into the laws that they had the duty to protect Turkey not only against external threats, but, also, internal ones and protect the nature of the regime as a secular state, committed to the principles or the founding father of Turkey, Atatürk.

What is unlike maybe -- or from the Latin American experience is that, once Turkey evolved from a one-party system in 1946 to a multiparty system, and subsequently held a long series of generally considered free and fair elections at the national and at the local level -- mayoral level -- somehow, the military went along with it.

But there was always a kind of a straitjacket. You know, there were clearly defined boundaries to the limits of democracy in Turkey.

In the '60s, '70s, '80s, it was very much defined by the Cold War, and by the polarization of the world into two poles. From the end of

the Cold War onwards, the military took over the duty to protect Turkey from internal threats. What they defined to be internal threats was political Islam and Kurdish nationalism.

So, that explains their presence behind the scenes, and, sometimes, out in the streets, in the form of the postmodern coup of 1997.

What changed in the 2000s -- I think it's two very important developments -- interrelated developments -- is the European Union coming onto the scene, and the attraction of E.U. membership brought about dramatic changes.

Turkish democracy tore its straightjacket -- and, maybe first time in its history, began to toy with substantive democracy -- what I would call participatory pluralist democracy. Hand-in-hand, what came along was also economic development.

And in 2004, '05, '06, whenever a Turkish four- or three-star general would make some statement publicly that had something to do with politics or economics, the Turkish stock exchange would fall.

MS. WITTES: This is a fascinating point, because if, as Shadi was suggesting, economics are a driver in these transitional environments -- although probably not a deterministic driver -- you know, at what point does a society shift from a situation where, as some would argue, we faced in Egypt over the past year, where the elected

government was not making economic policy necessary to stabilize the economy, and the military maybe helped to correct for that?

And Turkey, you're saying, got to a point where it was the opposite -- where the militaries were always seen as destabilizing, and that had harmful economic effects.

So, somehow, there might be a role for the military as an enforcer of boundaries, as I think you put it, that a society might establish for electoral competition. But it's a question of how that's perceived by the society as a whole, by the markets, and by the international community.

Now the constitution that was adopted in Egypt last December was an object of intense controversy, both in its drafting and after its passage. And it's quite clear -- it was clear to many of us at the time -- it's quite clear in retrospect that that constitution did not provide a sufficiently broad basis of rules where all of the political actors in Egypt felt like they had a stake in the system, and, therefore, a group of them went outside that system.

So Egypt now -- if it's getting a do-over, if you will, in writing its democratic rules -- has to think about what kind of constitution can manage politics in what is clearly a divided society -- and, unfortunately, an increasingly polarized society.

Now some people might argue that you might want to take

the military's role and put it in the constitution, and maybe that could depoliticize it a little bit, so that it's got defined ways it can be involved that everybody can agree on. Others might say that the fix lies elsewhere.

And I don't know how many of you saw the op-ed in this morning's *New York Times* by Bruce Ackerman -- Ted, I want to ask you about this -- and Shadi, as well -- a noted constitutional law scholar here in the United States who said, "The way to deal with divided societies is not to have presidents -- because when you have one executive office, the election for that office is too high stakes, and it doesn't allow for representation. So, Egypt should have a parliamentary system, and that would fix the problem."

Shadi, I wonder if you can tell us -- now Egyptians went through a debate, didn't they, last year, after the revolution, about what kind of system they wanted, and whether to have a president -- or a weak president, or a strong president? What happened last year, and should they rethink this question?

MR. HAMID: Yeah. Let me just say a word first about the military; then I'll get to the parliament/president issue -- because I think, just listening to Kemal, a couple ideas came to mind.

In Egypt, you had a negative trend, where one of the only achievements of the Morsi presidency was seemingly pushing the military

back to the barracks -- last August, the kind of so-called countercoup. So, a lot of people were happy -- even Morsi antagonists -- because they said, "Well, finally, we're getting to where" -- I remember hearing this -- "we're getting to where Turkey is now 40 years before them."

So, there was a real sense that Egypt was really able to accomplish something.

What I worry about here is that the -- a role for the military as the guardian or the custodian is now being legitimized, and possibly institutionalized. Whenever there's a deep political crisis in Egypt -- not just this time, but next year, and four years -- there's always going to be a group of civilians who will look to the military to step in, and enforce the boundaries, so to speak.

And Egypt will probably have elections within six months, but even with this elected government, there's a risk of having an unelected military that has reserve powers, and is able to step in, and kind of restrict what's possible.

So, I think that, to me, is one of the most dangerous precedents. And how do you get the military out of that role once you legitimize it with the cheering millions who love and admire the military now in Egypt for stepping in? So, that's something we're keeping in mind.

The president/parliamentary issue's really important. And,

actually, if you look at the history of coups, the majority of them happen in presidential systems, not parliamentary systems -- for, I think, you know, obvious and intuitive reasons. Maybe Turkey is an obvious exception to that, but there's nothing more polarizing than a president of a certain ideological disposition in a divided society.

