THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES
and
JOHN L. THORNTON CHINA CENTER

CHINA'S RISE:
ASSESSING VIEWS FROM EAST ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES

The Brookings Institution
Washington, D.C.
Friday, March 29, 2013

[Transcript prepared from an audio recording]

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190

PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction:

JONATHAN POLLACK
Senior Fellow and Director, John L. Thornton China Center
The Brookings Institution

HOW AMERICANS AND EAST ASIANS VIEW THE RISE OF CHINA:

Speakers:

LIU KANG
Professor of Chinese Studies, Duke University
Chair, Professor and Dean, Institute of Arts and Humanities
Shanghai Jiaotong University

CHU YUN-HAN
Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica; Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University

Discussants:

ROBERT SUTTER
Professor of Practice of International Affairs
Elliott School of George Washington University

SATU LIMAYE
Director, East-West Center in Washington

GEOPOLITICS AND COMPETITION FOR SOFT POWER IN EAST ASIA:

Speakers:

MIN-HUA HUANG
Senior Research Fellow, Shanghai Jiaotong University

BRIDGET WELSH
Associate Professor in Political Science
Singapore Management University

Discussants:

ANDREW NATHAN
Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University

DAVID M. LAMPTON
George and Sadie Hyman Professor of China Studies and Director of the China Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University SAIS

ASSESSING IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES:

Speakers:

ANDREW NATHAN
Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University

RICHARD BUSH
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution

JONATHAN POLLACK
Senior Fellow and Director, John L. Thornton China Center
The Brookings Institution

P R O C E E D I N G S

JONATHAN POLLACK: Good morning, everyone. I'm Jonathan Pollack, director of the John L. Thornton China Center here at Brookings. And today, the Thornton Center, collaboration with our Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, our cosponsor, in what I think is going to be a very, very interesting and unusual event -- a little different. In fact, I'd even say a lot different from the normal fare of policy debate that occurs here in Washington, if only because it is, number one, based on studies that rely on public opinion data, survey data, from a variety of East Asian states, as well as survey data from the United States.

So, rather than having the usual chattering-class conversation about China, we're going to have a different kind of conversation, in collaboration with colleagues from Taiwan, from China, from Singapore, and from the United States, on a very, very interesting set of papers that I think will reveal a great deal about the complexity of the questions that are address with respect to the rise of China.

Most important, I think it is the perceptions of mass publics that often don't receive the attention that they deserve, but they will certain get that attention in all of the papers that we're going to be assessing today.

Now, we are on a very tight schedule. So, we wish we had more time, but so the emphasis will be very, very much -- and I say this to all of the speakers -- that we will have a watchful eye on their use of time, in order to keep on schedule as much as possible.

So, without further ado, let me just emphasize, you can see in the program both the sequence of events and some background on the individual speakers. What we'll do now -- because so many of the presentations will involve the presentation of some of the findings -- rather than have the first panel convene here, the speakers, in turn will take to the podium so that they can illustrate their findings.

So, if I could -- I guess, Liu Kang, you will be the first speaker. And then, later, once all the presentations have been made, then the entire panel will come up.

So, our first speaker is Liu Kang, from Duke University and Shanghai Jiaotong University. Welcome.

LIU KANG: It's a real honor and a great pleasure to be here to present the survey results, which we conducted two years ago, the American

public opinion on China. As a matter of fact, we just completed another round of the survey, around the U.S. presidential election. As time allows, I will try to, you know, give you some comparative perspective.

The survey was conducted 2010, with Duke University, collaboration between Duke University and Shanghai Jiaotong University. I believe it was the first time that a Chinese university tried the effort to gauge the public opinion in the U.S. about China.

The survey was carried out by Indiana University Survey Center, through telephone interviews, random sampling.

We have some theoretical issues, hypotheses, when we designed the survey.

First, we would like to talk about the public opinion on foreign policy in the U.S. It's important that American citizens express their coherent views on foreign policies, making some impact on the decision-making in the U.S., especially in the context of Western democracies, United States in particular. Public opinion on international affairs matters. Public opinion, somehow, you know, helps the politicians to shape their views and opinions.

So these are the basic assumptions, you know, when we conduct the interviews, when we conduct the survey.

The reason we want to emphasize this is because for a long period of time, the foreign policy was conceived in China as somewhat elite and secretive, disregarding the public opinion. I think it's largely still true in China; the public opinion has, at best, a dubious position in the shaping of foreign policy in China.

However, I would say, increasingly, the Chinese government started to pay attention to the President Obama -- if not in China, at least in international community. As a matter of fact, our survey data, our survey results, was presented two weeks before President Hu Jintao's visit to the United States, and apparently, he and his staff did pay some attention to our survey report.

One thing that can show the increasing attention to the public opinion is that China has stepped up its media publicity campaign, before and after Hu Jintao's visit. As you may recall, the Chinese government sponsored a TV commercial on CNN, and also they put it on a large screen in Times Square, for almost two months around the time that President Hu Jintao visited the United States.

Now, some of the major questions we asked: The recognition of China's rise -- is it true that most American voters do not truly understand the significance of China as a rising and rivalrious power of the U.S.? Do they effectively perceive the rise of China?

And then there are some multidimensional views of the rising China: What are the views of the socioeconomic, political, cultural performance of China, as well as China's influence and behavior in the international community? What is their general feeling -- we used the so-called "feeling thermometer" -- towards China as its development. How is it related to their views of China's performance in various aspects? Does their exposure to China-related information in American media affect this general feeling, or assumptions public opinion somehow is really affected, if not shaped, by the media?

So, that's basically what we would like to do in this public opinion survey.

We actually have drawn on other existing public opinion surveys, such as the Pew survey, Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs, and also Committee 100 also had done surveys on the perception and attitudes towards China.

This is why we conceived our survey as kind of innovative. First, we directly measured the perceived importance of the rising China, as the cognitive confondation for further analysis, the multiple aspects beyond the general measures of China's image, relative salience of different aspects in shaping the general feelings -- especially the cultural values, subjective attitudes. And, finally, we tried to measure the kind of media impact, and the sources that the American acquisition of China-related information from different sources, as well as influence.

Now, here are some of the findings.

Of course, first, we asked questions about the economy: which country loans more to the other? China loans more -- about the same. These are basically, quite accurate assessments of what really happened in China, in terms of trade economic relationship.

The influence of China's politics -- again, we find the American attitudes towards China's influence in international politics, world politics, as usually positive, and recognizing the increase in 10 years' time. Again, you know, those are the positive and, we think, fair assessments of China's economy.

Now, the second data is kind of interesting, the political system. If you look at the figure, it's something like more than 50 percent of the American

public thinks that China has a political system that serves its people's needs. Now, this was the data two years ago. However, the data we just gathered this year significantly downgraded -- somehow reflecting the impact of election year's media publicity and the rhetoric of politicians concerning the political governance of China -- especially in the area of politics.

One more data I want to add that is not really presented in these slides, that is, well, we have about nearly 60 percent of the American public recognize that China has an effective government, serving the political needs of the people. We have, on the other hand, an overwhelming majority of the American public, more than 87 percent of American public, think that China's regime withholds its political rights from the people. So, you know, we have the conflicting data, which I think is quite significant.

Now, you know, we have some quite discouraging data about China's popular culture -- you know, the so-called "soft power," you know. An overwhelming majority of the American public do not think that China has a good popular culture. Surprisingly, China is very proud of its traditional culture, but we don't really find American public making such an acknowledgment of such a rich cultural heritage.

Now, here is the question about China's overall performance in the world. We asked whether China has dodged its responsibility in the world? Now, we have a large percentage of the American public opinion think that's the case. And, of course, the American public do not really have a very high expectations for China's democratic reform and political democracy.

Now, we have this thing, it's called a "feeling thermometer," and we compare China, Russia, India, and Japan. China is somewhere, you know, in the middle -- well, of course, it's lowest compared to those countries, but it's not too bad in terms of its perceived position, how Americans really feel about China. However, this year's data, again, you know, dropped down quite considerably, you know, from something like 46 percent to something almost like 41 -- yeah. So, we have, like, a 5 percent drop, okay.

Those are, you know, some of the general feelings, feelings towards China, about recognition of China's internationally competitive economy. Again, you know, those are, you know, fairly accurately corresponding to Americans' sort of objective assessment of the performance, you know, with this more subjective aspect of the feelings -- popular culture, and so on, the world politics. Okay.

We, from the very beginning, would like to measure the degree to which the media and political views expressed in American politics somehow helps shaping the public opinion, the resources that, you know, the public opinion,

U.S. public opinion have drawn from, you know, the media, particularly, the kind of views on China's political system, the democratic evaluation. We see, generally, there is some positive tendencies, and the interest in China news is somewhat, you know, on the upscale. And, you know, more Americans would like to visit China.

Later on, we will show you the effect that the Americans who visit China, have been present in China, does make a big impact on their attitudes and their perception of China -- more than any other factors, I guess, you know, if we look at the data, overall data, you know, cumulatively.

Now, reading news on the news websites -- you know, we can tell, you know, it makes a big difference. Those are the categories that, you know, different media outlets, different media channels, if not to have different variations on the impact of China.

And then we break down into their party identification, and their ideologies. It looks like, you know, Democrats, and those who hold liberal views, slightly favor China, you know, in more positive ways.

Now, here is the data that, you know, we can tell visiting -- if you look at somewhere down there, "information access," "visiting Mainland China," you know, has a fairly significant impact on the perception of China. And, of course, you know, if you divide up different media channels, you know, we find, of course, television, you know, has a much stronger impact on the perception of China, you know, with its image.

Incidentally, we've done another survey of the journalists in China -- the journalists, the Washington journalists in China, how they perceive their function, their work in China. We got most complaints from television journalists. They had the hardest time accessing information, and covering China, and they complained most about the Chinese authorities' harassment. So, somehow, in turn, that has some effect on the perception of China. I think this is something interesting to share.

Okay, now, some summary of the findings.

The majority of the Americans can effectively understand the significance of the rising China. We have tons more data that we cannot really share here. But, generally speaking, not simply the survey that we did two years ago, the survey we just completed this year also shows an increasing sophistication on understanding of the American public opinion on China -- more, definitely, American nowadays know much more about China.

Then, "The American public's views of China's are multidimensional, with embedded tensions, a mix of positive-negative evaluations." What we mean here is that embedded cultural, ideological, political views do surface in the assessment of China, especially when we ask about the subject of feelings -- like the contradictory assessment of China's political performance of the government, you know, the overwhelming majority think that China is, you know, withholding its political rights from its people, where, at the same time, you know, acknowledging its effectiveness of governance. So that's somehow, you know, a reflection of the ideological, deeply embedded ideological and political views in American public opinion,

Then we talk about the salient influence of the American public assessment of China's democracy and cultural performance. And this is what we consider -- with all these multidimensional factors, the cultural factor does make a big difference.

And a significant number of Americans are interested in China-related information, and acquire such information from the mass media. Now, we have to, you know, highlight that the mass media pretty much refers to the U.S. media, not Chinese media, even though China stepped up its campaign, media campaign, we have no idea whether that will make any difference. So that's somehow our assessment.

And because, you know, we, you know, realize that once you visit China it makes a difference, salient and positive influence of life experiences -- so, if you visit China or you spend some time in China -- then, of course, various degrees of media effect.

Now, finally, I want to make some suggestions based on the two surveys we've completed. First of all, we believe that a significant improvement of the American public opinion on China is quite unlikely, because of the deeply imbedded political, ideological issues, and, you know, biases, even -- you know, those variance in cultural factors, they're not easily going away, you know, even though you make all the publicity campaigns and try to, you know, trying to change the mindset, it won't work.

And, of course, the role of the media is also quite significant. There's no way, you know, for media to change its attitudes overnight regarding a given country, whether China, or Russia, or whoever that is.

And primarily negative coverage of China on most of the issues, if not all the issues -- still largely true in the media landscape, if you look at American media -- not simply the American media, but, I think, the Western media, in general.

Now, some suggestions were sufficient leeway for manipulation. The salience of ideologies, values, and cultural factors do make a difference. Whether recognition of China's superior economic, political performance will somehow, you know, contribute the increase of variance, whether or not that will have, that will cast a more positive impact is quite uncertain.

Lower hurdles for presenting China as a constant violator of human rights, and authoritarian abuser of violence, et cetera, less negative coverage presumably will help China, you know -- will help China's image.

One thing, you know, we can tell from this year's survey, I think the campaign rhetoric oftentimes, if not totally negative but, you know, oftentimes very controversial, China was singled out as a manipulator of currency. You know, this time, you know, the number goes up, you know, American public opinion think China is a big manipulator of the currency. I think that's somehow reflected in the campaign rhetoric.

If you look at the countries, you know, on the scale -- India, Japan remain the same, you know, no matter what kind of campaign rhetoric there was, it didn't really change. China somehow suffered significantly from the election campaign rhetoric. So, you know, those are the things, you know, you would like to -- you know, take a note. You know, maybe -- I don't know whether that's a policy recommendation.

I will stop here. Thank you very much. *(Applause)*

DR. POLLACK: Yes, our next speaker is Chu Yun-han. I should pay Professor Chu a specific compliment: He is, of course, one of Taiwan's most distinguished political scientists, but it was Professor Chu who proposed this program to us, and we're really delighted that we've actually realized it today.

So, Yun-han, the floor is yours.

CHU YUN-HAN: Good morning. First of all, I would like to thank Jonathan Pollack and Richard Bush for making today's event happen -- especially on the morning of Good Friday. I mean, this is quite exceptional.

The data my previous speaker, Liu Kang, has just presented represents, in his words, the first time effort by the university based in Shanghai to collaborate with an American institution of higher education to study the public opinion about China.

The data that I'm going to present here, I would say also is quite exceptional, especially in one particular regard. This also represents the first-time ever collaboration between Shanghai Jiaotong University with the regional comparative survey, which is headquartered in Taipei, believe it or not. Okay,

this is a cross-strait collaboration for scientific study of the public opinion across East Asia regarding, you know, how they perceive the rise of China.

Let me give you a little of background about the significance of this particular survey. I know I should -- okay.

Well, first of all, you know, we all noticed that the Chinese policy elite has increasingly recognized that for a rising power like China, soft power and national image management are essential aspects of its foreign policy agenda. As a matter of fact, the CCP Politburo organized what they call the "collective learning session," as early as 2004. They invited speakers to talk about soft power -- okay? -- Which means that, officially, you know, this concept entered into the lexicon of Chinese policy-makers. And then, later on, Hu Jintao, in his official political report to the 17th Party Congress, which is more than five years ago, mentioned that China needed to enhance the soft power of its culture.

And at the same time, we have also noted that China has invested billions of dollars to cultivate and upgrade its soft-power resources. For instance, it set up hundreds of Confucius Institutes around the world, set up 24-hour CC-TV cable news channel, and also, you know, put a lot of effort in organizing the summer Olympics in 2008, and also Shanghai Expo, 2010. And at the same time, it vigorously promoted the Boao Forum for Asia as a very high-profile regional forum that gets a lot of attention.

And also, there's no question that China gets a lot of attention throughout the region. There has been growing interest among ordinary citizens in the region. There are more people that, you know, they pay attention to the news regarding developing China, but also we see increasing number of people, you know, they register in learning Chinese.

And also, I think, especially after the 2008 to 2009, the sub-prime loan crisis, China suddenly emerged as the locomotive of the economic recovery in the international system, and especially for its Asian neighbors, overnight, you know, it emerged as a buyer of last resort after the financial crisis.

But, to what extent, you know, all this effort and also the fact that, you know, it has really become very influential economic player in the region, really helped to improve its image among the Asian citizens? And that's, you know, where you really derive your soft power. As Joseph Nye correctly points out, that soft power depends on the willing interpreter and receiver. There are other observers who might question that, you know, despite the fact that everyone, you know, recognizes the ascendance of China, but whether it can

convert its economic and political might, you know, into favorable image about China, or a lot of opinion leaders, and even ordinary citizens in the region, they might not be persuaded by its stated foreign policy objectives, or strategic intentions, and much less attracted by its political system.

However, there's not that many survey data around, you know, that we can verify, or to put our finger on this very important issue. Pew Global Attitudes Survey is, to my knowledge, the only cross-national survey that collects public opinion data on people's image about China on a regular basis. However, Pew, over the last few years, they covered only four countries in East Asia: Japan, China, Indonesia, and South Korea. Two years ago, they dropped South Korea, and last year, they dropped Indonesia -- okay? So, now you only have two East Asian countries covered by Pew.

