THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY:
HOW FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT TOOK THE UNITED STATES INTO WORLD WAR II

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. INDYK: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thanks very much for joining us today on the eve of July 4th weekend. Hope the weather improves. Welcome to Brookings. I'm Martin Indyk, the director of the Foreign Policy Program here at Brookings.

We're delighted today to have the opportunity to host the book launch of one of our former Senior Fellows, now a Nonresident Senior Fellow, Michael Fullilove. His book, *Rendezvous with Destiny: How Franklin D. Roosevelt and Five Extraordinary Men Took America into the War and into the World*, is published today, and it has actually come out in Australia a little earlier, to rave reviews, and I'm quite sure the reviews will be positive and interesting here, because it is a really good read and a fascinating dive -- deep dive -- into history from a different angle, the focus on the special envoys, the five special envoys that Franklin Roosevelt, who was immobilized and unable to travel except in extraordinary circumstances -- how he used those envoys to sidestep the State Department and to build the relationships and position the United States for the policy that he sought to pursue of taking America into the Second World War. And as Michael will explain, that changed the course of history, as we know, in very dramatic ways and, in particular, changed the role of America in the world in very dramatic ways.

And so this story is a fascinating one in itself, told beautifully by Michael in a way that takes you into the rooms where the decisions were being made and the conversations were being had that shaped the course of history. But it also has, I think, important lessons about statecraft, about the way in which presidents, with great difficulty, nevertheless can turn the American Chief of State in new and profoundly important directions; and therefore it has relevance for today as well.

Michael Fullilove is the director of the Lowy Institute for International

Policy in Sidney, Australia, where he does a great job of leading that institution, which has become, under his leadership, the premier think tank on international policy in Australia. He, as I said, was formerly here s a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Program. He previously directed the Global Issues Program at the Lowy Institute and before that was advisor to Paul Keating when he was prime minister of Australia.

His previous book was a memorable one as well. It was a book on the greatest modern speeches in Australian history, published by Random House in 2005.

To discuss Michael's book in a conversation with the author, we are delighted to welcome back to the podium Kurt Campbell. Kurt is currently the CEO of the Asia Group and co-chairman of the board of the think tank, which he founded, the Center for New American Security. But he is probably better known to all of you as the just-retired Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, a position he held for the first four years of the Obama administration. He was critically important and played, I think, a pivotal role -- if I could use that word -- in the development of President Obama's strategy of pivoting the United States toward Asia. And in that context, it will be particularly interesting to learn from Kurt about the lessons that can be drawn from Michael's *Rendezvous with Destiny*.

Kurt, in that position, received the Distinguished Service Award. I point that out, because I, too, received that award, so I know how difficult it is to achieve it. (Laughter) But I got it for the Hebron negotiations, and nobody could possibly remember the Hebron negotiations. But I dare say everybody will remember the role that Kurt Campbell played in the shaping of American strategy toward Asia. And so it is with great distinction we receive that award.

As I said, he was the co-founder of the Center for New American Security, a great new think tank that is doing terrific and influential work on national

security policy and defense policy here in Washington. Before that, he was the senior vice president and director of the International Security Program and the Henry A. Kissinger Chair at CSIS, the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And he's also held positions at the Kennedy School, and he was director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. So, he has a distinguished pedigree before he served in the government.

So, without further ado, I welcome Michael Fullilove to the -- his *Rendezvous with Destiny*.

MR. FULLILOVE: Martin, thank you for that very nice introduction. I'm delighted to be here at Brookings, an institution of which I am extremely fond.

As Martin said, I came to Brookings for a couple of years to watch President Obama win the Democratic nomination and then win the presidency, and I've been very proud to maintain my association with the Institution since then as a non-resident Fellow, and it's great to see a number of my Brookings colleagues in the room. Thank you very much for joining us.

Thank you to those who've come from outside Brookings, braving the rain today and showing great Australian fortitude in doing that. I know you're mainly here to see Kurt, but thank you anyway.

I'm delighted to be on the stage with Martin Indyk and Kurt Campbell, two friends and colleagues of mine of longstanding. Martin is a member of the Australian Diaspora. I know he's an American citizen and a high U.S. official, but he's still claimed by us. Kurt is a much admired policymaker in my part of the world. Of course we recognize very much and appreciate his role in the rebalance, but his association with the region goes back many, many years indeed. And both Martin and Kurt are connected with the Institute. Martin is one of my board members, and Kurt will be joining us later

this year as our inaugural distinguished international Fellow. So, I'm honored very much by Martin's invitation and by Kurt's agreement to participate.

Importantly, both Martin and Kurt are members of the Australian lobby. Now, I know there are many lobbies in Washington, but let me tell you, nothing is as insidious and seductive as the Australian lobby. We are dedicated to manipulating influential people inside the Beltway to the point where they acquire an interest in Cricket, a laconic sense of humor, and a laid back approach to life. (Laughter) We are very, very dangerous. (Laughter) Ladies and gentlemen, books should be written about the Australia lobby. (Laughter)

I'm also pleased to say that our leader, the leader of the Australia lobby, Ambassador Kim Beazley, is in the audience. So, thank you very much, leader. (Laughter)

Ladies and gentlemen, in the last couple of years, I've had a break from my duties at the Australia lobby to write this book, *Rendezvous with Destiny*. And I wanted to write about this topic for three reasons. The first is that I believe that FDR was the greatest statesman of the 20th century. He saved American democracy from the Great Depression. He led the allies to victory over the dictators. He won four consecutive presidential elections. And he did all this with a broken body. He was also a seductive, effervescent figure. Churchill said that meeting Roosevelt for the first time was like opening your first bottle of champagne. And let me tell you, when you spend a number of years writing a book about someone, it matters that they're likable, because you are with them for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. So, that was a not-insignificant factor in my choice.

Secondly, I wanted to write about this topic, because I have always thought that the period I write about -- which is the two years between the outbreak of the

European War in September 1939 and American entry to the war in December 1941 with the attack at Pearl Harbor -- was the turning point of the 20th century. In these two years, the disposition of forces in the world changed utterly, and by the end of this period the coalition that would inevitably, ultimately defeat the dictators -- that is, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the British Empire -- that coalition was in place.

And just as importantly, it's in these two years that America is transformed from a nervous, isolationist middle power into a global leader. And of course America emerges from the war that it enters after Pearl Harbor as the most powerful country in the world. In a real sense, this two-year period is the start of the American century in which we're still living.

And thirdly and finally, I wanted to write the kind of history that I like to read, which is not just about vast, impersonal forces but is about individuals with great Olympian strengths and enormous fragilities and colorful weaknesses. And I was particularly interested in how they interacted with those bigger forces.

When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, Americans were very anxious to isolate themselves from the conflict. In fact, only 1 in 40 Americans favored a declaration of war against Hitler when Germany invaded Poland, even though Hitler was plainly a clear and present danger to American interests as well as European interests.

