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# POLITICAL VOICE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:

# UNEQUAL AND UNDEMOCRATIC

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. GALSTON: Okay. This is the closest we've come to starting on time I think ever. Congratulations. You've all come and you've all come promptly. It's a miracle.

Let me begin by introducing myself and setting the scene just a little bit. I'm Bill Galston, senior fellow in Governance Studies here at Brookings. And I'd like to welcome you all to the latest in our long running series "Governing Ideas." The idea of this series is to try to fill a hole in a lot of the discussion that goes on in your nation's capital. We spend a lot of time talking about politics, and occasionally we descend to policy. We much too rarely back up from the daily flow and the monthly combat to try to understand some of the broader trends that are affecting our country and creating the context within which our politics is conducted. And the topic before us today is a perfect example of that kind of question. And I think this session will illustrate the kind of gain in understanding, insight, depth, and historical perspective that you can get by backing the camera up and taking a wider angle view.

The issue before us today is nothing more, nothing less than the health of our democracy. The health of our democracy is very much shaped and defined by the promise of civic equality. And so one important question is: how is that promise affected by the social, economic, educational, and even familial inequalities with which we are all too familiar. And secondly, if formally equal citizens do not have an equal voice or anything like it in shaping our public life, what difference does that make? And how much of that difference is reflected in

the kinds of political phenomena that we see playing out on a daily basis?

I can't think of three individuals who are better suited to clarify these questions. You have their detailed biographies in your packet and I'm not going to waste time by reciting them or even summarizing them. Suffice it to say that all three of today's authors hold chairs at distinguished academic institutions. All three are members of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. All three have done path-breaking work on the study of American politics. They collaborated, gosh, nearly 20 years ago and acclaimed an award-winning book Voice Inequality: Civic Volunteerism in American Politics. And their new book that we are gathered to discuss today, *The Unevenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy* updates, deepens, and I would say in some ways darkens the picture of our civic life that they painted nearly two decades ago.

The agenda is simple. The three authors, Sidney Verba, Henry Brady, and Kay Lehman Schlozman will each speak in that order for about 10 minutes each. Then I'll moderate a panel discussion for 10 or 15 minutes as time periods. And most of the last half hour will be your turf. You'll be given over to questions and comments from the floor and I'll spend a minute or so laying out some guidelines for that period of the agenda when the time comes. And without further adieu, Sid Verba.

MR. VERBA: Thank you very much. I'm here to introduce the book to find the proper button to press. Yeah, that's the proper button. I've done it. That's the cover of the book. The book is a heavyweight book certainly in

terms of pounds. It's 700 pages. We hope in terms of content as well. We wanted to give a comprehensive work to deal with a very important substantive character of American politics. I will just present a kind of overview of what's in the book. I won't try to read it all since it is 700 pages, but I'll try to tell you what it encompasses and then Henry and Kay will fill in some of the particular parts of it.

The main theme of the book, of course, is equality. It's not the amount of citizen engagement; it's the inequality of citizen engagement across citizens. How equal is the voice of American citizens when it comes to politics? This is obviously a crucial question when it comes to politics and democracy. Unlike income inequality, which we accept, though we might like a lot less of it, political equality is supposed to be much more equal. One person, one vote. We know that this has never been established in any country, certainly not here in terms of the meaning of the citizen voice even though each one may be limited to one vote, but we know that this country is very, very far from each citizen having an equal vote.

That's the main theme of the book. If you want to understand it, we're interested in the extent to which we do have a level playing field in the United States and it looks something like this if you look at the playing field.

Here are a few quotations about the subject. The first is the quotation from E. E. Schattschneider's book, a very famous statement about the nature of interest group voice in the United States is that it sings with an upper class accent. Four decades later it is singling with an even more upper class

accent. That's why we now have entitled the book *The Unevenly Chorus*.

The book has a lot of parts to it. One thing it has is it has -- oops, let me go back one step. Yes. The other quotations are other views about the nature of politics in the United States and about issues of inequality. The last line is a wonderful line about interest groups in the United States which we will come back to later when Kay talks about our interest group part of the book, but it just simply says that if you're not part of the process, if you're not at the table, then you're on the menu. People will do things to you and you want to have an equal voice which is not the case in the United States.

The book has a context at the beginning where our massive amount of data -- which those of you who look at the book will see is a massive amount of data -- is preceded by some works on the context of political inequality in the United States. The economic inequality and its nature, the ambivalent views in American political philosophy in theory about equality, and the question, which is a very interesting and important question, would equal political voice be a good thing? And one can think immediately of reasons why it might not be because people have voices that we don't agree with and maybe we wouldn't like to hear from them. We'd like to hear from the people we want to agree with, we do agree with. So we have that kind of a contextual discussion.

But one of the main themes in the book is the theme of persistence. That is one of the characteristics we have noticed in studying American politics over time is the strong relationship between socioeconomic class and the amount of political activity that goes on.

This is a very simple graph dividing the public into five equal levels of socioeconomic status, which is really a measure of income plus education, sort of what is the basis of social class. So if you divide the American public into five groups based upon socioeconomic status, this is the relationship to the amount of activity that goes on. And it turns out that there are five studies that have done this in more or less the same way over a 50-year period. It upsets me somewhat but I should point out that I was one of the co-authors of the earlier study in 1960, the civic culture, which had the same result as our most recent study in 2008. And in fact, we just got new data from 2012. It stays the same. There is persistence to this inequality.

We find lots of things, which I'll just give you some examples, of the persistence of political inequality. One thing we have studied is intergenerational transmission of political equality. Lots of people have studied the fact that if you come from a wealthy family, an educated family, that education level, that income level is passed on to the next generation. We have data that show that the same thing is true of political equality. If you come from parents who are politically engaged, you are more likely to be politically engaged. So there is a transmission of political activity from generation to generation, which is another reason why there is a persistence of this particular phenomenon. And in fact, the main cause of the persistence is something that we talk about in the book, the embeddedness of political inequality in the major institutions of American life. That is political inequality begins in the family where the education of children begins, goes through the school system where you get

differential education. And education is one of the things that pushes people to become politically equal. It's involved in the process of marriage. It's involved in the process of getting a job. It's involved in the organizations you belong to. So the inequality, those upward slopes are not something put on us by a political elite; they are something that grow out of the very country and nature of the institutions in which we live, which is one of the reasons why it is very difficult to change.

