

**THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**  
**CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES**

**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN**  
**NORTHEAST ASIA:**  
**A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE**

*The Brookings Institution*  
*Washington, D.C.*  
*Wednesday, May 30, 2012*

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM AN AUDIO RECORDING]

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING  
706 Duke Street, Suite 100  
Alexandria, VA 22314  
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190

PARTICIPANTS:

**Moderator:**

**RICHARD BUSH**

Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies  
The Brookings Institution

**Panelists:**

**KWEI-BO HUANG**

Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies  
The Brookings Institution;  
Associate Professor, Department of Diplomacy  
National Chengchi University

**STEPHEN NOERPER**

Senior Vice President  
The Korea Society

**CHANGJIAN JIANG**

Visiting Scholar, Weatherhead East Asia Institute  
Columbia University;  
Associate Professor, Department of International Politics  
Fudan University

**NANCY SNOW**

Fulbright Professor, Sophia University, Tokyo;  
Professor of Communications, California State University, Fullerton

**Discussants:**

**ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, III**

Senior Fellow, Center on Communication Leadership and Policy;  
University Fellow USC Center on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern  
California

**CRAIG HAYDEN**

Associate Professor, School of International Service  
American University

\* \* \* \* \*

## PROCEEDINGS

RICHARD BUSH: Ladies and gentlemen, why don't we go ahead and get started. We have a very full agenda, and a very interesting agenda. And I'm conscious of the time.

I'm also conscious of the fact that Professor Snow, in Japan, has made a great sacrifice to even be with us at this point in time. By my calculation it's 11:00 p.m. in Tokyo.

NANCY SNOW: That's right.

DR. BUSH: And so it's above and beyond the call of duty.

I won't introduce the speakers because you have their bios in front of you. I do want to say a word of thanks to my colleague Kwei-Bo Huang for all the hard work he has done to put this program together. And, appropriately, we will start with an introduction by him, and then move to the panel.

Kwei-Bo?

KWEI-BO HUANG: Thanks a lot, Richard. And also, I have to thank all my colleagues working at CNAPS, Brookings, for making this event happen. And I thank you all for your participation.

I think today this event is one of the very few occasions in Washington where people gather to discuss public diplomacy. And its goals, practices, opportunities and challenges for state actors in East Asia -- Northeast Asia, that is Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

I also think that some issues we are going to touch upon will include, for example, the history of public diplomacy, the governmental structures under public diplomacy is carried out, societal and international impetuses or restraints in the foreseeable future for these public diplomacy programs, or some practical suggestions for these governments for their respective public diplomacy programs.

It's very interesting to observe the contemporary evolution of public diplomacy in these four countries, mainly because the time for most of the state actors in this region to promote public diplomacy has been ripe. It has been ripe.

Leave aside the bureaucracies' capability to promote public diplomacy, let's think about some very basic conditions that have been met by these countries, or state actors, to promote public diplomacy in contemporary international community.

First, the condition is a foundation of rich traditional and pop cultures, important components of soft power. And this foundation serves the objectives of gastro-diplomacy, citizen diplomacy through tourism, and so on. That's the first condition.

And the second condition, probably even more important, is a strong national financial capability, with a variety of foreign aid programs that can promote public diplomacy. And I think these four actors actually are rich enough, at different levels, of course, to enhance public diplomacy.

And the third condition that has been met is the invention and application of advanced communication technology, either domestically or internationally. And I believe the four countries are very capable of doing this in this advanced communication technology, then promoting public diplomacy.

And the last, but not least, condition that has been met is a motive of using public diplomacy for certain purposes -- probably in a competitive environment. Think about Mainland China. Mainland China has motive, very strong, to restore its international image and to garner more support from the general publics in various countries. And South Korea, South Korea has the motive, as well, in order to remind people of a sharp difference between the two Koreas. And Taiwan, too. Taiwan needs a strong motive -- and Taiwan has it -- to strive for Taiwan's niche for survival and national development in the shadow of Mainland China.

So, what about Japan? Maybe Japan might have a relatively smaller motive for rigorous public diplomacy programs, but maybe I'm wrong. But I think Japan's constraints on using hard power after the Second World War, and Japan's recovery and transformation needs from the post-March 11 earthquake and nuclear disaster, can make Japan concentrate even more on public diplomacy in order to achieve its diplomatic goals.

So I think it's high time for us to discuss and ponder upon public diplomacy in Northeast Asia nowadays.

Without further ado, I think we can proceed to beginning the four presentations. Then we are followed by two comments by two experts.

Thank you very much.

DR. BUSH: Thank you, Kwei-Bo, for that introduction to frame the issue.

We will now ask Professor Changjian Jiang, who is an associate professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, and currently a visiting scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia.

Professor Jiang?

CHANGJIAN JIANG: Thank you, Director Richard Bush, and thank you, Professor Huang Kwei-Bo.

So, yes, my speech sequencing provides this last one. So, last one is best one. I got very nervous. But I now moved to first one. But China, we have a saying that first one means good start; means half-success. I got more nervous right now.

Okay, so my topic is about China public diplomacy. I will conduct this speech in 12 to 15 minutes, but it is enough for me, because my English will use up in 10 minutes.

My speech has three parts. One is I will short introduction about evolution of China public diplomacy. The second one, I will present the China public diplomacy characteristics, especially its institutionalized system. And the third one is the Chinese public diplomacy will meet some current challenges.

The first one, the evolution of the China public diplomacy -- so in 2005, the Professor Joseph Nye wanted the world to know, or to pay attention to the rise of the China soft power. But even though, he changed his mind. Recently he wrote article about China's soft power, he used a word like "weak," deficit.

And a lot of the scholars also pay attention to the rise of the China public diplomacy. Yes, the China public diplomacy moved very fast recently, but the China public diplomacy does not start with the empty-handed. If we go back to 1949, at that time Chairman Mao said we should manage the global affairs. We should let China's voice go around the world. But at that time, what kind of voice? Two. One is the Chairman Mao want the world to get to know the new China. The second one is Chairman Mao want to use some measures of the propaganda to support the anti-imperialism, and communism, of course support the national liberal movement, especially from the third world.

But if we go to after the Cultural Revolution, the China public diplomacy had a little bit changed. More and more the department from Party side, even from government side, gets involved in the public diplomacy decision-making process. So at this time, at this stage, we have two goals of China public diplomacy. One, we want to promote the China open and the reform policy. And the other one is that we should get much more pleasant, the international opinion environment.

So, we move to the third stage of the China public diplomacy, from 1989 to now. This time, or this period, the China public diplomacy will also have two goals. One, try to get a favorable public opinion around the international community, and the same time, try to get more the international audience to understand the China character of economic growth and social development.

Okay, you can look through these filters just to present the evolution of the China public diplomacy in detail. I want to point out this from 2009; China just launched a systematic public diplomatic strategy.

Why? Because this year, the Chairman Hu Jintao, the first time, the China top leader mentioned the public diplomacy in his speech. But, you know, in China we all know if the top leaders engage in something, we will move this kind of thing very quickly.

So, this year, or year after that, the division of information office in MFA upgrade to the Department of Information Office of MFA. *[Editor's Note: The office in question is the*

*division of public diplomacy, subsequently upgraded to the Department of Public Diplomacy Office.] And 2010, the minister of the MFA, Yang Jiechi, first time to systematically mention the China public diplomatic strategy. And the same time, interesting thing, is the chairman of the National Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qinglin, he take the public diplomacy as the main function of MPCC. So that means from the 2009, the China public diplomacy moved very fast. Okay. This is the historical background of the China public diplomacy.*

So we have another background we call the current background of China public diplomacy. One is globalization. You know, during the globalization, the economic interdependence with the world economy. So China makes rapid economic growth. But the question is, China make the rapid economic growth at the expense of the downplay of the Western countries' economy. But we should explain the China economic policy to our side of the world.

The second one is transparency of foreign policy. After the Cold War, the foreign policy area becomes much more open. The China, we have same story. More and more people have a strong interest in China foreign policy, not only just to listen the foreign policy, they want to present their comments -- not in newspaper, but on the internet...like professor Huang just mentioned, application of communication and technology. As we may know, the bad news will go around the world in 10 minutes. But China, if you observe the global media, their coverage about China, so I have to say most of them is negative about China. So China must use the global media and internet to present their idea about what they have done in the domestic politics, even the politics abroad.

The fourth, experience and the demonstration of other countries. When Obama visited China, he had a very good dialogue with the Chinese young people. And he also accepted interview from Nanfang Weekly. So a lot of foreign leaders, when they visit China, they communicate with the Chinese local people – so, what China will do?

The fifth, opportunity of big events. 2008, we have Olympic Games, and 2010 we have Expo. China wants to use these big events to promote China's national image, and to broadcasting China the social, economic development story all around the world.