And the BBC Global Scan, which sporadically, not systematically, covers a view on China, in the most recent one, 2012, it only also covered these four countries.

So that's why, you know, we argue that Asian Barometer Survey, which is headquartered in Taipei, fills up a very important void, you know. It was administered in 13 East Asian countries and territories, so it covers the bulk of East Asia, East Asia broadly defined, that also includes Southeast Asia.

And, on the basis of country-wide probability sampling and face-to-face interviews -- and what does it mean, okay? Not only suggests that, you know, this is a scientifically very reliable instrument for gathering the public opinion data, but it also means it is very expensive. Okay, imagine that you have to face-to-face interviews in a country like Indonesia -- okay? A country, you know, stretching over, you know, more than 2,000 miles, you know, from east to west, okay? And also, I think that, you know, this is probably a very important effort that, you know, we want those people their voice may not be always heard in the public discourse, or in the public opinion reporting. But everyone has an equal chance, you know, that, you know, of being heard in this kind of survey.

So, I'm going to do a little bit of propaganda here, you know, you're welcome to visit our website. We publish a lot of electronic working papers, and also, you know, we make those public data eventually, you know, after a certain period of embargo, to all users in the social science community.

The survey, however, was not conducted, you know, exactly concurrently, due to a lot of logistic difficulties. So, it stretches, you know, this latest wave, from the later part of 2010 until the early part of 2012 -- so, within about, you know, roughly about 18 months' span.

And then there are a couple of questions, you know, I want to share with you, which are very revealing. Number one, we asked people, you know, throughout Asia, "Which country has the most influence in Asia now? -- okay? I would say it's very interesting to see, you know, China itself, you know, stuck right in the middle -- okay? 44 percent of the respondents think that China is already the country that has the most influence in the region. However, there are remaining 25 percent consider the United States is still the country that has the most influence in the region.

And then most of the countries which are, in my expression, which are "adjacent" or "neighbor," you know, with China, they tend to feel very strongly, you know, how influential China has become -- okay? Like, in Vietnam, you know, 69 versus, you know, only 16 percent of Vietnamese respondents consider the United States, you know, has the most influence in the region.

Taiwan, you know, 67, Mongolia, 66. You know, Japan, 61, and Singapore -- so Singapore is the only country which is not really adjacent. You know, you have many, many buffer countries, you know, between. But you can argue that, you know, Singapore, for a lot of reasons, has been, although not geographically adjacent but, you know, it's culturally, economically, very, you know, close to China, so the Chinese influence was also much more strongly felt.

But except for Singapore and Vietnam, then the rest of Southeast Asia, I would say, still considers United States has the most influence -- although, you know, there are a substantial number of people in Thailand, in Malaysia, also recognize China as the most influential.

And, interesting, that the country where the influence of China has been least felt is the Philippines, the former U.S., you know, colony, and country with a very close cultural tie to the United States. And then, you know, another -- it's the lowest, you know, rung is Indonesia. So, Indonesia, Philippines, you know, you might consider they are a part of what we call the "maritime Southeast Asia" -- okay? -- which has a somewhat different view.

And then we asked the next question, "Which country will have the most influence in 10 years?" -- okay? Actually, you know, they are given four choices: Japan, China, United States, and India -- okay? However, you know, Japan and India, you know, never really emerge substantially.

So, then, you could argue that overwhelmingly, throughout Asia -- except, again, in Indonesia and the Philippines -- that the great majority of East Asian people consider China will have the most influence in 10 years -- okay? The Philippines still, you know, I should say very persistently believe that the United States will remain the most influential country in the region in 10 years' time. Indonesia is kind of divided: you know, 31 versus 33.

So, basically, you can argue that the ascendance of China has been widely recognized, especially about its future prospects.

Then what about their evaluation, their assessment? The question we asked is twofold: First, we asked, you know, how they will consider the impact of China on the region -- it's, generally speaking, positive or negative? Okay? And then next we asked, you know, "What kind of impact do you think China has on your own country?" Generally speaking, positive or negative?

To our surprise, actually -- at least, you know, that's what our survey data show, that the impact of China on the region has been, by and large, very favorably, actually positively perceived by a large number of Asian countries, especially countries located in Southeast Asia. Obviously, China feels very good about itself, right? You know, almost 100 percent. (Laughter) Which

is, you know, well understood. But, you know, countries like Singapore, Philippines, you know, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, and so on and so forth.

Now, obviously, it would surprise no one that, you know, Japan is where China's impact gets the most unfavorable, you know, perception -- okay? Only 19 percent of our respondents consider its influence on the region is largely positive -- okay? Mongolia has a very difficult relationship historically, you know, with China. And, I would say, you know, to my surprise, that even, you know, among the Taiwanese, 59 -- okay? -- consider the China influence in the region is, overall speaking, is positive.

But nevertheless, you know, once again, you know, it's quite an interesting coincidence that among those countries, you know, in the Northeast Asia -- okay? -- which is very close to China, you know, on the one hand, they recognize China's influence, okay, you know, much more so than people in Southeast Asia. At the same time, their assessment of China's impact is, relatively speaking, less favorable. So this is what I call the "phenomenon of too close for comfort" -- okay? (Laughter) Okay? You know, you are more far away, and on one hand, you don't feel, you know, its presence so strongly. At the same time, you feel less, you know, threatened or worrisome.

Then we also asked question about how they perceived the impact of China on their own country. The difference between these two charts has something -- I have to say, you know, has something to do with, you know, for the first question, there are more people who answered "Don't know," "No opinion," okay -- for them, you know, how to evaluate China's influence in the region is more difficult -- okay? But this one is easier, you know, so that's why -- one of the reasons is kind of a technical reason.

But let me, you know, especially highlight the outcome in Korea and Taiwan. You can tell that the population are kind of divided -- okay? -- right in the middle. About half the population thinks, you know, the impact of China on their own country is largely positive but, you know, the reverse side of the same coin, you know, telling you that another half, it's not that favorable. And, obviously, Japan also, again, you know, ranks at the lowest.

Let me compare our survey with other available comparative surveys. I would argue that, you know, probably -- first of all, you know, the wording of those questions is not truly identical -- okay? So, it's not strictly comparable -- but, I would say, by and large, functionally equivalent.

Although you can tell that, you know, the absolute level can fluctuate quite a bit, like Pew Survey, you know, in Korea, you know, can hover around about 38, in terms of favorable perception, to like 53 -- okay? -- within the range. But the pecking order, consistently stable over time -- okay? Japan, the

lowest, then South Korea, and Indonesia higher, and, obviously China always comes, feels very good about itself.

So, it tells you the robustness, you know, of our survey. Although it's not identical with other surveys, but, by and large, it's very consistent.

Now, I know my time is already up, but I'll try to stretch a little bit beyond the time limit.

Okay, what explains, you know, why some people they look at China more favorably, other people less favorably -- okay? Not only, you know, within the same country, but also a huge difference, you know, among countries.

Theoretically, you can argue that there are at least three sources -- okay? One is the geopolitical and security considerations -- okay? -- you know, whether they view China as a military threat, you know, whether there's territorial disputes, things like that. Or, you know, more pure economic calculation: You know, China represents opportunity versus challenge; whether the economic change in relationship is essentially compatible or competitive; whether they view the relationship as mutually beneficial, interdependent, or kind of lopsided dependency.

And, lastly, I would argue that ideological and cultural consideration is also very important -- whether they perceive their core values, you know, overlap with China, or just the opposite -- okay?

Let me give you some data -- this is not, you know, rocket science. And this is definitely a perfect linear relationship. But nevertheless, you know, if you measure how they place China on a scale, 1 through 10 point scale, you know, from the completely undemocratic, to completely democratic, about their own country, and about China, and then you calculate the gap -- okay? -- the difference. And then I calculate the national average of that, what I call the "democratic distance." You can tell that Japan thinks that, you know, it's far ahead of China, in terms of level of political development -- democratic development, okay?

But countries like Mongolia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippines, they don't see that much difference, you know -- although Freedom House might see things very differently, okay? This is public image, public perception about, you know, where China stands on this scale of democratic development.

By and large, you know, countries, especially Taiwan, Korea, Japan, you know, they consider themselves far more advanced in terms of democratic development -- okay? They tend to have, relatively speaking, less

favorable view on the impact of China on their own country -- okay? But, again, I say this is not a perfect linear relationship.

Another what we call the "cultural distance," that is, you know, we tried to measure what we call the "Asian values," you know the emphasis on harmony, you know, hierarchical relationship, emphasis on collective versus individual rights, collective obligation, you know, over individual rights -- things like that. And, then, again, we calculate the national average on this traditional scale.

And here, actually, you have a stronger linear relationship -- okay? -- which means that those countries that, you know, they share more of those kind of traditional Asian values with China than, basically, you know, might like China a lot more than those countries, you know, who believe in very different kind of social values from China. So this is a very important explanation -- but always, you know, the economic factor is always important in this regard.

And this is a relation between how they evaluate their own economic condition, their own country's economic conditions. It happens that, you know, those people that -- and also, especially, those countries where a majority think that their economy is doing not very well -- okay? -- like the case in Japan, or Mongolia, okay, then the same countries tend to have a less favorable view about China's influence.

So, you might argue that, you know, people who consider their economies' doing well, then they tend to attribute, you know, part of the reason has something to do with their growing economic ties with China. And, vice versa, you know, if they consider their economy is very sluggish, you know, doing poorly, they might partially blame China for their own problems.

So, I think I pretty much used up my time. But let me just try to throw one conclusion.

I think what we have just shown here suggests that the public opinion we observed is, I would say, it's largely compatible with the long-running policy pursued by a great majority of East Asian countries. Contrary to a theoretical prediction of neo-realists, most of Asian countries avoid pursuing either a balancing or bandwagoning strategy in the face of the intensified strategic competition between China and Japan -- sorry, China and the United States, you know, but also between China and Japan -- most of them avoid having to choose one side at the obvious expense of the other. Whenever possible, they offer maximizing benefit from deepening economic ties with China, while maintaining a close security relation with the United States, for hedging potential risks. Maybe, you know, the only case which doesn't really quite fit my generalization would be Japan.

Thank you for your attention. *(Applause)*

DR. POLLACK: Could I ask both paper-writers and the discussants now to come up on the stage?

We're very pleased to have both Bob Sutter, from George Washington University, and Satu Limaye, from the East-West Center here in Washington, to provide comments this morning. So I look forward to their remarks.

SATU LIMAYE: Well, I guess we'll start from this end of the table, since we hadn't pre-arranged.

Thank you, Jonathan and Richard, for the invitation. Thank you for the paper-presenters. It's a pleasure to be on this panel.

Look, we've been given 8 to 10 minutes, so I'm going to be very conscious of just laying out a few things for the discussion to follow, because the papers are extremely rich, very interesting, lots of things to look at.

I sort of focused my points mostly on the East Asia paper, five or six things.

First, I think it is really interesting that the survey data does public opinion survey rather than elite survey. To my mind, that was one of the most interesting things. Because over the last couple of years, there have been a lot of policy discussions at the elite level, and this brings the public thinking into it. And I found that very interesting.

And one of the things that stood out was the generally very positive view in Southeast Asian publics, according to this data survey, versus elite views that I have encountered in the region. And that struck me as an important point for maybe further discussion.

And I was particularly surprised by the gap between my impressions in travels and interviews in the region at the elite level versus the public level, because the timing of the surveys was a timing in which there was a particular intensity regarding China's relationship with the region. We can all periodize this differently, but let's call it from roughly the summer of 2010, when Secretary Clinton when to the ARF summit and made a statement about maritime issues for the first time, and then subsequently, up to the President's visit in November at EAS, for the first time that we attended EAS. So, I think the timing, combined with the gap between public and elite perception, on my point, was one thing that stood out very strongly for me.

And I know that this is an ongoing discussion about views. We have David Shambaugh's piece suggesting, you know, kind of -- I don't know if he gave the title, but called *Falling Out of Love with China*, on the one hand, versus Mr. Chas Freeman's new book, called *China, America, and the Shifting Balance of Prestige*. So there's an ongoing discussion about this, but I think it's worth delving a little bit more into this public-elite gap, and seeing whether it really exists, because I think it has all kinds of policy implications for the United States -- which I'll get to.

The second theme that sort of caught my attention in this study was the lack of a mainland Southeast Asia versus a maritime Southeast Asia gap. Yun-han referred to this. There is some gap, if you kind of dig deep into the numbers, but a general conventional wisdom has been that China's role in mainland Southeast Asia is much richer, deeper, more expansive than American role -- for reasons that we've been essentially re-engaging in mainland Southeast Asia, Burma most recently, but even the rest of what might, in old times, used to be called "Indochina" -- quite recently, compared to China, which has had an ongoing presence, and we are re-engaging. So that made me want to pull that thread a little bit more and find out.

Now, Myanmar and Laos data is not included, so that might changes things a bit. And it would particularly change things after the reengagement of the United States with Myanmar over the last 12, 14 months or so.

This has a very important policy implication, to my mind, because the rebalance to Asia is, in part, at least, in my mind, has a very Southeast Asia ASEAN component, in terms of ASEAN centrality for regional institutions, emerging partnerships with key countries, which are mostly in Southeast Asia, for opportunities to develop new relationships, and a rebalance within Asia to Southeast Asia, in terms of military posture -- rotational forces, et cetera. So I think this has a very important element in the survey, and merits digging more.

And if it's true that the public-elite divide is -- as I said in point one, and as the data suggests, on the one hand, it suggests more constraints to U.S. and regional elite cooperation than I previously thought there might be, that I've seen over the last 12, 15, 18 months. And this is important, because elites in those countries, even if, from an elite level, may wish to do more things with the U.S. as part of the rebalance -- and we've seen that in Singapore, we've seen it in Indonesia, we've seen it in the Philippines, we've seen it, to some extent, with Vietnam -- they may be constrained, if their publics aren't on board to the extent that they have a much more positive view. And I think, again, that, you know, merits sort of digging into.

On the other hand, it's very interesting that Southeast Asia, on average -- and particularly currently -- sees the U.S. as more influential. Now, that caught my attention because it kind of militates against the first finding about the gap. And that suggests to me a whole bunch of things about the way we might look at this, but first is in terms of timing. If it's a time of great -- when the survey was done -- of great intensity in maybe concerns about China, it was also a period, it strikes me, in which American commitment to Southeast Asia, in particular, was extraordinarily high -- ratifying TAC, joining EAS, going to ARF, et cetera. So, I would bear that in mind.

And it has implications for how far we can go with our emerging partnerships in the region. Because what it suggests is, there's quite a lot of -- on the one hand, there's a constrain because of public-elite divide, but on the other hand, because most Southeast Asians, on average, see the U.S. role now, and in 10 years, higher than Northeast Asia, it allows more scope for the United States to pursue the rebalance and emerging partnerships and cooperation with Southeast Asia. So that might be well worth fleshing out.

I'll leave aside the business of outliers simply for time reasons. I mean, there's -- I don't mean this in any way -- the peculiarities of the data on the Philippines kept coming to me, because there are issues of cultural, geographical proximity, democratic distance, U.S. relationship that weren't entirely clear to me.

On methodology -- without going into it in great detail -- there are two things that struck me. One was, I puzzled a little bit, Yun-han, about the definition of "influence." You know, "influence" -- you know, if you ask someone about "influence," on the one hand, you don't want to get deep into sort of dissecting it. On the other hand, some element of what that means would have been more useful to me, particularly in evaluating the welcoming nature of these attitudes.

And the second methodological concern I had was there weren't specific questions about Chinese policy with which to evaluate. It was sort of, if you look at the questions -- and the papers are available -- it was focused the evaluative factors "democratic distance," "cultural proximity," et cetera, but I think you don't need to go into policy wonkdom to ask the public questions about sovereignty, about ownership of territories, about aggression or non-aggression -- or however one wishes to refine the questions. But I think those might have given us a little bit different or more qualified findings, which are particularly, as I said, quite surprisingly positive in that time sector of the evaluation.

So, what's kind of my net assessment? My take-aways are sort of three.

One is: The status survey, both the American and the East Asia paper, inevitably kind of have the implication -- though I'm not suggesting you mean to do this at all -- of a zero-sum approach to China and the U.S. role. And I think that's a fundamental problematic. My interactions, but publicly and with elite levels across the Asian Pacific is they're more concerned, not about who's going to be top dog, but the relationship between the U.S. and China and everything that flows from it. And we all know it -- not too hot, not too cold, sort of the Goldilocks U.S.-China relationship for everyone.

