PLENARY I: TRANSITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

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MR. RIEDEL: Ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome you to the first plenary session of the U.S.-Islamic World Forum. Those of you who don’t know me, I am Bruce Riedel. I’m a Senior Fellow in the Saban Institute, the Brookings Institution, and Director of the Brooking Intelligence Project.

This panel is going to focus on transformation and change in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is an exciting time to be thinking about Afghanistan and Pakistan, although it comes at the end of a long period of misery. Thirty-five years ago this April, an obscure military coup in Kabul, grand eloquently entitled the Great Sour Revolution by its communist masters ushered in what has been now 35 years of war and violence in Afghanistan. That war and violence has spilled over into Pakistan. These two countries have suffered enormously from the hands of these 35 years of war. Over a million Afghans have died during this conflict, and as Martin and others just alluded to, 12 years ago, Afghanistan and Pakistan was the scene from which the attacks on the United States of America were launched. This forum, in many ways, was born out of the events in Afghanistan and Pakistan 12 years ago.

There is much that is changing, not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but in American policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, so the timing is particularly propitious. As Martin just indicated to you, President Obama last month laid out a transformed policy for the United States to fight terrorism. I won’t repeat everything that Martin said. I think he covered it very nicely. I’ll just highlight two points Martin didn’t mention.

The President very candidly admitted in that speech that (inaudible) administration, U.S./Pakistani relations had all but collapsed -- worst it’s been in decades. The President also admitted -- these are my words, not his -- that he was something of a reformed drone addict, and that his first administration had been too tempted by the drones, and that in his second administration he intended to be more selective in his use of unmanned aero vehicles over Pakistan and other parts, and of course (inaudible) can change.

For the first time in Pakistan’s history, a democratically elected civilian government filled out its entire term in office and has now been succeeded by another democratically elected civilian
government. There are many questions about how that government will proceed, but it is a milestone for the people of Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, of course, the changes are coming in 2014. As the President laid out in his speech, he is determined to transition Afghanistan from NATO-ISAF-American lead to Afghan-lead. There are many who question whether that is indeed possible, but we will find out more in the course of the next hour and a half. Afghanistan will also witness presidential elections next year; a change at the top. Later today you will hear from President Karzai. Today let us try to plant some of the questions that you should have in your mind as you hear him speak to you tonight.

Joining me to discuss these issues, I think we have a truly fantastic panel: four of the leading experts and participants in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I won’t spend a lot of time on their bios. You have those bios in front of you. Let me just highlight a few points.

Ambassador Husain Haqqani, a good friend of mine, currently professor at Boston University and a Fellow at the Hudson Institute, prior to that, Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States. Prior to that an award winning writer, probably the author of the single best book about Pakistani politics there is today, and in the process of writing what I believe will be a truly great book about U.S./Pakistani relations.

David Sedney, next to him, a career American government Foreign Service officer who has just left. He tells me he did not resign. He did not retire. He prefers to refer to it as “he left the United States government.” For the last 5 years, he has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. He’s been present at the creation and implementation of American policy towards these two countries over the last 5 years.

Next to him is Amrullah Saleh. Amrullah today is head of a democracy advocacy group in Afghanistan called the Green Trend, and I hope he will explain to us more about that. Prior to that he was Chief of Intelligence for the Afghanistan government, and prior to that he was a Senior Advisor to the legendary Afghan freedom fighter, Ahmad Shah Massoud.

Last, but far from least, at the very end is my colleague at the Brookings Institution, Michael O’Hanlon. Michael has written a score of books on American defense and foreign policy, and
one of them he co-authored with an Afghan. It was entitled *Toughing It Out in Afghanistan: Recommendations for American Policy*. He is just also co-authored a new study of where the United States is in Afghanistan and Pakistan today.

We’ll proceed in the following manner. I’m going to ask each of the panelists a few questions, then I may have a second quick go-round. Then we’re going to open it up to questions from you and also questions that we’ll be getting from Twitter and through other social mechanisms passed up to me.

I’m going to start with you, David, if I could. You have reached a personal milestone in leaving government. You leave it at a particularly auspicious moment for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Looking at where we are today, how would you characterize our American policy in Afghanistan, in particular, as succeeded or failed? What are you looking for in the next year and half as we go to 2014?

MR. SEDNEY: Thank you, Bruce. And again, I’ll stress that I’m no longer speaking for the United States government, but I have spent a good part of the last 11 years working on Afghanistan in the U.S. government, and when you ask what has succeeded, I will focus on that first. I would say it’s the broad effort to build the Afghan security forces; the army, the police, the intelligence in Afghanistan.

Eleven years ago, these were extremely nascent organizations. They couldn’t stand on their own two feet, and they did not have the capability to defend Afghanistan. You mention, Bruce, President Obama’s statement about the United States wanting Afghanistan and Afghans to take the lead. In my experience, and (inaudible) will agree or disagree, the people who want that even more than anyone in the United States are the Afghans themselves. Afghans in the military and the other security organizations say repeatedly they want to be in the lead.

Well, this year, 2013, they are getting that opportunity. It’s already started. Over 90 percent of military operations in Afghanistan are being run completely or in the lead by Afghanistan security forces. This is a major transition from just a year ago when most military operations were in partnership. It’s occurring at a time when NATO has nearly 100,000 troops, U.S. about 65-66,000 still in Afghanistan, but they’re all postured to be in a supporting role. So, this is the time to see whether the huge effort to build Afghanistan security forces as a foundational effort for the future of Afghanistan as a
place that no longer can be a haven for terrorists who attack others, whether this foundational effort will work.

I think the early returns are good in a sense that if Afghanistan forces are able to end this summer’s fighting season where they began with all the advances of the last several years still intact. That will be a great victory for those forces.

And then they will be prepared for the big event of next year, which is the elections, the political process, the change in government that will take place in Afghanistan a year from now. Because you ask, Bruce, essentially how will we measure success? I think the world will measure success in Afghanistan. Afghans will measure success in Afghanistan by what happens on the political side a year from now. You mentioned the impressive turnout in Pakistan, how that was an affirmation of Pakistani people’s desire for a better future. Afghanistan isn’t positioned to have the same kind of process, but whether it does or not is really in the hands of the Afghans.

So, as we look ahead, I think first we have in the near-term the performance of the Afghanistan security forces in the fighting season, and then beyond that, the political process which will be virtually entirely up to the Afghans to be able to prove that they are in a position to take control of their own destiny.

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you, David. Let me ask one follow-up question right off the bat. You’re not in government, so your prediction is not set in stone, but what do you think will be the U.S. role in Afghanistan after 2014? What do you think is the proper U.S. role after 2014?

MR. SEDNEY: Well, coming from my own security background, working on building the Afghanistan security forces for the last four and half years, I think the major financial commitment will continue to be supporting the Afghan security forces; training, advising, assisting, and funding, although with a lot of help from other countries.

But I think we will see a shift in the weight from a focus -- we already are seeing a shift in the weight and focus from the military security side to the development side. The goals and agenda that were laid out last summer in Tokyo, both in terms of assistance promised by others and performance pledged by the Afghanistan government under the initial accountability framework, I think we’ll see a shift.
to that more civilian focus, again depending on how the security effort this summer goes.