The sixth, strategy of cultural development. Yes, we have very clear strategy for the cultural development. We also invest a lot of money on this area. So now, in the maybe next five years, the China will put a lot of money to encourage the cultural education and the educational exchange.

The seventh is drawing from leaders and specialists. Okay, the Chinese top leaders, when they visited abroad, will like to communicate with the media, and communicate with the local people.

The last one is, carry on a tradition. As I just mentioned, the China's public diplomacy does not start empty-handed. We have a long tradition of people-to-people diplomacy.

So, now, how many departments get involved in the China public diplomacy? You can look (inaudible). We have more than 20 departments, even from the Party side and government side, and from NGO side get involved in the public diplomacy. It's very complicated system in China. But the problem is how to integrate it and how to coordinate.

So we have four ways to integrate it and coordinate. One is the membership. The top leaders of the departments from government side and from Party side also are the members of we call it "Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of CPC-CCC." The second one is Joint Conference. The MFA, he noticed we have a very complicated system; we need to integrate it and coordinate it. So he just set up the Joint Conference; more than 10 departments from the Party side and from the government side, joined this conference. We call the Public Diplomacy System of Joint Conference at ministry level.

The third one is Comm Director. The interesting thing, in China we have one department from Party side, we have another department from the government side. But the director is the same. The director is the same. Let me give you an example here. The International Communication Office of CPC Central Committee, and the Information Office of State Council, they share the same director.

The last one is in the system. The example is MPCC encourages the PCC at the sub-national level to promote establishment of the public diplomatic association so we have a way to integrate and coordinate the China complicated public diplomatic system.

Okay, two minutes.

So, the characteristic of public diplomacy in China, one is defensive. The current China public diplomacy, we try to counter the saying in the international community: saying like what, is China threat? Okay -- China arrogant. China's responsibility.

The second one, all the policy about the China public diplomacy, it just tries to get the favorable public opinion environment, tries to promote the China economic growth. The China public diplomacy, we don't want to -- how to say? -- distribute or promote our values or our ideology, inclusive. We don't want to compete with other countries, especially in values or ideology in the international communities. We just share values; just present the Chinese, their idea about the global security and global economic security, cooperative.

I just mentioned a lot of departments from government side and Party side organizations engage in the China public diplomacy. We need an institution to integrate and coordinate, selective.

The China public diplomacy, it doesn't want to do everything for the public diplomacy. It does things selective, like -- one minute? Okay -- such as the MFA, they do projects, try to arrange the chairman, top leader, to communicate with local people when they visit abroad. And we use the big events to promote China's image. We encourage cultural and

educational exchange, and we also get more and more NGOs, even the people from outside of the China, involved in the public diplomacy.

Okay, challenges. The political challenge. So, yes, we promote the China public diplomacy very fast recently, but we got the challenges from domestic issues, like Tibet issues, and the Qingzang issues, and some other politically sensitive issues; it may damage your efforts of the public diplomacy over one night, if you cannot handle these issues smoothly.

The economic challenges. As you may know, the world economics are not so good right now. Some politicians blame their economic conditions on the Chinese economic policy. We try to explain it to outside of China.

The cultural challenges. Because, like United States they have CNN, like the United Kingdom we have BBC, we have CCTV-4 and CCTV-9. But, you know, CCTV-4 and CCTV-9, it is now the big global media. Of course, 80 percent of communication comes by global media uses English as its main language, but not in the (inaudible). We have historical challenges. And the conceptual and the technology challenges.

Okay, here is the outcome of the China public diplomacy, if you look at the BBC poll about the people's views of, the influence of China. Here is the Western countries. France, Germany, and the U.K., and Italy and Russia. This is from Africa. This is from America. This is from China's neighboring countries. You can see, less people from Western world, they view China's influence positively. Even less the people from our neighboring countries, especially from Indonesia. Of course, in Japan -- you can see Japan here -- less than 20 percent of the people will view China's influence positively.

So, Africa is fine. And in Europe, U.K. is fine. But France, Germany, Italy, we've got less the people view China's influence positively. That means the work of the China public diplomacy, will still long way to go.

Thank you. (*Applause*)

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Professor Jiang.

And now we turn to Professor Nancy Snow in Tokyo. Professor Snow is professor of communications at California State University at Fullerton. This year she is a Fulbright Professor at Sophia University.

Professor Snow, thank you for joining us.

DR. SNOW: Thank you for having me. And *konbanwa*, good evening, to everybody.

I'm going to launch right into this --

DR. BUSH: Please.



DR. SNOW: -- and talk about the fact that Japan is really playing catch-up in the region, when it involves public diplomacy. It's always had a soft power agenda in the aftermath of World War II, when Japan's new constitution, specifically Article 9, forbade any military ambitions again.

But, of course, Japan, in the post-war period, took about 30 years or so to reach an economic super-power status. And so cultural diplomacy really took off, I would say, in the '60s, early '70s. The Japan Foundation was founded in 1972. There is a well known Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme, the JET Programme that brings over English-language teachers. It's been very popular. Another institutional organization of public diplomacy in Japan is the sort of Peace-Corps version, called the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, the JOCVs. And this consists of both young people, as well as seniors, going abroad, involving themselves in global development projects. We also, more recently, in Japan, have an Office of Global Communications in the prime minister's office. This is very new.

So the soft-power agenda has been there. And Japan's core strength in public diplomacy -- no surprise -- has been cultural diplomacy: "cool Japan," including manga, anime, J-pop, J-fashion, as well as an appreciation, exhibit of traditional Japanese culture -- rock gardens and architecture, tea ceremony, kimono culture.

The problem with the focus on anime and manga is that these features of Japan have taken off globally as part of the globalization process, and as a response to global consumer tastes. The global appeal of manga and anime have nothing to do with the Japanese state. It's not as if the government here first put these in place. So the challenge remains today, in Japan, how does the state expand this hip and cool sort-power image of Japan? And also, how does it reconcile that with Japan's East Asian history, its mixed reputation in the region?

I want to talk about sort of two phases of Japanese public diplomacy. And just as we had in America, sort of pre-9/11-post-9/11, we have pre-3/11 here.

In the 2000s, the Japanese government began to really appreciate an expansion of cultural exchange and cultural diplomacy. Just six years ago, the foreign minister, Taro, linked manga and anime with a hearts-and-minds campaign to China's youth, in a speech that he gave over here in the Akihabara District, the electronics mecca of Tokyo, to the University of Digital Content. He wondered, in this speech, what pictures emerge in the heads of foreigners when they hear the name "Japan". And he said, the more positive, the easier it is for Japan to get across its long-term views.

That same year, in '06, the head of Toyota, working with a ministry of foreign affairs advisory council, called the Council on the Movement of People Across Borders, recommended an international manga grand prize. And its purpose was twofold: to target international artists of manga and anime, and to appoint Japanese artists as cultural ambassadors to help promote J-pop overseas.

Just a year later, in '07, Taro gave a policy speech to the Diet here that officially called for J-pop to be used as a public diplomacy tool. And he said at that time, what is important is to be able to induce other countries to listen to Japan. If the use of pop culture can be useful in this process, we certainly should make the most of them.

Now, a natural offspring of this vision could be the AKB48 girl group. I don't know if anybody's heard of them, but that's Akihabara 48. And it has sort of spun off a lot of these Japanese girl groups throughout the region. And the AKB48, it was announced this week, will be involved in the promotion of Japanese reconstruction bonds. So I couldn't help but think of, during World War II, the Hollywood actors and actresses getting involved in promoting war bonds. And now in 2012, you've got AKB48 girl groups promoting reconstruction bonds.

"Cool Japan" -- the focus on Cool Japan has its problems. What does it mean to be "cool?" It's rather an ephemeral concept. Today's Cool Japan is tomorrow's Cool Korea, or Cool India, or Cool Taiwan. The Japanese government, and institutions like the Japan Foundation, recognize that being a cultural super-power isn't enough -- especially against the background of the lost decades.

Nevertheless, the emphasis on culture continues here in Japan, in a region where China, South Korea, Taiwan assert their own cultural features -- China, of course, with its global Confucian Institutes, in particular.

So the question then remains -- maybe that we can answer -- is culture power in the Northeast Asian region just politics by other means?

Now, let me shift to a new phase. 3/11 changed everything in Japan. It is no longer exclusively Cool Japan. There has been more of an inward-looking Japan. I would call it here a shift toward gratitude relations, Yamato spirit, that is driving Japan's soft power. Last year, in the international press, while there was negative coverage, of course, about Fukushima, the tsunami, the positive coverage was of the Japanese people, the pictures that spoke a thousand words, with long lines of people politely lined up, waiting for hours for water and food.

That picture, to the world, is an opportunity now. So what started out as neighbor-to-neighbor in Japan, after the quake and tsunami, was quickly appreciated internationally, and donations poured in. So, in terms of, Japanese public diplomacy, we went from "pray for Japan," the Lady Gaga-type bracelets that raised over \$3 million -- the Lady Gaga effect in 2011 became "Japan thanks you" effect in 2012. So, Japan's image today is on the rise with its recovery period.