One of the important characteristics of our book, which I think is one of its most path-breaking characteristics, is that our earlier book, Voice Inequality was a study of individuals based on surveys of individuals, what kinds of people became active in politics. This time we have a dual series of two bases for our analysis. One is more data on individuals but a very large statistical study of interest organizations in Washington. That is, we have put together for a 25-year period, a database of 35,000 organizations, God save us, with information about what the organizations are, how they take part in politics, how many of them give campaign money, how many of them hire a lot of lobbyists, how many of them file Amicus briefs with the courts and so forth and so on. We have them as organizations with differential voice in politics and so we can measure the extent to which various kinds of organizations representing different kinds of interests have a voice in politics. And as you might guess, we find that the same pattern we find for inequality on the individual level works in the same direction as inequality on the organizational level. And furthermore, that there is an interaction, a close connection between how individuals participate in politics and

the organizations with which they may be affiliated participate in politics. So this is a very heavy book in terms of the amount of data put forward to understand American politics.

One of the characteristics of our book is that we describe it a fox of a book with a hedgehog heart. That, as you all know from Isaiah Berlin, the fox knows many things and the hedgehog knows one big thing. Our book being long has many, many themes in it dealing with this problem or that particular kind of group or this particular kind of involvement in politics and so forth and so on. It goes off in many fox directions, but in the book there is a hedgehog which is the overwhelming impact of socioeconomic status on how active people are so that you now have a debate in this country about should we be worrying about identify groups -- women, African-Americans, other kinds of minorities, aged people, young people and so forth and so on. A big debate. Should we look at these particular groups or should we look at the broader picture?

One of the things we find is that you have to look at both and that every place we looked for what was driving inequality was the very central role of socioeconomic status so that even if you look at different groups that differ on average in their political activity -- minority groups, Hispanics, Blacks, women who used to be less active but now are equally active if not more, and other groups of that sort -- you find that if you look into the group you find it stratified by socioeconomic status so that it is something that is really important. Social class in America plays a major role. So that's what the book is about.

We end the book, which as Bill suggested, may be even more

gloomy than our earlier book, I think with a bit of gloom. That is, we ask the question. Our last chapter begins with Lenin's question, "What is to be done?" Except we have the title of the last chapter, "What if (if anything) is to be done?" Because we're not certain we know what can be done. We list a variety of ways in which this problem could be addressed. Some of them are small things that can be done and that, in fact, can be done but really wouldn't have a big impact on political inequality. Others might have a really big impact on political inequality. Changes in the way in which money is used in politics, changes in the way campaigns are run and so forth, almost all of them -- I would say right now all of them -- are things that could change things but don't hold your breath; they're not going to happen, in part because of the structure of government, the role of Congress, the role of the Supreme Court and its recent decisions. One of the things that cannot be changed or could be changed but will not is the role of money and the kind of stratification that we have found.

One of the interesting things about the ways in which people can participate in politics is the extent to which you can participate in a particular way and expand it, but that varies very, very much in terms of the kind of activity you're engaged in. This is a very simple point but voting, everybody's got one vote. Time to work for a candidate -- there are only 24 hours in a day but money -- money can be expanded incredibly. And under the current rules, it is being expanded tremendously. So if anything, the ability to change things is going to be low in the future and maybe is going down.

Last point, just about the nature of the book. Last point, very

quickly, the book is a research study on a major political problem in the United States. Research is supposed to be ruled by rules, and we hope our research is. It's ruled by objectivity, very careful use of statistics. And that's why we wrote the book, because we're scholars. The other reasons we wrote the book is because we're citizens and we consider this a really serious problem. And choosing a problem is not guided by any particular rules; it's guided by what you think is important in politics. So we're presenting a book that we think is important in politics and we are presenting a book that we hope has the right kind of research. And we're presenting a book in which each of the speakers is supposed to speak for only 10 minutes because time is limited, unlike money, and I couldn't buy them off, so let me turn it over to our next speaker.

(Applause)

MR. BRADY: I must say this is, as Bill suggested, a collaboration that's gone on for a long time, and one of the things that makes it work is that we genuinely like one another and enjoy one another's company, although you have to know that, of course, there are moments when we are arguing fiercely over various points but nevertheless, the great joy it's been to be able to work with Sid and Kay who are marvelous human beings and wonderful collaborators. I feel blessed to have had the opportunity.

You know, it's been fun to be in Washington here. Turn on the TV. You see all the advertisements. I realize there is a campaign apparently going on for president. In California we don't know that. We don't see a lot of those commercials. And it's interesting for me because what I'm about to tell you

about is the role of money in politics, and that money in politics is part of the reason why there are so many of those commercials.

So let me see if I can master the clicker. I did.

This takes all of the national election studies from 1952 to 2008 and puts them together in order to have enough cases so we can actually see what happens percentile by percentile in terms of political participation. So along the horizontal axis we have percentiles of socioeconomic status, going from the lowest level to the highest level, left to right. Along the vertical access we have the amount of political activity in terms of three kinds of activity -- campaign work, an activity that requires time; campaign meetings, an activity that requires time; and campaign donations, something that requires money. And what you notice immediately is, first of all, it's not equal. It's not a flat line for any of these things. All three lines go up with the percentiles. So folks at higher levels of SES, big surprise, are more involved in campaign work, campaign meetings, and so forth, but what's really stunning about this picture is the nearly sort of exponential rise in donations as you get towards the highest percentiles.

When I became dean of the Goldman School of Public Policy, my development staff took me aside and they told me, "You know what? It's people with money who give money." Which I know sounds like a totality, sort of, or at least sort of a fairly obvious truth, but it really, really is true. And it's people with money who give money. And this is not the amount of money by the way; this is just whether or not they contribute.

In a minute I'm going to show you the amounts of money that they

give because not only do they contribute at a higher rate; they give more money than other folks. So that has a big impact on American politics. And let me move to that. These three pie charts break up the American population by quintile. So basically, we're looking at the highest, the lowest quintiles, and quintiles in between in terms of socioeconomic status, and we ask for each of those quintiles what percentage of the votes are in that quintile. So for the lowest fifth on the left hand side there, about 14 percent of the votes come from the lowest quintile. Well, if that's 20 percent of the population, 14 percent of the voters, that's not too terrible, actually. As you go up you go from 14 to 18 to 19 to 22, 26 percent for the highest fifth. That's certainly unequal but it's not sort of disgustingly unequal. It's just unequal.