MR. RIEDEL: And one related but last question. Maybe a little bit naïve, but humor me. Many Afghans and many Pakistanis believe that, in fact, the United States is getting ready to cut and run. They’ve watched this movie before, literally. It’s a movie we’ve all watched, Charlie Wilson’s War. They think they’re about to see page 2 where the United States just runs away. What is your confidence level that that’s not the case?

MR. SEDNEY: My confidence level today is actually quite high, Bruce, and I’m quite aware that there’s no such thing as a naïve question from Bruce Riedel. And my confidence rose not just from my experience in the United States, but also from my discussions with colleagues from the entire international effort in Afghanistan. The NATO ISAF effort is not just NATO, not just United States. It includes Arabic countries from the Gulf here. That includes Jordan. That includes Malaysia. It includes Japan and Korea and Australia. The commitment of other countries, Germany, for example, has already decided on the level of its commitment to military support to Afghanistan after 2014, so I think that larger international support for Afghanistan that has built up over the last 11 1/2 years is something that is stronger than most people give credit to and I think we will see, again, in the model you described and the model Ambassador Indyk described of the United States working with others on this project of helping Afghanistan succeed.

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you. Let’s get an Afghan view, if we can next. I’m a career intelligence officer. Bob Gates, one of America’s great intelligence officers, once characterized the difference between intelligence officers and politicians as, politicians, when they see flowers go by ask where the wedding is. Intelligence officers ask where the funeral is. As a consequence, intelligence officers are usually more pessimistic than politicians about where we are going. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the prospects for the Afghanistan, the Afghan army, and Afghan elections over the course of the next year and a half?

MR. SALEH: Thank you very much. Let me thank the management of the conference for inviting me; the Brookings Institution and the government of Qatar.

I will answer that question after just making some comments about the remarks of the
others because especially Mr. Martin’s remarks in the opening of the conference. He said the war in Afghanistan is ending. The war in Afghanistan is not like a bicycle race to have a start and finish line. That is the Western narrative to say the Afghanistan war is ending. We are not seeing how it is ending, but what we are seeing is the strong will of the Western nations which emerged immediately post-9/11 to finish off extremist militancy in our part of the world and not allow something called ungovernable areas or black holes to exist in that part of the world. That strong willingness and that strong political will is ending, but not the Afghanistan war because what is the Afghanistan war? The Afghanistan war is between democratic space assisted and aided by the United States and the rest of the world. On the other side extremist groups: Taliban, Al Qaeda, like-minded Pakistani extremist groups aided by Pakistan battling us. That is not ending.

The casualties are as high as they were 2 years ago, as they were in the beginning of the surge in 2009. In the last 3 months, Afghanistan police force alone suffered 800 casualties; killed or wounded. And the wounded are the people who will not be able to go back into their duties and perform and work as normal human beings. They have been maimed for their life.

So, it’s not a matter of pessimism or optimism, and I think we need to stick to a realistic narrative, and that realism in the narrative of Afghans and United States is a little fading away depending what suits the domestic politics of (inaudible) contributing countries. They create a narrative again to suit that political caveat.

Now, we are very thankful to the United States and other countries who, post-9/11, came and helped us build institutions. Mr. David Sedney, as he said, I agree with him. We have an institution which not before. We have a police force. We have an army. We have intelligence. We have parliament. We have a robust education system. We have a health system, and these are achievements largely because of the help from the United States, Western Europe, other countries that we have it.

But also, there was another point mentioned. They said the U.S. public is tired of a decade of war. Put yourself in the shoes of an Afghan. We have been, for over 35 years, in war. We fought the Soviets. We were promised a better future by our allies. But then came the collapse of the Soviet Union. The West achieved its macro-strategic objective, which was to see the Soviet Union gone.
and defense budget of the Western countries decrease.

Then the war in Afghanistan was termed a civil war. We were abandoned, and it was said that it’s in the blood of Afghans that they fight each other for control of the state’s resources or control of natural resources or for tribal and ethnic supremacy. I am gradually seeing that narrative re-emerging with the sentence said as it was said the war in Afghanistan is ending. What will be there is instability, fighting, terrorism, blasts, will be part of the Afghan life.

So, my concluding remarks to this question are that fundamentals have not changed. And those fundamentals are sanctuaries are still there. The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is at its lowest record ever. The democratic space in Afghanistan is not enlarging. It is shrinking because insurgency has gained momentum, so the key issues for us will be political transition with legitimacy next year, a firm commitment from the world community, particularly the United States, to remain engaged with Afghans so we do not see total collapse of democratic space.

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you. As I expected, a very comprehensive review. There’s one issue though that you didn’t raise, and I saw you talking about it on Al Jazeera just an hour ago. There is a very common wisdom out there that the real solution to the problem in Afghanistan is some kind of political process; that there should be negotiations between the Taliban and Kabul to try to find a negotiated end to the conflict. (A) Do you think that’s realistic? Is there a real possibility of negotiations with the Taliban, and (B) is there a false hope here that’s being propagated that there is some magic solution to Afghan problems if only we can reason together in Doha or someplace like that?

MR. SALEH: First of all, taking into view and consideration the suffering of the Afghan people over the last four decades, I would say there is genuine desire to have peace. Afghanistan has massive soft power. As I said earlier, we have a functioning education system, a relatively functioning health system. The Afghans have access to mobile phones. We have -- I was flying together with our Minister of Communications. He said Afghanistan has 20 million active SIM cards. Out of a population of over 30 million, that’s impressive.

But the question is can the soft power of Afghanistan keep the insurgency at bay, and as I said earlier, democratic space increase. No, we need hard power to defend our achievements, and our
hard power is our army, our police, and other security agencies. The defense forces of Afghanistan, they do not have, let's say, conventional strength per se. These are forces half-equipped. They're still not fully trained and well equipped to defend Afghanistan's territorial integrity against a more robust infiltration from our neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan or to defend Afghanistan post-2014 if we are not aided by (inaudible) and air assets of NATO and constant embedded Special Forces officers.

But now, can we negotiate with the Taliban? And who are the Taliban? Where are they? I have said this time and again, we kill a lot of expendable Taliban. If you read about Afghanistan's situation, you will find out NATO killed this number of Taliban in this province or that province, but these are expendable Taliban. These are foot soldiers who are sent from sanctuaries, who are sent from Pakistan to be killed in Afghanistan. The number of real Taliban killed is minimal. The only big name that has been killed from the Taliban leadership is Mullah Dadullah who dared to venture out from Pakistan and came to Helmond back in 2007, and he did not survive for 2 months. He was killed. So, the Taliban command and control center is not in my soil. It's not in Afghanistan.

So, what do they want? Why they are not coming to the negotiations? There is a perception problem. Perhaps it's not perception. Perhaps it's a reality. Pakistan and Taliban believe that they're about to win the marathon. It is another mile that they have to run. If they have managed to (inaudible) elephant for 13 years, they can wait another year, and they can wait another year. They can wear down the patience of NATO and United States, and they're hoping to have a stronger position for bargaining in the negotiations table.

Now, let us have a jump and say we are in 2014, and we have this oddly decorated table where on one side we sit and on the other side the Taliban. What do they want? If Taliban become democratic, which is our dream, which is our wish, which is what you want, which is what we want, they will melt down. Democratization of the Taliban will mean death of the Taliban, and they know it. So, therefore, their aim is to remain militant, but in the meantime, eventually enter into a ceasefire arrangement with Kabul. I have used the example of Lebanon. The Taliban dream is to remain something like Hezbollah where they have a share of the power, but they remain a state within a state. They will control territory. They have some capability to deliver services, and they have their guns if the...
arrangement does not suit their interests. They have the ability to resort to violence and fighting again.