And that's why, you know, some of us were very much proponents of a pure parliamentary system in Egypt, as well as Tunisia, for precisely this reason -- and, also, because of the legacy of the kind of single figure, and how that person can very easily accumulate power through the office of the presidency.

But the reason why they settled on this kind of mixed system which still had a strong president is largely because liberals and non-Islamists were worried that, in a parliamentary system, Islamists would always win, because Islamists do better where they can compete in local districts, they have a better electoral machine, and there was a notion that, on a national election, it would be easier for liberals to win -- and it kind of didn't work out that way; an Islamist won.

And that's the same problem that you have in Tunisia now. Liberals are pushing for a mixed or even a presidential system, because they're worried that the Islamist party there, Ennahda, will do better than them in some way in parliamentary elections -- which is all

understandable, and, from their standpoint, it makes sense to try to balance against Islamists.

But what that led to is a kind of mixed system which kind of brought -- which was neither here nor there. It's confusing, and the dividing lines between Parliament's authority and the President's authority aren't clear -- and it was exacerbated by the fact that Egypt doesn't even have a real Parliament, and hasn't had one for a year. So, let's not forget that.

One of the reasons that Morsi was able to accumulate power was because there was no counterbalancing, legitimate legislative branch. So, we have -- and that's a whole different story about why the Parliament was dissolved in the first place.

MS. WITTES: Thank you, Shadi.

Ted, any response?

MR. PICCONE: I mean, that's a really important point -- going back to, what do you do when these crises hit? And the role of legislature usually encountering an executive grab or keeping the military out and solving the problem within the confines of the constitution -- you didn't have a Parliament.

But in theory -- and there's been a lot of writing about this in academia, about presidential versus parliamentary systems in Latin

America -- and a lot of effort maybe 10 years to really look again at the stability of parliamentary systems, and how do you move a presidential system into a parliamentary system -- and proves to be very difficult once it's entrenched.

But you do see better results from either hybrid or parliamentary systems in terms of political stability. One reason is because you have no confidence motions. You have forced negotiations in order for that Prime Minister to stay in power and to work with the other parties in finding some kind of negotiated solution. Presidential executive -- strong executive systems don't really open themselves to them.

MS. WITTES: So, you're saying, in essence, that parliamentary systems not only allow more different groups to be represented, but they also create more avenues for accountability in between elections.

MR. PICCONE: And crisis management.

MS. WITTES: And crisis management.

Kemal, Turkey is now debating whether to alter its system.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah, very interesting. You know, the Turkish parliamentary system, as I said earlier on, got going just after the Second World War. But I think because of what Shadi called this custodian and guardian role of the military, it took a long time for that system to be

internalized by the public-at-large.

And for it to be internalized, the emergence of a middle class was also very important. And the emergence of middle class, in an important way, didn't really start until the 1980s onwards. By the time we come to the 2000s and, coincidentally, with E.U. reforms, you begin to have a society that is starting to absorb and internalize the democratic system more and more -- one that looks substantive and pluralist.

But the unfortunate development in Turkey was that the opposition turned out to be very weakened, because of the past, the 1990s, corruption, problems to do with economics. You must recall that, in 2001, the Turkish economy hit the wall, and it was someone from Brookings that came in and saved at the time in the World Bank -- Kemal Derviş.

And the economy was put on track, but no opposition in the Parliament. The E.U. bowing out of the stage in Turkey's membership prospects created a situation where the ruling party became very dominant, and its Prime Minister became very dominant, and started to toy with the idea of a presidential system -- openly arguing that checks and balances are getting in the way of where he wants to take Turkey. And where he wants to take Turkey is, by and large, shared by the public -- make Turkey the 10th largest economy of 2023 -- but, more and more, in

an authoritarian fashion.

And what's fascinating -- just before the protests erupted, the ruling party held its own private get-together in a retreat, as you call it, here, in the U.S. And there, they studied public opinion polls on what the Turkish public thinks about a presidential system.

To the disappointment of the Prime Minister, not only, by and large, the public was uncomfortable with it, but those who were voting for AK Party were not very happy with it, either -- maybe at lower levels.

So, the immediate reaction of the Prime Minister was to turn and grill his own people, saying, "You did not do a good job in explaining to the public how great this presidential system is going to be" -- not making allowance -- a little bit like the military in the past -- not making allowance for the fact that the public might happen to have its own opinion -- might have reached the point where it can build and develop its own.

So, that's the -- but maybe one good thing that came out from the protests in Turkey is that it looks like the idea of a new constitution based on presidential system is out, lock, stock, and barrel, you know -- the baby and the -- yes.

MS. WITTES: That's one immediate consequence of the protests that we've seen in Turkey over the last month.

MR. KIRIŞCI: For the time being, yes.

