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TO THE BRINK AND BACK

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PROCEEDINGS

MS. WITTES: Good afternoon, welcome. I'm Tamara Cofman-Wites and, on behalf of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and the Foreign Policy Program here at Brookings, I'm delighted to welcome you in out of the rain to celebrate the launch of the latest book from our colleague, Saban Center Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel. It is of course, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Copies are outside if you didn't get a chance to get one on the way in.

Now, Bruce is a senior fellow in the Saban Center, where he's been with us for a number of years. He's also, of course, a former CIA officer, senior advisor to four American presidents on Middle East and South Asian issues, and headed up the inter-agency review on AfPak at the beginning of the Obama Administration.

Those of you who know Bruce at all know what an unusual creature he is in Washington. (Laughter) He is, as that bio tells you, a true expert in a number of areas, areas where expertise is rare and valued. But he is never, in a culture that's dominated by a lot of loud voices, he's never the first person to speak in a meeting or a conference. He sits back quietly, as he's doing right now, wondering what I'm going to say next. He listens carefully, as others around him spout their views, engage in robust debate, or simply list their talking points, and then in his quiet, measured voice, he cuts through all the chaff with fully-formed analysis of astonishing coherence and clarity that persuades everyone in the room that there simply is nothing further to say.

But in operating that way in the Washington context, I think Bruce over the course of his distinguished career has truly earned the praise that David Milleband gives him in his blurb on the back cover of this book that Bruce is expert, honest, rational, and humane. And it is those qualities that he brings to bear in analyzing this truly tricky topic and we're very grateful to him for doing so.
Many of you also know that Bruce is a frequent contributor to *The Daily Beast*, and we are particularly delighted that the founder and editor-in-chief, Tina Brown, is here and has agreed to join us and engage Bruce in a conversation about his new book.

So with no further ado, let me turn it over to her. Tina, thank you so much for being here.

MS. BROWN: Thank you so much. And it's certainly true that whenever another terrorist gets whacked by a drone, not only do I feel rather festive about the fact that somebody of evil has been removed from the world, the other great thing is that I know I'm going to get a wonderful piece from Bruce Riedel. (Laughter) So, I have a sort of terribly dual reaction every time there's a terrorist who meets his maker because Bruce writes better about issues of terrorism and AfPak and the bad guys and what we're doing about the bad guys than anybody else that I can think of right now in the common trait world.

So, let me start with a question about the title of your really brilliant and gripping book, *Avoiding Armageddon*. That's a very provocative title, Bruce. Have we really been on the edge of Armageddon in South Asia, and if so how close have we been, do you think, in recent years to nuclear war?

MR. RIEDEL: First of all, let me thank Tammy and you for this very kind introduction. If you go on any further I'm going to be as pink as my socks are, sitting up here.

We spent a lot of time at Brookings debating the title, actually, *Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back*. And I think "and back" is a very important part of this.

Every American president since John F. Kennedy has confronted a crisis
between India and Pakistan, some larger, some smaller. The last four presidents, starting with Bush the elder, have confronted crises that added nuclear dimension. In one case -- certainly one case, Bill Clinton -- we had a war underway in South Asia. Small war -- but small wars are real to the warriors just as big wars are real to the warriors -- that we now know was careening towards a much broader war. At the time it was confined to the Northern part of Kashmir, but we know the Indians were seriously considering blockading Pakistan's Port of Kashmir, which would have escalated the war right away.

The morning of the decisive meeting in 1999, the 4th of July, 1999 between President Clinton and Prime Minister Sharif of Blair House -- the President's daily brief, the CIA's top-secret newspaper, told the President that Pakistan is arming its nuclear weapons for use. It has to be considered one of the seminal moments of his presidency. He was looking at the very real possibility that if he couldn't persuade Nawaz Sharif to back down, India would escalate the war and Pakistan would respond with a nuclear blast.

So, I think we came very, very close in 1999, I would argue.

MS. BROWN: What was it that changed the dynamic there?

MR. RIEDEL: I think at the end of the day we were saved by three individuals. One is Bill Clinton, second is the Prime Minister of India, who showed remarkable self-restraint. India had been attacked and he responded in a measured way. But at the end, it was Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif knew that the course Pakistan was on in 1999 was going to lead to disaster. And he chose at the last minute literally, to veer the car in the right way and he lost his job for it and he came very close to loosing his head, and he went into exile for it.