That theoretically means two states emerging in Afghanistan, one which has had a pro-Taliban mentality. This is not Taliban, sorry. This is just Pakistan. (Laughter) -- and parts of the country under their control. In that type of a situation, the Afghan society will be deeply fragmented, and we will not have stability. So, the ideal situation will be to DDR the Taliban; disarm them, demobilize them, and reintegrate them, which they don't want.

Is there a middle ground? We in Afghanistan believe the key to the middle ground is in the hands of Rawalpindi. It's in the hands of the establishment in Pakistan. If they come to conclusion that Pakistan can gain enormously from good relationship with its neighbors, Pakistan instead of promoting militancy and extremism can promote trade, commerce, and harmony in the region. Taliban will lose relevance, and we will come to a settled Afghanistan which will not pose a threat to any of its neighbors.

MR. RIEDEL: I think that perfectly brings us to you, Husain. We've already heard President Obama say U.S./Pakistani relations are at an all-time low. We've heard Amrullah say Afghan/Pakistan relations are at an all-time low. Where do we go from here? Is the third coming of the come-back kid, Nawaz Sharif, reason for hope, change, or is Pakistan still stuck between -- (Interruption) (Recess)

MR. HAQQANI: Let me just begin by saying that it's very interesting that you had to have three officials, an American, a Pakistani and an Afghan, who all left their government, to be able to have an honest discussion about Afghanistan and Pakistan out here.

MR. RIEDEL: I tried to choose wisely.

MR. HAQQANI: Absolutely. Here's the problem. There are just too many myths about these two very important countries. For example, you mentioned Charlie Wilson’s War. Charlie Wilson’s war was only fought in Washington, D.C. What was fought in Afghanistan was a jihad, a jihad by people who actually believed in it and then after the Americans withdrew their support from it, the war that continued there was Zia-ul-Haq’s war, which was primarily for Pakistan’s strategic objectives as Zia-ul-
Haq and the Pakistani military and the ISI saw it, and that plunged Afghanistan into a long civil war because the Soviets were gone, so the Americans were gone, and once they were gone, nobody paid any attention.

Then, there is the war against terrorism. Pakistan’s involvement in that war has not been for the same objectives as has been stated by General Musharraf or the Americans. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan is still continuing with the same war that was there before, which is a kind of strategic depth argument that Afghanistan is our natural backyard, that we need to exclude India from any influence in our (inaudible), and to settle the Pashtunistan question, which still ranked in the minds of Pakistani establishment even if Afghanistan has not officially raised it for a long time.

So, it comes from an internal insecurity in Pakistan.

Now, as far as the Pakistani domestic political situation is concerned, one must understand that the price the Zardari government paid for completing its term, was to withdraw increasingly from the sphere of national security policy. Will Nawaz Sharif also have to do the same? We will just have to wait and see. He may bring about better economic management, he does represent, of course, an overwhelming majority of Pakistani voter’s aspirations, people have voted for him, but it must also be seen that for the first time in Pakistan, no political party, including Mr. Sharif’s, has received an overwhelming number of votes throughout the country.

Mr. Sharif has got his overwhelming majority in parliament primarily by sweeping the province of Punjab. He has no seat or very few seats from other provinces, and that really creates a problem for what direction Pakistan’s identity crisis, which has lingered on for a long time, will take.

So, will the establishment now take a deep breath, reflect on the last 66 years and reach the conclusion that people that it has really driven out of the country in the past for saying that Pakistan should embrace its diversity and should be genuinely democratic in recognizing that there are several ethnic groups within the country, that there are several aspirations for the country that need to be reconciled or will they continue to move along with what they consider to be Pakistan’s primary security paradigm? If they continue to do that, I’m afraid Mr. Sharif will have similar setbacks that he and the PPP have had in the past.
If the establishment genuinely relinquishes control, there will be considerable change. I do not see that happening right away.

On Afghanistan, I think there are two important things that we should bear in mind. One is the narrative of the jihadists, al-Qaeda, Taliban. The way they see it, they have forced America to withdraw. They do not pay attention to what is said by White House spokespersons. They think that just as they made the Soviet Union withdraw, they have made America withdraw, and that will only encourage their global jihadist agenda, it will not discourage them.

In fact, I will not be surprised if people with a shared ideology with al-Qaeda and the Taliban in other parts of the world say, hurray, we fought, we defeated the Soviets, and we have fought and we have defeated the Americans. Here’s the time to press our advantage. And that may actually spur the same kind of backlash and the same kind of terrorism that followed from the Soviet defeat from this perceived American defeat.

Second is that from Pakistan’s perspective, if Pakistan’s concerns that made Pakistan prolong the agony of Afghanistan in the form of the civil war, which was to deny influence to other regional powers in Afghanistan, if that persists then there will be a Pakistani narrative as well, which is, the Soviets left and we were saddled with the baggage. Now the Americans have left and we are saddled with the baggage again. And who are the instruments of Pakistani influence in Afghanistan? It’s not my friend (inaudible), it’s not President Hamid Karzai, it’s unfortunately again the Taliban, hence the reluctance of the Pakistani intelligence service to put the Taliban out for negotiations.

And my last point very quickly is, when other people talk about negotiations or about Afghanistan, they should never forget the basic principle that you cannot have a negotiation between the fire and the fire brigade. You can have a negotiation between the arsonist and the fire brigade, because the fire is not what you are -- is not the negotiating partner here and so it is important to identify who is the arsonist in Afghanistan and then talk to the Arsonist to get a possible deal that will prevent them from lighting the fire. This assumption that somehow you can talk to the fire, if only you can bring the fire out to some nice place in a beautiful hotel in a third country, is not going to work.

So, I think I have said quite a lot in this very short time.
MR. RIEDEL: You have -- let me ask you one follow up question. You talked a lot about the establishment, about the army, who I think, if I understood, might also be subtitled “The Arsonists”. This fall, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff will transition. In many ways, that may be a more important transition than the democratically elected transition.

Pakistani Army is, for Americans and other outsiders, a very, very difficult institution to understand. Do you see prospects for real change in the army with the change in command this year? And what is it that the army wants, especially in Afghanistan, but more broadly?

MR. HAQQANI: Look, again I’ll -- I mean, with Americans I always remind them that they’re a nation whose attitude to history is that, you know, the phrase “that’s history” means “that’s irrelevant”. But history is very important and in case of a country like Pakistan, which has a very short history but a desire to compete with a nation or nations around it with much longer history, history is all-important.

So, here’s the problem. The Pakistani’s military’s individual changes are changes of style, but there is a worldview, Pakistan takes pride in being an ideological state. People like me would want it to be a pragmatic state, a state that actually has policies, not a belief system, and because of that ideology, the changes in the leaders are not as deep as Americans often take it to be.

How much was the real difference between (inaudible) Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf? I mean, yes, Zia-ul-Haq served orange juice, Musharraf was willing to serve scotch, but that really is not the basis of the huge difference. In terms of the fundamentals, Musharraf’s world view -- I mean, you should read the comments that sort of people who interacted with Zia-ul-Haq they make about his views on India, his views on Afghanistan, his views on Iran, his views on Pakistan’s national security, and then you should read the same of Musharraf.