For hours devoted to politics, we get something that looks more unequal. Eleven percent to 15, to 15 to 30, to 30 percent. And by the way, we used 1990 data here because this is the citizen participation. And one of the things we did in that study is we had very detailed income measures so we could really get at who were the folk with money. And furthermore, and most importantly, very detailed and fine grained questions about donations. And that allowed us to really figure out how much money people at the highest level were giving. So this now just takes the total number of dollars that was given and asks who gives those dollars. And what you might notice is the lowest fifth is less than one percent of the dollars. The lowest 20 percent of the population gives less than one percent of the dollars. The highest quintile in terms of socioeconomic status gives 70 percent. So more than a majority. Much more than a majority. A

super majority.

I was just looking at some new data from 2012, which are not as good in terms of the refinements in terms of donations and so forth, so they actually don't allow us to get such good figures at the upper level because you don't really get those fine grained nuances. It's the Adelsons of this world who we'd really like to have more data on. Those data, even though they're not as good as what I'm showing you right here, suggest that at least 55 percent comes from the top quintile. Fifty-five percent of the dollars come from the top quintile. And my guess is these are underestimates, because we know there are some people in that top quintile who give very large sums of money, especially now. So tremendous inequality in terms of dollars given to politics.

Well, maybe it just has to be that way. Maybe inequality is the natural condition of human beings and we must, must have it that way. This is something we did just to show that it maybe doesn't have to be that way in every sphere of activity. The sort of line that goes up and down is a ratio of the amount of participation in the top quintile to the bottom quintile. And so if there's a lot more participation in the top quintile than the bottom quintile, that ratio will be above one and substantially above one, and in this case it varies between three and four for campaign activity. So that means there's a lot more campaign activity in the top quintile than the bottom quintile.

How about religious attendance and participation? What does that look like? That's the bottom-line over time. This goes from 1952 to 2008. Notice that's essentially a ratio of one. That means that the amount of religious

attendance by the top quintile is essentially the same as the religious attendance by the bottom quintile. That means that in every sphere of activity we don't have to have this kind of stratification. We certainly don't have it in terms of religious activity, so it's not the natural condition of societies that we have this stratification in every sphere of activity.

Okay. You might say, well, thank God for the Internet. That's going to change everything. I live near Silicon Valley and I hear this all the time. They are very fond of telling us in Silicon Valley and the computer science department at Berkeley and so forth about how the world has changed, the Internet has come, everybody is empowered. It will no longer be the case that we have this vast inequality. Well, with that in mind we did a 2008 study with the Pugh Center on the Internet. We've replicated it by the way for 2012. And we looked at the question of on-line versus offline activity. And so what we have here is along the bottom, the lowest to the highest quintile. So the bottom quintile and socioeconomic status to the highest quintile, all of these lines go up, which means there's stratification in these activities we're talking about because that's what these are is various forms of activity. And it's the percentage active in each one of those activities.

There's a lot of lines here but the important thing to know is that the top line is all activity. So this is activity on the Internet and off the Internet, and what we get is stratification, just like we've shown you time and again so far. But then we break it down on offline versus on-line. Not surprisingly -- actually, does this have a pointer? Maybe it does. How nice. Good. Okay.

So this is any offline act right here. That's highly stratified. This is any online activity. If anything, online activity is more highly stratified than offline activity. You might say, well, that's just because folk at the bottom don't have the Internet. Okay. So let's just look among Internet users, people with Internet. What does that look like? That's this line here. That's, I would say, just about as stratified as offline activity. So it's not just that they don't have the Internet; it's that even once they get on the Internet it's just as stratified as it was before. The Internet, at least in this realm, which is what we've got here, by the way, is comparable online and offline activity. So, for example, one of the activities was have you written a letter? So that's offline. Another one, have you written an e-mail? That's online. So we tried to make them as comparable as possible.

In the book, we discuss new forms of media on the Internet, like social media, and we say there's just the slimmest little hint that maybe that's going to make a difference. We're sort of skeptical and we're worried that the data are very confounded right now by the fact that it's the younger generation which is much more likely to be on the Internet using social media and other kinds of new fangled gizmos. And those folks have low SES, so it may look like they're a little more active but it's just because, frankly, it's the young people getting on the Internet first. And once we have everybody on the Internet, we're not going to have anything that even looks like equality. We'll continue to have the kind of inequalities that I've shown you again and again, and that Sid was showing you, and that Kay will show you.

So what does this all mean in the end? Well, here's just a simple

way to think about what it means for American politics. Along the horizontal here I have income in thousands of dollars, people's income. According to the median voter theory of downs, what you want to do is look where the median voter is, and that's the person who's going to have -- be decisive in American politics. Whether that's true anymore, by the way, we have a long discussion about what's going on in American politics right now.

We've got one way in which we think it might not be true. So we have the median income -- let me point at that. There's for everybody. There's registered voters. Here's campaign workers. Here's campaign donors, and here's campaign donors weighted by dollars. In other words, where does the median dollar come from because folks who have very high incomes are more likely to give money?

What you notice here is the median moves from being way down here, people of lower incomes. It moves past the mean income and all the way -- way up here towards pretty high income. If, as is true, the folks down here have different political ideas than the folks up here, and if money and politics, those ads that I was discussing earlier, really have a big impact on politics, so these folks in effect get to vote more, get to have more impact through those ads and through money, then politics is defined by these people and their concerns and viewpoints and not by these people.

And that's maybe one reason why we don't get redistribution in America. There's a famous observation by Downs that, gee, given that the median is down here, that's below the mean income, it would make sense for

voters to vote to redistribute income and for parties, in fact, to offer to do that so they can gain votes. But if, in fact, if parties are not appealing to these people but they're appealing to these people, there's no incentive whatsoever to redistribute income. In fact, there might be an incentive to cut the taxes of better off people.

With that I'll turn it over to Kay. I've talked about individuals to a large extent; she's going to talk about individuals and mobilization and organizations.

(Applause)

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: I want to begin by saying that Sidney said that we did this research because we're researchers and we look for the truth and also because we're citizens and because we care about the health of American democracy. But I want to add we do this research because we like working together. And I want to say in public we've been working together since I was pregnant with my daughter, who is now entering her third year in law school. And that it's been great fun and a privilege to work with Sidney and Henry. But I wanted to clear the air on that.

Henry mentioned that the folks who have a great deal of confidence in the Internet say that is what is going to save us. That is what is going to equalize citizen voice in American politics, and he showed you some data that suggests that, well, maybe not. Maybe not so much as the kids would say.

