

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

RELIGION, VALUES AND IMMIGRATION SURVEY RELEASE:
WHAT FACTORS INFLUENCE VIEWS ON IMMIGRATION POLICY?

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DIONNE: Welcome, everyone. I'll the folks in the back get seated. It's very nice of you all to come out today. This is, actually, a very exciting survey. I was telling a friend that you work on a questionnaire, you put out the questionnaire, and then you get the results back; and sometimes you have the happy experience of looking at the results and saying, hey, this is really interesting. And I think we actually hit that with this survey today, and, well, we're going to have a great discussion about it.

I'm, by the way, E.J. Dionne. For today's purposes, I am a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. I want to also announce that we will be live tweeting this event.

I wonder if I can live tweet from the stage. That would probably be improper.

I just want to give out the hash tag. It's *#ImmSurvey*, I-m-m (no space) Survey. And we will invite anyone to comment as we go along. Comments on Robbie's great tie or any comments are acceptable.

And I just want to say right at the outset that Brookings has been working with PRRI on these surveys now for three years, and it's been one of my very favorite partnerships, and it's really been enriching for us, and it's really great. It's been great fun to work with Robbie and Dan Cox and all the people at PRRI, and they work really hard, and the result is what you are holding in your hands or, in some cases, seeing online.

So, here's what we're going to do today. Robbie Jones, the CEO of the Public Religion Research Institute, will give an opening presentation of the key findings of the survey. Then Bill Galston and I will briefly give a summary of a couple of other points out of the survey.

Or are you going to do it for both of us, Bill?

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Oh. We will also hit on a couple of other points in the survey. And then we have two very distinguished panelists and commentators: Melissa Michelson, who is a professor of political science at Menlo College, and Karlyn Bowman, a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. And I want to thank them both for being here and thank Carlin, who has been the commentator on a number of our other surveys, and we're really grateful that she keeps coming back.

And then we will open it up for your comments and questions. I think most of you have the reports, so you can go to the back and ask, yes, you said this but what about question X? -- Whatever you want to do with the survey.

It's a real honor to introduce my colleague and friend, Robbie Jones.

Thank you very much.

MR. JONES: Well, thank you to everyone for your willingness to be here for the release of the Religion Values and Immigration Reform Survey. It's a joint study by Public Religion Research Institute and the Brookings Institution. This is a survey of nearly 4500 Americans, and it's one of the largest surveys ever done on the topic of immigration.

My role today is going to be to jump in and give you the 30,000-foot flyover of a lot of very interesting, complex data and try to make some sense out of it in 20 minutes. But before I do that, I do want to say just a few thank-yous of my own. First, I do want to just echo what E.J. said that this partnership between the Public Religion Research Institute and the Brookings Institution has been extremely valuable and fruitful and I think very, very productive over the last three years. I'm very honored to be a part of it, and I want to say thanks to E.J. and Bill and the entire Brookings team for helping us get this survey to where it is.

You know, public opinion surveys always depend on the quality and the

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creativity of the questions they ask and the analytical lenses that researchers bring to the data, and one of the things I can say with great confidence is that E.J. and Bill always bring the right blend of knowledge of the issues; insights into the underlying dynamics, which is one of the things we're trying to get to today as well; and the social science artistry that is really often necessary to get at complex issues pretty well.

I also want to thank Don Kerwin, the director of the Center for Migration Studies, who served as a consultant for the project, and thank the entire PRI team. We have here today Rabi David Saperstein, who is the chair of the board of Public Religion Research Institute. I want to thank him for his effort and time and also Daniel Cox and Juhem Navarro-Rivera, the co-authors of the report from the PRI team, as well as Amelia, Christina, and Crystal who played an instrumental role in getting us to where we are today.

Fielding a survey of this size and scope requires some fairly serious resources, and the survey would not have been possible without a generous grant from the Ford Foundation and without generous additional support from the Nathan Cummings Foundation. Here today we have the president of the Nathan Cummings Foundation, Simon Greer, and also from Public Interest Projects.

So, I'm going to give you the flyover, but I want flag four things for you to sort of pay attention to. One is that we found fairly positive views, overall, of immigrants in the country, so not a lot of evidence of strong, anti-immigrant sentiment that went across a number of demographic groups.

Secondly, we also found, at the same time, some concerns about the economic impact of illegal immigrants, particularly on wages, so that's certainly there in the survey. But despite that, we found very solid support for a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants who are already here across the country. What was perhaps the most

remarkable about that support, particularly in today's polarized political environment, is that it crossed party lines and it crossed religious lines. So, we had majorities of Democrats, Independents, Republicans and majorities of every religious group in the country supporting a path of citizenship for illegal immigrants who are here.

And then, finally, the fourth thing: We found broad agreement about value, a set of values that should guide immigration reform, and it animates where Americans think policymakers should go as they navigate the complexities and the details of immigration reform policy. And I'm going to kind of round out with that.

So, let me start with just some basics about the poll. As I said, there are nearly 4500 Americans that we interviewed. This was a telephone survey conducted on both landline and cell phones. We interviewed nearly 1800 people on the cellphone. It was conducted in both English and Spanish. And as I said, it's one of the largest surveys ever conducted on the issue of immigration.

Let me just kind of start, before I get to immigration policy, with some things about the cultural context and the rapid shift that we're seeing in the country.

I think all of us know and have a sense that the demographics in the American landscape are changing. These numbers are really a little bit small for the back, but let me sort of just highlight -- if you'll pay attention to the blue stripes, what it means -- each of these strips here, horizontal bars, are age cohorts. At the top are seniors age 65 and older; at the bottom are millennials, those age 18 to 29. One of the remarkable things about the landscape that you can actually see in a snapshot of generational cohorts if you divide them by race and religion is that you see them on the seniors. About 7 in 10 seniors identify as some kind of white Christian. When you compare that to millennials, you see that number drops to about 3 in 10 identify as some kind of white Christian.

So, just in this one little snapshot of religion, race, and ethnicity, you can really see the shifting dynamics that are taking place in the American landscape. So, that's certainly one important piece of context, this rapid shift that we're seeing. You can actually see the different makeup of the generational cohorts in the country today.

This next slide -- again, don't worry about all the numbers here, but one of the more intriguing questions that we had in the survey was about whether changes since the 1950s to American culture and way of life have been for the better or for the worst. You know, there's a lot wrapped up in that, right? But that's literally what the question said: Have the changes in the American culture way of life since the 1950s changed the country for the better, changed the country for the worst? Overall, we find that 54 percent, the majority of Americans, actually saying that the changes have been for the worst versus 40 percent saying changes have been for the better. However, as you might imagine, there are big racial divides on this question, so among Whites, about 6 in 10 say that the changes have been for the worst while majorities of African-Americans and majorities of Latinos say these changes have been for the better.

I think my colleague, Bill Galston, is going to unpack this a little bit more for us a little bit later. But this sense of how America has changed, not only demographically but in terms of culture and values since the 1950s and some anxieties about that I think are also kind of part of the mix here.

Just kind of following up on this, we had a very interesting finding. We asked directly about whether the idea of an America that was not majority white, where most people were not white, bothered the respondent, right? So, this is a pretty tough question to ask. And what we found is that when you ask it directly to Americans, not that many -- in fact, only about 14 percent -- say they agree with that question.

Now, we thought that was fairly low, actually. And so what we did is we

did a follow-up survey where we set up a survey experiment that was designed to allow respondents to answer this question indirectly; that is, without telling the interviewer directly that they had this concern, we set up a controlled survey experiment so they could tell us indirectly. And what we found is that there's a considerable difference between us. And when you ask it indirectly, that number goes from 14 percent to 23 percent of Americans saying that they hold this concern. Among Whites, that number rises from 13 percent to 31 percent of Whites who say they have this concern when you ask the question indirectly. And if you narrow it to white born-again Christians, the number jumps from 15 percent to 50 percent in the country.

So, there are these kinds of hidden concerns, I think, about the nation becoming majority minority that we can sort of pick up in the survey using some kind of creative methods that, again, are kind of part of the mix that this debate is happening in.

So, despite some of those concerns, when we also asked about how different groups in the country are changing American culture and way of life, here we see, actually, fairly positive views of immigrants. So, immigrants here -- 38 percent say that immigrants are changing the country for the better versus 28 percent saying they're changing for the worst. The balance say they're really not having any impact. And just for context, the group at the very top here, people who registered the highest levels of changing the country for the better are young people -- maybe not that surprising -- the group at the bottom registering the lowest numbers of people saying changing the country for the better are Atheists and non-religious people. So, still kind of a bias against people who are not religiously affiliated in the country and concerns about how they are changing the country. But immigrants on the whole, more Americans than not say they're changing the country for the better.

Another question that also captures this general sentiment, some

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concerns but generally positive views toward immigrants -- this question was about whether the growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society or threatens traditional American customs and values. So, we had people pick one or the other of those. Fifty-four percent of Americans say that the growing number of newcomers from other countries actually strengthen American society while 4 in 10 say it threatens traditional American culture and values.

Now, one of the things you can see -- we broke this out by generational cohort here. Eighteen to 29-year-olds is the second column there, seniors are all the way out to the right, and what you see here are real generational differences that correspond to that difference in diversity in the generational cohort. So, among the youngest Americans, which is the most diverse generation in the country ethnically and religiously, overwhelming numbers are that nearly 7 in 10 say that the growing number of newcomers strengthen American cultures, while seniors are basically evenly divided on the question. There's a much more homogeneous population among seniors. So, you see, there are kind of generational differences that are also part of the debate.

Finally, before I get to reform, we see some economic concerns. So, on the one hand we found that most Americans, about two-thirds, don't think that immigrants are taking jobs away from Americans or are not taking jobs that Americans want. So, 64 percent say they're taking jobs that Americans do not want; 27 percent say they're taking jobs away from Americans.

However, if you ask a question about the impact on wages, you get a slightly different picture here where you have actually a majority 56 percent saying that illegal immigrants say mostly hurt the economy by driving down wages for many Americans. So, on the one hand not really thinking they're taking jobs away from Americans directly but thinking they are having a negative impact on wages. So, that

economic concern is clearly there as well.

Now, despite sort of, you know, some of these concerns, we have positive views about immigrants overall but some concerns, especially on the economic impact on wages, we found some fairly high support for immigration reform. But before I get to that, I do want to say a word about priorities here.

