

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

CRISIS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE SAHEL:
THE COST OF LATE RESPONSE TO EARLY WARNINGS

Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, May 22, 2012

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. BRADLEY: Well, once again -- and apologies for the technical difficulties -- welcome to Brookings. My name is Megan Bradley. It's a pleasure to have you all here today for this panel on the "Crisis in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel: The Cost of Late Responses to Early Warnings." So as many of you know, the crisis that unfolded in 2011 in the Horn of Africa was the most severe emergency of its kind this century. More than 13 million people were affected by the drought, and perhaps as many as 100,000 died. What's, I think, particularly striking about this crisis is the fact that we so clearly saw it coming.

The sophisticated early warning systems, such as the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, started to forecast this crisis in August 2010. These predictions became increasingly more urgent as it became clear that the short rains in October to December were likely to be poor. In December 2010, the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group for East Africa said that preemptive action would be necessary to protect the livelihoods of people in the region and to avoid costly emergency interventions later on.

There was a modest increase after these early warnings, but a major scale-up of the international response really didn't happen until after major media coverage in the summer of 2011, and after the U.N. declared a famine in parts of Somalia. So by the time the humanitarian system was really robustly responding to the scale of the crisis, millions were already malnourished and tens of thousands had already died.

So with this sobering background, our goal today is to explore how to

improve the ability of the U.S. Government, other national governments, NGOs, and the United Nations to prevent the worst effects of these chronic crisis. First, by more effectively investing in long-term development and, second, by improving responses when early warnings are activated. So today's discussions are really informed by a recent report that was published by the co-sponsors of today's event: Oxfam America and Save the Children.

So I hope that many of you have had a chance to pick up a copy of this report, "A Dangerous Delay: The Cost of Late Responses to Early Warnings in the 2011 Drought in the Horn of Africa." Personally, what I found particularly useful about this report was its really strong emphasis on the need to move from crisis management to risk management.

So the report asks us, how can national governments, the U.N., and NGOs overcome the barriers that we see to early response such as the fear of getting it wrong or attitudes of resignation towards what are sometimes seen as chronic crises? And of course there aren't any answers that are easy to these questions, and the report doesn't pretend otherwise. But it does make a really compelling case for the need to incentivize early response and to act even when information remains uncertain. I also particularly appreciated the ways in which this report is really dedicated to drawing out the broader lessons from the crisis in the Horn to try to identify how these lessons can inform the challenges that we face elsewhere in the world.

And this is, of course, a really enormous task. It involves tackling the seemingly chronic coordination problems that we have in the humanitarian community and it also requires addressing the root causes of vulnerability so that we can reduce the

risk of drought and disasters in the first place. So these are the challenges that, of course, really cut to the heart of the humanitarian enterprise today. And unfortunately, these aren't challenges that we can put on the back burner because, as you all know, the situation that we see in the Sahel today is becoming increasingly concerning.

For the third time in a decade, the region is facing a drought that threatens to leave millions of people hungry. For those of you who've been following the news, the FAO estimates that as many as 60 million people may be affected by the food crisis. While the droughts in 2005 and 2010 mostly affected just Niger and Chad, the situation in the Sahel today is affecting a much wider swath of the region. Since the beginning of the year, NGOs, governments, and early warning systems have been pointing to a pending crisis. We've seen some response to this from the donor community.

Early donor meetings have resulted in calls for early action in the region to prevent the kind of crisis that we have seen in the Horn, but we still have major gaps in the funding that's been provided to projects in the region. Save the Children and Oxfam report that their projects are still underfunded and only half of the money that is needed for the U.N. response has actually been raised to date. So I think we really need to be clear about the lessons that have emerged from the crisis in the Horn, and think strategically about how we can apply them to the situation in the Sahel before it becomes a larger scale crisis.

And this, of course, isn't necessarily to say that the situation in the Sahel today is as bad as the situation in the Horn last year or that it will become this bad, but rather that we have an opportunity to try to think strategically about these lessons and to

try to support the resilience of communities that are living in these effected regions. And this is, I think, above all, a question of political will and that's really going to be at the heart of today's discussion. How do we marshal the political will to tackle these issues and what are the barriers to making the most of early response?

So before I introduce our panelists and say a quick word about the structure of the event today, I just wanted to draw your attention to a recent publication from the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement. This is our 2011 review of natural disasters. The theme of the report for this year is, "The Year That Shook the Rich." So the report looks in detail at some of the crises that we've seen in Japan, in Australia, in New Zealand. But it also includes a chapter on drought, which was a major challenge this past year in developed countries and in developing countries, of course. So the chapter on drought really focuses in on the situation in the Horn of Africa and looks at the ways in which the drought in the Horn turned into a famine in Somalia. So I think this will be of major interest to a lot of people here and I hope that you pick up a copy before you leave.

So in terms of the structure of today's event, we're going to be focusing in on three key issues. First, the lessons learned from the crisis in the Horn last year that can ensure that the different actors that are represented by our panelists today can improve the response to the situation in the Sahel and in other cases. Second, we'll be looking at early warning and response systems, looking at what mechanisms are in place to ensure that we receive adequate early warnings, and that these warnings are met with systematic and coordinated responses. And third, we'll look at disaster risk reduction and the long-term investment.

So thinking about how we can ensure that risk management and disaster risk reduction becomes a really integral part of responses to these emergencies. And again, above all, how can we rally the political will to respond to early warnings in the first place? So I'll ask each of our panelists to start by giving us a few introductory comments limited to about five minutes, and then we'll have a conversation between the panelists facilitated by Paul O'Brien, who's on my far left.

At the end of the panel discussion we'll open it up to questions from the audience. So we'll look forward to hearing from you.

Just a quick introduction for our panelists. On my left, is Michael Klosson, who's the vice president for policy and humanitarian response at Save the Children. Michael oversees the agency's public policy and advocacy work, as well as their global and emergency response work. He's represented Save the Children at various international meetings, including gatherings of the G-8 and the G-20. And he's been at the forefront of Save's response to the earthquake in Haiti and also to the floods in Pakistan, amongst others.

Catherine Bragg was appointed the assistant secretary general and deputy emergency relief coordinator, pardon me, in the office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs by the U.N. Secretary-General in 2007. Before this appointment, she had a distinguished career in the Federal Public Service of Canada, serving most recently with the Canadian International Development Agency.

Nancy Lindborg will hopefully be joining us quite soon. She's, unfortunately, been delayed. Many of you would know Nancy already. She's the USAID assistant administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian

Assistance. And before joining USAID she was, of course, the president of Mercy Corps. So hopefully, she will be with us soon.

And last but by no means least, Paul O'Brien is the vice president for policy and campaigns at Oxfam America. Before joining Oxfam in 2007, he spent five years in Afghanistan working in the office of the president and also in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

So welcome to our panelists. Thank you very much for your contributions, and we'll look forward to hearing from you.

MR. KLOSSON: Great. Thanks, Megan. And I think we've got a great panel, but also I see a lot of folks in the room that have tremendous expertise in this area. So I think it's going to be a good conversation on an issue that's really important. And I want to thank Brookings for teeing this conversation up, particularly to sort of look forward on the crisis that we face in the Sahel.

So I mean, I think people probably are familiar with Save the Children as a global humanitarian and development organization. We're in about 120 countries and we've been in both the Horn of Africa as well as the Sahel for many decades. We're in four of the countries in the Sahel and all the countries in the Horn. And my task really, is to sort of look back a little bit in order that the whole panel then can look forward and, as Megan was saying, to look a little bit at the lessons that we have learned as a result of what we've gone through in the Horn.

I spent quite a bit of time last June and July in Ethiopia, particularly on the border between Ethiopia and Somalia, and it was a very compelling visit for me. And I think it was -- a lot of good work was being done, but it was also very clear that it was --

the picture was quite mixed at that time. So right at the time that the crisis was peaking, we were all -- and by "we," I mean all of us: NGOs, national governments -- we were all scrambling.

And I can recall visiting in the camps, there was a young family that traveled from Somalia quite a few days on a truck and they had lost all their livestock and all of their livelihood, so they had no choice but to go on the move. And it was a mom with -- I think the kids, there were sort of four kids that were under nine years of age. And they had spent about six or seven days in what was called the Preregistration Center, really with no services. I mean, there was no organized food and there was no organized water. And then they got moved over to what was called the Transit Center. And when I met with them they were in the Transit Center and they'd been there for two weeks. And they had some food and some water and some support for the first six days and then it stopped.

That was, you know, late June, early July. And as Megan was saying, we saw this coming and yet all of us were scrambling. And it wasn't until later in the month of July that at least the camps in Dollo Ado that I was involved with, that we finally figured out who was going to do what where. Because in those early days, it was 1,500 people everyday coming across the border into these camps and we were all overwhelmed and I think we all -- the bottom line for me in seeing that response was that we should have been better prepared to deal with that.

So I think the point that we're making is that this -- a lot of warnings, but the response at scale and with urgency was delayed. And that's not to say that there wasn't some good things that were happening on the part of national governments and

multilateral agencies and NGOs. There were and I'll come to that in a moment. But if you look at -- in our report, if you look, for example, there's one indication which says it could be the funding that was coming in to address the crisis in the Horn. The real surge in funding really didn't happen until June and July and yet we had seen this thing coming from the previous fall. And so, why is that?

And I think there's a couple of reasons that probably enter into it. One is the, you know, often-cited CNN effect. So it's frequently the case on a large-scale emergency, large-scale disaster, in order to respond at scale for -- speaking particularly for NGOs, you know, you need resources. And particularly from publics, if the crisis is invisible, there's not a whole lot of resources that are coming from publics.