MS. WITTES: For the time being. I want to come back in a few minutes to the point that you made about the European Union's withdrawal -- perhaps encouraging more authoritarian tendencies on the part of the Turkish president -- because it gets to a very interesting question about the role that outside powers can play in shaping these domestic political debates. And I think for U.S. policy right now, that is the key question -- does the U.S. have influence, what kind of influence, and how best to wield it.

You have all been very patient, though, and so I want to open up our conversation to this broader audience. Before I start taking questioners, let me recognize a few folks in the audience who are visiting here from Cairo. They are old friends of mine and of the Saban Center, and I'm very glad to welcome them -- and I'd be very interested if any of you -- Hasham, or Anis, or Omar -- have thoughts that you'd like to share, but this is -- Hasham Fakne, Anis Aclimandos, Omar Mahana, and a couple of additional colleagues from the American Chambers of Commerce in Egypt, in Cairo, who are in Washington just for a visit. So, any of you -- Anis?

And I apologize for putting you on the spot, but I have to take advantage of your being here.

MR. ACLIMANDOS: It is very pretentious on my part to

answer when you have scholars like this sitting on the podium, but I have a few exceptions with what has been said.

I think that Mr. Shadi Hamid used to work elite -- describing the people of the street. And I excuse him because he was not there, but there were people from all walks of life. If we have 33 million people in the Egyptian elite, we're doing very well. So, I'm sorry, but that was not true.

The other thing that I would say is, when you don't have a system, when you don't have a Parliament, when you don't have an impeachment process, you must behave differently.

I mean, there are things that force you to get out of the straitjacket you've been put in. And you have to look at an election as a contract between the elected and people. If you breach the contract, you're no longer legitimate.

So, I'm sure that if, in this country, Mr. Obama wakes up in the morning and puts himself above the law, saying that all his decisions are above the law and not questionable, you will have a major problem.

So, in the absence of a Parliament and the system that was sectarian at best, that -- I'm trying to select my vocabulary here, but if you have a system that is not all-inclusive, puts itself above the law, introduces parliamentary change of the constitutional amendments at midnight and have them ready by 6:00 in the morning, to make sure that nobody will be

able to change anything, what do you do?

So, I want to pick up on Mr. Kemal, too -- what you said about the military and the military intervention. You said, "Until the military proves that they can transfer the power to a civilian authority, you have a problem."

They have immediately transferred the power to a civilian authority. I mean, during the move itself, in the presentation of the movement, you had the opposition represented, all walks of life represented, and an army that is very clearly telling you that they do not want to keep the power.

And, actually, there is a government being formed right now where you have a Vice President, you have a Prime Minister, you have a Cabinet being formed.

But the army is not really in power. We can discuss *ad nauseam* the fact that maybe if the army did not protect the popular movement, it wouldn't have happened -- maybe. But I think that having that number of people on the street defeats that theory.

Thank you.

MS. WITTES: Anis, thank you.

Okay. Omar, would you like to add something briefly?

MR. MAHANA: In fact, Mr. Piccone, would it be fair to --

once you have a military in place, it's very difficult to remove them.

I think after January 2011, we had the military council, who had all the powers for 18 months, and they handed over the power to Mr. Morsi when he was elected -- so there are exceptions to that.

No one has the crystal ball that our friend (inaudible) has, but it remains to be seen. I think it remains to be seen. I think the Muslim Brothers' regime was a very authoritarian democracy -- and this was a fact.

The constitution that you had was sort of rushed up by a very specific group that represented only the Muslim brothers and their affiliates. From the minute the draft was ready, in two weeks, referendum was in place, and it was approved. It took -- I mean, I like very much the intervention of (inaudible), who addressed the Muslim Brothers, telling them that, 1,500 years ago, the prophet Muhammad -- it took him seven and a half months to lobby for the Medina Charter. And it took Morsi two weeks to approve his constitution.

So, I'm very optimistic about the future of Egypt. I think there is (inaudible). I think democracy will prevail. And it's true I don't have the (inaudible) here, but we saw it on the ground, and I think the Egyptian people proved that they move very fast, before we lost our identity.

MS. WITTES: Thank you. You know, I should note that our

colleague, Shibley Telhami, had a piece out last week in which he made the point that, whatever twists and turns this transition has taken and may take in the future, the one constant is the degree of mobilization in the Egyptian public. It's not unified. It points in different directions, but, twice now, the Egyptian public has demonstrated its ability to drive events. And perhaps that is a cause for long-term optimism about the trajectory.

And yet, as we've been discussing, institutions matter. So, let me get your questions now -- and we'll begin with you, please.

And -- sorry -- just to repeat our Brookings house rules -- please identify yourself, and please keep it to one brief question so we can get to as many of you as possible. Yes?

SPEAKER: Thank you -- (inaudible) from the Embassy of Egypt. To continue what you're saying -- I have questions, you know, based on what Shadi said -- on the textbook and definition of the coup -- how to describe what happened, uprising in 2011, you know.