One of the interesting things about immigration reform is when we asked Americans, what is the highest issue priority you think the President and Congress should be tackling right now?, immigration ranks fairly low if we ask them about the highest priority. So still what's at the very top of the list is improving the job situation, reducing the job deficit, these economic concerns -- so, at the highest part of the list. Reforming the immigration system, only 24 percent of Americans say that this is the highest priority for Congress. But if you expand that a little bit and say, do you think it's the highest priority?, you get about 7 in 10 saying that it -- so, 7 in 10 Americans think it's a high priority, but only 24 percent think it should be the highest priority for Congress to tackle right now.

One other piece that's kind of relevant to the political context that we find ourselves in is we found a fair number of Americans, 45 percent, saying that they thought the Republican Party's position on immigration had hurt the party in recent elections. And what I think is maybe a little bit surprising is we also found 4 in 10 Republicans and 4 in 10 members of the Tea Party also saying that they think the Republican Party's position on immigration had hurt the party in recent elections. About the same number say they don't think it made that much difference, and only about 1 in 10 Republicans, for example, think it helped the Party but the significant number, 4 in 10, of Republicans saying that they think it hurt the Party in the recent elections.

So, finally, one of the key and critical questions in the entire -- one of the

thorniest questions in the immigration debate is the support for pass to citizenship for illegal immigrants who are already in the country. We asked this question a couple of different ways, and what I have here on this slide is a three-way question that has an option to allow them a way to become citizens provided they meet certain requirements. That's the green bar there. The tan bar in the middle is to allow them to become permanent legal residents but not citizens. And the red bar on the right is to identify and deport them. So, which of the following things is how the immigration system should deal with illegal immigrants?

Here we find a solid majority of Americans, 63 percent, favoring a path to citizenship that is allowing them to become citizens provided they meet certain requirements. 7 in 10 Democrats, two-thirds of independents, and even a majority 53 percent of Republicans favor this proposal. Those who identify with the Tea Party, you'll notice, are a little bit less, 45 percent, more divided on this but still 45 percent favoring a path to citizenship.

As many of you may know there's also been a lot of activism among religious groups around the issue of immigration, and one of the things that we find is actually remarkable agreement across religious groups and often on different sides of issues but on this issue, pretty much all on the same side.

So majorities of every religious group measured in the survey -- and I should say also that due to the size of the survey, we were actually able to break out a lot of smaller religious groups that we normally can't measure. But even doing that, every single religious group that we can measure in the survey, including a majority 56 percent of white evangelical protestants support a path to citizenship on the three-way question that we were talking about before. So, that kind of bipartisan cross-religious support I think is something quite remarkable and notable on this issue.

We've also seen a shift -- in a previous survey that we did with the Brookings Institution in 2011, we asked a binary question where we just put head to head, what is the best way to solve the country's illegal immigration problem? Is it to secure the borders and provide a path to citizenship? Or is it to secure the borders and rest and deport all those who are here illegally? In that survey in 2011, 62 percent of Americans favored the path to citizenship option, and when we re-ask that same question now with this head-to-head question, that number rises to 68 percent. So, we see a 6 percentage point increase between 2011 and 2013. Interestingly, that shift has not come from Democrats, so one theory might be just Democrats moving in very high numbers of support, but the numbers among Democrats between 2011 and 2013, there's no significant movement. It was 74 percent in 2011, 75 percent in 2013. The movement has really come from Independents, Republicans, and even from those who identify with the Tea Party. So, Republicans, for example, have gone from being evenly divided on this head-to-head question in 2011 to being majority support, 56 percent, in 2013. The Tea Party has gone from being majority opposed and majority supporting arrest and deport all those who are here illegally to being divided and half supporting a path to citizenship when the two questions were asked head to head.

One other aspect of the debate that really became live in 2012 elections was something that became known as self-deportation, and we operationalized this in the survey with a question. It was an agree/disagree question that said the best way to solve the country's illegal immigration problem is to make conditions so difficult for illegal immigrants that they return to their home country on their own. When we asked that question, we found two-thirds of the question saying that they disagree with that statement, only about a little more than a third saying they agree with that statement. We also found that 53 percent of Republicans disagree with that statement. That may

explain some of the reaction to Romney's position on this. In fact, the only group that has majority support agreeing with this statement are those who identify with the Tea Party there, and that's 56 percent of those who identify with the Tea Party agree with the statement and with the policy of self-deportation.

Support for the Dream Act also follows, that is, the allowing of immigrants brought to the U.S. as children to gain legal status if they join the military or go to college. It follows largely the same patterns as the support for citizenship. Here Republicans are a little bit more divided on this question, interestingly enough, than they are on the path to citizenship question, but the patterns are essentially the same.

One of the I think more interesting and creative contributions that the survey made was to try to get at what values are underlying commitments to different policy perspectives, and we found, actually, quite a bit of agreement among the general public and actually across parties on a set of values. So the top five values that about 8 in 10 Americans said were very or extremely important guides to immigration reform are: promoting national security; keeping families together; protecting the dignity of every person; ensuring fairness to taxpayers; and enforcing the rule of law. So, you can see some of those values sort of along kind of pragmatic and legal lines, some of those values along kind of cultural lines that are really about sort of family values, not so much pragmatic or legal. But what was also striking here is that there's actually cross-partisan agreement. The biggest difference that we could find in any of these values between Republicans and Democrats is only about 12 or 13 points. So, just one example. To be sure, Republicans were more likely to favor things like promoting national security; ensuring fairness to taxpayers while Democrats were more likely to favor keeping families together; protecting the dignity of every person.

But just to kind of give you one example, on protecting national security,

even though Republicans were more likely to favor this value as a guide to immigration reform, 81 percent of Democrats also favor it. If you take keeping families together, even though Democrats are more likely to favor that, 81 percent of Republicans also favor that value. So, there's actually quite a bit of consensus here that was more surprising.

Finally -- just, I'll kind of wrap this up with some kind of independent predictors for support for path to citizenship or opposition to a path to citizenship. There were basically five things that showed up. We set up some basic regression models to control for things like race, education, income, gender, party affiliation, religious affiliation and tried to see which factors held up as independent predictors holding all other factors constant. We basically found five things that stood up as strong, independent predictors.

The first one that Bill Galston will talk about here in just a minute is believing that America has changed for the better since the 1950s. Among those who believe that, 73 percent support a path to citizenship identifying as of Hispanic origin; 71 percent support a path to citizenship who are Hispanic.

One other thing I didn't talk about is that only about 3 in 10 Americans know that deportations have actually increased over the last 5 to 6 years. Among the group that knows that information -- it's also a very powerful independent predictor -- 7 in 10 support a path to citizenship who know that deportations have increased in the last 5 to 6 years.

And, finally, on the negative side, or lowering support, are those who say immigrants are changing their communities a lot. Support for a path to citizenship among that group is less than half at 47 percent; and identifying as a part of the Tea Party movement support is also less than half at 45 percent.

So, that's sort of a quick flyover of the data. I'm going to turn it over to my colleague, Bill Galston.

MR. GALSTON: Well, thank you so much, Robbie, for that brisk and revealing summary of the survey as a whole. I'm going to talk for no more than 10 minutes, and I remind myself and everyone else that there is a timekeeper right in that seat there to keep us on the straight and narrow.

This has been a terrific partnership, as Robbie and E.J. have said, and this is a wonderful survey. It's wonderful not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. The sample is so large that you can do all sorts of analyses that would not have been possible otherwise.

I want to focus very briefly on one of the breakouts that I find particularly interesting. Mainly, what this survey reveals about the attitudes of the white working class, a much discussed group in our nation's politics in the past generation. And let me just make four quick key points about this group.

First of all, the conventional wisdom about the white working class is not entirely wrong. They do tend to be more conservative than lots of other groups in American society. They are less inclined to approve of Obama and many of his policies, and they are less supportive of immigration reform than are more educated white Americans and certainly many, many minority groups.

But -- this is my second point -- less supportive of immigration reform does not mean opposed. Fifty-eight percent of white working-class Americans support the Dream Act. Fifty-six percent of white working-class Americans support comprehensive immigration reform, including a path to citizenship. So, the conventional view that this group of Americans is willing to build some kind of wall around fortress America is just not true. There are some people that feel that way, but as a group it is not true.

Third point. There are very strong generational effects and differences

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within the white working class, and in particular 18- to 29-year-olds who are in this group form a very distinctive subset. They are more educated. They are much more likely not only to have gotten out of high school but to have gotten some college education as well. They are less religiously affiliated and active. They are substantially less conservative. Here's a factoid for you: Among white working-class folks 65 years of age and older, 50 percent consider themselves conservative, only 12 percent liberal. Among 18- to 29-year-olds in this group, 35 percent -- 15 percentage points less -- consider themselves conservative, and 25 percent, fully a quarter of the group and very much the same as the rest of the country, consider themselves liberal. They're much more likely to be moderate or even liberal on cultural issues. Here's something that jumped out of me: 74 percent of white working-class Americans age 18 to 29 support same-sex marriage. The comparable figure for members of that group 65 and over is 33 percent. That is a nice snapshot of cultural change in America.

And, finally, and I guess most significant for these purposes, we are talking about much more pro-immigrant and pro-immigration policy reform attitudes on the part of this youngest cohort in the white working class.

There are also -- and this is my first point -- regional differences, in particular, the southern difference. Southerners in the white working class are much more likely to be conservative, to be religious, to be white evangelicals, and to be inclined to see immigrants as a threat to America's way of life.

The conventional view of white working class Americans in the media and elsewhere is often shaped by the loudest voices, many of whom are older and from the South.

But I hope I've shown you that the reality is much more complex.

Now for my second topic, and that is what we call the demography of

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nostalgia. Recall Obama's second inaugural and that memorable alliteration of Seneca Falls and Selma and Stonewall, and the message was very simple: We're a better country than we were in the 1950s when the modern civil rights movement was just beginning, the women's movement was just a gleam in Betty Friedan's eye, and the gay rights movement was virtually unimaginable, thus spoke Obama. But, as Robbie has already pointed out, a majority 54 percent, of the President's fellow citizens disagree with him on this point and think that America's culture and way of life have mostly changed for the worst since the 1950s.

