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**TAIWAN'S MATURING DEMOCRACY**

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ANDERSON COURT REPORTING  
706 Duke Street, Suite 100  
Alexandria, VA 22314  
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190

PARTICIPANTS:

**Introduction:**

RICHARD BUSH  
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies  
The Brookings Institution

**Opening Remarks:**

LARRY DIAMOND  
Professor of Political Science, Director, Center on Democracy, Development, and the  
Rule of Law  
Stanford University

**Panel 1: Government**

DAVID BROWN  
Adjunct Professor, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies  
Johns Hopkins University

DA-CHI LIAO  
Professor of Political Science  
National Sun Yat-sen University

NIGEL N.T. LI  
Adjunct Professor, Graduate School of Law,  
Soochow University  
Adjunct Professor, Graduate Institute of  
Political Science, National Taiwan University

JIUNN-RONG YEH  
Professor, College of Law  
National Taiwan University

**Panel 2: Politics and Society**

JOHN FUH-SHENG HSIEH  
Professor of Political Science  
University of South Carolina

ERICH CHE-WEI SHIH  
News Anchor and Senior Producer  
CTi Television

SHELLEY RIGGER  
Brown Professor of East Asian Politics  
Chair, Department of Political Science  
Davidson College

ERIC CHEN-HUA YU  
Assistant Professor of Political Science  
National Chengchi University

**Panel 3: Implications of Democratic Consolidation**

ALAN ROMBERG  
Distinguished Fellow and Director, East Asia  
Program  
The Stimson Center

LARRY DIAMOND  
Professor of Political Science, Director, Center  
on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law  
Stanford University

RICHARD BUSH  
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies  
The Brookings Institution

HO SZU-YIN  
Professor, Department of Political Science  
National Chengchi University

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## PROCEEDINGS

### Panel 1: Government

RICHARD BUSH: Ladies and gentlemen, why don't we go ahead and get started? I suppose that the weather has impeded traffic, and that's slowed our audience down, the rest of our audience. I certainly hope so.

Thank you all for coming. I'm Richard Bush, I'm the director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings, and it's my pleasure to welcome you all to our conference today on Taiwan's maturing democracy.

I would also like to thank all our speakers. I think we have an excellent group. I'd particularly like to express a warm welcome to our scholars and others from Taiwan who I am sure will make a huge contribution to today's proceedings.

Taiwan has a lot of very smart political analysts, and we're lucky to have so many of them here today. I'd also like to thank the staff who, as usual, have done their outstanding job. And I want to thank our co-sponsors, Stanford University's Center for Democracy Development and the Rule of Law. Larry Diamond, the center's director, has been a friend of mine for many, many years and more importantly, he's devoted a lot of time and a lot of careful thought to understanding Taiwan's democratization. So, it means a lot to Brookings to be able to co-sponsor with him and his center.

Now, let me take just a couple of minutes to explain what this conference is not about, and maybe that will help you understand what it is about. It's not about the January 2012 elections. Those contests and their outcomes were really interesting for political junkies and students of Taiwan politics, but we've actually done a conference on that so there's no need to do another. If you're interested in that, you can go to the Brookings website.

Our conference is not about President Ma Ying-jeou or Dr. Tsing Wan or any other Taiwan political leader. Taiwan has a lot of interesting political figures, but we're not here to psychoanalyze them.

Finally, the conference is not about the policies of the Taiwan government, at least not at the outset. You know, we're not going to get into detail about whether it was wise for the current administration to use the 1992 consensus as a basis for cross-strait negotiations or whether a peace accord would be in Taiwan's interest. Rather, our focus is on Taiwan's democratic system itself and the way it structures political outcomes for good or ill. Is that system in fact maturing, as we suggest in our title? Is it, to use political science jargon, becoming consolidated?

This subject obviously has a lot of academic interests, and we're fortunate, as I say, to have so many good scholars from Taiwan. But the maturity of Taiwan's democracy also has important real-world consequences. The island faces a number of challenges and choices,

most notably how to adjust to China, whose power is growing, but there are others. So, it's in the fundamental interest of all the people of the island, whether they're greens or blues, rich or poor, or middle class, the old and the young, that these choices are made well. And it's the political system that will really dominate how these choices are made and what the choices are. If the political system doesn't work very well, if it reflects badly the popular will, then it's the people who will suffer.

So, I think this is an important set of issues that we have before us today. Before we dive in with the first panel, I'd like to invite Larry Diamond to make some opening remarks.

LARRY DIAMOND: Well, I don't need to be long since Richard, I think, has very shrewdly and ably framed the conference. I'd just like to say, first of all that, you know, Richard is one of the people I most admire in this business, and any time I have a chance to invite him to a conference, which I've done repeatedly and thank you for coming, or to cooperate with him in an analysis or meeting, it's always a pleasure to do so. It's also a great pleasure to welcome many of you here or co-welcome you here, since many of you I've welcomed to Stanford at one point or another, and to say as well that I think this meeting is well-timed and well-crafted. And I can say well-crafted because you were mainly the crafter, Richard. Because there is a phenomenon going on in terms of democratic development in the world, and I think we'll see it unfolding over the course of this day. We were quite struck by it last year at Stanford when the annual meeting that we hold each year on Taiwan, we did last year as a comparative study of two maturing democracies in East Asia: Korea and Taiwan.

I have a hunch -- I won't get into it in much detail -- that much of what we'll hear today, like much of what we heard about Taiwan last spring, could be said about Korea as well, actually. Certainly it's true in the social and demographic sense in terms of the remarkable demographic transition that's underway, and in terms of the evolution, for example, of media and society and the obvious things that are going on worldwide in terms of the growth of the Internet and the increasing dominance of alternative media and the increasing independence of civil society. We'll see it as well towards the end of the day in some of the public opinion data that I have to present where the -- I'll just say, the phenomenon that I think we're seeing in Taiwan, of a citizenry that is basically committed to democracy, but pretty skeptical about a lot of its politicians and institutions is, again, reflective of a broader trend in maturing democracies toward what we call critical citizenship.