We had a similar crisis in 2001 and 2002 in Bush Jr. when Pakistani
terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament with the goal of murdering the Indian Prime Minister. Had they got their timing right, they would have done it. That crisis led to a yearlong standoff between India and Pakistan which over 1 million troops were mobilized on both sides.

President Obama faced his India-Pakistan crisis -- or at least the first one -- even before he was inaugurated with the attack on Mumbai in November 2008. There again, India showed incredible self-restraint and chose not to respond to an attack that killed 166 people with violence, but to in effect turn the other cheek.

MS. BROWN: And yet, the worst part about that bombing really is the perpetrator, the mastermind, Hafeez Saeed, is actually still at large, wondering around in Pakistan, making television broadcasts. I mean, he's hiding in plain sight.

MR. RIEDEL: Right.

MS. BROWN: How can that be? I mean, how can this man who is responsible for the death of all those people in Mumbai is not apprehended, in not in jail is not, you know, executed, actually?

MR. RIEDEL: And he's not alone. The top three most wanted on the U.S. most wanted terrorist list are all in Pakistan. Hafeez Saeed, not hiding at all, as you say. He appears on TV every day. Mullah Omar, the head of the Afghan Taliban, is not hiding, either. He's in Quetta in a safe house where the Pakistani interests or intelligence directory -- the Pakistani equivalent to the CIA.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's successor, is theoretically hiding but I think it's a safe bet that we will find him in something a lot like the safe house that his boss was found in, inside a closed military area. That gets to the answer to your question, now. The Pakistani military.

The Pakistani army remains obsessed with India. It has been obsessed
with India since partition. It has lost every war with India and in losing every war; it has come back even more obsessed with India.

It sees no way of ever defeating India conventionally, having tried and failed. And therefore, has come up with two strategies to try to even the playing field. One is building nuclear weapons, and Pakistan today has the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world, probably in excess of 200 nuclear weapons. And second, is what they refer to euphemistically is asymmetric warfare, which is a fancy term for supporting terrorists. And they are convinced that these strategies work, and they take from the fact that India has not retaliated in these previous cases the argument it works. See? We can do anything we want.

MS. BROWN: So in that case, if there's a third attack of this kind it's hard to imagine that India is going to sit on its hands again.

MR. RIEDEL: I think that's true. You will hear a healthy debate on this issue. Many in India and Pakistan will argue no, avoiding armageddon is too ominous. We know what we're doing. Like you and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, we know how to manage this relationship so that it can go to the edge but won't go over the edge.

I hope that's right. I think it's much more likely we're playing Russian roulette.

MS. BROWN: So, what can America's role be in making this intransigent problem, you know, go away? I mean, there have been many -- multiple attempts to make these two powers like each other and it doesn't seem to be working.

And at the same time, we've given Pakistan so much in the way of support and funds, and yet that poll in June 2012 showed that 74 percent of Pakistanis view America as the enemy. So what can this -- I mean, we're now about to be starting a
second, you know, Administration of Obama. What now can be done, what can John Kerry put in motion that will do anything if it is possible to do anything to change the situation?

MR. RIEDEL: We do one thing well and one thing poorly. The thing that we do well is conflict management. We have, in essence, a playbook when a crisis like this happens. We deploy the Secretary of State, the national security advisor, Secretary of Defense. We round up everyone we can; the British, the French, the Chinese, all to go in and urge restraint. So far, we've been very successful in doing that. What we're very weak at is conflict resolution.

Important, though, is if you look at the 70-year history of America's relationship with India and Pakistan -- and I would argue -- and I try to argue in the book - - that we have a demonstrated capacity to make the situation worse and we're good at that. We support the dictators, we give millions, billions of dollars to Pakistani dictators, we tend to undermine the civilian government. We know how to irritate and antagonize our Indian friends.

There's not much evidence that we're very good at moving a situation in the right direction, but I think there are opportunities ahead. Our relationship with India today is better than it's ever been before. The U.S./India civil nuclear deal, whatever you think of its merits in terms of arms control, has taken away the biggest irritant in our relationship. Trade between the United States and India is growing. Military relations are growing. Because we have stood by them in cases like the Kargil war, we have more trust in Delhi than we've ever had before.

Same can't be said, obviously, for our relationship with Islamabad. Our relationship there is as bad as it can be, but I think that the challenge that John Kerry and the President have is to try to nurture India and Pakistan together. They've got to take
the lead. We can cheer them on.