I guess it's not much of a surprise that 53 percent of men feel that way. But why do 55 percent of women feel that way? We hate to think about that. I'm not going to be glib about what's going on, but that's what the survey says.

I don't think it's much of a surprise, given the economic downturn for less educated Americans that most Americans with a high school education or less think that things have changed for the worst. But why is it that college grads are split down the middle on that point, 47 percent saying for the better, 48 percent for the worst?

Why is it the only educational cohort that thinks things have changed for the better, and just narrowly, are people with post-graduate and professional education? I guess it's not that much of a surprise that every cohort over the age of 30 thinks that somehow things have gotten worse since the 1950s, but I was surprised -- maybe you will be, too -- that only 51 percent of millennials, 18- to 29-year-olds, think that America is better now than it was in the 1950s. Fully 42 percent of these very young and very liberal, by the rest of the country's standards, Americans think that the American culture and way of life have actually gotten worse since the 1950s. What is that about? These are not rhetorical questions. I don't know, but it seems to me these are facts worth attending to.

Finally, it's no surprise that a majority of Whites think that the changes have been for the worst and the results of Robbie's little laboratory experiment, the three-way choice versus the four-way choice, indicates that. But I was surprised to learn that 4 in 10 African-Americans believe that America's culture and way of life have changed for the worst since the 1950s despite all the changes in our law, culture, and politics that culminated in the first African-American President. What is behind that?

Now, there's no question about the fact that the core of President Obama's coalition -- African-Americans, Latinos, Asians, Democrats, Liberals, young adults, and people with post-graduation education -- does think this -- this core does think the changes have been for the better. Obama's second inaugural spoke to them and for them. But the point that I want to make is that the Americans whose support put him over the top made the difference between a minority and the majority are much more ambivalent about these changes.

It's not hard for me and others to frame hypotheses about the sources of this ambivalence, but we need to think much harder about it as a country and, as always, to do more research -- we hope funded research.

Thank you very much.

MR. DIONNE: With that final plea, thank you.

I just want to interrupt my tweeters out there -- "tweeters" are better than "twitterers." The hash tag is *ImmSurvey*, if you want to comment.

I also just want to say a few quick thank-yous on top of all the people Robbie thanked, too. At Brookings so many people, but particularly Christine Jacobs, Ross Tilchin and Marian Goff. The Carnegie Corporation in New York has been supporting some of our immigration work, and I actually want to thank Rabbi David Saperstein, who is the person who introduced me to Robbie.

So, you may be responsible for this whole thing whether you like it or not. But thank you.

I just want to make basically a core political point, and this survey actually turns out to be happily timed, because there's a lot to explain about what's going on in the Republican Party.

You've seen a lot of movement in the Republican Party, even in recent days, with conversation around Rand Paul, Marco Rubio, and Jeb Bush toward a path to citizenship. There is a lot of optimism on Capitol Hill over a possibility of passing comprehensive immigration reform, something that has eluded Congress for a long time. And I think this survey suggests something important, which is this shift on immigration is not simply happening at elite levels. These shifts that you're seeing among particularly Republican political leaders -- and I'm going to focus on them, because I think they are going to be key to what happens on immigration reform -- this shift has happened all the way down to the grassroots.

I think one of the most striking overall findings in the survey, as you have already seen, is that rank and file Americans, including a majority of Republicans, seemed to be prepared to support broad immigration reform that includes a path to citizenship.

One of the survey's other striking findings is that the half-way position of providing illegal immigrants with a path to legal status but not to citizenship, a path that had been held and is still perhaps held by a number of Republican leaders, is the least popular option among rank and file Republicans, that those who do not favor, you know, strengthening the borders combined with a path to citizenship tend to be on the deportation side. So, this may be a middle way position that ends up dissatisfying a very large number of Americans. And in particular, if the political purpose of this shift on the

part of Republicans is to improve their standing with Latino voters -- Latino voters reject both the middle path and obviously deportation, as you saw from Robbie's numbers -- 71 percent of them support a path to citizenship. And so I think a lot of Republican politicians are very aware of this.

Now, I don't want to overlay what's happening here, and one of the things about this survey is we posed a lot of questions in different ways that did get a lot of anxieties. Majorities of Republicans in the Midwest and the South, in particular, agree that newcomers are threatening to the United States. There is support. If you just put it out there as a proposition, there is more support for deportation than the three-way question, which suggests when it comes to making a choice about policy; people end up not choosing deportation.

The biggest problem Republicans face on this issue I think is not exactly where their constituents stand, but the fact that they have a coalition management problem that the Democrats do not. Democrats and Independents are overwhelmingly in favor of a path to citizenship, particularly Democrats. Republicans, on the other hand, are divided on the issue. Again, there's been movement in favor of a path to citizenship, but Republicans have a coalition management problem.

Nonetheless, even a plurality of Tea Party members support a path to citizenship, and a lot of the chance of this happening depends on what happens in the House and do House Republicans who support immigration reform persuade Speaker Boehner to allow a vote on the issue. I think it's significant that a majority of Republicans in the red states, 56 percent -- and we have a strict definition of "red states"; we have red states, purple states, and blue states, and these are the most solidly Republican states in the country -- 56 percent of Republicans in those states support immigration reform.

Robbie has already pointed to, I think, a very important finding that

39 percent of Republicans say the party was hurt by the immigration issue in the last election. Only 11 percent think their stance helped them. Clearly, there's a kind of pragmatism in the base that matches the pragmatism in party elites and that that has been an important part of this.

You'll see some charts in the survey where there is a lot of difference among Republicans across regions on this -- again, Republican politicians looking to primaries more than elections. Might take a look at this. There are some indicators that on a few questions Republicans from the Northeast are a bit more sympathetic to certain aspects of immigration. Reform also may have a political effect in the House where Northeast republicans may demand the vote on this. Nonetheless, I think the lesson for the Parties -- there is not a great deal of difference across regions.

We'll go on. We can talk more about this, but I just wanted to draw a line under this political point. Surveys of opinion are imperfect guides to legislative maneuvering, but I think that this survey tells us something very important at an important time.

Yes, Senators and member of Congress who have won election, and in most cases reelection, have a justifiable confidence in their ability to weed their own constituents and gauge the cost and benefits of various political positions. They believe that they know more about this than the survey researchers represented on this and of our stage. And there's no question that their fear of opening themselves to primary challenges in primaries dominated by voters with intensely held views can yield calculations that cut against some of the analysis we have offered today.

Nonetheless, I think that our survey really makes quite clear that majority sentiment, including sentiment among Republicans, favors action, and I think supporters of a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants are unlikely to find a moment more favorable

than this one to the case that they have to make.

And with that, I want to turn to our two very distinguished respondents. You have the long bios. I think if you pick them up, I will just note that Dr. Michelson is a professor political science at Menlo College. Her major areas of research include Latino political incorporation field experiments and voter mobilization of ethnic and racial minorities, and she's the co-author of a whole lot of books. She got her BA from Columbia and her PhD from Yale University.

And Karlyn Bowman is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She's been there since 1979, was the managing editor of *Public Opinion* magazine until for some reason that is still totally alien to me they decided to shut it down. It was one of my favorite magazines. Karlyn was one of my very first editors many, many years ago when I wrote a piece for *Public Opinion*. She was the editor of *The American Enterprise* and is a contributor to the AEI magazine, *The American*, and has a slew of publishing credits that she can point to.

And so we'll start with Dr. Michelson.

Thank you so much for being with us.

MS. MICHELSON: Thank you. And thank you to the Brookings Institution and to the Public Religion Research Institute. I think this survey is very interesting and very valuable for moving the conversation forward.

I've only been given a few minutes for remarks before we move to the panel discussion and Q&A, but there are a couple of things in the survey that I want to talk about and bring attention to.

The first one is finding about deportations, and this -- perhaps not too surprising finding that most people are unaware that deportations have increased under the Obama administration and that Latinos, Hispanics, are the most likely to know that

that's going on. And of course that's logical, because Hispanics are the most likely to know somebody who is an undocumented immigrant.

Sixty-three percent of Hispanic voters have either a family member or a close personal friend who's an undocumented immigrant. It's not that there are, you know, legal citizen Latino communities and families and then this other, separate community of undocumented. It's in the same households, right? It's in the same communities. It's families and friends.

So, Hispanics know undocumented immigrants, and 39 percent of Hispanics know somebody personally who has been faced with deportation or detention. That's an increase. That's a number from this year. The number was much lower in 2010, 25 percent, but still there's this very widespread knowledge of deportations.

And yet, as we already know, more than 7 out of 10 Latino voters voted for Obama last year. So, it's not so much that deportation policy has hurt the Democratic Party. And so I think that's something important to see, how maybe reality isn't so -- the reality is known by Hispanics, and yet that's not what's driving their voting choice, right? So, similarly, we need to keep in mind that although there might be these sorts of attitudes on comprehensive immigration reform and the various positions of the parties, how much is that going to translate into vote choice?

And where I'm going with this is I think it's really important for the Republican Party -- and they know it's very important -- that in order to reach out to Hispanic voters, they need to change their position on immigration policy.

Priebus' study that came out on Monday -- the internal autopsy as, it's been called, of the Republican Party talking about what went wrong and how can we avoid that next time -- said that the Republican Party needs to drop its opposition to comprehensive immigration reform and move forward on a path to citizenship.

But if they do it in this very cynical, very obvious way of we're just doing this to win, we don't really care about Hispanic people but we want to win so we're going to stop saying things about self-deportation and we're going to support some sort of comprehensive immigration reform, that's not going to work.

In order to reach out to Hispanic voters, Republicans are going to have to do more than simply say we support comprehensive immigration reform. They have to show that they actually do care about Hispanic voters and about Hispanic communities. So, that part of the survey I think is really interesting and helpful.

The other thing that I want to highlight is the whole section on values that Robbie talked about, this idea that there's widespread consensus that comprehensive immigration reform should be driven by these five values of enhancing national security, keeping families together, protecting the dignity of every human being.

That's helpful, because we already know that elites in the Republican Party want to move comprehensive immigration reform forward and want to allow for a path to citizenship to at least get this issue off the table so that we can go back to talking about other things. And if it is framed as part of those values, then perhaps they can stave off some of these primary election considerations that E.J. talked about.