And I would say the same applies to legislatures. It's difficult to mobilize support in legislative bodies unless the crisis is visible in the media. So there's sort of a Catch-22: In order to prevent a crisis, you actually have to start it. And I think it's particularly -- and it's not so much the case in an earthquake, like Haiti. It's pretty obvious what happened and there was a lot of media attention. But when you have situations in the Horn in particular, where it's chronic, right, and then it slips into acute and is back into chronic and slips into acute and when you have that kind of situation where that's the norm, it's harder to mobilize the media attention and, therefore, the resources that are required for a lot of us to scale up. So I think that was one of the factors, and we can talk about that a bit.

I think, Megan -- a second would be what Megan's already mentioned, which is uncertainty. You know, policymakers really don't want to be spending a whole bunch of money if they don't have to. And how much certainty do you need before you

sort of push the button and start the machineries and start the relief effort underway on a big scale? And we're not talking small scale, we're talking big scale. So I think that's the second -- in the case of the Horn, that was the second factor that kind of delayed the response and contributed to the early warnings not being met by a robust scaled-up and urgent response.

There's also -- third would be sort of political and policy factors. I think, you know, some donor policies towards Somalia certainly complicated the ability of the NGO community and others to mount a response. I think there's always worries on the part of national governments. There's sort of a stigma if you're having a humanitarian crisis. You know, you could get blamed for that. So there's those kinds of calculations that enter into the responses.

And then finally, and I think it's no secret that there was certainly access challenges due to insecurity and instability in Somalia. So that's another basket of things that I think, delayed the response.

And just two others quickly. One is, I think, the way the humanitarian system worked in the Horn, there was sort of a lack of -- the joint needs assessment and the consolidated appeal were not synched up. So you had a consolidated appeal that came out in November of last year, but it wasn't synched up with the failed rains in the joint needs assessment. So it actually underestimated the need that, you know -- and so process issues like that.

And then finally -- and this is very much the case with NGOs, is Save the Children is a dual-mandate NGO. As I said, we do development work, we do humanitarian work. There's different people doing those different jobs. And how do you

transition from one to the other? I mean, people tend to be in their stovepipes. And when you have, again, with the chronic to acute to chronic, sort of how does this all fit together?

And I think that the challenges of moving out of a development mode into a humanitarian response mode, you know, complicated the response as well. It's not to say, as I said at the beginning, that there wasn't some good stuff being done. In Ethiopia, I saw in particular the Productive Safety Nets Program. That really, I think, mitigated the impact in a lot of areas. Particularly in the host communities in the southern part of Ethiopia, there was -- the government along with partners had put in place a pretty good community management of acute malnutrition system. So that also was mitigating the impact of the drought. So there were things like that.

There's a Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative and Pastoralist Community Development Program. There were things that were underway in Ethiopia that didn't keep millions of people from being at risk, but it kept many millions more from being at risk. And I think this is something that President Obama and Secretary Clinton and others have drawn attention to. It could have been worse because there were some very successful programming underway that helped folks, you know, weather the impact of that.

So the question then is sort of, what do we do about that? And then I think that's what's worth a really good discussion in the room. What we would suggest first is to focus on sort of the long-term development stuff. I mean, build resilience, and that's at the top of the list and I think it's something that Paul may get into a little bit. The second point, I think, is one that Megan touched on from our report, is to manage the risk,

not the crisis.

So the system ought to be geared -- you know, let's say you have a graph where you have -- on the Y-axis you have low impact to high impact, and on the X-axis -- don't forget -- remember my math terribly well, so X and Y, I may have it confused. But anyway, on the vertical axis that's the low impact to high impact. On the horizontal axis, it's sort of from low probability to high probability. So up there in the high impact, high probability quadrant, if you have warnings that are in that area, we ought to have a system in place so it responds with greater alacrity and greater scale.

And I think what we're talking about is having some agreement on triggers that could help us all understand who needs to do what when. And if you have better triggers based on warnings rather than, you know, dying kids on the front pages of *The Washington Post*, then I think you'd have a better response system set up. So that's, you know, that's one set of recommendations we'd make.

I think a secondary for recommendations really is more agile and flexible funding. And again if you go back to sort of the humanitarian and the development programs, they typically have different skill sets, different people doing it, different sources of funding, and it's hard to move those back and forth. They can be done at times, but it's difficult. So it would be good for us to think through, how do you have more agile funding, more flexible funding? So if you're in a development setting or chronic setting and it turns into acute, how do you then mobilize funding that could be used for that?

And I think -- and again, drawing on my Ethiopia experience, there were some longer term development programs, particularly in the Pastoralist Livelihoods

Initiative where there were crisis modifiers that were funded by OFDA. And I think that worked pretty well, where you can combine those two things up.

A third area really would be sort of integrating DRR through the whole work, through all of our work, so that we can help development programs adapt to the changing circumstances.

So I think those are sort of -- and maybe the fourth area would be, again, in terms of joining up development and humanitarian. I know USAID, and I wanted to say this when Nancy was here to give her credit, but the USAID is putting sort of joint planning cells in the Horn with USAID and OFDA, and I think the intent is or maybe the reality is the same in the Sahel. This kind of combining perspectives is something that I think we need to do more of. And also in the NGO community and across the multilateral agencies, figure out how to do that.

So those are some of the areas, I think, that we should take a look at to figure out how do we do things better? And particularly since this crisis in the Sahel is very much on us, I mean, we ought to really reflect quite quickly and get on with it.

So I think with that, I'm going to turn it back to Megan.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Michael. We won't hesitate before moving on to Catherine.

MS. BRAGG: Okay, great. Thanks. Well, the problem of following Michael, someone who's so knowledgeable and erudite, and having also read the report, "A Dangerous Delay," I could almost say just ditto and that will be all I have to say. (Laughter) In a lot of ways it is true. I do agree with a lot, a lot of what Michael has said and also what's in the report itself. But I was asked to address some of the challenges

that the international community, particularly the United Nations, faced in the Horn of Africa situation and what we have done to apply some of what we have learned to our current response to the Sahel.

And there are basically three baskets of challenges. You know, I can put it that way. The first one is political, the second one is about the humanitarian community itself, and the third one is on donorship and funding.

On the political front, the drought involves three countries and -- actually, you put also Djibouti and Eritrea in there, as well. But Djibouti is a very risk -- a small country. And Eritrea, we actually didn't have enough information. Basically it was blank for us. So we were concentrating on three countries and they were very, very different, you know, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya.

Somalia, in 2011, in the international domain was very much dominated by the political discourse and not the humanitarian or the human discourse. It was very much about the progress on the political front with the TGF, transitional federal government. And so a lot of the attention was on what's going right in a failed state that has been failing for decades? And so when the humanitarians started trying to put the discourse back onto humanitarian issues, there was a lot of the, well, so what's new? You know, like we've seen this in Somalia many, many times. So there was a lot of that that is just very much overshadowed by the political discourse.

In Ethiopia, a little bit less of that sort of element, but at the same time we faced a lot of sensitivity around the publications and the accuracy of figures. And there was lots of arguments between many parties and it really took well into the summer before we actually got to have any kind of agreed upon figures to be -- that's released.

And of course by then, the crisis was already full blown.

In Kenya, the same thing, very much distracted by political development you know, in terms of the stalled constitutional discussions and everything else around that. And Kenya was actually, I think, the last country to actually declare itself in emergency and in need of international assistance largely because of preoccupation about political events. Michael already mentioned about some domestic legislation of donor countries that also very much is influenced by some of these political developments as well. Domestic antiterrorism legislation is but one of them, but a very major obstacle for a lot of agencies in terms of being able to access funding.

And the second basket, which is what I called the, you know, the humanitarian community basket.

I know a lot has been written about the third set, which is about how donors have been late in coming forth with money, and I'll get to that in a minute and maybe repeat some of the things you already know.

But at the same time, in terms of the international community, we didn't have a compelling plan for early action either. The CAP was developed in the fall of 2010. The midyear review for a CAP -- normal year review is around this time of the year, about May. Now, if you kind of put it against the actual events that were unrolling, by May we knew bloody well what was going on. And yet the midyear review only had a very slight increase only from what they were forecasting back in the fall of 2010.

Now, why is that? To simplify life and, of course, many things happened, but just to, you know, simplify life, part of it is self censorship, if I can call it that. They looked at the funding stream coming in, they -- you know, the humanitarian country

teams, looked at the funding streams coming in and said, you know, we're actually very low -- there's very low funding here. There's no point in putting out a bigger CAP if there's not going to be any money coming in.

So what the country team basically was doing is that we're going to put out the CAP according to what we think the market would bear as opposed to a real picture of what they plan to do. Because a CAP is not just a funding instrument. A CAP is the strategic plan for the country teams. So they were containing themselves. And it was only after the famine was declared that there was a major revision of the CAP that put it from what was in the beginning of 800 Malian to 1.2 Malian, for example, for Somalia. So it really shows how we self-censor ourselves or we used to. We're learning. I'll get to what we've learned about, but I'm just talking about, you know, what are some of the things that has transpired.

So I think we can blame the donors a lot. But I think the international community in terms of the U.N., it's partners, also have to bear some of the responsibility that we were actually not really ready to say what would be the early action or to have taken the early actions and to have revised both our strategic and our operational plans based on the evolution of the crisis at that point.

And also there was very little appetite at that point of looking at early response as a part of preparedness and prevention for subsequent basis. That's one thing we have learned is that we were all very much still clinging to the pretty old way to thinking, that preparedness and prevention is something that happens before a crisis. All right, so you do that and then you have a crisis and then you have a response, right? I mean, what we have learned now is that actually early response as a crisis unfolds, that

a response is, in fact, by itself prevention for the deepening and the deterioration of situation into subsequent phases.

So we weren't into that kind of thinking back then. It's not that long ago, but we weren't into that kind of thinking. So that was also part of our impediment to have responded better with the Horn of Africa.

On donorship, a lot has been written about, you know, donor need of certainty, a triangulation of data before they actually would stick out their neck and actually write a check. And of course, that is, I'm quite sure, very true.

