THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

PREVENTING GENOCIDE AND MASS ATROCITIES:
BUILDING ON THE LEGACY OF RICHARD HOLBROOKE

Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, May 22, 2012

PARTICIPANTS:

PANEL 1: PREVENTING GENOCIDE AND MASS ATROCITIES: LESSONS FROM RICHARD HOLBROOKE'S EXPERIENCE

Moderator:

STROBE TALBOTT
President
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

ROBERT ORR
Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination and Strategic Planning,
Executive Office of the Secretary-General
United Nations

KATI MARTON
Author and Journalist

VALI NASR
Dean, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

PANEL 2: GENOCIDE AND MASS ATROCITY PREVENTION: FUTURE CHALLENGES AND POLICY CHOICES

Moderator:

BRUCE JONES,
Senior Fellow and Director, Managing Global Order
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

JOHN SHATTUCK
President and Rector
Central European University

RENATA UITZ
Professor of Law
Central European University

MICHAEL POSNER
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
U.S. Department of State

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TALBOTT: Good morning to all of you. I'm Strobe Talbott. It's my pleasure to welcome you to a particularly promising, and for many of us, a particularly meaningful event.

This is an event that is going to go for the next two hours, dedicated to the memory and accomplishments of a man, Richard C. Holbrooke, and to a cause, which took a lot of his energy and to which he made many contributions, which is preventing deadly conflict and doing something to deal with the pervasive problem of genocide and crimes against humanity.

Thank you very much, Vali, for reminding me -- by the way, this is not the first event that has been organized to commemorate the life and achievements of Richard Holbrooke, and at a couple of them the person opening the event would say, usually, I ask everybody in the room to turn off their cell phones, but given the man that we're celebrating, I would ask all of you to turn your cell phones on in case we get a call from him, which I'm still expecting and I suspect others are as well.

In any event, this next couple of hours also represents a budding partnership between the Brookings Institution and Central European University. Its president and director, John Shattuck, is here with us today and it's great to have you with us as well, Ellen, and other colleagues from this extraordinary institution that goes back, I guess, 21 years.

It was the vision of a number of proponents and champions of civil society, open society, and the democratization of that part of the world that used to be part of the Soviet empire, but it has extended its mandate and its reach to become truly a global institution and we're very, very pleased that we can begin the relationship, the formal relationship, between the Brookings Institution and CEU with an event of this kind

and particularly because of the role that Richard played in Central Europe.

Now, he had many activities in other parts of the world that the panelists are going to touch on here today. As I think all of you who are familiar with his biography know that he began his career in Southeast Asia, he made major contributions in Africa during the 1990s. He, of course, is probably best known for his work in the Balkans and he, quite literally, gave his life to the cause of trying to end the horrible instability and violence in South Asia.

And he was working on that task right up to his final day at the State Department when he was fatally stricken and he was then in the position of Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan working very closely with Secretary Clinton and, of course, with President Obama. And it's particularly appropriate that his wife, Kati Marton, should be with us this morning and participating in this panel, and I'll come back to her own standing as an expert in this field in just a moment.

By the way, before leaving the topic of Central European University, you will be hearing, when John participates in the second panel an hour from now, a little bit about the creation of the Richard C. Holbrooke Center for Conflict Resolution and Prevention of Genocide.

I also want to acknowledge my friend and colleague, Bruce Jones, who's down here in the front row. Bruce is a senior fellow at Brookings and the director of our Managing Global Order Initiative, and he and his team have done a great deal to put together today's program.

The first panel, that is for the next hour, is going to look somewhat through the lens of Richard's extraordinary career to see what lessons might be drawn from his experiences and efforts on the big subject of the day. And then the second panel will take a look at future challenges and policy choices available to the United

States, its allies, its friends, and to the international community.

The first panel I'm going to introduce very briefly so that we can get quickly into the discussion. Bob Orr is an old and good friend and former colleague who has had the title of Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations and who worked very closely with Richard Holbrooke at the UN, particularly in the 1990s. The Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, issued a public statement this morning announcing the promotion of Bob to a newly created position of Undersecretary for Public and Private Partnerships -- or Policy and Partnerships? It's such a new position I haven't even mastered the title yet, but I'm glad --

MR. ORR: No one else has either.

MR. TALBOTT: Well, I'm glad you have. Among other things it means that Bob is going to maintain a kind of policy planning function for the Secretary General, but also deal very operationally with major global threats including climate change and threats to global public health. So, congratulations to you, Bob, on that.

As for Vali Nasr, he has a distinguished career that has brought him into very close colleagueship with Richard Holbrooke and he has just recently been appointed the new dean of our neighbor here on Massachusetts Avenue, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies as dean, and he is going to retain, I'm happy to say, the title of non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, but not all that non-resident, by the way, since he'll be just a couple of doors down the street.

And as for Kati, she is an author and a journalist and in that capacity has a new book coming out in August, it's called *Paris: A Love Story*, and she might even find a way of weaving that into her remarks in just a minute. She's also been an extraordinarily accomplished and dedicated activist in the fields that we're talking about, part of the leadership of the Committee to Protect Journalists, the International Rescue

Committee, and also a member of the board of Central European University.

So, with that I would ask Bob to get us started and we're going to try to keep these opening comments fairly short so we can get a little bit of interaction among ourselves but then very quickly bring this very expert audience into the discussion.

MR. ORR: Thank you very much, Strobe. It's a great honor to be here and to share the stage with Kati, and you, Strobe, and Vali.

Richard Holbrooke was not a rules man, he was a break the rules man, so I'm going to do something very un-Holbrooke-ian. As I cast my brain back to spending time with him addressing issues around this topic of preventing mass atrocities, try to extract a few rules from not what he said, but what he did.

And I think the first rule that I learned from him was, make the whole world your own. He was very much identified, I think as Strobe said, with certain parts of the world and certain accomplishments in certain parts of the world, but he had a hunger to know and to address the problems of the whole world and that's where I really got to know him best, was in one of the parts of the world he knew least, which he admitted, finally, after some time, that when I first was briefing him as an incoming ambassador to the UN and I said, "You'll spend about 70 percent of your time on Africa." He looked at me quizzically and he said, "Have you even read my resume?"

But the fact was, his strategic mind was perfectly adapted to the needs of Africa, and his heart was perfectly adapted to the needs of Africa.

So, I think Kati joined us on the first big trip of his tenure as ambassador to the United Nations. And being very strategic he set out three goals for the trip to Africa -- we traveled to, I think, 11 or 12 countries -- first would be to bring peace to the Congo. If you think back to that time, no one thought the Congo could be touched or even helped. Let the war go, was the basic rule of the day.

Secondly, he sought to put HIV/AIDS front and center on the agenda, and this was a time when heads of state in Africa wouldn't even talk about it. And, third, he would highlight the issue of refugees, or even more importantly, what he called internal refugees, internally displaced people.

I watched a man figure out a continent as fast as a human being can, but it wasn't just intellectually, and it wasn't just the strategic Holbrooke that approached the problem. In each of these issues he chose to address, he went to the heart of the matter, but also the heart of the people. What would it take to move people? How would you get Washington to care about the Congo? How would you get the UN to acknowledge HIV/AIDS as a major security challenge? How would you get bureaucracies to redefine internally displaced people?

I think it was a natural outgrowth of his development in Africa that I learned kind of a rule number two, leave no individual behind, that he always looked at the grand strategy, and that's what people think about, the peacemaker, the big picture, he was always drilling down to the most vulnerable individual related to that issue, and that's how he would figure out what the issue was about. It spoke to his heart and his head that he would go and try to figure out where the refugee was, why, who she was, what she needed, and then he would work that up into the grand strategy, and I think that's something that I've tried to replicate, not always with Holbrooke-ian success.

There is a key to not leaving any individual behind, it's humanizing the problem. And I think here I would just point that I think, Kati, we went with him to a so-called IDP camp in Angola, which was a very powerful experience, and after that very powerful experience -- it was called a camp, it was really a wide spot in the road where there were 100,000 people living -- and he went back to the UN Country Team to talk with them and immediately said, "Where is UNHCR? How many refugees are you

working with?" They said, "Well, we have about 100 refugees from the Congo in Angola." He said, "A hundred? I've just been with 100,000 refugees. What are you doing for them?" And they said, "Oh, I'm sorry, there's a rule. They haven't crossed a border. We can't treat them." And he immediately, within five minutes, had made such an issue of this that the High Commissioner for Refugees was promptly, I think, woken in the middle of the night in Geneva and said that we're going to have a problem with the United States because they're really raising the issue of IDPs in a whole new way.

And it was something that I think came from that imperative to humanize the problem and not leave any person behind in the solutions that you're trying to craft at the strategic level.

The third rule that I would map onto Ambassador Holbrooke's career goes straight to the problem and in some cases goes straight at the evil. This is something that I think a lot of us shy away from. It's not polite. In diplomatic circles you find a way to talk around or at least deal with things diplomatically.

Ambassador Holbrooke had a knack for figuring out what the problem was and what the evil was that had to be addressed and going straight at it, and I just saw in a news clip this morning out of the Hague that there's a development in the defense case of Jean-Pierre Bemba, indicted on war crimes in the Congo, and I recall working with Ambassador Holbrooke, we had collected all of the rebel leaders in the Congo and we were trying to figure out how we could negotiate an end to the war. We came out of a meeting with the different rebel leaders and Ambassador Holbrooke whispered to me, pointing to Bemba, he said, "Work on him. Stay after him. He's power hungry. He'll do anything. He's ruthless. He's the guy we need."

