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NEW RESEARCH ON CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT: SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO?

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FERRIS: Okay, good morning everyone. Welcome to Brookings. My name is Beth Ferris. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings-LSE project on internal displacement. We welcome you to this event focusing on climate change, migration and displacement which is part of a series we've been doing for about a year and a half now. Trying to look at some of the particular complexities around movement that might be affected by the consequences of climate change.

This event we're hosting in conjunction with Georgetown University's Institute for the International Study of Migration with whom we work very closely. And I'm delighted to bring with you three really outstanding researchers from, all three of them from Europe. I see somebody motioning.

Can you hear me okay? No, perhaps you could turn up the volume or I move the microphone? Or I simply speak a little louder? Okay.

You know, in looking at the relationship between the effects of climate change and human mobility, there are widely different opinions as to how many people will be affected. Where and when and under what conditions people will be forced to move, or will they move voluntarily in anticipation of some of the negative consequences of climate change? And some have divided the group of people looking at these issues into the alarmists who are projecting movements of up to a billion people in the course of the next few decades and those who are more skeptical. Many from the migration community who argue that the reasons and the motivations for people moving are actually more complex than come out in some of the computer models that if the sea levels rise by X number of centimeters, so many people will be affected and be forced to move.

In this context the role of research is really important to look at the ways in which climate change may lead to different kinds of human mobility. So, we have three speakers today. We'll begin with Dr. Koko Warner, who's the head of Environmental Migration, Social Vulnerability and Adaptation at the UN University in Bonn. She's done a tremendous amount of work on climate change working very closely with the intergovernmental panel for climate change and the UN framework convention on climate change. She's been involved in a lot of the climate change negotiations. Been on the management board of EACH-FOR which was one of the European Union's major research projects looking at the impact of environmentally induced migration in 23 countries.

Be followed by Roger Zetter who is a former director of the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford University, now an emeritus professor with more time to think and write and cogitate on all these important issues. He's written lots of books and articles, particularly on forced migration and refugee issues. And then we'll turn to Walter Kälin, who's a non-resident senior fellow here at Brookings but probably better known as the former representative of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, a position he held from 2004 - 2010. He's also a professor of Constitutional and International Law at the Law Faculty of University of Bern and was actually co-director of the project on internal displacement with me for six years. So, it's wonderful to have you back Walter and wonderful to have all three of you.

So, we've asked each of the speakers to talk for about 15 minutes and then we'll have time for questions and reactions from each of you. Koko?

MS. WARNER: Thank you very much, Beth. It's a privilege to be here with all of you and Roger and Walter, hello. And hello to all of you. My name is Koko Warner. I am a researcher at the UN University located in Bonn, Germany. Some of you

are colleagues and friends from many different international activities. And it's, again, really nice to be with you today.

I lead a research group looking at human mobility or migration. Sometimes, we use these terms a little bit interchangeably. In the meantime, we're starting to say human mobility because there is a spectrum of movements and different characteristics. But I lead a research group looking at human mobility in the context of global environmental change. And that's where I'll start my comments today.

So, I'd like to give you a little bit of context and tell you about a new research initiative that we've had the chance to be part of funded by MacArthur Foundation and the AXA Group. Then I'd like to tell you about some of our findings from eight case study countries. These are new findings. We're really excited about them and they'll be publicly available in December of this year. Actually, last week of November but we'll be launching those at the so-called UN COPP Discussions, that's UN Framework Climate Convention or something like that, UNFCCC.

So, the data and all of that will be available. You'll have it soon and then I'd like to end my remarks with some reflections for policy makers at different levels. And I'd be really interested also to hear what you have to say about that Walter and many of you in the room as well as you, Roger.

In terms of the context, human mobility and environmental stressors is an interesting field. Many of you might be already engaged in this field and there are two very kind of broad groupings of perspectives. One comes out of migration scholarship and they look at migration, push-pull factors, areas of origin, areas of destination, and tend to see environmental factors particularly the negative stressors as one of a variety of reasons that influence household decision-making about mobility.

In a very different space, almost like on a planet, not this planet or

certainly not in Washington, DC, there's another view of environmental stressors. And that comes out of the earth observations community particularly the climate change community. This community tends to think very much about climate change as a major almost truly independent variable. Something so big and so system changing can really have profound impacts on where people live, how they live and longer term population distribution issues.

So, that perspective looks at the Earth and almost like a satellite bird's eye perspective. And they look at the Nile Delta and they say, "Well, if you've got one meter of sea level rise, there are currently, you know, 16 million people living in the Nile Delta in those areas that will then be inundated by salt water. And it's hard for people to live in salinified areas, et cetera." And then the quick jump of logic is, "Well, they're going to have to go."

And so you see these two perspectives and the role that research is playing is trying to get a little bit more resolution on the big debates. On one hand, skeptics who say we know environment plays a role but it's not the big thing and then another group of experts and decision-makers who say climate change is the big thing. It's going to be the major determinant of where people live in coming decades.

And so, what we've had the opportunity to do at UN University and again with so many of you in the audience and our colleagues here on the panel, is to engage in research that tries to get a little bit more definition on that question, what role do environmental factors play? Particularly climatic ones. So, when we're talking about our independent variables, we're really interested in things are related to the weather and longer term climate patterns.

And then the research that I'll tell you about, we've been interested in rainfall patterns. And I'll get to that in just a bit. So, there are these large debates and

they matter a lot. If environmental factors are one of a variety of factors, then you might say well actually it's not environmentally induced migration, it's labor migration.

If the discussion goes more towards that other body of work that says climate change is going to, it is a factor. It has the potential to become a much more important factor in mobility decisions. What if people are forced to move? Or what if the habitability of their areas of origin are threatened? Then it becomes maybe a different issue. Is it voluntary? Is it forced? Do people need protection of some kinds? Are there gaps that aren't addressed today?

So, there are all of these kinds of questions and they're informed by this broader discussion of what role do environmental factors play in mobility? So, against this background in the 2000s an emerging body of work has emerged asking those questions. So, what about environmental factors? How do they affect human mobility?

One of the projects that Beth mentioned that we were a part of at UN University was the environmental change and forced migration scenarios project. That was funded by the European Commission and it was -- did really crazy. 24 months, 26 case studies, eight partners, it was very ambitious and the results came out in 2008. And some of you may have a little kind of pamphlet called "In Search of Shelter." Some of the results of the EACH-FOR case study are highlighted there.

It was a first attempt to get a global overview of some of the patterns that we're starting to see emerge around environmental change of a variety of kinds. One of the case studies looked at pollution. A whole bunch of the other case studies looked at droughts. Some looked at extreme events. Some looked at desertification and on and on.

The next generation of research is something that we're a part of and Roger may also allude to a project the he has also funded by MacArthur Foundation

trying to get a more nuanced feel. One of the challenges in research that we faced with EACH-FOR was our variable environmental change was so huge that it was really hard, we were comparing apples and oranges. Comparing human mobility from flooding or related to flooding with that related to desertification or drought. They're really different patterns.