But at the same time, all of our past perhaps four or five years of emphasis on needs assessments in a lot of ways in the situation of the Horn could be seen as part of the impediment, as well. Because if you wait until you actually have good data from needs assessment, it's really -- it's very late. So there is part of that as well.

And I think we need to talk a little bit about how we have to make our funding instruments a lot more flexible. And I know that that's part of the discussion that Paul would conduct, so I won't go into that at the moment.

But generally, those were the three things that we saw: the political challenges, the humanitarian actors' own challenges, and donorship and funding challenges. How we have applied that, you know, what we've learned to the Sahel, very briefly -- and I know we're going to get into this discussion and I'm so glad Nancy is here; it will be a much more fulsome discussion to have Nancy here -- is that on the political front, I think that all of us, I mean all the parts of the international community, are really trying very hard to not let political factors and political discourse overshadow humanitarian situations.

So when the humanitarian community actually bring out a situation in a very active political situation such as in the Sahel, in Mali, Yemen, and other huge humanitarian situations, that, for quite a while, was very much overshadowed by all of the political transition that was happening. We've seen much less of the, oh, well, you know, the humanitarian situation's just something that happens all the time in these countries anyway and aren't we glad that we're seeing all of these political transitions that is happening over here.

I think we're all learning that we can't just ignore, you know, the obvious facts in our faces. In the Sahel response, definitely we're learning to support national authorities right off the bat. The early response plan that was put out around February, I think, was all in support of national plans. And the national authorities were also a lot earlier in their readiness to ask for international assistance or to declare a situation to be a national emergency.

So I think, on that front, I think we have moved a little bit in terms of how we approach it. In terms of the humanitarian community, you know, what I said about in the Horn, you know, we ourselves didn't bring particularly to the donors a compelling early action plan. We've learned that.

And in -- for the Sahel in February, there was an interagency regional early response plan that was intended to address it. Now, this is a little bit new for us, so that was not a terrific plan, I have to say. But, you know, we're still learning how to do this. So the plan that was put out in February was more intended just to -- well, for a starter, it was just a food and nutritional one and it only involved the food and nutritional agencies and not the other sectors. So, you know, I think in other crisis response -- in,

you know, cyclical crises, we probably would have to learn to do it earlier, in our earlier response plan, to be multisectoral and not just about food and nutrition. But at least in the Sahel, we did put out an interagency regional response plan in February of this year. And we all -- you know, learning what I said about how early response is by itself prevention and preparedness.

And in terms of donorship and funding, the CAP process actually has now -- I mean, I don't know what is your impression of, you know, what a CAP process is. I assume everybody knows a CAP is consolidated appeal process, right?

Okay. But it actually has become a lot more flexible in the last two or three years. For example, Kenya right now is already on a three-year response plan, even though the appeal is an annual appeal but is based on a three-year response plan to get over that whole restriction of, you know, CAPs are only for one year. Well, they're still annual, but -- and OPT is the second country that also uses a multiyear response plan. It's a two-year response plan. So we're already kind of adapting some of our instruments for that, and I know Paul wants to get into that discussion later on, so I will leave it for that discussion, as well.

But all of that to say that I think we are learning and we were not as stupid as we think. And I think we are making a bit more progress in terms of how we're addressing all of this.

And, yeah, I think I'm going to stop here and look forward to, you know, further discussion on some of these points.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Catherine. Wonderful to hear your thoughts on how we are indeed learning as a community. Since Nancy just joined

us, and welcome --

MS. LINDBORG: Thank you.

MS. BRADLEY: -- we're so glad that you could be here with us, I think we'll change the schedule a little bit. We'll hear from Paul and then we'll hear from Nancy and then we'll return to Paul for discussion amongst our panelists.

MR. O'BRIEN: So we were less than five minutes away from me offering to speak on behalf of the U.S. Government and announce a full-scale realignment of the budget from defense to development. (Laughter)

MS. LINDBORG: Shall I leave?

MR. O'BRIEN: I know you'd have loved it. You can never ask Nancy, where were you? I mean, what do you say? You know, was there a global emergency or something? Yeah.

Okay. Well, that's great because I get to set up a little bit for the discussion, hopefully, that we get to have with each other and then with all of you. And hopefully, comments will build on fellow panelists.

We're in a time of interesting change. Two dynamics that I think are worth pointing out from my remarks is obviously if we're talking about early warning, the technology discussion is changing radically, not just the information we have and how we're able to use it, what others can do with it in terms of advocacy work and trying to build attention. It's a very different world. But it's interesting, if you listen to Catherine's comments, it's not necessarily a good thing. Now that everybody has different or more data are we going to actually coalesce around simple, morally clear calls to action or are we going to spend our time debating it?

The second area, I think, of fluidity that is worth noting is we're all coalescing across the humanitarian and development arenas, around the sort of humbling realization that we are no longer that relevant to the broader change goals that we aspire to if we measure ourselves against the states and citizens that we know must drive the long-term resilience solutions, the long-term economic growth solutions, and so on. And we're all getting that in different ways. That's a lot of what the development agenda has been about over the last decade, but it's also a big part of the humanitarian discussion, which is why we now talk a lot more about resilience.

But it's easy to say that, right? That it's not about us so much, it's about effective states, active citizens, the relationship between them, and their ability to open up an enabling environment for all those other good dynamics that actually help people get through crises. A lot harder to do.

And the challenges come in two sorts and that's what I'm going to be asking my fellow panelists about: the policy challenges and the political challenges. The number that you heard from Megan, 100,000 people died in the Horn, we think, it's somewhere close to. That's more than, as I calculate, all the people that have died in Afghanistan in the latest round of conflict since 2001. And yet, I'm not sure that it created the kind of epiphany and determination that we should have had as we go into the Sahel and we now see, you know, maybe it's 10 million, maybe it's as much as 18 million people at risk. And we could see some very, very frightening numbers in the months ahead. So how do we generate the right kind of policy attention and the right kind of political will? Those are the two questions I want us to ask ourselves and I'm going to ask all of you. And I just want to put a finer point on each of those.

Here's a thought about the policy challenge. The old-fashioned model, which at the risk of gross oversimplification, we'll call the Washington Consensus approach to policy formulations and solutions, is you identify the collection of things. For them, it was the 10 to 20 financial reforms that you need to get a country on its feet. And then you just impose them whole scale on an environment with whatever resources you can muster as quickly as possible all the time, and you get the consequences that result. And the new type of policy thinking that we increasingly see in government and in think tanks like this esteemed institution, and even in the NGO world, is the sort of starting from the recognition that we are all severely resource-constrained and we are political attention-constrained.

The discussion is about sequencing. If you've got 10 policies that you've got to address in the Sahel to help those governments and those citizens achieve resilience, what do you do first? What's the constraint that if you could just attack that constraint, you will unlock, unleash, the local capacity to drive a resilience agenda? And that's a very complicated policy question in the Sahel; seven countries in very different places. You've got some countries who are dealing with, for example, food price hikes. Chad, Mali, I think, are at 70 percent higher than their 5-year average on food prices when you've got low food prices in the region.

But what we all thought was the simple answer, which is you just create the enabling environment where small holder farmers can get their food from their farms to the places in need, isn't happening. Some countries, Burkina Faso, are cutting down export. They won't allow cereals to get exported. Senegal prices are up nearly a third on cereals; Burkina Faso, more than half. So if we're going to find -- unlock the binding

constraint there to open up these markets so that local food suppliers can get to local food demanders, what do we do first?

Crop production at the same point, those places that we want to see food accelerated, is going down. Easy to identify, harder to solve. I was looking last night on OCHA's site at the different funding appeals and they have it broadly defined on the site for the Sahel in three categories: food, nutrition, and agriculture. Well, guess which one comes last? Food gets more than half funded, so does nutrition; agriculture, less than 20 percent. We can identify crop production as a policy constraint, but marshalling the political will to get production up from governments is just a much harder sell.

Then we've got all the insecurity constraints, as well, the policy constraints. AFRICOM would like us to be having a more serious discussion around security constraints in the region, and they're really talking about local -- they're talking about local ministries of defense and what they need to do to secure their own populations when you have what we all know to be going on in Northern Nigeria. Two hundred thousand people displaced in Mali because of insecurity. So should we do security first?

And then, of course, the flavor of the month for many of us in the development game, because now that we finally realize it's not about us, it's about them and how do you help governments function, it's all about transparency, the shining light that's going to solve everything. Should we be focusing all our time on public finance management? You've got four of the countries in the Sahel have significantly sized emergency response budgets: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. They all have more than \$100 million. It's not insignificant amounts ready to go. But is that money

going to get wasted? Are the allocations in the budgets right? Is that where we should be focusing our time?

So if you buy the argument that what we need to be doing is recognizing we can't do everything at once, what do we do first? That's a question I'd love to hear from the three important institutional actors here: U.S. Government, United Nations, and the NGOs who care about the broader picture. Where do you focus first?

That all being said, the policy discussion if we buy that it's not about us, it's about them, may be the easier of the two discussions if the other one is the political discussion. It was so much easier for us to generate political attention at a global level when we could do the Calvary charge, when we were in the cycle of tragedy-and-rescue, when we could use the "famine" word easily. But now that we're trying to be more responsible and we're trying to talk about resilience, we have to become significantly more politically sophisticated at generating a deep political discussion in the countries where we're trying to mobilize attention.

And just to put a finer point on this, I think we haven't begun to grapple with where the giving public is in terms of what it's going to need to get politically interested. The standards for authenticity are significantly different than they were 10 years ago.

The one organizing principle of social media is a profound distrust of institutions. How are we going to coalesce serious political attention in a giving public that desperately wants authenticity, is very skeptical of the stories they're being sold, and may not believe that our larger institutional answers and actors are trustworthy when we've all come to the realization that it's going to be much more about strengthening

institutions than simply delivering a response?

