

THE EDUCATION CHOICE AND COMPETITION INDEX BACKGROUND AND RESULTS 2012



Reuters

Grover J. "Russ" Whitehurst

with Sarah Whitfield

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The Education Choice and Competition Index Background and Results 2012

Introduction



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The federal government and the states are at crossroads on K-12 education policy. They can continue down the path of top-down accountability, devolve power to districts and thereby return to the status quo of the mid-nineties, or do something different by turning to market-based solutions.

Federal and state-level involvement in K-12 education has accelerated over the last 20 years, primarily in the guise of the standards and accountability movement. Previously the provision of public K-12 education was largely left to local school districts, with state and federal involvement limited to compensatory funding of districts with low property tax wealth. Dissatisfaction with the quality of the outcomes that system generated led to roughly half the states in the nation creating their own standards, testing, and accountability regimes, and then the federal government making such a system universal by requiring it under the 2001 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (No Child Left Behind, or NCLB). The best evidence indicates that the substantially heightened federal role has had a modest impact in mathematics achievement in elementary school and little or no effect on reading, far short of what had been hoped.[§] It might be that further centralization would yield more benefits, but it is doubtful that more federal control is politically possible and in any case the additional yield is uncertain.



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The second option--devolving recently accumulated federal and state power back to school districts -- is manifest in recent reauthorization proposals for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the waivers from NCLB that the Obama administration has offered to states willing to adopt its policies -- these allow each state to establish its own accountability system and require that those systems have teeth only for the lowest performing schools. The associated state-level free-pass on accountability for all but districts with the lowest performing schools in effect returns substantial authority to all but a few school districts. It is unclear how releasing states and school districts from federal accountability and granting them maximum flexibility is anything more than a return to the status

[§] Dee, T. S. and Jacob, B. (2011), The impact of no Child Left Behind on student achievement. *J. Pol. Anal. Manage.*, 30: 418–446. doi: 10.1002/pam.20586

Rather than public monopolies in the form of school districts providing education services through school assignments that are determined by a child's zip code, parents and their children would be able to shop for schools.

quo of the last century. It was disappointment with the effectiveness of our public schools at that time that led policymakers to embrace standards and accountability. The possibility that doing what we did before will produce different results seems remote in principle, and we have now a much better appreciation than we had then of the forces that support stasis and resist innovation in traditional school districts**.

Arguably, the best interests of the nation require something other than a return to local school governance or evolutionary improvements to the type of top-down accountability found in No Child Left Behind. An alternative approach to education reform that is both promising in terms of research results and in keeping with deep and long-standing American traditions is based on parent choice of schools and competition among schools for students. Rather than public monopolies in the form of school districts providing education services through school assignments that are determined by a child's zip code, parents and their children would be able to shop for schools. And rather than schools and school districts being held accountable for their performance through top-down accountability systems imposed by the state and federal governments, schools, would be held accountable by their ability to attract and retain customers (just like the many other enterprises that constitute the nation's economy, including the schools we call colleges) Unpopular schools would lose students and their associated revenue. If they did not figure out how to provide a more satisfying product they would eventually close. Popular schools would prosper and grow.

Competition cannot exist in public education unless parents can choose where to have their children schooled. Nor can competition among schools enhance student outcomes unless parents have good comparative information on school performance. And neither choice nor information will fundamentally change K-12 education unless public dollars follow students to their school of choice.

What is the appeal of school choice and competition?

- **Parental satisfaction.** Parents want choice: 27 percent move to their neighborhood of residence because of the schools. Another 16% have enrolled their children in public schools of choice, including charter schools. And 11% have their children in private schools despite the fact that they are paying twice for their children's education, once in taxes and again in tuition. The evidence is overwhelming that parents in

** Terry M. Moe (2011) *Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America's Public Schools*. The Brookings Institution Press.

It would be hard to identify a more fundamental principle of economics with more extensive empirical support than the effect of competition on productivity.

schools of choice are more satisfied with their children's schools than are parents whose children are assigned to a school by a school district. If you believe that our education system is to a significant degree about satisfying those it serves and those who pay for it through their tax dollars, we should give weight to the desire of parents to choose their children's schools and to the satisfaction that is generated by allowing them to do so.