And so, what we've tried to do with the rainfalls project, which now I'm telling you about, was to look at changing rainfall patterns. And so this project is called, "Where the Rain Falls." Exploring the interrelations of changing rainfall patterns, food security, as well as livelihood security, and human mobility. I already told you who's funding this project. It's a three year project. UN University is doing this with CARE. CARE is a major international NGO doing work all over the world primarily in development cooperation but also they have a lot of know-how in adaptation.

So, what are we doing? Well, we're taking eight case studies, eight districts. So, when you finally get our research results in December our research doesn't necessarily represent the entire country. It represents statistically significant findings in eight districts in eight countries. And that's one of the challenges of work of this kind. There's not very much data on stressors as well as mobility.

And so, what one of the contributions that we're trying to make is to start filling in some of the data but we're just a limited group and so we're doing it step by step. So, when you get our results you may keep that in mind. However, some of the patterns are quite interesting. And I'll tell you about those.

We had three objectives for this project. The first was to understand under what circumstances today do households use mobility to manage the risks of changing rainfall patterns and of food security. And so, you see our two kinds of variables are rainfall and food security. And what we're trying to understand is how does

that interact with risk management decisions that include mobility?

That was the first objective to understand that. What's going on today? The next objective is to understand using an agent based modeling approach, if decision-making structures stay about like they do today what might that look like in the future? So, we used a Monte Carlo simulation to simulate different rainfall scenarios and then tried to find out what do people do? Do they migrate more? Do they migrate less? Can you find out something about who's migrating and why? And that's in a modeling kind of approach. So, we've tried to understand what might we expect in coming decades?

And the third objective of our project was to take that knowledge or these insights and take it to practice and CARE is a really important part of that. So, all of the next year we'll be working with CARE's operational side in their programming and trying to understand how do we bring these results in a meaningful way to some of the activities that CARE is undertaking in developing countries.

So, what about the findings of this rainfalls research? As I said we had eight countries, eight case studies. Those eight countries were in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. What we wanted to do was get a sense of a variety of ecosystems, a variety of different circumstances in developing countries, as well as a variety of food security situations. So, we did work in Peru, Guatemala, Ghana, Tanzania, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Vietnam.

So, we've ranged from an intense situation in Peru where you had a really many ecosystems in a very kind of small area, very steep. Bangladesh, we were working the upper Brahmaputra in still a delta situation but that was also a different situation, Thailand, et cetera.

So, what did our research show? We found four household profiles. And each one of these, it's a spectrum, so they're not mutually exclusive. But I'll tell you

across all of our case studies, we found similar profiles in different, with different emphasis. And the profiles are basically households which use migration -- everybody, by the way, is using migration. But they use them in really different ways. And these household profiles, there's a lot more work to do so I present that to you in a humble way and I hope that you'll be able to do the next generation of research better than we're trying to do it right now.

But these profiles start addressing the question is mobility part of adaptation or is it that there's not enough adaptation so people leave because they have to survive? It's kind of a key question. Can you help people? Is there something to be done? Or is this a matter of, and the policy implications again are really important, is it part of development cooperation? Is the work part of protection and are there liability issues? So, there are a range of quite significant policy implications. So, now you want to know about the profiles.

And the profiles look like this. Some of the households that we surveyed--excuse me I went too fast. Let me tell you quickly about our methods. Sorry about that.

We used a mixed methods approach. For objective one which is to understand what are the current relationships? So, we did participatory research. We had a number of focus group discussions doing all sorts of things like risk ranking. We did walks around the villages and asking people to map what resources are important to them, et cetera. I have the document, if any of you are interested in our methods; I brought maybe a small handful of our research protocol if you're interested as well as our survey instrument which was the other method that I wanted to tell you about.

We had a survey which was the same across all of the countries and there are pros and cons to that. All of the information that we have is comparable to a

large degree. But of course, capturing the nuances when you have a survey instrument is a little bit static. So, we had to juggle some of those tradeoffs.

Back to the profiles. So, I'll tell you about four of the profiles. These are the ones that we found not mutually exclusive, a lot more work needs to be done but we found these in all of our case studies. And we think that it might be useful to continue exploring these profiles. So, the first profile were households which use migration as a form of building resilience. These households, I'll give you a couple of examples. Across all of our case studies migrants from these households tend to be in their early 20s. They tend to have three to five years more education than their parents. Their patterns of migration are temporary. Often for education purposes and the nature of their migration is such that they're building skills.

They usually send remittances back home. Their remittances are used for investments and education and health, livelihood diversification. These households tend to have access to a number of social and other institutional ways, like they link into social networks. They link into social safety net programs, et cetera. So, for these households, migration is one of a broader set of tools that they have to build their resilience and to avoid food insecurity.

The next profile of people, and again, this is a spectrum. The next profile of households used migration to survive but they're not getting ahead. And the next two profiles that I present have a lot in common. That's why I said they're not mutually exclusive. We need to find out more about what's going on here.

But these households used migration to survive. Their migrants are older. They tend to be heads of households. In fact, from now on out the migrant switch from being young, mostly single, not always men or woman, although in the places that we surveyed there was a higher proportion of male migrants. Now as you move down

this spectrum from resilience to urgent need and not resilience you start seeing the migrants are heads of households. They're male. They leave or they migrate. They move during the hunger season to obtain food or to obtain resources to get food.

And that was very distinct. The other migrants go for education, to earn money, et cetera, et cetera. These households specifically use migration during the hunger season to get food, to get money to buy food. Some of them are successful and these are the households that survive. The head of household is somehow able to obtain resources or food. Sends that back home and they survive but they don't thrive.

Now, I'm moving to the third profile set. And this is households which use mobility as a measure of last resort. Migration for them is an erosive strategy. They survive another day but over the years their asset base deteriorates. And migration is, in some ways, a last ditch effort to avoid food insecurity and losing their jobs. So, there is some similarity in these two profiles but the difference is those who are successful survive, and those who are not enter into a kind of erosynth coping strategy.

The weather, by the way, plays the driving role in the migration decisions of these people. And that's not surprising. The areas that we surveyed were all rural and overwhelmingly livelihoods were related to agricultural fisheries, livelihoods directly dependent on weather. So, that variability in rainfall plays a really important role.

By the way, I'll get to the fourth profile in just a minute but just an aside. Many of the people we surveyed told us that they perceive changes in weather patterns. They perceive that rain is coming too early or too late. That's really, that was a marked pattern that we saw in Asia where the monsoon pattern is so important. And so, these changes, these are perceptions but perception drives behavior.

The fourth profile was those households which the foresight reports referred to as trapped. They can't leave. These households tend to be anyway at the

social margins and they can't leave. And so, they're in a probably the most highly precarious situation of all of the households that we surveyed.

So, what about reflections? What does this mean for policy? Well, as we start getting more of a understanding, more of a nuanced understanding of under what circumstances do households use mobility to manage changes in weather or other kinds of climatic stressors, the more we understand that the more we can design policies that really appropriately target those kinds of people. One of our lessons learned was that adaptation efforts or those efforts which are intended to build the resilience of people really need good targeting mechanisms. Adaptation and resilience building happen across levels of society. And it's very important to understand the needs of the people who are affected, these kinds of people. So, there's a great need for targeting and more nuanced policy.