For one thing, I think we've stopped using words. That's not even a word, DRR? How are we going to start having conversations with people that morally and intuitively resonate? I think that's an interesting challenge.

And then finally, that may be the easier of the two political challenges, because the real political challenge if we accept that it's not about us, it's about them, is how we start having meaningful conversations with the governments in the region about turning their stated commitments to tackling these problems in serious and far-sided ways into real policy and ultimately local political will.

So I was looking on Transparency International last night. Rwanda cracks the top 50 for clean countries; Ghana cracks the top 75. Not one of the countries in the Sahel cracks the top 100. This is not a bunch of politically -- I'm at the risk of being -- well, I don't want to be insulting, but we're not dealing with strong capable governments on the average in the region, and yet we have collectively determined that they are the key answer. How are we going to do that?

Now, we're seeing some good signs. ECOWAS is playing a stronger hand. It's got the charter on food crisis prevention. If we coalesced around that, we held them to their best aspirations on that, could we actually coalesce strong responsive action? Like I say, you've got four countries in the region that have put together serious budgets with serious numbers. Is that a way for us to leverage some political will to say, you know, now that you're showing leadership, we're behind you. But we want to see how those monies are spent and we're going to incentivize you politically to make sure that it makes sense for you to be focusing on your humanitarian crises.

So anyway, those are questions that are on our minds. Can we coalesce policy attention? Can we sequence it right? And if we're now trying to deal with the deeper challenge of long-term resilience and helping countries more seriously help themselves, not just rhetorically, how do we deal with the awkward politics, both back here and in the countries? And what kinds of new skills are we going to need and new approaches are we going to need to do that work seriously? So those are the questions on my mind.

Now I get to ask Nancy, what was the global crisis? No. I get to ask Nancy pretty much that question. The U.S. is by far the most generous donor in the region. It's clearly got it that we need to be up there early and thoughtfully. But I think we're collectively a long way from having marshaled the political will that we need to make sure there's not going to be a problem in the Sahel. What do you think are the top challenges in terms of policy, particularly in the Sahel, although lessons learned from the Horn would be great?

And what do you think about this political challenge I'm throwing out? That we're going to have to think in new and sophisticated ways about how to generate real political will for what we're increasingly realizing is a more complicated story than we used to tell.

MS. BRADLEY: Just to interject, Nancy, if you would also like to make a broader statement of maybe about five minutes --

MR. O'BRIEN: I was trying to set her up for a 10 minuter.

MS. BRADLEY: -- you could give that now, I think, alongside your response to Paul's question, if you like. And then we'll segue into a discussion with the

panelists.

MS. LINDBORG: Great. So let me do a couple of early comments --

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

MS. LINDBORG: -- and I'll weave that in. Am I on?

SPEAKER: Yeah, I think so.

MS. LINDBORG: Yeah?

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah.

MS. LINDBORG: Okay. And I wanted to just start actually -- because I brought a prop. One of my first early encounters with Brookings was in the late '90s, when I participated in the roundtable on the gap, and I pulled this out of my file. And I don't know how many people here were at this. It was -- the participants included people like Julia Taft and Reynold Levy and, you know, on and on. But it's an interesting thing to pull out some of these to see what were we grappling with then and what has changed.

And then I also pulled out something that we're taking a very hard look at at Inside Aid, which is linking relief and development in the greater Horn of Africa, which was a big initiative that Brian Atwood and company did in about the same time period, so in the mid-'90s, when we were really grappling with recurring droughts in the Horn of Africa and asking ourselves a lot of these same questions.

And if you read through these documents, it's fascinating both in terms of some of the core principles that still hold true, country ownership, and some of the institutional changes that we are still looking at, some lessons we've learned, some we're taking advantage of this moment. I think as you noted quite rightly, there's a coalescing that happens, a focusing of the mind when you have 13+ million people at risk. And so it

is seizing this opportunity to both stand on the progress that we've made and then try to jet it forward.

So I wanted to just start quickly with noting here's what I think we did differently this time around. And you've captured some of it in the Dangerous Delay report. But I think even as we look at what we need to do differently, we should celebrate some of the progress that we've had since these efforts in the mid-'90s that engaged a lot of us. And the first is that there really was early action to early -- first of all, there are early warning systems. Both FSNAU and FEWS NET make an extraordinary difference in our ability to predict, although they do have limits and we need to recognize that.

And when I visited in May 2011, we already had \$250 million programmed for the Horn of Africa. And then as things geared up with the famine announcement in July, you know, we continued to put money in. But every year, year after year, we put in an average of about \$560 million of U.S. humanitarian funding into the Horn of Africa, which, you know, I think is both a startling number to realize in terms of the magnitude of the problem, the magnitude of the response, and the need to do things differently.

We had this last year, multiyear food crisis programs in play both in Ethiopia and Kenya with our NGO partners. Multiyear, multi-partner programs that were in the effort to do things differently and we've learned things from that. Crisis modifiers in use in Ethiopia and in response to this crisis, we really focused on access to markets, health programming because the leading cause of death in these high malnutrition environments is preventable disease for under-fives, and we made full use of our tools, cash programming. I'm waiting any day now for some of the reports on what happened

as a result of really an unprecedented use of cash and vouchers. So a different kind of very market-sensitive, very targeted program.

And Food for Peace has really transformed to put out nine new -- we're still in the process, but nine new nutritious products to enable us to be more nutritionally focused with our food aid. In addition, with -- we are now the world leader on cash programming for local regional purchase.

So these are all huge changes that have happened since we were working on this the last time; a lot of focus on building assets. But what hasn't happened is that we're still, prior to this crisis, not connecting up our humanitarian with our development. So that's the institutional challenge that we really took on at AID, and last summer put together joint planning cells and had our humanitarian and our development teams in Addis and Nairobi, sitting together and saying, okay, what's going to come after the humanitarian programming, instead of the typical pause where you lose the momentum, you lose the gains, and the networks.

And so by January of this last year, we had a plan for the dry lands of Kenya and Ethiopia and a regional plan that says, here's how we're going to integrate, layer, and sequence our humanitarian and our development programs in the Horn of Africa. And that is a significant difference. And we already have some joint programs that are out on the street working with partners. We're doing reviews of what happened with those three-year programs so we can build on those and making a commitment to really do business differently in that regard.

The second important difference is, as the CNN moment started to fade -- and this gets to some of your questions -- we put together a conference in Nairobi at

the beginning of April, so just over a month ago, that we co-hosted with the EGAD ministers of the member states and donor partners to say, okay, what are we going to do now so that we can take what is the significant amount of funding from World Bank, all the bilateral donors, to address the chronic crisis in the dry land? How are we going to take those funds and coordinate it across the donors in support of the country-led frameworks that EGAD was working with its member states to develop? And how do we create a frame for mutual accountability so that we know that our funds will, in fact, go toward the policy changes at the country level, the differing package of investments that those countries make, and hold ourselves accountable for following through on our commitments and doing so in a way that's fully coordinated?

The outcomes of that meeting in Nairobi were really twofold. EGAD and the member states agreed to have those frameworks done by the end of June where they're going to put on the table here's what we're going to do differently to address chronic crisis in the dry lands. And for those of you who have traveled there, I mean, the road literally ends in Garissa in Northeast Kenya. I mean, these are chronically marginalized, underinvested in areas. It's literally a different country from Kenya, and similar issues in Ethiopia. So what are you going to do differently, Kenya and Ethiopia, to address this?

And, you know, one of the things that Secretary Clinton did last July, as the famine was getting underway in Somalia and the crisis was amping up, is she called the heads of state in Ethiopia and Kenya and said, what are you going to do differently? We can't keep putting this level of humanitarian assistance in year after year. So these plans coming out at the end of June are meant to put it on the table so that we have the

opportunity to support.

Secondly, is we created something called a Global Alliance for Action for Drought Resilience in the Horn. Catchy name, but it is a group of the donors and the -- so both the development partners and the U.N. agencies who've come together.

Catherine was with us in Nairobi to say we will organize ourselves and we will commit to coordinating our resources in partnership with the EGAD member states to find a way to make these investments count and really move us forward.

And we have jointly -- the development partners and EGAD -- committed, sometime in October or November, to come up with a six-month results report to say, this is not what has happened. Noting that we're not going to meet again to discuss the process as a group, but rather have results to show. I mean, because we've had a lot of meetings about this, "resilience" is the organizing term. And I think what I find compelling about resilience is, first of all, it's not a three-letter acronym like DRR, and it's a word that gets us past what we started talking about in Brookings in terms of the gap. Is it relief? Is it development?

And this grey area of understanding that this is not always a linear progress, but it's a mutual goal that our development and our humanitarian resources can reach for without having to do a lot of legislative changes, but understand that we can do smarter, more effective humanitarian assistance in a way that sequences, integrates, and layers with our development resources. So these are all lessons that we can and we are bringing to the Sahel.

We did early action in response to the early warnings that came out end of 2011. There was a donor meeting that I know many of you are aware of in Rome in

early February. I traveled to Sahel, along with Valerie Amos and Helen Clark, to make that commitment very publicly. We've already laid down \$215 million of U.S. funding in the Sahel and other donors have put 370 down. And that was meant to really jumpstart the response, preposition food, lay in additional programs that build assets and created resilience.

The challenges in the Sahel, I think, are in -- even though some of the market reforms that have happened in the Sahel make the markets more functioning so that we want our programs to be very targeted and very sensitive to not undermining what has worked because of the reforms, but because of the variety of the countries -- seven instead of three or four if you count Djibouti -- but of the Horn it's much more complicated.

And we, the U.S., do not have the development programs in West Africa. We have closed out a lot of our missions. We don't have missions, we don't have development funding, we don't have the ability to do the joint planning cells in the same way. So we are committed to, as a donor community, as a development partner community, doing the same global alliance for action in the Sahel, this time with the Europeans in the lead. And we've been in good dialogue with the EU as it moves towards working with a regional partner to do the same kind of process that we did in Nairobi in the Sahel.