So, for example, if you go into a primary election, and instead of talking about comprehensive immigration reform and pointing out all the problems with it and talking about undocumented immigrants as a problem and instead we talk about how taking undocumented immigrants out of the shadows and providing them with a path to citizenship will enhance national security and will build stronger communities and protect families, then maybe they can get more support, right?

So, if you talk about, well, what if, under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, we basically created a market for false documents and so now we've

got millions of undocumented immigrants in the United States using false documents because they've been incentivized to do that by the 1986 law, if instead we regularize their status and we come up with some sort of biometric-based, fraud-resistant ID so that they can actually have an ID card that does say who they are and we know who everyone is and where everyone is, isn't that better? Isn't that safer when you have to show your ID to enter certain buildings and to travel? That enhances national security. It enhances local security if people are not afraid to call the police when something's happening, right?

If you don't worry that if you call the police because you heard gunfire or something's happening over here you're going to be deported and taken away from your children, and if we talk about comprehensive immigration reform and a path to citizenship I think in those kinds of terms, it's going to enhance security, it's going to enhance the safety of communities. That will help, right?

If we talk about keeping families together -- everybody loves family values -- that's going to help. There's obviously still some hesitation to consider all families equally. The opinion expressed in the survey that gay and lesbian spouses should not be given preference is a striking disconnect from the idea of keeping families together. Not all of America, despite our recent rapid movement on the gay marriage issue, is ready to consider gay marriages the same way. But, again, just focusing on those values can move things forward.

And finally -- I just got the two-minute warning sign, but the economy stuff, right? Everyone thinks the economy is more important. Everyone thinks jobs are more important. Frame it as moving us toward that. We've got major industries in the U.S.: construction, textiles, agriculture, all of these areas in which we are super-dependent on undocumented immigrants providing low-wage labor. And if we can talk

about how actually regularizing them would help the economy, right – it has shown that just regularizing folks through the Dream Act is going to create jobs, increase wages, boost the GDP -- if we talk about how a path to citizenship actually will be good for the economy and will create jobs, then maybe we can get more widespread support.

And so, just to kind of bring all that together, I think that, really, that wonderful contribution -- my favorite part of this survey -- is kind of how it can help us talk about comprehensive immigration reform by showing us what are folks thinking in terms of their values? What do they think is important? And that gives elites, gives opinion leaders a way to talk about it. Indeed, it's going to help them stave off primary competition and win elections, right?

Mitt Romney is no fool. Now, when he talked about self-deportation, it was to stave off his opponents in the nomination fight. And when Rick Perry said that he was a supporter of the Dream Act, he was practically laughed off the stage. So, if we can give Republican leaders a way to talk about this in a primary battle in a way that is not going to get them laughed off the stage, that we don't have John McCain moving from being a supporter of comprehensive reform to being an opponent just so he can run for President, I think this survey helps us figure out how to do that.

Thank you.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you.

And, Karlyn.

MS. BOWMAN: Thank you, E.J.

As usual, PRRI and Brookings have given us just a wealth of fascinating new data to study an important topic, and I'm very grateful to be invited back again to talk about this survey. Not only is the survey well timed, I think, as several of the panelists have said, but the large sample and the long questionnaire permit the kind of deep dive

that Bill described and that Robbie described in their introductory remarks that I think is so important in survey research.

I'll start with my standard disclaimer, and that is I don't believe surveys should ever be used to make policy. They're too crude; they're too blunt an instrument for that purpose. But, still, they can tell us a lot about how attitudes have evolved.

I'd like to take a step back and talk a little bit about the history of public opinion on this issue, because I think things are really a lot better than they were 50 years, 75 years ago in terms of attitudes generally, something that we see in this survey.

I want to go back to a book written by Rita Simon and Susan Alexander called *The Ambivalent Welcome: Print Media, Public Opinion and Immigration*. They surveyed public opinion starting in the 1930s and going through the 1990s. They found the first survey questions in the literature about refugees fleeing from Nazi Germany, and the vast majority of Americans at that time, 68 percent, said that these people should not be admitted given current conditions. Only 5 percent said that they should be encouraged to come.

The authors then reviewed every question on immigration asked between 1946 and 1990 and found that in only one instance, in 1953, did more than 10 percent of Americans favor increasing the number of immigrants permitted to enter the country. During this 40-odd year study, they found in every instance three times as many people supporting decreasing immigration as increasing it.

A question in their study from 1977 that asked about whether illegal aliens who had been in the United States for seven years should be allowed to remain found that 52 percent were opposed and 39 percent in favor. They found support for national ID cards starting in World War II when the very first such questions were asked

and the data are clear that Americans still like that idea.

Simon and Alexander concluded that the most consistent theme that emerges from all of the public opinion surveys is the essentially negative attitudes held by a majority of U.S. public court persons wishing to come to the United States. Whether the polls were conducted during the 1930s in a time with severe economic depression or in the 1960s in a time of economic growth and prosperity, public support for increasing the number of immigrants permitted to settle in the U.S. has remained low. The more recent the immigrant groups' arrival, the greater the skepticism.

They conclude by saying that it is a source of wonderment and bewilderment -- their words -- at how we invited more than 40 million people to gain admittance to our country during the century from 1890 to 1990 and to a country that at best was ambivalent toward them and at worst erected barriers to their entry.

The same themes, and especially the ambivalence, is evident in the PRRI survey. Many Americans today have the same concerns that they had decades ago about illegal immigration, whether or not it would displace native workers and lower the standard of living. Robbie mentioned one such finding in his introduction when 56 percent in the new survey said that illegal immigrants would mostly hurt the country, because they would drive down wages for many Americans. But I would argue that the responses on immigration issues generally are much more positive and welcoming today than they have been, and part of this is because of the demographic changes that Robbie outlined and that people like Phil Fry at Brookings have done so much work on.

And so I thought it was a very important response, again different from what we probably would have seen in the past if identical questions would be asked, when in the PRRI survey they ask separately about immigrants, Asians, and Hispanics, and they found that more people say that each of those groups is changing American

culture for the better than making it worse, and strong numbers said that they were having no impact, which I think can be taken positively.

Another positive in the survey that hasn't been mentioned thus far: Only 23 percent said the immigration system was completely broken. I guess I was somewhat surprised by that. And as has been said by several of the commentators thus far, strong majorities endorse the path to citizenship and permanent legal status. And a majority of Republicans, of course, supported the path to citizenship.

It's been clear to me for some time that the attitudes of rank and file Republicans have been softening on this issue. Immigration ranked dead last in 16 of the 18 exit polls of Republican primary voters in 2012. In only one state, and this was in Arizona, did more than 10 percent of voters in a GOP primary select it as the top problem. In Arizona, 13 percent gave that response.

In the two states where voters in these contests were asked about a path to citizenship for illegals, Florida and Arizona, more people supported a path to citizenship than had done do four years before. This sentiment prevailed after the very hot debates that Melissa has talked about.

The demographic composition of the people voting in the Arizona Republican primary was very similar to what it had been four years earlier, yet attitudes had shifted more than 10 percentage points in the positive direction.

Even though the debate in Washington is intense, public opinion has clearly moved nationally as many of the questions in the PRRI survey showed about what kind of priority this issue should be for Congress and the President moving ahead. Pew has asked a similar question for many years, and they've shown a sharp drop over the past years in terms of the priority the issue should have among both Republicans and Democrats. And I think as recent meetings on Capitol Hill suggest, Washington can often

get more done when the temperature is a lot lower.

A word about the politics. In the survey, the Democrats were more trusted than the Republicans on handling legal and separately illegal immigration. I'm not so sure how much weight we should give to that finding, for two reasons. In almost every area today, except for the economy and the deficit, Democrats are more trusted. The GOP brand is badly damaged. Still, interestingly, in all of the September and October questions that were asked by major pollsters that matched up Romney and Obama on handling either immigration or illegal immigration, the two were never separated by more than a few percentage points. The GOP's problems I think, as we all know, were much deeper than this issue, and I think that was a point that you also made.

I think the Democrats' advantage is a general one.

The PRRI poll question asking whether Republicans had been hurt by the issue -- and that question has already been mentioned -- showed that 45 percent said that they had been hurt and only 7 percent helped. A sizeable chunk of Republican Tea Party members thought that it had hurt, which I think reflects what we're seeing in other polls about the intense GOP criticism of the GOP in many areas.

I always think of questions I would like to have asked after I see a survey, and a follow-up question asking Republicans who thought it had hurt their party, why they thought had hurt their party, would have been interesting. Was it because the GOP wasn't tough enough? Or was it because the GOP was too tough. And I would like to have seen a question that asked people what they thought the Democratic and Republicans' positions on the issue were, because I think there is great variety.

A word about the politics of nostalgia, which Bill and E.J. write about in the essay and Bill talked about a few minutes ago. He described, in great deal, the results of a question that he and E.J. thought were remarkable. I don't really think it's

remarkable at all. I would argue that the nostalgia impulse has always been a powerful one in America, perhaps starting with a question that Gallop asked in 1936 about whether or not things were better in the horse-and-buggy days -- that was how they worded the question -- and of course people said they were. (Laughter) Roper then asked a question about whether moral standards were better than they had been many years before, and people said they were. And Ben Gaffin in a poll a few years later asked about whether people live as honest lives as they did in the past, and certainly a large chunk of people said that yes, in fact, that things were worse than they were in the past.

Some things are clearly better, and some things are clearly worse.

E.J., you mentioned women, and I think I understand that response from the other work that I've done on surveys. Women have more opportunities than in the past, but having more opportunities doesn't necessarily make people happier. I've always been puzzled by poll findings that I see when you look at women's attitudes in Japan and in the United States, and I'm sorry for this digression, but women in Japan admit they face a lot more discrimination than women in America say they do. But you'll find that women in Japan are a lot happier than women in America. What's the explanation?

We've gone farther along the continuum of extending individual opportunity, and we're the first to see some of the problems that come from that, from having more choices overall.

Americans are persistently anxious about their institutions and their ideals, because they care deeply about them, a decline in religious observance, of deteriorating work ethic, a loss of love of country, looser moral standards and less commitment to family belong to the shared culture are things to be concerned about, because I think they undergird the foundations of the nation. It's not solely a fear of

foreign influence. So, I take a lot of encouragement from these data, but where America is on the immigration issues Republicans clearly have that coalition problem you both referred to, but it may be less of a problem in the past and perhaps action will be taken.

Thank you.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you so much.