Another thing that people always would say to us is what about

processes of political mobilization? What about social movements? And there is no question that American history offers may examples of social moments. Many, but not all of which have mobilized disadvantaged groups that have brought new issues and new publics into politics in America. And the examples range from abolition and temperance in the 19th century to the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street in recent years.

But we took that question, what about processes of political mobilization and what do they do for political inequality or equality? And took a somewhat different approach by harnessing it to the power of the sample survey. To understand the processes by which friends and neighbors and co-workers and people who go to church together and people who are in voluntary associations together. Mobilize one another. They ask one another to get involved in politics.

And what we found is a process that we call ordinary recruitment. That's what happens when you're in the lobby of your church after services or when you're around the water cooler at work. These are everyday people talking to people, usually whom they know but not necessarily, to get them involved in politics. And what we found is that people act as rational prospectors. With the result that political activity that occurs in response to requests from others actually produces political voice that is even more tilted in the direction of the affluent and well educated than activity that is taken when people decide more or less on their own, that they're going to take part in politics.

So if you take a look at these data, on the left, what we just show

is once again a line that shows that with socioeconomic quintiles, as education and income go up so does political activity, but we also have data about who was asked. And those data, right on top of one another. So the processes by which people are asking one another to take part in politics, essentially replicate the processes of who is going to take part. Because who are you going to ask? The slug in your office who you know is never going to do anything? Or the person you know either because you know about them or you know their personality or you know what they do with their Saturdays is already active I politics.

And so what happens is these processes replicate the same socioeconomic stratification that we keep finding over and over again. And here we see these are the people who are active on their own. They decided to become active for whatever reason but not because they were responding to someone who asked them to get involved. Whereas, the lower line, which is possibly even more skewed than the upper line, shows the activity of people who were asked by someone they know or a friend of a friend or someone with whom they share some association who were asked to get involved.

And the result once again is particularly marked when it comes to political money. So what we have here on the top is a distribution of contributions by SES quintile, but then we took that apart and we said what's the difference between the people who did it on their own at their own initiative where a third of the money came from the highest 20 percent to those who did it because someone asked them for a contribution. And in this case, three-fifths of the money, 60 percent, comes from the highest quintile.

` So what we see is these processes of mobilization that while in social movements they really might bring in new people, new issues, new actors, and overcome political inequality. But when it comes to all this day-to-day activity that's the underlying ordinary way that we get involved in politics, that the processes by which people mobilize one another are, in fact, not reducing but are in fact increasing the inequalities of political voice.

As Sidney mentioned, an important aspect of our book is that we not only look at data about individuals like these but we also look at what kind of political voice emanates from what we call organized interests. We call them organized interests rather than interest groups because the lion's share of the organizations that communicate, and this study was Washington-based with policymakers in Washington, are not voluntary associations of individuals with individuals as members but are sometimes governments, you know, sub-national governments, often associations that have what we call institutions as members. So that might be a trade association or the Federation of American hospitals. So these are associations that have not individuals as members but have institutions as members, but the lion's share of the organizations that get involved are, in fact, institutions. Principally corporations but also the universities that hire the three of us, hospitals, museums, and so forth.

When we put together this database of 35,000 organizations, this, mind you, was a research project that said this time no new data. Read our lips. No new data. And the way I characterized this, to paraphrase Calvin Trillion, is a little like asking the customs official not to be interested in the plastic bag with the

white powder in it. So the people who promised you no new data have a database with 35,000 organizations in it. And just to show that we're totally encourageable, we are in the process of coding the 2011 data so that this data project doesn't die. And one of the major things that we did was we put organizations into one of 96 different categories in terms of what kind of interest it pursues or what kind of goals it sues, or what kind of people it organizes.

Sometimes politicians and journalists and political scientists talk about an overall group called citizens groups, which conflates a variety of kinds of groups, ranging from environmental groups, gay rights groups, anti-smoking groups, organizations of African-Americans, women, the elderly, and so forth. And we split that all apart. You know, we have categories that can be very finely grained for all those kinds of interests. We differentiate very finally.

Using as our baseline year, 2001, of the nearly 12,000 organizations that were active in Washington in 2001, as defined by having been listed in the Washington Representatives Directory, which is published by Columbia Books, this is the distribution of organizations active in Washington in 2001. And the traditional understanding and political science is that there are two kinds of organizations that are underrepresented in American politics. One is public interest groups, which may be liberal or conservative that advocate on behalf of public goods. And these can be things like safe streets or safe consumer products, environmental preservation, or low energy costs, human rights, or national security. And we can see that indeed, such public interest groups are less than one-twentieth of the organizations active in politics. The

other are organizations of the less advantaged, which are less than one percent of the organizations active in Washington. And as we can see from this table, the bulk of organized interest representation is centered around economic interests -- that is the bulk of organizations are representing people in terms of the way they make their living -- and pocketbook issues. And in this domain the concerns of organizations representing business swarm other kinds of organizations. Among the organizations that are defined by the pursuit of economic goals. Seventy-four percent of the economic organizations represent business. And of the overall set of organizations, a majority, 53 percent of all the organizations, whether they're concerned about recreation, about the identity interests of racial and ethnic groups or religious groups, whether they're defined by their pursuit of an ideological interest or a single issue, public good, or whatever. When we take the whole set and it's really to verse of organizations of organizations in Washington, 53 percent represent business. Representing the less advantaged are labor unions and a handful of organizations, the majority of which are service providers, including such big organizations as the Red Cross and Goodwill Industry that aid the poor.

Our epigraph noted -- and you saw that earlier -- that if you're not at the table, you're on the menu. And so we found 12,000 organizations in 2001 and 35,000 in the whole quarter century that we looked at. But kind of who's not there? In this group of nearly 12,000 in 2001, there are no organizations representing children in Head Start programs, Wal-Mart associates, people who are awaiting trial on a felony charge, women at home, and recipients of means-

tested benefits, like SNAP, the EITC, or TANF, organized and working in their own behalf as opposed to by others, and unless they are members of a labor union, anyone who has -- who does unskilled work -- excuse me. Let me say it the other way.

No one who does unskilled work, who's not in a labor union, has an organization representing him or her in Washington. There are thousands of organizations representing people in terms of their occupations. They represent cell biologists and they represent audiologists, and they even represent political scientists. But if you do unskilled work, and that's a substantial part of the labor force -- unless you're in a union, there's no organization whatsoever representing you.