And that segues right into the region's demand for a U.S. presence, but a calibrated supply of U.S. presence -- not over-presence, not pushing people to say, you know, let's take it against China.

So, I think that, to me, the issue isn't China-influential, or U.S. influential, or positive or negative, but how the U.S. and China manage their relationship with each other and with the region, in order to create an environment that fundamentally doesn't undermine East Asian interests -- which I hope is America's interest, as well. And I certainly would think it would be Chinese not to do that.

So that's -- and then maybe this is a little controversial, but my own assessment is -- and this has nothing to do with the survey but relates to the survey -- at the current time, U.S.-China relations -- and I think I found support for this in the region -- U.S.-China relations, and U.S.-Asia relations are generally better than China-Asia, and inter-Asia relations.

Please don't misunderstand -- I'm not saying U.S.-China relations are fine. I'm not saying all China-Asia relations are bad. I'm suggesting that if one does a nuanced balance, that, on the whole, where we are now is that the U.S.-China and U.S.-Asia relationship is balanced in a way that maybe the China and inter-Asia relations are less positive. That's all. And we can certainly discuss this.

On the U.S. point, I would only say that we have a project at the East-West Center -- I hope you'll get online and see it -- asiamattersforamerica.org, which looks at every State and Congressional district, just two pieces of data, because we were doing governors and local visits -- is, if you look at every State and Congressional district in this country's interactions, there is one standout on every variable we look at -- travel, tourism, trade, jobs from exports, exports, FDI, students, study abroad, et cetera -- and it's very simple, it's one word: China. The increase since 2010 is 40 percent of all governors have gone to China. State legislators are going to China. I was just in Indiana, they started a Kokomo Greater Economic Development Association, linked up with the U.S.-China Alliance, to build trade and investment relations with China.

So, whatever other issues -- and, clearly, there are issues, and quite reasonable issues, of democratic governance, human rights, et cetera -- most Americans are looking for a very pragmatic way to engage China, and to maximize the gains, knowing full well there are tradeoffs. One district is losing jobs because of something that's going on in China, another district is gaining wildly because they're able to export, or they're getting investment to build something that then gets exported, or what have you.

So, I think there's a very interesting relationship, and that's all I'll say on the U.S.

So, my time is done, and I thought I'd just lay out those things, to put them on the table for the discussion to follow.

Thank you very much. *(Applause)*

ROBERT SUTTER: Well, thanks very much for inviting me to be -- thanks to the sponsors for inviting me to be on the panel, and I very much enjoyed the presentations, and reading the papers. And, Satu, I also associate myself with Satu's remarks. I think they're -- it's my experience, as well, that, in private conversations with government officials in the Asia Pacific region, you get a very different perspective. And so there is a perceptions issue here, and I'm not sure exactly how to explain it, but you get a very different approach toward the United States than you do when you deal with the kind of data we're dealing with today.

But the data today has profound implications for American policy, and we need to take a look at that. We're in Washington, and we always look at the implications for U.S. policy.

But some basic points on the studies. These are very important studies, both of them, and they reinforce and advance the earlier work that's taken place in these areas. I'm not fully familiar with this earlier work, but I do follow both of these issues, and I'm going to refer to some earlier studies, and how these studies relate to where we are now. And then I will talk a little bit, in each case, about the implications for U.S. policy.

First, on the "How Americans View Rising China" -- just to review the points that I found most salient, they show an awareness on the part of the Americans of China's strengths, and they project the strengthening of China in these areas. They show reasons why Americans marginally disapprove of China -- more of them disapprove than approve China as a government.

They show the weaknesses of China's soft power, particularly in the areas of culture, and media, and this type of thing. And they show that these things aren't going to change easily, that these are longstanding trends that are likely to continue.

It seems to me that these reinforce, the findings of this study reinforce the understandings, which I thought -- for those of you that haven't followed this, there's a really good book on this, called *Living with the Dragon*. It's a wonderful book, summarizes all these different polls. Professor Nathan has a foreword to the book -- and it really underlines some points which I think can help -- and I think the survey is consistent with that, and it cites this, among others, other studies, that it deals with.

The American publics are reasonably well informed about China. They basically favor pragmatic U.S. engagement with China, with a full awareness of all the differences that the United States has with China. China is neither an enemy nor a friend, it's a rival for economic success, and for global influence. And what influences American opinion, according to Page and Xie, in this *Living with the Dragon* book -- and I think it shows forth in the study that we're dealing with today -- is that Americans are influenced by different values, and by economic competition with China. They dislike the Chinese government, and they want to compete, but they don't want to confront China. And so they want to get along.

And I think that the one area that the current study, and the Page and Xie study show is something that's important, the Page and Xie study, *Living with the Dragon*, shows that security issues are most important for the United States -- security, economic, and values, in their judgment, are the range of issues. And this study doesn't deal with security, and that's the issue that's most likely to get Americans excited about China in a critical way.

And so, you might want to think about that, anyway, including that in the study.

On how the East Asians view rising China, when you have the experience like Satu has, and I have, when you go around and you're talking to government officials throughout the region privately, and so forth, and in this kind of study, Americans are just overwhelmed. And so, in perceptions, America is losing, and so America has to -- you have to adjust to this. "Do I like it?" No. Do you have to adjust to it? Yes, you do. It's a reality that we have to deal with.

How meaningful is it? That's the question you don't know. You don't know how meaningful it is.

But the perception power shift comes through very strongly in this study, and it's consistent with other things. This isn't an anomaly. CSIS did a wonderful study about four years ago, looking at this issue from the elite point of view, and saying, yes, all the elites in Asia that they surveyed thought -- just the same type of trends: China is the most influential country, and it will, by far, be the most influential country.

Now, unlike this survey -- which is a very good survey, and I think it's great, and I hope they continue doing it -- the CSIS study looked at the role of the United States. And the role of the United States was sort of a hedge for these people. In other words, they said they didn't know about China -- the idea that China might be dominant, domineering, coercive in some way was very important to these elites, and therefore they wanted the U.S. to stay there. They wanted the U.S. as an anchor, to deal with this situation.

And so this was -- so while there was this pervasive impression, perception, that China was very important, and that the U.S. -- the CSIS study identified the U.S. role. And that really didn't come out in this study until your last slide that you showed today, where they don't want to choose between the United States and China. But otherwise, it didn't show up. And I think that -- I'm not sure it should, but it is an element that one needs to consider.

So, when we look at the policy implications on the U.S. survey, looking at the U.S., the implication is the Americans will be mixed in their attitudes toward China. You're not going to advance U.S. relationships easily with China. Americans are going to be suspicious of China, but they don't want trouble with China. And so, pragmatic interaction on the U.S. side, I think, is very likely to be supported by the American public -- for a whole range of pragmatic reasons, and not because anybody particularly, not because the mainstream of Americans like China, this type of thing.

On the other survey, what this shows, this perception could show that if you take the perceptions as reality, then you say, okay, what does this mean? It means the future of Asia, and China's role in Asia, is in China's hands. It's up to China. And so if China behaves in a certain way, if it emphasizes a benign approach, and it's not aggressive in any way, it is the most influential power, and the others don't matter much, well then all it has to do is be nice. Just be nice.

And so the main impediment there is, China can't be nice all the time. It has trouble doing this. It has conflicting interests.

But the implication is that's all they have to do. And the implication of this for the pivot, for the Obama government policy is, well, you can try to reengage in Asia -- and good luck, and I hope you do -- but if China's

benign, and it's the most influential power by far, well, then, it's not going to have a big impact. Now, maybe you won't have the zero-sum type of competition that Satu was talking about, and you just have this emerging order, with the U.S. playing a role, but China being overwhelmingly dominant in the region because it's so benign.

And so if I were in Beijing, and I were talking to Mr. Xi Jinping, I would say, you know, get your act together, stop talking about territorial disputes, be nice to everybody, and this study shows you'll dominate Asia. Just do that. You see? *(Laughter)*

And you're laughing, you're laughing because it is far from reality, I think.

And so I think that we need to keep that in mind. We need to understand, yes, there's this perception, great. But we can get swept away.

I wanted -- I said, would somebody show me a survey of Asian opinion, and this sort of thing, about Japan in 1987? You know, I would suspect that the survey would show Japan dominating Asia. This was called "the Japanese Lake" in Southeast Asia, as you remember. But, anyway, I don't want to get into that too much.

But the point, the implications, I think, are clear if you take the surveys very seriously, and I think you should take them seriously. But perceptions are only one dimension of what makes things go in the region, it seems to me.

And then just one small point: Having worked with Americans, taught people to -- we're getting ready to go to China, and visiting China, it could be an important element in how people think about China, but I think they've already self-selected. They're going to put down 6,000 bucks, easily, to go there. And to do that, they have to sort of like the place. They generally don't do that if they don't like it, if you see what I mean. So I wouldn't emphasize that too much, if you see what I mean.

Now, some people have to go, and you might get a different view. But, by and large, these people all want to go. And I think if they want to go, they're going to pay, and they're going to like it, generally. *(Applause)*

DR. POLLACK: Well, there will be time for just very few questions, because I believe there is a plan for a coffee break, if I'm not mistaken -- at the request of several people.

But, yes -- I see a question at the back of the room. Could you identify yourself, please, and direct your question as appropriate.

QUESTION: Sure. Thank you. David An, State Department, Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers. I work on East Asia.

Question on the East Asia Barometer, especially for Professor Chu Yun-han, is, with the East Asia Barometer, I understand that it is ongoing, you've been doing it for several years. I feel like the presentation was more of snapshot. And also one of the discussants mentioned former Secretary Clinton's comments in Hanoi in 2010, about the maritime territorial disputes.

But I'm more curious on if there's any, like, longitudinal or time series cross-sectional observations, if you notice any interesting findings comparing four, six, eight years ago? So, where we are now, considering where we've been, rather than just over the past year or two. Thank you.

DR. POLLACK: Yun-han, you want to -- ?

DR. CHU: Number one, Asian Barometer has incorporated this battery about how Asians perceive China and the United States only during its third wave survey. We have done two previous surveys, starting from the year 2000. Unfortunately, at that point, we haven't recognized that this is going to be a very interesting and important question to ask.

So, from this point on, we are planning to do survey, the next one survey, next year. So it would be very -- I hope that, you know, maybe two years from now, Jonathan and Richard will sponsor this event one more time, you know, we can refer back to this audience, you know, whether those favorable images, you know, stay the same, or actually suffer a lot, you know, from the recent tension.

So, basically, yes, it's going to be longitudinal, as long as, you know, I can get funding support. And if the State Department wants to pay for it, you know, (laughter), we will definitely welcome, you know. And we can incorporate many more items to answer the kind of questions that are more interesting, more qualified questions.

DR. POLLACK: Yes, right there.

QUESTION: Jeffrey Lin, from Senator Angus King's office. I'm directing this one at Professor Sutter. And sorry I didn't take your class last semester. It looked fun, but, I had other active priorities.

So, essentially I'm wondering, as you've noted that the Asian states, especially the elites, are looking to the U.S. more as a hedge, especially in

terms of security. But I was wondering if they'd like to see more U.S. involvement, especially in development, in opening up our economy via the TPP, for example, the prospects on that?

DR. POLLACK: Bob, you want to -- ?

DR. SUTTER: Sure. I think the American engagement with Asia is very multifaceted, and is welcomed broadly by many in the region. And I would also point out that the Americans, unlike China, and unlike most societies, don't rely on their government to interact with other parts of the world. It's very much a -- the American society is so interactive with Asia. And so this dimension -- and business is a big part of this.

So you have program to go forward with a free-trade agreement, that's great. It looks politically very important. When you compare government to government -- when you're dealing with China, it is a government-led operation, as far as interacting with Asia. When you're dealing with the United States, it's heavily non-governmental. It has always been that way. And so you get all sorts of interaction -- by business, media, foundations, universities -- and then, immigration in the United States, that just changes the nature of the American society and integrates it with Asia.

So this is an ongoing feature of American involvement, but it isn't, a lot of this isn't governmental, and so it doesn't get a lot of attention that way.

DR. POLLACK: Yes, a question right here.

QUESTION: My name's Edgar Gordon, no affiliation. I'm just wondering whether -- to take up the point, Professor Sutter's point -- whether China can be nice, given the fact that it seems to be using its nationalism, or pursuing nationalism as a means for legitimatizing its current government, just the way using economic development as a way of legitimizing its current government?

DR. POLLACK: Bob, you're on.

DR. SUTTER: No. They're very conflicted. And it's going to take them a long time to work this out.

And so, it's worse than you think. The nationalism is very well understood. The sense of image in China -- China's been building an image in foreign affairs ever since Mao Zedong took over in '49. And this image-building has focused on China being correct in foreign affairs, following principles in carrying out its foreign policy which lead to a moral foreign policy behavior.

The People's Republic of China has never acknowledged that it's made a mistake in foreign policy. And so, the neighbors of China don't believe this, because they've experienced China, again and again, doing things. But the people in China, in my experience, believe it. And the elites believe it. They really think this.

And so you talk about a constraint on behavior that we've been talking about in the region, this is a big constraint on the leadership of China to make a reasonably flexible approach to dealing with the disputes they have with their neighbors. Whenever they try to move in this direction, they run up against public opinion, elite opinion in China, that says, "You're too weak. You're not being strong enough in defending our righteous position, because our position is righteous." And they can't address this issue. They never address.

And so, until they do that, they really have a problem in making -- meeting the other parties halfway, in the area.

So, I think it's going to take awhile, it seems to me. And I don't see the beginning of the process yet, so I think -- that's why my short answer: no.

DR. POLLACK: This would be a very, very appropriate moment to break the discussion. We wish we could go on. There will be a third wrap-up session, so even if -- the second session will also be equally data-intensive, there will be opportunities for other questions.

But we should all give all of our speakers a good round of applause. *(Applause)*

RICHARD BUSH: My name is Richard Bush. I'm the director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings. And it's our pleasure to join with our colleagues in the John L. Thornton China Center to cosponsor this outstanding program.

The title of this session is "Geopolitics and Competition for Soft Power in East Asia." We will have two presentations -- first of all, by Huang Min-hua, who is affiliated with Shanghai Jiaotong University, and then by Bridget Welsh, who is an associate professor at Singapore Management University.

And while the presentations are going on, I ask the panelists to stay seated on the first row, then we'll migrate up here, and Any Nathan and Mike Lampton will provide some commentary. And then we will open it up for what I hope is a decent amount of time for Q&A.

So – Professor Huang.

HUANG MIN-HUA: Thanks, Richard. And thank you all to attend this conference.

Before I start, I probably want to talk a little bit about my work experiences, because I got a Ph.D. from Michigan, and I worked in Taiwan for four years, two different schools, and I worked to Texas A&M for another four years, and this year back to China. So I have been working in, like, four different universities, in three places -- Taiwan, China, U.S. So I kind of have feelings about the issues that we are talking about, but I'm poisoned too much by the so-called political science training. So these kind of pieces are a little bit more technical, but I try to make it more accessible.

All right. So, I'm going to talk about a little bit of my take about -- I mean, the layout of these presentations. The first is China, by many aspects -- military, economic, political, and culture -- no doubt now it's a rising power. And also, Chinese leaders, I mean, the bulk of the leaders, they all know they are rising powers. They know their power is rising and, in fact, they are very, try very hard to keep -- this is as my understanding -- keep low profile. You can see that Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, all these top leaders, they are talking in prudence, act in prudence, in a way.

But, of course, they initiate a lot of official campaigns for public diplomacy, and also image construction around the world. So there are a lot of measures -- that Professor Chu has already mentioned -- for the last eight years.

But, how about those neighboring countries in Asia, when they look at China, this kind of rising power, as well as their political leaders trying to do, how they feel about this? Unfortunately, there are a lot of events, particularly security-related, kind of tended, or kind of countervail China's efforts -- for example, like Japan, recently you see the Diaoyutai Island dispute, you see, inside Japan, their political campaign actually quite very, very against China, particularly for the LDP government when it goes up.

And you see Taiwan is kind of ambivalent because, economically, you cannot deny that Taiwan and China, they should go together. And politically, you see the KMT has a very nice relationship with China but, in fact, politically, can be made a lot of troubles. So it could swing to the other way when the economic bonus gone away in a few years.