And it was after one meeting that he had already figured out what the crux of how we were going to work this but it was based on not just a psychological

reading of an individual, but a structural understanding of the conflict and where it was coming from.

The fourth rule I would apply is a bit of a -- might seem like a contradiction. It's all about principle and politics, politics and principle. So many times when we address these big issues we try to take a principled stand and we try to address something just from a principled point of view or from a practical, pragmatic, political point of view. I think Richard Holbrooke was incapable of making that separation.

He knew principle and he knew politics and they became so interwoven in his worldview and in his operational use of diplomacy that it was how he solved problems, and I think that's something that we could all do a little bit better at as we try to understand the challenge we well be addressing in the next panel on preventing mass atrocities.

Finally, I would say a fifth lesson is it's all about the team. Richard Holbrooke was a virtuoso performer who never wanted to perform alone. That doesn't fit the public image of the man. Everyone thinks of him trying to grab the headlines -- yes, he grabbed plenty and he was darn good at it, but it was always to a purpose and he never forgot that it took a team to actually get the outcome he needed. He built teams.

He was an inveterate team builder. Vali was on a different era team than I was, but at each stop of his career, he built a real team because he knew he didn't have all the skills, he knew he didn't have all the knowledge, and he built that team around him and then he used them to maximum effect to get the desired outcome.

But it was at his most human that he loved his teams. It was a role he relished and I think it is one of his greatest legacies that at each of these stops along his career that he left a great substantive success behind, most importantly, he left a lot of people that are trying to do what he did so well.

MR. TALBOTT: Terrific, Bob. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. TALBOTT: Vali?

MR. NASR: Well, thank you also for inviting me here. It's always a pleasure to be in an event that pays tribute to Richard, not only because I think he deserves it, but also it's always rewarding for me to reminisce about my time working with him.

If I may begin from where Bob left off, I think, you know, that issue about his being a team builder and taking pride in his team is one of the sort of singular marks of his approach to leadership and I think it's an important legacy that he left behind.

You know, these days, as we read in the newspaper continuous comparisons of what is happening in Libya or Syria, it's very difficult not to think of Richard and what he might have thought and how he might have contributed to this Administration's handling of these issues is also a reminder that, you know, these key issues are not going to go away. This issue of human security, refugees, mass atrocities, is, in some ways, a bane that's part of international relations. So, I'm very happy to see that there will be an institution that will address these in the context of higher education and policymaking.

You know, in the Afghanistan/Pakistan context, I think just after that the most important issue was Richard's legacy in Bosnia. He was engaged in a very difficult issue off the bat in the Muslim world. Right after the problems that the Bush Administration had with the Muslim world, many saw Afghanistan as a test case in the region of the new President's commitment to shift American attitude towards the Muslim world. And Richard had a very difficult position of having to deal with justifying an escalated war in Afghanistan, and yet being able to address that issue. And I think that

there was a huge degree of trust that came after that, political capital, with his legacy in Bosnia.

I mean, I saw repeatedly doors that opened, ears that opened, and people would say, heads of state would tell him in their first meeting -- thanked him for Bosnia, and that was a conversation starter.

But also more importantly, it was a way for Richard to get them to talk about refugees, atrocities, rule of law, the most vulnerable people in society, because they couldn't argue with him on that. He had done it, and he had done it for Muslims and it was an important way of addressing the issue.

I mean, in Afghanistan we dealt with a very different problem largely because most atrocities were involved with the way Taliban were dealing with in localities, in trying to bully the citizenry into particular modes of behavior and so forth for their cause, but I think the issues that he had dealt with in Africa or in Europe were most applicable to Pakistan. In particular, not long after we were engaged there, there was -- the Pakistan military was pushed to go into the Valley of Swat to dislodge the Taliban from there, it created a massive, unexpected refugee crisis, and I think Richard, probably in the U.S. government, was the first person to understand what was going on.

I remember I texted him one early morning that, you know, I'm hearing from friends in Pakistan, there is an exodus of people coming out of Swat, there's an IDP issue, and by noontime Richard had galvanized the entire U.S. government to at least offer initial aid, got the embassy organized, got Washington organized. He understood exactly what would be coming next.

I remember times he would tell Pakistani leaders that, you know, this is what's going to happen next. This is what you need to do to avoid cholera, this is what you need to do in order to avoid chaos in the camps. He was virtually on the first

possible plane he could go to Pakistan to go to the camps. Not a single Pakistani leader had been to a refugee camp before Richard went and, again, from past experience, he took his own translator there and the government translator kept telling Richard, you know, the refugees are saying, everything is okay, they are being taken care of. And then he would say to his own translator, what is the guy saying? And he would say, we haven't got food, we haven't got water, you know, we have too many people per tent.

And so, you know, then Richard would go bang the government or push the U.S. government to do a lot more.

I think he understood very well the implications of a humanitarian crisis for America's national security interest. In other words, you can't expect stability in Pakistan of Afghanistan; you can't expect to push your policy forward if the society is going to collapse from underneath you. And he understood that these things have to be integrated together.

In the team he put together, I think in a maverick position, he actually created a slot, which was, you know, Marine White, who's here, led this effort as a senior advisor to deal specifically with refugee issues and with human security issues, and to find a way to tie that in with U.S. aid, with U.S. security, et cetera.

I think one of the issues that happened after Richard passed from the scene was that some of the sort of holistic view of the problem has gone away but, you know, I look at -- there are many things wrong with U.S. policy and relations with Pakistan today, but the work on refugees is probably one of the things that is moving forward, it's a bright spot, if you would, on our policy there.

The lesson that, you know, he brought to this is that it's important to act quickly and to take a leadership position. It's very important, particularly in his view, for the U.S. government to have a clarity of position and principle when it comes to

defending the most vulnerable people. And it has to do this not just out of the kindness of its heart, but understand that it's a national security imperative, and he was very effective in arguing that in Pakistan, for instance, and he argued it very effectively to the military, particularly when there was a massive flood that swept over 30 percent of Pakistani territory, that this is not charity. You need to get your helicopters to repurpose and provide aid to the IDPs largely because this is really about your mission in Afghanistan.

He was extremely effective in getting the media involved early on, to explain to them what is happening, to leverage them, in a way, to make what might be a local issue into an international issue.

And then, you know, I think he understood that it's very important to get the international agencies engaged and the early intervention is a way to create an umbrella for dealing with these issues.

And every security issue ultimately involves a rule of law problem, and he understood that, you know, when a military goes into Swat in large footprint, there is always an opportunity -- opportunity is the wrong word -- there is always a danger that there might be violation of human rights, there may be excessive behavior, there might -- the civilians caught between the guerrillas and the government pay the price, and the U.S. government ought to, early on, before these things happen, use every opportunity to make sure that this doesn't become an added crisis that you have to deal with.

You know, during the time we dealt with Pakistan it went through two huge massive refugee problems. Part of the reason why these things didn't become a greater impediment to U.S. policy or a larger international issue is because of that early intervention and to this day, you know, I think the singular positive thing in the minds of the Pakistanis is the American assistance with first IDPs in Swat and then with the refugee crisis that was the consequence of the floods.

And I think the larger lesson is that, you know, diplomacy, engagement, relationships, both personal and government to government, are key in providing avenues for being able to get involved quickly and being able to stem the tide of crisis from becoming much more, and that lessons do apply from case to case. You know, interventions are not isolated cases. That Bosnia mattered or Africa matters to Afghanistan/Pakistan, and partly what he tried to do in SRAP with having Maureen deal with refugee crisis is to create mechanisms within the State Department that would carry these lessons forward, that these don't get lost because Richard Holbrooke is no longer there, that, you know, as an institution the State Department and the Pentagon would be able to integrate concern and policy over human security over prevention of atrocity against civilians into the broader issues that they deal with.

And I think, you know, even building a curriculum over -- in an institution that's named after him, I think it's imperative to focus on this critical aspect that the persona, the personality, the career of Richard Holbrooke, has to be sort of externalized into our policy approach to crisis areas.

MR. TALBOTT: Thank you, Vali. Kati, over to you, and I think in order to get all of you into it, when Kati finishes her remarks, I will open it up. So, have your comments and questions ready.

MS. MARTON: Thank you, Strobe. Bob, Vali, Strobe, it's such a privilege for me to be part of this conversation, and I'm wearing two hats here -- one, of course, I preemptively -- sorry -- this is very un-Brookings Institution.

MR. TALBOTT: It's allowed.

MS. MARTON: But I ask for your forbearance.

I'm wearing the Holbrooke hat -- sorry, it passes, I promise you, it passes. It comes and then it goes. I'm also wearing my Central European University hat

and I'm tremendously grateful to John Shattuck for launching this center that will really enshrine and institutionalize Richard's values in a place which could not be more appropriate for Holbrooke's legacy. Central Europe, after all, was where he performed his diplomatic miracles in literally ending a war.

But Central Europe is also where two world wars and the bloodiest war since the Second World War erupted and so a center that's dedicated to the prevention of genocide in that region and in my hometown of Budapest is just a -- I cannot think of a more appropriate way to honor Richard and to enshrine his values.

Vali and Bob have touched on aspects of Richard's persona and achievements, each of which require long and deep conversations because they can't, as Vali so well put it, they can't disappear with the man. We have to draw important lessons from them.