But the maturing of democracy in Taiwan is an amazing development in world history, and looking back from the standpoint of 30 years ago or something, one might say a fairly unlikely one. And we think, many of us -- well, I'll speak for myself. I think that it's one that will ultimately have, and maybe is beginning to have, a very significant influence on the mainland. So, this -- you know, just because Taiwan now is one of a few liberal democracies in East Asia. I'd say at least three: Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. For that reason alone, it's a significant development we're studying, the maturing of democracy in Taiwan. But given the potential for this first Chinese democracy to possibly inspire the development or, in some way, help shape, culturally and otherwise, the desire for thinking about the emergence of a larger Chinese democracy, that's another reason to take this development extremely seriously.

So, Richard, thank you again. It's always a pleasure to collaborate with you. And I think now our panel can rise to the occasion, literally. (Laughter)

DAVID BROWN: I want to commend both Brookings and Stanford for the way they've put this conference together. I think, as Larry Diamond said, this is a very interesting and important topic, and one that gets lost in the specific things that Richard said this conference is not about. And so, I very much commend them for putting this panel together.

This first panel looks at one aspect of the overall problem, and that is governmental institutions: the Executive Branch, the Legislative Yuan, and the Judicial Branch, three of Taiwan's five branches of government. And I'm going to suggest a couple of perspectives that we can keep in mind as we listen to the presentations.

I don't know what my panelists are going to speak about. I know the questions they've been asked to address, but I think one thing is to keep in mind that it's been 25 years since the end of the authoritarian period. How much has Taiwan changed in that period?

Second perspective is that they've been asked to focus specifically on the last 10 to 12 years, from 2000. So that means that the seminal changes in the electoral system that made Taiwan an electoral democracy in the '90s is not really what they're going to be focusing on, or which I hope they will be focusing on. But rather, the way the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches have worked internally, worked in relation to each other, worked in relation to the society around them.

And a third perspective is to remember that while we're talking about institutions, each of these institutions is filled with people, and 25 years ago these people -- civil servants or lawyers -- their actions and their attitudes were shaped by the authoritarian period. They now have had 25 years to adjust, changing the patterns of their actions and the way they think about governance in a way that is supposed to fit a modern maturing democratic society. So, I suggest those three perspectives.

I think we're extremely fortunate today that we have three very distinguished scholars from Taiwan who arrived last night and leave tomorrow morning. They are really devoted to helping us understand their society.

Professor Liao is from the political science department of Sun Yat-sen University in Kaohsiung, Professor Yeh is from the College of Law at National Taiwan University, and Professor Li is a practicing attorney but also an adjunct professor both at Soochow and NTU.

They all have something else, and that is that they all have been involved in the public policy realm, so that they're not just academics. They can bring a breadth of experience to understanding the institutions they've been asked to talk about.

So with that introduction, I'm going to remind our speakers that we would like them to speak for not more than 15 minutes, and in order to allow ample time at the end for a Q&A, which you all will be involved in. So, Professor Liao?

DA-CHI LIAO: May I move over there? I'm going to use my PowerPoint.

MR. BROWN: You certainly may.

DR. LIAO: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for the moderator, especially thanks to the conference organizers, Dr. Richard Bush and Dr. Larry Diamond.

Really appreciated the organizer's consideration because this is the first time I got a ticket arranged by the conference organizer directly from Kaohsiung to Washington D.C. It's incredible, right? Because many people who think of Taiwan only think about Taipei, not Kaohsiung. So, yeah, especially I want to thank Dr. Richard Bush. About 12 years ago, the year the chairman just mentioned about 2000, Dr. Richard Bush established the American Center in Kaohsiung at our university, National Sun Yat-sen University. Still alive, the center, okay?

Okay, because chairman already warned us he's going to be the police, so we have to make our presentation shorter within the time allocated for us.

My assignment is talking about the Executive Yuan. It's not so easy because actually I usually am labeled as a legislative specialist, but now I'm going to talk about the Executive Yuan.

My topic is Cinderella. It's weird, right? In the beginning I tried to use a title called, "Little Daughter-in-Law": our premier, under the ROC's constitutions. But one of my colleagues from the United States he said, what do you mean by "Little Daughter-in-Law?" It makes no sense to foreign people because daughter-in-law maybe in the United States is still very strong, but in our culture little daughter-in-law, *xiao xi fu*, actually tried to please the in-laws -- her mother-in-law very much still right now in Taiwanese society. But the little daughter-in-law makes no sense to people here. So, some suggested to me use Cinderella. Actually, I disagree. Not really like the kind of the metaphor for the premier, because Cinderella has a really bright future. She got a prince to come and rescue her eventually. But for our premier under current constitutional systems, no way to have anyone to rescue him, only the president. Okay, that's my kind of understanding and interpretation of the job of premier under ROC's constitution.

I have to use the full screen adjustment. Where is the full? This minute didn't come in, okay?

SPEAKER: You want your slideshows?

DR. LIAO: Yeah, yeah, yeah. I want to have the slideshow, where is that? Where is the slideshow? Yeah. Okay, yeah. Look, come here. Okay, thank you.

There. Why I say the premier is similar to a Cinderella earlier age, not later on and has a happy life with a prince? We have a semi-presidential system, as you know, and actually exactly seven times the constitutional amendment. We have two executives, that's why

we call it a semi-presidential system, and exactly seven-times constitutional amendment. The two executive power sources and duty make it very simple to present to you. The president and premier, you see the power source. The president is directly elected by the people, because like Richard just mentioned about the elections held in January, and he's going to be the delegate to Taiwan to participate in the inauguration ceremony of the president directly elected by the people. The premier is appointed by the president, only, without the consensus of the Legislative Yuan. That power source makes their job very different.