And the challenge and the imperative will be that we really marry up with the other donors because we do not have the resources -- USAID, USG -- in the Sahel to do what we did in the Horn. We just don't. And we probably won't in this environment. And so it is critical that we find ways to focus on a couple places where we can make a

difference and focus on where we can coordinate with the other donors to make a difference. The country programs are still in play, but there are -- it's an interesting comparative exercise and I won't get into it. We can in the conversation between where's their greater progress in the Horn and where's their greater progress in the Sahel.

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah.

MS. LINDBORG: And it will take radical customization as we move forward --

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah.

MS. LINDBORG: -- to understand both the policy and the programmatic challenges and opportunities. This is a moment where there is political will and there is a lot of focus. It won't necessarily last without everybody keeping it on the front burner.

And I just want to close by talking about we put together for the first time at AID a public-facing campaign called the Forward Campaign, where we worked to reach out to a lot of our NGO partners and faith-based community members to try to create greater awareness of the crisis in the Horn. I think the complexity of these kinds of chronic crises that recur year after year are very difficult for the public to engage with. And this was one of the graphic packages -- part of a graphic package that we put together to try to enable everybody to use as they wanted to on their own websites.

I don't know if you can see this, but it's a very simple graphic that shows the number of people that were affected by the tsunami in Indonesia; 2 million. That first bar graph. Haiti is in the middle at 3 million and the Horn of Africa at 13 million. And yet if you look at what was publicly raised against these emergencies with this incredible disparity of affected population, it was -- let me just check my figures here. I think that

according to InterAction figures, by October 2011, 60 million was raised in the Horn compared to 1.29 billion for Haiti.

And it just -- you know, the ways in which we engage -- to your point, Paul, the ways in which we engage with the public and how they are engaged in these kinds of crises, we really have to think hard about that when you've got chronic complex crises.

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah.

MS. LINDBORG: Because that funding is not coming forward for these kinds of Horn and Sahel issues.

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah.

MS. LINDBORG: Even though I think the donor funding is, the private funding is not.

MR. O'BRIEN: So, Nancy, I'm going to follow up with you, if I may, on that, because -- on the last two comments.

I just -- it's interesting, the U.S. in the Horn is incredibly deep and sophisticated in terms of its relationships with the government and knowledge of the environment. You can go down a bunch of levels in Africa, and you'll still find folks who can pretty much name the entire political infrastructure of South-Central Somalia or whatever, because it's their job, right? But in -- you go now to the Sahel and, as you say, seven countries, and we're not deep in that context, yet we're spending 40 cents on every dollar in the region in terms of what I saw -- the overall giving portfolio -- in terms of response.

Are you working -- are we -- you know, we were offered the three Ds as

a synergistic idea, not as a co-opting idea of developing humanitarianism. Is state anteing up? Is AFRICOM anteing up in terms of quickly helping us to be more sophisticated in understanding the dynamics in the Sahel as we try to work with local actors and get some of their local plans up and running? First question.

And second question, just on your last point, the 13 million number for the Horn. This is the birth place of the modern humanitarian crisis, put Liberia aside. But in terms of mobilizing human compassion, Band-Aid and so on, Ethiopia in the '80s, we have a long history of associating with that part of the world as very fragile and capable of being helped through a crisis with our help. The Sahel is more of a mystery to the giving public in terms of certain early experiences in terms of describing where it is and what the history is partly because it hasn't had that. Do you think that block, I mean, which for us the number is going to be even bigger, potentially 18 million? We're going to struggle even more on actually getting people to understand scale and the need to engage in the Sahel? Or are we sort of -- is your shop treating these sort of commensurate levels of similar challenge to mobilize attention and broader public will?

And then, Catherine, I'm going to come to you on the funding question if I could.

MS. LINDBORG: So, on the question of Sahel, I mean, there's been almost an agreement that Europe is the lead in the Sahel. Half of it is Francophone. There's a deep, deep engagement with our European colleagues, both in funding and in presence, and typically DFID and USAID have been more deeply present and engaged in Horn. So, there's been a division of labor. And I think we want to continue to encourage that kind of partnership in burden sharing even as we move forward with our

commitments to both respond to this crisis and try to look at ways to build resilience.

There is deep knowledge, I think, throughout the government about Sahel and its structures. I mean, at AID, I can just tell you, there are folks who have spent their whole careers working West Africa. It doesn't mean that we don't know it.

MR. O'BRIEN: Mm-hmm.

MS. LINDBORG: And there are some very important regional bodies there. You know, there's CILSS, there's ECOWAS. The Club du Sahel plays a certain kind of role. But we made the determination some years back to close out individual country missions, so we have regional missions. We have country missions in Mali and Senegal and regional missions in Senegal and Ghana. So, there's -- it's more that a decision that we can't do everything everywhere.

MR. O'BRIEN: Mm-hmm, and is there robust interagency agency discussion going on?

MS. LINDBORG: There's -- the most robust is about the points of crisis in Mali and Nigeria. And, you know, it gets to your question of how do you hold those various frames at once, because there are the security concerns that -- it's eerily like the Horn in that you've got, in the midst of drought, you've got a conflict that's creating lack of access to certain populations and creating displacement both inside Mali and outside Mali into already drought-stressed environments. It's exactly the layout in certain ways as the Horn, and so that absolutely requires that whole of effort. But for the longer term, moving people out of chronic crises and building greater resilience, that requires looking at how we're going to knit up with probably programs other than just ours. You know, that's I know an issue that the U.N. is looking hard at helping to coordinate --

MR. O'BRIEN: Right.

MS. LINDBORG: -- and we'll work with these -- we need to have regional body engagement and country plans.

MR. O'BRIEN: Right. And, Catherine, if you want to speak to that, please do go ahead, but if I could add to the things that you respond to.

You mentioned the CAPS. They're more than funding instruments. They're strategies, and you want them deeply owned, increasingly so by the countries involved. That takes a level of political discussion that may be deeper and more complex than the traditional funding appeal for straight-up, direct service, humanitarian response. The appeal right now is 50 percent funded. There's a gap. And some think that as the country plans come in we may end up at 1-1/2 billion, which could leave us with a billion-dollar gap in the Sahel and a harder story to tell. And you mentioned the multiyear dimensions of this could make things difficult, too. How are you thinking about this as the United Nations in terms of not being sitting here a year or two from now and saying, you know, we just weren't able to marshal the attention that was deserved?

MS. BRAGG: Well, I should say that -- I wouldn't start with the premise that we might be potentially in need of a whole lot of money that might not be coming in. So far, we have already received over \$600 million to the CAP. That is no small number. And we should not -- and of course the United States accounts for a third of that \$600 million that's already been pledged, and we're only in May. So, I wouldn't say that there hasn't been attention or generosity.

At the same time, our current projection is that \$1.5 billion probably is a little high. Maybe it will come in more like \$1.2 billion.

MR. O'BRIEN: Mm-hmm.

MS. BRAGG: We're quibbling with numbers. I mean, still we're talking about very big numbers here for sure.

But I think if we have learned anything from the Horn experience in terms of fundraising, it is that we need to recognize that the traditional funding sources no longer make up the majority of the funding in the sense that, for example, the level of funding, both direct and through their own NGOs, from Islamic countries, and particularly Arabic Islamic countries were phenomenal for Somalia, and that's one part that is not very much a story that is being told.

We need to remember, all of the countries of the Sahel belong to OIC, the Organization of Islamic Conference. That is no coincidence, and I would suspect that this year with Ramadan, which is a period of generosity, that we probably will see a lot of Islamic fundraising for the Sahel as well. And increasingly, that is part of that global trend, the Islamic and Arabic countries not only just funding through their traditional means of bilateral funding, you know, to friendly authorities -- let's call it this way -- they also now have national humanitarian and development operating agencies.

I was just in Mogadishu last week, and I visited with the Turks. There are 30 Turkish NGOs operating there at the moment. So, they're not insignificant. So, there's a lot of funding, they're also going through that, that is not accounted for at the moment under the, you know, U.N. financial tracking system or the CAP. So, we need to broaden the way we look at both, if we're just on the topic of fundraising.

And you were asking about the CAP when it comes to national authorities, and that is, I think, something that we have really learned, which is that in the

Sahel countries at the moment, the response plan is very much following the national plan first as opposed to what we used to do, which is we'd develop our plan, then we'd go -- and if we were nice about it we would go to the national authorities and say, you know, here, we've got a CAP, what do you think? And most of the time, you know, they wouldn't know what to say, and so that's how we did things. Now, we go with national plan first as the starting point, and then what it is that the international community can do. So, when we say that, you know, when we put out the CAP, it is not just with the blessing of the national authorities. We have to work together. And if we've learned anything at all when it comes to dealing with recurrent crises is that if you're not working with national authorities and local communities, you're not going to get anywhere.

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah. That's great. I can't resist the aside that that may also solve another problem, because I know that in getting the CAP strategies together you have to deal with all the U.N. agencies in building that consensus, and then you go to the government. If the government says I don't like that, you have to go back to them again and say here we go again. If you start with the governments, it may help corral some of the agencies, too, in terms of coordinated action, so that's --

MS. BRAGG: Absolutely. But if I may just have a footnote to what you just said, it's not the -- the CAP is not just for U.N. agencies.

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah, yeah.

MS. BRAGG: It's also our NGO partners as well.

MR. O'BRIEN: Yes, absolutely.

MS. BRAGG: And actually since 2010, the number of projects in CAPS -
- locally speaking, not in the Sahel, locally speaking, there are more NGO projects in

there than our U.N. agency ones.

MR. O'BRIEN: Right.

MS. BRAGG: So, we don't own it. It is not (inaudible).