Richard Holbrooke was not for the faint-hearted. You had to be pretty brave and pretty self-confident to let Richard Holbrooke into your heart because once he entered your heart; he occupied a very large place there.

I had several hours with Admiral Mullen a couple of weeks ago, the wonderful recently retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Mike turned to me and said, "You know, Kati, I only knew Richard for two years, but I hear him in my head."

And, you know, Bob and I were just chatting and Bob said, "You know, I keep hearing Richard in my head." So, I mean, this is a great gift that he left us. He was so generous with his advice and counsel that I think we each -- those of us who opened our hearts to Richard, we each have a lifetime of Holbrooke-ian wisdom, right, and I never go into a meeting without hearing Richard say to me, "Okay, Kati, what do you want to take out of this meeting? Where do you want this to go?" He wasted no time. I've never known a man who wasted so little time as Richard.

He was a legendary mentor, and why was he such a mentor? Because he, himself, had been mentored. He lost his father very early in life and so he was always looking for mentors and he had some of the greatest mentors starting with Nicholas Katzenbach, Averell Harriman, Clark Clifford -- giants in the field of foreign policy, and from them Richard learned a wealth of knowledge and a sense of America's role in the world that he carried with him on every mission. He had a feeling that America should stand for certain values and that America should not primarily be known for its military power.

Certainly, Richard knew how to use military power as an arm of diplomacy, but he never considered himself the wingman to the generals.

One of his proudest achievements was, of course, the American Academy in Berlin, which really embodies the Holbrooke-ian value system that America has to stand for things other than military might.

He was ambassador to Germany when our military were withdrawing, it was the end of the Cold War, and Richard was determined that America have a permanent presence in the region that was nonmilitary. So, typically he cooked up this notion of an American Academy, which would, like Central European University will with the Holbrooke Center, embody and represent certain American values. And it's become one of the great success stories on the European cultural and political scene, a meeting place where American thinkers and artists and writers can interact with their European counterparts.

So, this was very much in keeping with Richard's view that diplomacy should be the most human of all professions, and for him, diplomacy was about one human being at a time. As Bob said, he really drilled down. He had, of course, the most breathtaking Rolodex ever assembled by man. In the last two years of his life, I don't

think we ever went for a walk in Central Park without a call coming in from Pakistan or a call going out from Richard's phone to Pakistan. That was how he approached his assignment.

Pakistan, for him, was of course the more important piece of the AfPak equation, the more dangerous, and the one that he invested so much of himself in. One of his final trips was after the floods in Pakistan where Richard, no longer young, you know, crawled into tents and heard -- and heard the stories of the people displaced by those floods, and then he was able then to represent those people. Richard was about empowering those that others had written off, not only people, but problems. Bob cited Congo as an "insoluble problem". Richard was drawn like Pooh to honey to insoluble problems. That was what he was -- he was a problem solver.

I think George Bernard Shaw had Richard in mind when he said that, "Progress is made by unreasonable men." Richard was unreasonable in pursuit of solving problems and in pursuit of giving people, whether in refugee camps or under Serb gunners, giving people their humanity back.

I think the last year has only qualified our loss. Thank you.

MR. TALBOTT: Bravo.

(Applause)

MR. TALBOTT: Over to you. Diana.

MS. NEGROPONTE: This is not a question. Diana Negroponte from the Brookings Institution. This is not a question, this is a contribution. In 1977, I was the recent new bride of John Negroponte, arrived here in Washington scared. Richard Holbrooke was John Negroponte's roommate, and through both of them, but particularly Richard, I came to understand the problem of Vietnamese boat people, and Richard's determination to increase the quota of refugees and immigrants from Vietnam so that

these people could make a home and a contribution in this country.

He was also a team builder, one of whose team members, Mike Armacost, was President of Brookings. Thank you, Kati, and thank all of you.

MS. MARTON: Thank you, Diana.

(Applause)

MR. TALBOTT: I'm tempted to bring another chair up here. Anybody else? Yes, sir.

SPEAKER: Given the personal nature of the relationships here and Kati's recent remarks about unreasonableness, I would just be interested to hear some anecdotes about unreasonable Holbrooke.

MS. MARTON: Do we have enough time? Strobe, why don't you start with one. You've got a wealth of those unreasonable Holbrooke anecdotes.

MR. TALBOTT: Well, I love the Shaw quote, but it doesn't quite nail it because Richard had, in addition to his ferocious determination to win an argument and to get accomplished what he was trying to get accomplished, he had a very, very rational mind. And he was not just, in an unorthodox way, diplomatically brilliant, but he was forensically brilliant as well, including his ability to adjust his argument when the person with whom he was arguing -- and there are several of us in the room -- actually knew a little bit more about the subject at hand than he did.

MS. MARTON: Unacceptable.

MR. TALBOTT: And he would not simply try to bulldoze over an inconvenient discrepancy between some assertion he was making and the destination he was trying to get to, he would simply drive around it, as it were, and come up with another set of facts which he was more sure of, and another line of argument that would fit the facts and just keep going.

So, he was -- you know, the nicknames include “Bulldozer” --

MS. MARTON: “Hurricane”.

MR. TALBOTT: “Hurricane”, and all of that, but that suggests sort of an immovable -- an irresistible force just daring any object to prove it was immovable, but he also had a terrific intellect and a respect for the facts, and this goes back to the point that all three of my colleagues have made, his reliance on a team.

The team was not just there to support him in what he wanted to do; it was always a team that included people whose job it was to -- precisely to know more about the situations they were dealing with, and to educate him. He was always open to being educated.

MS. MARTON: I totally agree with that. Hungary was one of the very few places on the planet that he did not know and since I’m from there and I wanted to get married there -- we were married there in a ceremony that was entirely in Hungarian and where Richard had one word to say, and that was *igen*, which means yes, and so in our 17 years together, whenever -- it was very rare that we disagreed on anything, but when we did I would say, but you said *igen* to that, and he would quickly back down.

He came as a neophyte to the region, as he did to Africa, and given his voracious appetite for the new, and to drill deep, he, toward the end of his life, I think he knew more about the region and its history than I did, and he was in the annoying position -- annoying for me -- of explaining Hungarians to me.

He felt that since he’d married one, he had earned the right. But he really did like to be challenged and that’s what made life so much fun is that he loved -- he loved people who stood up to him, right, Bob? And I mean, I knew -- I would hear you guys arguing and, I mean, I think Richard even argued with Kofi Annan. Nobody argues with Kofi, who has the sweetest temperament of any human being on the planet, but

Richard did when he thought that Kofi wasn't stepping up to it. I mean, he took him on in our apartment, do you remember?

MR. ORR: In one specific case of that, and there is the genuine unreasonableness of Richard Holbrooke, and there's the calculated unreasonableness of Richard Holbrooke, and in fact, one of the cases I think of where he was disagreeing, not just with Kofi Annan, one of his close friends, about HIV/AIDS being an appropriate topic for consideration on the Security Council of the United Nations --

MS. MARTON: Kofi disagreed with that.

MR. ORR: And so did every single country on the Security Council. WE started with exactly one vote, the United States' vote, against 14, and by the end of being very unreasonable, for a prolonged period of time, he had convinced not only the Secretary General of the UN -- not to take a legalistic view of the rules and procedures of the Security Council, but to look at the quality of the issue -- he had convinced not only the Secretary General, who he made a total ally in this cause, but he'd convinced 14 members and they unanimously agreed to take HIV/AIDS onto the agenda of the Security Council.

Our legal council at the time said, you cannot do this, and explained the 100 reasons why it could not be done. I don't remember any issue that was so cut and dried that everyone said it couldn't be done, there's one person who said it could, and by the end, we not only did it, but it changed the complexion of the HIV/AIDS issue globally. It started to be treated very differently at a political level.

MS. MARTON: What about bringing Jesse Helms to the Security Council and getting the United States to pay its close to $1 billion in back dues and making Jesse a friend of the --

MR. ORR: That was calculated unreasonableness.

MS. MARTON: Yeah, yeah. I mean, do you want -- I mean, that's a pretty enormous --

MR. TALBOTT: Well, Bob alluded to this, but on the HIV/AIDS issue, he not only had to, by force of his logic, his use of reason and passion, to bring the rest of the Security Council on board, he also had to bring the United States government on board.

MR. ORR: That's right.

MR. TALBOTT: This was not a -- and I was part of the home office at the foggy bottom at the time, and I can tell you, he had a lot of tough work to be done back here as well.

MR. NASR: Actually, if I may just quickly add, if you look -- since we are -- just this week there's a NATO summit and it's sort of a (inaudible) at least to an important phase of the Afghan war, you could say that everything about Richard's approach to Afghanistan/Pakistan was unreasonable. And he was marching to a different drummer. Early on he believed the war cannot be won on the battlefield. He broke a lot of shibboleths about the fact -- for instance, one case was people told them that it's impossible to get the Afghans and Pakistanis to agree on anything, they haven't signed a single treaty together. And lo and behold, Richard decided he was going to change that fact, and two years of hard work, they finally signed a transit trade agreement that they had first started negotiating in 1965 and it's the first treaty signed between the two countries since Pakistan became independent.

And then he began toying with the idea of actually making the Durand Line a permanent border between the two countries, although time didn't permit him that, but a lot of things that now have become established facts on the ground, like we talk to the Taliban -- when Richard started this issue that you need to talk to your enemy in

Afghanistan, it was completely unreasonable at that point in time, and now it is heart and center of policy. The idea that, you know, you could bring India, somehow, into the conversation was seen as completely unreasonable and now India and Pakistan have a conversation over Afghanistan.