- **Equity.** Poor and minority students are much more likely than their more advantaged counterparts to be assigned to a school. Because they are poor and immobile they cannot vote with their feet by moving to another zip code or school district. What they get from the school to which they are assigned in far too many instances is poor quality and low effectiveness in raising student achievement, despite relatively high per pupil spending. These families are trapped by a public monopoly that does not have to adapt to their needs in order to survive. The nation suffers because the least of us economically do not receive a good enough education to prosper in an increasingly knowledge-based economy.
- **Productivity and efficiency.** It would be hard to identify a more fundamental principle of economics with more extensive empirical support than the effect of competition on productivity. Entities that have monopolies in their markets tend to either charge more or provide less value than entities that are subject to competition. Total per pupil expenditure in public K-12 education has increased 38% in constant (inflation-adjusted) dollars since 1990-91 with only modest increases in most measures of academic achievement. Catholic schools and public charter schools have substantially lower levels of per-pupil expenditure than regular public schools. Urban charter schools as studied in New York City, Boston, and Chicago generate stronger academic outcomes than regular public schools serving the same mix of students. Introducing more choice and competition in K-12 education has the potential both to lower costs and raise achievement.
- **Innovation.** Someone 60 years of age could visit a typical public elementary school today and not feel out of place based on their experience as a student of a half century ago. In most modern industries anyone who has been out of action for more than a few years has trouble gaining a foothold in practices and processes that have morphed quickly in response to changes in technology and the marketplace. Few would disagree with the premise that the schools of tomorrow will not look like those of today or those of 50 years ago, that they will be fundamentally

transformed by technology and new knowledge of how people learn. And many observers believe that the best way for America to regain the international lead in education is by building on its pre-eminence in technology and cognitive science. But how are we to get there with a system of schooling that clings to its ways and has no compelling motive to embrace new approaches that will disrupt it? Choice and competition allows new entrants into the market for schools and provides them an incentive to do things differently. We already see this in the embrace of blending learning by some charter schools, in the growth of distance-learning providers for home schoolers, and in staffing and human resource policies among non-traditional schools that involve longer school days and years, part-time instructors, differentiated pay for different types of teachers, and retirement plans that are in tune with the high mobility rate among teachers. Breaking out of the box of our current educational system and innovating our way to a far different and better future will require choice and competition.

The Way Forward

We believe that progress in expanding choice can be accelerated by exposing differences among the geographical areas served by school districts in the degree to which they provide parents with choice and generate competition among schools. We do that through the Education Choice and Competition Index (ECCI). The ECCI provides an informative and consumer-relevant measure of the degree of choice and competition within the geographical boundaries of large school districts. Information from the ECCI is conveyed through a public interactive application: <http://www.brookings.edu/ECCI>. The main findings in terms of district scores are reproduced in Table 1 at the conclusion of this report. The interactive ECCI application, as contrasted with Table 1, provides the ability to drill down into the meaning of the district scores and to sort and arrange the data in multiple ways.

The ECCI is based on formal scoring rubrics within thirteen categories of policy and practice that are important to the availability and quality of choice and to the competition created by choice among providers of education services. The data on which districts are scored are derived largely from the U.S. government's National Center for Education Statistics. For categories which no federal data are available information is derived from school district websites and interviews with district staff. The ECCI generates overall letter grades for each of 100+ school districts and provides detailed information and scores for each of underlying categories on which the overall letter grades are based.

The goals these communities can share are providing more educational opportunity for children from disadvantaged backgrounds and reducing the number of low performing schools.