Robbie, I think on your next survey you have to ask Americans were things better in the horse-and-buggy days --

MR. JONES: Absolutely.

MR. DIONNE: -- and just have the ultimate nostalgia poll.

MR. JONES: Right.

MR. DIONNE: But that was wonderful.

MS. BOWMAN: I have a lot of questions on it.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. Thank you very much.

I want to ask Robbie if he has any particular responses, and I just want to put a couple of other things on the table as you're thinking about how you respond.

One thing that Robbie did not mention that I found fascinating in the survey -- if you've got the booklet, you'll find it on page 24 -- perception of immigrants changing community versus the society as a whole. And I thought it was fascinating that while only 32 percent of all Americans said immigrants were changing their community, 46 percent said they were changing American society. And this suggests an attitude that's about something sort of up here and just a generalized sense of the country rather than something that's happening in their own neighborhoods. And what is striking in the survey is that opposition to immigration reform is higher among people who live in communities where the respondents themselves say there are few immigrants so that it is not a response to proximity.

Also, by the way, on this particular question, as you'll see on page 24, the difference between liberals and conservatives, there is only a 5 percentage point difference with conservatives saying immigrants are more likely to change their communities but a 15 percentage point difference with conservatives more likely than liberals to say immigrants are changing American society. And I just think that this -- as we follow this debate, keeping in mind this distinction is very useful.

We have talked about this a lot among ourselves, so I cannot resist bringing it up. There was a *Washington Post* story about this where many religious advocates of immigration reform often invoke the Bible in welcoming strangers. And what was striking in our survey is that this ranked, actually, quite low when we asked if one of the values informing people's views or one of the values that should inform people's views is, I quote, "following the biblical example of welcoming the stranger."

MR. GALSTON: In fact, dead last.

MR. DIONNE: Yes, dead last. And, by the way, among people for whom the Bible is particularly important, evangelical Christians, they were more likely to say this was a value and, as I have summarized what I think the data mean, that more Americans are influenced by their parents who told them be careful of or stay away from strangers than they are from the Bible, which Bill quoted to me this morning -- please tell me the exact quote. Well, the one -- there were many, actually, in the Bible, but the one you quoted this morning.

MR. GALSTON: You know, versions of this are scattered through what you folks call the Old Testament (laughter), and to the effect that do right by the stranger, treat strangers correctly because you were strangers in the land of Egypt and will be -- you know, those of my tribe will be going over this in some detail in a few days.

MR. DIONNE: Yeah, that's why I wanted you to do that.

And I just think that obviously from a strategic point of view but also just in terms of a public opinion point of view, I've always found -- and Robbie has found this quite consistently.

So, Robbie, do you have anything you want to add or respond to and also put on the table any other issues, and then we can open it up for --

MR. JONES: Again, I'll just echo what you said there on the welcoming the stranger thing, that the groups that we found were not only white evangelical protestants but African-American protestants, another group for whom sort of being very close to the Bible and being very literate in the Bible matters.

MR. DIONNE: Yes.

MR. JONES: And among those who attend religious services weekly or more. So, I think what we've got here is sort of a biblical literacy index (laughter) that we can sort of put together that this is really about, right?, which I think undergirds your point about the people who are very literate in the Bible. Those metaphors ring when they hear welcoming a stranger. People who aren't -- they hear the other thing, right? And both of these are sort of in our culture in some ways and they wrestle, I think, for competition while we see the general numbers being fairly low.

One other sort of caveat. It is very interesting that Liberals, Republicans, and Democrats don't disagree about the levels at which immigrants are changing their communities a lot. But they do disagree about how immigrants are changing society, as you said. What's interesting about that, though, is that -- so, there's a kind of experience perception gap going on here that's seen through theological lenses. And that's pretty interesting.

One caveat I'd add, though, is that when we actually put them into a model and we test which one of these actually have teeth, it's really only -- it's not the

society perception one that has teeth, it's those people who say they're changing my community a lot that really has teeth.

So, the perception is a little softer, which you might imagine because it floats a little free of sort of actual experience. It's a perception overlay on top of actual experience that's there.

The only other thing I think I'd want to sort of throw out is, just to kind of put some fine numbers on this and, what you call, the GOP's coalition management problem, that if you got the report E.J. and Bill write eloquently and it linked about this, there are some nice charts at the very end -- I the last chapter of the report.

But just to kind of throw some numbers on this, one of the great things about the survey, given its size, we were actually able to look inside of the Republican Party. We had nearly 1200 Republicans in the survey, so in some ways we had a survey of Republicans inside of a survey of the American public.

So among the 1200 Republicans that we had in the survey, we were able to break them out into these kind of coalition groups, and we basically used two groups -- evangelicals and those who identify with the Tea Party movement and then those who did not, right?, so the kind of segment of the Republican Party using those lenses.

When we do that, it's very interesting that those -- so, all the numbers that I'm about to give are inside of those who say -- who identify as Republicans. So, among Republicans, those who are evangelical, 57 percent support -- I'm on three-part question for a path to citizenship -- 57 percent support a path to citizenship. Among those who are non-evangelical and not a member of the Tea Party, right?, so neither one of those things, 53 percent support a path to citizenship; those who are not liked in the Republican Party and not part of the Tea Party, 55 percent support a path to citizenship.

Now, where's the other number at? So, those who were both

evangelical and identify with the Tea Party, that number drops to 44 percent supporting a path to citizenship. And of those just Tea Party and not evangelical, the last little box there, 46 percent.

So, it's the Tea Party affiliation inside of the Republican Party that is really where the push and the pull is.

And there's, I think, real daylight here. We were talking about there are 13 points between evangelicals in the Republican Party and Tea Party members in the Republican Party, and I think that's a pretty interesting tension to manage inside the party.

The last thing I just want to say is about the states. The other nice thing about the survey is that we were actually able to get down to the state level at some of the larger states in the country, and when we did that, we already mentioned there aren't a lot of differences across regions. There are some -- but even at the state level -- we're looking at a whole range of states in different areas of the country -- we saw, really, no significant differences. So, we were able to break out Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Across all of those states, there's no statistical difference in support for path to citizenship. Arizona, 64 percent; California, 60 percent; Florida, 61 percent; Indiana, 67; Minnesota, 57; New York, 66; Ohio, 58; Pennsylvania, 62; and Texas, 64. All right, so a very solid majority support across this range of states that we were able to look at in the survey.

MR. DIONNE: I'm going to recluse myself for just a sec. My colleague is going to take over. I'll be right back.

MR. GALSTON: In following up with what Professor Michelson was underscoring -- you know, the inferences that one can draw from the study about how to frame and talk about this issue -- there was one other message surprise. At least I was

surprised. Not only was the biblically based message of welcoming the stranger weak in comparison with virtually everything else, but virtually tied for weakness and ineffectiveness was the standard secular political trope of honoring our tradition as a nation of immigrants. That cuts no ice with anybody.

And so the report sends a message to religious leaders that if they want to talk to people other than their own constituents, they're going to have to use a different vocabulary. And it also sends a message to secular politicians that simply resting on our tradition as a nation of immigrants is really not going to move the debate. And I found that striking and significant, and it just underscores the importance of the argument that Professor Michelson was making about the inferences that can be drawn from the study.

And with that, I'd love to engage in a colloquy with Karlyn on the politics and demography of nostalgia. But I'm going to restrain myself in your favor. So -- and I have only one plea, that when you are recognized please identify yourselves and use this as an opportunity to either ask a question or, if you wish to make a statement, please err on the side of brevity.

Yes, sir.

MR. GLUCK: Thank you. My name is Peter Gluck.

I'd be interested to know your reactions to this question. Assuming for the point of the question that the Republicans generally embrace comprehensive immigration reform, and they do it in a way that Professor Michelson has suggested broadly, how is that undermined when they embrace spending and taxing policies that work to the disadvantage of the same population that would be advantaged by immigration reform?

MS. MICHELSON: Can I answer?

MR. GALSTON: Yeah.

MS. MICHELSON: I think, then, one if not the biggest reason that Republicans are thinking of changing their position on comprehensive immigration reform is in order to reach out to Hispanic voters. And the truth is there are a lot of Hispanics in the United States who would vote Republican if they didn't think the Republican Party hated them, right? They actually like the Republican Party's message on things like jobs and taxes and self-reliance and entrepreneurship and small business. That resonates with a substantial portion of the Hispanic community -- not a majority, but Republicans don't need a majority, right? They just need 40, 42 percent. And if the Republican Party were to change its position on comprehensive immigration reform, I think there are already enough Latinos who would then feel comfortable voting Republican that Republicans could regain their competitiveness at the national stage.

So, it's not that all Hispanics would suddenly love the Republican Party, right? (Laughter) But to get back to, say, the 40 percent support level they enjoyed in 2004 when George W. Bush ran for President, to just be able to get enough Hispanic votes to make them competitive in those swing states where they need to be competitive, I think switching just on comprehensive immigration reform in fact does hold the possibility of doing that. And they don't have to worry about their other policies, because Latinos, Hispanics, are already with them on those issues. Not all of them, but enough of them. (Laughter)

MR. GALSTON: Yes, Karlyn.

MS. BOWMAN: I think their reasons were optimism and pessimism on that question for the Republicans going forward. First of all, you're going to see a generational change in the Republican Party. It's going to be a different Republican Party in 2016, and that's going to probably help the Republicans in a lot of ways. They're just not going to seem as hostile as someone like Mitt Romney, who seemed very, very

out of touch on a lot of issues overall.

But I think that the Republicans' problems with Hispanics are deeper and they relate to the compassion gap and to views of government. Pew did a survey a while ago, and they asked a question that's very familiar in the survey literature about should government be larger and do more things or smaller and do fewer things? And in that respect, it was an outlier because the number was so high. Eighty percent of Hispanics said that government should be doing more. And of course that isn't the Republicans' position on a lot of issues overall, so I think the problems are pretty deep, actually, overall.

MR. GALSTON: Yeah, I would answer your question this way. I don't think that Republicans' change in their position on immigration policy is a sufficient condition of political success going forward, but it is absolutely a necessary condition. And the reason I'm saying that is that for different constituencies, different issues function as threshold issues, right? Things that you have to get across in order to get a hearing for the rest of your message. And for Latinos in the United States, I think there is ample evidence that immigration policy has become one of those threshold or gateway issues, and the party has to get through that gate. And at that point, we'll all be able to gauge, if that does happen, whether the fact that most Latinos now are relatively liberal on questions of certain classic economic questions, government activism, although somewhat more traditional on a range of cultural and religious issues.