So, in many ways, you know, this whole AfPak policy was the way Richard approached it was it would have been much easier to basically go with the flow of opinion in this city, but he was a contrarian right at the outset.

MR. TALBOTT: Mic over here please.

MR. SMITH: Thank you. I'm Terry Smith, an old friend of Richards. I met him first in Vietnam more than 40 years ago.

MS. MARTON: Really?

MR. SMITH: But I love the way the Holbrooke-ian stories just bubble up here, one after the other, and so I'll add one very short one, which is, he set a record, I believe, on *The NewsHour*, not only for -- *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer* on PBS -- not only for his multiple appearances, which might be some kind of record, but on one occasion when he was at the UN, I was to interview him on the topic of the day, and we had eight minutes, he was the sole guest. I was in San Francisco where, conveniently for Richard, I could not interrupt him --

(Laughter)

MR. SMITH: So, that, I believe, stands as a record for an interview on *The NewsHour*. I asked one question.

(Laughter)

MS. MARTON: And eight minutes later --

MR. SMITH: I asked the first question on the topic of the day and he launched into it and eight minutes later I said, "Thank you very much." But it reminds me

of your point, Kati, that he had in mind exactly what he wanted to accomplish --

MS. MARTON: The outcome.

MR. SMITH: -- in that eight minute span, the point he wanted to get across, and not I -- and nobody was going to stop him.

MR. TALBOTT: And don't kid yourself, Terry, you wouldn't have stopped him if you had been there in the studio.

MR. SMITH: It's true.

MR. TALBOTT: Yes, sir. And then we'll come to the gentleman up here. So, first back there and then up here and that's probably it.

SPEAKER: What as Mr. Holbrooke's approach to official recognition of past genocides?

MS. MARTON: Of what?

MR. TALBOTT: Past genocides.

SPEAKER: Genocides, yes, official recognition. How important are they? Did he any time speak about that?

MR. TALBOTT: I have a feeling you might have one in particular in mind.

SPEAKER: Armenian.

MR. TALBOTT: Yeah. I'm really -- because as you posed the question, do any of you know the factual answer, and then if not, we'll go to speculation.

I'll speculate. My guess, and this is checkable and I may well be wrong, is that he would have been loath to use the "G" word in an official way in the sense that it has come up on an annual basis and on a perennial basis in this town and elsewhere for the simple reason that he felt it would complicate an already very complicated and challenging situation in trying to move forward in relations between Turkey and Armenia

most of all, but also dealing with some of the associated issues that he was very conscious of, the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh, and all of that, which is to emphatically not say that he would have argued against those, including some very brave Turkish scholars who have called a spade a spade, if I can put it that way.

He was acutely conscious of the various uses and categories of language -- diplomatic language, communiqué language, legislative language on the one hand, and the language that human beings use when they talk about real experiences.

MS. MARTON: I think he wanted to -- he wanted nations, peoples, to acknowledge their own history, be it as bloody as this was. He was very proud -- he was of German background -- he was very proud of the way the Germans had assimilated -- German-Jewish background -- he was very proud of the way the Germans had assimilated their terrible history and he felt that there was no going forward until you acknowledge the sins of the past, but he was ultimately a very practical person and he was, as we have already noted, about results, and results on the ground.

And so he would not have -- weighing the relative merits of using a word as opposed to making actual headway and improving the lives of millions, I think that making progress would have trumped the short-term benefits of using a word.

MR. TALBOTT: Let's have one last question right down here from this gentleman and a quick question and we'll promise you a short or a couple of short answers.

SPEAKER: Thank you very much. My name is Fabrice (inaudible). I'm a policy analyst. And my question is essentially I've heard stories of Richard Holbrooke arguing with Kofi Annan and then sort of like Kofi Annan is currently leading a peace plan on Syria and given all the events, what's happening, current situation on the ground. I was sort of curious as to how Richard would have advised Kofi Annan or the

Administration --

MS. MARTON: Wow. Volunteers.

(Laughter)

MR. TALBOTT: Bob, I think -- you got that one, pal.

MR. ORR: I'm afraid I have an answer.

SPEAKER: Thank you.

MR. ORR: I'm sure that he would be calling Kofi Annan on a daily basis -- no, no, hourly basis.

MS. MARTON: Hourly.

MR. ORR: Hourly basis, providing tactical advice as well as strategic advice, but I'm sure of one thing, he would have advised him to take the job.

MS. MARTON: Yeah.

MR. ORR: When the Secretary General asked the former Secretary General to do this job, both of them knew the chances of success were exceedingly low, but they both thought this was an enterprise worth trying because there were no other good options and that this was the best of options. It takes, I think, a big man, a big person, to take on a challenge that you're almost certain to fail, and I think Richard Holbrooke would have not only advised Kofi Annan to take the job, he would have then done everything humanly possible not only to help him solve it, but to help his friend solve it.

MR. NASR: Although I have a feeling that Richard would have preferred for an American diplomat to do this rather than the United Nations.

MS. MARTON: Anyone in particular?

MR. NASR: And I think his point of view would have been that probably the United States has to be much more expansive in engaging all the players, those that

it likes as well as those that it does not like. And I don't think he would have necessarily looked favorably upon sort of outsourcing this to the Arab League and not taking a sort of very direct position largely because of what Kati said, because it's important about U.S. values and this is a case where American diplomacy and American strategic interest and American values come together.

MR. TALBOTT: Well, this may be -- I'm not sure how much will convey from this panel to the next one, which we need to go to now, but there is an interesting point of speculation there. Richard did have a pretty strong view that there was one mess in the world he didn't want to get into.

MS. MARTON: Yup.

MR. TALBOTT: And that was the Middle East. So, while I was going, hmm, I wonder which diplomat he would have suggested -- I'm not sure he would have suggested himself for that one, but I'll leave it to the next panel to take that one on, if you run out of other things to talk about.

But John and Bruce, I hope you agree that this last hour has been very much, in both substance and sprit, what we were hoping for today, and while there are only four chairs up here on the riser, I feel as though there could be 100 chairs, not that we would have gotten to all 100 panelists, but I really appreciate the way, starting with Diana, you all entered -- and Terry -- that you entered into the spirit of the thing.

So, with that we're going to step down and our colleagues are going to come on up here and get miked up.

(Applause)

MR. JONES: Well, it's going to be a little difficult to follow that, but I think one of the points that was made repeatedly in that last panel was that one of the things that Richard Holbrooke believed in is that the issues that he cared about should be

institutionalized. It wasn't just about his work, but that there should be institutions and ideas that should follow forward. And that's very much the spirit of this panel. We didn't want this to just be a look back at the life and work of Richard Holbrooke, but also to think about how to carry that work forward, and to institutionalize it and to build on it.

And the title of this panel, I think, speaks to that. The effort here is to understand what still needs to be done -- after a period of some progress, I would say, what still needs to be done to strengthen both the will and the capacity, or the resolve and the capacity to act to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, both in the United States and at the international level.

And when we say "to build the capacity and the resolve," I think people tend to assume "government," but, deliberately, this panel is composed to think across civil society, scholarship, public policy, and, of course, the U.S. administration as one of the key actors in the struggle to continue to build better results in the prevention of genocide and mass atrocity.

So, we have a terrific panel to take up that challenge. We're going to start with John Shattuck, who is also a cosponsor of this event. And thank you very much, John, for bringing this event to us. John is an international legal scholar, and a leading figure in human rights, and has been for many years; served as the Assistance Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor under Bill Clinton; was then at Harvard, and then at the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation; and is now the President and the Rector of Central European University, where the Richard Holbrooke Center will be established.

Renata Uitz is a professor of comparative constitutional law, and Chair of the Comparative Constitutional Law Program and CEU Legal Studies, and has been

teaching at CEU since 2001 on comparative constitutional law, but also on transitional justice and human rights protection

And then we're delighted also to be joined by Michael Posner, who is currently the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and has been since 2009, and comes to the State Department from Human Rights First, where he served both as executive director and president, and has been a leading figure in human rights and fair labor issues for many, many years.

So it's a terrific panel to address how to take the work of Richard Holbrooke forward.

And, John, why don't you kick us off?

MR. SHATTUCK: Thanks very much. And it's a great privilege for CEU to be working here with Brookings on this extraordinary set of issues that we're exploring, and the life our colleague and friend, Richard Holbrooke.

I'm going to talk a little bit about the one topic that has not yet really emerged so much, which is the remarkable legacy of Richard Holbrooke in the Balkans. And I'm going to start by answering the question: Why is the Central European University hosting a Richard C. Holbrooke Center for the Prevention of Genocide and Conflict Resolution?

And the answer is that this is the region in which -- that is, Central Europe, and southeastern Europe, where the Holbrooke legacy, many respects, was created in its most vibrant way. We've heard many stories already about it, but I'm going to tell you a few more about the Balkans. It's also the city, Budapest, where Central European University is located, from which much of the intervention that took place with NATO to stop the atrocities and genocide that was taking place in Bosnia at that time was going forward.

So it's quite fitting that Central European University join here Richard Holbrooke Center for Conflict Resolution and Genocide Prevention. It's a great pleasure, Kati, to be here with you, as a distinguished member of our board. And, Strobe, thank you so much for hosting this event.

Let me just say a few words at the outset about the university that I run, that is going to host this center.