FDR wanted to help the democracies in their fight against the dictatorships, but he was hemmed in by congressional and public opposition. Roosevelt's extraordinary achievement was to navigate these constraints and move a divided and hesitant America toward ever greater involvement in the war. Within two years, America had rearmed and remobilized. A torrent of Lend-Lease aid was flowing eastward to Churchill's Britain and Stalin's Soviet Union, and the United States was waging an undeclared naval war against Germany in the Atlantic. By the time of

Pearl Harbor in December 1941, America's course was set for global leadership.

In these two years, in other words, America turned. But how did it turn so quickly? How did FDR come to have such faith in the ability of Britain and the Soviet Union to withstand the force of the axis attacks? How could Roosevelt obtain the intelligence he craved and take the measure of Churchill and Stalin when he was trapped in a wheelchair in Washington?

FDR had enormous mistrust for the department that Martin and Kurt worked for -- the State Department. In fact, after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt was said to have joked that, "My State Department is neutral in this war, and I hope it remains that way." (Laughter) He regarded most U.S. diplomats and cookie pushers and conservatives in striped pants. The ambassador reports he received from Joe Kennedy and others were invariably defeatist in time. So, instead, he turned to five associates, only one of whom had any background in international affairs, and sent them on special missions to Europe.

First off the mark was Sumner Welles, a chilly patrician, described by *Time Magazine* as a casting director's dream of a diplomat. Welles was eventually railroaded out of the State Department for making homosexual advances to African-American porters on the President's train, which is probably inadvisable even today. (Laughter) But Roosevelt sent Welles around Europe in the spring of 1940 during the so-called Phony War before the great armies of Europe had really locked horns, meeting with Mussolini in Rome, Hitler in Berlin, the leaders of the Third Republic in Paris, and Neville Chamberlain's government in London.

At this point, Roosevelt was looking for ways to help the British and the French, but he had not yet settled on an effective policy. But by the late summer of 1940, a couple of months later, the world had changed utterly. Hitler had unleashed his

blitzkrieg; France had fallen; and only Britain and her empire remained standing -- and who knew for how long.

Now, Wild Bill Donovan, Republican war hero, lawyer, adventurer, and future spymaster, of course the founder of the OSS -- if you go out to Langley you'll see a bronze statue of Wild Bill in the foyer -- now, Donovan visited a lonely Britain at the President's behest to determine whether it could hold out against the Nazis. And Donovan's report helped convince FDR that this was a country worth backing.

A few months after that in November 1940, Roosevelt won an unprecedented third term as President, and his war policy toughened further. He threw a lifeline to Britain in the form of Lend-Lease, and he dispatched three men to help secure it. The first was presidential confidant, Harry Hopkins, the scruffy, sickly social worker, son of a saddle maker from Sioux City, Iowa, who became the whirling dervish at the center of the New Deal, who went to have dinner with FDR on the night that Hitler invited the low countries. Roosevelt invited him to stay the night, and he ended up living in the White House for most of the next three and a half years. And Roosevelt sent Hopkins to explain Lend-Lease to Churchill. He thought that opposites attract, and this was the perfect person to explain this incredible program of aid to Churchill.

One of my favorite stories was -- and I might read it from the book -- was that Churchill immediately saw the importance of Hopkins to British life, so he (inaudible) Hopkins up and down the length of the British Isles trying to impress him with the British spirit. But Hopkins was quite laconic and careful in the comments he made until finally Churchill had a private dinner for Hopkins and Churchill gave one of his rousing speeches and asked Hopkins to say a few words. And Hopkins, who was a very frail and unwell person got up and his face was white and drawn. He said, "Mr. Chairman, I'm not making speeches over here. I'm reporting what I see to Mr. Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

my President, a great man, a very great man. But now that I'm here and on my feet, perhaps I might say, in the language of the Old Book," -- and here he paused and looked straight down the table at Churchill, "Whither thou goest, I will go and where thou lodgest, I will lodge. Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God." And then he lowered his voice and said very quietly, "Even until the end."

So, Hopkins was the first of these envoys. The second was Averell Harriman, an ambitious, handsome railroad heir and banker, who was charged with delivering the aid to London. He also found time while he was in London to romance Winston Churchill's daughter-in-law, Pamela Churchill, whose husband was off fighting in Egypt. And years later -- many of you will know that Pamela had a very extensive romantic career throughout the 20th century (laughter), and she later married Averell and transformed herself into Pamela Harriman, socialite, fundraising queen, and mentor to President Clinton, who appointed her as ambassador to France. And Pamela died at a great age, swimming laps at the Ritz Hotel in Paris, which is, personally, the way I want to go myself when my time comes. (Laughter) And the Ritz was Sumner Welles' hotel in Paris when he was on mission. So, one of the great things about writing histories like these is you find these circles that close.

Roosevelt even put to work his rumpled, charismatic opponent in the 1940 presidential election, Wendell Willkie, the Indiana dynamo, a great forgotten figure, actually, of the 20th century and of the Republican Party, a great internationalist at a time when all the Republican leaders were isolationists, whose visit to London and Dublin was a public relations triumph, lifting British morale, winning over wary Americans and edging the Republican Party away from isolationism.

The Willkie mission showed Roosevelt's great genius for turning other people to his purposes. Willkie didn't want to be seen as Roosevelt's envoy. He wanted

to be seen as his own man. He wanted to retain his political possibilities for the next presidential election. But Roosevelt was too clever for him, and he invited him to the White House before he went to London, and when he was talking to Willkie he pulled out a sheet of White House stationery and he wrote this letter. It was a letter to Churchill and he asked Willkie to deliver it to Churchill, and the letter went like this:

"Dear Churchill,

Wendell Willkie will give you this. He is truly helping to kick politics out over here. I think this verse applies to your people as it does to us.

'Sail on, O Ship of State!
Sail on, O Union strong and great!
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate!'

As ever yours,
Franklin Roosevelt."

And so poor Willkie was transformed from a really substantial national political figure into an errand boy for the man who had beaten him. (Laughter) And of course Churchill latched onto this letter and quoted this letter in speeches that he gave back to the United States. And the letter itself and the Longfellow poem that Roosevelt was quoting became a metaphor for the Anglo-American relationship.

And then, finally, in summer 1941, Hitler let the dice fly, and he ordered the invasion of Russia. And, again, it was the frail Harry Hopkins who dominated proceedings, returning to Britain to confer with Churchill and making a death defying journey to Moscow to meet with Joseph Stalin. Hopkins' mission gave Roosevelt the

confidence to gamble on aiding the Soviet Union against the advice of most of his counselors. He provided a character reference for Russia just as Bill Donovan had earlier provided one for Britain.

In late 1941, in August, Roosevelt and Churchill met for the first time as leaders at the Atlantic Conference, the extraordinary meeting at sea, at which the modern Anglo-American relationship was initiated and plans for aiding the Soviet Union were decided. And this represented the consummation of a long-distance relationship that had been sustained through the labors of the special envoys, especially Harry Hopkins who was present at the climax.

Of course on the 7th of December 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, America declared war on Japan, Hitler declared war on America, and, finally, America was in the war. FDR was a war President.