I have the kind of constitutional amendment rule, to show you the kind of constitution that accords the premier's power. Article 53, 55, after the Amendment 203 talking about the provisions of Article 55 of the constitution shall cease to apply. Article 53 says Executive Yuan should be the highest demonstrative organ of the state. And then, in the past the Executive Yuan, the premier, should get the consent of the Legislative Yuan, then appointed by the president of the ROC. But right now, it's not the case. So, the power sources make them very different.

Okay, all the kinds of little -- will show the evidence, so I won't go into detail, otherwise I will waste too much time. Country signature, because in the previous we had a cabinet system in mind, buried in our constitutional design. So, the president announced -- promulgate any legislation has to have the country sign from the Executive Yuan's members. But right now, it's not that comprehensive. I won't go into details, they are attached in the mirror you can look into, but not here.

And also, responsibility to the Legislative Yuan. The president does not really have that kind of responsibility to respond to the Legislative Yuan, not such a kind of very clear allocation of the duties. But for the premier, yes, indeed, it's very much so. I won't go into the amendment details, just show you.

So, the premier saw under this kind of power structure, power source -- the power source of the president comes from the people. That's democracy. And the premier only comes from the president. He can assign or dismiss him under his will. Okay.

So, why I say it's similar to the Cinderella story? Because the premier, the only duty he has to do is please the president. Otherwise, he will be dismissed by the president. Superficially, he's the chief of the cabinet. He can appoint cabinet members, but substantially it's difficult to lead. Why? Because the president is the boss.

If the premier wants to appoint the cabinet members on the surface, it is. But substantially, the president's willingness -- a president's preference always takes into account. Even though behind the scenes the president told the premier maybe in different ways, different manners who he likes to appoint to which position.

So, for the chief of the Executive Yuan, the premier, difficult to lead the cabinet members. A strong cabinet member may directly report to the president in a certain way, so obviously. The premier just cannot say too much, because the boss is the president.



Then, Chen Chong [Sean Chen] as an example. You can see, there's articles on Taiwan's newspapers, last month Premier Chen was tired and sick in the LY [Legislative Yuan]. He said, "Okay, I cannot answer your questions anymore," because he's got stomach illness. Then, after the president went to the foreign visit, then he said, "Mind your president." Okay, Chen Chong, I certainly support him. Even after May 20, he's still to be the premier; got strong support from the president. Then the people make a loud joke on that.

There's a TV program from Taiwan's news media. I think you just take a little look at -- how many minutes do I have? Maybe we skip this because it's only in Chinese. Okay.

You can see that they portray the kind of low job of Chen Chong before he got ill, and lots of troubles occurred to the current cabinet, like the American beef problem and like the increasing price for gasoline and electricity. That kind of problem. Also, difficulty to lead.

Another example recently happened. Taiwan's security is changing, incomes -- actually, we tax on this one, which way we should take on the security exchange income. There's a current financial minister, Christina Liu, there's a large struggle going on. So, I don't know whether you know the recent situation.

The cabinet meetings cannot solve the problem. The cabinet already put this legislation on the agenda, sent to the Legislative Yuan. The first time in Legislative Yuan history to remove this legislation off the agenda. Say, okay, maybe we should postpone.

It never happened in the Legislative Yuan because it's a cabinet bill sent to the Legislative Yuan, so there's kind of this historical record. The presidents comes forward to say, okay, we still insist on taxing on the security exchange incomes, and ask the Legislative Yuan to establish this bill and to review this bill next session. Okay, that's the current events. It's difficult to lead. I also have a TV program, but I don't think we have enough time to see that.

So, what consequences have we got? I labeled this as a personalized president. President's personality is crucial to shape the executive function. The president -- I use the two -- exactly echo back to the chairman's perspective, talking about 2000 to right now. The person, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou. I divided their personalities into two types. One is a routine-breaker, one is a routine-follower. One is a good student; the other one is not a bad student, but likes to break the routine. So, their personality influences their way to pick up the premier.

Routine-breakers like Chen Shui-bian, he can either appoint a follower, routine-follower, or he can accept a breaker. So, there's several ministers during his term, altogether five. Actually six because Chang Chun-hsiung took the position twice.

Routine-follower, Ma Ying-jeou, his personality is really "follow the rules," very good student, always a good student. So, he likes to appoint good students, too. So, that's from Liu Chao-shiuan, Chen Chung, and Wu Den-yih a little bit in-between because he's a typical politician. I say that without any bad connotation. So, but -- why do you laugh there? But he's in-between the breaker, and that's changed when the president appoints the kind of personality of prime minister. The chance for followers, still, for the routine-breaker's personality as president

who likes to appoint a routine follower, because they're obedient. But in certain cases, they also can accept a routine-breaker. But for routine-follower presidents, they like to appoint routine-followers.

So what happens and is the effect on the executive function? The president dominates, certainly, under the follower and the routine-breaker. But for the breaker, there's a confrontation. Policy-making stalemate, that's really strong. I have a lot of evidence for all of this, but I don't think we have time to read through.

And for the routine follower to appoint a routine follower as premier, the case is leadership vacuum, especially during the period of crisis occurrence. If we have big crisis, big challenges, contingent situations are easy -- it's easy for us to feel like where is the leadership? Because we, in our words, these two kinds of people, routine-followers are [inaudible]. How do we interpret? Just follow the rules. That's a gentle, mild, and always polite to the other party. So, it's difficult but makes things clear to make strong decisions. That's the routine-follower's personality.

Then, the last one is difficult for the routine-follower as a president, difficult to appoint a routine-breaker. But if really something like -- he cannot do too much because he's still under the supervision of the president. The president decided on him and he lost his job, so he'd like to show he's become a show-horse. If the president is a routine-follower, appoint a routine-breaker for the premier, then it's a show-horse. That's my categorization.

I have all the evidence for what they say about their jobs as prime minister, but I don't think we have time to go through it. Very interesting. Every word -- I can show you just one Hsieh Chang-ting [Frank Hsieh], but in Chinese. See?