There's a lot more to say but I think that Roger and Walter, you'll expand with all of your knowledge. So, I'll end there. As I said, our findings will be available in about six weeks. They're embargoed right now. All of our communications people are saying "Don't say that, don't say that." So, we just have to wait just a little bit but we'd be very happy to engage in further conversation. We have a lot to learn and we may be able to learn from you. So, thanks very much Beth.

MS. FERRIS: Well, thank you very much Koko. And for setting the stage by looking at the household level I think is important. We turn now to Roger.

MR. ZETTER: Thank you Beth and good morning everybody. I'm delighted to be here and also to participate with Walter. We were on a platform in Vienna last week with Jay McCanum. Rather different perspective than we're offering today but it's a delight to be with Koko. We've worked together on a number of projects advising each other's projects over the last two to three years and Koko fortunately was the

excellent examiner of one of my most successful field students. So, I can publicly thank her for that here.

My perspective is a rather more focused one. Koko's work as she was saying today very much looked at the household level in terms of the way rainfall vulnerability affects household livelihoods and particularly food security. My particular focus is looking at the question of rights and the protection of rights for displaced people. And how that mediates or doesn't the way in which households and communities respond to climate change, their susceptibility to environmental stress, and the way in which rights inform decisions about mobility, about planned resettlement from perhaps government schemes, adaptation, mitigation processes and so on.

Just very briefly, the context of this, a number of us have been working this field, I guess, for the last four or five years. Really the kind of context is the notion that people who migrate involuntarily and obviously there are big questions about how involuntary migration mobility is in the context of environmental stress. But broadly speaking an assumption that changing environment, declining environmental productivity, increasing salination, increasing drought, rising sea levels make people more susceptible to mobility and in a sense kind of force choices. It puts it, in my view, in the category of involuntary migration but obviously as Koko says set within the context of many other political, economic, and social decisions about the way people invoke mobility as a response to these stresses.

Nevertheless, if we take the context of involuntary migration in relation to environmental stress there is, of course, a huge history of rights protection for involuntary migrants, the classic refugee convention through to the 1998 guiding principles and so on. And it's really within that context that where people migrate involuntarily there should be some form of rights protection of people whose rights are made vulnerable by the

need to migrate or the decisions to migrate.

Particularly, my focus in on internal displacement, the extent to which people perhaps under environmental conditions are forced or make choices to migrate across borders is another larger problem which Walter has done a lot of work. But my focus is very much on internal displacement. Very much in the context of slow onset change, not so much the kind of disaster, extreme weather patterns which again are attributed to changing climate, although I will say a little bit about that.

I've been working on this in the context of two projects. The first project was funded by the UNHCR and the governments of Norway and Switzerland. And that was looking very much at the kind of macro national level. What are governments doing about issues of climate change, vulnerable populations, and the potential for migration? So, it's very much a kind of policy analysis of government documents, government strategies. But also the extent to which they were making links between potential migratory patterns, mobility patterns in their countries. And the issue of rights protection for people whose lives were made vulnerable by these changes.

The second project which I'm in the middle of which Koko alluded to is a project funded; it's a two year project, funded by MacArthur Foundation. And this is really the kind of looking at the bottom up perspective. What's actually happening on the ground? So, the first study was very much a kind of top down view but it obviously posed a lot of questions as to how people read the rights discourse if you like, how they engage debates on rights, how they invoke issues of rights when they're going to be resettled by government or if they are perhaps, if they can avail themselves of compensation mechanisms and so on.

So, this project is very much like Koko's. Looking at the household level but with a very, very specific lens, the issue of rights and the way in which households

and communities do or do not have access to a rights based framing, if you'd like, of part of the way, part of their decision-making about mobility, whether to move whether to stay.

It's, both projects have focused on five archetypal countries, if you'd like, of climate change, Bangladesh and Vietnam on the one hand and then Kenya, Ghana, and Ethiopia on the other hand. And to the extent that these might be kind of representative and there is an interesting overlap with a couple of countries that, or three of the countries I think that Koko's worked in.

And really, what I want to do is to give a kind of first glimpse of some of the findings that have just come from the fieldwork we've been doing on the second project. We've more or less finished the fieldwork. We're beginning to get a kind of handle, if you'd like, on some of these issues that I've been talking about at the local level, what actually happens. And really, I suppose in a nutshell there are three perhaps four conclusions already.

The first of these is that there's very little evidence at all at the local level. There is any availability or accessibility of legal and normative rights protection frameworks on the ground to populations who are vulnerable to the risk of displacement because of environmental stress. It's a really -- we talk about protection gaps and many of us have talked about the protection gaps at the national level. It's a very different kind of protection gap at the local level. This is, as I say, a vacuum one might say in terms of the availability or accessibility of rights at the local level of a rights based framework.

And secondly, and perhaps consequentially and not surprisingly, that any consideration of that there might be some kind of rights based context within decisions, within which might inform, if you like, or mediate household's decisions whether to adapt, whether to migrate, how they might move, where they might move to in the context of the environmental stress this does not appear to be relevant at all. Rather it's many of other

factors that Koko alluded to, security, loss of customary rights, gender consideration, social networks both in the villages where they come from and the urban areas to which they largely migrate, issues of livelihood and adaptation. In a sense there's not surprising that those are important and significant contextual factors but I think what I found surprising that in fact the issue of rights based concerns doesn't appear to mediate these decisions at all.

Thirdly, at the local level the lack of evidence on formal legal normative rights frameworks contrast with something which, I think, is emerging from our work. The importance which is attached to customary rights, now, and cultural norms that mediate responses to environmental stress including migration. Now, this is a very rich field for anthropologists and over many, many years the relationship between cultural and local customary rights, adaptation, mobility in the context of environmental stress, this has been a very rich seam particularly for anthropological research.

What is perhaps surprising is that given the much more formal discussion and invocation of rights and guiding principles and legal normative frameworks at the national level, what appears to be significant finding from our research is that there is still a very great weight attached to customary rights and cultural norms that mediate or constrain people's decisions to migrate. So, you've got a kind of twin track if you'd like. And I'll say a little bit more about this in a minute in the context of one of the countries. But you've got a kind of twin track almost sometimes in sort of antithesis to each other. A formal framework at a national level which hardly operates at all at the local level and then the more enduring, if you like, more sustainable customary and cultural norms which seem to mediate a lot of the decisions. And obviously the big question there is just how sustainable those customary and cultural norms are given the projected intensity of climate change and the environmental stress.

What I want to do in the time available is really just to look at two of the five countries just to really give a couple of vignettes, if you like, of to substantiate the points that I've just made. I want to look at Vietnam and then I want to look at Bangladesh.

As I say my concern is not so much with the rapid onset disasters, although a country like Vietnam has a very, very well-established disaster response capacity. And basically people move in the very short term response to disasters essentially flooded out through cyclones and then they are reinserted back in their communities. And in a sense, although Vietnam doesn't invoke the kind of international humanitarian disaster response machinery, to all intents and purposes within the country itself its response I think very much mirrors that.

What happens in the longer term though in terms of a kind of rights based discourse I think is rather interesting because again you've got a kind of double track strategy. On the one hand, within Vietnam very much embedded in the strategic planning of the country is the concept of living with floods. So, in other words, the response of Vietnam is to see the challenge of slow onset climate change, rising sea levels, increasing frequency of cyclones in the Mekong Delta and so on. To see it as a developmental challenge, not a humanitarian challenge which is what the other four countries largely frame the discourse in.