MR. O'BRIEN: Okay, a nice segue for Michael.

So, Michael, the great stories about the Horn and what was learned, but now we face the Sahel, and it would be really interesting to hear from you what you think in light of your experience, this discussion, for NGOs in particular, key takeaways as we try to be relevant to the Sahel context. But I am really intrigued by this changing political scenario for us.

Oxfam is grappling with the question -- two questions. One, how do we convince our giving publics that we are meaningfully spending their dollars when we are working through partners often on trying to change local policies for the long-term resilience agenda rather than to save a life which we can put in front of them in terms of a picture? And, secondly, if we really believe these governments are lacking political will and we want to strengthen the voice that challenges them and holds them accountable but we want to maintain our operational presence, too, to actually do the good humanitarian work that we were associated with, how do we do that? And in the Sahel and everywhere else, this is a challenge for us.

MR. KLOSSON: Okay. Well, actually, let me do three things: pick up on the funding conversation a little bit, you know, talk about what we're doing in the Sahel differently, perhaps based on what we learned in the Horn, then talk a little bit about this changing role.

I think on the -- I mean, funding and political will get connected. And,

you know, I think even though the U.S. has done really well in stepping out on the Sahel, and, you know, certainly if you do a fair-share analysis it's pretty -- it's good, but I think the fact of the matter is it is partly the level of the pledges. So if you do a reassessment and the level required goes up, as Paul was suggesting, the gap is going to increase. But that's not the only ball to keep your eye on. It also depends on sort of where the money is going. And I think if you look at that, I mean, even though the numbers in one way are going up, in terms of pledges, if you look at NGOs doing work on the ground, we're still -- I mean, we're -- maybe in terms of our appeal, we've put out, like, a \$60 million appeal for countries. I think it's about \$17 million that we've been able to raise. So even if the pledges are being made, there's a question of getting the money to where it needs to go, and we're not seeing that yet. So, there's a whole allocation process that I think, you know, complicates matters.

There's also, I think, if you'd do an analysis, you'd probably see, you know, particularly for the SRF and things like that, that the U.N. agencies are getting their fair share sooner rather than -- and then the money comes on elsewhere. But there are some delays built into the system, and so it is -- in part, it is about the resources, even if it's going to be Europe stepping up and doing the larger share of this. So, I mean, I think that's the first point.

And then also your point earlier, Paul, about where is the money going, and food and nutrition are getting prioritized, but ag development is not. I mean, how do we tackle that kind of thing?

And maybe there's -- maybe we need to think a little bit about the whole consolidated appeal process, because it seems that there is a regional preparedness

plan that I think was launched last December, and maybe that could have been used as a vehicle for some of this, putting the picture out across the region more publicly to start generating some of this attention and frontloading some of the resources rather than, you know, sort of waiting for Godot, waiting for the CAP. I mean, there may be some other things we ought to think about in how we go about this business.

In terms of the Sahel, I mean, I think it's very encouraging what Nancy was talking about and the kind of steps that AID has taken and the focus on the dry lands policy and pulling governments and multilaterals and everybody together to sort of build resilience the next time around. We've been -- I can't put sort of a concrete picture on the table that that's what -- Save the Children has its own dry lands policy. We don't, but we're very interested in participating in these other things. But what we have done is to put -- is really to start looking at how do we join up the humanitarian and the development thing in a more innovative fashion, including focusing on resilience. And some of our resilience people are -- D is a three-letter word -- our DRR people. But, I mean, that -- you know, we've increased our staffing and capacity in that area now compared to where we were earlier.

We've also recognized that in the case of the Sahel, we really wanted to get a jump on what we saw to be a looming crisis, and so we had folks go out to our country programs, critically Mali, but some of the others, you know, late last year/early this year to work on emergency preparedness planning so that the development people are prepared to switch gears, you know, when they have to and sort of move in and out of these acute and chronic circumstances.

And I guess the third thing I flag up is in the case of the Sahel I think

we're using some improved analytic techniques, like household economic analysis -- HEAs -- to do vulnerability assessments, which I don't think we were doing as much of in the case of the Horn. So, we've -- you know, we're trying to get a better handle, at a household level, on the vulnerabilities that communities face and then, sir, what does that mean in terms of programming?

So, those are some of the things that we're doing differently in the Sahel versus the Horn.

I think the role that NGOs play, it's kind of interesting, because I think for international NGOs, I mean, I think that if -- in this case, if there's a division of labor among donors, and part of the role of international NGOs, I think, who are in a variety of countries, is we have that ability to sort of get conversations going in places other than the United States, and so if it's really that the U.S. is doing well but some other donors are not, then we can be part of getting that kind of conversation going. And we did that, you know, out of the humanitarian space, but, say, into the recent Camp David G-8 summit, I mean, Save the Children was very -- we're in six -- we have Save the Children members in six of the eight G-8 capitals. And we're very active in bringing nutrition to the foreground in conversations with those leaders so that there is greater attention in the initiative that the G-8 launched over the weekend to nutrition as part of agriculture development. And we're not going to take credit for that, but we are part of that conversation.

So, I think, you know, that there is this balance to be struck, I think, between the advocacy piece of it and understanding that and sort of the capacity-building piece and understanding that, and we can get into that perhaps a little bit more.

MR. O'BRIEN: That's great.

I think, Nancy, a quick follow-up, and then, Megan, back to you and it's, I think, great.

MS. LINDBORG: Actually, I want to say three quick things. One is just I want to underscore Catherine's point, the role of the new donors. And as a result, we signed an MOU with the OIC and have spent a lot of time reinforcing and supporting their --

MR. O'BRIEN: OIC being?

MS. LINDBORG: The --

MS. BRAGG: Organization Islamic Council --

MS. LINDBORG: The Organization of the Islamic Cooperation. And they were -- we had technical exchanges. We've been very supportive of their engagement with OCHA so they'd be of one system. And I think that's -- and we've also funded Arabic training and materials so their NGOs can participate in the information gathering in clusters. I think a solution would be really, really important going forward. And I know that a number of NGO partners are working on those relationships as well, or I urge you to.

I think we have to keep in mind that part of what's going on in the Sahel, however, is just deep chronic underdevelopment. And I commend OCHA for pointing out the baseline indicators, because as we start getting alarmed at the numbers of malnutrition and of children dying, you have to look at what is the baseline, and it's startling just what happens in a good year in the Sahel. And so it gets to a deep, chronic, fundamental problem that we use these crises to fundraise for what are essentially

development issues. And so, you know, as you talk about political will, you need to talk about that.

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah.

MS. LINDBORG: And then after that, I would just close by saying, you know, this weekend there were the G-8 conversations, and we really reaffirmed, as the United States, the commitment to the Feed the Future initiative and a lot of the commitments to increase investments in ag and nutrition that President Obama first announced in L'Aquila, and continue to be at the forefront of how we think about things like this.

MR. KLOSSON: We're lucky to have a two-finger on Nancy. Come with me.

MS. BRADLEY: (Laughter) I want to make sure that we give the audience a chance to jump in as well.

MR. KLOSSON: I mean, I think Nancy's point is a really good one.

MS. BRAGG: Sorry.

MS. BRADLEY: That's okay.

MR. KLOSSON: It's, you know, development. It's a humanitarian one. You're looking at the baseline figures. But the bottom line is, it's people. And that's sort of what we've got to -- I mean, I think, for NGOs at least, that's the picture we want to keep out there. It's not about helping, you know, whether you're in a humanitarian crisis or in a poor development setting. You're -- it's the same people. So, that's what we --

MS. LINDBORG: That's the beauty of resilience.

MR. KLOSSON: And that's what I was leading up to, so we agree.

MS. BRADLEY: (Laughter) Well, thank you very much to Paul for the questions that he's posed to the panelists, and we'd like to give the audience members a chance to do the same.

If you could just raise your hand if you'd like to ask a question, and we'll have a mic brought up to you. If you could briefly introduce yourself as well, that would be great.

We'll just collect up three or four questions and then we'll bring it back to the panel.

MR. OWUONDO: Okay, my name is Joseph Owuondo, and until the beginning of the month I was in Kenya, and I was a support project manager of a Partnership of Peace project.

I have four things that I'm going to say very fast. One is thank you very much for how you focus. I want to bring it like from, you know, the local communities' perspective. I don't want to talk at this level, because one of the questions we have is this one. Your approach, as you have been saying or as you have been discussing, is from really top to upright, and there's a problem with the communities, because either in response or in the warnings, if the communities do not participate or if they don't own that process, it will not work. That's a solid fact.

The second thing we are talking about is early warning. And any time you're talking about early warning without early response concurrently, we are doing nothing.

Three, even as -- I hope some of you are here. There's a competition between the donors. Even in their programs, they come down there and they want to do

-- they're the same people from up here, and they're competing and doing one thing altogether, even in the humanitarian response, and it's a conflict.

Finally, for how long are you going to support us? For how long? I think in answering that question on how we will be able to have constructive and strategic ways of helping the problems in the Horn.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you very much. On the right-hand side here.

MR. KING: Thanks very much. My name is Barnaby Willis King. I'm an independent consultant working on humanitarian policy.

I've just come back from Ethiopia where I've been looking at all of the SRF and the response to the 2011 crisis, and I'm very struck how we talk about regions -- you know, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel -- and it's very striking how actually the responses are very country-based. We've heard about some of the initiatives on donor coordination, some of the regional bodies, the response plan in the Sahel. I'm interested in what the panelists have to say additionally on what does a regional approach mean? What are the limits of a regional approach? Is it mainly for fundraising? But what can we actually do in terms of real, practical planning and response at a regional level, particularly when, as many of the panelists have emphasized, we're backing national plans? Countries in these regions are incredibly diverse, very different, offering competition resources. How do we square that role of national plans with regional responses?

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you and we'll take one more question. Right here. Thanks.