Chen Shui-bian blamed Hsieh Chang-ting as mindless, because you didn't solve the problem. Hsieh Chang-ting has nothing to say, or maybe the president makes the wrong decision, pick up the wrong person. That's what he said before. They had a very strong confrontation. I have a lot of this kind of evidence, I'll just show you a little bit. Then -- okay, a lot. Two minutes.

Prime minister Ma Ying-jeou, they are kind of submissive but they still feel it's difficult to play their role because, like economic issues, it's supposed to be the prime minister's jurisdiction, but the president has to say a lot about the economic issue, especially regarding the so-called ACFA.

How to reform? There's one question reached by the Brookings Institution. How do we reform the current semi-presidential system? I have to say, it's really difficult to reform using a legal, formal way to amend the constitution again because we have a very, very high threshold to pass kind of the new revisions. I'll show you the constitutional rule, I won't go into the details.

But what can we do? We have kind of law backgrounds as professors and a lawyer here, so maybe we can discuss later.

What should reform direct to? Parliamentarianism or presidential? My view is, it's difficult to go to the parliamentarianism because cultural preference to a strong leader. I have evidence here but I have no time to show that.

Then DPP is opposed to parliamentarianism, for sure. They occupy -- I can show you why. It's interesting. I got so much information here. DPP is difficult to take the majority seat in the legislation. From the historical records, you can see all the DPP as a light green part. So, they want -- so far, they just thought maybe it's impossible to accept the parliamentary system.

Then the third one is power exchange for collision, immature yet even though today's topic is Taiwan's maturing democracy. Before us, to have a power sharing to exchange power, to arrange a collision government under a parliamentarianism system is difficult. We have a valuable example, the Bian-Soong meeting in the year 2005. So, I won't show the detail. It's interesting but, sorry, I just have 15 minutes. So, presidentialism is easier to evolve.

How to do? Currently, a lot of people say the president should deliver the State of Nation report, like an American president that delivers the State of the Union report to the Senate and Congress together. We can develop that, but there's an argument between whether the president should take questioning from the members or not. I think it's better not to take questions, just follow the American presidential model. Then, legislation should be better equipped with information power, otherwise they just correlate.

Okay, the third one. The Grand Justice interpretation of the constitution may play a role in renewing the nature of the constitution. We actually depend upon this part of very heavily -- I think Professor Yeh will make more explanation of the role of Grand Justice in the future. We already did one, 686 interpretation. Why should we have investigation power to do checks and balances of executive power? Some way for us to incrementally revise our -- to change the nature of the system.

That's my presentation. Thank you. I wait for your further questions. I have a lot of information inside there, it's really interesting. Sorry, I just don't have enough time to show it all. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. BROWN: Thank you very much. Professor Yeh? Professor Yeh will now talk about the Legislative Yuan.

JIUNN-RONG YEH: Thank you. Let me get my -- can somebody help me? Okay, and show? Okay, I'll now get my -- okay -- slideshow? And then from the current slide?

MR. BROWN: From beginning.

DR. YEH: Oh, from beginning. Good, very good. Thank you very much.

Well, first of all, I would like to thank Richard and Larry for having me. I'm very

pleased to be here. I would like to share with you some of my observations; to some extent, also my experience in the government. But I didn't choose this topic. If I had a chance to choose the topic I wouldn't chose legislature, I might just choose the executive or the judiciary. Probably judiciary would be my -- the very top of my choice, and legislature would be the last one.

Because it's a collective party of constitutional institutions and it's hard to predict and it has been notorious. What can I say about the legislature? But in fact, it has been getting better. To some extent it's been getting better, and this is what we are going to talk about.

So, how are we going to see through the legislature? Under the, you know, topic of maturing democracy, what has changed in the legislature or not changed? And also, what were the driving forces for this change? And also, what's the impacts of this change? And what's the implication?

But where we need to know the salient features of the legislatures when we are talking about Legislative Yuan in Taiwan. We simply cannot see this institution from the perspective of, say, Diet in Japan or Congress in the United States. This Legislative Yuan in our constitution is very different.

I put up three elements for you. Number one is, I think, operating the five power scheme. Some of the power enjoyed by modern, you know, congress may not be there in the legislature. It's enjoyed by, say, the other Yuan, the other branch of the government. And it's the semi-presidential system. You know, the check and balance system and the semi-presidential system is very different. You've got to deal with not only the premier but also the president. And sometimes, it's a very fuzzy picture.

And also, multiple congress compacts. Taiwan used to have three congresses, and it's recognized by the constitutional court. Control Yuan, National Assembly, and also legislature are all considered as our congress. Gradually, through constitutional revision and also political change, now the Legislative Yuan emerged as the only one. But still, there are complications with the Control Yuan. Only in the year 2005, we killed the national assembly, so that the Legislative Yuan emerged, you know, as the only one. So, qualifies as congress, okay? So, very, very complex.

The change or the reform in the legislature has to mean in the core, you know, area of the constitutional revision enterprise that happened since 1991. Before 2005, the change has been minimal. You know, the first and second revision was to allow a national, you know, election of the legislature. But it was in 2005 a substantial institutional change happened to the Judicial Yuan, and that's the topic that we are going to talk about. So, when we say change we are going to say that change happened in 2005, but the first application was in the year 2008 and then followed by 2012.

So, what was the change? The change happened in 2005 and was a constitutional revision. I should say, I was one of the members of the mission-oriented national assembly. I was also actually the secretary general of the national assembly. I actually signed a document sending to the president, kill the national assembly. It's on the record.

But aside from killing the national assembly, there was substantial reform. The first one was public referendum for constitutional revision. This is the first part of the enterprise, and we got to put all this package together to understand why they were reformed by that. Why politicians would say yes to that package, because everybody wants to get something from that package and that's why there was agreement, there was a consensus, to push that forward.