Then move forward and come to the current leadership of the Pakistani army, and the views are, again, not very different, they’re just adapted, but here is a fundamental construct, and that construct is that Pakistan is hemmed in by enemies all the time, the whole world is against Pakistan, the only thing that keeps Pakistan together is a strong military. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons to get ultimate security, but now a new layer of insecurity has been added, which I often say is like a guy who
buys a gun and then stays up all night out of fear that somebody will steal the gun. And that is the new layer of insecurity.

Usually a country becomes very secure with nuclear weapons but -- you know, unless you’re Kim Jong-Un and North Korea. So, Pakistan’s security paradigm needs an open debate and Pakistanis like me who want that open debate are not necessarily welcome now because it’s easier to keep that paradigm alive by not allowing it to be debated.

But if there’s a genuine debate in Pakistan, people will say, how much security do we really need? What are our security threats? Will a sovereign, independent, democratic Afghanistan be a threat to us or will it be a partner for us? Why can’t we have a friendly government in Kabul by befriending the government in Kabul instead of trying to impose a government in Kabul, which is what Pakistan has tried to do since 1989?

So, those are debates that are not necessarily present in Pakistani society, and the Pakistani military, it’s a very disciplined institution, it’s an institution that is trained in a certain manner. I personally feel that the over emphasis on individuals that Americans sometimes have in policy, does not necessarily apply to a state like Pakistan.

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you. Mike, you have made the case now for years that the United States needs to tough it out in Afghanistan.

We’ve just heard Husain say that the forces of the global jihad are on the verge of proclaiming strategic victory in forcing the Americans out. What does the United States need to do now to signal to Afghans, Pakistanis, that it is serious about toughing it out, that it is not cutting and running? What kind of statements do we need to hear from the White House, from other senior policymakers, about America’s path forward?

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you, Bruce, and it’s an honor to be on this panel and to be here in Doha at the forum and to be following up on this conversation, including the conversation between -- the shadow conversation between Martin Indyk and (inaudible) Asali and I’d like to pick up on that in regard to your question.

I think the simplest thing to say to start, and I do not speak for the Administration and
have not been in the Administration, but this Administration’s policies are actually substantially more resolute on Afghanistan than its rhetoric, and I think, therefore, the natural and simple answer to your question, Bruce, is the Administration should take credit for its strength of policy and for its strength of commitment.

Unfortunately, there’s an American political dynamic, a perceived American political necessity, that leads President Obama to speak the way that Martin Indyk mentioned earlier that he often speaks. I think Martin was paraphrasing President Obama more than necessarily declaring that the war was about to end.

But we do talk about it this way. President Obama talks about ending two wars, and again, he feels the need to say that, apparently, to make Americans who are tired of these conflicts stay with whatever is still needed. I think he actually should be a little bit more straightforward in how he describes his own policies.

Let me give you just a very quick capsule history of how President Obama’s policies are actually much stronger than his own rhetoric sometimes implies, much stronger than people commonly perceive. He gave a West Point speech in 2009, which is now often remembered for the fact that he promised to start ending the surge a year and a half later, but he actually tripled U.S. combat forces in that first year in office, following up on Bruce Riedel’s initial review, which was then complemented by the McChrystal White House process later that year.

The net effect was to triple U.S. forces, and yet all we think about is how Obama didn’t want to commit to stay forever. Obama’s surge in Afghanistan lasted just as long as President Bush’s surge in Iraq. The difference was the rhetoric, not the duration of the surge.

Today in Afghanistan the United States still has twice as many troops as it did when President Obama took office. In 2012, President Obama ran for reelection during a time of internal reflection in the United States, a perceived need to focus more on our own problems, and yet during that entire year, he never accelerated the drawdown of American forces in Afghanistan.

He gave a speech in June 2011 in which he said he would accelerate the drawdown a bit more than General Petraeus and other commanders would have preferred, but in fact he then kept his
mouth shut on any policy changes for the next 18 months and he did not speak about Afghanistan again in terms of any new reduction strategy until his State of the Union address this year after winning reelection.

And of course, in that address he emphasized that he was going to cut our forces by half by next year, but he could have just as easily said, I’m going to keep our forces right where they are for another fighting season, because that’s the other part of this policy, which he didn’t want to talk about, but our forces in Afghanistan this year, as I mentioned, are not being cut substantially during the fighting season and they remain twice as numerous as they were when President Obama took office.

So, the policies are resolute. Admittedly, there is some wavering. The last thing I’ll say is that I just had the privilege, as you alluded to, Bruce, of coauthoring a paper with former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy and former Commander of the ISAF mission, John Allen, and we talked about how we hope the Administration will be forthcoming fairly soon on committing to a relatively robust, enduring presence in Afghanistan, and that tells you something, that two very loyal former officials of this Administration wanted to go on record giving a slight nudge to the remaining members of the Administration to please be resolute and forthright fairly soon, but the policy recommendation was nuanced and not radically different from where either Flournoy or Allen or myself saw things going already.

In other words, we were essentially asking the Administration, in a sense, to take rhetorical and public credit for the policies that we think it probably still believes in. And so, actions speak louder than words. Unfortunately, words can undercut actions and I think there’s been too much reluctance on the part of my countrymen and my government to acknowledge just how firm and resolute they’ve been on Afghanistan.

But the last thing, to wrap it all together, this is President Obama’s war now. Now, admittedly, it’s fundamentally the Afghan’s war and South Asia’s war, but in terms of American politics and the American legacy, this will be seen as President Obama’s conflict. For better or for worse, he’s not going to be able to change that fact and he knows it, which means that any policy that implied accepting defeat in Afghanistan is not realistic for him, and I think that’s a good thing, but again, think
about how presidents in our country think of their role in the history books. They don't like to be seen as losing wars on their watch, and President Obama is not going to do it either.

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you, Mike. There's one other aspect of the American war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it's the aspect that, if you watch television, predominates more than any other, and that's the drone war. Every day American drones fly over Pakistan. Two years ago, every other day they fired lethal ordinance at a target on the ground, now it's more likely once every two weeks.

Are we getting this right? Do we need to continue to use the drones? Did the President, in your judgment, get the drone issue right in his speech on the 24th of May?

MR. O'HANLON: Yeah, it's a great question, Bruce. My instincts on this are that we still don't have the explanation right. Whatever else we're doing, we still need to, for one thing, underscore just how hard we're working to minimize civilian casualties with these strikes.

There's a perception around the world, which may have been true at one time, I don't think it's true any longer, that the United States was a little bit too cavalier about when it would push the trigger and fire the drone ordinance, and I think in the last couple of years, from what I've seen, the number of civilian casualties that we have caused from these drone strikes, while still too many and still regrettable, is measured in the dozens, not in the hundreds and not in the thousands.

That's still a very important human tragedy, but by the standards of warfare, it's a fairly careful and restrained use of force. I don't think that's well understood. I think it's, in fact, disbelieved by most people, and that part of it, at a minimum, we need to work harder to explain.

I think the frequency of drone strikes is headed in the right direction. We don't need to use them as often, we may need to even reduce the frequency a little more, but I'm even more concerned, as I mentioned, about this issue of properly explaining how we make decisions and how we've become, I think, very, very careful in deciding when to fire.