But there is another side to this coin that is a major concern, and that is how do you promote Japanese public diplomacy, person-to-person diplomacy, when public suspicion persists related to the Fukushima nuclear fallout, and the Japanese government's lack of transparency in that period?

There is a huge loss of trust in government and corporate institutions. The issue today, where there's a lot of divided public opinion, and a tension between the government and the

people, of course, is what will the future look like? Will it be Cool Japan? Green Japan? Will it be a nuclear Japan? A post-nuclear Japan? Or something in between?

The mass anti-nuclear sentiments in Japan challenge the government's efforts to link nuclear power with the Japan nation-branding campaign of the so-called "Future City." And just two days ago, former Prime Minister Kan told the Diet that Japan should give up nuclear power. Now, maybe that's easy for him to say. He's no longer prime minister. Prime Minister Noda will decide, in the next days and weeks, whether or not to start a nuclear power plant in the Fukui Prefecture.

And so there is, again -- with public opinion, I think, at about two-thirds against nuclear power -- there is this tension about how Japan will present itself to the world. With the decline in the population, with the so-called shrinking society, there may be an opportunity to sort of re-image Japan. But to be a totally no-nuke nation: I don't foresee that.

Another great concern that I wanted to address vis-a-vis Japanese public diplomacy, I'd bring to your attention today's *International Herald Tribune*, if you didn't see the article. There is a persistent lack of internationalization in Japanese higher education, also -- according to *The New York Times* and the *Herald Tribune* -- in hiring Japanese who have studied abroad. So, internationalization in Japan has traditionally been linked to economic growth and to business issues.

So the Japanese government, in the last few years, to address this lack of internationalization in higher ed formed the Global 30 Project, which was originally slated to involve up to 30 universities, but it stands today at 13. These 13 Japanese institutions of higher learning are using government funds to internationalize their curriculum, to increase foreign student percentages, and to offer more English language instruction. The program's goal is to reach 300,000 international students in Japan by 2020.

Now, let's look at the reality. The 13 member institutions alone had about 21,000 international students in 2011. Foreign student numbers in Japan in 2011 were just over 138,000, with nearly 90,000 coming from one country, China, and the rest from South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Malaysia. U.S. student numbers in Japan were 1,400.

Global interest in the Japanese language is on a rise, in part because of love and affection for J-pop, manga, anime, more than for economic reasons. But Japan recognizes it has no equivalent to the Confucian Institutes outside the Japan Foundation.

Less than 4 percent of Japan's university students are from overseas. That's about 133,000, compared to China's 223,000, and the U.S., with over 672,000 international students.

I am part of 5 percent of foreign faculty here in Japan. Most of us are hired to either teach in English -- as I was hired to teach American foreign policy and American culture at Sophia, in English -- or these foreign instructors are hired to teach English as a second language.

The Japanese government is concerned that fewer Japanese students are going abroad to the U.S. and Europe. South Korea, which is half the size of Japan, sends twice the number of its students to America.

All of this is causing angst about Japan's ability to compete globally. But, with one of the worst public debts among industrialized nations, these changes will be slow.

It was mentioned earlier, in reference to China, that there is also a lack of a global media presence. Same thing holds in Japan. Nothing equivalent to a CNN International or a BBC-like global media. I think, in part, the prime minister's office established the Office of Global Communications to strengthen its presence with international media, and to reestablish the credibility of the Japan brand.

But a closed-image society -- a closed-society image, I should say -- persists. Japan's government policies favor ethnic homogeneity to maintain social order over a more immigrant policy. And Japan's going to have to address this in the future. If you add in the fact that Japanese is not a global language, either in business or diplomacy, you have a recipe for a more sluggish soft-power nation.

In the future, public diplomacy agenda will likely expand in gratitude relations in two areas, I should say -- open reconstruction collaboration, and also, when possible, official developmental assistance. A recent boost is that Japan is now a finalist to hold the summer Olympics in 2020. However, there's been sort of a back-and-forth about how much support there is among the Tokyo-ites for hosting the Olympics in 2020. It seems to be under 50 percent, so it's not quite the boost they were looking for.

There is also -- I wanted to mention the Japan Foundation again, celebrating its 40th anniversary. And just to do kind of a quick case study of Japan Foundation, 40 years ago, maybe in what we could call "PD 1.0," as opposed to "Public Diplomacy 3.0," the style back then was to be very culturally specific, to show a nation's cultural uniqueness, to go big with exhibits, to go macro.

Today, according to one of the directors I spoke to at the Japan Foundation, the focus is now more toward compassion, person-to-person diplomacy, more of a micro approach. As he described it, Mr. Hara -- Hideki Hara -- he said it is about getting nods from people, as opposed to having a big wow-factor.

And he gave me an example of a small exchange. The Japan Foundation brought over a Brazilian-Japanese artist by the name of Hamilton Yokota, who goes by the name TFreak. And he's a graffiti artist. He was brought over on an exchange to paint very bright murals -- flowers and fish -- on temporary houses in Ishinomaki, which is part of the damaged region in the Honshu region. And as Mr. Hara explained it to me, he said, it meant everything to the officials from the Japan Foundation to get smiles from those who are living in the temporary housing.

It is very much a micro, sort of small level, person-to-person style of public diplomacy. You could call it, perhaps, the personal, the *kizuna*, is public diplomacy in Japan.

I think the challenge for Japan today -- just to finish up my remarks -- is how does a nation, that has over 2 million who have clicked "like" on the sushi page on Facebook -- how does that translate into state and foreign policy goals? How does a government -- where, again, there's decline in public trust in government, both domestically and internationally -- how does a government then expand the good will coming out of the post-3/11 period? And I think this is going to be a challenge for Japan going forward.

I also wanted to mention, this year is the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Educational Commission that oversees Fulbright. And on Friday we had a reception. And, to our surprise -- this was at the Imperial Palace -- the Emperor and Empress were our surprise guests. There were maybe a couple of hundred people there.

What was striking to me was to see so few young people. So the Japanese Fulbrighters were those who had gone on exchanges in the '50s and '60s. They are now in the 70s, some are in their 80s. And I wonder, as somebody who's now been on my second Fulbright, you know, who's going to replace these people in international educational exchange? And I think it's a worry for me, as much as it's a worry, probably, for those inside the Office of Global Communications.

So I think I will stop there and listen to my other fellow panelists.

Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

DR. BUSH: Thank you, Professor Snow. You raise some important questions. We now move to Korea, and our speaker is Stephen Noerper, who is the senior vice president at the Korea Society.

Steve?

STEPHEN NOERPER: Thank you. Good morning, and thank you to Richard, and to Kevin, and Jennifer, and all here. I greatly appreciate being here, and thank you, all of you, for coming.

The Korean situation, I think, is interesting, and you'll hear some differentiation from both of the former two case studies in some interesting ways in the next few minutes.

I do think there are some carry-overs, and some of what Professor Jiang emphasized, in terms of the reactions to the historical, also play out, certainly, in Korea.

By way of background, just briefly, when you talk about the Korean situation in public diplomacy, a root, a foundation that's really important in terms of the quest for legitimacy, in light of colonialism, in light of factionalism that followed the colonial period in the mid-few

years of the last century, and that led into the Korean War. So, certainly, colonialism, factionalism, and war left a Korea that had found itself demoralized, basically destroyed by the scourge of war.

And so, to borrow from Gustavo Lagos and the literature of the early '60s that was modeled around colonialism, there was a reaction to that loss of status. And I think we hear that, maybe, in a few of the other cases in different -- of course, different historical contexts. But that is a primary driver.

Secondly, to borrow from Rostow, on economic stages of growth, the growing economic technological maturity certainly has led to a shift among Koreans, in terms of trying to elevate their status on the regional and global stage. And I would couple with that the motivation associated with vulnerability and threat, which is a heavy emphasis of Krasner and others -- although it's not exclusively that. So there's a bit of an exception here, that the vulnerability and threat that South Korea feels, especially vis-a-vis North Korea -- which I'll get to more in a minute -- is an important factor at play.

And for most of the early part of Korea's public diplomacy experiment, a bifurcated international system was very much in flux, but, over time, with economics elevated to a realm of high politics, to borrow from Rostow. And I think the interesting part of that is that during the Cold War, Korea benefitted from being on the right side, in the sense of the alliance with the Americans. And that had both a positive benefit, as well as a negative benefit of being overshadowed, or the accusations of being a U.S. puppet or U.S. dependent. And that was an adjective used much more in the '60s and early '70s.

What we did see over the course of the '70s and '80s was a Korea that prospered diplomatically, as well as economically. There's been lots of literature on the economic miracle, but there's very much a diplomatic miracle. And we've seen that play out in some of the other Asian Tigers, as well.