FDR, I think in a very real sense -- I mean, people will often say that the Japanese took America into the war, and of course that's true in one sense. But, in a truer sense, in a deeper, more important sense, I think FDR and his representatives had taken America into the war. And by defeating domestic isolationism and later foreign enemies, they also took America into the world.

Martin, I might end with one final story, which goes to the question of alliances. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Churchill told Roosevelt that he wanted to come to Washington to confer with America, which was now formally allied to Britain. And these were much less formal days. So, Roosevelt accommodated Churchill and most of the entourage in the White House itself, and they were knocking around in the residence with Eleanor and Eleanor's lady friends and Franklin's assistants and Harry Hopkins, who was living down the corridor, and one day Roosevelt had something to tell Churchill. And so he wheeled himself into Churchill's bedroom at the White House, and he was horrified to

find Churchill had set up or caused to be set up a bathtub in the middle of the bedroom. And as some of you will know Churchill had unusual personal habits. And he was horrified to find Churchill sitting in the bathtub having a bath, because it was mid-morning. And Roosevelt was a bit prudish about these kinds of things, he was horrified, he started to wheel himself out. But Churchill supposedly rose like a sea monster from the bathtub (laughter) and he stood before Franklin naked, plump, pink, and dripping. Unashamed, Churchill declared, "The prime minister of Great Britain has nothing to conceal from the President of the United States." (Laughter)

I believe in alliances and special relationships, Martin and Kurt, but any alliance can be too close. (Laughter) And I think that is too close.

MR. INDYK: Thank you, Michael that was terrific. I thought you were actually going to conclude by saying, you know, if the alliance could withstand that experience, it could withstand anything.

Kurt, please.

MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you. Thank you, Martin. It's wonderful to see such a great group of people here today, and it's a reminder of how important books still are, and I want to pay homage to Lord Master Ambassador Ken Beazley, the head of our secret society of the secret U.S. Australian and thank Martin for the invitation.

I just want to begin by saying that everything about this book and this event has just really pissed me off at a very fundamental level. (Laughter) And I'll just begin. So, about three months ago -- I'd been talking to Michael about this book for a couple of years and, you know, he said, look, I'm writing about -- I said, you know, why don't you write about something that you know more about, that's closer to home, like dingos or rugby or the Coral Sea, you know (laughter), kind of little bit, you know, a little -- you know -- I said, you know, this is a big topic, are you sure? And he said, no, I'm sure.

So a couple of months ago someone said, look, why don't you be prepared to discuss this book. And I remember thinking at the time, isn't there anyone else? When something comes up on Australia I get a call. Is there anyone else in Washington who also does Australia? Why do I always have to do the Australia things. I do other countries as well; I do other countries well. So, he said no, no, you should do this. I said, okay, so I'll do it. So, they sent the book to me. And I love books. I read a lot of them. When I was think tanks I supported writers in residence programs. Very proud of the books that came out of those efforts. And so I like every -- I take a look at every aspect of it.

So, immediately I did not like this book because of how much was great about it. (Laughter) I loved the -- I loved the cover. And if you have a chance to take a look at the blurbs, these blurbs are unbelievable. Many of these people are dead. (Laughter) He's got a great one from Stalin, like, you know. (Laughter) But they're some of the best imaginable blurbs. And so about two months ago I had set it aside for a while. I said, well, I'm actually going to have to read this. And I then started to read it and literally, at the very outset of the book it grabs you, because it is a depiction of the moment in which basically the war begins in Europe. And it shows you, quite literally, Roosevelt on his steel cot with all the things around him -- old newspapers and bottles of Aspirin and the like, and from that point on you are completely hooked.

If you look at any bibliography of the -- historiography of the United States, you'll find that two periods in time receive the most attention. One, obviously, is the Civil War -- you know, volumes and volumes about both Lincoln and the role of the generals -- and secondly is the period during the Second World War and that period immediately thereafter. What was astonishing to me when I first saw this book and talked to Michael about the proposition about it, I would have thought that there

would be a number of treatments about those lieutenants around the President in 1939 and 1940 that helped basically develop the internationalist consensus and the decision to go to war. But, surprisingly, there is no such effort. And so what Michael has found in this remarkable literature of the Second World War is a wonderful story that has not yet been told. And what I loved about it -- anyone who's read Evan Thomas' and Walter Isaacson's *The Wise Men*, this in many respects is the companion piece. It is the prequel of the group of men that designed the institutions and the framework of the post-World War II world.

But in many respects, this book is more interesting; and in that respect it is similar to the wonderful trilogy about the American military during the Second World War. So, *An Army at Dawn*, which is basically about the U.S. military before these giants become giants -- Eisenhower and Marshall -- they're young men making enormous mistakes early on the battlefield. This is a comparable story of the United States' tentative, uncertain venturing out on the playing field. And what I loved about it -- and I want to say just quite directly, I love this book. I try to read about or two a week. This is the best book I've read in probably two or three years. It's that good, and it really pisses me off. (Laughter) And I left --

MR. INDYK: What pisses you off, that you didn't write it or --

MR. CAMPBELL: Everything. Everything. I didn't write it. I did support it. I don't get to go on the book tour. I mean, just this -- I have a typical Washington response to it, Martin, at every possible level. It's that good.

And what I really didn't like about it was how important it was for me read this having just left the State Department, and let me tell you why, because what's great about this book is that it captures -- at the outset, Michael describes how historians and others talk about Roosevelt as a heavily forested interior. He's an almost impossible man

to get to know, right? And so what Michael has done is not try to focus too much on the unknowable Roosevelt, right? And he truly is fundamentally unknowable, this whole, you know, depiction of him flying of the sphinx saying, ah, the sphinx, I know you -- you know, kind of this idea of how difficult he was to penetrate.

What you see him through is the lens of these five incredibly dynamic men, all as powerful as you can imagine but all yearning to be part of the action. Ironically, all of them -- despite their remarkable successes, they all wanted to be part of the action. They were all insecure. They all desperately wanted to be respected and to be thought of as doing a good job and that their advice mattered to Roosevelt.

This is the domain of modern diplomacy, ladies and gentlemen. (Laughter) That's how it feels, right? You're out there, you're walking out on the ice, you're always wondering how is this playing back home? Are your insights -- are your initiatives respected? You know, what are people thinking?

This is exactly how these men felt on these incredibly perilous journeys. The ones in Britain are better known than the earlier ones. I think the treatment of the initial interactions with Stalin are fascinating. They are primarily from English sources, but they're as good as I've seen. And what I like is the way that they have been woven together to paint a tapestry of not only these men basically educating Roosevelt.

But you are also left with the impression, as you read the book, that there is a sense very early that Roosevelt actually knew where he wanted to go and that in many respects these men were acting on basically a presumption from Roosevelt that this is what he wanted to see happen and that, frankly, he was just actually testing his propositions as opposed to being informed by their findings on the ground. It's magnificent to see Churchill so effectively manipulate the interlocutors in a way that the only nation probably more effective historically at the strategic manipulation in Australia

may be Great Britain. Clearly, Australia has surpassed that of late. (Laughter) Climate's better, et cetera. So, that's what I loved about the book.