MR. RIEDEL: Ambassador Haqqani, your country has demanded an end to drone wars, not less, not more surveillance/less lethal missions; an end to the drone wars. To me, that's probably a showstopper for the United States of America. Is there any way around this?

MR. HAQQANI: Well, first of all, I agree with Mike, by the way, and as ambassador,
when I was in an official position, you may recall that I used to say that quite often, that the U.S. government needs to -- look, if you're conducting war and you do not want to acknowledge that you are, then you will create problems. You will give the other side the opportunity -- if you announce how many casualties have resulted from a strike, then you have a counter-narrative otherwise the narrative is only one-sided and that is drones somehow kill civilians.

Secondly, there is the surveillance function of the drone, which is far more important. I mean, these drone strikes have become -- you know, they have become the lightning rod because that's what gets talked about, but for every strike, there are thousands of hours of flights that have taken place, primarily gathering intelligence.

And here's the point that I used to make in government, and I'm making out of government. If there are going to be parts of a country where the country's government (inaudible) does not run, then somebody will have to exercise some kind of surveillance there to be able to find out what's happening there if it's going to affect every other country. Like, I always argue that bin Laden violated Pakistani sovereignty first. Everybody talks about the American violation of Pakistani sovereignty in taking out bin Laden, but nobody talks about the fact that he was also violating Pakistani sovereignty by operating out of Pakistani territory without Pakistani official sanction.

So, the real way of getting around, for Pakistan, in my humble opinion, is that either Pakistan exercises full control over the territories over which the drones operate, and Pakistan says, you share the intelligence with us and we will take these people out if it has the capacity, and if it does not, then I think it is something we will all have to, unfortunately, live with, whether we agree with it or not because let us be honest, a drone strike causes far less fatalities and casualties than a B-52 bombing would, or for that matter, an F-16 strike would, which is the Pakistani official way of dealing with these situations in remote mountains.

MR. RIEDEL: Amrullah, you famously confronted President Musharraf in 2008 or 2007 that high value target number one, Osama bin Laden, was hiding somewhere in the Abbottabad area. If I recall, his reaction to you was, “What do you think my country is, a banana republic?”

Is Pakistan’s tolerance of terrorism receding at all? Do you see any way it is? And how
do you think the United States should deal with Pakistan’s tolerance of terrorism and unwanted guests, if they are unwanted, like Osama bin Laden and now Ayman al-Zawahiri?

MR. SALEH: I don’t think Osama bin Laden violated Pakistani sovereignty. He went to a country where he was welcomed both by political forces and by some consent of specific circles in the establishment.

Now, to recall that famous conversation I had with ex-president Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan, this is what we brought to his attention. We said, “Excellency, we have reports which suggest and we are very confident of our information, that bin Laden is not in tribal areas, he’s not hiding in the mountains, he’s not walking every day to dig another cave or find a sanctuary in the wild tribal areas of Pakistan. We, based on circumstantial evidence and some hard evidence, we believe he is in Mansehra.”

I didn’t pronounce the word Abbottabad, but Abbottabad and Mansehra are about 12 miles away from each other. They are not far away from each other.

And he got very emotional and he said, “Pakistan is not a banana republic and I do not buy intelligence from lowly Afghan intelligence, et cetera, et cetera,” but we were proven right. Years later, bin Laden was found in Abbottabad.

Before coming to Doha two days ago, I spoke to an ex case officer who for years has been watching Abbottabad and Mansehra. He’s out of his job and bin Laden’s compound was not and -- was not the only al-Qaeda compound in Abbottabad. There were other Taliban and al-Qaeda compounds there post that famous operation, probably al-Qaeda compounds have closed down, but this officer has been telling me that until a few months ago, famous Taliban leaders still resided either in Abbottabad or near Abbottabad.

Now, what we as Afghans propose to the Pakistani government is this, we say, because you have been giving refuge and assistance to Afghans during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and because millions of Afghans talk to millions of Pakistanis every day, thousands of Afghans go to thousands of Pakistani doctors every day, people to people relationship between our two countries is excellent, what you need to do is stop recognizing the defunct emirate of Malamaal and recognize Kabul
as the legitimate state of Afghanistan. If you stop dealing with non-state actors, if you stop dealing with groups that you wish to come and dominate politics of Afghanistan, you can influence Afghanistan legitimately, you can overcome those concerns and anxieties that you have believing and thinking that Afghanistan may be used against Pakistan.

There is a soft way, there is a civilized way of discussing those issues with us, so the Pakistan policy has been they sort of slap the Afghans ten times and then they say, we are friends. That has not worked in the past two decades, at least. They have bombed our graveyards, they have bombed our hotels, they have assassinated our political leaders, they have bombed our national days, they have tried to assassinate our president, they have done all sorts of things, but then they say we are victims of terrorism.

It is very difficult for Afghans to believe they are victims of terrorism while we understand and they admit that they are with the Taliban.

Now, every time I am asked if we have a smoking gun as hard evidence in our hand to show they are with the Taliban, with all due respect to the host country, supposedly there is a Taliban office here. Where are they coming from? They fly either from Islamabad or Karachi. When they come to Doha, they come from Karachi, Islamabad or Lahore, and when they go back for consultation with their leaders, they go from Doha to Karachi or Islamabad.

So, Pakistan serves as the headquarters of the Taliban. That shows the level of the tolerance of the Pakistani establishment for not only Taliban, but extremist groups as a whole in that region.

So, for as long as it is state policy in Pakistan to use these groups for promotion of its agenda, not in Afghanistan only, but in other countries, that part of the world will remain unstable for a long time.

Well, that said, what hurts us is, west is now sitting on mountains and mountains of intelligence knowing Islamabad is guilty of supporting these groups and has massive tolerance for their existence, but yet there is no tough action against the establishment and the military infrastructure in Pakistan. That has created a conspiracy theory in Afghanistan, and that we ask ourselves a simple
question, why the west is financing both sides of the conflict. They are giving billions of dollars for Pakistan army to “give them the counter-insurgency capabilities” and part of that money then leaks into the hands of the Taliban. In the meantime, they are helping the Afghan government to keep the Taliban at bay, who are financed by (inaudible).

That conspiracy theory again has created the notion that perhaps there is a hidden wider agenda in which we are not a player and we are not taken into confidence.

MR. RIEDEL: It’s not just conspiracy theorists who ask the question why the United States provides so much money to the Pakistani military.

David, you’ve been constrained for the last five years from talking about the drone war. You may still not want to talk about the drone war, but before we go to questions from the public, I want to give you the opportunity to talk about the drone war or anything else you’ve heard here, and please put your hands up, I’m going to go to you next, and please identify yourself when I call on you.

David.

MR. SEDNEY: I would like to comment on two things, Bruce. First, great respect for all my colleagues here and their views, particularly Amrullah Saleh, who I’ve worked with for many years before he was in the government, when he was in the government, when he was out of the government, when he was back in the government, and of course, out of the government now, but who knows what’s next.

Amrullah made the point about the casualties that the Afghan Security Forces are taking now. I think that, as tragic as it is, not as evidence of failure, but as evidence of progress because what’s happened in Afghanistan over the last two years is instead of foreign forces taking the brunt of the casualties, foreign forces leading the fighting, today it’s the Afghan forces leading the fighting and they are fighting with Afghans, they are fighting with the Taliban, with obviously, leadership and the safe havens mentioned in Pakistan.