But the combination for Korea of democratization in 1987, hosting the Olympics in 1988, the end of the Cold War, the policy of Nordpolitik, modeled after Ostpolitik, that led to normalizations with the former communist countries -- maybe most importantly with the former Soviet Union and with China -- and then in 1992, led Korea to join, with North Korea, in the United Nations' membership.

There is an important definition -- and I think this was a useful term introduced in the introduction by Kwei-Bo Huang -- about sharp differences. And so there's a sense of exceptionalism in the Korea case. Interesting, in that maybe one of the only other obvious examples would be China and Taiwan, on a global basis.

But the counterbalance with North Korea, and what that meant in terms of economic competition in the 1960s -- where it's largely argued that there was parity between the two Koreas, and a relative North Korean advantage in the early and mid-'70s -- by way of international support. That was a period with the strength of the non-aligned movement, when a

large share of positive international attention actually went more toward the North Koreans. Within 15 years, that was -- and lots of great data sets on this -- but that was largely reversed, and went very much the other way, to support, after the end of the Cold War, and with economic advancement, towards South Korea.

So there's an advancement of public diplomacy, in terms of a term and an understanding that really fundamentally departs with democratization, and with the Olympics. And Professor Jiang mentioned the power of the Olympiad, by way of China, but certainly for South Korea, the 1988 summer games was a huge, huge coming of age.

The definition, then, can largely, in this sense, be defined by the DPRK challenge and growing economic contacts during that period of time, the '60s through the '80. And the coordination of this was largely under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the information service part of the Ministry of Culture.

There are offsets that have persisted, in terms of the perceptions vis-à-vis the DPRK. And there are challenges and opportunities akin to that. Certainly, North Korea is associated with, largely, negatives today -- nuclearization, missiles, threat -- and that is a huge distractor for the South Koreans as they go forward.

In the other sense, it's an opportunity. Somebody recently said to me, "Where do you do most of your work?" And I mentioned Korea, and they said, "The regular Korea, or the other Korea?" So there's a notion of "regular" that I think is rather important here.

Let me summarize Korea's public diplomacy policy goals and practices.

There is this expanded definition. The context of the '50s, of the '80s, giving way, really, from the '90s onward toward economics and business. Cultural exports -- and we've seen for most of the 2000s a real flowering of Korean culture. The establishment of the Korea Foundation -- much more recently than Nancy has cited with the Japan Foundation -- in 1991, by the Korean National Assembly to enhance international, to grow exchanges. But under its most recent president, Kim Byung-kook, who is a friend of many here in this room, the growth of the role to really look at Korea's expansion of soft power globally.

I would note here that today we also have a definition, in terms of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs goals to consolidate its relations with neighbors, to expand contacts with other regions, consolidate multilateral efforts, to support overseas Korean communities, and to actively pursue cultural diplomacy. And those have become something of the framework around which most of the understanding of public diplomacy is focused.

There are other ministries increasingly involved. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy campaign to boost competitiveness and exports with design and branding focus really initiated in 2000. So the notion of a brand "Korea" became very much more dominant this last decade.

And so this array of ministries and entities -- the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, with its motto of "Culture Enjoyed by Everyone," the growth of entities like the Presidential Council on National Branding, which was established in January of 2009, by executive decree, to promote Korea's global image, to right misconceptions about Korea, its culture, products, and people, and to raise respect to support Korean business and nationals abroad. So you can see the dovetail with the priorities of something like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Important to note, one of the very strong things is the leveraging here of private sector brands -- the vision for Power Korea 2010 goal of 70 percent of exports in brand-name products, and a minimum 10 Korean brands among the world's top 100.

Expanding corporate influence and the impact of global brand leaders: Samsung, LG, Hyundai. And this can't be emphasized enough, in terms of international perceptions of Korea, and the association with quality, much-in-demand products. Certainly, the largest share, between Samsung and LG, of handsets globally, global leader in flat-panel technology, *Motor Trend's* car of the year -- these are huge, in terms of cementing a notion of efficiencies.

The expanding global media -- it's still a nascent effort, but there is an Arirang TV that is oriented towards a broader global coverage. It's linked to an Arirang Radio, which is connected to SiriusXM, and a broadcast of something called "Korea Today." This is led by CNN's former bureau chief Sohn Jie-ae. Three English-language dailies -- but an area, too, that is expanding and going through some changes.

And then I would note, also, a growth in information technology -- broadband IT, Korea Vision 2007, IT 839 Strategy, which was aimed at IT research, commerce, and infrastructure. And with the development of things I've mentioned, like handhelds, the associated technologies -- there's been a lot in the paper, just today and yesterday, about Samsung's new handheld platform, and how its newest release in Europe has been very popular. Smart television is another one.

The growth in cross-cultural communication, and the recent regional lead with exports of K-pop, K-classical, telenovelas, gaming, animation, film, with recognition at Cannes, Berlin, and other festivals. And not only to Asia but to Africa, Latin America, and now the United States and Europe. And, as we've seen, that operates on many levels, but it seems to be a popular entertainment, something that has gained real, real steam.

I would couple all of this with growth in regional and global leadership with Korea. The "global Korea" theme of the current Korean administration, the hosting of the 2010 G-20 leaders' summit, and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, this year's Yeosu World Expo, the 2018 winter Olympics.

There are aspirations leadership roles in green technology and nuclear energy, things like the UAE deal. The rise of Koreans and Korean-Americans in the United States, in international affairs: Secretary General Ban Ki-moon; Song Sang-Hyun, the president of the



International Criminal Court; Jim Yong Kim, the president of the World Bank; U.S. Ambassador to the ROK, Sung Y. Kim; U.S. State Department Legal Advisor, Harold Koh.

Really, the Korean-American success story, contributing to positive cultural branding here, and the Korean experience on the nevertheless stage being one of enhanced leadership, and that certainly has a very positive impact in terms of international perceptions.

Culinary diplomacy, which has been a priority of the First Lady of Korea for a few years now -- and I'll mention in just a few moments, we do tremendous turnout at programs like these when they involve culinary activity -- but the whole motivation and excitement around that.

And then to echo Nancy's presentation in terms of mention of volunteers abroad, Korean volunteers abroad have become very much an active force. It's modeled on the U.S. Peace Corps, and there are other tie-ins, Korean missionaryism, construction, and other business activities.

And then, lastly, the growth of Sejong Institutes -- much smaller than the Confucius Institutes, but still a priority of some in Seoul, and the continued strength of Koreans studying in the United States and abroad.

Let me just say in a minute's time about public diplomacy and the Korea Society. We are an independent American non-profit. We're celebrating our 55th anniversary this year, promoting an enhanced understanding between the peoples of Korea and the United States. Our support comes from corporations and individuals. About 10 percent of our funding comes from the Korea Foundation. But we are not a lobbying organization, although there is something here in town, the Korean Economic Institute, which has wonderful programs; they are registered lobbyists.

But we are an independent U.S. organization based out of New York, but with programs, a few here in Washington, and then increasingly, nationally. We've just finished up in Austin. And for our New York programs we've done, in the last two years, 90-plus. We had over 10,000 attendees this last year. We've been trying to grow those constituencies among young professionals and others, and they include things on film, education, as I've noted, culinary, visual culture, and, first and foremost, policy and corporate programs out of our New York offices. And it's become something of a model for some other national aspirants -- Mongolia and the Philippines are two endeavors that have crossed our paths in recent months.

Let me just say, then, by way of conclusion, a few of the foreseeable challenges.

One is the challenge of coordination of the public diplomacy effort. And as Professor Jiang said in his presentation, very complicated. There's always the challenge of integration and coordination.

I would caution that, though, by saying that the competition among these entities can be a good thing and that with that comes innovation and new approaches. So I think we need to be very clear, as we try to define public diplomacy vis-à-vis state-led efforts versus corporate, or

individual and people-to-people contact efforts, how stratified one really wants to be in one's prescriptions. But it's interesting to debate, and maybe we'll get to that in the Q&A.

The challenge of the sustainability of public diplomacy efforts in Korea that are heavily reliant on corporate and cultural exports -- because to continue the current level, they have to maintain a leading edge. And so there's already been a spate of articles about things cooling, and that's a concern among some in cultural circles. But I think, given the tremendous gains of recent years, that that's something that's maybe a bit overstated.

A challenge to maintaining the global Korea theme -- I mentioned it's associated with this administration. I recently had a Korean colleague who said that that term may not well be used after the December election, as people try to define themselves against the prior administration. But it's something to keep in mind, because the use of language here, and the emphasis, especially, to domestic population in terms of global orientation is really important.

The challenge posed by DPRK brinksmanship, and the distraction that that has meant to global attention -- the association of the word "Korea," too often, especially in American mindsets, with North Korea, and Kim Jong-il, and now Kim Jong-un.