It's kind of a remarkable university. Actually, Richard and I visited it long before I was ever the president. I mean, it is a university that comes out of the transitions of the Berlin Wall falling, and all the changes that took place in Central and Eastern Europe, and the effort to develop, once again, critical thinking and liberal education at the highest level, and the highest levels of excellence, in the countries of the former Soviet Union -- and now, as Strobe said earlier, far beyond.

It's really a crossroads university, because it looks east and west. It also looks to the Middle East, and to the south. Budapest, as you know, was occupied by the Ottomans for many years. It certainly had its share of occupations over the years and, in that sense, it is a crossroads of occupiers, but also a crossroads in which the democracy that is desperately trying to be born again is taking seed.

So this university is a graduate-level university. It has 2,000 students, or will soon have that many, focusing on social sciences, humanities, law and public policy. It's creating the first school of public policy in international affairs in the region. The new dean is, in fact, a senior fellow at Brookings, non-resident, Wolfgang Reinicke. So we have many ties here between the university and Brookings itself.

Let me say some words, a few words, about the Holbrooke legacy, and the Holbrooke strategy, very specifically, in the Balkans.

Like everything else about the man, it was a strategy that was unconventional, bold, and, in many respects overturned a lot of the previous thoughts that had gone into this terrible war, in terms of efforts to try to end it.

We all know that the war was essentially the product of cynical leaders' coming out of the post-Communist era, vying for their own ability to move forward. There's a story -- I think I heard it from Richard -- that the war basically started on a paper napkin at a dinner that Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman had together, where they drew a picture of Bosnia, sometime about 1991, and looked at how they might, in fact, occupy it themselves.

It was a war, of course, that had a very weak response, both in the United States and in Europe. Famously, James Baker saying we have no dog in that fight, in 1991. And that resulted in an endless and feckless period of peacekeeping which was not keeping any peace by the United Nations, which was really not being given any direction, either by the United States or by Europe.

And along came Richard. And this was a cause which he took very powerfully. And I think what he did, in many respects, is a forerunner of future efforts -- which we're going to talk about here this morning -- to develop strategies for preventing atrocities and stopping genocide.

What he did, basically, was to challenge the fundamental assumption that all peace exercises in Bosnia had taken up until then, which is that you have to work with war criminals. You have to work with the people who are committing these atrocities. And he too the position that, "I'll certainly work with them, but they also have to be accountable for what they're doing." And when Srebenica came along, he dispatched me to look into why it was that these 7,000 men that we all have heard about had gone missing. And I was sent to central Bosnia, and Tuzla, to interview refugees where were

coming out of the Srebenica area. And, in fact, there was clear evidence that there had been a mass genocide. He immediately characterized it -- along with others in the State Department -- as what seemed to be the worst genocide since the Second World War.

And he developed a very new strategy for addressing this conflict, a strategy that drew together conventional diplomacy and instruments of justice. He did something that very few diplomats ever do in a situation like this, he embraced the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia which, at that point, had indicted already several leading figures, including Radovan Karadzic.

He called for human rights investigations on the ground, at the very time that he was doing shuttle diplomacy to the Balkan capitals.

He had basically four elements of his strategy which, I think, took us to the Dayton peace process. First was to spotlight and publicize ongoing mass atrocities. Here, again, he sent me and others to the field to conduct intensive human rights investigations.

Second, he developed a strategy of securing commitments from the leaders, on the spot, to stop the atrocities that were going on that he was hearing about directly from the field, from me and others. I remember several rather scratchy satellite phone conversations that we had when he was landing in Belgrade, and I was on the ground in Zenica. And he said, "Shattuck, you've got to get me more evidence than you've already gotten me." And so I would ask several people around me. And then the phone would go dead. But he would then dial me back, and take down everything I'd said, went in, confronted Milosevic with some ongoing and immediate ethnic cleansing and atrocities that were going on.

He took a very even-handed approach toward those who were committing these atrocities. He knew that it was important not to take sides, while at the

same time to be tough with everyone. And, again, that was the role that those of us who were providing him with information gave him.

He threatened to either start up the bombing again, or perhaps if those who was dealing with didn't respond properly, to indicate that they might well be subject to indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal.

And, above all, he decided to isolate war criminals, rather than dealing with them. Those who had been indicted by the Tribunal, he said he was not going to actually negotiate with, and they were not going to be invited to the table -- unlike all previous negotiations.

With more than a touch of irony, Holbrooke told Milosevic that he wouldn't negotiate with Karadzic and Mladic. He said, "That's your problem. We will not compromise on war criminals." And it was a remarkable new strategy for a diplomat to be using in trying not only to end the war, but to stop ongoing atrocities.

There are many lessons, I think, that are to be learned from this, above all, the ones that we've heard from the morning panel, the earlier panel, that bold action, unfettered by conventional diplomacy, is the only way to stop ongoing mass violence. Justice and accountability are every bit a part of the process. You can't have a peace process after genocide has been committed, without justice. And diplomacy must be backed by a credible threat of force in order to negotiate the end of a conflict involving mass atrocities.

And perhaps most important, because this is all about the Holbrooke legacy itself, individual leadership is essential in a multilateral world -- the leadership that breaks out of collective caution, and isn't deterred by the lack of consensus about what to do or how to go about doing it.

So, we're building on these lessons at Central European University, as we contemplate the opening of this Holbrooke Center for Conflict Resolution and Genocide Prevention in a region where there is a very dark history of atrocities. And the Center will have -- and I'll just very quickly touch on several elements of it, and then turn to my other panelists -- three dimensions: training -- certainly, training in diplomacy, negotiations, case studies drawn from the kinds of subjects that we're talking about here, role playing, civil-military relations, human rights advocacy, and certainly the study of international justice.

Second, it will have a research component. It will study the historical roots of violent conflict, and early-warning mechanisms, benefits, and limitations of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect that has since come into being. The role of the media in preventing or, in the wrong hands, in promoting mass violence, as in the case of Rwanda. Relationship between justice and peace-making. And the role of law in promoting reconciliation, and enabling transitional justice.

And, finally, the final element -- and this is a particular tribute to Holbrooke -- we expect our center to have real-time negotiations. The center, and some of the senior fellows in it, and senior advisors, have themselves been involved in negotiations, whether with Holbrooke or with others. Javier Solana, for example, is a major member of our center advisory board. Gassan Salome, who is a former foreign minister of Lebanon, and who was very actively involved in the recent negotiations that were led by Kofi Annan in Syria. And the former Hungarian foreign minister, Peter Balasz.

We all expect to engage in real-time negotiations of the type that are needed, connecting an academic institution with a more activist but very careful and

even-handed approach, and using some of these techniques that Richard Holbrooke himself has exemplified.

So, thank you very much. And we look forward to working with anyone here who is interested in the work of this center -- including my distinguished successor as Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, and Renata Uitz, to my left, who is a distinguished professor at CEU, and will be very active in the center.

MR. JONES: So that's a perfect transition. Renata, why don't you just kick off straight from there?

MS. UITZ: Thank you. And thank you very much for the opportunity to be included in this very distinguished panel.

The few remarks which I have prepared really relate to how preventive mechanisms could build on the record of responses to past atrocities, ranging from mass killings to transition from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.

And I would like to pick on three trends which I believe -- although at first they might appear terribly obvious, their interaction is really not properly accounted for at the moment.

The first trend, especially for the last 20 years, has clearly been the convergence of public international law, humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international criminal law. On the one hand, it's a very visible development, because you see the mushrooming of international criminal courts and hybrid courts for various conflicts, and now we have the permanent court in The Hague. And it's clear that the Yugoslavia Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal definitely contributed more efficiently than any other institution before into solidifying standards and principles of international criminal law or international justice, which previously was not seen on the international level. Whether you are speaking about establishing what armed conflict means for the

purposes of criminal responsibility, or how do you prosecute rape as an international crime, these institutions definitely did make major contributions.

And you do see a spillover effect. It's less than a month ago the European Court of Human Rights found that Russia, indeed, violated the European Convention, and Russia's lack of response to the plight of victims of the Katyn massacre actually amounts to inhuman treatment. This is all about the rights of victims to be treated fairly and compassionately by national authorities much after mass atrocities. The European Court emphasized, in its judgment, that it was not sufficient for a government to acknowledge that there has been a killing 70 years, far, far away, and it has to do something with our predecessors -- that actually governments do have to assist victims in getting the facts right, and getting as much as it was possible the information about their perished family members in mass graves in remote places.

This is a very, very important development. But I do feel that sometimes we might be even a little bit blinded by the convergence, because we, of course, capitalize on positive developments. At the same time, when it comes to discussions about whether, for instance, amnesties have a room in the transitional justice or conflict resolution toolkit, or what to do exactly about the responsibility to protect, these debates actually remind us that there are serious divides between these formerly independent fields of law. I mean, the perspective of one field, which focuses on equal sovereigns, and what is in their powers to do, is very different from the perspectives of human rights defenders to focus on the plight of individuals, internally displaced people, or stateless people, who are living in deplorable conditions as a result of a decade-long conflict, which might even be a conflict between private warlords.

So this gap should be properly accounted for in any preventive mechanism in the future.

The second point I want to raise is probably even more trivial. We are aware that many of the mechanisms, especially post-conflict, are extremely legalized. Lawyers are called in to draft constitutions, to draft basic charters for institutions, to tell you what a decent bill of rights looks like. And when it comes to responding to mass conflict, you actually staff your truth commissions or investigation commissions, or courts by lawyers.