The ECCI is grounded in the conceptual model and policy recommendations of the Brown Center Task Force on Choice and Competition in K-12 Education.^{††} The Task Force framed its work within the realities of large variation in the quality of public schools, widespread selection of schools by choice of place of residence, and choice being exercised predominantly within the public sector. These realities offer opportunities for common ground between advocates for choice and advocates for public schools. The goals these communities can share are providing more educational opportunity for children from disadvantaged backgrounds and reducing the number of low performing schools. The mechanisms they can share are a system that affords parents as much choice as possible within the universe of taxpayer supported students and schools, portals by which parents can readily access rich information on the performance of schools, a system for exercising choice that minimizes the disparity between the schools parents want their children to attend and those to which their children gain access, and a funding system that supports the growth of parentally preferred schools and school systems.

What does a school district, or more to the point, a metropolitan area have to do to create K-12 choice and competition and receive a high score on the ECCI? A detailed answer to this question can be found in the formal [scoring guide](#). In general, a high score on the ECCI requires that the geographical area served by a school district provide parents of school-aged children with:

- Maximum choice, including:
 - good traditional public schools
 - magnet schools
 - charter schools
 - affordable private schools
 - virtual education
- A choice process that maximizes the match between parental preference and school assignment, including:
 - no default (everyone must choose)
 - a common application
 - rich and valid information on school performance (including test results that incorporate growth and are comparable across all schools)
 - clear presentation of information (including support for less educated parents)

^{††}http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2010/2/02%20school%20choice/0202_school_choice.pdf

- Funding and management processes that favor the growth of popular schools at the expense of unpopular schools, including:
 - weighted student-based funding in which a high proportion of the total local, state, and federal funding follows students to their schools of choice
 - processes for closing unpopular schools
- Subsidies for the costs of choice for poor families, particularly for transportation

2011 Results (Last Year)

The 2011 version of the ECCI included overall and category scores for the 25 largest school districts in the U.S. The high score went to New York City, with Chicago in second place. Both received letter grades of B. The low score was received by Orange County, Florida, which received a grade of F.

The side by side comparison of district practices and characteristics is a critical design feature of the ECCI interactive application. It allows districts and those who wish to influence district policies to benchmark the districts and to see what has and can be accomplished in districts that are performing well. Thus we saw in 2011 that New York performed particularly well in its assignment mechanism, its provision of relevant performance data, and its policies and practices for restructuring or closing unpopular schools. Chicago, in contrast to New York, had more alternative schools, a greater proportion of school funding that was student-based, and superior web-based information and displays to support school choice.

Low performers, including Orange County, were distinguished from higher performers, including New York and Chicago, by the absence of choice. In other words in these low scoring districts students receive an assignment to a school by the district based on their place of residence and there is little or nothing parents can do about it. Under our scoring rules and the conceptual model on which they are based, everything pivots off choice. Thus a district that doesn't support choice cannot score well even if it does a good job within some categories of the scoring system. Orange County, for instance, had better treatment of virtual education than either New York or Chicago by virtue of the state of Florida's Florida Virtual School (which is open to all public school students in the state). Further, we found its school information website to be easier to understand and navigate than New York's. But in the absence of parental choice among its regular public schools these are merely bells and whistles.

The Recovery School District in New Orleans (RSD) is the highest scoring district in the 2012 ECCI.

2012 Results

The ECCI is substantially expanded for 2012, with 107 school districts versus 25 in 2011. These 107 districts include the 100 largest districts in the U.S. in terms of student enrollment plus eight additional mid-sized districts that are of interest because of their choice and competition policies. We also made substantial improvements to the web interface to the ECCI.

There were also adjustments in the scoring rules for 2012. The two most substantive are an increase in the requirements for the availability of choice and an increase in the proportion of total funding that must follow children to schools. The former change in rules requires that districts receiving a high score on the availability of choice have a mix of available school types, including charter schools and affordable private schools, whereas last year's districts could receive a high score largely on the basis of having a lot of magnet schools. The reason for the change in scoring is that in practice magnet schools are similar to traditional public schools within the districts in which they are located on most variables that affect the nature of a child's education environment, and they are managed by school districts so as to minimize disruption to traditional public schools. As such they do not provide as much choice to parents in terms of the nature of their children's education or as much competition with traditional forms of education delivery as alternatives, including charters and affordable private schools.