The other package was in the reform legislature comprising three elements. The first one is the most important one. Actually, that built up the most driving force for the reform. That is, to downsize, to cut in half the seats of the Legislative Yuan. Before that reform, people just hate the legislature so much because at that time between national assembly and the legislature they sort of condemned each other. One called the other a pile of garbage, the other called the other a cockroach. So, it was the war between the cockroach and the pile of garbage. So, people were kind of fed up with that self-expanding institution. Lots of fist fighting, lots of corruption going on in the legislature.

So, people gave up and tried to punish the Legislative Yuan. So when the proposal came out and said, let's cut the seats into half, everybody applauded. Every political party followed, and that was the driving force.

For two very important institutional reforms, one is single-member districts, the other one is two-vote system. Sort of put in the proportional representation into the package. So, this is the whole package of the 2005 constitutional revision. But these three, downsizing and SMD and two-vote system, work together. We need to see that as a package. Let me sort of lay out the composition of that.

Another new system with 73 seats open for district election, 6 preserved for indigenous group people, and then 34 by proportional representation. So, that was the new system. But when we are talking about the evaluation of this political change, there are two tiers of analysis. Number one is, that kind of new system changed to the representation and the legitimacy of the congress itself, or the Legislative Yuan itself. The second tier is about what kind of delivery, what kind of performance, what kind of evaluation from the general public? So, these are two tiers of performance. I would like to analyze these one by one.

Let me begin with the first one. Before congressional reform, there were lots of party representations, including KMT, DPP, PFP, and also TSU and the New Party. So, the multi-party representation. After this system, only two. So, changing to two-party system. But before, it was major -- multi-party representation.

And also before in the previous two terms the fifth and the sixth terms, DPP was the largest political party in the congress for two terms, but when it comes to Pan-Green and Pan-Blue, Pan-Blue enjoyed the majority. But you see, the percentage is like this: the percentage was 51.4 versus 44.5, 50.7 versus 44.9. The margin was not very big, so that was before the new system.

But that political -- the electoral system got lots of criticism because as you see,

the per capita representation in Taiwan is about 98,000. Compared to other, you know, democracies this is really too small, and that's why the people want to cut that. But because they over cut, cut into half, actually creating lots of problems. Now we have 113 [legislators]. So, lots of effort has been done, but the single most important deficiencies, in my opinion, is the number. We cut from 225 to 113, cut into half. It should be like anywhere from 168 to 186. That would be the proper number for that, and I have some explanation for that.

So, the reform -- let me skip this and get to the result of the 2008. We are not talking about elections, I'm talking about systems, right? But let's see. The Pan-Blue got the seat share, it was 67 percent. And Pan-Green, the seat share was 23 percent. What a difference. That means the majority got more than three-fourths of the seats. What does that mean, constitutionally? That means any constitutional mechanism guaranteed a minority to propose any bill that is bigger than one-fourth will become impossible. That is one example. In the past, one-third of the legislators could appeal to constitutional courts, one-third. But because of this, this channel of constitutional interpretation has been completely crossed. Okay?

So, this kind of result actually has lots of implications constitutionally. The kind of check and balance mechanism guaranteed by the constitution actually becomes obsolete because of this result. That is, the majority got more than three-fourths of the seats. But how about the fourth share? The fourth share doesn't explain in that way. Now there's disparity.

There's very clear disparity going on there. See? KMT, the fourth share, was 52.4. The seat share was 71, and DPP got 37.5 percent of the vote but only got 23 percent of the seats. So, the transformation from fourth share to sixth share got distorted in such a great extent. Was that because of the electoral rules out of the 2005 constitutional revision? That is, downsizing the seats of the parliament from 2,025 to 113? And also, one single district and two votes? And I argue, this electoral rule does matter. And to a great extent, costs profound political consequence in the longer-term. That's exactly what happened right now.

And the situation doesn't get better, only got softened in the recent election, 2012. Okay? So, less than one-fourth of the majority in the -- I have mentioned some of those constitutional consequences, I'm going to skip that. The result of the 2012 election is getting better but still institutional problems, as I just mentioned. That is the disparity of the, you know, vote share and seat share, still there.

You see the seat change, and an equal vote. Okay? So, let's see. Let's look into the issue.

The issue is, KMT got 53.5 [percent of the] vote but got 71 [seats], and let's see some of the extreme representation. In Lienkiang County, a little bit less than 10,000 people got 1 seat. In Hsinchu County, 475,000 people get 1 seat. You see? About 476 times. So, people got different votes. The weight of the votes are so different. This is very serious. It happened in 12 seats. Aborigines' seats were six, and also offshore islands, and two in the East, Taitung and Hualien, those are the lowest representation, but pretty much controlled by KMT. So, KMT in any election would get 11 seats, anyway. Imagine, 11 out of 113.

So, there is a saying politically that DPP after this new rule is not going to be the majority party anymore in history. But some people still remain hopeful that there may be some kind of change. Let me speed up and finish the second part.

My observation of the first impact was, change to the rules has a great impact to legislative representation. The slight improvement in the 2012 election does not prove otherwise, despite its improvement. An issue with long-term significance, but it requires super-strong political will to do it and do it right.

Okay, let me come to the second tier, and it's going to be a little bit easier for that. Is the legislature doing better after reform? Has the reformed contributed to the change, for better or for worse? Variables -- and also, there are variables beyond legislative reform?

Let me mention that after the 2008 election, four elected legislators from KMT were criminally charged with buying vote during that 2008 campaign, and later disqualified as legislators by the court, and this means final. There could be more to come, but that means 2008 they were buying votes, charges, and actually it has been ruled by the court at least four legislators from KMT has been disqualified. And they are all subject to reelection, most of the seats were regained by DPP after the election. So, this is one.

The other one is the satisfactory investigation by, say, TVBS and also by Transparency International, and also by, most importantly, Citizen Congress Watch. A report has been disappointed, but with some sort of improvement, slight improvement. So, this is by Citizen Congress Watch. As you see, this is the newly established coalition of various citizen groups in Taiwan, and I see this as a very important development in Taiwan's democracy. That is, you have a watchdog group watching the performance of the congress in a credible way. Legislators actually began to take this seriously.