In Korea, you see the North Korea issues are kind of worsening, as well as the U.S. presence in Korean peninsula kind of making -- I mean, China, of course, now seems to follow the existing norm, but there's no guarantee, right?

And you see Philippines and Vietnam, the island dispute in South China Sea, and particularly, recently in China, there is a voice out , in some very,

very -- I mean, scholars saying the China probably should stand tough, so they are kind of making, established administrative unit in Sansha City. And they kind of secure the regular presence in the South China Sea.

And you see Mongolia, there is a longstanding aversion in Mongolian politics that really, really dislike China, because they are totally dependent on China, economically speaking.

So all these factors, in a way, they're kind of making China's public diplomacy and image-construction efforts counterproductive, or not have any effect at all.

So this paper actually is more about a collective effort to identify, to explain the sources of how Asian perceptions of China's rise, whether it's positive or negative, we want to look at the country level -- I mean, country level, there are a lot of issues Professor Chu has already talked about. So it's a kind of follow-up study here, like geopolitics issues, like economic interdependence, like culture affinity or distance.

But when we do the public opinion survey, most leading measurements will be at the individual level, because we interview we used the stratified random sampling, and then we trying to have a probabilistic samples, in representative scientifically of all the countries. So there are a lot of individual-level factors that are involved -- for example, socioeconomic satisfaction, whether people, when they feel their socioeconomic situation better off. Because you think about all the Asian countries, they mostly, they all have very, very tight relationships, in terms of economics -- export, import, they are part of the production chain in the Pacific rim.

So, when the economic situation goes well, they probably will think about, okay, this is related to China. So it could have, could generate positive evaluation about China. So that's individual level factors.

It's not just that, it could, like cognitive factors, too. For example, if they think that China, democratic speaking, they think China at the same level of them, they probably will be, have a nicer image of China, right? But if you feel that China is really, really undemocratic, abuse of human rights, and politically not democratic at all, they probably have a very bad feeling about China.

And, also, ideology -- that ideology, what I mean, is about economic openness. Because, in China, in Asian Pacific -- for example, let me give you a case, like Taiwan, a lot of people debating about whether we should refrain ourselves, in terms of economic integrations, because if we integrate too much with China, we probably would get hurt. And, in some countries, it's -- like Mongolia, even it's really benefit for Mongolians to bundle their interests with

China. There are a lot of policy debates inside of Mongolia, because they hate China, and if they feel they are economically totally tied with China, they lose all their independence.

As far as political values, it's more deeper levels, like attitudinal, like in their values, deep down, they are hard, they don't like the Chinese style traditionalist, authoritarian, these kind of factors. So it's individual-level factors.

So, when we do the public opinion survey, the country level, the contextual, the structural factors, as well as individual-level factors, both factors would have effects on the people's evaluation -- right?

So, in terms of poli-sci training, we try to find a way to tease out the particular factors, how much they actually exert an influence on perception of China -- right? So I lay out the main purpose of this paper.

So this is the first slide. We have two questions that we tried to measure the perception of China, the first, which is, "Which country has the most influence in China?" Then you see, "China," "Japan," "India" -- most influencing Asia -- still, you see the answer set is "China," "Japan," "India," "United States," and "Other" -- right? And then we definitely want to see if it's China or not China. So that's the measure one.

Measure two is, regardless whether respondent thinks China has influences, whether they think China does good more than harm -- all right? So, those two, I will take -- individual, is either "yes," or "no." It becomes binary. And then we will take the percentage of positive responses of both variables, and then we can spot each country's location, because it becomes a percentage measure -- right? So we join the plots into a tow-dimensional figures, then you can see there's four areas, right?

Generally, if you look at the bottom right, at the bottom right you see, if they have -- they think China has the most influence, and the percentage is very high, but you see they have very negative perception of China. If that is the case, then it shows that the general public in these countries, they're vigilant China's rise, but they have widespread dislike about China, right?

If you see the upper-left, then you see, if they don't think that China has most influence in Asia -- mostly they don't think -- but if they have a much nicer, positive, or favorable perception of China, then you see they are less vigilant about China's rise, but they have much more benign attitude toward China's influences, right?

So, if you see the top-right corner here, it means that they have great vigilance, but it's not actually that sure whether China's influence is actually goes which way.

Then I will show you the empirical data, then you will see why I categorize, or I label this way. And then you'll see that that corner, that bottom corner which is ignoring China, because China is not, you know, have influences, most influence, and they don't really like China. So, that's about like a just conceptual (inaudible) before we look at the data.

And then this is what the data looks like, all right? So we see in the bottom-right corner, we see there are two countries, which is Japan and Mongolia, you show very, very high vigilance about China's influence in Asia, but you see very low, I mean, favorable perception about China. So you see the margin is really, really revealing -- right? So, which means that they have great vigilance about China, but they don't like China at all.

And you see the other set, which is comprising three countries: Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. They are all about (inaudible), but it's all about, like 50 percent or even 60 percent. They are vigilant, well vigilant about the rise of China, but they sort of have a slightly more positive attitude toward China, but not that quite. It's not like 80, 90, 100 percent. So, about the same level, which means they're kind of ambivalent, mixed feeling, about how to interpret the rise of China. They all know China is rising, but they're just kind of struggling in their mind, well, gee, how should I think of it?

And you see the bottom, all these countries, the rest of the other countries, including China itself, you see mostly they have favorable or benign, you know, perception of China, but they do not really think that China has the most influence in Asia -- okay? So that's what I call "less vigilance, the more benign attitudes." So that's about our finding, if we look at these two items together, then we can get a picture like that.

Then what we're trying to do actually is to follow up Professor Chu's presentation in the last panel, that we look at, for example, geopolitical tensions. Here -- of course, I'm poisoned by poli-sci training, so I give a definition here: it's defined as a composite indicator comprising -- the first is non-ASEAN+1 -- ASEAN+1 is ASEAN countries plus China. And then warring experience -- whether they have the war experience since the last century. And then there's regime similarity. Regime is quite easy, I just use polity for -- using "7" as the -- they have polity score, which is the difference between democratic score, autocratic score. If it's higher than 7, I define it as a democracy. So, it's simply just whether -- China is not a democracy -- whether all the rest of the other countries, they are democracies or not. If they are democracies, they are different

from China, so it's "1." If they are not democracy, by polity definition, then they are the same -- right?

So here, basically, is what I call geopolitical tension. Here is just one tiny thing I wanted to elaborate a little bit about, the non-ASEAN+1. It's not actually saying that the -- ASEAN, a lot of people know, is mostly about free-trade. About the security, it's not really that tight, and they do not have a very, very strong kind of enforcement agreement between them that they should have to defense coordinate together. But it's kind of -- think about this: China, as opposed to, like a Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Mongolia, all these countries, China has a separate issue with all these places. And all these places -- although all have relations with the United States, and kind of balancing out what China is trying to -- in terms of country of interest, it's different from ASEAN, because ASEAN kind of has more multilateral mechanisms that they can coordinate their interests.

And so China -- my understanding is China is trying to stay away to have a really serious against ASEAN. They try to be nicer, very nice, give them very -- I mean, a lot of investment, buying their economy, and trying to shape good images in Southeast Asia -- although it might run the other way. But it's my understanding, China is trying to do, it's trying to please the ASEAN countries. So that's the reason when I say it's not ASEAN that you see much more likely, they have certain kind of tension, because they all have deep issues with China. And ASEAN countries, China's trying, at this stage, in my understanding, trying to please the ASEAN countries.

So, what it actually says, we have geopolitical tension measures like this, and then if we plot all these countries in these two (inaudible) dependent variables, and inside the parenthesis, there is a measure of geopolitical tensions.

Now, mostly, you will see -- this is just a hypothetical, like you don't have to make it 60 percent like this, the dotted line. But I'm just trying to give you a sense that if you look at this stuff, the lower-right corner, which I think they are very vigilant, and they dislike China, then you will see mostly Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, Japan, they all cluster the border or inside the corners, which means geopolitical tension actually is related to why they don't like China, or why they are really vigilant about China's rise.

So, that's just some kind of a rough empirical finding I'm just showing you about the geopolitical factors.

The other is the economic interdependence. Professor Chu's paper also pointed out, it's really difficult for us to think about how the level of economic interdependence will affect how people think about China -- right?

So here, I'm trying to something, economic interdependence. I define it -- again, it's the poisoned by poli-sci -- defined as "Average percentage of bilateral export and import with China, in proportion to overall export and volume, respectively." So it's just taking the average of the two percentages.

I'm not calculating the net amount of, like, deficit, or -- I'm not doing that. I just, to measure the interdependence. Maybe it's not perfect, but it's a way of measurement.

So you see the measure here, and generally this tells you if they are interdependent with China more, then they will have less favorable perception of China. But here, you see it could be outlier like Japan and Mongolia making this negative. But if you're taking up those two cases, it still looks like negative; it's just more clustered together. But it's still negative. So this negative relationship stands out. And it's kind of countervailed to our knowledge so far, that we think economic interdependence will bring about the interests together, and then kind of resolve the conflicts between the countries. In Asia, particularly with China, it seems not the case.

Then we have cultural distance. The other factors we should not really forget is about cultures -- again, poisoned by poli-sci -- defined as "the level of cultural differences, in view of Chinese traditional social values, including the following dimensions -- " -- in Asian Barometer, we have 14 questions measuring so-called "traditional values," which anchors on some kind of Chinese cultural elements, like collectivism versus individualism, like long-term prospect interest versus self-interest, like collective interest versus self-interest; filial piety, respect for authority, conflict avoidance, fatalism, gender bias -- there are 14 questions that you can measure that.

And you see, we use the China's measure as the cardinal points, and then we measure the distance. So, it takes the absolute value of the differences, then you see this is the cultural differences measure here.

All right, then just I plot with the -- I only find it's significantly related to China has the most influence, which is the recognition question. So here, it's basically telling you, if they have more cultural difference, generally they were less likely to recognize China's influences. If they are culturally more close to China, then you will understand, and you are more likely to feel that China actually, it's power is rising, its influence is rising -- all right? So that's the basic finding here.

This table -- again, poisoned by poli-sci -- but what it actually does is that since we have pointed out contextual factors matter, individual factors matter, all this matters, how can we do that? So we actually can do the so-called multi-level analysis. Here I'm actually doing what we call "contextual modeling,"

which I include the individual level factors, as well as the contextual-level factors, put it into the same model. I normalize all the variables before I do the analysis, so their scales are all the same -- it's a standard normal distribution. Then the meaning is that the coefficient, the magnitude of the coefficient, we can actually compare, and to tell whether it's more powerful or less powerful. That's what I basically do.

And here, "no significance," then I just skip it. And then you see, there's a shaded pink area telling you what's significant explaining these two -- the first is whether they acknowledge China's rise, whether they think China has the most influence. The other is whether they have favorable image of China -- right? But basically, you can see the first model, none of the contextual variables matter -- all right? And it matters in what? In the liberal orientation in education, in (inaudible). It's most likely like American textbooks about political interest. People, if they are more interested, they have higher education, if they are male, they are more interested in politics. And because of that, they know more about what's China's power in the region, and its rise in the world.

So, the null finding of the first model actually has more revealing and meanings, which means that actually, so far, China's efforts in public diplomacy is not actually biased upward or biased downward about people's perception about whether China has rise or not. It's still like American textbook, American politics textbook telling you if people are more interested, they will select themselves to know about China, and then they will know China is rising because that's a fact.

But I would see most interesting is in the second model. You see, although there some kind of significance in the individual level, comparing to the magnitude here, the most significant factors is all contextual -- although, individual level factors also matter, and you see there's a negative about the liberal orientation, as well as well as the favorable image. There's definitely, if you have more liberal orientation, you definitely hate -- dislike China, and you have negative evaluation of China's image. So it's nothing surprise.

But it jumps up is the contextual factors here really matter? And, again, you see the economic interdependence here, showing the negative relationship, which means if the countries, if they are economically interdependent with China more, generally, in that context, in the countries, people will generally have a more negative, I mean, view or perception about China.

All right, so it's about the general findings here.

I want to make some -- I mean, I want to use two minutes, very quickly, to talk about something.

All these findings, basically telling you that, in terms of whether they recognize China's rise or not, it's not so much about political or economic related, it's not about the context, it's about the political knowledge, interest in politics, psychological involvement in politics. So, again, like I say, it could mean that lack of significant effects of China's public diplomacy. Because China is trying to do public diplomacy, if people realize it, they should be more aware about China's rise, right? But people mostly in Asia, they don't know about this.

But it could be optimistic interpretation about the first model, the non-finding model, which is it that it shows no sign of political antagonism that relates to anxiety or fear about China's rise -- right? If you have anxious about China's rise, if you have a political fear about China's rise, then you will be more vigilant, right? But I didn't see that. So, it's just like American textbook, I mean, theory about interest in politics and knowing whether China is rising or not.

But the second interpretation here is about the second model, here basically telling you the geopolitical tension, as well as the cultural difference, those two factors; you cannot actually change it in a very short period of time. So, not much can do the Chinese leaders, they cannot actually change that much in a short period of time.

What they can do, actually, is economic interdependence. But the bad news here is that the economic interdependence China with their neighboring countries, you see even more negative perception about China. They're telling very bad news, right? Because China thinks that if they bundle their economic interests with all their neighbors, become part of the production chain, they can buy all these countries in their favor. No.

But, here, I will have to give you a qualification. If you take away -- okay, if you take away Mongolia, then the relationship will be significantly reduced. So that's a qualification I wanted to remind you.

Okay, I stop here. Thank you. *(Applause)*

DR. BUSH: Bridget?

BRIDGET WELSH: Good morning, everyone. I'm going to see if I can get these things going here.

I'd like to, first of all, thank Jonathan Pollack and Richard Bush for the kind invitation here at Brookings. And I'd also like to acknowledge some old friends in the audience, and new friends, and to wish everybody a happy Easter, for those who are celebrating Easter.

My job is to present one specific question that has not been presented so far, which is looking at the issue of which model should East Asian publics follow? And in this question, I'm looking, basically assessing which choices they make in terms of which country they should follow, and why.

I want to begin, because time is short, with some of the key take-aways of the presentation, and then go into some of the assessments.

Essentially, this question is used as a measure of what are the levels of soft power -- and I'll show you what those answers are -- and I also look at what are the factors, and actors that account for these particular variations?

And here's what I found. First of all, U.S. soft power is actually much higher than China. U.S. is chosen as a model much more among East Asian publics than China, across countries, in terms of measure, and also across the region as a whole. So, when we look at the earlier discussions, which looked at questions of influence or perceptions, actually, when they're forced to ask which country they would follow, the U.S. comes out in a much more positive light than China does.

The second big takeaway is that there's considerable variation among East Asia. There are some countries that are more likely to choose China than the United States, and there is differences in the degree of which they will choose U.S. over China, or even over other answers. And this actually, this variation, is very interesting. And that raises the questions of the puzzles.

And, in a sense, what I try to do is to try to explain this variation -- what are the reasons for that? And I use two different levels of analysis: I look specifically at factors that are at the country level, things like security, economic interdependence, cultural affinity -- things that were just recently presented by my colleague Min-hua.

And the second thing I look at are actually individual-level analyses. And here, we're very lucky in the Asia Barometer Survey, in that we have 200 other questions that we can use to actually assess what are the reasons that they may have these different perspectives. And we actually come up with very interesting findings, in that, actually -- no surprise -- values do matter, and democratic values, and Asian values, and even perceptions about questions associated with demographic features, these also come into play.

And what we see here is that, of the factors that emerge that are important in understanding why people in East Asian choose between China, or between the United States, we see a few key things, and here they are: Security clashes matter. Hard power affects soft power.

The second thing that actually is interesting is that governments and countries that promote China as a model, or promote the United States as a model, actually, this impacts the way the public perceive it.

The third thing we find is that, particularly, values towards democracy, or towards Asian values like traditional political traditionalism, these impact people's perceptions at the individual level. And, importantly, if they think China is actually nice, positive, actually they think China should be a model. So, in fact, most of the things -- that's the key thing that pulls support towards China.

So, in this regard, what's very interesting are some of the implications. Bob Sutter, just a moment ago, in the earlier panel, emphasized is that what China does actually affects -- if China's nice, it's going to affect its public perception. The implication, in looking at this particular set of questions' analysis only reinforces that, and then, particularly here in the area of security.