It's also troubling the President and (inaudible). And continue on -- the U.S. opposition -- what's your comment on the idea that cutting aid -- calling for cutting aid to Egypt -- will actually influence the anti-sentiment of the Egyptian people towards U.S.?

MS. WITTES: Thank you. Okay. So, I think those are two interesting questions -- one about, well, if this was a military coup, what

happened on February 11, 2011?

And then, also, what might be the consequences of the U.S. government defining this as a military coup under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act?

Now, of course, in all those military interventions in Turkey, the U.S. never suspended aid, did it, Kemal?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Oh, it did.

MS. WITTES: It did?

MR. KIRIŞCI: It did, after the 1980 coup. The Council of Europe also suspended Turkey's membership, which was a major, major shock.

I'm willing to take the first question --

MS. WITTES: Please.

MR. KIRIŞCI: -- but the second one might amount to intervention in domestic affairs, so -- I think, from my point of view -- and from the point of view from where I think the Prime Minister and the other opposition leaders in a chorus, saying, "This is a coup," comparing it to 2011, the biggest and the most conspicuous difference is that this government came to power through fair and free elections.

Whether we like their policies or not, they had -- and I share your concerns and the observations you've made. Some of them look a

bit similar to what was going on in Turkey, too. But they were free --

MS. WITTES: Well -- and perhaps we can posit, for the purposes of the discussion, that one can be democratically elected and not govern in a democratic manner.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah, yeah.

MS. WITTES: Can we posit that, gentlemen? Thank you. Okay, go ahead.

MR. KIRIŞCI: That's what I want to come to. This is the dilemma. This is the dilemma. You know, you have the Muslim Brotherhood, whom a lot believe have a lukewarm attitude towards democracy. You have the West -- maybe this is interference in domestic affairs. You have a West -- United States, other countries -- who want to push democracy forward, and want to bring Muslim Brotherhood and other political Islamic movements onto the ship of democracy.

And then, you know, a development like the one in Egypt happens -- or the one that happened in 2006, in Palestine and Gaza Strip. And from one day to the other, the advocates of democracy change positions. And imagine the impact that that has on a movement which is divided in itself, too, about democracy -- question marks to do with democracy, as far as their position and understanding of Islam, et cetera goes, without going into the details of it.

I think this is the biggest challenge, and I think this is why, in Turkey, there is this consensus over what happened in Egypt being a coup and not helping the advancement of democracy.

That belief is a result that it will become even more difficult within the Muslim Brotherhood continuing to advocate the notion that we should continue to struggle, combat for democracy.

Those of you might recall how our Prime Minister went to Cairo in 2011, I think it was, and he made the speech where he said, you know, "I am a pious practicing Muslim, but I'm the head of a secular state." And I understand that wasn't particularly well-received.

I mean, this is going to be difficult to advocate. I think the challenge lies in there, but I also agree with what you said about our colleague who said, "This is a transition, and let's say the ship is going in the direction of democratizing Egypt. I think it will just make it more difficult if we take the Turkish experience as a reference point."

MS. WITTES: Okay. Let me make a brief comment on your second question, and then turn to Ted for his views on this, as well.

Now I think, while the semantics -- what label you use -- has political meaning in Cairo, it has political meaning in Washington, let's set aside the symbolism and talk about the substance.

I think, for the United States, the considerations here are not

only about its relationship with Egypt, how it might be perceived by Egyptians -- and let's be honest -- I think Egyptians on both sides of this political argument are unhappy at the United States government right now -- for different reasons. They both have theories about how the United States has betrayed them, so it may be that there's no-win situation for Washington on this policy choice.

But beyond the U.S./Egyptian relationship, there is a global concern here, and there's a precedential concern about U.S. policy. This is a law that was passed by Congress that applies globally. It's not about Egypt in particular. It's not about the Arab world. It's not about the Muslim world. It's about an American commitment to supporting democratic governments and withdrawing support when democratic governments are overthrown. So, in a sense, it's nothing personal.

Now should the United States -- and, as I'm going to ask Ted to talk about -- the United States has faced the choice elsewhere of whether to withdraw support from countries that are important strategic partners. And it's been a devilish choice. But part of the challenge for the U.S. here is whether to hold to its global commitments on democracy and human rights, or whether to set those commitments aside in this case because it's strategically important.

And I think that is a terribly difficult choice for the United

States. It's not a simple one, but it's one that, I think, goes well beyond Egypt.

Ted?

MR. PICCONE: Well, I mean, it's not just about the United States. Let's step back and face some facts, okay? A number of regions have seen coups and instability like this, and regional organizations have adopted provisions to deal with these situations.

The African Union has suspended Egypt as a member of the African Union because it has had this interruption in its constitutional order. The African Union adopted this provision because it was, in part, a way to protect incumbents who had finally come to power through free and fair elections and didn't want to be thrown out of power a year later. So, they said, "Well, let's get our neighbors to all agree that we're going to all react when there's an overthrow."