And then, actually, you are surprised that not much has changed since the Second World War. And these trials, let's admit, look totally banal. It looks extremely banal that after a mass conflict which took many, many lives, and the survivors even suffered more than those who were dead, are then resolved in an air-conditioned room. People are in nicely ironed shirts. They sit with headphones. And when it comes to the atrocities which are monstrous which they have committed, these are reduced to various exhibits which are neatly typed out on fairly double-spaced pages. And these exhibits are then paraded in emotionless voices, one after the other.

So, are lawyers not part of the solution? I do believe lawyers are part of the solutions, but they cannot deliver more than this. Trials look like this exactly because you expect them to be performed by independent and impartial tribunals. You expect rules of evidence and requirements of due process to be observed. And as a result, lawyers cannot do much more, more than that.

But they can become part of the solution -- and I do insist on that -- if they are invited, and they are seen as part of a much more comprehensive response to mass atrocities. And exactly as you don't involve the designer of a perfect crane as an interior decorator in building the home, you do have to realize that the solutions they come up with are instrumental, but definitely are not sufficient in handling the impact of mass conflicts 20 or 30 years on.

So, let me come to my third point, which I think is exactly about the last thing, or the temporal dimension of conflict resolution, why transitional justice mechanisms are moved to mid-conflict, and so they are not post-conflict mechanisms anymore. You do realize that the same lawyers I was talking about actually do form an important professional network, and they have immense field experience.

So there is a network of constitutional lawyers, together with human rights lawyers, who bring in a totally different set of platforms of dispute resolution, the impact of which is clearly not accounted for. To give a very trivial example, who would have thought, in Dayton, in 1995, that more than a decade after the constitution was put on paper, there will be a court of law out there which says that the very basic arrangement which distributed political representation among ethnic groups -- Bosniacs and Serbs, the three key ethnic groups in the region -- actually violated the European Convention of Human Rights. Nobody--I mean, it's true that the local constituents, who were the key negotiators at the time, and key constituents of the body politic, they had 12 years to figure out how to include the others, and how to maybe at least translate the constitution, but definitely to consider taking the constitution one step further, to turn it from a peace agreement into a functioning representative institution for a new community. It didn't happen.

Of course, the European Court of Human Rights' judgment, surprising as it is, it could not have been foreseen at the time. And I'm not trying to say that someone had limited imagination at the time of Dayton. But, rather, what I'm saying is that the European Court of Human Rights' judgment brings another player into the field which was not particularly visible at the time of conflict resolution, together with national constitutional courts and other bodies.

And these are the bodies, the responses of which need to be accounted for in the future. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in this particular case, of course, will not solve anything, because it still was not implemented. Its enforcement does take a lot of effort, not only from the Council of Europe, but also from many of the NGOs, academics, policy people, and activists on the ground.

And I'm very much hoping that the CEU Center will be one of the forums and places where this debate can take place and continue from here on.

MR. JONES: Thank you very much.

Mike, we were very grateful that the administration chose to announce the new Atrocities Prevention Board in the lead-up to our event. So maybe you could talk a little bit about that, but also about other aspects of the administration's work. This has been an administration quite focused on human rights issues from a number of perspectives.

So -- over to you.

MR. POSNER: Thank you. Let me say, first of all, it's a pleasure to be here, and to be in such great company. John and I, in particular, go back a long way, and have worked on these issues in a variety of settings. And it's not at all surprising that, with John at the helm, the Central European University is taking on this really important mission.

I'm also thrilled that we're recognizing here the role that Richard Holbrooke played. He's a larger-than-life character, and a real leader, and we miss him a great deal.

Like Kati Marton, my family came from Hungary, and my own personal experience with this -- if I can just divert for one minute before talking about what we're doing now -- my own personal experience was, as a child listening to my grandmother's

stories of what had happened to her family, two of her brothers survived, and they told the stories of what had happened to the family.

As a young law student, I went to -- I got involved in human rights, with that history, looking at what was happening in Uganda in the 1970s. I interviewed over a hundred Ugandans in exile in 1974, during Idi Amin's time. And what was really striking to me was the lack of any international attention to what was going on. I'm interviewing people who were describing villages destroyed, hundreds of thousands of people being killed, one after another ethnic group being targeted, and yet the world was largely silent.

So, to me -- and all of us come with out own personal histories -- but to work in this administration, and on these issues in particular, is especially important.

President Obama has talked often about strengthening our resolve through what we've called -- and Secretary Clinton keeps calling -- "principled engagement." We're committed to universal principles, applied across the world, based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And we're mindful, whether it's Uganda, or Cambodia, or Rwanda, or Yugoslavia, that the world has too often failed to address these things in real-time.

So, with Samantha Power at the lead, who has had such an important role, both in documenting what had happened in Rwanda, and who was so involved in the former Yugoslavia, and who now sits as my counterpart in the White House, the President announced last August a Presidential Study Directive which lays out the case for a national security strategy based on genocide prevention. It's based very much on the study task force that Madeleine Albright and William Cohen undertook in 2008, and the recommendations they made. And it led to the announcement last month of the Atrocities Prevention Board. And the President announced this at the Holocaust Museum, appropriately.

It really has three aspects. One is to try to set in motion a set of activities or tools, on an interagency basis, for preventing, and providing early warnings, of genocide to prevent these things from happening -- critically important.

Secondly, to have a set of actions in place that allow a rapid response when situations start to deteriorate and you're in the midst of what is a crisis situation.

And third, following up on what John said, a notion that essential to this is that there be a piece devoted to accountability and justice.

And so, among the steps that we've taken, we are setting up what's called a National Intelligence Estimate, which will evaluate global risks. This is really both to facilitate a more systematic collection of data, but also to make information available on a broader basis throughout our government. We're going to identify risks with the notion that this will help us address those risks.

The Treasury Department is working to deploy the financial tools at its disposal -- asset freezes and the like, targeted sanctions -- to move more quickly, to move more decisively, and to make government more effective in basically sanctioning bad behavior, both of governments and, importantly, of private companies, especially those in the technology sector, who are aiding and abetting outrageous behavior. And there was an executive order announced several weeks ago that particularly targeted technology companies working in Syria and Iran.

Third, the Department of Defense, critically important in this, is incorporating a set of atrocity-prevention doctrines, both in its doctrine and planning. The Joint Staff have prepared a mass atrocity response paper. The geographic commands are incorporating prevention and response as a priority.

Critically important. We talk about "whole of government" approach. It's easy to talk about it; it's very hard to do it. And this is really one of those instances

where, across the government, people have come to together and said we recognize we have a set of challenges. We don't have unlimited authority or ability to affect them, but we are going to do more than we've done, in a more systematic way.

And at State, we're increasing our, what we call, "surge capacity." Secretary Clinton has set up a new civilian security operations bureau which is going to focus on these emergency situations -- again, prevention and reaction. In my own bureau, John's old bureau, the Democracy, Rights, and Labor Bureau, we're continuing, really, in the spirit of what John and Richard Holbrooke did, we sent teams out to southern Sudan and Ethiopia to interview refugees coming out of southern Kordofan. We've done a major assessment of what's happening there, in real-time, so that people can't say we don't know what's happening.

We're doing the same thing in Syria now. With NGOs, with the support of other governments, we're documenting, in real-time, what's happening. We're building capacity, we're facilitating coordination. And we're enhancing communication.

Let me say, finally -- and I'm sure there will be lots of questions about this -- I think we all recognize that we can put the tools in place, we can be smart, we can be bureaucratically effective in doing the best we can do. And that doesn't mean that we're going to get to the place where the Sudans, the Syrias stop happening. It's a reality of life that people behave badly a lot. Sometimes they behave outrageously.

What it does mean is that, as a government, we should not be caught unaware. We should not be caught were somebody says, "Did you think of -- ", and we answer, "No." And we ought to, to the best of our ability, be combining both, as John said, diplomatic strategies, the potential use of force, multilateral, bilateral diplomacy, and sanctions in a way that reduces the worst behavior and, in some cases, prevents it from ever occurring.

Let me just stop with that.

MR. JONES: Thank you very much. And I'm struck with your opening, your personal memory of Uganda in 1973. I mean, we are now in a moment when the United States has deployed Special Forces to Uganda to help the Ugandan army capture or kill Joseph Kony, one of the most outrageous warlords out there. So if you think about the distance we've traveled from a period of time in which large-scale genocide in Central Africa could go largely unnoticed to where we are today.

That doesn't mean there isn't an awful lot of work still to do, however. And I think where we want to take the conversation now is, what else needs to be done, and where we want to see things moving, at both a U.S. level, at an international level, and in the research and policy-debate world.

So let me throw the floor open, and we'll go from there. And I think we might take several questions, and then come back to the panel a couple times.

In the middle of the room, and then we'll go to the back.

MS. WILLARD: Thank you. My name is Emily Willard. I work at the National Security Archive. And I had a question that was addressed in the previous panel, but also came up in discussion in this panel.

I was wondering how useful the term and the word "genocide" is in looking at how to prevent genocide and mass atrocities? Looking at how to address it in real-time, but also looking at how to address justice and accountability for past crimes.

Because we see that using the term "genocide" is very controversial and political, all the way back to what happened in Armenia, but also in Sudan, Rwanda, Bosnia. And even in Guatemala, the recent elected president decided to come and say that -- deny that a genocide took place, where a United Nations truth commission said that it did. And also what we see happening in Syria and Libya.

So if anyone has any comments on where they see the future discourse of defining -- how to define "violence," which then leads to how the international community will react to addressing that violence.