The good news is, there's an increasing body on both sides that recognized that the path of going to crisis and crisis is insanity. When in fact, India and Pakistan today could, through a productive relationship, create Nirvana in South Asia. If you harnessed the entrepreneurial talent of India and Pakistan together, I think you would create an economic prosperity zone that would make the European Union be a distant memory and would outdo China.

MS. BROWN: Yet, there's escalating sectarian bloodshed now in Pakistan and Malik Ishaq was just arrested this week for stirring anti-Shiite hatred, and he's roamed free for all this time, like Saeed has.

So I mean, what chances are there of Pakistan ending impunity for known terrorists? We know that we didn't even want to tell the Pakistanis when we went in to get Osama bin Laden, and surely nothing can actually change unless we deal with our own problems inside Pakistan with terrorists? Why they're attacking Mumbai or attacking the West.

MR. RIEDEL: Exactly. Pakistan today is a country under siege. It is the world's number one patron state sponsor of terrorism, it is probably also one of the world's number one victims of terrorism and the two are related. American presidents -- and I've watched four of them do it -- have been telling Pakistanis for a quarter of a century if you patronize terrorism it will ultimately consume you.

We have the virtue of knowing we were right. Now the question is: how do we move it forward? I think there are fragile signs of a real debate for the first time in Pakistan on this issue. It's what I call the battle for the soul of Pakistan.

There are voices out there which are saying this is a self-destructive policy. We can't continue on this road. So far, those voices are still pretty small and they
have yet to move the army and the jihadist forces in Pakistan, and it will be very hard to do it.

Our objective has to be to help those people. Not only are they moving the country or they want to move the country in the right direction, they're doing it at incredible risk to themselves. The girl, Malala, who was shot in the head by the Taliban. That's the battle for the soul of Pakistan.

My first rule in a situation like this in terms of policy advice is, do no harm. That's easy to say and actually very hard to do in Pakistan, because in Pakistan for reasons of our own self-defense, we do harm ourselves every day with drone strikes. It's a very difficult balance, but we have to constantly be thinking about ways to try to move this battle for the soul of Pakistan in the right direction and certainly try to do nothing that hinders those voices.

MS. BROWN: How much has the war in Afghanistan been a bad thing for Pakistan? If you talk to certain people who are friendly towards Pakistan they say, well, so much of their turbulence and instability and terrorism has been caused by refugees coming from Afghanistan, radical elements coming from Afghanistan. Is there any truth in that?

MR. RIEDEL: There is, there's a lot of truth.

We see this as a war that's now 10 years old. Afghans and Pakistanis see this as a war that's 30 years old. If you look at it in those terms, Pakistan has suffered tremendously. The coalition across culture that dominates Pakistani cities today that makes places like Quetta or Karachi murder capitals of the world is a product of the spillover from all of these Afghan wars. Not just the current one, but all of these Afghan wars.

The Pakistani military and intelligence's love affair with terrorist groups
like Lashkar-e-Taiba, like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the one that attacks Shi’a, all date back to
the start of this war and to decisions made by Zia-ul-Haq at the beginning of the war.

The American role in all of this has generally been to support the
generals in Islamabad. Ronald Reagan loved Zia-ul-Haq, David --

MS. BROWN: How badly do you think Bush II was conned by
Musharraf? I mean, it feels as if he was just completely taken in by Musharraf. Is that
true?

MR. RIEDEL: I think that's very true. The former Afghan foreign
minister, Abdullah Abdullah, has this great phrase about the relationship between
Musharraf and Bush. And he says, Musharraf threw dust in Bush's eyes. And I think it's
true, I think he was very good at that.

The generals are experts at telling us what we want to hear and
convincing us that they’re serious while at the same time, they’re not.

President Obama, I think, falls into a different category. You hinted at it,
and just to expand on the point -- you know, when he sent the Seal team into Abottabad
to kill Osama bin Laden, at that point the United States had provided Pakistan with $25
billion in military and economic assistance in 10 years. That's even more than we gave
Israel in those 10 years. And any time you're giving some other country more money that
you're giving Israel, you're really in an unusual position. We gave them all that money for
one purpose, to fight al-Qaeda. And at the moment of truth, the President made the right
decision. He couldn't trust the Pakistanis with that information. I think that everything
we've seen since then underscores that.