But as Sidney made clear when he talked about participation among individuals, that it's not that we necessarily, that activists, do the same amount and not all organizations are created equal in terms of how much they do. So it's not just having an organization to represent you, it's how much that organization is able to do. And we added a lot of data, again, around this baseline year of 2001, showing the different kinds of organizations in terms of the distribution of activity. And so we see if business groups are a majority of all organizations, they have a majority of the in-house lobbyists and they hire an even larger share of the outside firms to represent them. When it comes to really substantial investment that can be made, business groups are responsible for 72 percent of the money that is registered by the government as being spent on lobbying.

And that contrasts with the congressional testimonies. This is kind of worth noting because who testifies in Congress is not necessarily at the discretion of the organization itself; it's put together by the people who are organizing the hearings, which are members of Congress and their staffs and the committee staffs and so on and so forth. And when it comes to testifying in Congress, the underrepresented groups, such as the less privileged, the public interest groups, have a somewhat greater voice. The business groups do do a plurality of the testimonies but the balance is very different between lobbying expenditures -- oops.

MR. GALSTON: This is the review.

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: Yeah, right. And it's all on the exam. This is what I wanted. Sorry about that. How do we get it to show the bottom?

All right. Well, what our would have seen at the bottom -- how can I make this -- let me see if --

MR. GALSTON: You get over there. You talk and I'll get this done.

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: If I can show you -- thank you -- one interesting thing that we found, and these data are now from 2001, is that when it comes to PAC donations, a very broad definition of what we call the less privileged that includes unions, this is the area in which they have the greatest voice. It is ironic that in the domain of political money, because unions figure pretty importantly in PAC donations, they have a greater weight in this area of

political participation than in some of the others. Of course, we know that those data are now outmoded and that the lid has been taken off of organizational giving. And so those data would look very differently if we were able to aggregate all kinds of organized giving.

So Sidney mentioned that our penultimate chapter is called "What (if anything) is to be done?" And you've already figured out that this is a book that was labeled by one leader as really depressing. And we wish we could be upbeat, but it seems that the political changes that are even remotely feasible would not make much difference, and the ones that might really ameliorate the circumstances that we're talking about are very unlikely to materialize. In an age in which the Supreme Court has blown the lid off campaign finance regulation and the state legislatures are passing voter ID laws around the country, it's very easy to be despairing about what can be done to level the playing field of American democracy.

(Applause)

MR. GALSTON: Well, we have about 10 minutes for a moderate discussion, and then the rest of the time is yours. So let me try to squeeze in a couple questions that may be on other people's minds as well.

My first question concerns the relationship between political voice that you've been focusing on and political outcomes because at the end of the line one of the things we're really interested in is that linkage. Now, someone might naively ask a question of the following sort. I'm looking at a list of really rapidly growing federal government programs, and that list includes the following:

Medicaid, Food Stamps, the EITC, the Disability Program. I could add to that list. You know, all of them highly needs tested and all of them -- and all of them conferring disproportionate benefits on some of the least among us. Now, what is the relationship between the story of political voice that you've been telling and those sorts of outcomes?

MR. BRADY: Let me just say one thing and then I'm going to pass it off to my co-authors, but the first thing to do is to distinguish among those programs. In the book we look at people who are recipients, for example, of Medicare or Social Security. They're much more likely to be involved in politics and to get involved. And one of my students, Andrea Campbell, who is now at MIT, has written a book about this, about how they have a fairly substantial voice and for a variety of reasons you might imagine. It's the Medicaid and the social welfare recipients, who don't have much of a voice, and it is true, of course, that social welfare has been cut quite substantially in a lot of the states. And even Medicaid, it's true that it's growing but it's growing because health care costs are going up. It's actually been cut compared to Medicare in most places. Cut relatively speaking. It still goes up because health care prices are going up so much, but Medicaid reimbursements are so low that there's a lot of hospitals now that aren't sure they want them anymore. And so that's a long-term problem. And there's no voice out there saying we must do this. And of course, we've seen the big hullabaloo over the Obama Health Care Program.

MR. VERBA: I would add one thing, and I think, Bill, as you would expect, has asked a very tough question and a very important question, and that

is what's the relationship between citizen voice as expressed in a variety of ways -- by voting, by acting in campaigns, writing letters to people, giving money, and so forth -- to what the government does. It turns out that this is something that political scientists are desperate to measure and it's very, very hard to measure because policies are extremely complicated and sometimes you can pass a policy that looks wonderful for a particular group, but if you look at page 94 of the 200-page bill, it all disappears. So it is a very difficult thing to make a clear connection. That is not to say that it isn't very important to try to do it.

What we tend to find is that the voice of those people, who as Henry just mentioned, would be -- you would expect most needy of a voice over the government. People receiving Medicaid, people receiving various kinds of welfare benefits, are the ones least likely to be active. And those who have benefits, like Medicare or Social Security that are fairly well locked into place, that aren't challenged each year by the amount of money that goes into them, are much more likely to be active. So that, in fact, the voice we believe, and there's lots of evidence in particular places, is a voice that if it is expressed has at least some resonance.

The other point we make in the book, which is a kind of fudgy point but it's very crucial for understanding the nature of political voice, is that in a democracy any policy that comes up is likely to have winners and losers because people are allowed to express their views and there will be people on both sides of an issue. And therefore, we say that the political ideal of democracy is not equal output because it can't be equal. If you do something that benefits one

group, it may hurt other groups. Equal consideration of the needs and preferences of the American public. And there are so many needs and preferences that don't even get at the table that are silenced if political voice is silent. So that's one of the themes that underlies our book, although we wish we could measure as carefully the output as we can measure the input.

MR. VERBA: Let me just say, Bill, I think it's the EITC which is the big mystery because that has, I think, really expanded. I think that has really been an important poverty program in American. And exactly why that's happened with, in fact, so little voice from the poor is an interesting story. And I think I could tell you a story about that and I'm sure you would know what that was about. It's about work requirements. These are people who work. They're deserving and so forth and so on. And that may be the story.