The second change in rules – an increase in the requirements for the proportion of dollars that follow students – was derived from our experience with the much expanded list of districts in the 2012 data collection. It was clear that many districts were exceeding the 25% threshold for a high score that we established in 2011. Thus we increased the threshold to 50%.

The Winner

The Recovery School District in New Orleans (RSD) is the highest scoring district in the 2012 ECCI. It is the first and only district to receive a grade of A on the ECCI for its choice and competition environment.

The geographical area served by the RSD scores well on nearly all of the components of the ECCI. In particular there is high availability of choice in the RSD, with over 80% of schools being alternatives to traditional public schools including charters, a good supply of affordable private schools and tax credits available for private school attendance, and with virtual education provided through the Louisiana Virtual School. The school assignment process maximizes the match between parental preference and school assignment at the high school

There are large and functionally important differences between the RSD and 36 districts receiving a grade of F on nearly every component of the ECCI.

level through an ideal computer matching algorithm. There is no default school assignment (everyone must choose), a common application for traditional public schools and charters, and information on school performance that includes test results for children attending private schools. Information on school performance is clearly presented with support for parents in understanding and navigating the choice process. Transportation expenses to schools of choice are covered through free public transportation tokens or yellow bus service.

The RSD's overall grade of A does not mean that it scored perfectly on everything. In particular there could be improvements in information on school performance, which presently lacks data on teachers and principals, does not present school gains calculated from individual student test scores, does not reveal the popularity of schools based on their rankings in parental preference, and does not enable side-by-side school comparisons. The information presently provided is useful and easily understood, but parents will be better informed and make better choices if they can compare schools on things like the absentee rate for teachers and the school principal's previous record.

There are large and functionally important differences between the RSD and 36 districts receiving a grade of F on nearly every component of the ECCI. These low scoring districts are traditional in every sense of the word in that students are assigned to schools based on their place of residence, there are few alternatives to these traditional schools, and funding doesn't follow children. This doesn't necessarily mean these are bad districts in a general sense, and they surely vary in how well they are managed and the performance of their students on achievement tests. But they are districts where choice can only be effectively exercised by buying or renting a home within the geographical catchment area of the school to which parents want to send their child. This is inequitable to poor families, suppresses parental satisfaction, reduces productivity, and inhibits innovation. Over time, we expect geographical areas that provide little school choice to parents and no competition among schools to face negative consequences in terms of student achievement compared to areas that embrace a dynamic and information-rich marketplace for K-12 schooling.

Whereas comparisons of the RSD and districts receiving a grade of F provide contrasts on all the components of the ECCI, comparisons of the RSD with higher scoring districts are more nuanced and perhaps more revealing of areas in which districts that are pretty good could make improvements that are within their grasp. One such area is the assignment mechanism that is deployed to translate parental preferences into actual school assignments.

Consider the assignment mechanism used in Washington, D.C. vs. the one used in the RSD. In D.C. oversubscribed out-of-boundary public schools and charter schools each use a lottery for admission, with each school conducting its own lottery. Parents apply to each charter school individually. Applications to out-of-boundary public schools are centralized but each public school has its own lottery. Citywide high schools differ in that they have a coordinated matching system rather than a lottery for each school. The coordinated system operates by matching as many students as possible to their first expressed choice. Any students that fail to match to their first choice because it is oversubscribed then go to “stand in line”^{‡‡} at the next school on their list of preferences that still has openings, and so on until there is a school to which they are admitted through the luck of the draw or because it is undersubscribed.

Both the individual school lotteries and the citywide high school matching system used in D.C. promote gaming of the system by parents and fail to maximize the match between true school preferences and student assignments. Consider the case of individual school lotteries. Every child has a chance of being admitted to a particular school that is proportional to the number of seats and the number of applicants. The child’s chance of admission has nothing to do with the parents’ preference for that school -- a parent who has placed her child in the lottery for a school that is far down on her preference list has exactly the same chance of having her child admitted to that school as a parent within the same lottery who strongly prefers that school. The best strategy for a parent would be to apply to as many schools as possible and then accept the offer of admission that comes from the most preferred school. But to the extent that large numbers of parents play this game then every school is heavily oversubscribed and school assignments approach randomness with respect to parental preferences. Further, the true popularity of schools is masked. In this sense it is like what happened to selective colleges and universities when they switched to a common, easily completed, online application process -- their application rates soared and they seemed all of a sudden become more popular and more selective when in fact they were neither.