There is also a sense that just lurks beneath the surface at just the frustration of government, right? So, what is very clear is that this was not a period of particular esprit in the War Department, in the State Department. There was a lot of sense of being beleaguered; of people working around them; of overlapping responsibilities; of a sense that Roosevelt was not sharing things, was not trustful of the bureaucracy, and wanted to run things basically out of the White House. Now, we've never experienced anything like that in our government. (Laughter)

And so it's a fascinating read in that respect. And I will say that you can see, you know, even during this period where these guys are basically operating outside of the State Department system using the military channels of communication to send secret messages back to Roosevelt, the seething quality of the next generation of leaders who are determined, once they emerge from the Second World War, to put in place mechanisms that will never allow a President like Roosevelt to move around them. So, there's a fascinating little aside about how many of the early decisions were taken without consultation of the War Department in particular.

And although there's only one brief reference in the book to Forestall, we know that, really in many respects, the modern architect of the national security state, of the apparatus that came into being in the so-called 1947 National Security Act, was James Forestall. He was the person that probably had the deepest misgivings and bitterness toward Roosevelt and was most frustrated by these completely what he viewed as amateurish and, you know, completely without record, notes, and decisions that were taken during critical periods of the war. He believed that some of the Lend-Lease decisions, if they had been better orchestrated, would have led to more capability arriving

in both Great Britain and in Stalin's Russia at a time and in a way that would have affected the battlefield fight much more so than the back of the envelope decisions that Roosevelt and his team made.

Just as an aside, it was Forestall -- when he originally wrote the National Security Act, he made very clear that what he was seeking to do was to create a structure that would allow, never, someone like Roosevelt to make decisions without consulting the government. So, as part of, you know, the Air Force, Department of Defense, and everything, but most importantly it was the creation of the National Security Council. And the purpose behind that was threefold.

First, Forestall wanted a formal mechanism in which, if there were a crisis, the President would be forced to bring the members of the National Security Council together so that decisions would be made by these senior people and that there would be not the ability of a Roosevelt to go out and make decisions on his own. So, that was the central piece of his legislation.

He also believed, number two, that there should be a series of documents that would animate strategic decisions about alliances and military power, subsequently the use of nuclear weapons. That was the national security paper process of which NSC-68 was one of the key documents. And as an afterthought Forestall and his allies said, look, you know, to do the first one and two, it's clear that the President's going to need a small staff. And so what he decided was that there would need to be perhaps a retired colonel, lieutenant colonel, and two or three people that would be staffed in some basement that would assist in calling the meetings and making people come to the table that would force the President to take the advice of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

Now, the great irony, of course, is that if you look historically, almost

every serious meeting of the National Security Council was theater, like during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which no real decisions were taken but great steps to try to make it seem, to the participants, that their views were being valued by the President.

Secondly, the document process has been important, guiding the (inaudible) government. But the third, the great irony, is that the creation of the staff really, in many respects, has given the President the opportunity to develop policy independent, in many respects, of the agencies that Forestall and his allies tried to basically chain down the President with respect to decision-making.

Martin, in closing, this book will give you a sense of a different period of enormous possibility in which the American role and these representatives -- when they landed in their respective countries, they were treated with a deference and a sense of expectation that is rarely present in American diplomacy. And it's hard not to read this book without experiencing a little bit of longing of a period gone by. (Laughter)

And I'll just close it. The thing that was fascinating about Michael. He does make a couple of observations in the book that I'd never thought of. If you consider every locus of diplomacy that Roosevelt undertook, it was Atlanticist. All of the meetings of his senior players were in Europe. There was no comparable set of engagements with any leaders in Asia. In fact, all the subsequent high-level engagements -- the failed Marshall mission in the 1940s, and others -- happened basically after the end of the Second World War; and one is left with the wonder of what it would be like to have a person with, frankly, some very clear Asian qualities -- so, a man, very difficult to fully understand and comprehend with a lot of fates and thrusts like Roosevelt, what his genius might have meant for certain kinds of diplomatic engagements in Asia if that had transpired.

Anyway, just in closing, buy this book; give it to friends; read it quietly;

see that you did not come up with the idea that you did not write this book. (Laughter) Be a little bit ashamed that an Australian wrote it, you know. (Laughter) Better that they write about Rugby or some exotic spider that when you get bit by it you swell up and die. But be grateful that the book has been written.

Martin.

MR. INDYK: Thank you, Kurt. That's terrific.

Listen, Michael, first of all, just a question about these five envoys relating to something that Kurt said there. If you can single one of them out that was best at basically building the relationship with the President, on whom they depended for the success -- you know, that personal relationship is critically important. I think I know the answer since I read the book, but just take us through this in terms of these five big personalities, how they --

MR. FULLILOVE: In terms of their relationship with FDR.

MR. INDYK: Their relationship with FDR, yeah.

MR. FULLILOVE: Yeah, I mean, Hopkins is the hero, in a way, of the book and not only because he undertakes these three missions but because with his failing health he not only builds this intimate relationship with Roosevelt but builds almost, I mean, very tight relationships with Churchill and Stalin. In fact, one of his contemporaries said that he was right in the middle of the big three -- the triangular relationship between the allies that won the war. And one of his contemporaries said that each of Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt trusted Hopkins more than they trusted each other. And I think that was right.

In terms of the relationship with Roosevelt --

MR. INDYK: How did he build that trust?

MR. FULLILOVE: He had a directness, an informality. I think there was

something about the romanticism of his mission that appealed to Churchill, and there was something about his frankness and directness that appealed to the sort of brutal personality of Stalin. And when it came to Roosevelt, I think he -- I mean, he worked it. He worked the relationship. He had an almost extrasensory understanding of Roosevelt's moods. He knew when to flatter and when not to flatter. But he also had this laconic approach to life, and I say in the book that he was, like, in a city of pomp and sycophancy. His informality was like a gust of air-conditioning on a humid Washington day. And I think Roosevelt liked that.

And I have to say one of the highlights of this process was a couple of weeks ago when I was speaking at a bookstore in Sydney, a famous bookstore, and I gave a talk and then I had a book signing, and a lady came up and said, "Thank you for the book. I'd love you to sign this book, because Harry Hopkins was my grandfather."

MR. INDYK: Well.

MR. FULLILOVE: And one of Harry's sons immigrated to Australia, because he was interested in the dingos and the spiders and all that sort of stuff that Kurt mentions. (Laughter) It's funny, it sounds like he doesn't like Australia. We can never get rid of him. He's always down visiting, you know. But, anyway, one of Harry's sons moved to Australia, and so there's a whole family of Hopkins, including a Harry L. Hopkins, and four of them came to my book launch.

Anyway, Hopkins is the hero.