But nonetheless, the key point I think here is that in terms of living with floods part of the national development strategy is to relocate, the word resettlement doesn't appear in the vocabulary, relocation is the term that is used by the government. To relocate very large numbers of households from the most flood prone areas of the country. Depending on which document you read it could be between 135,000 and 300,000 households by 2015 will be relocated. So, we're dealing with significant

numbers.

The key point of course is what rights the people have in terms of these kind of forced or, if you like, planned relocation decisions. And what one finds there is local community involvement in decision-making priorities in terms of relocation is very heavily circumscribed. Local leadership plays a dominant role in decisions. The collective decision-making is really most about the kind of logistics of relocation rather than the strategy, if you like, of that relocation process. And that there might be rights based claims or opportunities arising from these relocation strategies, for example full participation of local communities in developing and managing the relocation strategies, this is very, very limited. It's a non-existent concept, if you like, in current policy agendas.

Paradoxically, that said compared with the other countries one component of rights based protection for households in Vietnam I think is quite significant. And that is that there is a very well established process, in theory but not in practice, of compensation mechanisms and interest free loans for populations, targeted populations who are relocated for house construction, compensation interest free loans. Inevitably, the practice falls far short of the theory. The implementation is very complex, access to the loans and the grants and so on is very complicated and perhaps not surprisingly in this country and the same in Bangladesh as well, it's probably very substantially open to corruption and displacement.

Now I said there were two tracks of response in Vietnam. One track is this relocation strategy with a very limited rights based acknowledgement, if you like, that rights form any part of the decision-making process. The other response is what one might call spontaneous or voluntary migration. Now here one finds in stark sort of contrast to the kind of state driven planned relocation model I've just described is that spontaneous and voluntary migration is substantially larger than planned relocation. And

it has been for the last 15-20 years in Vietnam. In fact, part of the kind of the economic dynamic of Vietnam has only taken place because there has been enormous spontaneous relocation by populations from the countryside to the cities.

But what is particularly significant, I think from my perspective here, if one looks at this from the lens of rights and protecting rights of people who move, what is happening in the case of spontaneous migration both in response to environmental stress but broader sort of economic drivers, if you like, is that people are trading off a loss of very substantial rights that they have in the countryside or in their communities which come from the household registration system. They're trading off the loss of those against the economic benefits or the economic potential that comes from migration to the cities.

So, on the one hand through the formal process there is little acknowledgement if you like or little invocation of rights in the planned strategy. And then conversely in the context of the much larger process of spontaneous mobility, spontaneous movement largely from the countryside to the cities, people are actually taking the risk, if you like, of trading off rights. Of losing rights that come from household registration which gives them access to food health, care benefits, et cetera, et cetera, access to education. They're trading off those rights by living an undocumented existence, if you like, in the cities.

Shifting now to Bangladesh, obviously a very, very different political and very different economic context where public discourse on the threats, if you like, posed by climate change is intense at the government level and especially through civil society, NGOs and so on. But there are a number of quite interesting perceptions there again if one uses the lens of the rights based discourse.

First of all, although government policies recognize that there will be

substantial population displacement the IPCC reckons that there will be about 20 million people displaced by climate change when one takes the figure as Koko says with a lot of caveats because all these projections I think are largely sort of simplistic in the kind of assumptions they're based on. But even if it's half accurate it's a significant figure.

So, there they acknowledge the displacement is a potential consequence of climate change. If one looks at the strategies of Bangladesh, particularly its adaptation plans, its climate change strategies, there is very, very little recognition of how the strategy will deal with that level of displacement, whatever level of displacement is going to take place. And very much of the response is about disaster mitigation, adaptive measures at the local level, developing flood resistant crops, cyclone shelters, et cetera, et cetera.

But I think there are two interesting conclusions. There's, first of all, there's no provisions made for any planned resettlement as we've seen is the case in Vietnam. In other words, there's really no limited there is no official recognition of the concept of internal displacement and how strategies might respond to that in effective way. And secondly is a corollary that perhaps not surprisingly to the extent the displacement is going to take place, as I've said, they're framed very much in the context of emergency relief programs, this classic sort of central stage, if you like, of the guiding principles of protecting rights at the point of displacement in the disaster scenario. Not in terms of before displacement takes place and after displacement and resettlement. These three pillars, if you like, of the guiding principles.

It's very much in the mentality of a kind of disaster response strategy and policy discourse, the focus is there. And in a sense although there is some provision of sort of compensation for people, relief programs, et cetera, terminate very rapidly after the immediate impact of disasters has taken place. And the way and the extent to which

rights mediate these responses is very, very limited indeed. Again there are provisions for compensation and provisions for reconstruction of houses destroyed by cyclones. But again, very much in order to encourage people to return to rural areas and rural settlements, again I haven't got time to go into this but underpinning government development strategies is a very anti-urban discourse. It's very much focused on rural development and rural strategies. And that again, one can see the way that is built into the disaster and also the slow onset response.

I think what is surprising in a country like Bangladesh is because there are well developed constitutional provisions to protect civil and political rights and it has a very, very active civil society. And you might expect that kind of context to be the context in which rights based principles are articulated and governments are held to account, if you like. When it comes to migration, when it comes to displacement in the context of environmental stress and climate change, these kinds of responses have yet to be recognized in the legal and constitutional framework of the country.

So, despite using the, I think the not so much an objectionable phrase but certainly a kind of complete misnomer, the concept of environmental refugees, climate victims which appears in government policies and discourse, these categories of people are not formally defined. Nor is there any indication of how their rights might be identified or their rights assessed and responded to in the context of being an environmental refugee in government terminology.

And as I say in terms of the extent to which there is limited response and as it were a protection of the rights of people through factors such as compensation for damage and flooding, endemic corruption and the lack of any kind of transparency procedures and the presence of local power brokers really makes this I think a very, very limited opportunity.

I think these two vignettes provide a revealing account of the way in which rights and rights protection at the local level is neglected for people whose livelihoods are susceptible to environmental stress and where mobility or migration might be part of the response that these people might see as a way out of these pressures. It seems to me it's not just a failure to sort of respect these rights but what's remarkable is the complete absence, if you like, of any kind of discussion of the principle of rights attached to displacement let alone any formal legal or normative framework of rights yet to be presented.

Part of this, I think, is really a response to and a suspicion about government. Just quoting from a respondent in Kenya, one of the households we looked at there, talking of government policies to tackle environmental stress he said, "They do empty promises. They are only acting by mouth." So, it's a kind of suspicion I think of government on the one hand and particularly it's suspicion of government resettlement policies on the other. And I think there is a lot of quite negative experience in many of the countries we've looked at in response to this.

I've got only two or three minutes left but let me just now switch to a third country, Kenya, because I think what it emerging from our fieldwork in Kenya and I think it's going to be very much the evidence we find in the other countries as well perhaps Vietnam might be the exception. And here it's really back to my sort of third hypothesis really that ethnic allegiances, cultural norms, customary rights, community solidarity are very, very important mediating factors.