And then, in terms of the longer term, the challenge of integration, and the evolution of public diplomacy for integrating in a united Korea, and the challenge of building support among overseas Koreans, because they are disparate communities. Though it's a stated priority, it's not akin to the Cuban-American community, for example, which is motivated toward Castro. It's much more decentralized, but perhaps it might be more mobilized as Koreans integrate over time.

And then, lastly, there has been a decline in terms of student attendance in the United States, though it's still a formidable force, visas and other restrictions, you know, have played out internationally. They don't affect just Koreans, by all means. They tend to have affected a lot of different populations in the course of the last decade. But we need to consider that, in terms of our own competitiveness, and our integration and demonstration effect.

So those are some thoughts, in terms of public diplomacy in South Korea. And I look forward to talking more about it with you in the Q&A. *(Applause)*

DR. BUSH: That's great, Steve. Thank you very much.  
And now we come back to Kwei-Bo.

DR. HUANG: Thanks, Richard. And please stop me at the 16th minute.  
Today, I think my topic covers Taiwan only. And I'm going to focus on contemporary public diplomacy practice of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

First, I would like to mention a little bit the decentralized nature of Taiwan's public diplomacy in the central government. To me, I think there are only four major central government agencies that are held responsible for Taiwan's public diplomacy. The first one is, of course, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which absorbs the international communication programs from the Governmental Information Office, GIO, on May 20th. So it's sort of like the case of USIA and Department of State in the 1990s, the same story happened in Taiwan just a few days ago. And supervised by Foreign Affairs Ministry, there is Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Foundation. We call it Taiwan ICDF. It offers educational and training cooperation to international or non-governmental organizations, and to Taiwan's allies and friendly countries to develop the human resources based on the so-called "Taiwan experience," and also to spur social and economic progress with the assistance of the Taiwan government.

And also under the supervision of Foreign Affairs, there is the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, where I used to serve as a vice president for one-and-a-half years. And this Taiwan Foundation for Democracy is sort of like the National Endowment for Democracy in the States.

And in addition to Foreign Affairs, there is an Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission. It was called "Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission." When the DPP came into office in 2000, they disliked the term "Chinese," so they changed from "Chinese" to "Compatriot." Of course, it works on diaspora democracy, connecting with overseas Chinese Taiwanese, with a macro-view TV that is broadcasting in 90 -- nine, zero -- countries, on the basis of a very small budget. Last year, it was about \$5.5 million U.S. only.

And the third agency I'm going to talk about is the Ministry of Education, in charge of education exchange programs, and the various scholarships provided by the Taiwan government.

And the fourth is the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, newly established, through its international cooperative arrangements and exchange programs in culture.

In addition to these agencies, there is a Tourism Bureau under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. Of course, it deals with the promotion of tourism from abroad to Taiwan.

And the last major organization I'm going to touch upon is the Taiwan External Trade Development Council, TAITRA. TAITRA is a non-profit organization set up by the Republic of China government to work on the branding of Taiwanese products and companies, in order to increase the so-called innovation value of their products and expertise, and to expand trade relations between Taiwan and foreign countries.

So, at least, these are, to me, the major government agencies, or government-established agencies, dealing with Taiwan's public diplomacy. And apparently, as you can tell, they are not well-organized, and they are not well-coordinated.

Nowadays, I think Taiwan has a very urgent need to retool these public diplomacy programs, for one reason. For example, Foreign Affairs Ministry's budget had increased by about 60 percent during the period from 1994 to 2008. However the number of Taiwan's diplomatic allies dropped, from 29 in 2000, to 23 in 2008, until now -- not to mention checkbook diplomacy played by the two sides of the Taiwan strait do not contribute to global good governance, and for Taiwan, its international image.

And for a second reason: Mainland China's manipulative soft power may reduce the connections, or weaken the connections between Taiwan and its diplomatic allies, thus further isolating Taiwan in diplomacy.

And for a third reason: Taiwan's hard power cannot be compared with than of Mainland China. But I think Taiwan's economic power is still too huge to ignore, not to mention Taiwan's global digital economy position, in Taiwan's ICT, in Taiwan's banking, et cetera, et cetera. So I think Taiwan's public diplomacy should capitalize on this.

And also, Taiwan has been able to become a humanitarian power, and gain leverage through classical and pop cultures, and good deeds performed by Taiwan's general public. So I think, rather than spending financial resources and political capital wooing foreign governments, Taiwan can do better in terms of promoting successful public diplomacy programs in order to increase its international image, in order to gain more support from the international community, and generate a significant amount of goodwill from foreign people.

And what about the challenges and opportunities faced by Taiwan? I think there are two challenges, at least, for Taiwan.

The first challenge is the public diplomacy-related programs are not coordinated at the cabinet level, thus lacking integrated strategic goals. One of the agencies with cabinet backing must be made to serve as the leading coordinator to provide directions, and to launch interagency programs on public diplomacy. And, because I was on public service leave for the past few years, so I know no agency, no ministry at the cabinet level is willing to do that, because no one wants to lead. No one wants to be the number one to lead in bureaucracy in Taiwan. So I think it depends on the will of the very top leadership to ask at least one ministry to take the leading role.

And, in the meantime, I think the knowledge and awareness of public diplomacy are not yet sufficient for Taiwan to develop a good public diplomacy program. Therefore, I think Taiwan government needs to think of a way to come up with some good training programs in order to stimulate the bureaucracy's thinking and awareness of the importance of public diplomacy for Taiwan's future.

And challenge two is that Taiwan's national image needs to be shaped with uniqueness and diversity in order to demonstrate the common but differentiated components with those of Mainland China. People know that Chinese culture has been preserved very well in Taiwan, and that we are proud to say that Taiwan's culture is actually the Chinese culture, with

Taiwanese characteristics. And in Taiwan, we can see a lot of things, new and old, and it's a good mixture of aboriginal and modern.

But I think nation-branding strategies that is planned and evolved with whatever current features and products that can best represent Taiwan is a must. Unlike Korea, South Korea, Taiwan hasn't had any committee that is cross-ministry or agencies, and that is working on nation branding.

When I served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was with the Foreign Minister at the Legislative Yuan defending the Foreign Affairs Ministry's budget. And one DPP legislator actually tried to cut the budget of Foreign Affairs by criticizing MOFA for doing some nation-branding research. He said, "That should be done by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, or TAITRA" -- the trade council. Not Foreign Affairs. And he tried to cut the budget for promoting youth exchanges to our diplomatic allies. You know, our 22 diplomatic allies, out of 23, are located in less developed countries, locations.

So I think that's one of the important missions for the Foreign Affairs Ministry, to send the youth generation to gain more experience with our diplomatic allies, and to enhance the people-to-people relations with our diplomatic allies. But that DPP legislator tried to cut the budget, saying, no, that should be done by the National Youth Commission, or the Ministry of Education, not you, Foreign Affairs.

So you can see, there is a huge, a very salient division of labor, forced division of labor, drawn by some people who really don't know public diplomacy and its essence. I think that will be a big problem for Taiwan.

And opportunities? I think there are also two.

The first opportunity for Taiwan is to promote Taiwan as a global role model of democratization, and as a beacon for the political development of Mainland China. Two approaches that can be undertaken by Taiwan are to enhance democratic assistance, mainly through the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. And, two, to build Taiwan's democratic image, and inspire citizens in less democratic countries, through Taiwan's help. And I think it's also very important to use the media, and the people-to-people exchanges to influence those countries subtly.

And the second opportunity I want to say is Taiwan can take advantage of its cultural and educational values, with strong ICT capability. So cultural diplomacy is, of course, one of the major tools for Taiwan to strengthen traditional diplomacy, by skillfully exporting Taiwan's cultural image to the world. And Taiwan can also foster a robust cultural, creative industry, or create a fund for cultural diplomacy, and also to create more Taiwan Academies abroad -- not in confrontation with the Confucius Institutions, but try to promote the Taiwanese, to promote Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics in Taiwan.

So I think Taiwan can also play a major role in global ICT industries that, at the same time, facilitate Taiwan's public diplomacy programs. So that also needs a great deal of interagency coordination in Taiwan.

Finally, I would like to provide several suggestions to Taiwan's future public diplomacy.

First, of course, better and resolute coordination of government agencies to find Taiwan niches in public diplomacy. In the shadow of Mainland China, it's a must.

Second, Taiwan really needs two things. What really makes Taiwan unique or attractive in the eyes of foreigners? That's something serious that needs to be pondered upon by the Taiwanese government.

And the third suggestion, or question, is how, or whether, can Taiwan's public diplomacy be less confrontational in the face of the rising China? We don't want to get involved in any more confrontational basis with Mainland China, but how can the soft measures of diplomacy be seen by Mainland China as less confrontational, and beneficial to the future development of the cross-Taiwan Strait relations?

And, lastly, as implied by some of my colleagues on the panel, the public-private partnership in planning and promoting public diplomacy is therefore very significant, strategically and practically. Without the participation of Taiwan's NGOs and big companies, can Taiwan's public diplomacy not have a bright future?