MS. BROWN: So where has that left us, then? I mean, given that we
did go in and we did get Osama bin Laden -- I mean, the fact that Mullah Omar and
Zuwar are still there and nothing's happened? I mean, I actually thought naively that
perhaps after someone was killed you'd see the Pakistani's giving up the others. But it doesn't seem to have happened, and what is their state of being about this now? What is their rationale for this appalling thing?

MR. RIEDEL: The army remains obsessed with India. That's what drives their policy.

If you ask chief of army staff, General Kayani, what is the nature of his being he will tell you, I am obsessed with India.

So, how do we break this? We can't do it but we can help Indians and Pakistanis do it, and it needs to be done in several levels. One is, people-to-people contact, increasing that. Up until 1965, Indians and Pakistanis could cross the border without a visa. Now, the only people who can cross the border without a visa have to be over 90 and under 9. And the ISI and its Indian equivalent look at every visa application as an opportunity to say "no", not as an opportunity to say "yes".

People are beginning to look at this. India and Pakistan are changing those things. Trade as well. India and Pakistan could have a vibrant direct trade. The Economist, for example, estimates that within five years if they lifted some tariff regulations on both sides they could quadruple trade. That's one part.

Another part, though, has to be resolving the Kashmir issue. Kashmir is the issue that divides Indians and Pakistanis. There's no escaping it. American Presidents since John F. Kennedy have tried to escape the Kashmir issue as too hard, too difficult to deal with. And certainly if we appointed a special negotiator for Kashmir, he would never, ever, ever get a visa to go to New Delhi. You can count on it.

But we need to be more subtle, we need to be a little more indirect. We need to be a cheerleader for Indians and Pakistanis doing this. Musharraf, who we've dissed pretty thoroughly here -- to be fair to him after he tried nuclear blackmail,
terrorism, a small war, came around to negotiations and negotiated indirectly with Prime Minister Vajpayee and then Prime Minister Singh the basic outlines of the deal.

We need to get back to that deal.

MS. BROWN: Now, what do you think is going to happen in the forthcoming elections in Pakistan?

MR. RIEDEL: The forthcoming elections in Pakistan --

MS. BROWN: Does Imran Khan have any kind of a chance?

MR. RIEDEL: No.

MS. BROWN: He was good in Davros, what can I say?

MR. RIEDEL: He's very good. He's very articulate, he understands a lot of the problem. Pakistani politics are run by two political parties, and if you don't have the grassroots networks, you're not really competing. He doesn't have the grassroots network.

The way to think about Pakistani elections is simple; essentially, they're having a runoff between the winners and losers of the 1988 election every year since 1988. 1988, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto went at it for the first time, and in 2013 they'll go at it for a second time only she's dead, but her husband will be the stand-in.

If you think of it in those terms it's not hard to understand why Pakistanis are desperate for Imran Khan or anybody -- a Martian -- anybody to come on the scene and have something different to say. But, they're likely to be disappointed.

All that said, this year -- assuming there is not a military coup or something like that -- Pakistan will cross threshold for the first time in its history; an elected government will serve out its full term. There will be an election, and a new elected government will take its place.

Now, that may not seem like a big deal but for Pakistan it's a huge deal.
This gets back to the question, how do we help Pakistan? Well, we want to encourage this process.

MS. BROWN: What do you think can be expected now for women in Pakistan? I mean, we were all, as you mentioned, very shocked by the whole Malala incident. If you talk to anybody there, they say that actually Malala was one that we happened to hear about, that there's plenty of that going on every month.

So, what kind of protection do you think can be offered to women in Pakistan and in Afghanistan now, in terms of the troops pulling out, in terms of the sectarian violence? Is this going to get worse for them now?

MR. RIEDEL: I think that we're certainly in for a rough next two years. The confluence of Pakistan's elections, the turnover and command of the Pakistani army, the chief of army staff changes this year. NATO, America draw down in Afghanistan. Elections in Afghanistan. The forces of militancy, of terrorism, of jihadism, of violence. You're going to see all of these as opportunities to try to veer the situation in the worst-possible direction.

Our ability to do much to help people in Pakistan is pretty limited. You quoted the numbers. We now out-poll India as the bad guy in Pakistan.

MS. BROWN: Is that a result of the drone policy?