These kind of rights, if you like, what we would think of as an informal rights based framework is far more significant than the more formal legal and normative frameworks that many of us think of as the way in rights are vulnerable, households might be protected. And what one finds is that the traditional patterns of inheritance

systems, a way which land is accessed, collective farming practices, reserving land for regeneration, partial destocking of cattle before the drought comes, many of these programs supported by NGOs and humanitarians and development actors. These seem to be quite significant rights based frames, if you like, within which mobility decisions are made or the decision to stay and adapt. Because in some communities, obviously, there's very strong cultural resistance to migration and a notion that people are running away.

I think if one wants to sort of just summarize very quickly, I think, and I've really only had time to give a very brief snapshot of the kind of the view from the ground, if you like, and a very different view from a more traditional perspective on rights and cultural norms. First of all, it shouldn't be forgotten that in a country like Kenya and Bangladesh many rural households in vulnerable regions rely on substantial and sustained emergency food rations and support distributed by government. In the case of Kenya, the Kenyan Red Cross and so on and other NGOs and this may act as a very significant kind of safety valve in migration decisions.

So, although at one level one might say it's looking at traditional customary rights which provide a kind of frame of protection and a network of support, on the other hand one has to recognize that is quite a fragile supporting system. And as stress increases, and food insecurity increases, it may be that food aid distributed by governments in a sense will not be able to continue to provide a larger safety valve.

But I think the second response is that many of these communities, as I've said, are very suspicious of government policies on land issues with respect to land and planned resettlement projects and the practices of forced evictions which take place in many of these countries.

If I've got just one minute to wind up, and a bit like Koko was suggesting,

what should be done? What I've suggested in the short paper that I've written, really I think there are sort of four or five key challenges. The first, obviously, is that there needs to be a paradigm shift at the national level concerning internal displacement mobility. Recognizing the potential scale of this and I think this would be a first step towards defining policies that would take into account rights and needs of migrants.

In none of these countries does one find a coherent response to internal displacement and migration. It's a highly politically sensitive subject in a county like Kenya, in a country like Bangladesh, obviously in Vietnam where spontaneous migration in theory doesn't exist, also in Ethiopia. So, looking at migration and responding to internal displacement I think a paradigm shift is needed in thinking there. And similarly secondly I think a paradigm shift with in terms of and respect and protection of migrant rights, particularly those susceptible to displacement.

Thirdly at the international level we know that UNHCR, IOM have been taken the lead in developing policy and operational responses. But we know that this has been extremely problematic in terms of sort of mandates, turf wars, and so on and so forth. And in fact, quite a resistance I think by member states particularly UNHCR taking on a larger role here. And this is, I think, where the Nansen Initiate I think comes in and Walter will speak on that.

Fourth humanitarian development actors is I think you've got to adapt to a much higher profile and provide a much more concerted encouragement or advocacy to national governments and mainstreaming protection policies and norms as part of governments' adaptation mitigation and development programs. They should support civil society, actors in rights based advocacy, community empowerment, et cetera, et cetera.

Finally, I think all these stakeholders have a duty to ensure that the rich

countries fulfill their commitment to finance measures to address climate change induced displacement, migration, planned relocation. And particularly, the sort of break-through paragraph 14F which Koko was very instrumental in advocating for at the Cancun framework, was it last year or two years ago? Rather is two years.

So, four, five, I think, sort of key strategies there.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much Roger. And we turn now to the Nansen Initiative with Walter Kälin.

MR. KÄLIN: Thank you very much, Beth. First it's really a pleasure being back here. Many fond memories come back of our time together as Co-Directors of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement.

I will not say that much about internal displacement now but rather cross border displacement. Some of it is based on a study I did together with Nina Schrepfer which has been published by UNHCR earlier this year. And some of it is about this Nansen Initiative which right now seems to be kind of rumor but which will materialize next Tuesday when it will be officially launched.

So, what are we talking about? We are talking about after we've been talking about households at the country level, and the gaps in the protection at the country level. Now we're talking about gaps in protection frameworks at the international level.

What do we have in international law very short as regards internal displacement? We do have the guiding principles on internal displacement. They are authoritative but non-binding. So it's very important that they are in fact translated into national laws and policies. And some countries are moving ahead.

In Kenya, for instance, there is a draft bill pending in Parliament, also a draft strategy on internal displacement and both not only address displacement caused

by armed conflict and violence but also by natural disasters including those triggered by climate change. We do have the Kampala Convention which could enter any day now into force, just one ratification left which explicitly and in a binding way talks about internal displacement. Also (inaudible) caused by natural disasters specifically makes a reference to climate change.

We do have again in Africa the Great Lakes Pact on internal displacement that is very general but obliges states to incorporate into their domestic law the guiding principles which are wide enough to cover also the kind of forced displacement we are talking about here. The big challenge as Roger Zetter set out is to make that operational at all levels at the country level.

Where we do have to pick up at the international level is cross border displacement and I'm leaving aside now migration in the sense of voluntary migration. I'm talking about those cases where people are forced or predominantly forced to leave. These people are not refugees. Any kind of definition we have on refugees is based on the assumption that someone is turning against the people who have to flee. The state or non-state actors, it's about persecution in a narrow or a broader sense. Something we don't have in the context of disaster slow onset and sudden onset. Usually their governments are to some extent willing to help people. Maybe they are indifferent. Very often they are not able to really assist and protect people but it's still very different. So, it doesn't fit.

So, there is this big gap. No normative framework regarding the protection of people displaced across borders, international orders. There are, of course, human rights. Fine. But it's no human right for instance to be admitted if I have to leave my country in the context of a climate change. There is no clear cut human rights protection against being sent back to a country where a disaster occurred. There are

some elements of that but it's certainly not sufficient as Faris Tomoro in another setting will present a paper where she mentions, for instance, the case of those citizens from Haiti who fled into the Dominican Republic after the earthquake and then one day were all sent back. And it was not the way it should be done.

So, there is this gap. What to do about that gap? The Earth Science people for a long time are talking about climate refugees but they never made the link between the notion of refugee and the need for international protection which for lawyers is kind of the approach to the refugee problem. And for a long, long time the topic was really very much neglected.

And it was really only as little back as 2009 that the whole issue was put formally on the agenda when the heads of the Humanitarian Agencies of the UN and the big NGOs will come together in the interagency standing committee of the UN sent a letter to the Secretariat of the UN framework convention on climate change. Really pushing the idea that the climate negotiations should also look at the issue of protection and assistance for those that are displaced in the context of climate change.

The outcome was that already in Copenhagen, which was not very successful overall, but on that part it was quite good that states agreed yes we need to say something about population movement in the context of climate change. And the outcome was this famous Article 14 paragraph F of the Cancun outcome on adaptation measures. It's a very general article. It only says we the states, we are ready to look at displacement, migration and relocation both internally and cross border as an adaptation challenge. It means it should be part of the adaptation plans. It means that also for this topic there should be access to Green Climate Fund, other funding mechanisms which is very important. We're talking here about huge challenges in terms of humanitarian aid but in also rebuilding, prevention, adaptation, not only general but also in the context of

population mobility.

The big achievement was it's put on the agenda. But then the question was what next? How can we translate this very, very general kind of promise we're going to deal with it? How can we translate it into actions? The climate negations are not really the best place for that. Because who is going to these conferences of state parties? It's mainly representatives from Ministries of Environment, Finance, Foreign Ministries and these are not the kind of people who at the level of governments are really dealing with humanitarian issues, with issues of protection, with issues of displacement or migration or relocation.