This is the same thing that happened in Latin America, which really led in this area in 1991, adopting resolution that said, "If there's a coup, we're going to all condemn it, and suspend the members, and we're going to take diplomatic steps to try to mediate and get this country back on the democratic path." And the African Union has now put a mediation team together that they'll send to Cairo.

Now is that going to make any difference? I mean, at the

end of the day, it's the national actors that have to work this through and negotiate a resolution. I mean, in the case of Egypt, if I recall correctly, Mubarak resigned. I mean, now you can say he was forced to resign; the military made him resign after all those protests.

But legally -- and I'm a lawyer by training -- I mean, what concerns me most about this whole story is that rule of law is being thrown out. What is the legal legitimacy of the current government in Egypt? It's not clear to me.

So, the --

MS. WITTES: Okay.

MR. PICCONE: -- existing constitution -- well, I mean, there is a general practice that we recognize the governments that have been freely and fairly elected. And this government -- that's not the case here.

So, it really does present an existential dilemma, and I think moving as quickly as possible to a legitimate regime is exactly what is happening now in Egypt. That's a very positive development. I think that should be noted. I mean, the fact that there's moving two special elections within a certain timetable -- that's a positive thing. That's a good thing. It's moving in the right direction.

MS. WITTES: Okay. And with all respect to our friends from Cairo, if I turned this into a debate between the two of us, it would be

unfair to the rest of the audience. So, I will come back to you, but not immediately.

MR. HAMID: Tammy, could I jump in, though?

MS. WITTES: Yes, Shadi, go ahead.

MR. HAMID: The first questions and criticisms seem to be directed towards me, so I should just respond briefly, if that's okay.

MS. WITTES: Please.

MR. HAMID: Yeah. So, when I talked about liberal leads, I was just trying to say that's one group. I also talked about ordinary Egyptians who are fundamentally concerned about economics. So, maybe that wasn't clear. But I do recognize that it was a very broad swath of Egyptians, and I tried to emphasize that.

That said, 33 million -- that number is factually incorrect. It defies everything we know about physical space and how physical space works. I don't know how that number came about, but that's actually very concerning that people use that number, because it becomes a war of crowds -- that who can bring out the most people onto the streets -- and it's a kind of street legitimacy.

You know, and as for the impeachment process, there was an impeachment process in the Egyptian constitution. It required a 2/3 vote of Parliament. So, that was actually there. That was there.

But I think the more important point here is, even if I agree that Morsi was an incredibly disappointing President -- he was the wrong man at the wrong time; there's no doubt about that -- but how bad Morsi was, in my view, has no bearing on the question of whether a military coup was justified -- because, again, he was freely and fairly elected.

To me, that has to be respected. And there was still a constitutional order that the opposition could work through. Parliamentary elections were coming up. They were going to be internationally monitored. So, there were avenues to express grievances. There were avenues for opposition. Those were not closed to the opposition, and I think it's very dangerous to set the precedent that when things aren't going well, or when you have a bad authoritarian-leaning leader, that you go outside of the political process. That sets a dangerous precedent for every time that that happens in the future.

And just to kind of -- not to go too long about this, but I think there's also the issue that now the current government in Egypt is actually more repressive in six days than Morsi's was in a year. If you look at the number of arrests of the opposition -- now the Brotherhood -- if you talk about the massacre on July 8 -- over 50 killed -- the shutting down of TV stations -- the list goes on -- and it's remarkable that that level of repression has been achieved in just a week.

So, if we really want to talk about level of repression, then we can certainly talk about this government. So, let's just try to be fair. But I take your point -- that Morsi was a very bad President -- but, for me, that's not relevant to the question of whether a coup was justified.

And lastly, I'll just say, do Islamists have the right to call for military coups in the future? Because that's what some liberal opposition leaders were doing.

So, I would just ask the questioners, do you acknowledge the right of Islamists to bring out millions into the street, and call for the military to intervene and conduct a coup? If you say no, you're not being consistent.

MS. WITTES: Okay. So, I think part of the challenge that we're getting at in this back-and-forth is, how do you translate the activity that's taking place in the street -- that mass mobilization -- into an institutionalized political system where all sides feel they have a fair shot at getting what they want or need?

I'm going to go way to the back for the next question, to Stan Kober, in the yellow shirt.

MR. KOBER: I'm Stanley Kober. I can't help but thinking of at least one other revolution -- Russia -- February 1917, a revolution -- democratic revolution. That fall, Lenin overthrew it. Initially, they called it

a coup -- realized a coup is not legitimizing -- changed it to the Great October Socialist Revolution.

But what followed? That wasn't the end of it. There came a civil war. It was only after the conclusion of that civil war.

Syria, we have a civil war. Is that the future if there's no agreement between coup and revolution?

MS. WITTES: Thank you. So, if I understand, Stan, your question -- you're saying, given the polarization, given the division over this set of events, how does Egypt avoid the fate of these other countries -- or, indeed, is its fate one of civil conflict?