MR. RIEDEL: No, it's -- the drones have added to it, but it's unfair to blame the drones for that. 60 years of American foreign policy has created this. Pakistanis believe that the United States treats their country like a tissue; use it and throw it away. They actually have a different terminology, but I'll stick with tissue in this audience. (Laughter)

And any objective review of U.S.- Pakistani relations would have to argue, I think they're right. That's where we are. We have -- we don't have -- you know,
in the State Department they like to call it the trust deficit. Such an innocuous term. You know, the trust deficit. That's not what it is. They hate us, they absolutely hate us. They may admire things about America, about our democracy, about our entrepreneurship, but they hate our foreign policy and the drones is only the latest part of that.

The challenge here is with all of that baggage, let's not make it worse first and then let's look for ways to help Malala and others like that by being on the side of democracy, good governance, the rule of law, accountability.

MS. BROWN: Well, thank you, Bruce. You've now made me incredibly threatened, depressed, and I'd love to turn it now to the audience to see if you are -- I'm sure there's lots of questions. Yes, over here.

Yes, he's just coming with a mic. Maybe you want to self-identify when you stand up.

MR. SARAJAKBUR: Thank you very much. My name is Malik Sarajakbur. I'm a journalist from Pakistan.

In your book you talk extensively about the relationships between the U.S. presidents and the Indian or Pakistani prime ministers. Do you -- how much do you think have the U.S. presidents personally experience of traveling to the region or their experiences of having been there, being influenced or adding to or improving their relationship? Like the way you talk about President Nixon's relationship towards the region and his problems with the (inaudible), for instance?

So, has the U.S. had a policy towards India and Pakistan or has it been like personality-driven based on personal contacts and relationships?

Thank you.

MR. RIEDEL: One of the most fun things in researching this book was
studying each American president and their relationship with India and Pakistan. And I think I am now prepared to go on any trivia contest and when it says, American presidents in South Asia, to take that and I think I know all the answers. I'll give you one, and then I'm going to come to your important question.

The American president who spent more time in South Asia than any other? Ulysses S. Grant. (Laughter) Because when he went --

MS. BROWN: Is that because he couldn't get away because of the travel?

MR. RIEDEL: Right. When he went in the 1870s you couldn't just go for an hour, you had to go -- it was an investment of time and he spent more than a month.

How important is it? Critically important. Presidents are like people everywhere, they tend to think in personal terms. Bush and Mush, he thought he was -- looked into his eyes and could trust him. You can criticize his judgement but you can understand how he got there.

I think Obama, famously known for not being one of the world's great bonders, has bonded pretty well with Singh. The two of them seem to find a common ground. The danger with Pakistan right now is that we've lost any hope of trying to get those bonds.

I think one of the interesting phenomenon of this first Obama administration is how each of the principles in the Cabinet at one point or another basically decided, I'm not doing Pakistan anymore. I've had it.

MS. BROWN: But is that because it's -- I mean, who are you bonding with, is the point? Zardari, for instance. What is he like? And then clearly when you try to bond with him you've got the army to bond with, too. So is it a dual-pronged effort to win both of these people or is it hopeless?
MR. RIEDEL: It's got to be engagement across the board, but engagement with your eyes wide open. Just because they tell you what you want to hear doesn't mean they're going to do it.

We have to engage with what we have. President Zardari is a crook, okay? He's referred to as Mister 10 Percent. A Pakistani I talked to said, no, he's Mister 100 Percent. He takes everything, if he can get it.

That said, President Zardari's vision of Pakistan is fundamentally different than that of the generals. He wants Pakistan to be at peace with India. He wants to stop fighting terrorism. That's why the Mumbai attack happened, was they wanted to sabotage that and they sabotaged it very well.

So there's no shortcut here. Engagement is the only alternative, but it's got to be engagement with our eyes wide open.

MS. BROWN: Yes.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks very much. I'm Garrett Mitchell and I write The Mitchell Report and read all of Bruce's books. (Laughter)

I was thinking about the question of policy options in a situation like this. And you began by saying, first do no harm, which I think is what you said not so long ago about the Sunni/Shia divide that we're faced with.

In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Haqqani has defined a new kind of relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan, and I won't elaborate on what that is but we'll make a presumption that you're familiar with it. A, what do you think about the validity of what he's proposing? And second, in what ways is it the same as or different from the first do no harm recommendation that you're making?

MR. RIEDEL: Ambassador Haqqani's a close friend and he is -- if you want me to give you an example of people fighting for the soul of Afghanistan, here's
one.