The result, the performance, has been relatively better but not surprisingly well. For example, budget review the Legislative Yuan for the history cut only 0.007 percent of the budget for that year. Because the super majority of the legislators were controlled by KMT. Poor quality of the past acts -- that's according to Citizen Congress Watch. And also, the Judicial Reform Foundation is one of the very important citizen groups for that. Also, came up with some sort of review and pretty much along the same lines.

The performance of seventh session legislators -- this is what I have to say -- all eight sessions you see slight improvement but not significant, no significant change being found. Okay? Let me -- let me skip this.

There are changes, actually. They are streamlined subcommittees into eight. And also, less frequent filibusters and also, there is a new institution transparency mechanism being set up, that is IVOD. That is a live broadcast and video on-demand that's available online. But the request for a TV channel that's pretty similar to C-SPAN has been pretty much, you know, dragging their feet. More consolidated watchdog groups. The Citizen Congress Watch actually has been there, and that's a good sign.

Lastly, I would like to say while observing the performance of the Legislative Yuan – it's not easy, as I say, but we need to put that into broader pictures rather than simply tagging the legislature along. We need to put it into the context of the semi-presidential system, you know, particularly -- Professor Liao just mentioned the presidential affairs report controversy. That just reflects how congress can react, can do, and there is -- it's very limited, actually, to some extent. Sometimes it's not their fault, it's constitutional structure. So we need to loop that into a more broader, you know, context in order to understand what's been going on.

Thank you very much. I sort of went over time a little bit. (Applause)

MR. BROWN: Thank you, Professor Yeh. You've given us a lot to think about. And now, we'll turn to Nigel Li, please.

NIGEL N.T. LI: It's my turn to see how this is done. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to thank for the invitation, and it's a true pleasure and honor to be here to share with you the topic of judiciary.

Actually, were the issue to be designated as a judiciary alone, perhaps the presentation would be different. But the topic I was assigned to is procuratorate and the judiciary in Taiwan, and that actually allows me to have two issues presented for today's purpose.

I would first share with you the major points, in my mind. Actually, we're talking about the democracy development in Taiwan and everybody agrees, independence, judicial independence plays an extremely important role. So, I begin with thinking along that line.

First I must say, there is a recent event taking place which may play a crucial role in terms of establishing a better system for judicial independence and for the -- to enhance the quality of the judiciary. Particularly, this event plays a significant role in the future of the judicial reform in Taiwan. That is, we had a new law in place which is called the Judge's Act, *fa guan fa*. This one was promulgated on July 6, 2011. It will take effect on July 6, this year. So, we still -- the law is pending to the enforcement.

I'd like to first take a look at the objective of the act. It says this act is to ensure judges can try cases independently. Their tenure should be secured, and external rating systems for judges shall be established, and the act is enacted to protect people's right to a fair trial.

This seems to be cliché. I must tell you, this is for the first time in Taiwan's law that this important law and values has been explicitly adopted. The value of judicial independence was stated explicitly in law and the very function of the judiciary is to protect people's right to a fair trial. I must tell you, this shared goal by many democracies now seen in a new law in Taiwan is not an easy peace.

This will be a new and fundamental law for the judiciary in tandem with the Court Act, which was effective since 1932 and which does not, actually, define the role of a judge. In the Court Act, you know how the judges are appointed but there is no specific provision stating what is the function of a judge.



So, I would like to share with you two lines of issues from a historical perspective. I will take these as structural issues and not quality issues. Speaking of judicial reform, one major issue would be the quality of the judiciary needs to be beefed up, but this is not something I will share with you today.

I would say, this new act, the act that I just mentioned, is a new -- is trying to push for answers against two chronic, unsettled issues in Taiwan's legal system. Namely, the first thing is a line between procuratorate and the judiciary has never been clearly drawn in the system. The second issue is whether procuratorate should be institutionally independent. That's two issues quite crucial in terms of judicial reform.

First, I will speak about lines between procuratorate and judiciary not clearly drawn. Historically, separation of the judiciary from executive branch is a concept alien in notion to the Chinese culture and political system. So, that's why the line between the procuratorate and the judiciary has always been blurred since the inception of the Republic. Before, in the Xing Dynasty, actually, the local magistrate who also takes the judicial power of trial, civil or criminal cases. And since the inception of the Republic, that tradition continues for a while. And since the adoption of the constitution, the issue -- that phenomenon has changed. But, the line blurred between the two institutions, the judiciary and the procuratorate, still lingers.

I would like to mention one particular important -- in my eyes, this is a very important interpretation sometimes ignored by many. The journey of transformation, or to try to draw a distinctive line between the two institutions, I would say, began in the 1950s. When in 1953 a ruling by the Grand Justices was issued at the request of the controlling Yuan. The issue was, where does the judge, with a tenure stipulated in Article 81 of the constitution, include the prosecutors?

The constitution sets forth tenure, lifetime tenure, for judges, and because the judges are supposed to be independent from other powers, government powers, by that time the law -- the law of court -- says that the prosecutors enjoy the same tenure, similar lifetime tenure as a judge would have. So, that's why Control Yuan takes the issue to the Grand Justices, and this is the holding.

The holding is, the judge referred to the constitution means the judge of the Article 81 and 80 are the same. It means, the reason why a judge shall enjoy tenure, lifetime tenure, is because of their function being independent. This is to ensure the independence of a judiciary. That's why it does not include the prosecutor.

However, the Grand Justice further to state the status quo at the time, saying, however, a guarantee of a tenure for prosecutors extended by the Court Act is the same as that of a tenure judge. That's a statement of the then-existing law.

The reason why I shared the interpretation of 1953 with you is because behind this issue of drawing a line between the two actually has a sensitive touch upon the tenure issue, which directly would have an impact upon the package, the compensation, to be received by the

prosecutors.