Related problems bedevil the citywide high school assignment process in D.C. Consider the consequence for a prospective student and her parent of ranking first the most popular high school in the district when it is heavily oversubscribed and the next four schools in terms of the student and parent’s preference are also oversubscribed. Assume that the most popular high school in

^{‡‡} The “line” is within the centralized administrative system that manages school assignments. It is not a physical line of students in front of a school. However, the function of the computerized line and a physical line would be the same in terms of school assignment outcomes – students on line would be selected randomly to fill the available seats at the school.

If this were an easy problem to solve people would not be receiving Nobel prizes for doing so.

the district, which is also the student's true first choice, has three times as many students ranking it first as there are available seats. If the next four schools in terms of the student's true preferences are also oversubscribed by students ranking them first the student has only one chance in four in being admitted to the high school she prefers and no chance of being admitted to the next four schools on her list. The best way for a parent and student to game this system would be to rank first a school that is not the top choice but is reasonably high up on the preference list while having good odds of admission. Decent odds of getting into a somewhat preferred school trump listing as first choice the truly preferred school with poor odds of admission. This is not a system that maximizes the match between preference and assignment. It is a system that distorts the expression of parental preference and advantages parents who have the knowledge of how to game the system.

Now consider how the system works in the RSD. The computer-based matching algorithms, which are based on work for which Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for 2012, create assignments that result in the smallest possible mathematical difference between the expressed choices and assignments over the whole population of parents exercising choice. If this were an easy problem to solve people would not be receiving Nobel prizes for doing so. These assignment rules are executed by a computer program and can only be formally expressed mathematically. But we can illustrate how these rules work in a tangible way.

Imagine that the assignment process begins by temporarily assigning students to schools in a completely random manner. This can be accomplished by assigning each child a lottery number and having schools randomly draw as many lottery numbers as they have seats in their school. At this point, the assignment of students to schools has taken none of the parental preferences into account (much as would be the case in the D.C. individual school lotteries if every parent applied to every school). Parental preference is expressed at the next stage, at which parents look for other students who would be willing to swap places with their child. Consider two students who are assigned to schools such that each student prefers the others' assignment. These students would swap seats so that each moves to a more preferred school. Students are permitted to swap seats multiple times, working their way closer to their most preferred school. The school assignments become permanent once there are no more trades involving two or more students that will result in all students ending up with a better match.

Obviously one would never ask parents to go through the exercise of finding students to swap schools with their child, but if they did so perfectly well the

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But the point is general: metropolitan areas that want to improve their environment for school choice and competition have a ready and useful tool in the ECCI.

outcome would be the same as the one achieved virtually instantaneously by using a computer program to implement an efficient assignment rule based on parents' listed school preferences.

This may seem like a convoluted system, but the subtleties are very important. If the assignment of students is done in any other way, such as is the case in D.C., the ultimate assignment of students to schools will be suboptimal in terms of maximizing parents' satisfaction. Deviations from this rule will also result in undesirable parent behavior because there will be incentives for parents to misrepresent their school preferences. This results in suboptimal assignment as well as unfair outcomes for parents who are less able to understand and game the system. In the assignment scheme used in the RSD, parents have no incentive to misrepresent their preferences. Their best chance of having their child admitted to their most preferred school is to rank it first, and so on down the line.

Districts that in many respects have strong environments for school choice and competition but suboptimal assignment mechanisms could improve substantially by adopting processes like those used for high school assignments in the RSD. The Houston Independent School District is like Washington, D.C. in that regard. All districts that allow parents to exercise choice would benefit from an assignment process that is similarly designed.