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: The question you asked is a question we get asked a lot, and the political science e-version comes in two different ways. The people who study individual politics point out -- and especially it comes from Henry's colleagues-- that voters and non-voters really don't have very different attitudes. So what difference does it make? And what we found is that, yeah, that's true. That voters and non-voters have relatively similar attitudes based on their response to questions that are canned that are given to them by survey researchers. But there is a lot about their experience which is very different. So we found out, for example, in our work that non-voters are more likely to be without medical insurance. They're more likely to live in what the surveyor who goes and gives them the in-person survey says is

dilapidated housing. They have quite different experiences, and one thing that the increasing emphasis on money and the fact that our public officials spend so much time fund-raising means that they spend less and less time with ordinary people, not just people who live in dilapidated housing and don't have health insurance, but people who suffer the ordinary indignities of what it is to be a middle class American in this day and ate. They spend less time rubbing elbows with them and have less understanding of what their problems and needs are.

The other version of this point comes from the people who study organized interests who show, I think, correctly and compelling that the relationship between how much an organization does in a policy dispute and whether they win or lose is very indeterminate and very indistinct. But what those people have never shown is that it doesn't help to be there. If you're there, you're always better off or at least not worse off. And if you, again, if you're not at the table, that's when the substantial losses take place if your voice is not heard at all.

So this is a complicated question. You know, you went right to the heart of it and we have a lot of different answers to it.

MR. BRADY: Foxy answers.

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: Yeah.

MR. GALSTON: I have a long list of questions here but in a show of restraint I'm going to confine myself to one more before beginning the question and answer period. And I bet Sid knows what's coming.

What is the role of political culture in all of this? Let me, you

know, and let me explain that question. Henry, you were -- you were posing the contemporary version of Gayarg Zimral's, "Why is there no socialism in the United States?" But in the contemporary version, you know, why not redistribution of income given Tony Downs's famous propositions, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And you can talk about asymmetries of voice, et cetera, but isn't there also a cultural component that is having to do with the distinctiveness of American political culture and beliefs about what equality actually means in the economic sphere?

MR. BRADY: I'm going to say yes and pass it to Sid.

MR. VERBA: I'm going to say yes. And I wrote a book on the subject I think 52 or 53 years ago. It just had its 50th anniversary, which is called *The Civic Culture*. I haven't used the term "culture" very much I think since then but I still get questions from graduate students about some data in that book and they think they've found that I made a tremendous mistake and I say I can't remember what I said back then. Because culture is a very difficult thing to measure. I think it is terribly important. I'll back away from that and say that this is an important characteristic. It's one of the characteristics -- we have a chapter in the book called "The Ambivalent View." I forget what exactly -- ambivalent attitude of the American public toward equality. And it's quite clear that we are a populous that will, as one thing, that we are one of the most unequal of democracies in the world when it comes either to economic equality or political equality. And nevertheless, we also are one of the democracies that thinks pure equality would not be a good thing and that thinks we are fairly equal. So that, in

fact, there is a culture in the United States that allows for large inequalities of income -- willing to accept it -- and that tolerates but doesn't like as much inequality of political voice.

One side issue, one of the interesting things that's been found on the notion of inequality of income, at least that's been said, is that most of us sitting in this room are not really offended by the fact that Bill Gates makes a lot more money than we do, but if the person working in the office next to you or your brother-in-law makes $100 a month more than you do, that drives you nuts. So we do have a sense of equality that may be more locally established.

But let me say that even though the American people in general would oppose redistribution -- taxing the rich to pay the poor -- nevertheless, when it comes to specific policies, they are more likely to be willing to favor policies that are more egalitarian. And especially if they're more egalitarian from their own point of view.

One last characteristic, which I think is true, is something that Kay and I discovered -- not discovered but wrote about in a book on unemployment many, many, many years ago, has to do with the fact that Americans all think of themselves as members of the middle class. We don't think of ourselves as being in the working class. And if you listen to the television all the time, it's the middle class we have to worry about, not the 20 percent poor people at the bottom who really are in great poverty. And so that indeed there is a cultural drag on what one might want as an outcome. If we could design the political system with its outcomes and designed a purely egalitarian system which would

be outrageous off everybody, nevertheless, if we try to do that the public wouldn't like it. So there is a cultural characteristic. I stop.

MR. GALSTON: Well, to prove that I'm as good as my word, it's now your turn. And here are some guidelines.

When you're recognized, wait until the roving microphone reaches you. Second, you'll please state your name and if you choose, your institutional affiliation. Third, please state a question concisely. Speeches from the floor will be ruthlessly suppressed.

So question number one. I see a hand in the middle there. Yeah. There you go.

MR. GALL: Stephen Gall (phonetic), University of Maryland.

It's very persuasive that the organized interests are having effects on outcomes that correspond to their goals. If you looked at the number of dollars spent for progressive forces and outcomes or regress of outcomes you'll probably find a big asymmetry that does correspond to changes that have happened in policy. But if you look at the views of individuals at different SES levels, it's much harder to find those distinctions and it's not always so clear that people in higher SES categories have views that are so clearly what you would call in their interest. So it seems kind of -- to dispatch the null hypothesis that it doesn't matter, isn't it important to look at the relationship between political attitudes and preferences and SES quintiles?

MR. BRADY: Yes. And we do do that in the book. And I could have shown you some data on it. It is of course true that there's not a perfect

correlation by any means between, say, economic attitudes and income. Or even religious attendance and attitudes about social issues. Nevertheless, those correlations do exist. And second of all, if you just go directly to the attitudes and look at them, there's no question but that the people with more conservative economic attitudes especially are more likely to be participants in politics. They're certainly much more likely to give money to politics and substantial amounts of money. So you get the same kinds of results.

MR. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: Can I just add that the precise question that you asked is answered in great detail in a new book by Marty Gilens from Princeton, and it's called something like *Influence and Affluence* or something like that. And that's where you would need to look at that particular angle on it.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. There's a gentleman right in the front row here in the red shirt.

MR. HARVEST: John Harvest. Kay brushed up against Citizens United, but I'd like to have the panel address Citizens United directly. My sense is it's a constitutional game changer of the order of Marbury and Dred Scott, another good one, and that the next edition of his book will convulse your findings in all kinds of ugly and bad ways. Your thoughts?

MR. BRADY: I'll just say yes. It is a game changer, I think, and I think that we already see that it's bringing enormous amounts of money into politics. By the way, it's not just Citizens United; it's a series of cases and so it's rather complicated. But, Kay?