The second issue is that the implication here is the U.S. -- the U.S.'s power is quite important in the soft power, and that its base of its soft power rests heavily with its democratic orientation. And this is actually a very important pull factor for many of the countries in East Asia.

So here are those key take-aways. And now let me try to use the next 12 minutes or so to actually explain this.

So, here's just a bit of an overview, that basically we don't really have very good measures of what soft power perceptions are. And what the ABS survey does, is that it actually really is quite innovative, in that it offers us what we can see from below, in a very innovative way. And it allows us to look at questions like the variation in perceptions among publics, how it relates to questions of soft power, and also it allows us to make assessments between U.S. and China.

And I agree wholeheartedly with what Satu said earlier, that we frame this as a competition but, in fact, the reality is, most people in the region don't see it that way. But I think, for the purpose of a heuristic device, we're going to present it that way.

And the survey, as you've learned earlier, it comes from recent data, in 13 countries and territories. We really only present 12, because Hong Kong's not in the analysis here, but we do generally actually see very interesting differences. And I want to also plug -- like Yu-han did, before -- we'd like to expand into Myanmar, and so we need money for that. So if you have money for that, I'd be particularly very happy for that.

The question we used in this analysis is, "Which country would you choose as a model?" And the options they had were China, the United States, India, Japan, and, of course, "yourself." And here we go.

We look at this at the rubrics of different security country-level analysis, and individual-level analysis. Here are the findings.

Let me draw your attention to the thing you can't see, which is underneath the table, and that is the issue associated with the average numbers. The United States -- 28 percent of East Asian publics, on average, choose the U.S. as a model, as compared to China, 13 percent -- less than half of the United States. And if we look at the overall answers and responses to this question, China comes fourth. I know four is not a good lucky number in the China context, but we're looking at -- and if we see this, in terms of who East Asians in the region see, they choose first the United States, and then followed by themselves, and then Japan, and then China. And also, for those of you who look at these issues of questions in regard to India, I would only point out that India got a very pathetic number of 1 percent.

So, what we're looking at is, in the larger scheme of things, we're actually seeing a very dominant choice of the United States as a leader to choose to follow. And I think this is very telling for the larger perspectives and assessments. Because unlike the other questions, which ask about influence or perceptions, this is a question that really actually, I think, in some ways shows the attraction of different models and, in a sense, is a much better measure of soft power than some of the other, which just measure powers and perceptions.

But what this doesn't capture -- and, as I'm sure you're already look at these numbers, and it's waking up your post-coffee wake-up type of situation -- you're seeing lots of variation. I think I wanted to draw your attention to specifically the U.S.-China variation in this answer.

And the way I organized the data is I actually went from the lowest to highest. And so let me just pull out a few of the findings here.

The first key finding I want to mention is that the yellow number is actually -- the yellow stream -- is much higher than the brown stream, aka "U.S. versus China," in the overwhelming majority of countries. So the majority of countries in East Asia are more likely to choose the United States as a model than China. And it's really very acute in places like the Philippines, where the Philippines, it's about 70 percent versus 7 percent. So we can see, in the Philippines there's a clear position that is very marked. And then we see similar high numbers in the context of Korea, in the context of Cambodia. More than double of Cambodians or Koreans are more likely to choose the United States as a model to follow than that of China.

But then, towards the other end of this, where we start to look at the lower numbers, this is where the complexities start to come in. And this, I think, only reinforces what Satu was saying in the presentation earlier, because people don't like to be forced to have to make these types of choices. And we actually see a lot of diversity.

So we actually see a number of countries where the "China" is actually much higher than that of the United States -- the most prominent of that, of course, is Vietnam. Interestingly enough, Vietnam has tensions with China, there's lots of issues. But, in fact, more than double Vietnamese are more likely to choose China as a model than the United States. Obviously, there were lots of tensions with the United States, as well.

But we also have the questions also in the case of Malaysia and in the case of Thailand. These are the countries where China actually has more of a model impact, in the sense of a choice of a model, than the United States. But the other countries are towards in the middle, and we still see the general trend.

I would also like to point out another country that has a very big difference in terms of choosing the United States versus China is Japan, 2 percent, versus almost 20 percent -- again, a very important, sharp dichotomy, although many, as you go back to the slide earlier, many Japanese choose themselves. Many have -- Japan is the highest country that -- over half of Japanese, 52 percent of Japanese, choose their own country as a model, which I find also kind of an interesting type of finding.

So these are some of the broader implications of what we're seeing.

First of all, the Southeast Asia numbers generally are higher than the Northeast Asia numbers, which I think is quite revealing. And, again, this goes back to what Yun-han was pointing out, that geography, place, position -- or, so to say, the further away you are from China, the more likely you are to choose China, another way of phrasing that -- a majority, as I've said, the majority of countries.

And I think another interesting observation is that China itself chooses the U.S. model more than its own model -- 38 percent of Chinese, as opposed to 27 percent of Chinese. And I think this is also very revealing, and would be a wake-up call, if I was China.

Okay, some of the other observations I've made.

So, given all this variation, how do we begin to understand it in a way that actually makes sense? So I essentially used, basically, four levels of analysis, four different issues in the country-level analysis. I looked at security

tensions, I looked at alliance relationships, I looked at economic interdependence -- aka trade, aid flows, budget deficits, economic investment. I look at whether or not the governments promoted different models. And I looked at the questions of cultural affinity and clashes.

And here, out of these four questions, the two factors that emerge as actually important are security tensions and model promotion. In fact, in contrast a little bit to what was presented by Min-hua, cultural affinity doesn't seem to impact this particular question. And, interesting enough -- and I think this is very important from a policy perspective -- economic interdependence doesn't seem to be a factor either, right?

What really matters are security, and the actions of elites in these countries in promoting different models for development.

And let me just pull out a few of those because, obviously, I'm short of time, and I've promised Jonathan -- Jonathan sits next to me, so I have been given that nudge, and I better keep to time -- and that is that the security tension issues clearly comes out, especially in Northeast Asia.

But if you look at the numbers that Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines have about choosing China as a model, we actually see these are countries, disproportionally, that have poor security tension relations. And, in contrast, the security alliances, such as the affinity between the United States and Thailand, the United States and Korea, they're not as much of a pull factor as, clearly, the tensions issues that matter.

Now, the only exception has to do with Vietnam. And I think part of that can be explained by the second explanation at the country level, which has to do with the promotion of China as a model among Vietnamese. And I think that explains some of that reason.

Values also come to play. I've already gotten the two-minute mark, so I'm actually going to speed up a tiny bit.

All right, then we look at the micro level. And here, we use this huge set of questions that we have, and we look at attitudes towards equality, attitudes towards freedom, support for authoritarianism -- "authoritarian" should have an "ism" -- Asian values, social and political traditionalism, demographic features, and views of China's position. And we see which of these factors help us to understand why they might have chosen the United States versus why they might have chosen China.

And here are some of the findings that we find at the micro level.

If you like equality, you choose the United States. If you like freedom, you choose the United States. If you're less politically traditional, you choose the United States. And if you have more money, you choose the United States. *(Laughter)*

The United States is more of a pull factor at these individual levels. The only thing that pulled China -- towards China, was that they saw your view as positive in the region. That was the only thing that really pulled you in that particular area.

So, political culture and values really mattered in the context at the local level, and the individual level, for supporting the United States, and not choosing China. But, in fact, choosing China, it really had to do with the actions that the Chinese -- how they perceived what China was doing.

So this brings me to the conclusion of my presentation, and that is: Soft power, for the United States, remains quite significant; that the push factors for China are actually very significant. And this goes back, reinforces what Bob Sutter said earlier: If China acts and is nice, then people will think of it as nice, and think of it as a model. If it chooses not to be nice -- well, enough said.

The pull-factors for democracy, in terms of soft power for the United States -- arising -- democracy, more prosperity, is going to likely increase the United States' soft power. And so, from a perspective of policy, this actually suggests that the United States really needs to stick with what it knows best, which is working on its economy, promoting democracy, acting democratic, and this will maintain its soft power.

I think the trends suggest that China needs to be more careful of its actions, especially in Southeast Asia.

I'll close there. Thank you so much. *(Applause)*

DR. BUSH: If the presenters and the panelists, commentators, could come up to the stage?

Bridget, while you're getting your stuff, I would speculate that maybe the reason that the Vietnamese prefer the Chinese model best is that they believe that that's the best way to deal with the security challenge that China poses; that they would be less able to do so if they had an American model, because it's too chaotic.

So -- we turn the floor over, first, to Andy Nathan, and then Mike Lampton, for about 10 minutes' worth of comments.

So -- Andy?

ANDREW NATHAN: I wonder if Min-hua, if we could see Min-hua's slide, the multilevel analysis. I just want to clarify something.

DR. BUSH: Okay. Could we bring the screen down again, please?

DR. NATHAN: Sorry.

DR. BUSH: That's okay.

DR. NATHAN: Yeah. Is that right? Thanks. So, all these data are going by us very fast, so I just want to check in with Min-hua here -- the two dependent variables, "China's rise," and "favorable image," how were they measured?

DR. HUANG: Umm –

DR. NATHAN: "China's rise," I believe was a question introduced by -- in Jun-han's paper.

DR. HUANG: most influence.

DR. NATHAN: "Most influence in Asia." And the "favorable image" question?

DR. HUANG: impact on the region.

DR. NATHAN: "Is China's impact on the region largely positive or negative?" Okay. Good.

So, I want to suggest one way of thinking about these two papers is in the context of studies about what drives public opinion. And, as you've heard mentioned, there's a, you know, long tradition of work in this area, particularly in the area of American politics. And you've heard mentioned this book by Page and Xie, called *Living with the Dragon*, but Page is chiefly a student of American politics, and wrote an earlier book with Bob Shapiro, Page and Shapiro. The name of that book, as I recall, is *The Rational Public*. Is that the right name?

So, there's a long series of investigations into public opinion about -- although public opinion fluctuates, and there are many irrational people in the public, according to this stream of research, if you average out public opinion, as is done in these studies, there's a consistency and a realism in the development of public opinion. Public opinion simply responds, eventually, in a rather steady manner, to realities on the ground, to the facts that exist -- even though people's

knowledge of those facts, as you've heard, is partly selective. That is, if you're educated, if you're interested, you will learn more, and so there's that variation, as well as that the public's access to the facts is mediated through the media, which may have their own biases and mechanisms.

Nonetheless, there is this argument that, in the bottom line, in the big picture, the public sees the truth, the facts, and its opinions evolve in that way.

A second view of public opinion is to say that it is controlled by stereotypes and prejudices -- by, say, images of China as, you know, a different -- say, in the American case, you know, as "exotic," as "foreign," as "yellow" -- you know, things like that, "the yellow horde." And in the case of Asia, by images of China that wouldn't respond to changing situations. They're just stereotypes and prejudices.

And a third view of public opinion is that it can be manipulated by public relations activities, by propaganda.

And I'm sure that there's some truth in all of these views, but what I go out of these two papers on this panel was an argument from the paper-writers -- and it seemed to me to be a pretty strong one -- in support of this view that public opinion is actually shaped by real interests, and real behaviors.

And so if we're looking still at -- and Bridget's and Min-hua's presentations are very consistent, although they deal with different dependent variables. So his dependent variables were these two questions that we just reviewed, where her main dependent variable is this question of what country would you take as a model? And you can imagine that an intelligent respondent to the questionnaire might respond in different ways to these questions. So, for example, Thailand, "What country would you take as a model," having been through the corruption and the coups, and the struggle between the countryside and the city, and all that, maybe the Thais wouldn't want to be like the United States, with our similar crazy stuff going on here, with the Red States and the Blue States. So it depends -- the dependent variables are different.

But I think both Bridget's and Min-hua's findings show a realism of public opinion -- individual-level effects, democratic -- just to look at this particular table, and Bridget also emphasized this a lot. I mean, if you like democracy and liberalism, then it makes sense to, you know, look at China with some alarm, and so on.

And on the contextual effects, I gather that Bridget and Min-hua operationalized “geopolitical tension” differently, because Bridget gave a higher score for Vietnam's and Philippines' political tension than Min-hua did. And I would say Bridget's measurement was more correct than Min-hua's.

But, you know, it doesn't matter too much, in a way, because if Min-hua were to change his coding to coincide with Bridget's it would make that particular figure that he presented only more striking. It would just move more, it would strengthen the degree to which the countries that have geopolitical tension are in the quadrant where they ought to be.

So, you know, I think both of the papers suggest that these publics in Asia are looking at their interests, they're looking at their interests at an individual level and at a national level, and then they're judging China from that point of view.

And that would bring me to a second point, which is that I was surprised -- Bob Sutter really hit it when he said, you know, the message of these papers is that China should be nice. And I even wonder whether, in some sense, that was the purpose of the project. I don't know. (Laughter) And I'm certainly not accusing anybody of cooking the data.

But, you know, there's a strong message that if you think you can do soft -- if you think you can increase your prestige just by talking nice, and claiming to be benign, it won't work. But then, how to be nice. And I think most of the presentations emphasize being nice to Asians, you know, to not be so assertive in the South China Sea and things like that.

But a second thing that came out more to me -- because, as you know, I'm interested in human rights issues in China -- is how important it is for China to change its domestic system, and stop violating human rights, if it wishes to be taken seriously as a benign country. And this raises a kind of puzzle about the United States, which is that, in most regions of the world, the United States -- and in Asia, especially, I suppose -- is accepted as a benign presence, even though, if we think about history in a dispassionate way, its presence has not been very benign in Asia, at least in a lot of ways. Maybe it's been benign economically, but not in many other ways.

How do you get to be perceived as benign? And the domestic model is actually maybe very, very important in that respect. And this makes the challenge for China to be even greater.

And since I'm appearing on the next panel, I have an opportunity to go into other aspects of these questions then. *(Applause)*

MIKE LAMPTON: Well, thank you to the organizers. Thank you to the paper-writers. Also, I just want to commend the sort of cross-strait collaborative dimension of this. I think that's really a good thing, and I commend all that have pushed in that direction.

Also, I hope you find the money to expand the polling effort. So I'll throw my weight behind that, whatever that may be.

I must say, the most interesting, disturbing number I've seen was actually in the last panel, revealing. And that was the roughly 97 percent of Chinese think they're doing terrifically. I mean, it doesn't show a high paying-attention-to-the-data and the system responding to the environment in the way you would hope. Now, a little was taken off the edge by Bridget's observation that Chinese actually seem to, with at least a plurality, prefer the American model to their own. So that shows a certain self-analytic capability that the other figure doesn't.

But I think it's a very interesting question: Why is China not paying more attention to its environment than this data suggests?

Now, I disagree a little with Bob Sutter, because he basically said China's never, since 1949, paid attention to its environment, and so that's not changing. I see what he means, and I don't entirely disagree. But, the fact is, I think, what was notable, from 1977 to 2008, was China really managed to dramatically increase its hard power without scaring the neighborhood to a dramatic degree. And then somewhere around 2008, 2009, suddenly, it was like the memory bank on reassuring foreign policy got erased.

So, I think the really interesting analytic question is: Why has Chinese foreign policy, to the degree -- the Chinese would deny it's changed but, in fact, I think there's a wide degree of consensus that it has in some important ways. What accounts for that?

Now, you know, I'm not going to defend the Chinese, because I've already postulated what I think the basic problem is, and it lies substantially in that direction. But one thing that hasn't come up is the Southeast Asians or, for that matter, Northeast Asians and Japan, as actors that shape China's behavior. And we don't want to have the assumption that all the behavior of everybody around China has been entirely reassuring to China, either. So, there's an interactive process, and this sort of looks as the neighbors as the inert receptors of Chinese behavior and so forth. I think that's clearly not -- that's probably, in my view, not a sustainable model.

Now, it seems to me these papers -- I'll treat them the same, or I'll make some comments that suggest I see them in the same vein, but there are some differences that I would want to highlight, too.

First of all, I think they really raise the right questions. I mean, how successful are China's soft-power efforts? They're putting a lot of effort

behind it, and I think the data here would suggest not achieving all that China would have hoped.

Is China's soft power being, or its efforts in this regard being more successful in some areas than others? And I think, in relative terms, yes. They're more successful in Southeast Asia than Northeast Asia, is certainly the case.

What could China do to improve its efficacy? I think we have some answers there. I guess Bob has stolen our conceptual formulation: It's "be nice" is the answer to that question.

But, anyway, it seems to me these papers are both asking the right questions, and they come up, broadly speaking, with what strikes me as the sensible answers.