MR. CAMPBELL: Okay, Martin, on this question, I do think, you know, the term "emotional intelligence" was obviously not invented during this time, but what's striking about Hopkins is I actually think he is a man who understands the game and is actually a master player. But his greatest gift is disguising that, so he can always come across as this sickly, humble Midwesterner. But he understood Roosevelt's moods better

than the others. And I think that intimacy gave him the ability over a longer period of time. I think the problem with the question, Martin, is that it -- different periods. The advice or role was more significant, actually. There were points where one of the emissaries -- Donovan's role was very important for a brief period of time, as was Wendell Willkie's. But over a sustained period, it was Hopkins. But it is also the case, as the book makes clear, that these are men that were desperate for the approval and engagement of Roosevelt. But Roosevelt could discard friendships very easily, and there was a quality of -- almost a transactional quality. He was not emotionally engaged with any of these men, I don't think.

MR. INDYK: Would you agree?

MR. FULLILOVE: Sounds familiar. Well, he was a ruthless person -- and, you're right, he was able in the end to discard people, and one of them was Hopkins. And toward the end of the war, they had a few fallings out, and one of the reasons was that actually Harry decided he wanted to move out of the White House, because his third wife decided she didn't want to have cocktail parties every day in the Oval Office with FDR and have -- she wanted to have her own dining table. And that led to a lot of problems, because Roosevelt liked his intimates close to hand, and they argued -- Hopkins and Roosevelt argued on the way home from Yalta, and Hopkins never said goodbye to FDR and always regretted it, and he got the news that FDR had died at the Mayo Clinic where he was back for his illness, and his nurse had no idea who Hopkins was and she couldn't not work out while he was getting condolence calls from Charles De Gaulle and Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill.

MR. INDYK: If you look at the way that Roosevelt took the nation to war, which is really the heart of the thesis here, compare it for us with modern history, current history. For example, contrast it with the way that George W. Bush took this nation to

war.

MR. FULLILOVE: Well, it's an invidious comparison for Mr. Bush, of course, but, I mean, I think they're really the opposite approaches. I mean, they're different conflicts and different scales. But whereas President Bush took America to war quite quickly, it seemed to me he didn't nurture a bipartisan consensus. In fact, in some ways he used the war to beat his opponents around the head. He wasn't able to persuade other countries, many other countries with the exception of Britain and Australia and a few others, that it was worth fighting. And so America more or less went into it by itself, and Roosevelt was really the opposite. I mean, this book tells the story of this incredible effort, but very subtle and dexterous effort, over the course of two years to build a bipartisan, domestic consensus in favor of internationalism and ultimately intervention. And he was prepared to use other countries as proxies. He was prepared to lead from behind, as it were, by allowing the Brits and the French and the Soviets to do most of the fighting. He was prepared to take his time. In fact, Roosevelt was criticized almost as much by hawks, who felt he was going too fast, as he was by doves, who felt he was going too slowly. He did it carefully and slowly, often in reaction to events, and yet when you step back and you look at the whole run of events, there is an inexorable and very clear direction, as Kurt says. He knew where he wanted to end up. But he wanted to do it in a way that took the country with him so that the country didn't enter the war divided but it entered the war united and ready for the fight.

MR. INDYK: Of course there was a difference. Pearl Harbor came at the end of that process; 9/11 came at the beginning.

MR. FULLILOVE: Yes. Yeah, and although Pearl Harbor helped, and Pearl Harbor totally destroyed isolationism as a force in the United States at that time. But by then, Roosevelt had already marginalized the isolationists over these two years,

but it's through this deluge of speeches and messages and fireside chats and broadcasts and decisions and special missions.

MR. CAMPBELL: Can I - Mark, I have a slightly different view on that. The interesting thing --

MR. INDYK: Let me say, please do comment on that, but also in your comment tell us a little bit about the challenge of the pivot, of shifting American foreign policy.

MR. CAMPBELL: Yeah.

MR. INDYK: There are comparisons with the way that Roosevelt shifted policy and the way that Obama's trying with your help to shift American policy.

MR. CAMPBELL: The one thing I would say is I think there is a -- first of all, there is occasionally a sense that oh, if we could only go back, in which there is a greater sense of national unity. What's striking about the book is it's hard to remember that probably the most bitter feelings of any President of the last hundred years were directed toward Roosevelt, deeply held in contempt by Republicans and even many in the Democratic Party more generally.

I think what happened was that he did not win over the entire Republican Party but a key small coalition of Republican elites, largely in the east, and he was affected in doing that. And I think what happened after Pearl Harbor was not the demolition of the isolationists; it was that their opposition took a different form.

People don't remember that, you know, the congressional actions in 1942 -- Roosevelt and the administration were on a deep defensive, and he took many criticisms for the conduct of the war and almost lost the support to undertake what he was seeking to do right in the most perilous point in 1942. I think -- and, in fact, immediately after the war, a similar dynamic emerged in the Republican Party in the

courting of Truman and others of Vanderbilt, the famous sort of “Ethel Waters edge.”

So, I don’t believe that it is as simple as just with one fell swoop one whole part of the Republican Party or the American political establishment was transformed. Their opposition just went into a different form more generally, and, frankly, it just improved Roosevelt’s hand, who was a master strategist and tactician both, something that I think is forgotten when we look back on him more generally.

On the idea of rebalancing, Martin, if you think in historical terms, what generally happens at the end of wars in the United States, whether it’s the Second World War or the Korean War or the Vietnam War or the Cold War, there is a desire of Americans to want to come home, to want to focus on domestic pursuits. And I would argue that we’re right on the cusp of a substantial debate in the United States about coming home, about spending more time at home. And you see that at elite levels. A wonderful book by Richard Hoss called *Foreign Policy Begins at Home*, which has been purposely misconstrued as a treatise on disengagement. It’s really much more about certain kinds of domestic investments.

And also what we’re seeing in the American body politic, Martin, which if you’re an internationalist on the Democratic side, you always could count on the Republican Party to be your base, to form some sort of alliance on military spending and support. But what is happening right now is the consensus within the Republican Party on the strong national security apparatus that has essentially been the basis of the foreign policy commitments of the last 70 years. That is coming apart. No one talks about it very much, but it is actually a very worrisome trend, and it’s not clear how far that goes.

So, the first thing that you struggle against, Martin, is a desire to come home, right? And what I think what the President and others have sought to do is

basically rather than come home, re-channel, redirect the focus and onus of American foreign policy more toward Asia. But the one pressure will be this pressure to come home. But the second one is like that scene in the overacted part of *Godfather III* in which Michael -- when Michael is talking about leaving the Mafia and he says, "I want to leave but they keep pulling me back in."

Thanks to Martin and his friends, we are --

MR. INDYK: But I want to leave, too.

MR. CAMPBELL: It's going to be very hard to leave the Middle East. We would never leave in the way that -- you know, we have strategic responsibilities and we will be deeply engaged, but we have been hyper-engaged for a decade, and Syria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan -- these are going to demand a remarkable component of our time. To be successful in Asia, it's going to require us to do much more over a sustained period of time.