We have illustrated the value of district-to-district comparisons on specific components of the ECCI using the school assignment process. But the point is general: metropolitan areas that want to improve their environment for school choice and competition have a ready and useful tool in the ECCI. They can benchmark themselves to other districts and learn from those that have managed to obtain a higher score on one or another component of the ECCI.

Conclusion

The ECCI provides a snapshot of the quality of education choice and competition within the geographical areas served by large school districts and allows for comparisons of choice and competition policies and practices across districts. The ECCI identifies areas in which policies can be changed to expand choice and competition. Some changes can occur within the decision-making authority of a school district, e.g., switching from school assignments based on place of residence to open enrollment. Others need the involvement of a metropolitan area or the cooperation of multiple education providers, e.g., the decision to provide a common application and assignment process that combines independent charter schools and a school district's schools of choice. Some may require federal action, e.g., present federal regulations require independent

school lotteries for over-subscribed charter schools. We intend for the ECCI to spur action at all these levels.

A fundamental rationale for school choice is its effect of creating a vibrant marketplace for better schools. There is evidence that it presently does so, but its effects are muted by administrative and legislative requirements that reduce choice and buffer schools from the effects of competition. With a quarter of America's youth not graduating with a regular high school degree, with those students who remain in school performing at mediocre academic levels compared with students in many of the nations with which we compete, and with the costs of our public education system among the highest in the world, we believe that reform requires something other than more of the same. The wide availability of school choice based on valid information on school performance and with consequences for schools based on their popularity is, we believe, a foundation for progress. The intent of the ECCI is to create public awareness of the differences among districts in their support of school choice, provide a framework for efforts to improve choice and competition, and recognize leaders among school districts in the design and implementation of choice and competition systems.

Table 1: District Scores and Rankings, 2012

| Rank | District Name | Grade | Numeric Score |
|-------------|----------------------|--------------|----------------------|
| 1. | Recovery District | A | 0.81 |
| 2. | New York City | B+ | 0.69 |
| 3. | Washington DC | B | 0.64 |
| 4. | Minneapolis | B | 0.60 |
| 5. | Houston | B- | 0.59 |
| 6. | Orleans Parish | B- | 0.58 |
| 7. | Milwaukee | B- | 0.56 |
| 7. | San Diego | B- | 0.56 |
| 7. | Baltimore City | B- | 0.56 |
| 10. | Dade County | B- | 0.55 |
| 11. | Chicago | C+ | 0.54 |
| 12. | Forsyth County | C+ | 0.53 |
| 12. | Denver | C+ | 0.53 |
| 12. | Tucson | C+ | 0.53 |
| 15. | Gwinnett County | C+ | 0.52 |
| 16. | Wake County | C+ | 0.51 |
| 16. | Newark | C+ | 0.51 |
| 16. | DeKalb County | C+ | 0.51 |
| 19. | Pinellas County | C+ | 0.50 |
| 19. | Hillsborough | C+ | 0.50 |
| 19. | Douglas County | C+ | 0.50 |
| 22. | Duval | C | 0.49 |
| 22. | Broward | C | 0.49 |
| 22. | Greenville | C | 0.49 |
| 22. | Cherry Creek | C | 0.49 |
| 22. | Baltimore County | C | 0.49 |
| 27. | Seminole | C | 0.48 |
| 27. | Los Angeles | C | 0.48 |
| 27. | San Francisco | C | 0.48 |
| 30. | Lee | C | 0.47 |
| 30. | Anchorage | C | 0.47 |
| 30. | Sacramento City | C | 0.47 |
| 30. | Fairfax County | C | 0.47 |
| 34. | Pasco | C | 0.46 |
| 34. | Volusia | C | 0.46 |