That is important not just because of the issue of the strength of the Afghan Security Forces, which as I said before, are proving to be often better than they thought they were going to be in these conflicts, but they do take casualties. They are not as well equipped as the foreign forces are.
They are still many, many decades behind the U.S. Army, the German army, the British army and others, though they are improving in many areas.

But I also wanted to point out that there’s a issue of ideology here because the Taliban’s ideology is, as Ambassador Haqqani said, one of jihad, that they are fighting to evict foreign forces from Afghanistan. This year, they are not fighting foreign forces. Yes, there are foreign forces still there, we’re still supporting them, but the leadership -- and not just the fighting, but the planning, the interaction with the enemy on the battlefield, is done by the Afghan leadership, and this cuts to the core, I think, of the Taliban narrative. Are they fighting a jihad to evict foreigners from Afghanistan and then able to claim the victory that the ambassador mentioned? Or is Afghanistan, with the help of the international community, standing up for itself and being able to control its own destiny, being able to control its own security?

Regardless of what happens elsewhere, Afghanistan will need strong security forces. I think history shows that Afghanistan will face great security problems. A weak security infrastructure in Afghanistan is likely to lead to continued conflict in ways we can’t even predict, so Afghanistan needs that base.

And then the final point I would make -- I went beyond two, I’m adding a third, Bruce -- is the point that Amrullah Saleh made earlier, which I think is very true and I hear it as well, both in Afghanistan and other places including Pakistan, and that’s being tired of war, seeking peace, but of course that peace can only come from Afghans talking to Afghans. It definitely needs to come in a regional construct.

The role of Pakistan, as we’ve heard from people here today, is highly important, but in the end it’s going to be Afghans who are going to have to make peace with Afghans and that is something that, at the core, is how this war will end, when there are -- there’s an agreement between those sides.

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you. Now it’s over to you. What I’d like to do is take two or three questions. If you have a question for a particular individual, please indicate who that is. Our policy is always ladies first. I think a microphone will be coming to you hopefully in a second.

QUESTIONER: (Inaudible) from the Wilson Center in Washington, DC. Question for Amrullah Saleh. I would like Michael’s input on that question. What do you think the role of Iran is going
to be after the withdrawal of the U.S. troops? And you alluded to the wish of maybe the Taliban to become another Hezbollah. We know who has created Hezbollah and who is financing Hezbollah. So, can you comment on that a little bit in Afghanistan? And Michael, what do you think the U.S. believes that Iran is going to do? Thank you.

MR. RIEDEL: There’s a gentleman right behind there with a hat on. Could you identify yourself and ask your question?

QUESTIONER: (Inaudible), a journalist from Pakistan. I wish there would have been a presentation from Pakistan on the panel because Mr. Husain Haqqani is representing America or American policies.

To Mr. Mike, Pakistan has paid any price on U.S. war or not?

MR. RIEDEL: One more. Sadeen Ibrahim please.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. My question is to Husain and Amrullah. After listening to the panel, I ended up with impression that there are vested interests in maintaining that conflict flurry and that’s what I would like the panel to address.

There are, obviously, those who are benefitting from the continuation of that intensity of conflict in both Afghanistan and on the border with Pakistan. And I do not hear the role of the military, especially of the ISI, in Pakistan, which some people have alluded there they are really, the prime mover in maintaining that level of intensity of the conflict because it serves their interest, and I’d like to see if that theory is wanting in any way. Thank you.

MR. RIEDEL: Husain, would you like to go first?

MR. HAQQANI: I’m going to give a quick response to that. It’s not just vested interest, it’s a worldview and as the gentleman on the right reflected it, there is a view that there is only one possible policy for Pakistan, and that that policy is represented by the ISI and by the Pakistani army.

Because there has been no debate within Pakistan, that there can be alternative visions for Pakistan, therefore it has become, unfortunately, a kind of a -- the view of a vested interest. But it’s not just vested interest, it’s not just vested interest, it’s a worldview, it’s a belief system, it’s an ideology, and that in itself will prolong it, because even if the state and the government decide that we are going to
change this policy, there are people down below who believe it and they believe this is the way forward.

And I'll just give one little anecdote, that right after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, I used to go for Friday prayers to a mosque near my office in Islamabad and outside the mosque on the wall was written a small poem, and that poem loosely translated into English read something like this: “We have forced the breakup of the Soviet Union. Tomorrow we will force the breakup of India. And (inaudible), one day we will see the lightening of jihad burning down America.”

This is way back, 1991, '92, so obviously it's a belief system that this is what we need to do, that this is the way we will create a new world, and whether, you know, unless and until somebody confronts that belief system, and as long as some people in the state apparatus say, maybe it's not that bad, these people are important for us because of our own national security, it will continue to be that way.

I hope that Amrullah has a slightly sort of similar view on this, or maybe he may want to take up the question of the ISI with greater intensity than I am willing to take at this point.

MR. RIEDEL: Please.

MR. SALEH: Ma'am, first to your question, because sometimes I am labeled a single-issue politician (inaudible) with ISI and Pakistan, so I would like to talk about Iran a little.

When it comes to the role of Iran and my country, it has evolved into three stages. Immediately post-9/11, the Iranians thought that a gesture towards America by cooperating on the issue of terrorism “influencing the northern alliance to be more cooperative and also sharing intelligence with America” may serve as a strategic opening for the interest of Iran. At that time, the president of Iran was Khatami, and his slogan was, participation. Participate in dialogue, participate in rebuilding of Afghanistan, and participate in dismantling of the Sunni extremist terror groups in the region. And they were hoping that by providing and extending this cooperation, they will be able to get concessions from the United States on other issues.

They stopped this attitude or this phase of cooperation end of 2003 because United States did not welcome it. United States did not give a high value to the Iranian cooperation. And now there is a lot of material emerging, stories from United States books written from other corners and
revealing what was a few years ago secret and hidden, now it is available and you can also find it in open sources.

Then came the second phase, with election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He believed that benign and soft policies of Khatami were counterproductive, not only the United States did not give any value to the Iranian cooperation, it did not lead to a strategic opening in the relationship between the two countries, so let us have a tougher stand, both in Afghanistan and in the region, and stop any type of cooperation.

So, let us say since 2005, the Iranians reestablished links with all sorts of groups inside Afghanistan, but the Iranian policy in Afghanistan has been mainly standing on three pillars. Pillar one, maintain close, good, and friendly relationship with Kabul, and this has been admitted and acknowledged by President Karzai and they have helped the state of Afghanistan in various ways, as I joked earlier with my friend Mr. Riedel, they have given money on the table, under the table, so that's no longer a secret.

Pillar two of their strategy has been to maintain a balance by having a relationship with democratic opposition, expanding the cultural influence of Iran, financing what they call value-based media outlets in Afghanistan, and also deepening the historical ties, not necessarily through state channels, but through non-state channels.

That sometimes, depending to which section of Afghan society you talk to, some consider it positive, some consider it negative, we are not united on how to define the influence of Iran in Afghanistan.