To give you a sense, just for -- just -- we spend more money in one day or two days in Afghanistan than we do on our entire foreign policy budget in Asia, right? Just to give you a sense, right? So, any sense of this dramatic move -- we're at the very early stages of what has, primarily to date, been a diplomatic set of initiatives that will have to be built on over time. I think it's hard, and probably a décor of this, Martin, is not just money but people. We have very able people in our government, most of whom in the current environment have spent the last 10 or 15 years focused on the Middle East. I can identify probably 10 or 15 very able senior generals, foreign policy players, intelligence guys who know everything there is to know about building, you know, post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. There isn't a comparable group of people that you would turn to if you wanted to really think and talk about Asia.

MR. INDYK: And you've got the Secretary of State preoccupied with a

particular part of the Middle East now, and so it comes back to the question of special envoys. Since Hickok, given his preoccupation, spent the amount of time necessary.

MR. CAMPBELL: Well, it's not clear that he believes that. I mean, he's really -- Secretary Kerry has made a very profound, deep personal commitment to the Middle East peace process and is both the strategist and the daily implementer of activity. It's a very hard thing to do that job and to be Secretary of State at the same time, and time will tell.

MR. INDYK: But the question (inaudible), should the President appoint a special envoy for Asia?

MR. CAMPBELL: Well, I thought you were going to ask the other question, should we have a special envoy for the Middle East? (Laughter)

MR. INDYK: We have one, right?

MR. CAMPBELL: You know, there is the perennial question about, you know, the principles versus special envoys when the President first came in -- Secretary of State Clinton -- they appointed a lot of very senior special envoys with, frankly, mixed results. I mean, I think that ultimately what really matters to the region -- and they'll know it when they see it -- is the engagement of the President per se. These are presidential-level initiatives, and the senior people in the cabinet -- Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, and then their key lieutenants under them. And, frankly, the region has changed now. In the past, they would be prepared to sit quietly and take it. But if we don't basically build on the bar that's already been established, I think we'll hear from Asia that they're dissatisfied. And so I think we've got some time, and I'm confident that the President and his team understand the stakes, but we're going to have to really step it up.

MR. INDYK: When you look at the special envoys of the Obama

administration, compare them with the special envoys of Franklin Roosevelt, what comparisons and contrasts can you draw?

MR. FULLILOVE: It's hard to compare, because, I mean, these days special envoys are not as special as they used to be. (Laughter) I mean, in the days that I'm writing about, these guys were unencumbered by bureaucracy. They had personal relationships with the President. Often Cordell Hull was not even involved in their appointment, didn't see their reports. They were traveling without an entourage. I mean, often these guys are traveling by themselves into war zones. So, it's a different thing.

I think that special envoys in the contemporary (inaudible) can be effective. But I think you need to be disciplined about the way you use them. I don't think, for example, President Clinton was disciplined about it. I think he devalued the currency of special envoys by having so many of them. There were something 50 flapping around when Clinton left the White House, doing all sorts of things. (Laughter)

I think they can be effective, but you've got to be disciplined. And you have to use them on an important issue so that you are not constantly turning the Secretary of State's head. And I think this is where, actually -- I'll agree with Kurt -- that a special envoy on bringing peace to the Holy Land would be, in my opinion, a good idea, because I applaud him for his effort. But sitting where I sit, I think Obama's most important foreign policy initiative is focusing on the region where America's greatest opportunities and challenges lie, and that's Asia and the Pacific. And I think that the danger -- and I'd state it a little more strongly than Kurt would -- I mean, the danger is that Asians will start to say, well, actually, the pivot was last year's story, and Secretary Clinton was obviously very focused on Asia. She's left the State Department. Kurt and others who were very involved in the pivot have also left public service.

MR. CAMPBELL: Tom Donlan.

MR. FULLILOVE: Tom Donlan. We're seeing Secretary Kerry -- notwithstanding the ASEAN meeting on Monday, we're seeing him much more in the Middle East than in Asia. What is this all about? And, to me, in a sense, I mean, to cut to the quick, I think -- I remember one of Clinton's very famous special envoys once said to me, "An envoy is not an answer, it's an instrument. The key is what is the policy?" And that, I think, is the important thing. And I think Obama needs to double down on the rebalance, and he needs to focus on that, and if that means getting Kerry onboard a little bit more in our part of the world, then I think that's what he should do.

MR. INDYK: Spoken like a true Australian. (Laughter)

Let's go to questions. Wait for the microphone, please identify yourself, and please ask a question. And standing up doesn't get you noticed. We'll come to you later.

MR. CHU: My name is Steven Chu, purely historical questions.

First on the on the -- I understood that Churchill denied that the bathtub incident ever happened, but my question is: Was there any conscious rivalry between the five?

MR. FULLILOVE: First of all, the bathtub story. I have a couple of good primary sources that it happened (Laughter) But it's such a good story that it surely can't be true. (Laughter) So, I really searched hard for the primary sources to justify putting it in the book, because I could not write a book on this, period, and not tell that story.

In terms of the rivalry between them, not really in the sense that they were -- they were sort of doing different things. I mean, Willkie saw his rivalry as being with Roosevelt, and Willkie felt very ill used by Roosevelt, because Roosevelt continued to use Willkie. He's send him on other special missions when he wanted, and then he'd dismiss him when he didn't want him. Whenever he wanted his supporter endorsement,

he'd sort of offer an inducement, but then he's disappear again. And Willkie died in 1944, quite a bitter man, bitter at Roosevelt and bitter at Churchill. So, I don't think he saw himself on the same level.

Wells increasingly became wrapped up in his own misadventures because of the incident that I've described. His enemies, many of whom were angry at his prominence on this special mission, used that to destroy him.

And to Kurt's point about Roosevelt's ruthlessness, Roosevelt let him go in the end. But it was interesting. Roosevelt -- William Bullitt, who was another great figure in American diplomacy, was most responsible for bringing down Sumner Welles. He was ambassador in France, and he was outraged that Welles was sent on this mission. And Roosevelt was determined -- he never forgave Bullitt -- he was determined to get him. But Roosevelt was a big Clintonian in the sense that he didn't like telling people to their face what he thought of them. So, he never really said that to Bullitt's face, and Bullitt came to Roosevelt and said, I'm going to run for mayor of Philadelphia, because Bullitt was from a very prominent Philadelphia family. And Roosevelt said, sure, you should do that. And then he sent a message to the Philadelphia political bosses, "Cut his throat." (Laughter) So, he got his own back.

But, to your point, I wouldn't say that they were --I wouldn't say there was a great deal of rivalry. Equally, I wouldn't say that they worked as a team. They weren't all sort of pulling a harness in the same direction. It's just that when I looked at it in retrospect, it seemed obvious to me that Roosevelt was using them as a group, and he was using them to do different things. Just to finish on this point, you know, he used them in very different ways. He used Hopkins to commune with the leaders. He used Willkie to send big symbolic messages to the British, to other allies, and to the Americans and to the Republican Party. He used Averell Harriman as a fix-it man, because he

wanted someone to actually get the trains running or actually get the ships sailing and make sure that the aid that was delivered was the aid that the British needed. So, Roosevelt did have this genius for using people, and that had both -- you know, that was one of his great strengths as President. But for the people who were being used, I think ultimately many of them in the end did feel used by him.