So, UNHCR felt we have to take it out of that framework and we have to build on that paragraph but we have to look at it within another framework. And as it happened last year we celebrated not only my 60th birthday but also the 60th birthday of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, and some of the younger namely the 50th anniversary of the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons. And UNHCR said this anniversary is a good framework. Let's do something about it.

First step, UNHCR organized an expert meeting in Bellagio early 2011. People came together and basically the experts agreed yes there is a gap the way I just presented it. Yes, we have to address it. Yes, it's a complex issue because for instance, it's very difficult if not impossible to establish causalities between climate change and a specific individual or family or community moving. So, maybe climate induced or climate change induced migration and displacement is the wrong approach. But still it's a phenomenon. Still it's a reality that in the context of environmental changes people are moving.

Anyway, the next step then was the Nansen Conference in Oslo in June of last year sponsored by the Norwegian government, co-organized Norway, UNHCR

others . Many of us were there. A rather large group of people, academics, people from governments even though it was not formal governmental representation, NGOs and so on and so on were there. The Conference as an outcome did not adopt but did welcome an attempt by the Chairmanship to formulate ten principles, the Nansen principles that again are very general.

On the one hand they are talking about responsibilities. They say the primary responsibility for protecting people displaced in the context of climate change and other types of natural disasters are the national governments. The issue Roger just addressed. They talk about the important role of local authorities; of communities really here we cannot just wait for the governments to act. What is already now happening most often is that the initiative first comes from the front line responders and very often there are also the affected, namely the local authorities, the local communities.

Nansen principles talk about the important role of the international community and then they go on to talk about the normative framework. They come to the conclusion we should work harder on making the guiding principles and operational framework for people displaced within their own countries, and we need to address that gap.

Okay, this was a good platform and it was a kind of a consensus we can build on that. And the next step then was to bring that to the ministerial meeting in December of last year where the ministers mainly from countries that have ratified one or both of these conventions came together to celebrate these anniversaries. And the idea was that there would be in the ministerial declaration or communique one paragraph. We are going to engage together with the support from UNHCR on not only putting the issue of protection of those displaced across borders on the agenda but really to start a dialogue.

Well there was very little appetite for that. Some states said no we are not ready to do that because we don't want UNHCR to do it. Others said we don't want to address it because we are talking about domestic matters. And we don't want internationals tell us whether or not we should relocate people and whether these people have rights or not. And still others said we have other priorities. Is it really a problem? Yes there are a few people but it's not pressing enough. We can wait. We're talking about long term developments.

So, the attempt failed and this was a real setback because it was really the signal coming from the governments, don't touch it. What to do in this situation? Norway, of course, didn't give up. And the good thing was that part of the ceremonies in Geneva December last year was for State representative to make pledges. Many pledged to ratify this or that convention to look at their laws to do this or that and Norway together with Switzerland and supported by a few states, Mexico, Costa Rica, Germany also responded very positively. Norway together with Switzerland made that pledge.

If you can't have it as a kind of semi-formal UN process then we governments will start it. We are taking the initiative to start the dialogue. Not with everyone outside the UN, with those that are interested, with those that are willing. And it's from that pledge that the Nansen Initiative will come out as I said next Tuesday when it will be launched in the context of the EXCOM meeting in Geneva.

What is the Nansen Initiative about? It's about an intergovernmental consultation process. It's not about drafting a convention. It's not about drafting guiding principles. There have been many who said well let's replicate the guiding principles on internal displacement. This was very successful within limitations but still considering what we had in 1992 when the work started out we have come very far. So, let's replicate it. Many of us and I very much shared that idea, were of the opinion it would not

work because there were specific elements that were in place when Francis Deng started with the guiding principles and that can explain why they were successful.

First, there was a clear mandate coming from governments. Please develop an appropriate normative framework as the language said, then this is was the resolution of the Human Rights Commission. We don't have any kind of a mandate here, quite to the contrary. The outcome of the ministerial meeting was a clear signal. No law, there is no mandate.

Second, the guiding principles were very much about restating existing law. Taking the very general norms that are contained in the human rights conventions and thinking them through. What do these general human rights guarantees specifically mean in the context of internal displacement? So, it was very much about codifying and making more specific what already is hard law.

Here the conclusion is we don't have any hard law or not any but very little hard law. There are big gaps. So, this kind of an approach does not work. And you can't develop new international law without a mandate and a willingness from the states at an expert level. And there were some other factors. So, this is not the way to do.

So, the proponents of the Nansen Initiative said it's too early to think about the convention or guiding principles. What we really need to start from scratch with governments. To build up consensus, build up that consensus bottom up. Let's go to particular affected regions, the Horn of Africa, South Pacific, Central American, and so on and so on. Let's talk to governments. Let's see do they have a common understanding what's happening?

Do they have a common understanding on what the challenges are? And to what extent do they perceive protection issues as a challenge? Are there any good practices and there are some good practices but very isolated, haphazard,

scattered that could provide a model for other regions too. What should be done? Are there ideas about what should be done?

So, this bottom up process that very much tries to build consensus on these issues practically will start out with regional and sub-regional consultations. Consultations however that are not limited to bring politicians together and they just talking the way politicians sometimes talk. What we feel is that these discussions really have to be based on the available evidence. So, the research component, that's probably why we're talking on this podium on the research about it. The research component will be very, very important.

The work done by the people here on the podium and many others needs really to be synthesized. What do we know? Needs to be translated in a language that is accessible to decision-makers. And this will be the point of departure for that kind of discussion we want to do. So, we will confront the decision-makers with the findings and say look. This is what we think is the reality. In light of this, what do you perceive as being the challenges? What do you think would be the responses? So, the whole process will be really accompanied by a very strong research component.

We'll then bring that together at the global level for consultations. Global doesn't mean UN General Assembly. Again, the states that are willing to engage on that. And I think if the regional and sub-regional consultations are successful then more and more governments will join that process. And the whole thing should result in what we call a protection agenda. So, not a normative framework, but a document that brings out what the analysis is, what we have identified in this process as the challenges, what in this process has been identified as possible principles, approaches, ways to address these challenges.

We'll look at protection and protection principles but in a wider context

because protection norms alone, it will not work. We also have to look at the intergovernmental cooperation. That's cross border cooperation. That's the role of the donors of the international community. We'll also look at the operational response, mandates of humanitarian and development agencies, about their role et cetera and bringing these three elements together, international cooperation, standards of protection for affected people, and the operational response will make something more holistic and coherent.

The idea is that after three years and it's a three year project, with the adoption of this agenda we will have a very, very good point of departure then for the next step. Next step can mean that, for instance, some governments will say okay it's a good idea to have a temporary protection status also for people displaced by natural disasters cross border. The US has it for those who are already in country. Some others have it, maybe that's something in terms of an idea that could be picked up at national levels.

Maybe regional, sub regional organizations, the Council of Europe, the AU, the African Union, ECOWAS, et cetera will pick it up, develop soft law or hard law instruments at their level and maybe even at the UN level we can start a process. The formal migrational development, for instance, would be a good place to put it really on the agenda, something that has not been possible yet to have it there. So, that's the idea then to have a very solid basis for as a next step. Turn it into norms, into soft law or binding principles into action.