And the third pillar of the Iranian policy has been, okay, there is this notion that Iran is under siege because of the U.S. presence in the region. Iranians say, well, these troops being so close to us means they gave us the ability to strike at targets of our choice if Iran comes under attack, so therefore maintaining links with proxy groups with capability of striking at U.S. interest in the region as part of the Iranian strategy, which means basically that old saying of the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Now, that is how Iran is in Afghanistan today, but for pushing the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan state, the Iranian influence on Taliban is not deep. It is an opportunistic relationship. But for pushing the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan state is through Islamabad through (inaudible).
On the role of the ISI, when we talk about the ISI, we specifically talk about three departments of ISI who are involved in Afghanistan, and their involvement goes back to the very early days of the creation of Pakistan as a state, but these three departments of ISI were massively assisted back in the ‘80s by the NATO block to defeat soviet forces in Afghanistan, and these three divisions are, direct (inaudible), which is specifically designed for Afghanistan when it comes to sabotage, manipulation, financing, et cetera, et cetera.

Then we have the SSG, Special Services Group. This is part of the army. These are special units that were created back in the ‘50s with the help of the United States to be prepared for countering communist insurgency in Pakistan, but since their creation, they have been more involved with Afghan and venture until today, and some of the units from the SSG were fighting alongside the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, and they were evacuated based on an understanding with the United States post-9/11.

And there is what used to be but is still functioning, Afghan Logistic Cell. Afghan Logistic Cell is a transport network functioning within Pakistan handled by ISI, so when they transport staff for the Taliban and if these staff are stopped by regular Pakistani police, it is the ISI liaison telling them to release these convoys.

Why I went into details of outlining which sections of ISI handle Afghan situation, it’s because sometimes in order to justify no action or soft action against Pakistan, they say, perhaps there are rogue elements. It’s a big country and big organization, rogue elements -- we are not talking about rogue elements. ISI is a very disciplined organization. Pakistan army is a very disciplined organization. You have seen very few defections of the army officers. You have seen very few defections of the ISI officers to other countries, so they remain very loyal to the system.

And I totally agree with Mr. Husain Haqqani that the country for many years is punching above its weight. They are hoping to dismember and dismantle big countries. They want to handle while they are suffering from energy crisis, government crisis, it is a country sinking into ethnic politics, but yet when it comes to the project of Afghanistan, they are as over-confident as they were in ’88.

MR. RIEDEL: Let’s get some more questions from the audience. Over here, sir, right in
the front. And please identify yourself.

MR. MAGID: My name is Mohamed Magid. I'm the president of Islamic Society of North America and the Imam of ADAMS Center. My question is that I heard the issue of ideology and you made an example, Ambassador, about the mosque in Pakistan, and the issue of parliament. How much of this is about religious leaders and religion debates with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and how much are you involving or you believe that the religious leadership be involved in this issue of ideology?

And the second question is that, does the road to peace in Afghanistan goes through needle head, seems like Pakistan having an issue of India coming to Afghanistan, where is India in this dialogue?

MR. RIEDEL: If you could just pass it right next to you. Please, we need some hard questions for the Americans here.

MR. TURK: My name is Jihad Turk. I'm serving as president of a new Islamic Graduate Seminary called Bayan Claremont. Going back to the drone issue, it seems to me that the number of civilians that the Taliban kill in their attacks on whatever targets that they target, far exceeds the number of those that are killed by the drone attacks. And as a critic of the drone war, it still seems to me that the advantage that the Taliban use in the rhetoric and the narrative of somehow taking the high moral ground against the Americans that are killing civilians is not a credible one given the number of civilians that they kill in that particular conflict.

What is, number one, really behind the sentiment that they're able to generate anti-American sentiment with regards to the drone war? And if it's an issue of breaking the sovereignty of Pakistan, you know, isn't there some way to at least undermine this argument that they're making about taking the moral high ground?

MR. RIEDEL: Let's get a couple more. I thought I saw a hand over here. Please. Yes.

QUESTIONER: Good morning, everybody. I'm (inaudible) from Afghanistan. I was really honored to be here and (inaudible) to all of you, understanding and deep knowledge about Afghanistan. I would like to have my opinion as a comment of one in this panel discussion because all politicians are on the table. I think it's better to have view of a common average person.
I think nobody can ignore the influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan affairs. A blind can ignore that, a deaf, a dumb. Not a (inaudible) person.

We depend on Pakistan for all aspects of life, politically, economically, and also ideologically. Politically, in the last three decades, almost, our technicians, our doctors, our engineers, were trained in Pakistan universities during the refugee life we had in Pakistan.

And from ideological perspective also, lots of Afghans, while refuge life, they were trained in Pakistani madrassas. And also from economical point of view, it's obvious, our heat is coming from Pakistan. On a daily basis, hundreds of Afghans are going for medical treatment to Pakistan. For all aspects we are depending on Pakistan.

When you were talking about transition and upcoming election in 2014 in Afghanistan, a question was coming in my mind. Okay, we have weak leadership in Afghanistan. The person who was put on Afghanistan leadership, cheered by U.S. government was failed. Of course, we have very weak opposition to the current government system. They are lacking trust of people.

So, you don't think it is paving the way for Taliban’s emerging and coming to power?

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you. Thank you. I’m very glad you raised the question of President Karzai, because as we wind down here I want all of you to think what it is we should be listening for tonight when we speak to -- when President Karzai speaks to us.

I’m going to take one more question and then we’re going to go around and let everyone respond to these and have their last word.

All the way over there, please, sir.

MR. SERWER: I’m Daniel Serwer. I’m a professor at Johns Hopkins (SAIS).

Ambassador Haqqani, you mentioned the issue of Pashtunistan as one of the things that motivates Pakistani policy. Would recognition of the Durand Line make a difference? And Amrullah Saleh, why does Afghanistan not accept the Durand Line, and what would motivate you to do so?

MR. RIEDEL: Let’s start with Mike. He can respond to any of these questions you’ve heard, but please also give us your thoughts on President Karzai and what we should be listening for tonight.
MR. O’HANLON:  Thanks, Bruce.  Just a couple of points.  First, I want to say an impassioned defense and admiration of Ambassador Haqqani, and that’s no surprise, perhaps, coming from an American.  That was the point of the critique.  But let me just say how much I’ve learned from him over the years, and I think Ambassador Haqqani has managed to make Americans like me listen to the legitimate grievances of Pakistan in terms of the history of our relationship and the things that we need to work on to do better.

So, perhaps he finds a tone that’s not entirely pleasing to all of his countrymen, but it’s a tone that actually gets Americans to listen, and as evidence that some of us have, I would point out, that even though it’s not perhaps enough and even though Pakistanis point out how much our geo-strategy, our policies in their region have cost them, we’ve sustained a very substantial aid level to Pakistan now for better than a decade even as we know that there are elements in Pakistan that are actually not supporting what we’re trying to do in Afghanistan.

This is an accomplishment of people like Ambassador Haqqani to get Americans to be able to handle this sort of tension, this sort of dissonance, this sort of contradiction even in the policy situation.  So, I want to just give a loud word of thanks to him for his service.

Secondly, on the issue of New Delhi and the question earlier about whether the road to peace in Afghanistan goes through New Delhi, very good question, and I think Indians have played an important role.  But I also think it’s important that that role be placed within the broader international framework that it’s been placed within so far, because otherwise, getting back to Pakistan, you just risk turning this into too much of a proxy war, at least in Pakistani eyes, that Afghanistan becomes the battleground that excuses some of the more belligerent behavior by some elements in Pakistan that it really threatens the future stability of Afghanistan still to this day.