Now, Shadi, you and I were having a conversation this morning about precisely that point. What do you think will shape the answer to that question -- whether Egypt is going to go down a road of civil conflict. We've heard some very upsetting, I would say, rhetoric from Muslim Brotherhood leaders about martyrdom for the cause. We've also heard some very upsetting indicators from those on the other side about the need to keep these guys out of the system.

So, how could Egypt avoid that fate?

MR. HAMID: Well, the key to that is finding a way to reincorporate the Muslim Brotherhood into the political process, but it's very difficult to envision what the sequencing of events there is -- because

the problem you have in Egypt now -- and this is endemic to any post-coup context -- is, you have dueling legitimacies. You have one part of the country that considers Adly Mansour the legitimate President, but you have the other part which considers Morsi the President. How do you resolve that?

Normally, you would do so through voting, or through elections, or through a political process, but there is none of that. And that's why there aren't clear mechanisms going forward.

I think what would have to happen here is, the Brotherhood would have to give up its legitimacy claims somehow. But the only way they're going to do that, in my view, is if they're given rock-solid guarantees about freedom of movement for their leaders. Their leaders would have to be released. They would have to have guarantees about a level playing field in elections. What happens if the Brotherhood wins a plurality in parliamentary elections? Would they be allowed to appoint a Prime Minister? They would have to be reassured about those sets of concerns.

Otherwise, they're not going to do it. And it's difficult for them to stand down now, because they had been using this inflammatory language about seeking martyrdom for legitimacy, and were willing to, you know, sacrifice and all of this. Once you use that language with your

supporters, it's difficult to step back and say, "Well, legitimacy is no longer worth dying for. We're going to have to give it up, and say Morsi is no longer the President."

Now it's not promising for the very simple reason that the military doesn't seem very interested in offering those guarantees. You can't have a negotiation if the leaders of the movement are all in prison. They would have to be released, as a starting point. And when the military is saying that the Brotherhood --

MS. WITTES: Well, that's an interesting point, Shadi -- sorry --

MR. HAMID: Yeah.

MS. WITTES: -- because in South Africa, of course, the negotiations took place largely while Mandela was still in custody, and his release came at the culmination of that negotiation.

So, it's not impossible, but I grant you that it sets a bar.

MR. HAMID: It's more difficult, let's say. Yeah.

MR. PICCONE: Can I jump in here?

MS. WITTES: Yeah, Ted; go ahead.

MR. PICCONE: There are two cases that come to mind. First of all, in terms of civil conflict, civil war, I'm surprised that no one has mentioned Algeria -- seems very relevant to this question -- the role of

Islamist politics, the role of the military. We saw what happened in that story.

Thinking about Latin America and dueling legitimacies, a very specific experience is, most recently, Honduras, where the elected President was thrown out of the country, and there was a succession procedure in place. So, I believe it was the head of the National Assembly became the Interim President, and they moved toward elections.

That created a legitimizing effect that, eventually, the next government was elected. Meantime, the guy who was thrown out snuck back in, and took up residence in the Brazilian Embassy.

And so there was a real competing legitimacy issue. The guy was physically present in the country and said, "I'm still President."

And, eventually, he left again, and he's come back into the country, but it just shows how polarizing the situation can be.

Haiti, of course, with Aristide -- remained a legitimately-recognized President of Haiti for three years in exile, before he was allowed back into the country. During that three-year period, the military ruled. And, of course, human rights abuses went up. It was a mess.

So, there are historical cases where we can say what happens, and it's usually not so good.

MS. WITTES: Kemal, anything to add?

MR. KIRIŞCI: You know, I don't want to take up time from questions, but let me just say, I do agree with Shadi's analysis, and I think there's a bigger picture there.

And the bigger picture is to incorporate political Islam into democratic politics -- and that's the larger challenge. So, what happens in Egypt is inevitably going to have repercussions on what happens on this issue beyond Egypt. And Ted has already mentioned the experience of Algeria. I don't think the two countries are similar, but that's a scenario out there.

MS. WITTES: Thank you. You know, maybe I'll just add one more point on this, which is that Shadi noted that the Brotherhood or other Islamist parties that may emerge would look for guarantees that they will have a role in the process.

I would imagine that those political parties that worked to oust Morsi would also be looking for guarantees that a return to the process by the Brotherhood would be accompanied by some rules that would prevent the kind of majoritarian politics that they saw this past year, that led them to feel excluded from the system.

And so, if you think about it in those terms, perhaps there's a set of *quid pro quos* that could be arrived at, through what would undoubtedly be a very torturous negotiation.

But I think that the search for that kind of inclusion is ultimately the answer to Stan's question.

Let me take a couple more from the back. And what I'm going to do, since our time is short, is, I'm going to take three in a row, right back here, and then we'll come back to the panel.

So, yes, please. Yes -- in the corner. Mm-hmm.