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: I mean, I would say yes, too. And as far as the second edition of this book, I think we really need to talk to Cynthia Verba, Patty Cates, and Stanley

Schlozman, and there might be a rebellion. I discounted the importance of rebellion, but that one --

MR. GALSTON: Having said that, it'll be really interesting over time, you know, to trace the marginal utility of additional dollars above a certain threshold. And it's b no means that one is talking a linear game. And as a matter of fact, there are some arguments, the fact that the marginal utility of additional money declines to zero maybe even goes negative if people really start to resent being barraged all the time with money-purchased communications. So --

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: I would argue though that we need to remember that money given in politics attempts to do two different things, often not simultaneously. One is to affect who is going to win or lose in the election. The second is to affect what does the eventual winner do in office? And there's no question that even though the super PACs are giving independent expenditures, what we've seen at the conventions is they're all over the policymakers. They're getting a kind of access to tell a story they believe in that the rest of us who can't give those kinds of donations are not going to have. And so the test is not going to just be whether the American public turns off or whether the biggest spender wins every election, which is not going to happen, but the extent to which there's differential access for those who are giving large

amounts of money.

MR. BRADY: Let me just say that theoretically I think what we're saying is that democracy in politics is not just about decision-making; it's also about information that gets to policymakers. And we're especially worried that the information that gets to policymakers is extraordinarily slanted in one direction and that ultimately seeps in and shapes the political culture and the whole way we think about politics.

MR. GALSTON: Well, it would be interesting to do a case study of the people on Wall Street who gave so much money to Barack Obama in 2008.

Now for a word from the press.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks. I'll stand up. I'm Garrett Mitchell, and I write the *Mitchell Report*. And I apologize for arriving late, and this question may reveal that.

It occurred to me -- the question I want to ask is not intended to be as facetious as it will sound. And the question is slimily this -- does your study suggest that Woody Allen had it right or wrong? That 80 percent of life is just showing up?

MR. VERBA: I should say that at my age, the fact that I'm here talking to you, suggests that Woody Allen is correct. But no, I think the point about just showing up is absolutely crucial. That, in a sense to repeat what Kay was saying, that so much of the discussion of the huge amount of money going into politics is politics to influence the vote and politics to influence the election. Very important. But the data we have says the most important money, the

largest amount of money, which overlaps with the money that goes into elections, is money that goes into lobbying. That is hiring experts to work on particular issues who work with congressional committees, help them find what their agendas are, and so forth and so on. It's the work between elections affected by who was active in the election that really makes the lobbying people part of the process, which is perfectly legal and is part of the notion of the government should be informed about what people out there think and are saying. But if the ones whose voices they hear are of a particular sort, then that is tilting things in a particular direction. So it's the very complicated business of hiring lobbyists who connect with people who are making decisions in government agencies, in congressional committees and so forth that plays a really major role in tilting policy in one direction or another.

The last point, which is very related to that is policy is a 150-page bill on some subject which looks like it's going in this direction but if you really look carefully it's not going anywhere or it's going in the other direction. And that often comes out of the work in designing and producing legislation or producing regulations and the like.

MR. BRADY: The regulations for Dodd-Frank.

MR. GALSTON: My perception of equality includes geography as well as demography, which means I'd like to do justice to the rear of the room and then move forward again. So I see a hand right there. Yes. You're headed in the right direction and you've gotten there. Very good.

MS. POPLIN: Hi. I'm Dr. Caroline Poplin, and as far as this is

concerned I'm just an ordinary citizen.

You've explained where the money comes from and how effective the money is on Capitol Hill. My question is there are still more voters who need help than there are little people -- than there are in the top whatever -- five percent, one percent -- who give all the money. Why do people vote against their own interests? And my example would be Elizabeth Warren in Massachusetts, which is where I'm from. Massachusetts is as blue a state as they come. She is -- she was the sponsor of the Consumer Financial Protection Board, which would benefit many more people than something else, and she's having a lot of trouble. They're putting in a lot of money against her but why is her position on this and other issues not prevailing with the voters?

MR. BRADY: I would answer with two things. First, ideology is a powerful force and it does have an impact on how people vote. And some people simply believe, for example, that income redistribution -- let's say they're not well off but they still believe that income redistribution is a bad idea and believe that the free market will actually provide them with more opportunity. They may be wrong but that's what they believe.

The second thing is that people vote for portfolios of reasons, and of course, economic issues are not the only thing they care about. They also care about social issues. And there's no question but that American politics is at least two dimensional. There's both economic issues and increasingly since the 1970s, social issues have become very, very important. And those social issues sometimes trump the economic issues and have a big impact on how people

vote.

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: I live in Massachusetts, too, and I want to just add the first thing is I have a feeling that I'm not the only person in this room who is voting against her economic interests. And so that it's not just that this is a phenomena that is not just confined to have-nots.

The second thing is, another thing that happens in campaigns is that people learn about the candidates, and in Massachusetts, the word on the street is that the Warren campaign is not being run very well. That her ads are somewhat off-putting. I mean, I have a lot of friends who went to house parties where a staffer who knew nothing showed up and at this point it was early on and preaching to the choir and it just wasn't going very well. So in politics, everything is really complicated and it's very hard to make a very narrow equation between economics, health interests, and votes.

MR. GALSTON: It's also an interesting phenomena, at least the last time I checked, Elizabeth Warren was actually out raising Scott Brown. That may have --

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: That's correct.

MR. GALSTON: So you have a bunch of people who are "contributing" against their economic interests, but this is not such an obscure phenomenon. You know, someone made a crack a generation ago that there are groups, such as Jews, who live like Episcopalians and vote like Puerto Ricans. And this is not a rare phenomenon in American politics. Okay.

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: Let me add one more thing about

Massachusetts, and that is Massachusetts politics, progressive as it is, has not been very kind to women candidates. Massachusetts has, I believe, elected only three female members of Congress in a medium-size delegation that's now 10. It's been bigger over time. We've had one acting governor, who took over when Paul Celluci decided to be ambassador to Canada, and we've never had an elected governor and we've never had an elected female senator. So that's another thing going on.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. It's now time for me to be fair to the middle of the room. So I see a hand there and a hand there, and we'll take it in that order.

MR. SPALDING: Hi, I'm Steve Spalding with Common Cause.

In terms of government reforms, one question is what common effect do you think small dollar donor voluntary public financing would have, the likes of which there is in Maine and Arizona and Connecticut?

MR. BRADY: It depends upon the details of the scheme. I mean, it seems to me I think we would all believe that the right way to go ultimately would be public financing entirely. It's a long way from here to there in this country and that looks too much like socialism to too many people, so it seems highly unlikely. I can imagine schemes in various states, and I'm not actually familiar with the details of some of the ones you've just described, that might be helpful. But, of course, there's always the possibility if it's voluntary that people are going to opt out as Obama did in 2008, and then we go in another direction and then money just comes pouring in.