So, I would like to see New Delhi’s role stay substantial.  But the final thing to say on this front, and this is actually one big difference between what’s been going on in Afghanistan the last 12 years and what happened in the Soviet period.  We’ve got about 60 to 70 countries that are part of this international coalition working together either militarily or economically with our Afghan friends to try to help them win their war, even though it’s nowhere near won yet, and build their country, and I think it’s
important that Indian continue to play a role.

   But we should take heart in the fact that so many other countries still want to play a role as well.

And then finally, for President Karzai tonight, and here I want to acknowledge how much I’ve learned on Afghanistan over the years from Ron Neumann, the former U.S. ambassador there who’s with us in this conference this week. I think we have to listen carefully for how President Karzai describes the campaign that’s coming up in Afghanistan to choose a president to replace him next April. And I would like to hear some of the ideas that President Karzai has to make sure this process helps produce a good winner and produce a relatively legitimate process.

   And some of the things that I think we need to look for include to what extent are political parties strengthened -- I think Afghanistan is overdue for some political movements of the type that Amrullah’s involved with now and that others are involved with, and it’s important that they develop their strength now. Next year is too late.

   Also, the state-controlled media needs to be ready to cover different parties and different candidates in a fair way. Also, the Independent Election Commission and the Electoral Complaints Commission need to be staffed by Afghans who represent a wide range of political viewpoints and interests, they can’t just be handpicked by the palace, otherwise, the process itself is not going to be of high transparency or necessarily of high integrity.

   I want to say in my last word, it was the Afghans at the IEC and the ECC, the Independent Election Commission, the Electoral Complaints Commission -- it was the Afghans who did the hard work in 2009 and 2010 to find the evidence of fraud and to show how those elections needed to get better. We internationalists played a tiny role by comparison to what the Afghans did themselves, so we have to continue to empower them and see these independent Afghan watchdog groups remain independent.

   So, I’m curious as to how President Karzai is going to help build a campaign process that can choose a leader and a coalition for that leader, a cabinet for that leader, that ultimately enjoy legitimacy among the Afghan people and the international community.
MR. RIEDEL: Husain, please respond to the India question as well as any others you want, but could you start by telling us the title -- the draft title of your forthcoming book?

MR. HAQQANI: My forthcoming book is titled Magnificent Delusions: The United States, Pakistan, and the History of an Epic Misunderstanding, and it is basically about how the United States has, in fact, reinforced Pakistan’s misunderstandings about the region in which it happens to be in and how Pakistan’s policy has made the Americans look at the region quite differently than they should have.

So, it’s how everybody has actually reinforced each other into following policies that have brought us to this day.

On the question of the Durand Line, let me just be very clear. While there may be people in Afghanistan who’ve raised the question about the Durand Line as far as the government of Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan, and, for that matter, every other government in the world is concerned, it is a settled matter. It is the Pakistan/Afghanistan international border and in fact when people refer to it as the Durand Line even now, it kind of offends the Pakistanis.

The problem lies in what, very interestingly, an American Secretary of State, and not one of those really illustrious ones, relatively less sort of prominent one, described -- William Rogers -- described as “psychological/political issues” in Pakistan. It’s a psychological issue because it was raised in 1948. In their heart of hearts Pakistanis have this fear the Afghans have not accepted the Pakistan/Afghanistan border as the legitimate border.

Same applies to a lot of the Pakistan/India questions. For example, in case of Afghanistan, Pakistan has a legitimate concern that India should not have military bases there, which it does not, that it should not use Afghanistan for undermining Pakistan’s integrity and independence and national unity, which, again through a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, can be assured.

The problem comes when Pakistanis sometimes -- and it has happened many times in our recent history -- they exaggerate the Indian presence in Afghanistan. There was a time when people used to say -- Pakistani officials used to say, there are 20 Indian consulates in Afghanistan whereas both Pakistan and India have only four consulates in Afghanistan. And similarly, there are other things, like...
trade, et cetera, et cetera, which Pakistan can only deal with by matching it, meaning, if India gives $2 billion in aid to Afghanistan, Pakistan, if it wants to have that kind of influence, should spend the same amount of money, which unfortunately it is not in a position to do right now.

And so, the solution, if there is one, is in actually persuading Pakistan’s leaders to understand that just as they do not want anyone to dictate to them, they do not have a right to dictate to the Afghans.

The Taliban are not a force for good. They are not a force for good for Pakistan, they are not a force for good for Afghanistan. They have caused a lot of damage in Pakistan and therefore, at some point, somebody will have to deal with them.

As far as American policy is concerned, my short comment at the end of the panel is that America went into Afghanistan as a result of 9/11, but it went in and overextended its mission, and as a result now, is trying to diminish its mission to a point where it may not necessarily be effective for the real purposes for which it went.

It is American domestic politics and I take the point that Mike made, which was a very valid point, that President Obama’s actual policy and stated policy may be slightly different in the reverse direction, his rhetoric may be less than what he’s actually doing, but that said, one should be very careful. The Taliban, the al-Qaeda and the many Pakistan-based jihadi groups have not ended their mission and therefore those forces that have aligned against them should not end their mission prematurely either.

MR. RIEDEL: Amrullah, I’d like to give you the floor and also to say a word or two about what you’re listening for tonight from President Karzai.

MR. SALEH: I want to very briefly talk about -- not talk about, because it’s a very deep subject -- ideology that Taliban represent and the Durand Line issue.

When a suicide attack happens at a wedding party and dozens of people are killed, voices from Mecca to Medina to Cairo to Tehran to Los Angeles to Kabul all echo at the same time and they say, this is not Islam. This is not representing Islam.

When a civilian’s throat is cut, again from around the world we receive messages of condolence, sympathy from media, academia, clerics saying, this is not Islam.
When women are not allowed to participate in the society, when they are denied the very basic right of education, when they are denied the right to have access to health, from very conservative clerics to moderate, highly educated al-Ashar graduates denounce it and they say, this is not Islam, because in Islam the women have more rights than it is understood today.

When political participation is denied, we have the same situation. That is the religion of the Taliban. If it is not Islam, then what is it? If it is not the religion, why we are talking about accommodating a group of throat cutters in our state system or in our society? That is belittling of the agenda of creating a humane and civilized society in Afghanistan.

Now, a British soldier was cut into pieces in broad daylight in London or near London. Will British government ever, in the stead of putting that guy to justice, will put him in a five-star hotel and say, “Brother, what made you do this? Can we accommodate your grievances?” That is what the West is expecting us, to bring the killers of our brothers, to bring those who cut the noses off the Afghan women, to bring those who do suicide bombings at our wedding parties, to put them on the other side of the table and say, “Brother, you represent a religion and I have lost my direction; let us talk.”

That is because there is not much respect for the dignity of a nation called Afghanistan when it comes to geopolitics. Thank you.

MR. RIEDEL: David, the last word is yours.

MR. SEDNEY: Last words, again, going back to the issue of elections, the political process in Afghanistan, I agree entirely with the statement by the questioner, that is Afghans need to be the ones who choose their own leader. I think they have a historic opportunity to do so next year. I will quote my former boss, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who said, “The United States should not be involved in choosing foreign leaders. We’ve proven we’re not very good at it.” It’s really up to the Afghans.

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you very much. Thank you to everyone on the panel.

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