SPEAKER: I am (inaudible), with the Pakistan American League. Our friend mentioned about political Islam.

I think political Islam is much better than military Islam. So, let's not transform this political Islam to political Islam -- and that can happen if military becomes a part of it.

This is the first time in the history of Egypt after King Farouk was overthrown that somebody (inaudible) a country who did not come from uniform. Every ruler was (inaudible) ruled autocratically in Egypt. And they never had experience for democracy.

I agree (inaudible) that he was not a President who could really and aggressively help the country of crisis, but he was elected democratically.

I think it's important --

MS. WITTES: Is there a question? I'm sorry.

SPEAKER: Yes, yes; certainly. My question is that this kind

of precedent, when the military becomes a party, and the people who are actually (inaudible) -- they are being put in jails. How can you expect fairness? And in this absence of fairness and absence of honesty, how can you expect peace and stability in a country?

MS. WITTES: Okay, thank you. And there are two gentlemen right by the back door that had their hands up. We'll just take them each -- if you could both please be brief. Thank you.

SPEAKER: I'll try to be brief. What organization in Egypt can maintain stability, if not the military? And the military here -- you always talk about it as a force, as opposed to the most significant economic institution in the country, representing somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 percent or more of the commercial economy.

One other thing I'd like to ask, and that is: Isn't there a different analogy? And that is the United States analogy -- where we had a revolution. We had the original colonies coming together. They established an initial government that was going in a very loose confederacy, and it changed direction. And they (inaudible) established the Constitution.

And, like Egypt, I would submit, the different important political and social issues that were not being implemented initially were brought into that, in the Articles of the Constitution.

MS. WITTES: Okay, a good reminder that the United States had 13 years of a failed experiment before we ended up with the Constitution we have today.

Yes?

MR. AK: Mohammed Ak, the pro-democracy Egyptian-American -- I'm asking about the guarantees to the Brotherhood and other Islamic parties -- or even other parties.

MS. WITTES: Just hold that microphone right up to you -- yeah, thank you.

MR. AK: Who can provide the guarantee, and who is going to validate this guarantee? The U.S. is definitely not, so who else can be a fair negotiator between the parties?

MS. WITTES: Okay, thank you. So, we have a series of questions here, basically about, how do you -- even if you get a political agreement, how do you enforce it? And doesn't the military have some role in providing public order, and being that of enforcer, given that it's already, in essence, an 800-pound gorilla in the system?

So, I think we've talked about that a little bit. There are up sides and down sides, but I'd be very interested in thoughts as we ask you not only for responses to these, but, also, for your closing comments, since we're coming up on our time.

Also, in terms of U.S. policy, given that, at this stage, the United States's closest remaining relationship is with the Egyptian military -- what leverage does that give the United States, and how best should it use it?

Why don't we start with Shadi, in Doha?

MR. HAMID: Okay, sure. I think one of the questioners made a really good point -- that, you know, if we have to choose, political Islam is better than militant Islam.

And it's worth emphasizing -- Kemal said this already -- that this is going to have a negative effect on how some Islamists look at the democratic process. I think, at least in the short run, the Brotherhood will be able to impose discipline on its own members. The Brotherhood is generally good at doing that.

My concern, though, is independent Islamists -- ordinary Egyptians who are angry about the coup -- Salafi groups, fence-sitters -- and you really have to wonder, what keeps them in the system, if they're saying now that there's no place for Islamists -- that Islamists will not be allowed to win.

And you already see radicals using this narrative to their advantage, and I think it's going to have appeal with some Egyptians and some Arabs across the region. And their argument will be, "We told you

so -- that democracy is not a way to push the Islamic project, because the world will stop you, liberals will stop you" -- whoever in the conspiracy theory, whatever -- that violence is the only way.

So, people really have to be aware that this is a dangerous, dangerous message. And already, we saw the effects of that. It's amazing to me that the night of the coup, there was a video of a crowd in Sinai, and they were chanting, "No peace after today" -- but not just that -- "No elections after today," suggesting that they had tried elections; elections didn't work for them, because they were annulled, effectively. So, a different path has to be embraced.

The fact that happened so quickly, and the response is so direct, is even more than I would have expected.

On the issue of the fair negotiator, this is a problem. Who enforces the guarantees? It's interesting that in an interview the other day, a Muslim Brotherhood leader suggested Turkey as a third-party facilitator, but, of course, liberals won't accept that because they see, rightly, that the AK Party is sympathetic to Morsi and the Brotherhood. So, that's not going to work. The U.S. clearly doesn't want to play that role, and Egyptians wouldn't want it.

So, I guess it's going to have to be directly with the military, and with liberal and non-Islamist groups. They're just going to have to

manage it amongst themselves. I don't know how that looks -- and perhaps those have expertise in negotiation could maybe come up with some ideas. But, as Tamara said, it's going to be torturous. These negotiations will be very, very difficult.