We'll get a chance to find out how that all shakes out. But if the party doesn't figure out a way of getting -- if the country doesn't figure out a way of getting (inaudible) and if we're still having this debate in 2016, then I confidentially predict that the numbers that we saw in 2012 will not budge.

MR. DIONNE: Could I underscore that even though I have disappeared

for most of Bill's answer (laughter), which is -- he is so good that he can answer questions he hasn't even heard.

Well, just to underscore Bill's point -- I think the best proof of how important immigration is as a threshold or gateway issue is a comparison of what George W. Bush received among Latinos and about what Mitt Romney received among Latinos. In two elections, depending on how you want to count the numbers, Bush got at least 40 percent of the Latino votes. Some estimates are even a little bit higher. That declined to the 30s for John McCain, because even though McCain had a pro-immigration reform position, he sort of moved away from that for the primaries, and the party itself had moved far away from where Bush was.

And I actually think, to go to Bill's point on the White working class, this is partly a threshold issue on tolerance for the under-30s, and I think it's very important to see that one of the values -- and here I know I'm echoing something Bill mentioned earlier today -- you know, social tolerance and openness is one of the essential values of this younger generation. On the one hand, that generation includes more African-Americans, Latinos, and Asians than the over-65 generation. So, that's part of why its attitudes are where they are. But that, in turn, influences the attitudes of white members of that younger generation, because -- correct me if I'm wrong, I think you mentioned this to me, Robbie -- 60 percent of young people say that they have a recent immigrant as a friend or acquaintance versus --

MS. MICHELSON: I said that.

MR. DIONNE: Oh, yeah.

MR. JONES: Yeah.

MR. DIONNE: Oh, I'm sorry. Well, that's versus 40 percent of the over-65. So, this is, I think, a gateway, threshold issue certainly for Latinos, but I think it goes

beyond Latinos as well.

MR. GALSTON: Certainly.

MR. CHATTERJEE: My name is Samar Chatterjee. I'd like to say with this survey let's hope the debate on path to citizenship is settled, because you can't have an apartheid system of so many millions of people without citizenship living in this country. So, I hope everybody who is a sort of Republican or Democrat would think about it and finally say it's resolved.

The only other point I have is that the nostalgia aspect -- that people said that this country was a lot better before than it is now, I do share it. I've lived in this country from 1968 to now, and I do think the country has substantially degraded, and therefore I think that our leadership in this country needs to figure out how we can make this country a lot better.

And I think that younger people who have voted on that other end, not having the nostalgia, I think they don't know how good this country was. (Laughter)

MR. JONES: Well, it's good to have a nostalgia representative. The Coalition of Nostalgia.

Go ahead.

MR. GALSTON: Okay, let me -- you know, let just say not exactly in response to that but sort of jumping off from that, I take Karlyn's point that there is almost always politics in nostalgia. But I think that in addition to that -- and you really gestured toward this in the way you went on to treat the issue -- I do think we need to think harder than we have up to now about the two-edge sword, the two-edge sword that freedom and choice represent, because I think -- and this is partly a vote by the sort of monotonic theme of Obama's second inaugural, because the clear suggestion there was in every conceivable way we're going from moral strength to moral strength. We are so much

better than we were, you know, before Seneca Falls and Selma and Stonewall, and, look, from a moral point of view I absolutely agree with him, and I think most people do. The question is: what else is going on in Americans' minds? And it's not just this tic default reflex to think that things were already better back then. I think there is genuine ambivalence rooted in current experiences and not just some vague impression, in the case of millennials, no impression except what they've gotten from television and YouTube about what the 1950s were actually about.

But just to extend my incredulity, I'd say *Bonanza* is better than *Desperate Housewives*.

But let's talk about something contemporary, *Mad Men*. Okay, I want to appeal to the two women on the panel. (Laughter) I mean this in dead seriousness now, right? You know, do either of you watch *Mad Men*?

MS. BOWMAN: Yes.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. Do both of you watch *Mad Men*?

MS. MICHELSON: I am sorry. I've heard of it.

MR. GALSTON: You've heard of it, okay. Sorry about that.

Okay, Karlyn, you're my focus group. (Laughter) Okay, this is social science research in the making and just want you to know best way with an n of 1. It's either better if the n is yourself, but, you know, I'll have to settle for Karlyn here. I mean, how do you react to *Mad Men*?

MS. BOWMAN: Oh, obviously, the same way I think that you do, by God. But of course I love the clothes. It was a pretty tough time for women, obviously. No question about it. We've made extraordinary strides since that time. But with those expansions of opportunity for any group always come problems. We've extended the continuum, as I said, of individualism and giving individuals more opportunity.

But it doesn't make your decisions about whether to stay home or work easier or to work part time or work full time. I think there are just always tradeoffs that are complicated, and some things are better and some things are worse.

MR. GALSTON: I want to go to David, but I don't want to ask something as --

MS. BOWMAN: I don't want the focus to be on nostalgia --

MR. GALSTON: No, no, but I think this nostalgia finding is very interesting.

And I'm going to go to you, David, in a second.

Just as our expert on nostalgia having gone back as far as you have in research, it does strike me -- I wasn't completely shocked by that finding that we came up with partly because I think there are streams of nostalgia on both the left and the right and that people on the right tend to focus on various kinds of traditional values, although some people on the left focus on other values like generosity and a less harshly competitive climate.

But then there's also the economic facts where especially, I think, for many American blue collar workers there was a sense that people in their position actually did better, and it's -- you can make that empirical case for this -- did better in the 1950s. I'm just curious how you read the factors that might be going into this. Oh, and David wanted to elaborate.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yeah, you actually were beginning down the path I wanted go.

MR. DIONNE: I must be on the right path, then.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Isn't there clearly a narrative, Bill, that is out there to say that if you look at the breakdown of the family, the rate of divorce, the breakdown of

community, how people move, the breakdown -- the rise of crime, the rise of drug abuse in the country, the stagnation of wages for the middle class, the breakdown of pension systems, the breakdown of the mortgage system, the fact that college kids are having tougher times finding jobs. It seems to me it's not a specious argument that there are some who put that all together in a narrative to say that things today are not nearly as dependable for a whole cohort of America than they felt a generation, two generations ago here.

Now, we can we point to all the cohorts who are doing significantly better. But those who would live within the reality, those scores of millions of people who live within the reality I'm not surprised at all that you would get that kind of "nostalgia."

MR. GALSTON: Well, maybe not but I will just -- I'll just report, you know, that if somebody told me in advance of this survey that a higher percentage of women than men would say that America --

MR. SAPENSTEIN: We did a sampling error, right.

MR. GALSTON: No, no, no. No, no.

MR. JONES: The numbers again?

MS. MICHELSON: 55.

MR. GALSTON: 53 and 55.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yeah.

MR. DIONNE: Okay, but on the verge of statistical significance and certainly -- if somebody had told me that that number for women thinking that things had gotten worse in American culture and America's way of life since the 1950s would be higher than for men, given the fact economically and from the standpoint of social status, unless I'm missing something in the numbers, you know, women have improved their standing significantly. It's not just relative to men. Women's salaries have risen in the

past 60 years. For many men, that has not happened.

MS. BOWMAN: Just a final comment. I started work on this project on nostalgia in 2005, and for all of the reasons that you've mentioned I've never released the study, because I haven't been able to grapple with it. So, I think you've actually helped me, even though I disagree.

MR. GALSTON: I want you to release the study.

But, David, your speech was so persuasive I was singing "Saperstein for President. He'll bring back the best of the '50s." (Laughter)

Who else? Did you have something else you wanted to say before --

MR. SAPERSTEIN: I was also struck by the finding that you didn't have time to get to, because of the world in which I live, that clergy are less likely to be speaking out about immigration today. And amongst those things that the religious community sees itself as having lifted up -- gun control, immigration, and climate change -- as they rank on the importance of things and, of course, economic and national security things always rank more. But they're the bottom three of that, so, you know, I'm sure how to put that all together. But it seems to me the religious communities have some work to do -- always.

MS. MICHELSON: If they want to move the conversation forward, I think people other than legislators speaking to Hispanic congregations need to start talking about why we should be treating strangers better and be more welcoming and that it is -- it's not a surprising finding, because religious leaders are speaking to their communities and they want their message to resonate. But I think it is a way for religious leaders, if they're interested, to help.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: I was struck by the way that there is the white evangelical non-Tea Party folks. There clearly is a religious component within the --

there's a little chart on page 42 where evangelical not Tea Party is a rather large percentage supporting a path to citizenship. So, it does suggest that the notion that there is some religious component to support immigration reform. It's not just hype or invented by advocates.

MS. BOWMAN: But, interestingly, when surveys just ask generally, do you want politics from the pulpit on contemporary issues? Not very many people say yes whether the issue is abortion or immigration.

MS. MICHELSON: If they want politics, that suggests you're saying who you should vote for and whether Republicans are better than Democrats. But to talk about immigration and to talk about, you know, welcoming strangers and to link biblical passages to contemporary issues -- would they be opposed to that?

MR. SAPPERSTEIN: We don't know because of the way the question's asked.

MS. BOWMAN: That's right.

MR. SAPPERSTEIN: It's asked --

MS. MICHELSON: Need another survey.

MS. BOWMAN: That's right.

MR. JONES: We always need another survey on things like that.

What's remarkable about this is just -- you're right -- only 22 percent of regular church attenders -- you know, we had a screen on regular church attenders. Only 22 percent say that their clergy leader speaks about this either sometimes or often. Even sometimes, right? When it's only 22 percent. In fact, the only group -- the only religious group in the survey that were a majority says their clergy leader speaks about the issues sometimes more often, it's perhaps not that surprising, or Hispanic Catholics, right?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: I think that -- we were discussing this in class this

week at Georgetown where I think it is far easier for the leaders of relatively politically homogeneous congregations to preach on political questions, both narrowly and broadly, than it is for the leaders of politically heterogeneous congregations, because there is always someone who disagrees with him and says why are you bringing politics into the pulpit, which somebody said -- I think is usually said only when you disagree with whatever was brought into the pulpit.