MR. CAMPBELL: And sad, and there's a lot of -- what's striking about this book is that this is, like, a brief high point for these men and they operate at the pinnacle, but the last scenes of many of them are of sadness, of regret. I was struck -- it's a really good question. The way I thought about it was there's very little lateral thinking about any of these guys. They're fundamentally preoccupied with their relationship with Roosevelt and at the mission at hand, not what the others are doing.

MR. FULLILOVE: The exception to that story, the exception to that point about the sad endings was Averell Harriman, and of course this was really the beginning of this storied career where he was one of the dominant figures of post-war diplomacy. And in many ways, he came to overshadow -- he's come to overshadow Harry Hopkins, although in my opinion Hopkins was much the greater man. But Harriman I actually found the least likeable, at least at this point in his career. I interviewed Holbrook on these, and Harriman said that Holbrook was -- Holbrook was a protégé of Averell Harriman's -- and Holbrook said that Harriman was a wonderful man to work for, wonderful toward young people, and so on. But that's not the impression -- that's not the Harriman that I'm writing about. Harriman at this point was determined, ambitious; was prepared to push anyone out of the way, including Ambassador Gil Winant, who was a wonderful figure, who was the actual ambassador in London for most of this period. Harriman was more than happy to go around him and to FDR.

MR. INDYK: Yes, please.

MR. SMITH: Bruce Smith at Brookings, retired.

I'd like to first just join that Australian lobby (laughter), having spent a wonderful semester admonished. So, I --

MR. INDYK: Welcome.

MR. SMITH: Tell me how to sign up.

Forgive a small little plug and then, Martin, I will get to a question.

I've just completed a biography of our colleague, Link Gordon, and Link -- and I'm struggling with a title, maybe Kirk can help me -- was the wise man's wise man, particularly Harriman. He didn't get with Harriman until '46, but we go through the various things you're talking about, and he helped run the Marshall Plan. He conceived the Marshall Plan and its organizational focus, then was with him in Paris, made it work, and then came back in the White House, and, interestingly, Harriman was brought back to the white House by Truman to be sort of the national security advisor, the first one, and to fight against NSC-68, because Truman thought it was extravagant, too much money, whatnot. Korea changed that.

But let me get to my question. And it's the one that Kurt posed about the system versus the in-and-outers. During the war and the post-war period, you had people like Gordon come in and serve as the wise man to these wise men and, you know, the dollar-a-year people, the industrialists, academics, whatnot. You can't do that now. Have we really lost something? What have we lost? Is it better to have the Forestall systemization approach or the World War II/post-war in-and-outers?

And just to prime you a little bit, when Link turned his attention from the Atlanticist orientation to Latin America and when he became in the Harriman role himself, he and JFK sort of made Brazil policy and they cut out the State Department, and it didn't work out too well. State was trying to hold Gordon back, and Gordon was pushing

toward, you know, getting tough with Brazil, which eventually led on to the coup, so are we worse off? Maybe it's an academic question. Can't go back to that era. Not having the ability to bring talent in and out of the government readily because of all kinds of conflicts of interest and other problems, what's the net balance on that question?

MR. FULLILOVE: Well, outside -- the question, actually, to an Australian seems odd, and I'll tell you why: Because we look at your system as being much more flexible than our system in bringing talent in. I mean, someone like Kurt can come in as a policy entrepreneur, play a really critical role in one really important part of grand strategy. He can then leave. Government continues to play a role from the sidelines. Perhaps we hope come back in the future. I mean, that sort of thing is -- you know, that's very hard to get in the British system or the Australian system or most systems. So, I think, in a sense, the American system is probably as far out toward that direction as you can go these days, because it's so complicated and complex, and the structures, the issues are so terribly difficult and complicated that although this was a wonderful period -- and like Kurt, I would have loved to have been one of these wise men or the wise man to one of these wise men. But I don't think you can go back to that. And in fact I think, you know, there's even -- I think there are even downsides of having as much of an in-an-outer system as you have now in term of, you know, losing talent from time to time and losing institutional memory.

MR. CAMPBELL: Just -- first of all, I had heard a little bit about the book you're writing. The title I like is *The Wisest Man* and then colon and then put after that. And I think that will cause people to think, oh, and then relate it to his advice to the wise men. I think that's a good idea.

MR. FULLILOVE: Just call it -- don't call it *Rendezvous with Destiny*, please.

MR. CAMPBELL: Right. That's my -- I mean, I think it's very hard not to read this book. I mean, it seems -- the period seems just endlessly romantic and sexy and cool; and it's just so different than the forms that we have to fill out at the State Department now. (Laughter) So, it's just -- we're not going to go back to that kind of era, and there are things that are lost and then there are things that are gained. Ultimately, I do believe that government and the opportunity to serve at high level will continue to attract people to serve for a period of time in their lives, and the hope will be, frankly, more than anything else what's really lost in this very bitter period is the ability to get people confirmed, and I think it does discourage people who ultimately would like to serve but they worry about what would happen if they're dragged through what is really an unrelenting process.

MR. INDYK: Right there in the back.

MR. TOWELL: Timothy Towell, retired foreign service officer.

You were talking about Pearl Harbor essentially marginalizing the isolationists. How did Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his fabulous team deal with sort of aggressive, tough isolationists: The nasty people at the *Chicago* Tribune, for example; the great American hero, Charles A. Lindberg, for example; and really the sneaky Irishman from Boston, Joseph Kennedy?

MR. FULLILOVE: Well, he dealt with Kennedy by marginalizing him and going around him, and he didn't tell -- he didn't officially -- well, actually, no one -- the President didn't actually tell Kennedy that Donovan was on the way, and Kennedy was outraged to hear that Donovan was there. He said, you know, what do they want me here for? What am I doing, pouring tea? And so Roosevelt played his very delicate dance with Kennedy. He didn't like Kennedy. I mean, let's face it. Roosevelt's appointment of Kennedy was an unaccountable diplomatic appointment. I mean, it was

madness. It was a dreadful, dreadful decision to have this appeaser, this isolationist in this incredibly important post. So, what did Roosevelt do? He played him, basically, and he kept him sufficiently on the line that Kennedy didn't come out vociferously against Lend-Lease, but he went around him wherever he could. And then when Kennedy complained about being marginalized, FDR denied it. So, that had nothing to do with me. That was Secretary Knox. (Laughter)

MR. CAMPBELL: That's (inaudible).

MR. FULLILOVE: So, that's the way FDR did it with him. With the isolationists, I mean, what Roosevelt did was -- the policy that you see in the book is consistently getting tougher and tougher as the conditions in Europe get worse and worse. Roosevelt uses these events to dramatize the interested state for the American people and to keep pushing the isolationists back and back and back. And so first of all, after the fall of France, he comes up with the destroy of bases deal where he sends these destroyers over and he has a public debate then, and then after he wins in November 1940, he comes up with this idea of Lend-Lease.