And lastly, on the point of U.S. policy, the U.S. does still have leverage with the Egyptian military. And that leverage, in my view, should be used. But I think it sends a very negative message when we say, essentially, that even when the Egyptian military does the one thing that they probably shouldn't do according to U.S. law -- even then, the aid will continue to flow.

What is the message there? The message there is, there's no way that the U.S. will ever suspend aid to the Egyptian military. There's literally nothing they can do, short of canceling Camp David, which would push the Obama administration to suspend aid.

So, that means we don't have leverage. Leverage only works if the recipient group feels that there might be something to lose if they don't meet a certain set of democratic standards. They clearly don't believe that there is anything to lose, so I think we have to kind of, you know, think about how we understand leverage.

If we don't use leverage, if you don't use conditionality, then you're effectively giving up your leverage. So, I think the way forward that

seems very sensible to me is that you have a suspension of aid according to U.S. law now, and then if and when free and fair elections that are inclusive are held within the next year, then aid can be resumed. That would be a positive incentive structure for the Egyptian military. They care about the relationship with the U.S.

You know, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates can step in with $12 billion, but they can't step in in terms of the military-to-military relationships, the provision of equipment, the prestige aspect. No one can do that now, except the U.S., so let's use that leverage.

MS. WITTES: Shadi, thank you.

Kemal?

MR. KIRIŞCI: I think the elections that had taken place in Egypt were very critical, because it was the beginning of a new phase, of a new process -- one that I believe was going to take a very, very long time.

When you look at the experience of Europe, with democracy, and look back at it, you see how long it took. And Europe came to where it did in the last 56 years. But there is a whole background to it in the economic, political, intellectual sense of the word.

As I say these things, I can't help but think of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and *the Social Contract*. And I feel that, at the very early

stages, this process has been interrupted -- and we see the dilemmas and the difficulties it has created, in terms of drawing the parties back to the game.

It's a little bit like a soccer game -- you know, it takes a while to lay down the rules, and then you have to stick to the rules to be able to advance.

And it is not an easy exercise. I mean, I just thought about it. I was born in the year when the third election took place in Turkey -- 1954. And I really thought that I was going to see pluralist democracy in Turkey, and, for a moment in the mid-2000s, I thought it was there.

But it didn't last that long, so you have to keep working on it. And maybe what one can draw from the lessons of what happened in Turkey in June -- and continues to happen again -- is that maybe this is an exercise in trying to re-lay down the course of the big ship of democracy, and one in Turkey where, hopefully, the country will move from a majoritarian understanding of democracy -- which is very much reflected in the idea that whoever comes out of the ballot box has the right to shove it down the others' -- the minorities' -- throats the policies it prefers.

But what happened last month, I think, reminded the government -- I think, reminded the Prime Minister, too -- this is not possible. And off we will go, I suspect, through another good 10 years,

unless the European Union can come back and say in a convincing manner -- and a bit like the dilemma in Egypt with the Brotherhood, most of the Turkish public is not going to buy what the E.U. says on its face value. So, it will be a long exercise.

I want to end by saying that I watched the Congressional hearing on Turkey and on what happened in Turkey in June. I was fascinated by a Congressman -- Mr. Meeks, I think it was -- how he drew parallels between the way in which it took such a long time to arrive at a relatively more pluralist democracy, substantive democracy in this country. He looked back at the 1960s.

So, my moral of the story here is, this is a long exercise. And, in some ways, it's frustrating, because those of us who are in the midst of it want things to move along very quickly, and in a very decisive manner. And this is not going to be the case.

MS. WITTES: Thank you.

Ted?

MR. PICCONE: Well, just very briefly -- I agree with Shadi about using U.S. leverage. We need to use it, if we're going to have any credibility in terms of our global democracy policy. And we have to call a coup a coup, and take steps to try to restore the democratic process to the extent we can from the outside.

And I think that's a very small piece that we have to play, but we have something. And we should work with the African Union and others, in some kind of multilateral effort to do that.

I would just say, you know, political crises like this are inevitable. And so planning ahead so that the next time, it can be managed in a way that doesn't cause a rupture in the constitutional or legal order would be important.

So, in the writing of the next constitution, in Egypt or any other country, there really needs to be some hard thinking about how to deal with this. And I know there is an impeachment provision, and the legislature had been suspended. So, what are you going to do now?

So, is there a scenario where the judiciary, maybe, should be appealed to when the legislature is not in power, and there's this kind of crisis?

There needs to be a very clearly spelled-out succession step so that it's not the military steps in, but someone who's already been designated by the office.

And there needs to be strict prohibitions against coups, and there needs to be punishment for it.

MS. WITTES: Thank you.

Well, I'm going to close us out with a saying that I think

Kemal's remarks get at -- but all of us who study the difficult process of democratization, I think, understand a saying that comes from 1960s America -- keep your hands on the plow; hold on.

So, thanks very much to all of you. I know we'll have a lot more to talk about as Egypt continues to evolve.

Thanks for joining us.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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