I think I will just stop here. Thank you. (*Applause*)

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much. We now have comments by two experts on public diplomacy. First is Adam Clayton Powell III, of the University of Southern California.

Adam?

ADAM CLAYTON POWELL: (in progress) -- have some strong public diplomacy elements in common. They all have huge, positive economic stories to tell. They've become major economic powers in one or, at most, two generations. Just think of where all four of these countries were 60 years ago.

This resonates throughout Africa, where I do a great deal of work, and Latin America: who do you want to emulate if you are a country in the south? Do you want to emulate Europe, or do you want to emulate East Asia? The answer is increasingly, and now almost unanimously, Asia.

All four countries have strong cultural stories to tell: music, art, now movies, and even food -- although some would say that it would be difficult to develop a taste, immediately, at least, for Taiwan's stinky tofu.

But all four face challenges of different kinds. In China, public diplomacy is always in conflict with internal policies. It's very much in the news recently, with the dissident who came to the United States, to New York. Tibet is a longstanding case in point. As Professor Jiang notes, bad news goes around the world in 10 minutes.

Beijing needs more of the story-teller, rather than the policy-repeater -- again, in Professor Jiang's terms. And it needs to upgrade CCTV, which it knows. This is a work in progress. CCTV, as you know, has constructed a major production center in New York, and has a large center in Los Angeles. And as those come on line, you'll see much more visible CCTV broadcasts here in the United States.

In Japan, as Professor Snow noted, there's a lack of a BBC or CNN-like global presence. NHK, again, is something of a work in progress. I would submit that NHK English language newscasts are now on the air daily in Los Angeles, on KCET television every afternoon, and public television. I don't think they did here, but public television in the United States in other cities carried live several hours a day of NHK coverage of the 3/11 tsunami and nuclear accidents. And, certainly, NHK is widespread, again, throughout the south, throughout Africa and Asia.

But there is isolation. As Professor Snow noted, the article of the *International Herald Tribune*, which is on the front page of the business section of today's *New York Times*, has a rather remarkable headline -- at least here in the U.S.: "For Japanese Job Seekers, Overseas Study Can Be a Deal Killer." It's not only study overseas -- they're not talking about *gaijin*, they're not talking about foreigners, these are Japanese job applicants in Japan. If they have studied outside of Japan, or have worked outside of Japan, these are considered major hurdles for getting a job in Japan.

Now, consider that, when also in today's news, in *The Wall Street Journal*, Japanese companies, which have larger cash on hand than all U.S. companies -- we've been reading a lot about the huge cash reserves of U.S. companies, the Japanese companies have even more, and they are in the process of making major, major investments outside of Japan. How you do this successfully at a time when you're turning inward in terms of hiring, in terms of education, and in terms of job experience is going to be a challenge.

It's also a challenge in the technology area. One of my appointments at USC has been in the School of Engineering. And certainly in the lab that I used to run, and others, they refer to Japanese R&D and being inward looking and, in fact, one image that's used is that Japan is like the Galapagos of technology. It evolves, but separately.

Japan also faces the rise of Korean industry -- high broadband penetration, cultural power, as Professor North noted. Also, to use Professor Jiang's wonderful phrase, the opportunity of big events -- Korea and the 2018 Olympics, 30 years after the Seoul Olympics. That is going to be a major item. When Korea was announced as the winner for 2018, I called a friend of mine at the Washington Post and I said how are you going to play that? And he said, oh, we'll play it inside, but we have a great photo we're going to use at the top of page 1 -- which ran across the

entire width of the top of *The Washington Post's* front page. So I asked to email that to me as soon as it came out, and I emailed it to Y.H. Cho, who's the head of the Korean Olympics bid, where, of course, they had no idea they would have this kind of impact in the U.S.

Japan faces another challenge from Korea which is not insignificant, which is in infrastructure of logistics. Most notably, for, I think, most of us in this room who travel to Asia frequently, Narita -- Narita is simply a problem. It has one runway, which can shut down. The last time I went through Narita there was debris on the runway and the airport closed. This would be unthinkable at Incheon, or in Shanghai, or Beijing, or Hong Kong.

Also there's the rise of Korean story-telling and culture -- K-pop. Korean soap operas are now popular throughout the region, so much so that China actually limited the number of hours that Korean soap operas and Korean programs could be on the air in China.

To Taiwan -- from my visit to the region a few months ago, Taiwan public TV, which I visited during my stay there, is an example of very, very impact, on very limited resources, as Professor Huang noted -- especially compared to CCTV, NHK, or other well known global brands.

It has fewer government-to-government relationships, as noted -- down to 23, I think is the number now. But it is leveraging very interesting relationships, notably with the Palace Museum, and so projecting Chinese culture, which is driving exchanges, and driving huge, huge increases in tourism, particularly across the Strait.

They're also leveraging co-production deals with dozens of broadcasters in other countries. And they like to position themselves as the only Chinese broadcast service from an elected democracy -- which relates to Professor Huang's opportunity number one.

I would just add as a P.S., something which attracted almost no attention here. Two weeks ago, at the Peabody Awards, one of the two international winners for other than live news coverage -- NHK won for coverage of 3/11, BBC and Al Jazeera won for coverage of Arab Spring. The other two winners were for documentaries, and one of them was Taiwan Public Television, which I believe is their first Peabody Award.

But I would just close by saying that Taiwan faces an interesting wall of apathy in the West which is somewhat surprising. While I was on the ground in Taipei, the Mayor of Beijing was making the first visit to Taiwan of any major Chinese mayor. And he had a delegation of 500 business people. They were there making deals. They stayed for a week. They left on two 747s, and it was front-page news in all four countries: in Korea, in Japan, in Taiwan and, of course, extensive coverage in China. And it was presented as the next major step forward in cross-Strait relationships.

After awhile, I realized that I wasn't seeing anything about that on [nytimes.com](http://nytimes.com), or [washingtonpost.com](http://washingtonpost.com). And so I did a search, and even started talking to reporters in the region, who told me that New York and Washington simply weren't interested in the story -- which was



somewhat frustrating to the reporters in Asia, but also meant that there was no coverage here, other than by wire service. A story from Agence France Presse picked up in a brief in *The Los Angeles Times* was the only U.S. mention I could find of the Beijing mayor's visit for a week. So there's this wall of lack of interest, which is something we're just going to have to be -- it's just going to have to be punched through, as it were.

Thank you. (*Applause*)

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much. Last, but certainly not least, Craig Hayden of American University.

Craig?

CRAIG HAYDEN: Thank you very much for the opportunity to attend this wonderful event. There's certainly a lot to respond to, so I'll try and get to it as quickly as possible.

To begin with, I'd like to say that one of the great things about this event is that it highlights what I would consider to be a lab for PD innovation, which is the countries mentioned in this discussion. International relations scholar and public diplomacy expert Jan Melissen, at the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in the Netherlands, has long lamented the fact that our understanding of public diplomacy is constrained and limited by a focus on the United States. And I think that events like this push our knowledge forward in comparing different public diplomacy perspectives.

First off, on China, I think it's important to note that China's incredible investment in public diplomacy bears some recognition as pushing our own understanding of what public diplomacy can mean, what's it for, what it can do, but also illustrates how perceptions about what public diplomacy can do can manifest.

As China strives to influence the narrative about itself and its rise, and the norms that define international relations -- within which it must operate -- we really see the limits of what public diplomacy can do, at least at this point in time. We see this, first, in the incredible investment in infrastructure and programming, the rise of training institutes in Beijing and Charhar, efforts to influence the global communication infrastructure through influence in technical standards, but also new proposals for a global communications governance regime.

But I also think there are some thematic challenges to what China is trying to do, based on, you know, Professor Jiang's presentation today.

First of all, as China seeks to embrace new media technologies and strategies of dissemination, I think it's important to recognize that, while we can use technology, we also need to understand the social, political, and cultural significance of these technologies themselves. What do these technologies mean to people to use them? Not just what can they disseminate. Transparency, for example, is not just a technical capacity. It is a cultural expectation and a shared

ethos. And I think this bears -- this has some implications for how China designs and implements public diplomacy.

Put another way, how does China view the interpretive agency of those populations it wants to address? Are they dupes to information campaigns? Or measured consumers, clever consumers, of information and messages?

So this raises a bunch of questions, I think, based upon, you know, the research, and also what we heard today.

While China is investing incredible amounts in public diplomacy, this is conditioned by other events, such as the expulsion of the Al Jazeera bureau recently, other controversies. And also just by research on the ground. When the United States was trying to understand the capacity of its own ability to shape the message, to frame events about itself during the controversial Iraq war, political communications scholar Robert Entman poured cold water on this prospect -- right? -- that it's not easy to just shape the frame of how news outlets and other information providers tell the story of your country. All right. So it's a daunting prospect.