That's the idea we have. We are even not at the beginning. We will start only later this year after the launch. When I say we, what does it mean? The organizational structure is a very simple one. We have a steering committee set up by a small number of governments; six to eight half/half industrialized countries, countries

from the south. So, obviously, Norway and Switzerland will be there, Australia already has joined. Mexico, Costa Rica have joined. Some other states are still in the process at the capital level to decide but we'll have it together very, very soon, the steering committee.

There will be a consultative committee which is wide open where we have academic institutions and have two members, three members of the consultative committee here on the podium. We'll have the organizations there, not only the humanitarian but the whole range, development actors, those dealing with disaster, risk reduction, climate change, et cetera. We'll have the NGOs there.

We have a very small secretariat and we'll have an envoy, the Nansen envoy. I will be able to devote some of my time to that task trying to bring things together to push the activities so I will be in contact with many of you in that function as of first of November. And with this I would to close here.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much Walter. And thanks to all three of you for a very different complimentary presentations.

We have time now for questions. If you will raise your hand we have some microphones that will magically appear in front of you. If you could identify yourself with your name and institution and you can direct questions to any or all of the panelists. We'll do one, two, three and if it's okay we'll take several questions then before responding.

You can stand up and introduce yourself.

MS. YARR: How do you do? Thank you for this enlightening panel. My name is Linda Yarr. I'm with Partnerships for International Strategies in Asia, George Washington University. And my question is for Roger regarding the work on Vietnam in particular.

As I understood you, you mentioned that you studied households moving from rural areas to the cities and that those households are making a choice between giving up their household registration benefits for the potential gains of working in the city. But from my understanding and perhaps things have changed more recently; many households in Vietnam would have an elderly person, particularly a female grand person, grandmother remaining in the village, cultivating the land and also as a kind of safety net for the household.

So, I'm wondering how you defined the household that moved? Was it you know the nuclear family, one male or how that worked? Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Can you hear okay in the back? No. Okay. Maybe you could ask them to turn up the mic a little bit.

Next question.

MR. KOVACH: I'm Tim Kovach from American University. This question is particularly for Koko and Roger. One thought is that when people are forced to displace or are resettled by governments following disasters they can often be resettled to places where they face not only new social challenges but also new environmental challenges that differ from their origin location. Thinking particularly for Koko of the EACH-FOR case study in Mozambique or following the continual floods on the Zambezi and Limpopo Rivers. People were then moved to different areas where they then faced challenges from droughts that they did not experience in their origin communities.

So, I'm wondering if you can provide any lessons learned or particular case studies of success stories on how national level institutions or subnational institutions attempted to help mitigate those new vulnerabilities that people would face in their resettlement communities.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you and here at the front.

MR. CERNEA: Thank you. Thank you for --

MS. FERRIS: If you could identify yourself?

MR. CERNEA: Thank you very much for the presentations. All very interesting. I have two questions combined with a bit of comment. First of all, Koko Warner and to Roger, very interesting to hear the findings of research. My question is you spoke both about migration and climate change caused displacement. There is always a risk to conflate the two things. Normal regular traditional migration or rural urban migration which we know for centuries for the entire history, in particular the 20th century is quite a lot. And the relocational population their initiative now, not to the government initiative because of perceived climate change threats. First, migration is defined by economists as being caused by relative deprivation, perceptional relative deprivation and follow up or pursuit or better opportunities for the same labor amounts.

Climate change is explained as you did by the perception of threats and the risks of remaining in the place. So, my question is what is the criteria you are using in order to distinguish in your research the two types of movement? Because we can be convincing to government and trigger action only when we are able to distinguish the second from the first.

The second question I believe Roger brought us realistically, Walter not Roger. Walter brought us realistically to review of recent events and it was the realization of the reluctance of many governments to take action. And he has the real important things is how do we translate principles into action? How do we trigger that particularly in displacement caused by conflict or disaster, environmental cause is another form of macro global disasters?

So, I'd like to ask Roger, what do you think is the first, the best strategy? We have been working on arguing human rights as a platform, as an impetus but I feel, I

sense you are feeling the need for more. So, I'd like to posit the idea that there is a lot to learn from development caused displacement and the policies which were elaborated to which represent framework for actions. And in that respect I believe the group here, I didn't introduce myself. My name is Michael Cernea and I am a non-resident fellow here in the group which is led by Beth Ferris at Brookings.

This particular group under the leadership of Beth is trying now deliberately to learn from the experience of action under development caused displacement and the action frameworks which were elaborated in terms of policies, which for development agencies are the equivalent of laws. There are transgressions of course but it's still laws and where many countries translate those in laws. And now, for instance, in India there is a law in the Parliament looking that forward and they have made some progress intellectually here. My own presence in this group is because the idea came up to bring together the development expertise with the human rights expertise.

So, I'd like to invite your comment on that and what are the potentials you see for actually propelling action at the level of governments beyond principles. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Michael. Okay we've got questions on Vietnam, on how to deal with relocations to areas where there are new vulnerabilities, question about the criteria used in the research for determining, I think, motivations of migration, and how to approach governments and how to learn from development actors in their experiences with relocations.

Koko, you want to start? You can say no.

MS. WARNER: Thank you. Excellent questions. Maybe to Sunke if I understood your name correctly. Thanks, it's a question about resettlement. When we

did our EACH-FOR research indeed we picked up in Vietnam and Mozambique planned resettlement programs. And there are half a dozen to a dozen documented cases, probably more for those of you in the resettlement scholarly ward. You probably know a lot more.

I think there are some lessons. I do want just to say in the Rainfalls project that we're doing right now, we weren't looking actively at resettlement programs but rather just trying to understand under what circumstances do households use migration to manage the stresses of rainfall variability and food security. So, I'm going to draw my lessons from that. And they may be relevant for resettlement but already you've got the best thinkers in the world right here. So, maybe they can also provide more insights.

I was thinking of the design of programs, understanding the networks and that a migrant represents not just a migrant but people back at home. And that's really important to remember. Another thought is around options, adaptation options providing options for people so that mobility is one of a wider spectrum of risk management tools, or a wider way to manage these climatic stresses and not a situation of dire need.

And then a forethought is understanding the wider system. One thing that we sometimes approach mobility as is a humanitarian response. Many people are displaced due to rapid onset disaster situations like flooding, Mozambique. But we have to understand that that was one of our lessons learned from our Mozambique work is that people live in a system. They care about their livelihoods. They have to manage a variety of things and in designing appropriate policy responses, it's really important to understand livelihoods needs.

In both Bangladesh and Vietnam we visited, not as our Rainfalls work but

some other work, we visited relocation sites. In Bangladesh, for example, we went to a place where a village was being relocated. This was a development resettlement program around a big bridge that the Bank was or is, I'm not sure, working on. And there was, they had filled in some of the Delta with sand. There was a school, a kind of high rise building of apartments. There was a marketplace and they have inaugurated this new resettlement location and people came and then they went back. They didn't stay.