MR. JONES: That's why rabbis are so fearless about speaking out.

MR. GALSTON: Somebody -- oh, please.

MS. MICHELSON: We've got lots of hands.

MR. GALSTON: Yes, right in front of you. Yes, and then the lady.

SPEAKER: I actually have a question that (phone ringing) --

MR. GALSTON: Why don't we take the three of you. That way, everyone -- there'll be a trinity of good questions. (Phone ringing)

MR. DIONNE: Whose phone is that?

SPEAKER: It's mine.

SPEAKER: This question comes from Twitter, actually, from the Coalition on Human Needs, and this has been touched on before, but why doesn't the nation of immigrants theme resonate with Americans today? Isn't that what we are?

MR. JONES: I can start there. So, right. It's right that it was down at the bottom, right? About half of Americans say that this is a very important or extremely important value. When we looked underneath it, there's a very -- basically, I think the thing to say is that it's slipping as a cultural value right? Because what we can see is older Americans are more likely than younger Americans to say this is a very or extremely important value. Also when we look -- again, the survey size helped us here. When we look at the historic centers of turn-of-the-century immigration -- New York,

Massachusetts -- and we can look at the state level -- at those states -- there's still a lot of traction for that value in New York and in Massachusetts and the Northeast; where there's not a lot of traction, that is in the South, in the Midwest; and where there are newer waves of immigration. So, I mean, part of kind of what's culturally happening here that we're able to see with the survey is, I think, a generational slippage of this kind of value, you know, that just doesn't resonate, I think, as widely or as broadly as one might have thought.

MR. GALSTON: That's sort of paradoxical, right? Because did I hear you say correctly that young adults are less responsive to this --

MR. JONES: Yes, and slightly more older.

MR. GALSTON: Less responsive despite the fact that their generation has been constituted by this historic reopening of the American immigration gates that didn't even happen until 1964.

MR. JONES: Right.

MR. GALSTON: Right? So, maybe it's just that they've taken so much -
- maybe this is a commentary on the teaching of American history in our public schools.
(Laughter)

MS. MICHELSON: You could say that for a lot of the surveys.

(Laughter)

MR. GALSTON: But I also think the ethos -- I mean, having grown up in Massachusetts and living in New York for a while, this notion of a nation of immigrants -- New York has Ellis Island and the Statue of Liberty -- I think it's so deep that it surprises me, but then I realize I am just culturally conditioned, and I think that's very useful, because I suspect a lot of people active on this issue are part of that culturally conditioned group.

Please, my friend and colleague over here.

No, no, no, right over there, those -- yeah, and then the lady in front of you. The two of you, and then we'll go to the other side.

MR. DIONNE: And the woman on the aisle.

GASTON: Hi, good afternoon. My name is Gaston (inaudible). I'm an immigrant from Bolivia.

I noticed today the use of language, and some of you use "legal immigrants" and then, professor, you used "undocumented immigrants." So, I was wondering how the use of language affected, when you conducted that survey, or how was the response among Spanish speakers with the terms that you used, and I would like to know more about that. Thank you.

MR. JONES: I'll say a little bit about "undocumented" versus "illegal," because we've actually done some very interesting research on that in 2011. And when we did our first survey, we tackled some of these issues together with Brookings in 2011, we actually split formed a survey question that had exactly the same wording, and we used "undocumented immigrants" on one side of the survey, and we used "illegal immigrants" on the other side of the survey. Interestingly enough, what ended up happening is you actually saw more opposition when you used the word "undocumented immigrants," which is paradoxical, because I think a lot more left-leaning and liberal groups tend to use "undocumented" versus "illegal." But what I think was going on there is that people sort of had a negative reaction to that, because they felt like it wasn't the term of use in the paper and it wasn't the term they hear all the time and they were a little concerned that something was being put over on them by a kind of use of a term that seemed a little unfamiliar and seemed reaching a little bit, right?, or leading a little bit. So, the term "undocumented," "illegal" -- we've stayed in this survey, for the most part,

with the term "illegal immigrant," which is the term you see in the newspaper and the press, and that's the term that we've kind of stayed with in the survey here.

Jim, I don't know if you want to speak about the Spanish --

MR. NAVARRO-RIVERA: Well, the Spanish --

MR. NAVARRO-RIVERA: Well, the Spanish --

MR. JONES: This is Juhem Navarro-Rivera. He's a research associate at PRRI, responsible for the Spanish translations, so.

MR. NAVARRO-RIVERA: So, yeah, the Spanish translation, because we were using a former -- to have the trend from the former questions that we were using at that point before I joined. It was -- the word that was used was "illegal." So, basically, I had to -- to the keep the trend, I had to keep the word that way. But, yeah, I did propose, before I saw that after trend, using "undocumented" than actually "illegal." So, in the Spanish translation, (inaudible) to keep that trend going.

MR. DIONNE: I actually think -- the problem with "undocumented" is I think a lot of people don't know exactly what that means, and that that's the difficulty in using it. I suspect there is a little bit of what Robbie talked about in sort of putting something over on you. And, clearly, when you see some of the numbers we're getting for a path to citizenship when we used the term "illegal," you know, it seems to me maybe the straightforward, simple language is better to use, because it is straightforward.

MS. MICHELSON: It might be more straightforward, but for Hispanics that term is often offensive, and I think if politicians want to increase their support among Hispanic voters, they need to avoid using words in those communities that those communities find distasteful. And so regardless of whether it's the term that's used --

MR. DIONNE: Even when it's associated with friendly policies?

MS. MICHELSON: If the policy is being put forward in what is viewed as a cynical and not-heartfelt attempt to win votes, yeah. If Latino -- if Hispanic voters think that the Republican Party or Republican candidates actually care about Hispanics, then that's part of the thinking about authentic --

MR. DIONNE: Regardless of party.

MS. MICHELSON: Right. So, if they're using words that the community finds offensive and yet saying, but here is this shiny thing for you here, I don't think it will have as much of the desired effect, because it will lead to Hispanic voters seeing, well, you're saying you support comprehensive immigration reform and a path to citizenship, but you're also using this word that we find hateful, and so how much do you really care?

MR. DIONNE: But there is a tactical question here, because the majority that may come to exist for comprehensive immigration reform is a majority that will be built on white Americans and not Latinos. And so the persuasion -- the persuasion has to be directed to the people who are not already committed.

MS. MICHELSON: That's true.

MR. DIONNE: And it may be that the language of persuasion for them is not the same as the language of endearment for Latinos. (Laughter) Then what do you do?

MR. GALSTON: Thank you. Please. Is it on?

MS. KRAMER: Yeah, Ricki Kramer.

MS. MICHELSON: Just watch the stage. Just take over.

MS. KRAMER: I wanted to know -- I realize this is not a longitudinal sample, but I'm wondering, given your historic perspective and some of the other things you just talked about, what your sense is of the prognosis of the Gen-Xers sort of aging into somewhat more conservative position. And there are two things that could be going

on. One of them is, on the one hand, they are sort of rising in a much more tolerant environment -- the gay marriage issue and all that other stuff that's going on in social issues -- but on the other hand, they're going to age into this stuff that David Saperstein talked about, which is the long-term prognosis for economy and economic advancement and so forth.

So, what's the sense of how this compares to what else we've looked at in terms of the younger generation aging?

MR. GALSTON: So, could I just say real quick, I am a skeptic that -- a similar view is people get more conservative as they grow older. I'm sure in some ways that's probably true, but I have always been more taken by a cohort analysis that says certain generations are very marked by the politics that they had over a period of time when they were young. And so the new deal generation -- was the new deal generation all the way through?, and, yes, there was some slippage, say, in the late '60s, early '70s, but they remained a new deal cohort all the way through. To a lesser degree, I think you can see a kind of Reagan generation moving through the electorate.

So, while in certain respects I think what you say is right. I think we are more likely to see a cohort, and I think the future of American politics hangs on how much does this generation change with time. Obama's share of the under-30s went from 68 to 60. Now, okay, that's a decline, but I don't know how a party can keep 68 percent of, you know, any vote.

The question is does it sort of slip further and do Republicans become competitive in this group, or does it remain this, you know, rather liberal generation compared to all that came before. But, as I say, I'm a cohort fan.

MR. JONES: Well, I've looked at the political science on this question, and it's pretty clear there are both cohort or generational effects and age effects.

MR. GALSTON: Yes.

MR. JONES: And let me give you a classic example of that. As you age through young adulthood, get married, have children, set down more permanent roots, although an increasing fraction of people in this society don't, you are much more likely, all things being equal, to be affiliated with some religious organization and to attend religious services at least somewhat more frequently than you did when you were on the dark side of the theological moon at age 25. Having said that, where you start out at age 20 has a continuing effect on where you end up at age 45. If at age 20, a generation is less affiliated and less observant than previous generations were when they were age 20, the odds are very low that their religious affiliation attendance statistics will ever catch up, even though they rise, even though they rise as they age. And so it's not one or the other, it's both, and this is quite a consistent result.

MR. DIONNE: The one other thing I just want to add very quickly -- I want to get to some of the questions -- is there is also going on here that there is a part of this dynamic, what I might call, like, the friends-and-family effect, right?, that the younger generation has, in a way, that the older generation doesn't.

I actually recall that thing, like, the older generation -- 7 in 10 seniors are white and Christian, right? Less than 3 in 10 millennials are white and Christian. So -- and it goes for -- if you ask about millennials, they are much more likely to know someone who was outside the country; they're more likely to have a close friend or family member who is gay or lesbian; they're much more likely to be in frequent contact with people who speak only Spanish.

So, there are all of these kinds of social networks, I think, that are also part of the thing. And unless your theory is that the younger generation is going to shed all of these social relationships as they get older, which I find utterly implausible, right?,

that these things are going to carry through, and I think things like same-sex marriage and immigration are two issues where they're absolutely tied up with social bonds of friendship and family in a way that's going to give them some staying power I think even as this generation gets older.

MR. GALSTON: We'll go to this lady over here. My favorite one-liner on life-cycle changes came from a conservative friend who said the definition of a conservative is a liberal with a daughter in high school. (Laughter)

EMMA: Okay, my name is Emma (inaudible). I am the president of the Spanish (inaudible) of Our Lady Queen of Peace in Arlington, okay?