Moving on to Japan, I mean, one thing we can note is that Japan is doing something right. They came out on top in the recent BBG poll. But I think that Professor Snow's survey of Japan's public diplomacy and the challenges that are presented in it, I think is an important lesson for public diplomacy, and the concept of soft power, more generally.

Japan's quandary of leveraging cultural resources to cultivate soft power, I think, is a lesson for the limits of soft power. So despite, for example, Prime Minister Aso's enthusiasm for manga and anime, what does it mean for statecraft? Other than, you know, industrial policy for the creative industries of Japan. And I think this is a lesson learned, in part, by South Korea's own efforts to aggressively promote its cultural industries along multiple dimensions.

So what are some other questions about Japan? What will the future look like? We heard some indications about the continued emphasis of cultural diplomacy. Regarding NHK, as Adam Powell suggested recently, this is still a work in progress, plus there are some lingering issues about NHK's relationship between the public and the state. Is the NHK a voice of citizens, or a mouthpiece for government? I don't think that's been resolved.

Also, the issue of internationalization -- I know Professor Snow touched on that considerably. I think this reflects a more complicated domestic cultural politics question that I think has yet to be resolved in the Japanese context. What does it mean to be Japanese? And how does Japanese culture adapt to globalizing influences?

And, finally, big debt. This is a big, hard question for Japan. How do you prioritize what public diplomacy programs you invest in, when you have diminished resources? These are real concerns. Recall the shaky arguments made by the United States when the USIA was dismantled, that American soft power could be sustained by pop culture and CNN. And then

we've spent the ensuing decade lamenting the fact that the U.S. had dismantled its arsenal in the war of ideas.

On Korea, I think one thing that's interesting about Korea is the concerted effort of branding that I think has begun to erase conceptual boundaries between public diplomacy and private sector branding activities. And I think this has implications for scholarship, for governance, and for our institutional understanding of public diplomacy. I also think that public-private partnerships are something that public diplomacy practitioners around the world like to talk about, but I think Korea is a good example of how to do this effectively.

Korean popular culture is widely recognized as a tremendous force. The *hallyu* movement, the Korean wave, is a global cultural phenomenon, popular in a variety of regions around the world. It is changing genres of entertainment. And I think we've just begun to scratch the surface for how hallyu is both demonstrative of globalization, but also something that can be leveraged for public diplomacy purposes.

Also, the interesting point made by Mr. Noerper is this issue of coordination, and that perhaps competition among public diplomacy agencies could be a beneficial thing to innovate public diplomacy. What I found interesting about that is that in the United States there has often been a critique that multiple actors' doing public diplomacy creates contradictory messages. So I think this is a direct challenge to the -- quote-unquote -- "whole of government" approach.

I'm actually inclined to agree that this sort of competition might be productive, especially when you're trying to demonstrate an innovative culture. But I think this remains to be seen, how this plays out.

And, finally, regarding Taiwan, this is a very comprehensive presentation. And the only thing I can really add is to contribute something from Professor Gary Rawnsley's extensive work on Taiwanese public diplomacy. In his research on whether or not Taiwan is effectively cultivating soft power, he points to a very simple measure: diplomatic recognition. You know, whereas other countries and states try to figure out how to measure and evaluate, we have a pretty clear measure here.

But what is actually being done in Taiwan, in terms of public diplomacy and efforts to cultivate soft power?

Rawnsley's critique builds, in some respects, on what Professor Huang was saying, and that is that there is a wrong focus in Taiwanese public diplomacy. Much of what we see, in the West, at least, in terms of Taiwanese public diplomacy, is an effort to highlight the cultural traditions of Taiwan as representative of Chinese historical cultural traditions. To define public diplomacy of Taiwan, by it being the steward of traditional ancient Chinese values, I think ignores the broader impact it could have as being representative of a Chinese democratic society. And I think that this is a point already well made. In other words, Taiwanese public diplomacy may be picking the wrong battles.

Why is this so? Another lesson we learned today from the presentation is that Taiwan is a case study in difficulties arising from organizational and bureaucratic confusion in the conduct of public diplomacy. So, while there is lots of potential to promote the democratic aspects of Taiwan's soft power resources, I think this will be an interesting case study forward in our understanding of how competitive public diplomacy can operate in such a, well, competitive environment in North Asian countries.

Thank you very much for a great set of presentations. (*Applause*)

DR. BUSH: Thank you to both presenters and commentators. We now have a little bit of time for Q&A and discussion.

And before I go there, I would just like to say that I'm a little bit afraid that, at a certain point, not under my control, the plug is going to be pulled on Nancy Snow.

So I wanted to thank you very much for participating with us at a very late hour. And maybe when you're back in the United States we can have you again, and not impose on you.

So if I call on you, please identify yourself. Please wait for the mic before you identify yourself, and pose your question. Keep your question brief so that other people will have more of a chance. If you're directing your question to one of our participants, please identify that person.

So, the first question. Okay, over here.

QUESTION: Thank you, thank you Dr. Bush. Thank you, Dr. Snow. I'd like to ask this question to all of you, including Dr. Bush, and especially Dr. Snow. Would you, from the perspective of each country you're talking about, propose, envision, a realistic public diplomacy for them in the situation of Asia-Pacific, especially in South China Sea?

Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Anybody want to take that on? Dr. Jiang.

DR. JIANG: Yes, if you look the BBC poll about the South China Sea countries, their view about China soft power is unstable. When we get back to 1998 to 1999, we've got more people view the China influence positively among the countries around the South China Sea. But now, the last challenge for the China public diplomacy is the dispute of the territory around the South China Sea right now.

But we try, we try, to do something -- not just political, but also economic. Because we share the big economic common interest around this area, we try to cool down the hot topic about the dispute of the territory around the South China Sea.

But I think the situation is remaining right now, that both China government and the Philippine government want to cool down the dispute right now. I think maybe in a few years we have a very close economic operation with each other, I think maybe the situation will be changed.

DR. BUSH: Kwei-Bo?

DR. HUANG: I think public diplomacy hasn't been applied to the dispute over the South China Sea -- yet. But if public diplomacy is going to be applied, then I think only two actors will be able to do that for now. One is, of course, Mainland China, the other is Taiwan, Republic of China. Because you need money to educate foreign publics that the South China Sea belongs to what countries?

And among all these claimants, I believe money talks, and money will influence the consideration of using public diplomacy to educate foreign publics.

DR. BUSH: I would just add -- since you invited me to say something -- that sometimes actions have the strongest public diplomacy effect, even though that's not their intention.

Who has another question? Right there. Wait for the mic. Oh, Professor Snow, did you want to --

DR. SNOW: Did you want me to address --

QUESTION: Yes, we also have a dispute around the --

DR. SNOW: -- the previous question?

DR. BUSH: Just -- I'm sorry. Professor Snow, did you have a comment you wanted to make? You don't have to.

DR. SNOW: No. I would actually just agree with the two panelists. Yes.

DR. BUSH: Okay. Thanks. Next question. Yes, please.

QUESTION: Just two quick comments. First --

DR. BUSH: Who are you?

QUESTION: Jae Park, visiting fellow at CSIS in Washington, D.C.

DR. BUSH: Good. Okay.

QUESTION: About the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it has long been understood, this public diplomacy, misunderstood as "public affairs" when it comes to public.

That public is not public of another country's public in Korea. And then the public affairs activities have been recently very pushed and encouraged by senior officials, that mid-level career diplomats are being pushed to elementary schools, or universities and colleges, to have more communication in terms of the diplomacy. That's one point. And then, recently, the public diplomacy reorganization is being under consideration. So, sooner or later, maybe a department of public diplomacy will be established there.

The second comment is that, as I mentioned, the concept or definition is very vague, the "public diplomacy." And here, from this conference, I can feel that public diplomacy is understood as more like cultural diplomacy. And I think there should be more than the cultural diplomacy.

When we emphasize the cultural diplomacy, there may be limitations that can we really say it is public, because there's too much influence from the private sectors.

That's my comment. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Any responses? Comments? Steve?

MR. NOERPER: You know, I think, in essence you're not disagreeing with us on it. It's one that I think our discussants have pointed out, shows some benefit across lines, whether they're state or they're public-private. And so, balancing innovation with coordination is essential, and we'll see how it develops in the Korean model. But thank you for that.

DR. BUSH: Another question? Yes, right here. Wait for the mic.

QUESTION: Just comments by Hayden.

DR. BUSH: Could you identify yourself?

QUESTION: I'm a visiting scholar at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University. Hayden, the comment mentioned on the Taiwan's public diplomacy, have a (inaudible) maybe relevant ancient Chinese tradition, and Chinese traditional values. I want to ask Dr. Huang, what's your response for the comments?

DR. HUANG: I think Professor Rawnsley's suggestion is partially right, because Taiwan would like to concentrate its resources to target only one solid public diplomacy program, then I would pick democracy, democratization.