The man who wrote the book about how the military controls the politics of the country and then went on to serve as ambassador of that same state because he knew that there was no shortcut to talking. He has referred to as the need for a divorce. I think this marriage is over so I don't know why we need to go through the legal process of divorce. It is certainly one of the most broken marriages -- there's not a character in *Dallas* that could rival the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

But we still need to talk to each other and we're not going to get away from that. We need to find ways to help people like Hussain Haqqani. It's not easy to do. When we put our arms around them they get called home and have their passports taken away and are almost killed. So, we're going to have to be more subtle here.

One of the things we need to do -- and I think he would agree with me on this -- is stop thinking about these countries in isolation and start thinking of them holistically. I think one of the mistakes the president made in his first term was AfPak. It's a very poorly-phrased term. Most Pakistanis do not like to be referred to as a “Pak”. Very few Afghans want to be referred to as an “Af”. It wasn't -- it also makes your thinking about the region perverted. We need to think about the region as united. That's why I keep saying, do no harm but also encourage those who are trying to move in the right direction.

India wants increased trade with Pakistan. Let's be on the same wavelength. Let's promote it. Let's increase trade ourselves with Pakistan.

**MS. BROWN:** This gentleman here.

**MR. HURWITZ:** Thank you. My name is Elliot Hurwitz and I'm retired.

Mr. Riedel, I have a question for you, although it is a difficult question.

**Are --**
MR. RIEDEL: All the other ones were easy? (Laughter)

MR. HOROWITZ: RPVs, also known as drones, create turmoil in Southern Asia and everywhere else in the world. In your judgment, are the advantages of RPVs greater than the disadvantages?

MR. RIEDEL: Okay, you're right. This is, of many difficult questions, one of the most difficult.

Let me begin with a little bit of perspective. The drones began under President Bush. The first use of drones in a systematic way was in 2007. At that time, in 2007, the policy of the administration was to give Pakistan advance notice of lethal drone strikes. Seemed like a common courtesy. We're attacking people in their country, we should let them know it's coming. Every single time we did that, the target wasn't there when the missile arrived. And they did it enough that it was, let's say, a statistically significant database.

You don't have to be Sherlock Holmes to connect these dots. Someone who was getting the advanced notice was telling the terrorists. That changed at the end of the Bush administration. By the time President Obama came into office, he inherited a fully-mature program, ready to operate. What do I mean by that? Not just unmanned aerial vehicles in the air, but intelligence officers on the ground who could tell you where to find the bad guys.

Over the course of the last four years, that program has significantly degraded al-Qaeda's capabilities. It has not defeated al-Qaeda, it has not destroyed al-Qaeda, but it has significantly degraded.

In the absence of Pakistan taking action against these targets, this is the only way the President has to deal with the problem. But, it comes with a cost. It comes with a very big cost. It adds to Pakistan's anger at America. The challenge here for
Obama and his team is to avoid drone addiction, to see the drone as the answer to every problem, and to be extremely selective.

Now that's really easy to say in Falk Auditorium on Massachusetts Avenue. It's a lot more complicated to turn that into practice when the CIA comes to you and says, here's Mister Bad Guy. We want to take him out. We know where he is, and we have a window.

One of the things that I think has been healthy about the debate about John Brennan becoming the director of the CIA is we are finally having a serious conversation in this country about how much is enough, how much is too much, and I think from what I've read and what Mr. Brennan thinks about these things, he understands that we need to have a more rigorous process of doing this, and that we can't see the drone as the answer to every security threat we face.

But on the other hand, we can't throw it away.

MS. BROWN: Thank you. This person here who has been trying to get in.

MR. CHAUDHRY: Thank you. I am Dr. Nissad Chaudhry with the Pakistan-American League.

Bruce, you mentioned about a survey about Pakistan's people (inaudible) that 74 or 74 percent are anti-Americans. I think this survey becomes questionable because about 700,000 Pakistani-Americans, (inaudible) live in this country and they are really proud of their adopted land. And they are also ambassadors of goodwill for the U.S.A. They inherited the East, they have adopted the West.

I think that 75 percent of people might disagree with the policies towards Pakistan, but people of Pakistan love the people of America. The American people are wonderful people. The best friends I have, they're all Americans and you know it
(inaudible). So, I think that survey becomes a little questionable when it comes to people of Pakistan against Americans. They are not against Americans. They love to be here, they love America, and they love their way of life. And especially, the American virtues.