And to your question, how does he do it? How does he put the argument over them? He does it with this Rooseveltian genius for public relations. He comes back and he says, you know, you may not want to give all this aid to the allies, so I'll tell you what. We'll lend the aid to them. Of course, now he wants a used shell or a used tank or a used bullet returned to them. But Roosevelt comes up with this metaphor and he says that it's like if your neighbor's house was on fire you wouldn't try to sell him the garden hose to put out the fire; you'd lend it to him, and when he's finished with it he'd return it to you in good order. And of course this makes no sense. Lending a stretch of garden hose to your neighbor is nothing like an unprecedented transfer of arms with billions and billions of dollars. They're not even vaguely comparable. But Roosevelt, with the

upturned cigarette, *bourgeois de* vivre, the fireside chats, the constant argument. He put it out there, and he made Americans have a debate throughout the country on every radio station, the latest page of every newspaper. They had an argument about whethetr -- and the argument at stake was this: Were we prepared to aid the allies even at the risk of all? And ultimately Americans decided to. And in this period you see the public opinion shift -- were they prepared to do it even at the risk of all.

MR. CAMPBELL: The other thing, if I could just say. What is lost in some of this sort of Ghazi history they talking about of the romance is the brutal internal fighting that Roosevelt is subjected to. So, immediately after Pearl Harbor, his critics launch on something that we would understand and recognize very clearly today: major congressional reviews and other reviews, Roberts Commission about how did the United States find itself where we were, that we were surprised in Pearl Harbor, and who on Roosevelt's staff has to be blamed, right? So -- and Roosevelt spends part of his time managing the war, figuring out where to go, and part of his time maneuvering to protect his key players.

For a period of time, the Republicans decide that, look, we're going to go after -- we can get Marshall, right?, who they recognize plays this critical role for Roosevelt. And Roosevelt designs this entire kind of defense -- puts people out in front so the commanders of the Navy out in Hawaii become expendable, right? So, he basically establishes all these different feints in order to keep the isolationists and the Republican critics at bay. That goes on entirely through 1941 and 1942. That period -- this is remembered as a period of remarkable national immunity, and it is actually just not just the case.

MR. INDYK: This is going to have to be the last question unfortunately, and it goes to Marvin Kalb.

MR. KALB: Thank you, Martin, very much.

Thank you for a terrific presentation.

MR. FULLILOVE: Thank you.

MR. KALB: I look forward to reading the book.

I'd like to ask for your insight a bit more, please, in the Hopkins/Stalin relationship. Hopkins might have had a certain view of Stalin, but my understanding of Stalin's view of Hopkins was that he represented a corrupt capitalist system. He had very little personal feelings for Hopkins or by the way, anyone else. Hopkins might have presented a rather rosy vision of Stalin, and to what extent do you think that might have colored Roosevelt's view of Stalin and made the subsequent negotiations in World War II that much more difficult?

MR. FULLILOVE: It's a good question. I mean, the issue at stake for Hopkins' mission to Stalin, which was really a death-defying mission for Hopkins, was not the sort of grand questions about the post-war period and all that. It was whether the Soviet Union would withstand the ferocious attack of the axis at that point, because the consensus in Washington was that the Red Army would fall before the (inaudible) in between one and three months. So, that's what Hopkins was testing. It wasn't this big question, can we be allies? It was, will they survive? Should we aid them, or are we throwing good aid after bad by aiding them? And he journeyed to Moscow and he made a decision based on very few facts. And, by the way, Stalin was trying to manipulate him the whole time. Stalin made sure that even though the government was in disarray and he had only recently from Isdaka, and he, himself, was in turmoil, internal turmoil, there was none of that on display. It was calm. It was solid. He was completely in command. And he did everything he could to give Hopkins that impression. Does that mean that Hopkins was hoodwinked? I don't think so, because Hopkins nevertheless made the

right judgment, which was that Stalin was so furious at Hitler that he wouldn't make a deal with Hitler and that the system of command and control in the Soviet Union was such that the Red Army would probably hold out until the winter closed in. That's really the question. So, Hopkins made that judgment, and I think, you know, in retrospect it was correct. That's not to say that all Roosevelt's judgments about Stalin were correct, but I think at that time Hopkins got it right.

And if I could just finish with one anecdote from that mission that gives you a sense of Hopkins' playfulness and his sense of humor. Hopkins went to Moscow from London, where he'd been seeing Churchill. And Marshall assigned a young American flyer from the Midwest to accompany Hopkins on this trip and to train up the Russians on certain aircraft -- the P-40 that the Americans were going to give them en masse. So, this young flyer met Hopkins at the train station and went on this special train where they were going to the far north of Scotland, and then they would board a flying boat, a PBY -- you call them Catalina, the British call them -- to fly around Finland and Norway up to Archangel to get to Moscow. It's quite a dangerous trip. And in the train on the way up to Scotland, this young flyer was a teetotaler, and Hopkins was not. Despite his bad health, he was a playboy and a big drinker and he loved nightclubs and he loved having fun. And the steward came around and offered them a drink, and Hopkins took an Old Fashioned or whatever and the flyer said, oh, no, not for me. And Hopkins was not impressed by this. And it happened another time. And on the third time Hopkins said, you know, I don't give a damn whether you drink or not but will you quit looking so superior, he said with a laugh. (Laughter)

Anyway, they get up to Scotland. They get on the flying boat, they make it all the way to Archangel, and the Soviet admiral insists on putting a massive banquet on, on the afterdeck of his yacht. And it's one of these four-hour affairs with caviar and

cold fish and bread and all those sorts of things -- and innumerable vodka toasts. And I found this old video of this young flyer as an old man telling this story, and he said, I was hiding in the corner the whole time and hoping -- you know, they're making toasts to Churchill, to Stalin, to the seagulls and he thought, I think I got away with this. But then a Soviet general with a white linen tunic and a mouthful of gold teeth came up to Hopkins with a beaker full of vodka and said, I want to propose a toast to this young American who's come all the way so far from home to protect the motherland. And this young American Midwesterner said "I knew my time had come." (Laughter) I stood up, I filled my glass with vodka, and I knocked it back. And this was the first time he had ever drunk alcohol. (Laughter) And you can imagine it hit his system like a sledgehammer and he sort of lost his balance, collapsed into his seat, and he put his napkin over his head while he sort of re-gathered his senses. And after a minute or two he came out from under the napkin, and who does he see looking at him with a laconic smile from across the table but Harry Hopkins. And Harry says, that shows a definite lack of character. (Laughter)

MR. INDYK: Well, there are no lack of characters in this book, and I hope you'll read it. Buy it first, then read it, and, as Kurt says, give it to your friends, too, as I'm going to do this weekend. *Rendezvous with History*, Michael Kurt, thank you both very much for coming.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related

to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2016