MS. MANGHETTI: Hi, Anita Manghetti, Office of -- I don't even know

what our new acronym is -- Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, State Department. I just mostly wanted to let people know something and had a comment.

My comment is I'm not convinced by the arguments that the terminology we use is so complex. I think the problem is that, A, sometimes we don't know what we're talking about but we found a good word for it and, B, that, well, I just keep thinking if Volkswagen can make the term "Farfegnugen" popular and people respond to it, I don't think it's the issue of calling something DRR or calling it relief to development transition. I think we as a community are really uncomfortable with simplifying the message about what we do, and I think that we're going to have to become more comfortable with that simplicity if we want this nation of 15-second attention spans to engage.

But the other thing I wanted to mention, and it's along the lines of resilience, is that one of the things the U.S. Government is now doing and is factored into the budget bill process, which is looking out two years, is telling countries that they must tell us what they're doing programming-wise and if there are monetary implications of moving from relief to development. And I realize that that is not chronologically linear, but by putting that in a planning process that's looking out two years, what we're giving missions the opportunity to do is to demonstrate how they're building in resilience, and not only how they're doing that, but how the development side is taking that on, thus freeing up emergency assistance for new disasters.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you very much. I'll turn it back to the panelists for some quick responses. We'll start with Michael and move down the line, and then, hopefully, we'll have time for another round or two of questions.

MR. KLOSSON: Yeah, I think on the point on DRR, I think it's really, you

know, who's the audience? And so if you're trying to have people within the U.S. Government understand something, you have a very complex paradigm put out there, and then otherwise if you're going to have the public do it, you get a get a clever marketer. I mean, we did an ad in the *Washington Post* on Friday talking about the G-8 and this food initiative. We just went without. Kind of gets -- you get the idea. So, I think it's different people for different purposes.

And then I think on the regional response, I mean, we have -- Save the Children was in four countries -- three countries in the Horn and four in the Sahel -- and we have a bit of a regional response sort of, but it's pretty light. And most of it is driven at the country program level. There's -- maybe a couple of functions were able to consolidate at a regional level, but most of it's driven at the country level, just speaking operationally for an NGO.

MS. BRAGG: Perhaps I can tackle a couple of the comments about, you know, what is regional about the regional approach, which is a damn good question, because I was on the phone with David Gressly yesterday. He's the newly designated regional humanitarian coordinator for the Sahel, and that's exactly the question I asked him. I said, so how are you playing at the moment? Are you just being kind of, like, mentor to the country-based resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator, or are you playing, actually, a more regional role? And then we had a discussion around that. And where we really kind of come out is, all humanitarian assistance has to be locally based, country based. But there are situations and crises that are regionally contiguous, if we can call it that, and could be seen as one single phenomenon, because the causes probably have similarities, such as the Horn or Sahel right now is about the climate

change and the drought.

We do emphasize the regional perspective, because the importance of regional organization such as ECOWAS, because if we only take a country approach we would not be engaging with some really important and influential players that are at the regional level. There's a committee that's called CILSS. I can't remember what it stands for. You know, there's also a regional committee that has been dealing with -- currently chaired by DRC, that has been looking at drought in this geographic area and has been longstanding. So, there's a process, a structure that we can exploit as part of -- "exploit," the good sense of that word, you know, in terms of our response. So -- and if we don't take a regional approach, we will be losing, you know, that element of that. And sometimes there are cross-border issues in addition to the usual refugee issues that by definition cross border.

In the Sahel, the security situation is very much around, you know, both what is happening in Mali at the moment, but the narco trafficking basically and also the terrorist groups that are operating there. They are regionally operating, and so we, if we want to -- "we" being operating organizations -- would have to take those into consideration as well, and we can't just stay country focused. So, this is what we mean by the regional approach.

So, we're not having a -- and I know a lot of donors -- I don't know about USAID, but I know a lot of donors have questioned us continuously this year as to why there was no regional appeal for the Sahel. But we just didn't think that it would really make sense, because their response -- dignitary response -- has to be, as I said, just not locally. And I very much appreciate the first comment. We have to start locally and then

we go up.

If I can just also make a -- say a few words about last week when I was in Kenya and a very successful project that I saw, this very much a local demonstration project. And it is in a region called Isiolo. Actually, there's a city that's called Isiolo that's in the foothills of Mt. Kenya, right smack in the middle of the country. It is a demonstration project of Food for Assets, which is actually just a variation on Food for Work. Except, the work has to be build community assets such as rehabilitation or driver canals or water harvesting projects in such a place. It has to be for the assets of the community.

The community is pastoral -- agro-pastoralist -- so it's both, and this project is largely about agricultural crop producing. So they would -- and I saw just absolutely wonderful examples of bananas hanging from trees and maize with corn the size that looked like, you know, corn on steroids to me. You know, like it was just humongous. You know, and it was just so good to see in a region that is at the moment food insecure as well as really quite affected by the drought, and yet, at the same time, we have this really successful project of how the agro-pastoralists went into crop production.

And then in the outer rim of the community where they replanted grass, you know, so that they could preserve that part of the pastoralist part of their culture and heritage and not just -- the object, of course, was to convert them into being farmers.

Why did I bring this up, you know, when it comes to local ownership and response? Because this is a very local project. But at the same time, it's funded and operated by WFP in conjunction with the government. Actually -- in fact, the first person I

met in there was a government representative and not a WFP person, which, to me, was really actually a really good demonstration of how you have local, national, and international cooperation in one demonstration project. The idea is to replicate the success of that project, you know, in other areas as well, and that's the sort of thing that we've got to look for. And it is about sustainable solutions. It's not just about handing out food; it's not just about dealing with the (inaudible) right now.

So, I'll take the opportunity to have the floor to answer the question about prioritization. What would I think we need to do first? I think the first thing is about saving livelihood and not to save lives, and that goes for both humanitarians and for development people. It's about saving livelihoods, seeing livelihoods as that bridge between the humanitarians and the development agencies. And if I have my way, I would not have the word "agriculture" as a cluster in any CAPS any more, because I think it distracts from everything else, because people think agriculture is about development issues and not -- I mean, I would prefer they cornered livelihoods, which, if you look at the projects that's exactly what they are. And to show that we do learn, the change for 2011 to 2012's Somalia cap, the -- by one count, about one-third of the projects, by another count 40 percent of the projects, all the projects in the cap have a resilient livelihood element to it. So, we are changing the way that we are actually approaching humanitarian aid.

Sorry, I spent far too long.

MS. BRADLEY: That's fine.

MR. O'BRIEN: That's great.

MS. LINDBORG: I would just add one thing to -- I fully agree with your

regional approach explanation and the importance of country plus regional, and the only thing I would add is that there are economic issues that are often regional.

MS. BRAGG: Yes, I forgot that, yeah.

MS. LINDBORG: So, one of the most important things that we've seen in the Sahel, for example, is the way that the food and the markets are traded --

MS. BRAGG: Absolutely, yeah.

MS. LINDBORG: -- regionally, and that's a huge piece of the analysis for how we provide aid, where, of what kind, because the last thing we want to do is put a bunch of food into a functioning market area for general distribution. So, that's one of the key things.

MS. BRAGG: Absolutely.

And then similarly, in the Horn, as you look at the livelihoods issues, the ways in which the pastoral lifestyles cross country boundaries, both in terms of markets and graze lands, pasture lands, we've got to look regionally, so it's both. Fully subscribe to the need to go both communities up, regional and national down, and I think that is a lesson that we've learned and take to heart.

And I want to say that we've gotten very good at early response to early recovery in both the Sahel and the Horn. We did early response, and the question is why -- you know, what else -- is it that it's not big enough? Is it that you need more actors because the burden is so large? I mean, I think we need to change that question, because there is really response, data shows, but yet still people are falling into crises. So, it's a different question I think.

MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah. Okay, three quickies. Simplification, the

challenge. I think it is partly a marketing challenge for us, for others, but it's also a leadership challenge. And, you know, our first questioner reminded us how far removed we are from the context in which much of what we care about gets left out. But we do have a unique privilege in Washington for all its dysfunctionalities. It's a collecting point for people from different disciplines to talk about how we talk about the future and to try and simplify some of these complexities and to agree on priorities in ways that others can understand. That is sometimes what Washington does very well. I do think we have a shared burden across government and other contexts, NGOs, think tanks, to ask ourselves how the next global humanitarian discussion ought to be framed and what can we contribute to it, and not just as a marketing question but as a leadership question.

On the regional thing, I just wanted to remind folks -- what was -- there's -- I can't remember the name of the Paul Collier book -- *Guns, Boats, and* something -- but there's this very provocative statement at the end, that the regions of Africa, including the Sahel, are badly designed and for the wrong regions, either colonially or they were defined out of problems rather than opportunities: Let's call the place the Sahel because they're all suffering in some shared way. That's not how the European Union was defined, and so on. If we are going to think of -- I mean, ECOWAS obviously is a different answer and maybe the future, but the way everybody is looking at Europe right now, I think the love affair with regionalization is going through a little bit of a post-honeymoon. And we need to think thoughtfully about the role of regions as they -- and we're a rights-based organization and our time is coming again as we all collectively realize that the best arbiter of rights and responsibilities still sits with the nation-state and the Westphalian system and the ability of communities to hold those states accountable.

And that's where I truly agree with the last speaker -- the first speaker or questioner -- about the roles of communities.

But you closed by asking the provocative question how long is this going to go on? And I would say I hope -- if you mean us saving each other in old jag cavalry-charged crisis and rescue responses, hopefully not much longer. But if you mean communal engagement on holding each other responsible and getting the best of each other's talents so that if I were setting up a restaurant in the United States, the first person I'd want in is a Kenyan to train me on how to run the service industry at the top level of excellence, my answer to you is I hope we're visiting each other forever.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you very much. We have time for a quick final round of questions, so if you'd like to raise your hand.

And here on the left.