Now, we can't go into it, but you have so many questions, and you have -- you put several questions and the answers together, and you sort of have measures that reflect multiple questions. There's a lot of methodology, which I'm sure I mostly don't understand, going on behind.

But you do end up with some results that lead me to think you've got countries not exactly in what I would have thought was the right place.

The Philippines just continually shows up in places in your charts where I wouldn't have predicted it. Maybe I'm wrong, but at least I need more convincing on that.

Vietnam, too, just seems to me, the perception of hostility I get when I go and interview in Vietnam is a lot higher than what I would call "ambivalence" -- so, you know, Vietnam, it seems to me.

Also, I would just note: American allies don't always come up very high in their appreciation of the United States. And I thought that was kind of interesting. You know, we're lauding ourselves, in comparative terms, with China, but why don't we do better with some of our allies? So, I mean, I think we can be a little self-reflective ourselves. We don't want to be the 97 percent, you know, "Americans are doing great, right? So, in any case, I'd raise a few questions in that regard.

Now, you know, methodologically, it seems to me the two papers have somewhat different definitions of "soft power." And, of course, there are many more than just two, but Bridget's, I thought, was a good one, that is to say "Whose model do you think is better?" Of course, it leaves aside is everybody conceiving the model as the same thing? But then yours, Min-hua, is essentially, "Do you recognize China's power?" And "Do you think it's benign or constructive for you?"

So, anyway, the two papers were coming to the similar conclusions, but were actually using different definitions of soft power to get there. So you can make what you want out of that.

Let me just conclude by asking a couple of questions.

One I've, in effect posed, but why do we think China's -- well, to what degree do we think China's foreign policy has changed? What role do we see China's neighbors playing in that change? And why do we think the Chinese seem to have difficulty processing, recognizing, and reacting constructively now to what is pretty clear messaging coming from its peripheries? So, I think it's sort of what drives China's foreign policy here, is one set of issues.

And the other thing that I guess I actually do not believe, but both papers tend to suggest, is that economic interdependence -- well, particularly Min-hua's paper suggests economic interdependence actually works against positive perceptions.

And I wonder if your measure is actually measuring interdependence, or it's measuring dependence. In other words, I'd want to know who's running big trade deficits with China and is losing a lot of labor-intensive industry? And my guess is that if -- and you correct me if I'm wrong -- but what you're measuring is the magnitude of the economic relationship, not the balance in the international. So another on China's to-do list, it seems to me, ought to get more balanced trade relations with its neighbors.

Thank you. *(Applause)*

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Mike. Thank you very much, Andy.

We now have 28 minutes for questions. I would ask that Bridget and Min-hua fold anything they want to say to Andy and Mike into their answers to other questions.

The rules here are that: Wait to be recognized. Wait for the mic. Identify yourself. And ask a short question. I mean, all of these people are really smart, so you don't have to do a very long and complicated question. They'll get it very briefly. So, I saw a question right there. Up here in the middle, white shirt, dark tie.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. My name is Andrew Anderson-Sprecher. And there's two data-points that jumped out as interesting. I wonder if people had any comments or additional thoughts -- one was with

Mongolia and their negative attitudes in relation to economic interdependence. And I noticed that the trade was almost all Mongolian exports to China, so that seemed like they don't really like their customers, which goes perhaps the opposite of what Dr. Lampton said. So I thought that was something going on there.

The other thing was with the Philippines, is nobody cited themselves as a model, which sort of threw off the other numbers.

So I was wondering if you have any thoughts on either of those data-points. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: On Mongolia, I mean one of the aspects of the economic relationship is that a lot of Chinese joint-ventures in Mongolia rely on Chinese labor that they bring in, and then they create all kinds of negative social effects within Mongolian society. And so it's partly a response to that.

Satu, did you have a -- oh, you have a question? Okay, hang on just a second. The gentleman right there, in the tan coat.

QUESTION: Thank you. My name's Akira Chiba , from Japan, and I have a question for Dr. Huang concerning the second slide, in which he showed us the vigilance-ambivalence coordinates, so to speak.

And my question is about the southwest corner of that coordinate, because that southeast corner talks about ignoring China. Now, ignoring Japan is something not unheard of, because we pay attention to the flow, but we ignore the stock. But precisely because we pay attention to the flow, ignoring China doesn't seem to be what's really happening in this decade.

So, shouldn't this southwest corner be representing the affectionate-low vigilance domain -- in other words, what we call the "Panda huggers?"

DR. BUSH: Okay, let's take these two. Anybody want to respond?

DR. HUANG: Yes.

DR. BUSH: Min-hua?

DR. HUANG: It's kind of embarrassing to answer the Philippines, the data question. I actually believe is execution team probably -- no? But, to my knowledge, it's still very strange about no one's choosing themselves. So, that, I acknowledge.

About Mongolia, there are a lot of -- again, in China, as well as in Mongolia, I mean, they have a lot of hate feeling about China. And it's not just -- it's a long history about they feel kind of between Russia and as well as China. And its nationalistic feeling against China is really, really high, even economic highly dependent.

And one final, which is the labeling question. I totally agree with you, it's not actually that sophisticated, in terms of when I'm labeling. So it could have other interpretations, too. So -- yes.

DR. BUSH: Mike, do you have -- ?

DR. LAMPTON: No.

DR. BUSH: Nobody? Okay, Satu? And then we'll go to the back.

DR. LIMAYE: This is really a question on -- Satu Limaye, from the East-West Center. My question is really for the project, and going forward, because you're going to do longitudinal work.

What was really striking to me between the two panels, and the two sets of papers, is the very generally positive first set of -- when you didn't introduce security. But when, Bridget, you introduced geopolitics and security, the driver becomes much more negative of views of China -- not on other counts, as you talked about.

And I wonder how you deal with that as you design the next iteration of this. Because it seems that the security driver almost seems to trump every other driver. And that becomes very important -- if David is right, which I think is a really important point, and what Bob Sutter said earlier -- is that China thinks it's doing really well and doesn't need to change its foreign policy, then the security driver is likely to increase in salience to Southeast Asia.

DR. BUSH: Okay, why don't you hand the mic to Yun-han so he can respond.

DR. CHU: I think I need to clarify a few things.

Number one, the first panel papers give you an overall picture where China stands, you know, in the public view among the Asian people. And Min-hua's paper actually, we call it a second paper, as well, tried to provide the kinds of causal analysis: You know, what drives favorable or unfavorable view about China? Okay?

And then when you do the analysis, basically what you find is that, you know, if you have stronger belief in democratic values, then you tend to view China, you know, in an unfavorable light -- okay?

But that doesn't mean that, you know, a great majority view China in less favorable light. It's not true.

So what -- you know, what you can derive there. Not a great majority of Asian people strongly believe in democratic values. If they do, then China will be looked down upon, you know, in a much less favorable.

But what it shows, actually, you know, a lot of Asian people, you know -- read our anther book, you know, *How East Asians View Democracy*, you know, 2008, Columbia University Press. Unfortunately, in many Asian societies, East Asia, you know, not a great majority they are strongly committed to liberal democratic values.

And so that's why they can continue to view China in a very favorable light, you know, in terms of absolute level. So that's why, you know, the two papers, you know, they're compatible.

So, if you look at, you know, the other side, you know, cultural mechanisms, then you'll say, oh, you know, China has a lot of problems, you know, if they don't reform their political system, if they don't be nice to the neighbors, and so on and so forth. Okay.

But at the same time, you might argue the other way around, that is to say, despite the security concerns, despite geographical considerations, China's influence on the region is still, relatively speaking, you know, more positive view than otherwise -- okay. So the damage has been limited, and it’s not as bad as it is -- okay -- although that remains one of the very important explanatory sources for the difference.

I don't know whether I clarified that.

DR. BUSH: Okay, Mike?

DR. LAMPTON: Two things -- one, the continual observation that security is the big -- if not "the" big one, a very big one. Of course, this fits with -- I guess we'll call it "group and social psychology,” Maslow, the hierarchy of human needs. I mean, security is the first thing on every group and individual, and then economics, and then self-actualization.

So I think the findings fit with what we know about group and, indeed, individual nation behavior.

Just one other thing, though, on this democratic values, and it's clearly -- I think these papers indicate the importance of that as a variable, and I accept it. And I thought the comments Andy made were great. But if you're trying to think from policy point of view, so what does China do with that information? Go democratic tomorrow? Not an option -- right? But if it had a credible plan to move in a more liberal, let us say, direction, you could get some play there. I mean, part of it is the perception that China may be not going in the right direction. So you have the capacity to -- I think you have the capacity to get going in a better direction, right? So it's not a bimodal, you're either that or you're not that, and you're locked in.

So, you know, I think China has the capacity -- I don't mean it will do it. I'm not predicting it will -- but it has the theoretic option of going through a period of tutelage and to a more bright democratic future in somewhere distant. I think there's an option there.

DR. BUSH: Well, that's an interesting way of putting it. Yu Donghui in the back, and then I'll come to the middle.

QUESTION: Thank you. Yu Dong Hui, with China Review News Agency. Talking about the soft power, China's First Lady, Peng Liyuan, is making her international debut. And it's sparking the fashion frenzy in China. The Western media generally had a positive reporting about her performance. What do you think about her debut? Do you think it's a kind of special soft power that Chinese government could take advantage, to promote its image in the international arena? Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Does anybody want to touch that one? *(Laughter)*

DR. WELSH: As the only woman on the panel, I will point out that the data shows that men choose China as a model more than women. So maybe there's more room to reach out to women.

DR. BUSH: Hmm.

SPEAKER: Not if she sings.

DR. NATHAN: I want –

DR. BUSH: Yes.

QUESTION: I want to mention, you know, from the question that I raised about different theories that shape how messages are received. You know, they might be shaped through the media, and stuff like that. This brings up

an interesting question about how the sort of pre-existing evaluative frame of the receiver affects the message. So one message can be sent out, and it can mean very different things to different people.

And one of things that struck me was some commentary that I saw around that when she put on national minority costumes, and sang national minority songs, certain Americans received that as very, very negative, because we have a completely different history of race relations in this country, and a different perspective on race. So we would think, how can the dominant race don the costume and appropriate the music of an oppressed race? This is a form of oppression. But I recognize that that vision of what she did is extremely shaped by a unique American, you know, receiving framework.

And so I think the example -- this is not quite an answer to your question, but it is to point out a theoretical issue that attends all of this kind of research.

DR. BUSH: Michael Yahuda, in the middle, right here.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. Given that geopolitics seems to be one of the themes that has come up, I wonder if there's one aspect of it that deserves more attention -- and that is, we're dealing with a country which is perceived as very great, surrounded by smaller countries.

And if we look at similar situations -- I think, if we look at India -- I don't think we would find that its neighbors feel very pleased to be next door to India. If we look at Russia, I don't think its neighbors feel very pleased to be next to Russia. And I think even in the United States, you will find that –

SPEAKER: Especially in the United States --

QUESTION: -- the Canadians and the Mexicans don't dance with delight every day to say how wonderful their neighbor is.

And I think this may be also a factor with regard to China and its neighborhood. And, of course, China has its own characteristics that may make its relationship with its neighbors even more difficult.

But, again, one of the characteristics of great countries like this is that they're very absorbed in themselves. They pay very little attention to what are the cultures and interests of their neighbors. And I think that creates difficulties when the great country seeks, somehow or other, to reach across to them in some forms of propaganda, or whatever term one wants to use.

But I think this sort of great-power problem needs to be brought in, if one is going to talk about geopolitics.

DR. BUSH: Anybody? Bridget?

DR. WELSH: I think I want to pick up a little bit on what you've said, and speak a little bit to what Mike said earlier.

I think, you know, there is a lot of unpacking that needs to be done, in terms of vis-a-vis the questions of neighbors. And you talk about it in terms of culture, and position, which I think is a very right way.

But I also think, when we look at the economic interdependence variable -- this is something I struggled with, right? -- Because you have a lot of investment by China in its neighbors in environmentally not so sound areas, for example, in Myanmar and Cambodia. And so it's not just about jobs, it's also about the nature of these types of investment -- which goes back to what you're saying -- the nature of the relationship, which has to be looked at in a much more, I think, "unpacked" way.

I mean, I think the reason the economic interdependence variable did not come up as significant is because I think we haven't unpacked it yet. And we have to unpack these things a little bit more nuanced, for us to understand what is the type of dynamic. And also, you know, for example, in Myanmar, they look at the Chinese as Big Brother, but at the same time, there's these cultural type of antagonisms that also exist. These things also have to be tried to be captured, I think, as the survey moves forward, not just looking at drivers of security, but also looking at drivers of cultural interrelationships, and much more careful attention to how they perceive the economic ties.

DR. BUSH: Just -- do you want to -- Mike?

DR. LAMPTON: I just wanted to respond to Michael's very good observation -- and we sometimes just forget the obvious, that big powers have littler neighbors, and that sets up a whole set of generic problems. I agree.

But China has behaved more and less, over time, reassuringly to its neighbors. If you look -- and what I have in mind when I say that is look at the resolution of almost all its land borders. You know, we've got still a problem with India, and so on -- I don't mean "all."

But, basically, I remember a study that appeared in *China Quarterly* that basically said, you know, the Chinese resolved, in terms of measured by square miles, the non-Chinese claimant to the border got it resolved in a way that was relatively favorable to them.

So it still leaves the question: Why can't China adopt a similar approach in dealing with its maritime claims that are causing it so much difficulty?

So, yes, I think big powers always have problems with their littler neighbors, or less influential in some way.

But there still has been variation in Chinese behavior over time. It has behaved in ways that are much more reassuring, and less reassuring. I mean, just look at the Taiwan Straits, and what the Chinese approach there is. I think it's fairly sensible.

So, you know, your observation is justified, but doesn't, in my mind, do away with the problem.

DR. BUSH: And just to extend the point, the history of the United States in the Western Hemisphere also has the dimension of multiple interventions in Mexico, and Central America, and Cuba, and Santo Domingo, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And is that the direction that China is going? I hope not. We didn't gain any points from doing it here.

The gentleman right here.

QUESTION: Thank you. My name is (inaudible) Li, from Chinese Embassy. I think, two comments, briefly. One is (inaudible) they all mentioned that it seems China have to be nice to its neighbors. And (inaudible)) its neighbors, it's nice. And China is a bad guy. All neighbors is good guy.

I think you have to, I mean, objectively look at why China actually sometimes, China is reaction to its neighbors. So when look at these things, you have to also judge about the neighbor's policy. That's one comment.

The second comment is: we can also ask this question in terms of values or political development. And I think the question, if we ask, is China more open now than 10 years ago? So, why? I mean, China actually, at least it seems is sort of belief that the Chinese political reform has made big progress, but it seems that the progress is not recognized. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Thank you. Anybody want to comment? He reinforced a point that you had made. Any other questions? The gentleman right back there, in the tan sweater.

QUESTION: Hello. My name is Antoine Roth. I'm a student at George Washington University. And my question comes back to security. And so, to what extent do you think the change in distribution of power, considering

really like in terms of basic military forces, and actual, the mass of it, how does it influence perception? And how does China mitigate that? Professor Lampton mentioned this successful reassurance campaign. So, just what's the effect on perceptions in the neighborhood? Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Any takers? Yes, Mike?

DR. LAMPTON: I guess I've sort of come to a view -- and it may not be correct -- but I see China -- I think back to *Science and Civilization in China*, by Joseph Needham –

DR. NATHAN: Why are you pointing at me? *(Laughter)*

DR. LAMPTON: In case I forgot the name, you were going to rescue me.

DR. NATHAN: Yeah, because I'm as old as Needham? Right.

DR. LAMPTON: Yeah -- but anyway, the idea that China, Chinese people, China sees itself in a network of relationships, and not in a network of absolute rules and so forth. So as power changes, all of the relationships in this network have to adjust.

And so, in my view, it's self-evident: economic and military power of China is going up. China, in the preceding period, whether it was 100 years, or the last 50, or the last 30, had to negotiate a set of relations -- whether it was with respect to Taiwan, or with respect to the Philippines, or the South China Sea -- and, generally speaking, those were not entirely satisfactory implicit negotiations for China. They accepted less than they wanted.

Now China's power is growing, and it thinks it's entitled to negotiate better deals. I think that's the underlying dynamic. There isn't an absolute set of rules here, there's an ever-negotiating set of networks. And as your power changes, the weak are not entitled to as much as the strong.

I think that's the world we're in.