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|-----|------------------------|----|------|
| 34. | Washoe County | C | 0.46 |
| 34. | Omaha | C | 0.46 |
| 34. | North East ISD | C | 0.46 |
| 34. | Fresno Unified | C | 0.46 |
| 40. | Cobb County | C | 0.45 |
| 41. | Seattle | C- | 0.44 |
| 41. | Prince George's County | C- | 0.44 |
| 41. | Jefferson County (CO) | C- | 0.44 |
| 41. | Boston | C- | 0.44 |
| 41. | Albany | C- | 0.44 |
| 46. | Jefferson County (KY) | C- | 0.43 |
| 47. | San Juan | C- | 0.42 |
| 47. | Montgomery County | C- | 0.42 |
| 47. | Garland ISD | C- | 0.42 |
| 47. | Charlotte-Mecklenburg | C- | 0.42 |
| 47. | Orange | C- | 0.42 |
| 52. | Granite District | C- | 0.41 |
| 52. | Philadelphia | C- | 0.41 |
| 52. | Indianapolis | C- | 0.41 |
| 55. | Henrico County | C- | 0.40 |
| 55. | Dallas | C- | 0.40 |
| 55. | Albuquerque | C- | 0.40 |
| 55. | Palm Beach | C- | 0.40 |
| 55. | Clark County | C- | 0.40 |
| 55. | Brevard | C- | 0.40 |
| 61. | Memphis | D | 0.39 |
| 61. | Polk | D | 0.39 |
| 63. | Prince William County | D | 0.38 |
| 63. | Lewisville ISD | D | 0.38 |
| 65. | Detroit City | D | 0.37 |
| 66. | Wichita | D | 0.36 |
| 66. | San Bernardino City | D | 0.36 |
| 66. | Corona-Norco Unified | D | 0.36 |
| 66. | Capistrano Unified | D | 0.36 |
| 66. | Aldine ISD | D | 0.36 |
| 71. | Osceola | D | 0.35 |
| 72. | Jordan | F | 0.34 |
| 72. | Elk Grove Unified | F | 0.34 |

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|------|----------------------|---|------|
| 72. | Davidson County | F | 0.34 |
| 75. | VA Beach City | F | 0.33 |
| 75. | Fulton County | F | 0.33 |
| 75. | Cypress-Fairbanks | F | 0.33 |
| 75. | Arlington ISD | F | 0.33 |
| 79. | Plano ISD | F | 0.31 |
| 79. | Conroe ISD | F | 0.31 |
| 79. | Chesterfield County | F | 0.31 |
| 82. | Santa Ana | F | 0.30 |
| 82. | Fort Worth ISD | F | 0.30 |
| 82. | Davis | F | 0.30 |
| 85. | Shelby County | F | 0.29 |
| 85. | Long Beach | F | 0.29 |
| 85. | Fort Bend | F | 0.29 |
| 88. | Mesa Unified | F | 0.28 |
| 89. | Columbus City | F | 0.27 |
| 89. | Austin ISD | F | 0.27 |
| 89. | Katy ISD | F | 0.27 |
| 89. | Anne Arundel County | F | 0.27 |
| 93. | Cumberland County | F | 0.26 |
| 94. | Atlanta | F | 0.25 |
| 95. | Pasadena ISD | F | 0.24 |
| 95. | Howard County | F | 0.24 |
| 97. | Clayton County | F | 0.23 |
| 98. | El Paso ISD | F | 0.22 |
| 98. | Alpine | F | 0.22 |
| 100. | Mobile County | F | 0.21 |
| 100. | Knox County | F | 0.21 |
| 102. | Guilford County | F | 0.20 |
| 102. | Garden Grove Unified | F | 0.20 |
| 104. | Northside ISD | F | 0.19 |
| 105. | San Antonio ISD | F | 0.13 |
| 105. | Loudoun County | F | 0.13 |
| 107. | Brownsville ISD | F | 0.11 |

Source: <http://brookings.edu/ECCI>

About the Brown Center on Education Policy

Established in 1992, the Brown Center on Education Policy conducts research and provides policy recommendations on topics in American education. The Brown Center is part of The Brookings Institution, a private nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and innovative policy solutions. For more than 90 years, Brookings has analyzed current and emerging issues and produced new ideas that matter - for the nation and the world.

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