And another crucial judicial decision can be seen in 1960. At that time, the issue was, are the high courts and district courts allowed to be subordinate to the executive branch under the Ministry of Justice in tandem with the procuratorate? At that time -- that's in 1960 -- courts and prosecutors both are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Cabinet. And the Grand Justice at that time says, in view of the fact that different levels of courts and subordinate courts below the high court inclusively hold the judicial power over trials, this court shall be subordinate to the Judicial Yuan.

And this, after the promulgation of this ruling, 20 years later, in the 1980s, the Court Act was amended and this interpretation was implemented. That is, starting at the time of 1980 you see the first attempt to draw a distinctive line between the two.

And then in 1995, we have another new ruling saying that only the judge can enjoy the power to issue writ of habeas corpus and the prosecutors cannot do that. This ruling in 1995 is a bold ruling which actually -- I will not -- I have no time to go into details of this ruling, but I would share that after the Criminal Procedure Act has been revised nearly 20 times to ensure that the judges are no longer to function further like a prosecutor. They should act as an independent judiciary.

Then, the reverse system is being gradually introduced to the criminal procedure to replace the inquisitory system, and this continuing issue is often at this very moment. Another debate is still coming. Recently, the Supreme Court made a decision that the court will not further exercise the investigation to help the prosecutor to prove that the defendant is guilty.

The only time -- the Supreme Court says, the only time the judge of a criminal court will exercise investigation power is to prove that the defendant is innocent. That invites a serious protest from the prosecutor. One prosecutor claims that he will go to the Supreme Court to sit in front of the Supreme Court door to say that the court has lost its independence. So, another round of debates emerges because of this type of issue. And that, I consider, still the same problem continues. That is, do you see a line to be drawn between the two institutions?

One thing about the Judge Act -- tell me that my time is up. But I can share with you the one thing about the Judge Act. There has been a talk of war behind the scenes. The original plan of the judiciary is not to include the prosecutor into the judge law, the Judge Act. But the Ministry of Justice disagrees, and after a long time of negotiation and the Judge Act -- the bill sits in the Legislative Yuan for more than 10 years, and eventually a compromise was made. That is, the judiciary will save a blanket chapter for the Ministry of Justice to fill in, and then that chapter was added in to describe the function of the prosecutors.

Well, I have to say that probably I should go directly to a drawing I tried to delineate for you as a summary of the pictures. Before the enactment of the -- adoption of the constitution, the concept of judicial and executive powers are basically a mixture. And then, you see that from the executive power people tried to pull out the judicial power. At that time, the only thing in the constitution was the Supreme Court, and then the Grand Justice tried to put the

judiciary into an integrated system, and tried to separate it from the executive power. But at that time, the prosecutors are considered something in parallel to courts, both under the executive power. And after the implementation of '86, you see two circles. That is, judicial power is separated from executive power but with the prosecutors sitting in between. You cannot tell whether they are judiciary or executive branch. Then after the 392, you can tell judicial power tried to send the prosecutors back to the executive power, but the prosecutors refused for that kind of plan.

And now, the prosecutor tried to become independent. I have no time to share with you the details, but is that a good idea? Is something for exploration in the future.

I should end my presentation now. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. BROWN: I want to commend Dr. Li for shedding more light on judicial reform in 15 minutes or so than I have had the pleasure in the past to receive.

Before I open the thing for questions, there is one aspect of the operation of the Legislative Yuan which I think needs to be put on the table as an issue in terms of democracy. And that is that as I understand it, the majority of bills that pass through the Legislative Yuan are in fact dealt with and finalized through a process of inter-party collaboration or consultation, and they are not voted on in committee and in the plenary. And as this is a very unique part of Taiwan's judicial system, I wonder if I could ask Professor Yeh to explain how this came about and whether it is a good thing and whether it needs reform?

DR. YEH: Well, thank you very much for this. I actually put the issue in my PowerPoint, but didn't get a chance to explain that.

MR. BROWN: I cut you off, so I'm now giving you the chance.

DR. YEH: Yeah, thank you very much

Well, it's a very unique operation. In practice, any recognizable party, major party represented in the Legislative Yuan formal caucus -- of course, before the second reading, before sending a bill for second reading, you need to -- in practice, you need to get the signature from the leader of every caucus, okay? I have the experience of asking for signatures from various. But the problem is, how about those groups of people -- there are only, like, three or four or five legislators. They claim that they don't belong to any political party, but nevertheless they form a group and they say, we are going to form a caucus, and that was exactly what was going on.

They tried to gain as much as possible from the process, and they got recognized. The internal rule of the Legislative Yuan recognized if you have more than three legislators forming together, then you can form a caucus. And for any bill who is going to send for second reading, you need to get their signature. And you see lots of sort of bargaining going on. Those small groups of people would like to ask for lots of returns for their signature, and I personally took pains in asking for that when I was in the government.

And I think this is one of the unique practices in our Legislative Yuan that need to be addressed. This is really the background, in my opinion.

MR. BROWN: Thank you. With that, I'd like to open it up for questions. And following the general rules here, I ask you to identify yourself, to keep your comment or question brief, and to wait for a microphone. So, who would like to go first? Up here in front.

QUESTION: Thanks. I'm Mike Fonte. I'm the DPP's Washington liaison. I wonder about the Legislative Yuan process. I noticed recently Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng had to break a tie and then there was also a committee where there was a seven to six vote. Not all the KMT people voted.

So I guess the question is, whether the reforms -- the single-member district and the accountability that comes with it -- is having that kind of an impact now. Used to be caucuses would always vote, whatever the party said, you had to do it, right? Now it looks like at least in the current situation there seems to be some flexibility, shall we say, on the KMT side. I wonder what your thoughts are.

DR. YEH: Well, I would say the recent American beef issue -- you actually see a swing vote. I don't know whether it's a swing vote or not. It's a critical vote by the speaker, by Wang Jin-pyng. But that was very exceptional, that was because party difference on this issue simply cannot control each individual legislator for this particular issue. Otherwise on other issues, I still see very strong party hold on all issues.