MR. BUSH: Anybody else? Any other questions? Okay, what I would propose is to thank our panelists, and we'll conclude this session, and move immediately to the next one. So, Andy Nathan stays up at the table. I stay up here. Jonathan comes up, and Yun-han will chair. *(Applause)*

DR. CHU: Here is the wrap-up session. As we announced and promised, you know, in the beginning of the program, I know that, you know, this is Good Friday, and we are approaching noontime, so we have a lot of enemies.

But at the same time, I'm sure that, you know, you're all anxious to listen to our three panelists. They will each give 10 minutes lead-off remarks, and then, you know, we will come back to the floor, you know, then we can entertain more Q&A, you know, during the remaining 20 to 30 minutes.

Obviously, here we are at Brookings, and we want to attract as much not just intellectual juices out of those data, but also the implication for the region, for U.S. policy toward East Asia, especially as the Clinton -- I'm sorry, Obama administration enters its second term, and many important positions, you know, at the policy-making level will be filled pretty soon.

I think, you know, obviously we want to listen to the three wise men, you know, what kind of advice they can give to the second term Obama administration.

So, Jonathan, should I invite you to speak first?

DR. POLLACK: No particular order, but -- yeah, but we can certainly go that way.

I'm trying to reflect, first, on some of what I think I've learned today. Many, many years ago, a very, very famous political scientist, Arnold Wolfers, talked about national security as an ambiguous concept. And I think maybe public opinion is also an ambiguous concept. I mean, I've been enlightened about the sheer complexity of this phenomenon -- and, indeed, the way it may operate in various Asian states often may be counterintuitive.

But it's a reminder that political behavior is not all elite behavior. The intensity of beliefs, the malleability of beliefs, it still seems to me, is an open question.

In this regard, I think, also, several of the points made by different commentators stick out in my own mind, that, you know, implicitly, I think, a lot of the arguments made today reflected the presumption of economics as a factor that has influenced perceptions of China -- up to a point.

And what strikes me is that perhaps many of China's neighbors wish China stability and success, but maybe not too much success. But, given the sheer weight of the Chinese economy, given the fact that often China has money to throw around, if you will, may change that calculation.

In this respect, thinking about soft power, and the notion of China and the United States being in a soft-power competition, I think is problematic, because American soft power emerges out of a whole host of factors and attractions, and the way, who we are, and how we go about it. I daresay that

China's model of soft power is kind of -- if I can mix my metaphors -- sort of a brute-force model of soft power, in the sense that China does have lots of money -- and sometimes you do throw money at a problem. But it doesn't really have that kind of organic quality, it seems to me.

But in this respect, perhaps the calculation in China is that in the same way that China, domestically, gets this resounding support from its own citizens -- remarkable numbers -- perhaps the presumption is that the same principle could apply in how China tries to influence thinking beyond its borders. Here, I agree very, very strongly with Michael Yahuda's point about just simply the reminder of the sheer magnitude and self-absorption that big states have. Little states can be very self-absorbed, too. It's just simply that the consequences of being big make that calculation very, very different.

One thing that I would like to highlight, however -- and here I agree very much with a point made by Mike Lampton -- is that I don't know, I mean, we could be very fatalistic about this -- you know, "This is always the way Chinese have behaved. It's never going to change, never, never, never" -- when, in fact, I don't think we're dealing with static considerations, nor are we dealing with a world of simply either-or. I'm kind of on the war path on this. I think we tend to get so trapped in binary thinking, when the world that I understand is a world of more-or-less, or it's something in-between.

The question is whether or not that kind of a perception can materialize and see an evolution of the Chinese system over time, such that its influence would be more by indirection, rather than by sheer dominance. I don't know that we're at that point -- in fact, I don't think we are at that point.

And I think that when we ask ourselves either the attraction or the aversion to China, it will be very, very much a function of the kind of Chinese system we are dealing with, and how it behaves.

Now, in this regard, rather than Americans being a little too smug about their power, let's remember that the development of China, and the more favorable views of China that emerged so much from the late '90s onwards were, in part, a direct consequence of America's rather unappealing behavior abroad. If we've gotten smarter about it, so much the better -- although there are no guarantees. I mean, I find it kind of ironic that, at least in terms of the operative dominant characterization that Chinese, the party and the propaganda apparatus make about the United States, it almost describes the United States as much more heavy-handed today than it was in the Bush administration. And I daresay that, in my own view, that there's a problem there with the facts, and with cause and effect.

One other point I would want to make, and I think it bears on all of our discussions here today, and that is the perceived salience of security as a factor. As China becomes more powerful, how does it choose to exercise that power? Because it does seem to me, as China has the means to assert its influence, both directly and indirectly, it may well be that some of these more positive perceptions of China on the part of neighbors will erode significantly in the years to come.

One last point I'd want to make just as we try to characterize China -- I'm struck by so much of the work that Ian Johnston has done to look at variations in public opinion within the Chinese system, in essence, finding a kind of a cosmopolitan quality in the Beijing area survey findings again and again and again, where you have more educated individuals, more worldly, and so forth and so on. And that leads, not surprisingly, to very, very different attitudes about the outside world.

So, by that, I think, we really have to ask ourselves some questions about what kind of an identity does China assume? What degree of tolerance or lack of tolerance will there be for variations within the system? As China gets to be, in some respects, an even messier system in the future, does that lead to a more relaxed or a more anxious view of China? When I said, before, that neighbors don't want China to be too successful, at the same time, I think that there are acute anxieties about instability in China, and what some of its consequences might be.

So, I think that the papers here today, and the richness of the discussion, gives us not only a lot of food for thought, but I think it has really enriched our debate, or ought to enrich our debate and our understanding of China, and how outside actors try to influence Chinese behavior over the longer term.

Thank you. *(Applause)*

DR. CHU: Now we'll turn to Richard Bush.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Yun-han. I tried to put myself in the shoes of an American policy-maker whom Yun-han came to brief about the results of this survey, and think how would I react? Now, I should say, I'm decidedly not a policy-maker. I mean, this is just a mental exercise.

But I would have a variety of reactions. In general, I would, first of all, be really excited to have real data. Too often, we are instructed by governments, or by pundits, on what the opinions are of Asian publics, and how we should take their definition of public opinion into account. Well, this is a good corrective.

Second, I would be happy that the United States is doing better than I probably would have expected. The last decade, frankly, was really mixed for the U.S. image. And, based on some of these findings, we're not doing so bad. The U.S. model is still attractive in some places compared to China. Interdependence is a double-edged sword, because it creates losers as well as winners.

We do benefit sometimes from China's actions. And I would find it a little bit ironic that China is using culture to promote its power and influence, when the Chinese Communist Party is probably the one organization that's done the most to destroy and degrade and otherwise harm traditional Chinese culture.

My final general comment would be that rebalancing didn't come too late. Maybe just soon enough, but it didn't come too late. Certainly, we need to implement it well. We have to recognize that, based on some of Min-hua's findings, we are still going against the tide of East Asian expectations that China is going up, it's going to be more influential over the next decade, and the United States will not.

I think that I would also recognize that the future of the U.S. around the world, and in East Asia is in our hands. And we need to rebuild the pillars of our national power if we're going to be able to have the kind of role that we want to have, and which I think East Asians want us to play, because it gives them more flexibility.

My second general reaction in response to these results would be to be very hungry for more. I mean, it's very important that these surveys are continued, so that we see what the trends are over time. I think that, you know, the problem of any survey research is that sometimes the findings are a function of the questions. And general questions, in particular, allow the respondent to interpret what the concepts mean. If you say, "What do you think of the Chinese model?" Well, different people are going to have different understandings of what that means. And sometimes responses are a function of knowledge -- and Yun-han understands that very well.

I think that -- I mean, we can take an example from one of the papers in the first panel that it would be useful for me as a policy-maker to know what my citizenry thought about two questions that were more specific than the ones that are asked. And number one is, "Do you think that China will challenge the U.S. position and role in East Asia in the next 10 years?" What Americans think about that, I think is important.

Number two, is our economic relationship with China yielding mutual benefit? I know what the President of the United States thinks on that

question, and his answer is no. And his answer counts a little bit more. But it would be good to know what the public things.

On a methodological note, it would be very interesting for me to know how entrenched are the opinions that these surveys yield? To what extent are they a function of events that occurred in the weeks and months right before the poll was taken? Or are we sort of identifying things that are rather more fundamental, and which are not going to be changed.

I mean, if it's a function of recent events, and if we assume that China is going to be more assertive, then that may increase negative views in East Asia -- or, I'm sorry -- and it may create opportunities for U.S. policy to exploit to promote our own interests.

And rebalancing, I think, can be seen in this light. We're not about to contain China, but it does allow us and our friends in the region to strengthen their hedge as they deal with China.

I think the most profound message that I would take away from this data is that leaders matter. Leaders matter. Note that their job is embedded in the label we put on them -- the job of leaders is to lead, not to be led around.

Now, leaders have to sort of take account of public opinion, and all kinds of other things, but I think too often in recent years, we've seen Asian leaders be led rather than lead. Look again at U.S. opinion about China. By and large, the findings that you got were sensible. I'm not surprised that Americans think that. I also think that those views are not frozen. Therefore, that creates an opportunity for the President of the United States, should he or she choose to use it, to shape support for whatever policy he or she wishes to pursue.

Looking at China, and looking at this result that Chinese people think that they're doing just fine, thank you, I think Chinese leaders, as part of their responsibility to lead, is to talk some sense to the Chinese public and be honest with them about the consequences of China's action. I know this is hard to do, and there are some institutional obstacles to doing so. But I think that we would all be better off -- and Chinese leaders would be better off -- with a certain amount of honesty.

I think leaders do have, if they're skillful, the ability to define a country's interest in certain ways, rather than let others define the interest. They're able to define what the relevant public is, and not let others do it for them.

And in this situation, leaders have a couple of different options. They can act like demagogues, and they can create opinion that sort of inflicts on

themselves a certain set of policies. And there's always enough material to demagogue a foreign policy issue.

Leaders can worry too much about the feelings of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. And, you know, if you're a weak state in Southeast Asia, then maybe you have a certain temptation to do it. But, you know, sometimes it's useful to draw lines. I think Singapore's a good example here.

Finally, another option is to do a good job in justifying the mixed strategy that most countries pursue towards China -- and China's pursuing a mixed strategy towards us.

Now, all of this is easy for me to see -- that leaders should lead. And I understand that our President and every other leader in East Asia is in a very complicated situation. I think that this would be easier to do if leaders interact with each other more, and develop, between themselves, a deeper understanding of each other's situation. They, after all, are the only ones in their country who have the broadest vision of their country's interest. They are the only ones at the top of their systems who can task various agencies, each of which has their own interests, to act more in terms of the leader's interest rather than their own.

Thank you very much. *(Applause)*

DR. CHU: Andy?

DR. NATHAN: Thank you. Well, we know that governments do invest in soft power and public diplomacy, and they do so in different ways. As Bob Sutter pointed out, I guess the Chinese soft power has been much more government-led, and is more consistent on message than the American soft power strategy, which has been around for quite a long time, has depended a lot on funding -- you know, jazz musicians to go overseas, for example, in the '50s, and more people-to-people kinds of things, and bringing visitors to this country from other countries.

The Japanese government has invested a lot in the international promotion of anime, which I would have -- to me, makes a bad image, but apparently to the -- and the Korean government, I guess, has invested in promoted K-pop, and so forth. And so there are different styles, and the Chinese style is one.

And I would like to raise the question of why do governments care about soft power, and put some money into it? And I guess that that is different for countries that have different international issues, and different international strategies, so that, for example, I guess the U.S. has been investing in soft power

over the years with a national -- I'm just guessing. I mean, I'm not asserting that this is the case -- but with a national strategy of really trying to change the values of other countries in the world to be more compatible with the American political system and economic system, to promote liberal capitalism, and some concept, which maybe is a crazy concept, that if the world were more like the United States, American security would be enhanced by that. I don't think Chinese soft power strategy is at all, in my opinion -- and I think the papers agree with this -- is it all directed toward a security strategy that, if all the governments were like China, then China would be more secure.

I think another -- so that's a difference. I think that both American and Chinese soft power strategy is directed at opening markets, making it just better to land in some airports someplace and be an American, or be a Chinese, and be understood, and be trusted to some extent, and have an easier time, you know, just getting down to business. And that's a reason why both China and the United States have brought a lot of students from other parts of the world to their educational institutions, so that they can learn the language and be cooperators when they go back home to their own country, with people coming from the "mother country," as it were.

Now, I think another purpose of Chinese soft strategy, and especially in Asia during the time that they pursued this theory of peaceful rise, was this assurance strategy that Mike Lampton alluded to, of sort of reducing, diminishing the degree to which the Asian countries would bandwagon, would balance against China by bandwagoning with the United States, just to reduce the tendency to be afraid of China, so that countries would not consider, say, economic -- you know, they would be happy to cooperate with China's economic rise, and happy to welcome China into the ASEAN+3 framework, and things like that, not fearing Chinese intentions. So that reassurance strategy, that was a purpose of it, I think. And I'm not sure -- and perhaps that also is a reason for the Americans.

If you compared those to somebody like Japan or South Korea, I think they're soft power strategies have been predominantly commercial in purpose.

Then it raises the question of “is it worth it”? You know, so is soft power worth spending money on? Does it matter to serve national security goals?

Now, I tend to be convinced by Bob Sutter and Satu's, and I guess everybody, I think, has alluded to this, that when it comes to pursuing one's foreign policy interests, it's the elites who usually make policy, and whose attitude toward you is more important than the mass. Now, here we have -- what's valuable about these studies, in a not completely unique, but relatively innovative

about these studies, is that they look at the mass, they look at public opinion, at mass public opinion.

And this raises the question of "do we care"? As policy-makers? As American or Chinese policy-makers, do -- Yun-han said, let the average person speak through these surveys. But do we care, as policy-makers, what they think?

That raises the question of what is the influence of public opinion on foreign policy. And that varies a great deal. It varies by the country type, the political system type. So in a democratic system like the United States, public opinion has more influence, in China, I would say less.

It varies by the policy area. So in the, say, trade area, in the U.S., trade policy is quite influenced by, as Satu was saying, by the interests of each Congressional district, and something like security policy is less influenced, because the public knows less, cares less, sees less -- unless, you know, you're losing a war someplace, and the public wants to get out. And it depends on the strategic space that a country has. So a country like Vietnam, or like most Southeast Asian countries, has very little choice, actually, about what to do in their foreign policy, and so it doesn't matter what the public thinks, the elites have to do what they have to do.

So, particularly when it comes to our subject here that we've mainly concentrated on, is Chinese behavior influencing the publics in Asia in a way that would influence Chinese interests in Asia? I'm a little skeptical about that. Whether the Chinese publics like China -- I'm sorry, the Asian publics in Country A, B, C, or D like China or don't like China, I'm not sure that it makes much difference to the policies that the foreign policy-makers in those Asian countries find themselves, basically, constrained to adopt by reality.

And here, I sort of disagree with a point that appeared in, I think it was in -- well, in one of the papers that Yun-han co-authored, in which you said that the Asian countries are not balancing against China. I mean, if the Japan alliance with the U.S., and Korean alliance, and Philippine alliance, and Vietnamese quasi-alliance, and so forth, with the United States aren't balancing against China, then I don't know what balancing against China would look like. And I think these countries are simply doing what they have to do on the chessboard of politics, regardless of what the public thinks.

This would bring me to my final question, which converges a lot with Mike Lampton's remark at the end of the last panel, which is, we want China to be nice, but if you're a Chinese policy-maker, is it really worth it to be nice? I would say, perhaps not.

In fact, it's often very beneficial in international affairs to be not nice. And I think this is the moment that the Chinese strategists think: It's probably time for us to really take off the gloves, and, you know, show that we're tough. If other people are afraid of us, that's good. That's better. Because we need to -- we cannot tolerate the current balance of power in Asia. We've got to move the ball sometime, and this is the time. The Americans are weak, they're tied up, they can't even tie their shoelaces, you know. And they talk a lot, but they're going no place. The Japanese have temporarily elected another prime minister who'll last for six or seven months, who talks tough, but he's out. You know -- and this is a great time for us to be tough. And the other guys are going to bitch and moan, and then they're going to back off. So, if you don't like it, that's okay. It's a good enough tradeoff.

DR. CHU: Wow. *(Applause)* Andrew Nathan always surprises us. We can still entertain a few questions, if you have any burning questions. Yes, the gentleman way in the back. Yes. Would you please identify yourself, and also keep your question short.