MR. JONES: Thanks.

Let me take the gentleman there.

MR. TERRAGINO: My name is Larry Terragino.

I guess I'm struck by the absence of a military member on this esteemed panel here, because I think one of the central policy issues, prospectively, here is the potential use of force. So I would be interested in the point of view of the panel on how we make that decision? In other words, what are the principles of engagement in this -- and not from necessarily the point of view of a single nation, ours, but international forces, quasi-military forces -- intervention of any kind that moves beyond the diplomatic to the force?

Thank you.

MR. JONES: Thanks.

Let me take one more at the back. Gentleman at the back.

MR. FREEMAN: Lawrence Freeman, from EIR magazine, African desk.

How concerned are you about going down the slippery slope of using humanitarian intervention for military regime change? There's been a big backlash in the U.S. Congress, by the Russians, against what was done in Libya, where the alleged atrocity was used to overthrow a government.

You have now Senator Webb, who's very close to the military, has introduced a bill, or will -- no, he has -- into the Senate, saying that the President does not have the right to use military force on the grounds of so-called "humanitarian intervention." He says, "I can't even define what that means," and that would totally

overturn the responsibilities defined in the U.S. Constitution that the Congress is the only one who can declare ware.

So, now you're on the slippery slope, where you can claim it is humanitarian intervention, following from Tony Blair's "responsibility to protect" doctrine. And the Russians, even recently, both Medvedev and Putin, said no, national sovereignty is primary. And I agree with them.

And if you can claim there's genocide in South Kordofan, which I just came back from last month, and you can claim this, and you can claim that, then you have the authority to overturn the nation-state which was set up after the treaty of Westphalia.

I think that's very dangerous. So I'd like to know how you respond to that. And the fact that the U.S. Congress, Congressman Jones in the House, also has a bill restricting the President from military intervention -- I consider those good, patriotic responses to this type of global right to intervene.

MR. JONES: It reminds of -- just very briefly -- when we were negotiating, I was in Kofi Annan's office when we were the responsibility-to-protect. And one of our interlocutors at the time was Newt Gingrich, who was running a study at USAP on how to strengthen the U.N. And he came to meet us at one session and he said, "I have good news for you, and I have bad news for you. The good news is the United States is going to support the concept of the responsibility-to-protect. The bad news is the United States is going to support the concept of the responsibility-to-protect." And we went from there.

And I think all of these questions come to these central issues of sort of how do we think about the term and the framework for the use of force in response to mass atrocities.

So, Mike, why don't you start, and we'll work our way back.

MR. POSNER: Well, let me say, first of all, on the term "genocide," I think we've been very careful in setting up the Prevention Board that we're using the term "atrocity" or "mass atrocity." I think we're looking at actions that are distinct because they're systematic, they're widespread, and there's gross abuses.

So the term "genocide" does have a value, but I think if we wind up only using that term, we don't deal with some of the things that all of us know and realize need to be addressed. And I think that's the right way forward.

On the second and third questions, which are sort of mirror-images of the other, I think there are a range of things that are uppermost in our mind. I don't think there is a one-size-fits-all response to the use of force.

As John said, I don't think you can take it off the table. That doesn't mean that it's always going to be used. And I would distinguish, to illustrate that, what we did in Libya, and what we're doing now in Syria. We have to be mindful of the practical limitations of our military, and the risks that you've identified, in the last question, of extending ourselves where there isn't legitimacy -- globally or within the region -- and where the facts and circumstances don't make a military response practically effective.

In Libya, we had a country that was geographically divided, where you had a local population that was not only positive or open to our intervening or having some kind of a military response, they were desperate for it. It was clear that in Benghazi that if there hadn't been a NATO coalition response, there would have been bloodbath, a massacre. We also had the support of the Arab League; we had the support of the Security Council.

All of those factors weighed on the decision of whether to intervene. And I think now, looking back retrospectively, we saved lives, and we created a better environment -- not an easy environment, but one that I think we can easily justify.

Those circumstances, or many of them, don't hold in Syria. And so I think there is a recognition on our part that a U.S. military intervention, or a NATO intervention, may, in fact, further militarize the conflict.

Again, one can debate that, but I think what I'm saying is that there needs to be a recognition that the world is a complicated place, and as we face Kordofan, or we face Syria, we've got to be mindful of the military practicality, the political legitimacy, local views and opinions, the practicality of what we're doing.

But we've not -- we never should be in the place where we abandon people that are in desperate shape. So we've got to have, as an option, the notion that there will be some form of intervention that may, at some point, include military intervention from us or others. That's where we are in these situations. And I think inevitably -- it's not going to satisfy everybody, but we've got to take these cases one at a time.

MR. SHATTUCK: It certainly is true that it would be helpful to this discussion to have a military voice sitting on the panel. I agree with the point that was made back here. On the other hand, I would say the voice, in a sense, that's overarching in this whole discussion has been that of Richard Holbrooke, who was very quick to establish alliances and clear connections with those who would be able to exercise military judgment better than he.

And so I think what, above all, is needed is this careful connection between civilian and military authorities.

But let me go back to the first question, relating to genocide, because I think it is a very loaded term, to be sure. It's also a term with very specific legal meaning, and often is thrown around in ways that don't suggest that the person using it understands the legal meaning -- the legal meaning basically being the intention to destroy, on the basis of a person -- on the basis of ethnicity or religion, in particular, or race, an entire group. And the intention clearly has to be there.

There were some very difficult moments early in the post-Cold War era, particularly around Rwanda, where genocide became, in a sense, the property of the lawyers, that is to say, the policy-makers essentially turned to the lawyers to see whether or not something should be labeled a genocide. And in the case of Rwanda, it was particularly painful, because I think there is a legal convention -- many people here know it, the Genocide Convention, which the United States has signed -- which actually calls for those who have signed it to take appropriate action under circumstances where a genocide is taking place.

And so what happened in Rwanda was that the policy-makers took the position that we don't really know what this is, and we are very preoccupied with other things, and it seems to be mass violence. The lawyers then took hold of it and essentially said, we're not going to label it genocide because to do so would be to indicate that there would have to be a policy response.

And down at my level, which was the level that Mike is now performing at the State Department, we were essentially prohibited from calling what we saw on the ground -- and I had traveled throughout the region, and interviewed in Rwanda -- what was clearly a genocide, we were prevented by State Department lawyers, doing their job, from calling it a "genocide."

So we need to overcome this kind of legal crisis of the terminology of "genocide." I think the use of the term "mass atrocities" here is a very appropriate one. Ultimately, the judgment is going to be a matter for the courts, to be sure. But what we see in the case of mass atrocities may not carry the same level of intent that genocide carries, but it may be something that needs to be addressed.

Finally, on the question of intervention, humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect -- yes, I think it's certainly true, as Bruce suggested, that there is both good news and bad news here, which is that we don't -- this is a doctrine that is very difficult to explain in great detail. It is very situational. And it depends on a number of important criteria being met -- first and foremost being the legitimacy and the legal determination, in my view, at a U.N. Security Council level, that some military force is necessary because a failed state, or a failing state, has failed to provide protection for civilians who are then subject to mass atrocities. And finally, a criterion which involves the exhaustion of all other possible means -- diplomatic, sanctions, other kinds of means that don't involve the use of force.

But in the end, as I think most military specialists in this field would agree, there has to be at least the option and the threat of the use of force -- which was very effective in bringing the end to the war in Bosnia, as I said earlier, through the means by which Richard Holbrooke was able to constantly refer to the prospect of force being used, again, if the atrocities continued.

MS. UITZ: Two very quick points, because a lot of the things were already said about politicization, and the politics of "genocide."

I mean, you have to be mindful of the fact, in addition to all the other things, that this is extremely locally context-dependent. So the fact, for instance, that in France genocide-denial was stopped by the Constitutional Council doesn't mean that the

French are totally pro-genocide, go for it, and encourage everyone. But, rather, that the national discourse for a long time, and for many totally incidental factors, reached a point that the genocide-denier law became a vehicle of restricting freedom of speech to previously unseen proportions. And that's a very different story from, say, Armenian genocide and Turkey. And I do believe that many of the preventive mechanisms do have to also be mindful of these local differences, otherwise we are missing quite a bit on the efficiency side.

Now, when it comes to the military response, I mean, obviously, the earlier -- and adding to what John has just said -- I mean, the earlier the warning mechanism, the broader your network, your signaling network, can actually become. Which means that you can actually, and do have to, rely on a range of different national and regional professional efforts -- not all of them are governmental -- which can supply decision-makers with a wealth of information, and also an opportunity to signal to significant players that something is going wrong at a terribly rapid speed.

So it's not simply a military response, or economic sanctions, but actually sometimes you have much softer means which then can become part of the toolkit.

And this is all the more important, I believe, because you cannot pretend that all of your perpetrators, or potential perpetrators, are state actors. History shows that these are not state actors. And once you are dealing with non-state actors here, traditional toolkits are not as efficient in practice as they look on paper. So I would like just to put that on the table.

MR. JONES: We're coming close to the end of time, but I think what we're going to do is take a lightning round. I'll take three very quick questions, and then come back to the panel for very quick final remarks.

In the middle of the room.

MR. GUGGENHEIM: Hi, my name is Joe Guggenheim.