MS. SCRIBNER: Hi. Shannon Scribner, with Oxfam America. Thank you very much for this very interesting discussion.

I had a question on the regional leadership that's been raised and kind of the regional approach, and it has to do with the donors conference that was scheduled for the beginning of June, the African Union Donors Conference for the Sahel, and just -- I think it was ECOWAS with U.N. support as well. And so as I'm thinking about this political will, we keep hearing about the conference has been canceled and it's going to be pushed to a different date and that it keeps moving locations. So, unfortunately, we don't have anyone here from ECOWAS or from the African Union to kind of ask the question of where does that stand? Are we going to have a donors' conference for the Sahel? I know we've had a conference in Rome, but the political will of the regional

actors had a lead on that. Where are we? And maybe it's more of a question for Nancy and Catherine.

MS. BRADLEY: On the left-hand side in the blue shirt?

SPEAKER: Thank you for all of your comments. I'm going to -- maybe you've touched on this a little bit, but I just want to bring it more to the bluntness.

I see a very dangerous dance in both the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. I see governments that intentionally neglect the geographic location and population. I see us supporting those governments or closing our eyes to those governments for political reasons. Ethiopia is a classic example. Then there's a crisis in that area and they say -- the government says help, and we say okay, no problem, and we go and we help. And I see a very dangerous dance that I believe is going to continue unless we confront that situation. And maybe I'm wrong, I'd like to hear your comments on that.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you very much. And for the final question, the gentleman in the green shirt here.

BRENDAN: Hi, my name is Brendan.

You guys have all touched on the growing role of nontraditional donors in these regions of the world, and I know that the U.N. is working to establish, you know, some standard dialogues with them, particularly with the OIC in Somalia. I was just wondering how do you see that relationship developing?

And then taking this a step beyond that, how do you see the future of funding playing out with, you know, these organizations, you know, being more skeptical of the cluster system, preferring bilateral funding, donations that way, and just any thoughts you might have on that? I appreciate it, thank you.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you.

Once again, we'll start with Michael, and we'll move our way through to Paul.

MR. KLOSSON: Yeah, I'm going to let Nancy and Catherine answer the regional donors thing, but I'll say that I think it's -- you know, from our perspective it's really important that it happened and that it could provide a moment to get clear of some of the coordination challenges and sort of this how do you some of the relief response work in the context of building resilience, and I think there's -- I think this regional conference can help clarify who's going to do what, when, where. So, the sooner that happens the better, and that would be our call on that.

On the second point, which was about the politics of the response, I mean, I think we would associate ourselves with the kind of vision that Paul has put out about at the end of the day. It's sort of national governments and civil societies that kind of need to get on with things in a particular country, that international organizations -- our role is to try to help fill gaps. And I think in order to do that we generally -- and if you look at -- we do it under the rubric of humanitarian principles, which is really impartial, sort of an impartial approach, and so we're in the business of trying to help who need help regardless of that, and that's what we would certainly want to see going forward.

And on the new donor part of it, we're having the same kind of conversations that others have been having. I can't -- I don't have anything new to share on that score at this stage.

MS. BRAGG: On the same point, I totally agree with Michael about, you know, as humanitarians, you know, we have to abide by the humanitarian principles of

neutrality and impartiality. And it does translate as we will work with anybody. There are a lot of parties, lots of people in governments, lots of governments that I'd much rather not be the way they are and not have to interact with them. But we are in the business that we're in, and I think that part of what we have to accept is that we will work with whoever we need to work with in order to get to that point where the aid gets to the people who need it. At the same time, I don't think we are naïve either, and of course it's always a debate as to how far you're willing to go. But I think part of what we -- not just, you know, in terms of rhetoric by saying that all international humanitarian assistance should be in support of national authorities so that they can discharge their responsibilities and their obligations. I think the fact that we are willing to work with them sometimes gives them that opportunity for them to live up to their obligation as well, that without our presence that opportunity might not even be there. And, again, I don't want to be naïve about it, and I don't want to say, you know, lovely things like, you know, we are the ones who can actually bring them along and make them be better people than they are or better institutions than they are. Sometimes maybe, but most of the time not. But what we are trying to do is enlarge that opportunity for AID to get there, and the first responsibility for AID to citizens is the government itself.

On the question of nontraditional donors and OIC, certainly I would say a lot of progress has been made in terms of the IASC orbit and those who are outside of that orbit.

And, you know, since we're talking about, you know, the Arabic and Islamic world, I think a lot has been done to bring the two together with willingness on and inclination on both sides. You know, our start from a small point and then I'll broaden

out.

Just like the U.S., OSHA also has signed an MOU with OIC, okay?

That's not, you know, earth shattering in itself. But in Yemen, OIC is seeking to open an office. They asked if they could co-locate with OCHA. So, we're actually going to share office space in Sana'a. When the government of Syria was making it so difficult for the U.N. to be able to be part of the Nice assessment -- this was, how to say, three months back now, it's quite a way back -- part of that tipping point was that OIC was going to go into it as well with the U.N., and that they are also looking to co-locate in the same building with OCHA. Unfortunately, OCHA probably has to move out, because we're not security compliant in our building at the moment, so, you know, that's another story in itself. But what all of that will illustrate is that, you know, because we've not arrived at that point where we actually have a lot of mutual respect and real inclination to work together, we even see it in specific instances like, you know, having offices side by side with each other.

In Somalia, in Mogadishu, what I saw last week was that they come and attend our cluster meetings, our coordination meetings. We go and attend the OIC coordination platform meeting as well. So, we're already doing that. Now, that's not to say, you know, we are totally merged, because obviously IASC is IASC, non- IASC is non-IASC, and we've got to recognize that. And until such point as, you know, we both get -- you know, abide by and follow the same set of red lines and no-go zones and *modus operandi*, I don't think we're ever going to be merged. But at the same time, you know, we are working a lot more closely together.

I think that's, you know --

Okay, pick up from there.

MS. LINDBORG: Yeah, so, the question about the dangerous dance. You know, I think core to understanding the pernicious and constant crisis in the Horn is to understand the exclusion that's gone on certainly in Kenya, in certain communities in the dry lands, and, you know, in a more complex patchwork of issues in Ethiopia. Core to moving forward is having the conversation about what are the policy changes and what are the differing investments that countries will make? And then regional policies, as well, as we discussed in terms of training economic impacts, that will change what goes on in those dry land areas.

And so it's these country frames that are being developed as a part of the EGAD-led process. It's each member state that is a part of EGAD and then EGAD marshalling the process, putting down what they're going to do differently. What are the policies? What are their own investments? And what do they need help with? And that becomes the organizing principle for donors to be able to support what really needs to be a specific and concerted set of changes, or we're going to be doing this all over again next time and, you know, in a period where we're seeing these droughts come faster and faster. So, I would posit that this is not a dangerous dance; it's a necessary dance to try to move toward something that's truly longer lasting and more sustainable. And interestingly, it's coming at a time when there is this renewed focus both through USA Forward, for those of you who followed that, as well as through the fragile states' New Deal, and you could argue we're going back to the MCC in terms of looking at if you don't have change at the country level, if you don't have accountable, legitimate, transparent, you know, inclusive governments with active civil societies and strong private sectors,

you will have constant -- every time a shock hits that community, that country will tip over. And so it's really about trying to stand up those solid, serious, longer-term solutions so we don't fall back into continuous crises.

On the donors' conference, this is an active conversation. A lot of shared desire to have this happen. Stand by. Things are -- conversations are happening every day. (Laughter) You know, the situation in Mali and the important role that ECOWAS is playing on the Mali situation is complicating it. But, you know, stand by day by day.

MR. O'BRIEN: Couldn't agree more with Nancy on the second to last statement about the need to focus on governments, but I do see it a little bit differently. I don't disagree what she said, but there is a dangerous dance going on.

We just had President Meles come here from Ethiopia to celebrate global development and our shared commitment to it in precisely the same year as he's shutting down civil society space in his own country and telling the NGOs they can't do work -that fundamental of American values, that, you know, you trust institutions, not men. And we're -- I think we are always in conflict where people of goodwill and good mind in this government have different agendas. There are some people in the State Department and the military who need Ethiopia on side. But if we want them on side, 20 or 30 years from now, we're going to be focused very heavily on civil society's space and engagement and whether they're looking after their own people, and that's a fundamental tension that we have to be very thoughtful about in this city in resolving the tensions on, so I think it's an important question to ask. I'm glad it got asked and to have a chance to debate with all of you.

Just one quick thing on the new donor thing. We've talked a lot about the Islamic issue. I think one of the things we'll take away from this, we're going to have to find new sources of money maybe outside of even the traditional government donor world. And just to -- we don't have time to go into it, everybody needs to go, but two names, things that we should be thinking about: resource extraction and how we get the money out of that into humanitarian work -- that's where Africa is going to be -- and innovative sources of financing, which are facing a deep moral hurl at the moment. We found out that if we name things like financial transaction tax to stop speculation, we can get not tens of millions but hundreds of millions of new money to stop speculators, but the humanitarians haven't jumped on that agenda and said and we know how you can spend it. And until they do, the European economies are going to say, oh, yeah, financial transaction tax is a great idea, have you heard about our debt burden? And we're not going to get the kind of progress we need for sort of global development and humanitarian work, so I think we should be thinking about that. And we could go on about infrastructure, because I know Africans would like to if they were in this discussion on where spending should go, but for another day.

This was fun. (Laughter)

MS. BRADLEY: Yes, indeed.

And so with that I'd like to close by thanking everyone in the audience for making the time to join us today, and in particular I'd like to thank the panelists for their contribution to today's discussion.

I think, you know, this is a field where optimism often comes at a premium, but for me what comes through very clearly here is that although we still have

such perennial challenges, there's a remarkable amount that has been learned, and I think this discussion has been very helpful in distilling that. So, thank you once again for joining us today. (Applause)

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