QUESTION: I'm Pat Malloy. I'm a trade lawyer, and I teach at Catholic University Law School as an adjunct trade professor. I've been concerned about the imbalance in the economic relationship between the United States and China. I thought Richard Bush really hit it when he pointed out that -- I've always thought the economic imbalance will poison the political relationship in time. Because even though the elite may feel, as Professor Nathan said, they form foreign policy, even though they may favor a closer relationship, most Americans don't think that we're benefitting from this relationship and, in fact, that it's harming the country.

And so I just wanted to throw that out, and saw what do the panel think about that observation?

DR. CHU: I would suggest, actually -- you know, I can take a few questions, and then come back to the panel for them to have their last words. Any other -- yes.

QUESTION: Eric McVadon, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. The African-American and Latino components of our society are growing very significantly in size. It's my impression that those two components have very little interest and knowledge, for understandable reasons, of our foreign policy and our relations with Asia, maybe Europe, the Middle East, and so forth. Do you think that's true? And does it matter?

DR. CHU: Yes.

QUESTION: Jeffrey Lin, from Senator Angus King's office. I was wondering, in particular, given that there's a whole bunch of territorial disputes brewing in Asia without any Chinese involvement, if China might be sort of tempted to eventually start picking sides in said disputes, like, for example, what happened recently in Malaysia, with those followers of the Sultan coming down into Sabah Province, for example, that China could try to, well, at least try to play a mediator role, perhaps, to improve its image in Asia, use it as sort of leverage to balance out the recent events of the past two years.

DR. CHU: Okay. Yes -- two more. The gentleman in the yellow tie. Yes.

QUESTION: Michael Yahuda –

DR. CHU: Oh, Mike -- yes. Sorry.

QUESTION: -- from GW. My question is for Andy Nathan. The picture of China you presented to us was it's now the tough guy. The international context favors that position for China.

But on the other hand, the Chinese government is spending a lot of money in trying to improve its image in the outside world, in addition to which, the Chinese government does seem sensitive to certain kinds of human rights issues. For example, there was the blind activist, and rather than standing up to the Americans and saying, "You're interfering in our affairs, buzz off," on the contrary, they acted in many ways that would seem unexpected, given the presentation you've given. And, as you said earlier on, a lot of your work is concerned with human rights issues in China.

So, do you feel that the outside world can have some influence in the way human rights may develop in China? Or do you think that we've reached, as it were, in the cycle of development, a very bad period for the capacity of outsiders to change human rights in China for the better?

QUESTION: Thank you. Li Yangdong from (inaudible)) University. Andrew actually depicted a very interesting picture about the aggressive action, possible aggressive action from China. And, well, Richard expressed the concern that probably over the next decade, that U.S. control over the entire Asian area most probably will be undermined by the rapid rise of China.

Well, given all those concerns, I'm very curious about what will be the actions or reactions from the U.S.'s side for the foreign policy in this area?

DR. CHU: Okay, one last question. Yes.

QUESTION: Thank you very much for taking so many factors into consideration. I'm Beverly Hong-Fincher. Anyway, but I find one important feature that is missing in all these surveys, that is the overseas Chinese. And they are just omnipresent in all these, you know, Southeast Asia -- Taiwan, you know, U.S., for example. And, you know, we talk, in the U.S., in the last election, everybody talks about, you know, African-Americans and, you know, Latino-Americans, but nobody talks about Asian-Americans -- very few, anyway. But they all vote in a certain way, as you know. I mean, that opinion is very, very important.

And I wonder why you did not take the diasporic Chinese into consideration in your surveys? Thank you.

DR. CHU: Okay, before we go back to our panelists, maybe I should answer that specific question.

Well, actually, obviously we do collect data on people's ethnicity. So, when we do a survey in Singapore, you know, we know whether, you know, the respondents are Malay, Indian, or Chinese. And same thing in Malaysia, and things like that.

But, I think this variable might be important in a country like Singapore and Malaysia, but in Indonesia, you know, the proportion to the population is too small -- okay? So, we cannot do any kind of meaningful analysis. Same thing can be said about Thailand -- and, Thai, sometimes they don't want to reveal, you know, their -- you know, a lot of people are, say, a quarter Chinese or, you know.

So, basically, so that's not a variable can be applied, you know, across the board. That's why it has not been shown here. But we do intend to do more country-specific analysis, and this variable will definitely be incorporated into our model, you know, whenever they are relevant. So, thank you for your comment.

MR. NATHAN: And that's true for the U.S. sample, too. There aren't enough –

DR. CHU: Not enough. Not enough –

DR. NATHAN: -- Chinese or African-Americans, or Hispanic-Americans –

DR. CHU: That's right. No.

DR. NATHAN: -- to do that analysis.

DR. CHU: That's right. Yeah.

SPEAKER: Just need to get more funding to do -- *(laughter).*

DR. CHU: Or, you should do more targeted, you know, interview. Anyway. So, I will start with Andy, in that order, and then Jonathan, you can have the last word.

DR. NATHAN: So, first of all, to answer Michael's question, on the case of the blind activist Chen Guangcheng, there were some unique circumstances. He was in the American Embassy, which made it very difficult to find a way to deal with him without the agreement of the Americans. And it was on the eve of -- what important meeting? Was it the Strategic Dialogue? The Strategic and Economic Dialogue, where there are a lot of equities, you know, and you didn't want -- the Chinese side had a huge incentive to settle the question quickly.

But since he -- and so they reached an agreement that, I agree, was extraordinarily, was unique in its generosity. I mean, and that uniqueness is important, because there's never been another thing later, or since, or before, there's never been such a case. And so I don't think it reflects a real change in Chinese policy.

And when you consider how their promises to him were kept, then you see that they weren't. In other words, the mistreatment that he had received was not investigated, although they had committed to do so. His relatives back in the village in Dongshigu have continued to be abused, and so on.

But to answer your broader question, I don't think, I'm not too optimistic about pressure from the outside world having a major impact on Chinese government policies that the outside world is pressing them about. What I think has more of an impact is the indirect influence of encouragement and assistance, and various forms of ways in which the outside factors strengthen the inside factors that are at work, which are very slow moving and unpredictable.

So I think it's the outside pieces is essential, but that its weight as a cause of change is relatively small.

On the -- I just want to correct the word that you used when you said that I said that China was taking "aggressive" action. I always avoid that word, because I think "aggressive" action would be something like China's having an ever-expanding set of territorial claims, or something like that, something expansionist.

And I think that the Chinese territorial claims are quite stable. They've been there for a long time. Their just as good as anybody else's territorial claims, which is to say not that good. But I mean, you know, these territorial claims are all very, you know, open to debate.

And so, I would like the word -- which I think most China specialists use -- "assertive." China is "asserting" its claims, and those claims are stable. And they are, you know, not unreasonable from an international law point of view -- not that they're necessarily correct.

But your question is, then, how will -- but that does represent a change, I think, in Chinese policy, and one to which the U.S. is responding with this rebalancing. And I think the U.S. policy under Obama has been, and will continue to be -- even though he has different Secretaries of State and Defense -- will continue to be a kind of push-back, and that the two countries are trying to find out where their, you know, interests overlap, and to find some kind of -- you know, I like the word "rebalancing" -- to find some balance. And that will produce friction, and I hope not kinetic conflict.

And I won't answer the other questions, because they were directed at the others. But I want to underscore this question, because you said, "Do you know that the President thinks that U.S.-China economic relations are not mutually beneficial." And I wondered how -- where has he said that? How do we know that? And that's kind of amazing.

DR. BUSH: He -- I know from people who have worked for him that he feels strongly about this. During the campaign, he made the remark more than once, that he said China does not play by the rules.

DR. NATHAN: Mm-hmm.

DR. BUSH: And in the context of American society and culture, where, from a very young age kids are taught to play by the rules, this is a strong statement.

DR. NATHAN: I see. Uh-huh.

DR. BUSH: And I think it does, in fact, reflect his deep-seated views.

DR. CHU: So -- are you over?

DR. NATHAN: Yes. Yes.

DR. CHU: Yeah, okay. Yes.

DR. BUSH: Let me take Pat's question first -- which I've already started to answer, and it's on this question of mutual benefit.

Now, first, I would say that there was a deliberate decision early on for the United States to be prepared to give China a certain advantage when it came to access to the U.S. market, to U.S. technology, to U.S. higher education, and so on. And this was part of a larger strategic purpose, and that was to incorporate China into the international system, to domesticate it, if you will, and so that its revival as a great power would not be destabilizing. And I think that remains the policy to this day. We have made adjustments all the way along, we've had to deal with new contexts, but I think that's the basic approach.

Now, I would say that the degree of mutual benefit depends very much on which part of the country you're talking about, and which sectors you are talking about. Obviously, some sectors continue to derive great benefit from China. Think of the Pacific Northwest. Think of California. On balance, they've done pretty well over time. But there are other parts of the country, and we know what they are, that have -- whose fortunes have declined as our economic relationship with China has grown.

Now, there is the question of, you know, does one cause the other? Globalization has certainly led to a decline in standard of living for a large segment of Americans. Economists might say that technological change is just as important a factor in this development as globalization is, and that whatever we do vis-a-vis China, we have to address within our own system the need to create the human resources that can cope with a context of rapid technological change. And that's one of the pillars of national power that our leaders have a responsibility to rebuild.

I agree with you that in the past, elites, particularly economic elites, were in favor of this incorporative economic policy towards China. And I worked on Capitol Hill for a while, and the members that I worked for relied on those economic elites to do what they wanted to do. So I know how that game is played.

But I think we're in a new situation now where, increasingly, those very economic elites who have participated, who have supported longstanding U.S. economic policy towards China are changing their mind. And that's primarily because of the cyber-security issue, and they feel they're getting ripped off, that China is pursuing economic growth through theft. There are also concerns about the changing business environment in China. And this trend, if it continues, is not good for China, because of the support that the business community has provided for a certain approach to U.S.-China relations.

So I think, actually, President Obama has positioned himself in what turns out to be a really good point on the spectrum.

To come to your question -- I agree with you, particularly on the word "assertive" rather than "aggressive." I would say that how -- that what is somewhat new in this situation is that China has changed the way it is asserting its territorial claims, however much merit they have. And, in fact, it is acting in ways that see, incrementally, to change the status quo. And that's something the United States opposes.

Now, looking at the broad picture, I really hope that the United States and China, through their interaction, can create, for the long term, a relationship of coexistence in East Asia. I think we will have to face a series of test cases within the region and outside -- North Korea's the toughest one right now. Taiwan was tough, it could get tough again. Maritime Asia is another set.

And our two countries together are going to have to work very, very hard, day by day and week by week, to ensure that we handle these issues well -- in part, because third countries are very important to the outcomes.

I would, though, say that China's leaders themselves say, "We still need a peaceful international environment to deal with the array of domestic challenges. We want a new pattern of great-power relations, so that we don't repeat dynamics that created World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and so on. And that's not a bad thing.

DR. CHU: Jonathan?

DR. POLLACK: Well, I don't want to take too much time to stand between the audience, many of whom have stayed, and your lunch.

But I am struck that, in our concluding panel -- of course, by design -- we have tried to raise some of the larger issues, moving away from some of the considerations that factor in these papers. And yet I do think that there are so many interconnections here that, on the one hand, we are talking about a society, and a system, that in some respects, in terms of its international role and activities, is just simply not recognizable with what it was several decades ago. This is an ongoing process. I think that, considered at the level of what the United States tries to achieve with China, what messages it tries to send, will, in some measure, have an influence on future Chinese behavior.

Richard just alluded to the whole question of a new framework for major power relations which, to American ears -- at least mine -- seems pretty content free. It really reflects a very, very different kind of operative style, that the Chinese are always trying to define some kind of a set of principles and apply them until they no longer apply. So, you know, ironically, if I think about it,

"peaceful rise" doesn't look very peaceful right now, so you're trying to sort of up the ante to see if you can actually evolve some sort of rules of the road with the United States.

But, then again, Americans tend to approach things in very, very operational fashion: Here's a problem, here's an issue. What are we going to do about it? And regardless of the frustrations with China, I think that there is a broad recognition -- it has been there, I think, through virtually -- well, no, not "virtually," every American presidential administration that has dealt with China -- that your real choices look very, very different when you're sitting in the White House. That doesn't mean that doesn't mean that we are craven, and simply yield to China all the time, but the realities of the interconnections between the United States and China make it extremely difficult to apply, if you will, the starker kinds of characterizations of what we might do.

This is true across the board, including on economic relations, which I'm glad that was raised. Even that is a very, very complicated picture.

Now, it's true, there is a fierce objection now, that I think Obama does feel, to the idea that -- although I don't think he's ever used the word "cheat," but that's the implication, that there is –

DR. BUSH: Well, if you don't play by the rules –

DR. POLLACK: -- you don't play by the rules. You know, you've got a thumb on the scale. You're stealing, not only technology, but more to the point, you're penetrating into the cyber-world in all kinds of ways that I don't have a remote clue to understand.

But, in a way, it kind of highlights, it seems to me, the fundamental tension in our relationship with China. In an ironic way, what America really does want is a very authoritative, powerful Chinese state, with real central authority, that can presumably crack down on miscreants of one kind or another, and make sure that intellectual property rights are policed, and so forth and so on, rather than, you know -- I mean, even though sometimes our debate about these issues may ignore these considerations, we don't want a weak China, but we want a -- you know, to use Zoellick's word, we want a "responsible" China, whatever we may think that is. But our definition of responsibility may change, maybe changing over time, as China changes over time.

The other thing that I think I would want to highlight is, you know, we necessarily tend to singularize the relationship with China, and yet the panel today, the presentations today, ought to be a reminder to us that the relationship with China is not simply a big-power game. There are a whole range of states -- obviously, all of China's neighbors -- that are profoundly affected, not only by

China's evolution over time, but by the character of the relationship and polices that the United States enunciates vis-a-vis China. And that will remain, it seems to me, a work very, very much in progress.

A couple of other points I'd want to make when we ask about China, and when we ask about how we influence China -- you know, I'm always thinking about -- I forget the precise numbers. Richard, you may have these at the tip of your fingers -- that the extent of the American presence in China, and how it's perceived. And by "presence," I mean presence of all kinds: students, business, governmental, NGOs, what have you. You know, this is where, to other powers -- and I think, here, of both China and of Russia -- you know, the United States is often looked upon as intrusive, annoying, demanding, hectoring. And yet I think, at some level, probably a lot of Chinese are quietly rooting for the United States to persist with some of what it does.

But I think, here again, we have to proceed in realistic fashion. I know that can be very, very frustrating, particularly when we see Chinese behavior that violates our sensibilities, and what clearly are global norms.

You know, I'm struck, for example, by the disclosures from the study on cyber-security, and the protestations of Chinese innocence that come from on high. And my reaction to that is, if it is truly the case that the Chinese government -- we'll use that label -- does not know, is uninvolved in what goes on in that 10-story building in Shanghai, then there's been a rather -- then someone's asleep at the switch in China. Coming back yet again to what kind of a China do we want?

In all of this, I think, I always come back to the fact that, fundamentally, these are issues of China's domestic evolution, in ways large and small, the latitude that its citizens have or do not have for pursuing their own interests, and so forth -- and how this manifests itself in terms of China's inescapable weight in Asia as a whole.

And I think that there's a lot more work that has to be done here, but I am very glad that we have introduced these factors that often do not intrude upon all the grand conceptualizations and strategies that people talk about vis-a-vis China. These are people involved, more than anything else, and societies involved. And we ought to bear that in mind.

To all of you, I thank you for your attention and interest. This has been a very, very lively afternoon.

And, on behalf of the Thornton Center, let me thank again all of our contributors today. It's really been great fun to be here today. And we hope we have other opportunities. *(Applause)*

Richard?

DR. BUSH: I share those sentiments. I thank the audience for your questions. I apologize for the air conditioning. I can't wait to get out of here.

But before we do, I'd like to echo Jonathan's earlier comment, and thank Yun-han for giving us the opportunity to do this program. It was at your initiative that we learned about this set of studies in the first place, and I think it's been a very rich discussion. And we are indebted to you.

Thanks. *(Applause)*

DR. CHU: Now, we finally come to the end. But before we break up, I just want to thank Jonathan and Richard one more time for organizing this event, and also their wonderful staff, working behind the curtain.

Thank you. Thank you all. *(Applause)*

* * * * *