In the question of genocide, and also the question of the problems of refugees and displaced persons resulting from genocide, it's always seemed to me that much greater activity could be undertaken by the U.S. Defense Department to somewhat reorder some of the tasks that they take so that they would have the ability to use the airlift capacity and the stationing of supplies to bring aid quickly to refugees around the world. It wouldn't be, to me, a massive change in some of the role of the Defense Department.

But I wonder what you think about that. And are we doing anything along the lines of using our military to deliver humanitarian aid in a more effective and more ongoing way?

MR. JONES: Right in front.

SPEAKER: I would like to thank the (inaudible) for telling us that now there is going to be some accountability, and measures put in place to identify risks or case estimates.

I am from Africa. And as an African woman, I obviously wondered why is it that when there is atrocity against African women, the international community does not work hard enough to bring the perpetrators to justice? Like, why the women in Bosnia have justice, and not the women in Africa?

And I would like to ask the gentlemen how are you able to identify (inaudible) in Africa before they get out of control? Because these, the problems in Africa seem to be so complex, and we have the feeling the usual thing is to listen to what the majority of a place tells the (inaudible) authorities.

And also, I was wondering if maybe tapping into the Diaspora in the U.S. may help you get the (inaudible).

Thank you.

MR. JONES: Thanks.

MR. ZEBARI: Thank you. My name is Karwan Zebari. I am from the Kurdistan region.

My question is going to be critical of our government, the U.S. government.

Sometimes we purposely overlook some of the atrocities being carried out, perhaps because of our interests -- whether it's trade interests or arms interests. And I'll give you two examples. One, during the 1980s, Saddam was carrying out all these mass killings, mass atrocities, but we kept subject quiet because we had arms treaty with Saddam, and Saddam being the enemy-of-my-enemy being the friend. And it wasn't until recently, and even until recently, we're still discovering mass graves.

The question is, how many Richard Holbrookes do we need to uncover, or shed some light on some of these atrocities.

And one recent example is we are currently overlooking some of the things that are going on in Bahrain. What are we doing with -- especially with the creation of this Atrocities Prevention Board -- to perhaps shed some light, even with the countries that we have trade agreements, or that are not to the best of our interests, to the national interests?

Thank you.

MR. JONES: Thanks very much.

And I'm going to add one question, then we'll go from my right, and go down the row.

So, each of you speaking in a personal capacity, if you had your wish-list, if you could achieve anything right now, if you were to have one additional tool,

mechanism, or law at your disposal, at either the U.S. government level or the international level, what would it be? What's the one other thing that we most need, to be able to effectively prevent genocide and mass atrocities?

We'll start with you, Renata.

MS. UITZ: That was unfair.

MR. JONES: (Laughs.) Well, you can answer the other questions, too.

MS. UITZ: Well, the other questions went the other direction. But the suggestion of having more Richard Holbrookes definitely sounds good. But actually, having teams of experts with very, very different skills at the table -- not only military people, and lawyers, and historians, and social scientists, but also a range of expertise, because my sense -- concentrated in one room, in any of the preventive mechanisms you are building, or around them. Otherwise much of the information which we are still collecting will make very, very little sense to people coming from one or the other directions.

So, someone who has (inaudible), if it's not one person, then it should be 10, but in the same room, in a good team.

MR. JONES: John.

MR. SHATTUCK: Well, let me start with one that's, I think, coming into being. And I'm so pleased that Mike has described to us this Atrocities Prevention Board.

When I go back to the period that I was serving in government, it was clear to me that there was virtually -- there was no bureaucratic incentive for people other than the Richard Holbrookes, who operate outside of the bureaucracy, to engage on these issues of genocide prevention and mass atrocities prevention. And I think the worst example of that, again, is Rwanda, in that the bureaucracy basically slept through

Rwanda, and there were no incentives to have any early warning or action. And there were some people who tried to get it, but it was impossible to get it.

So, I think if this Atrocities Prevention Board is going to prove to be the kind of presidential leadership that says this is important, therefore people at low levels should pay attention and should engage, and their rank will be improved if they, in fact, take action to stop a genocide, then I think that is very positive.

But let me mention two other laws that I would like to see, which are -- and here, I'm going to be critical of the U.S. Government. I would like to see the U.S. Government ratify the International Criminal Court. I think so would many of my friends who are in the U.S. Government. The politics of doing so is almost impossible. But I think the U.S. has significantly lost credibility in the international community relating to these issues because it hasn't ratified the ICC.

And I would mention one other, which happens to be a particular concern of mine, which I am deeply troubled by the prospect than an American citizen can be killed by a drone overseas with very little due process of law -- as I see it. And I think this is opening the door to significant -- well, just vast changes in the way in which the U.S. Government is relating to its own citizens, to say nothing of citizens abroad.

And so I would like to see both of those issues clarified.

MR. JONES: Mike, we have several questions addressed to you, and then if you want to address the wish-list question, too?

MR. POSNER: I'm happy to.

First of all, on the issue of refugees and the role of the military, my sense is that over the last 15 or 20 years the military has become much more attuned to a broader humanitarian mission as part of what they do, but there are some limits to that. One limit is that the organizations that are the primary humanitarian deliverers don't want

to be part of a military operation. So groups like the Rescue Committee, and CARE, and Save the Children, and Oxfam are very conscious of the independent role that they play. But on just a mechanical level, or in terms of logistics, military in a range of places is doing everything within its power to be a partner in that effort -- subject to those rules.

On the question about African human rights and the role of African women, since I worked on the Uganda issues 30-some years ago, four things have changed that are really important. It isn't to say that the problems aren't real. They're very real, as you've said. But there is now local advocacy. When I was in Uganda there were no human rights groups. There were, in fact, very few human rights groups, local human rights groups, in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Today, you can't find a country in Africa where there aren't local advocates for women, for human rights, for children, and the like. That's a huge change.

Second is technology. You can't do what Idi Amin was doing in 1974 because the world sees it, they see it in real-time, they see the visuals on You-tube the next day.

The third is what John talked about, an evolving diplomacy. And we're about to celebrate the 35th anniversary of DRL, of the Democracy and Human Rights Bureau in the State Department. I have a boss, Hillary Clinton, who doesn't let anybody else forget about the importance of empowering women in the world. And so I have the wind at my back in a way that my predecessors -- and certainly, Patt Derian, when she came into the State Department in 1977, would have found unbelievable. It doesn't mean we're all the way there, but we've moved a great deal.

And fourth -- and also critically important -- is the changing dynamic within Africa. You have today leaders like Ellen Johnson Sirleaf running governments, who are very mindful of these issues. It doesn't mean we're all the way there. Again, I'm

very mindful of the challenges you, and we, all face. And I agree with you that the Diaspora here can help us.

But I do feel that we're in a different place than we were in the '70s, '80s, '90s -- even 10 years ago.

On the issue -- the third question was about tough choices, tough allies. Bahrain, you mentioned.

One of the things that I'm particularly pleased about -- and it's been an evolution over the last several years -- is the extent to which CENTCOM, General Mattis, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are very much aligned with what we're trying to do in Bahrain. We have a national security interest. We've articulated that over and over again. But even last week, when we announced some extension of security cooperation, we were very clear the human rights situation is not good. In some respects it's deteriorating.

The public statements that have come out of not only State but out of the military are very clear: We know that the situation is extremely dangerous there, polarized. We talked about increasing polarization, what's happening on the street. Those messages are being reinforced by our military colleagues.

So, again, we're not there yet. We've got a huge challenge in Bahrain. But there is a real sense that the government understands, at all levels, where we are.

And, finally, on the one tool -- the greatest thing that we lack is public engagement on these issues. We lack media attention. What's happening in Nigeria, or Sudan, or any of the places -- most of the places we're talking about, most Americans have absolutely no idea that it's happening.

If it's 30 seconds on the nightly news, that's a big deal. Very little attention in Congress, frankly. There's a few pet issues, but so many of these issues don't get the attention they deserve.

Without public attention, government doesn't feel the pressure it needs, frankly, to do the right thing. So that would be my one wish.

I'm more optimistic with John on the International Criminal Court. I think we're moving slowly to engage, as we can, with the constraints of the law. We've got a

lot of educating to do in the Congress, but we're certainly moving the direction, and the Court's moving in the direction of being more legitimate here. It's not going to happen overnight.

And on the drones, we could have a whole panel on that. But I would say the one thing that's animate Harold Koh's involvement in this, and mine, is the notion that are no law-free zones. We talked earlier about the interconnectedness of the law. There are no law-free zones. And so whatever we're doing, there is a legal regime behind it.

We can debate the policy implications, but there's a heck of a lot of time and energy trying to figure out what's appropriate, what's legal, and what's right.

MR. JONES: Thank you very much.

I have to say, if I look back on the last decade or so, it seems to me that we could sum things up in the following way: that 10 years ago, in Rwanda, and 15 years ago, efforts like that, it was actually relatively easy to avoid acting. There are always going to be constraints on action, there are always going to be times and places where action is impossible for a range of reasons.

But I think, between R-to-P, the Atrocities Prevention Board, and some of the experiences we've had, we're shifting the ground a little bit towards where it's more difficult not to act, or where the presumption should be -- and increasingly is -- that if it's possible to act in a credible way to stop mass atrocities, we will -- versus a more defensive and an avoidance posture that we've had a for a long period of time. That's not to say there aren't still innumerable obstacles.

And I hope that this beginning conversation, with ECU, and with others, helps to contribute in the spirit of the man whose life and work we're here to commemorate and celebrate.

So thank you all for being here today. And thanks for joining me in thanking the panel.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2012