And that was a big dilemma. Why won't people stay in this great place? There's everything's made out of concrete and it looks more orderly than you know the way people live around the riverbanks and they're not threatened as much by flooding. And some of the lessons learned from that, which again, all of you can articulate better is that social networks matter. People rely on a horizontal organization of social interactions. You need to be close to the people that you associate with. If you're not there to fix their bike, they'll go somewhere else.

There are all sort of lessons learned, I think again, as you were pointing out Professor Cernea from development resettlement that can, that may be applicable. But a much more systematic thinking of mobility in a wider context, for me that's been one of my biggest lessons learned in our research. Thanks.

MS. FERRIS: Roger?

MR. ZETTER: Thank you. Yes, let me take the Vietnam question first. It was sort of aimed at me.

Yes, you're absolutely right. Obviously in the very short presentation I didn't have time to go into details but you are right. I didn't say much about the approach the kind of fieldwork methods but we were interviewing households in environmentally stressed areas in each of these countries. In other words, households who hadn't moved but might be thinking of mobility as an adaptation and then we were looking at relatively

close urban areas, generally where people, and again we took sample households there of where people migrated.

So, we were interviewing as many people who were not moving as well as those who had migrated into largely urban areas. But you're absolutely right. It was quite clear there is a strategy for keeping, as you say, a kind of safety net or a toehold in the rural areas to sustain the household registration. But I think what becomes clear is that that might be, I think one has to look at the mobility decisions as a process rather than a kind of step change.

And that depending on how households survived in the city, then it might just be one or two members of household not the whole nuclear family or extended family. Depending on how people integrated and settled in the city, then sort of more of the household might then move to the city whether or not there was environmental stress. So, yes you're right. I mean it's a more nuanced picture than I presented in the short paper.

The second question on the social environmental challenges to resettlement that really hasn't been part of the work that I've been doing. And I sort of hesitate to step into that field when we've got a number of resident experts here, not in the least Michael, but also Beth who's written a really innovative chapter for the World Disaster's Report of the International Federation of Red Cross, which I've edited this year which is on forced migrations coming out in a couple of weeks' time.

So, I think there's a lot of expertise here and I think Koko sort of outlined or highlighted some of the kind of key challenges really that resettlement, I think planned resettlement is very rarely successful and impoverishment is the experience of large numbers of people who are resettled. Notwithstanding the principles and the practice and the framework that Michael was largely instrumental in establishing the Bank 20

years ago at least.

Moving to your question, Michael, about the sort of conflation of climate change and environmental stress amongst this whole kind of portfolio of factors that households evaluate in the decision to move or the decision to stay, this I think it is a challenge. And I mean your question was is there a particular criterion we can distinguish?

I think as Koko said, the kind of initial thinking sort of ten years ago was that yes, let's sort of look at the dominant gene, if you like, climate change and let's sort of try and evaluate that. And it was on that basis that the sort of classic (inaudible) 200 million people are going to be displaced. I think what social scientists have done since that decade ago, I think in some sense is very embarrassing kind of reflection on issues. I think there's been a lot of backpedalling and really I think what we would argue is that only in very exceptional circumstances can you isolate the dominant gene.

And that in reality, I think what a lot of our work has done is to say well in addition to the kind of classic variables that determine migratory decisions about livelihoods strategies, social networks, political context, et cetera, et cetera, we need to bring in an environmental factor. But I think many of us would resist the temptation to say that the environmental factor is a dominant factor amongst these other variables. And I think a lot of our work has tried to provide a more nuanced understanding of how environmental factors, declining productivity of agricultural land, the declining quality of grazing land for nomadic and pastoral people and so on, how this becomes an additional variable in household strategies and livelihood assessments.

So, in a sense I'm kind of ducking your question but on the other hand I think what we need to do is to avoid the pitfall of saying there is the environmental refugee or there is the environmental migrant, expect in I think very, very exceptional

circumstances. And I think, in the longer term, although it's a classic sort of academic argument that we need more research. I think in the medium to longer term, one would have much more effective policy and strategy making and maybe be able to tackle some of the problems of the, in a sense, the negative consequence of planned resettlement if we understand the complexity and the range of variables which households invoke in the decision they make to migrate.

I don't know whether you would agree Koko but --

MS. WARNER: Only that it raised a question. We're trying to understand, like our work with these very, very early household profiles that I told you about. We're really trying to understand when is environmental change particularly important. I mentioned some agent based modeling that we've done and I'll give you some ideas of results from Tanzania that will be coming out in about six weeks.

In Tanzania we modeled households and we found broadly they're content households who feel, they feel pretty okay and those are households which tend to fit into that first profile where they use migration to build resilience vis-à-vis a variety of factors but also climatic stressors.

And then there are vulnerable households. Those households, we modeled them based on current decision-making that we saw in the field. We noticed that the content households are not particularly sensitive to changes in rainfall scenarios using these Monte Carlo simulations that I said. So, for example, we did a simulation where you have extreme drying or extreme wetting situations. And there was very marginal changes in household migration behavior in that modeled environment.

But with the vulnerable households, they were more sensitive to climatic factors and you saw much greater changes in household migration decisions. So, I think there's more that we can learn. We're maybe starting but the question that I have is why

does it matter? Operationally that was part of your question Sunke, as I was thinking about what lessons have we learned, we need to think about migration as a system. How people in areas of origin and destination relate to each other. Their scale issues, and that's operationally important but how do you deal with that in a legal sense where there are protection gaps.

And so, I'm really interested to learn what your insights because that bit of a dilemma. You want to find out which factor matters and what do you do about? And so, that's a question, Roger, that was prompted by your responses.

MS. FERRIS: But we'll give you, Walter, the last word in terms of explaining how to work with governments and incorporate development induced lessons.

MR. KÄLIN: Yes. Well, I think what you raised, Michael, in terms of bringing the development perspective to the table is extremely important. I mean in looking at the ideas, as I said we are looking at cross border movements and cross border displacement. So the internal relocations; that's not something we are dealing with at least not very prominently.

But your perspective, the development perspective is of course very important when we're talking about strengthening resilience. But more specifically it's in two contexts. First, cross border relocations. Like the Pacific Islands where there are ideas of bringing populations from some islands to other islands. Jane McAdam could tell about that a lot, that past experiences usually had been negative and she came to results that are very similar to your results. If you're not very, very careful then it will not work.

So, that's where I think we can learn a lot from your experiences and where the guidelines that have been developed relocation, resettlement, in the context of development projects can be adopted and further developed.

And second and also in the context of durable solutions and returns, for a country that has admitted people who have fled across the border, the question of course becomes when can we ask them to go back? And one criteria is what will be the condition? Do they have a chance to reintegrate and then again, we're talking very much about durable solutions that are restoring the lives of people who have been displaced.

On the panel we'll both be sitting on in an hour we'll talk about how to use your IR model that you developed for the context of relocation, resettlement and the context of development projects to, in general, finding durable solutions for internal displaced and in our case, now externally displaced persons. How to move from this process of impoverishment that comes with displacement back to a life that has all the important factors.

So, you can be confident that it's something real important we can build on.

MS. FERRIS: Well, I want to thank all three of our panelists for showing us just how messy this situation is in terms of examining the relationship and rejecting simple answers, I think, is certainly a good contribution of research. Thanks to you and thanks to all of you for coming.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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