Well, I have a few comments. One is the involvement of the parish on politics? One thing is to call it politics, and another thing is to call it the common good. That's when things change, okay? My parish organized the Coalition Against Secure Communities two years ago, and we won in Arlington. The only thing is we have a very active campaign for immigration reform, and it is praise from the pulpit asking for a compassionate solution to the immigration problem. This has been going on for a long time. So, yes, you generalize when you think that churches don't get involved.

The other thing is why Latinos voted for Obama despite secure communities. I think the problem is that everybody thinks that when a President gets in for the first term, the President is working on his reelection. The second time, it's not going to be a reelection and he'll be free to do what he wants to do, and it was always the hope that Obama will take care of immigration while there was no hope that Republicans would do. See, they were talking about self-deportation. I think it was the most insulting thing that anybody could tell.

So, that's all. Thank you.

MR. GALSTON: Thank you very much. Is yours a predominantly Latino

parish, or does --

EMMA: Not at all.

MR. GALSTON: Not at all. That's interesting.

EMMA: It's an American parish.

MR. GALSTON: Yeah. Thank you so much.

EMMA: It's a parish of choice. So, I drive from Reston to Arlington to go to the parish, and people come from Manassas and from everywhere.

MR. GALSTON: Thank you so much.

Could we go to the back there? Yeah.

MR. SCRIBNER: Hello, my name's Todd Scribner. I'm from the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.

I noted that one of the values is the (inaudible) immigration reform and keeping families together is very high up on the list. And what I also understand, though, in the discussions going on among the Gang of Eight within the House and the Senate is that there is some talk about eliminating some of the family visa categories and replacing with a point system. So, I guess a point system that would actually sort of be based more on employment and bringing high-skilled workers potentially, that sort of thing.

So, I guess my question is twofold. First, how would you see that discussion moving forward, particularly in light of the moral values that you sort of found for your survey; and, secondly, based on your economic findings, if the Senate and the House try to replace it with a point system that was more economic oriented, would that affect the way in which it was received -- if a comprehensive immigration reform bill was received by people who were worried that immigrants were taking jobs or, you know, how would that play out as well?

MR. GALSTON: I was hoping someone would ask that question, so

thank you appropriately from the Bishop's Conference.

Robbie, you want to take that?

MR. JONES: Well, I mean, I think the main thing to say is that this is absolutely like a bedrock value, right? I mean, like I said, 81 percent of Republicans, you know, say that keeping families together is a very or extremely important value that should guide any immigration policy. So, I think the one thing to say is that however it comes out, I think, in the sort of nitty-gritty details of policies and points and how many points you've assigned to what and all that, I think, you know, the case will have to be made somehow, right?, that if you really want to appeal to the things that the American people think are important and want to make the case for kind of the moral legitimacy of a policy, somehow making the argument that this is a policy that's friendly to families, that keeps families together, is going to be absolutely essential. And not just for Democrats but also for Republicans as well.

Now, how well it gets worked out in the weeds, I don't know, but I do think that this has enough staying power in cross-party lines that a politician who's concerned with connecting the policy and making it connect to the kind of moral grounds that both Democrats and Republicans in the country and Americans overall sort of value is going to be at pains to make that connection and to sort of make the justification, for wherever the cutoff is, that this is still a policy that you can, you know, without wincing say, you know, is any of that keeping families together?

MR. DIONNE: Yeah, let's -- and the last point that you made, Robbie, I think is the essential one, because the survey talks in a very broad-brush way about keeping families together. What do people actually understand when they hear that word "family"? How extended is that concept, right? I don't think that, you know, I doubt very much that any conceivable reform would tamper with the unity or reunification of what I

think the majority of Americans understand is the nuclear family.

But the family reunification provisions under current law extend significantly beyond that, as you know, and I think that those are likely to be the major topic of discussion in these negotiations. And I think we don't know on the basis of this survey where a line can be drawn that's politically defensible and where a majority of the people will say that's the wrong place to draw. We just don't know. But they're already is a line in law, and that line could end up being relocated, but whether that runs afoul of this norm we don't know.

I must say I was surprised -- may I shouldn't have been -- at how high that number was. They are both -- those who say it's extremely important and those who say it's either extremely or very important, I think those, right?, in terms of the range of where -- how broad you define the family. But I would say that's a -- it's a very important value to a lot of Americans, and it really crosses almost every line that we could find. But -- so thank you for noticing that.

Over here -- the gentleman?

MR. GRAVES-FITZSIMMONS: Hi, my name is Guthrie Graves-Fitzsimmons, and I do faith outreach for the National Immigration Forum, and I had two questions.

The first is you sort of talked multiple times about how the 50 percent of following the biblical commandment to welcome a stranger was the lowest of the moral values? And you sort of alluded to this earlier, but if you put all of the biblical commandments on public policy, do you think this would pull the highest? Is there any other issue in American political life where there's so much religious consensus that a biblical value should form our public policy?

And, along those same lines, my second question is 57 percent, you

mentioned, of evangelicals support a pathway to citizenship, yet 52 percent of white evangelicals have never heard it mentioned in their church. To move the needle more, is the solution more sermons from white evangelical churches?

MR. GALSTON: Can I say just on your point, personally I think the -- if you ask as a personal matter, I think the welcoming the stranger is a powerful not just message but value that should be embraced. That's a different question from how people hear it when they hear it and that what we find is that people who are most closely linked to the Bible, the people for whom the Bible is clearly very important by their identity, they respond to it more than other people do. But I'll let -- go ahead.

MR. JONES: Well, just very quickly, the golden rule --

MR. GALSTON: Oh, yes --

MR. JONES: -- scores substantially better than the welcoming strangers. So, we already have the beginning in answer to your question.

MR. GRAVES-FITZSIMMONS: Did you get that from the Bible?

MR. GALSTON: Yeah, well, they forget -- they forget the welcoming the strangers is from the Bible, too.

I mean, I think E.J. may have been leaning into this, I think your point about forgetting that that's from the bible is actually an important one. And there are certain things in the sociological literature, and there is, like, this term called adaptive upgrading, right? What happens is there's a value that has a certain home to it, which if it gains enough cultural sort of credibility, right? It can actually float free of its original home.

Like, the terms of criminal law, right, is actually one that -- there's a kind of funny story, that a religious leader said that they had a young Jewish person come, which is healing the world in Hebrew as (inaudible) go to him and how do you say (speaking in foreign language)? All right. (Laughter)

All right, now, while that sinks in (laughter) -- but the reason that's funny, right? and the reason that's occurring is because in certain liberal sectors, that -- you know, and that term has floated free, right, of its original moorings so much so that someone from the community from which it came mistakes is as an alien term that needs re-translating back into its home base.

But I do think that the golden rule, for that reasons, right? -- I mean, you can find this principle in Buddhism, you can find it in Judaism, you can find it in virtually every world religion is why it has a kind of cultural resonance. And for Christians, you know, when they hear this idea, it has not only the kind of general, you know, like, a prospective taking, kind of covert kind of stuff, but it also has a biblical base to it, right? Christians have an extra overlay, and Jews have an extra overlay from a slightly different source. But I think that's why it travels well in a way that welcoming a stranger doesn't.

MR. JONES: I beg to disagree.

MR. GALSTON: Yeah?

MR. JONES: Jews and Christians have exactly the same source, but Jesus neglected to drop the appropriate footnote to Deuteronomy.

MR. GALSTON: All right, all right. (Laughter)

MR. JONES: He was Swiss-Jewish. He didn't have to, right?

MR. GALSTON: Well, funny, in the immortal words of Kinky Friedman --
No, go ahead.

MR. DIONNE: Who else? Way in the back. My friend. Thank you.

MS. McCARTHY: Hi, Marina McCarthy, Commission on U.S. Presidential Scholars. I was just curious, having not read the study yet -- I was just wondering, do you get into East Asian, South Asian responses? Can you disaggregate? It seems like the conversation is mostly Latin American. But I'm wondering if there are

other immigrant groups that --

MS. BOWMAN: There were only 94 Asian respondents to this survey.

MR. GALSTON: Yeah.

MS. BOWMAN: So --

MS. McCARTHY: Not just respondents, but I'm just wondering, it just seemed to have a Latino theme.

MS. BOWMAN: I think the issue of immigration has been racialized to be almost equated with Latino immigrants.

MS. McCARTHY: Not South Asian or --

MS. BOWMAN: I think if you ask most Americans to envision, to visualize an immigrant, they will think of a Latino.

MR. JONES: Hm-mm, that's right.

MR. DIONNE: Among Asians themselves I think one of the things that explains the swing to Obama in this election -- I think immigration is part of that picture. But do you have any -- is there any -- we can't-- say much about Asians just because they did not loom large in --

MR. JONES: I mean, one piece of evidence on this I think is on the question where we asked about different groups and how they were changing American culture in life for the better or for the worst that goes, I think, to Professor Michelson's point, is that Hispanics and immigrants were ranked very, very similarly, right?, in terms of changing for the better or changing for the worse? Asians were ranked very differently, so Asians, by a factor of 4 to 1 were -- the Americans said that Asians were changing American society for the better rather than for the worst by a factor of 4 to 1. Among Hispanics, that's 2 to 1. Still more better than worst, but it's much less powerful, so, yeah, we don't have quite enough Asians to really get to certainly break them out

even to give you a solid number on Asians as a whole in the survey, even one of this size.

Which actually brings to mind a familiar maxim that this would go some way toward supporting, and that is it's frequently said that this wave of Asian immigration is like the wave of Jewish immigration a hundred years ago. That's a frequent comparison. And, in fact, if you look at the attitudes of Asians and Jews in this survey, they are remarkably similar in all of the areas where you can see -- and Asians and Jews are the two groups most likely to say that the present -- call it the American culture and way of life -- is decisively better. Yet, those are the only two groups in the '60s.

MR. DIONNE: I'm tempted to ask how do you say (foreign word) in Hindi. (Laughter)

One last -- oh, do we have another question from our tweeters before we close?

SPEAKER: No.

MR. DIONNE: Do we have one last question, burning question, that anyone has?

No.

I just really want to thank you all for coming. I want to thank our distinguished panelists, and I want to thank Robbie and Bill. We will -- we are -- I'm quite sure we'll be back again with a new survey. And also, you know, if you need any more -- for those of you who may be doing some writing on this, Robbie has all kinds of other breakdowns that are available.

Thank you all very, very much.

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