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: Let me second all that was said and also point out that the data show that small donors are not very different in their characteristics in terms of they are well educated and upper middle class. They're not phenomenally wealthy. So again, the details really matter but without knowing the precise details I would say it's not as democratic a way of citizen input as public finance which represents the American people which will be extremely unpopular when we're dealing with deficits and for a lot of other reasons.

MR. VERBA: Let me add maybe one word to the word that was used just in answer to the previous question which is related to the question before it which is we don't want policies in this country that are socialistic. And by that I mean it's what the television news or television commentary tell us socialism is and why it's a terrible thing and therefore, I might vote against my own -- what I would think would be objective interest in terms of some policy because I hear on TV that this is a policy that's going to destroy liberty in the United States and so forth. And one of the real problems we're faced with in the current situation is the breakdown of the barrier between news and opinion and the way in which both sides -- but I won't say which side I think is doing more of it than the other -- both sides will present arguments that sound incredibly plausible, vis-à-vis their internal structure. There's nobody in the United States, including I think maybe the people at this table, who could really specify whether that $700 billion that is going from Medicare to Obama Care, whatever that means, what exactly is that and how is moving -- and is that a good thing or a

bad thing? We all know whether it's a good thing or a bad thing depending upon which candidate we like or what's our general view of the world, but these are extremely complicated issues that are presented in ways to make them as complicated as possible but tilted in one way or the other. So that's another reason why you don't get a connection necessarily between people's self interest and how they vote.

SPEAKER: Thank you. My name is (inaudible) and I work for Transparency International in Slovakia and I'm here for four months with Sunlight Foundation.

So what we've heard so far was a brilliant descriptive status of actually learning that people who are well off engage more and have more means to engage in politics. I'd like to raise a normative question. How is this a problem? And if this is, how does the money or the means to actually engage more in politics transfer into political influence and again back to outputs? Thank you. And the reason I'm raising this question is that unless we can draw a mechanism and show that money and influence and more engagement in politics buys different results, that probably shouldn't be a problem to worry about that that much. Thank you.

MR. BRADY: Well, we've talked about that at some length already and I guess I would just reiterate what we said, which is we do think ultimately that it has an impact. It's complicated. It's not as simple as sort of a direct mechanical relationship, but I think there are mechanisms by which it has an impotent impact. We keep arguing, and I think it's absolutely true, that if

you're not at the table, if nobody is hearing your concerns, people are generally not going to be very much concerned about your concerns. And I just think that's true. It's just a simple fact of life. It's hard to believe that the average member of Congress how spends enormous amounts of time raising money with well off people isn't influenced by the fact that that person is constantly hearing the complaints of well off people who have complaints and have problems. They've got real problems and they deserve help, and they get a good chance to talk about those problems. But they're not the only people in America who have problems. There's lots of other folks who have really deep and profound problems who don't get those kinds of opportunities.

MS. LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN: I also want to add that we've spent a lot of time talking about money, which is appropriate that when it comes to individual participation, the real root variable is education and not income. And that education in many ways facilitates an individual's ability to take part and to do so in ways that communicate to public officials what's on their minds. Educated people are (a) more affluent, as you've pointed out and we've talked about several times but they are likely to have the kinds of jobs that give them civic skills, jobs in which they do things, like organize meetings and make presentations and so forth, and they can take those to political activity. For people who have jobs like that, as most people in this room and everybody up here, it's much easier to compose that e-mail than for people who do other kinds of work. And also, well educated people don't just do that in their paid work. They're much more likely to get those opportunities in their religious institutions

and in their voluntary associations. Again, developing civic skills that are much easier to take into politics in other ways. People who are well educated are also more likely to be interested in politics, to have political knowledge, to think that they can make a difference in politics. And so there's a whole bunch of reasons why education is politically empowering. So I just wanted to make the point that it's not all about money. And it's not all about campaign donations.

MR. VERBA: Let me add to that one of the main themes we have in the book, it's in one of the chapters, is a kind of model of how do people come to be active in politics? And we start out with the notion that the first thing you need is the right to participate. And in the United States, the two things for which most people have the right are the right to vote, although that's being whittled away along the edges so it's not as clear as it used to be, and the First Amendment, which gives everybody the right to say what they want about politics. And that is equal. But that doesn't necessarily lead to political activity because you also need the resources to be able to do it. You need money if our want to give money to politics. You need information if you want to be able to participate effectively. Education allows you to do it. But you also have the need to have experience that suggests that this is going to do some good.

And we did something in our earlier work that no one had really done. We interviewed lots of people, and if they said they were active in politics we asked them dozens of questions -- how are you active? What do you do? And so forth. And then we found a bunch of people who when we asked what are you doing in politics? And they said nothing. And so we figured here we are

paying money to have an interview with somebody and if they say nothing, we have nothing more to say to them. And so we did something that survey researchers usually don't do because it sounds odd. We asked why not? Can you ask somebody why they're not doing something? And it turned out we got some really very useful answers. It wasn't that I'm happy. I really like what the government's doing. There were some people who said this just doesn't interest me whatsoever. We're not quite sure what that means. But there were lots of people who said I'm not doing something because I don't think it would do any good. But whatever reason, they had the sense that they didn't have a voice or they said we tried. Nothing happened, so why should I try again? So that the notion that there is satisfaction among those people who are silent in politics, and if you're not saying anything, why should we worry about you? You're not complaining. If you'd rather watch television rather than go to a community meeting that's dealing with problems, that's your problem.

But in fact, if you don't have the resources, you don't go to that community meeting because you can't afford a babysitter or you don't know enough about it or you've tried it once and haven't done it, that is a thing that does violate our notion of having an equal voice. And so the notion that we can in a sense ignore political silence because if something was wrong we would have heard. If we don't hear from them everything must be fine. And that's not true.

MR. GALSTON: Well, speaking as a political theorist, it's gratifying to, you know, be able to end this positive session on a normative note.

And let me just -- a couple of concluding comments. First of all, in the back of the room you will see large stacks of large books. And they are on sale and I suspect very much that if you want to buy one, one of the authors or perhaps all of them would be willing to sign it for you. And secondly, I'd like to enlist your support in helping to thank the splendid panelists for their presentations.

(Applause)

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