My question is that the U.S.A. has plans to withdraw from Afghanistan and NATO forces also. There could be some residual force inside Afghanistan. When all these forces, which is a huge number, comes out and people in that area have a happy fighting -- this is a game for them, like hunting, fishing -- what could be the possible fallout? And how can we develop a digital approach? Because all these three countries, their stability as well as their territorial integrity, is inter-dependent. As you mentioned, (inaudible) who want understanding.

MR. RIEDELM: Right.

MR. RADRIV: Can America play such a role to bring all these three countries on the table? Because America does have leverage in that region.

MR. RIEDELM: Before I address your question, yes. There's a huge Pakistani-American community, there's a huge Indian-American community, a huge Bangladeshi-American community, and we need to use those bridges in the future more creatively than we've used them in the past. That is an asset we have. They are incredibly successful communities, as well.

The United States is certainly not going to be able to do the second thing until it starts looking at this problem in a regional scope. So, my first response is, I'm hoping to see the revival of the South Asia Bureau in the State Department, and its mutation in the White House and in the Pentagon. We need to think about the area holistically if we're going to have a holistic policy.

Afghanistan itself. Let's also put a little perspective on this. When Barack Obama inherited the Afghan war in January 2009, we were on the verge of a
catastrophic defeat. In the report I wrote to the President then, the section on Afghanistan was entitled, *We Are Losing the War but it is Not Yet Lost*. We had neglected for seven years the fundamentals in Afghanistan. We thought that security would come from magic, not from building security forces.

We embarked on a five-year program and we're now close to the end. We have created that security force. We are now withdrawing and transitioning to that. There is no guarantee this will work. I call it a gamble. It is a huge gamble. We don't have an alternative. We can't stay in Afghanistan, we can't keep 100,000 Americans there, we can't afford this. We're broke. But, it is a gamble. It needs to be -- you need to go through this gamble in as cautious a way as possible, not recklessly.

We cannot simply walk away from Afghanistan. You mentioned Afghan girls. 4 million Afghan girls are going to school today. We can't throw those people under the bus. We will need to maintain some residual presence. It will be much cheaper than what we're doing now. It will require, though, a willingness to stick at this longer than most Americans, I think, have the willingness to.

Here's the bottom line: We've abandoned Afghanistan before, arguably twice, in 1989 and in 2002. We see what the result is. So if you've made a mistake twice and you do it a third time, that's not tragic. That's criminal.

MS. BROWN: I have time for one last question. So, I'm just going to -- let me take something from the back here, over here. Thank you.

MR. TURANI: Thank you. My name is Sajad Turani. I'm a retired person, also, recently from Pakistan.

I have a comment and a question. You said Pakistan is the foremost sponsor of terrorism. I thought Iran used to have that privilege. When did you change
that to Pakistan?

But the question I have is: you mentioned very correctly that the big difference between India and Pakistan and the reason for their antagonism all these years is the issue of Kashmir. You just sort of switched it away. There are security (inaudible), there are all kinds of other things that the U.S. could do to resolve that issue and then bring the two countries together. What can you recommend for that?

MR. RIEDEL: Well, it's certainly a close race between Iran and Pakistan. But I think if you look at numbers of terrorist organizations, Pakistan I think has pride of place.

It's a dubious distinction, one that is destroying the country. According to the government of Pakistan, since 9/11 45,000 Pakistanis have died in terrorist-related incidents. Since 9/11 there have been 300 suicide bombings in Pakistan. Before 9/11 there was 1. This is a country which is being consumed by the militancy that it has chosen to sponsor over the years. The good news is, more and more Pakistanis are aware of this.

The problem of Kashmir, we can't pose a solution but we can certainly facilitate a solution. I will give you one practical aspect. When India and Pakistan -- if India and Pakistan can reach some agreement on how to diffuse it, it will need to go to the security council for global international blessing. That's up our alley, that's where we specialize, in things like that. We can also help in building a coalition of states to support them when they do this. From the Chinese to the Saudis to the British to all those who have a stake in the outcome.

So, it's not the classic American solution. The classic American solution is, let's appoint a special negotiator. But you know, we can be a little more subtle. We can be a little more indirect.
We certainly need to work with the parties but we can also be there with the parties to transfer an idea into reality.

MS. BROWN: Thank you so much, Bruce. Very fascinating book. Everybody, if you get a chance to read it, it's gripping. It'll keep you up at night. It did me.

I want to thank Bruce Riedel, who is so knowledgeable and so gripping in his analysis. Thank you, Bruce.

MR. RIEDEL: Thank you, Tina. Thank you.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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