But we cannot ignore the fact that Taiwan possesses, preserves the best Chinese culture since the Chiang Kai-shek administration moved to Taiwan in 1949. So Taiwan cannot ignore that value, asset, it has held. And I think Taiwan can actually do both at the same time.

But, again, coordinated resource allocation is then a necessary thing to consider by Taiwan government.

DR. BUSH: I would just supplement that to say that one factor here is the audience you're trying to reach. That I would agree that democracy is important for audiences in the West, in particular, but the preservation of Chinese culture may be very important for audiences in Mainland China.

The Chinese blogger Han Han recently wrote, in a very eloquent statement -- and this was after he paid a visit to Taiwan -- he said, "Taiwan has preserved what we on the Mainland have lost."

DR. HUANG: If I can add -- and, actually, the third dimension Taiwan can work on is to promote the small and medium enterprises. That's what Taiwan has done through the APEC mechanism, to disseminate Taiwan's experience in helping those enterprises to succeed.

DR. BUSH: Steve?

MR. NOERPER: Just a quick, quick note -- given your comment, and your emphasis on democratization, and the promotion of democracy. Having lived in Mongolia for three years, beginning about 10 years ago, that is very much a message heard. And for a young democracy like Mongolia, they listen very much to Taiwan, and to South Korea. And that's an interesting pattern to keep up with.

DR. BUSH: Another question? Let's come right here.

QUESTION: Hi, Jongjoo Lee from the Korean Embassy. Thank you all for the wonderful presentations. My question goes to Professor Jiang. You highlight that China has long history to promote soft power, and especially since 2009 Chinese leadership raised the issue of public diplomacy publicly.

So do you see that Chinese leadership considered aspects of national image, or international image, more seriously when they're making certain policy decisions? I mean, many experts here in D.C. --

DR. JIANG: Would you please say your question again?

QUESTION: Yes. I mean, I would like to illustrate my question. I mean, many experts here in D.C. argue that the Chinese policy, especially Chinese policy toward North Korea, degraded Chinese international image in many cases.

So, you said Chinese leadership is now fully aware how important public diplomacy, or its international image, is. Do you see the Chinese leadership is taking more seriously when they're making certain policy decisions, especially North Korea policy?

I mean, when they are making their decision in North Korea policy, do they think about aspects of public diplomacy? That could be my question.

DR. JIANG: Okay. Not only on North Korea issues, but also Iran, or Syria issues, the China foreign policy about these issues -- yes, as you said, it may raise some misunderstanding among international society.

But the one reality is that China also cooperates with the international society, including the United States, and other countries from Europe, to cope with the nuclear weapons issues in North Korea. Same story with Iran.

So, if we mention the public policy is not foreign policy, so China should use global media, and the internet, and other measures, trying to let the world know that China will engage with the international society to cope with such kind of things which relate to the international security.

DR. BUSH: Thank you.

Question back there, the man with the tie.

QUESTION: I'm Tony Dao, from Central News Agency, Taiwan. The question for Professor Snow. Japan used to be such a powerful country in the '80s and '90s cultural influence, hugely in Asia. But we see the rise of Korea in the last decade. And right now, even Samsung is much better than Sony, and K-pop is much better than J-pop, especially for Chinese in the Mainland. What went wrong in Japan? The government knows things like that? That's the question. Thank you.

DR. SNOW: Right. I think the lost decades changed everything. Economically, the focus was worrisome. I remember when I was in graduate school in the '80s at American University, and we talked about Japan as the super economic power, "Japan, Inc." And since I've been coming to Japan, since 1993, it has changed dramatically.

Japan has been slow to adjust to this. But I think my message today is that there is opportunity, out of 3/11, to sort of have an awakening here that won't be "Cool Japan," but could perhaps be "Cool Japan" and something else -- as I said, gratitude relations, a sense that there's sort of a resurgence of the U.S.-Japan strong relationship, and a recognition that Japan can work collaboratively, and more personally in the public diplomacy arena.

It's not going to be so much of this cultural superiority. I actually wanted to quote Mr. Hara from the Japan Foundation. I thought he put it quite beautifully. And he said, "The worst thing that can happen to people like me -- " -- and, of course, he's referring to himself working at the Japan Foundation -- " -- is to have set prejudices about my country versus another country's uniqueness. The cultural diplomacy based on uniqueness, superiority, or inferiority, for that matter, is over." And this is a Japan Foundation senior director. He said, "Now it's all about compassion. It's all about getting nods from other countries."

So this is a real shift. And it's not one that is shared among everyone. Whether it's in the PM's office, or the Japan Foundation, there's still a very statist approach here.



It's also worrisome that there isn't a real public-driven public diplomacy here. So, for instance, today in class, when I mentioned the Japan Foundation, the students didn't really know what the Japan Foundation did. And I found out, when I worked at the U.S. Information Agency in the 1990s, a lot of my compatriots didn't know what USIA did.

So there's a lack of really integrating the Japanese public in telling stories about Japan. It is still too much driven at the state level and very centralized. But, again, that's changing as a result of the opportunities now, going forward, and how Japan is going to position itself in the post-3/11 recovery gratitude era that we're entering.

MR. BUSH: Other comments? Okay, there's a question there. The red and black shirt.

QUESTION: Thank you. I'm a graduate student from Beijing Foreign Studies University, and now a visiting student in the University of Denver.

Actually, in the year before last year, we set up a research center of public diplomacy, and we hold a lot of conferences and discussions, forums. So when we talk about the public diplomacy, we, like we encourage those enterprises to go abroad and to do business with a lot of people, like especially in Africa.

But what we heard in those conferences, like those entrepreneurs, they are saying it's really hard to do business there, especially for the private sector, due to the cultural differences.

So it is like, in the meantime, like we are promoting our culture, like the Chinese culture, but we are trapped by our strong culture. Because there are so many differences in the way we do business, so many troubles. So I pretty much wondered how the experience from Japan and Korea. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: That's an interesting observation. Nancy or Steve, do you want to comment?

DR. SNOW: Steve, go ahead. *(Laughs)*

MR. NOERPER: Well, I just think it's a fascinating observation. It really is. It's a very interesting line-in.

And I guess I'd have to think about it relative to Korea. I mean, the historical reality is it's a much smaller nation that has been couched among these great powers. And so the notion of legitimacy and stakeholdership, and that, is very different from a Chinese notion of a much more central kingdom -- you know, ethnocentric type of approach. So that creates a different reality of the cultural mindset that very much informs the political mindset.

And then the experiences of the 20th century, you know would be very different for the modern Korean reality -- though there may be some commonalities, especially vis-à-vis the West, that might come out more over time.

And then, last, I guess there's just a Confucian aspect of the cultural flows from China, through Korea, to Japan, that would have some sort of relational impact, in terms of the way they look at that, as well. But it's fascinating. It's a great observation, and I'll continue to think about it. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Nancy?

DR. SNOW: I just wanted to add, I'm wondering what would be the Japanese counterpart to the Confucian Institutes. I was struck with CNN International, talking about a Sushi Intern company that has arisen, where, you know, the idea of sort of sushi as a Japanese cultural cuisine, it's now become this worldwide phenomenon, but it's sort of being changed to suit the particular organization.

In the case of the woman who founded Sushi Intern, she said that sushi is about walking into a restaurant and picking out what you want. And here in Japan, there have been efforts to create sort of a "sushi regulatory agency," to send Japanese out around the world to make sure that sushi is being prepared correctly.

So there is this sort of struggle between kind of this cultural straightjacket, versus accepting that, in a globalized public diplomacy environment, people are going to make adjustments to specific cultural heritage ideas and events. And Japan has to come to terms with that, because there's historical pride, of course, with this long cultural history. And they haven't yet figured out, how do we become more flexible with allowing people to make adjustments to what they view as "Japanese heritage," but on their own terms?

So, manga and anime, for instance, are going to mean something different to Chinese youth, U.K. youth. There's going to be an appreciation for it, but will that filter back into strengthening Japan's national image, Japan's foreign policy?

DR. BUSH: Thank you. Professor Jiang, do you --?

DR. JIANG: Yes, you just mentioned China enterprises go to Africa. But if you go back to my figures about the BBC poll, more people from Africa view the China influences positively.

But we know the Chinese food is also welcomed in Africa. But African people must use money to buy the food. If the China enterprises won't share the profit with the local people, it's pretty hard to get African people to hold favorable public opinion to the China enterprises present there.

So, that's why MFA has the policy to ask the Chinese enterprises in Africa to respect local law and the local culture.

DR. BUSH: Okay. Thank you very much. I think, with that, we'll bring our program to a close.

First, I'd like to thank all of you in the audience for coming, and for your great questions. I'd like to thank the presenters and commentators for your participation and, again, Kwei-Bo, for your leadership in organizing the program.

And, Dr. Snow, we'll let you get some rest.

DR. SNOW: Thank you. I appreciate it. Thanks very much.

DR. BUSH: Okay. Thank you. (*Applause*)

\* \* \* \* \*