There is a figure going on. It has been investigated by the Citizen Congress Watch. The majority of the bill was like 90 percent support from one party, or 90 percent support from the other party. Very divided. For each individual legislator to deliberate, and also some sort of very rational debate, in my opinion has not been there.

As I mentioned, you know, you still have the caucus party difference and individual party to endorse any kind of policy. So, that kind of democratic deliberation -- I think the level of that is still low, in my opinion.

DR. LIAO: May I also respond a little bit? Because under the single-member district, actually each legislator got pressure from the constituency more than from the party. If they received -- the legislator -- received a lot of phone calls from the constituency, then they will avoid the party discipline and tried to defect. That's a consideration.

Also, the same case in the United States, because of single-member districts. I predict the party discipline will be looser, looser in the future because the constituency pressure is getting heavier, heavier, heavier. Yeah, thank you.

MR. BROWN: Thank you. I've Gerrit and then we'll go to the back and then up to Alan.

QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Gerrit van der Wees. I'm editor of *Taiwan*

*Communiqué.* I have a question about the judiciary for Nigel Li. But Professor Yeh also wanted to talk about the judiciary, so I'm also giving you a chance at that.

Professor Jerry Cohen at Harvard a couple years ago wrote an article, and he criticized the judicial profession in Taiwan for not standing up more for judicial reform in Taiwan. He called it very politicized, and he said it should be more of an effort by the professorate itself to move towards judicial reform. And he actually referred to a nation of sheep.

What would you do if you had your druthers in terms of moving towards judicial reform in the future, so it really becomes a very neutral and truly independent system?

DR. LI: In short, I think the very issue I presented today -- that is, to draw a line between the judges and prosecutors -- exactly should be the focus of the judicial reform. That is helpful to shape the value of the judicial independence, something in lack of since the beginning of the things.

We are still in that process, and we have a new law, and I think we are at the wake of judicial conscience of the value of the judicial independence. Of course, relevant issues are the quality and the accountability of judges. That is, I think, a more serious problem because we have already bureaucratic, or we should say, institutional or career judges. Most of the judges start to serve as a judge since they are perhaps -- the majority of them since the time they graduate from law school, after they pass the judge's test. That has been an issue for constant discussion or debate. As to one of the plans of the judiciary is to stop using judge tests to select judges. Instead, they like to appoint judges more like the American system, to appoint new judges out of senior lawyers or prosecutors or professors. But that effort has not been proven successful, so people are still trying to figure out how to enhance the accountability of judges in terms of the quality. But that may really take a generation to overcome.

On the other hand, I would say another important value of the Judge Act sometimes ignored by many people is that this Judge Act in one of the provisions for the first time, again, explicitly states that the judge has a mandate to try their cases in accordance with the constitutional power, and they should apply the constitution as part of the basis for their judgment. This seems to be common sense but, again, this is the very first time that provision has been introduced.

And with that provision in place, the judges would have a mandate and, of course, a duty to write into their judgments what is compliant with constitutional values. I take that as extremely important, and that's why one of the reasons I would take this Judge Act as a crucial factor in terms of judicial reform in the years to come.

MR. BROWN: Thank you. There's a gentleman in the far back to the right.

QUESTION: John Hsieh from the University of South Carolina. I have one question for Professor Liao, another one for Professor Yeh. In Professor Liao's presentation at the end she talked about two options for Taiwan's constitutional future. One is for parliamentary system, another one for presidential. I'm just wondering why not just stick to the semi-

presidential system. Whether it's possible just with some kind of minor revision that this system can still be a kind of viable option.

For instance, if you believe that the vital government situation is bad, then why not just give the Legislative Yuan some kind of invested vote. That is, when the president nominates the premier and the premier has to be -- then the Legislative has to have a vote to express its consent with regard to the presidential nominee, and so on. And whether you think that's also viable?

And another question for Professor Yeh. This is really out of curiosity, because you mentioned that this new system, some people call it a mixed-member majoritarian system, MMM system, and it benefits the -- gives huge bonuses to the large parties, particularly to the largest party. We all knew that, and even before 2004 constitutional reform. Actually, some people in the DPP, Lin Cho-shui for instance, were opposed to the kind of revision. But then, the DPP actually just went ahead. I don't know whether you have any kind of insight for reasons why the DPP wants to kill itself, to commit suicide. (Laughter)

DR. LIAO: Shall I? Okay. Thank you for Professor John Hsieh's question. Actually, if you pay attention enough, I didn't say we are going to change the current semi-presidential system. I already said that reform is difficult, especially through the kind of formal amendment procedure because we set up a three-fourths first in the Legislative Yuan, and then it's half of the general electorate. That's 9 million votes. It's really difficult to get a new amendment. So, I said in an incremental way.

The incremental including the kind of political consensus, including what you mentioned about if it is possible to have a certain kind of consensus from a Legislative Yuan after the president appoints a prime minister. Actually, the French system does have this kind of procedure. If the cabinet minister -- if the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan are not the president's party, then the prime minister -- even appointed by the president -- he still can't ask for a consent from the parliament; that's a French system.

We don't have that rule, but we may be able to create that rule. We think that the Legislative Yuan's internal rule of law is possible, but it depends upon power struggles. I don't think at this moment it's possible because each ruling party the president, I think -- everyone doesn't want to have a rule to constrain its power. That's the current situation. But in the future, maybe two parts. The ruling president is another party. The parliament belongs to the majority seat is another party that is divided, so-called left and right cohabitation in the French system. It's possible to happen that way. But still, it depends upon the power struggle.

So, I think that we still under the current semi-presidential system we won't have a big change, but slowly, incrementally it's possible to have a fixed certain kind of -- not really working very well situation, yeah. Thank you for your question.

DR. YEH: I don't have the inside story, but I do have some personal recollection of some of the development during that period of time.

We need to remember that time before the election, before a major election. Major political parties all agree about this proposal, about a whole package, including small parties. There was -- they all agreed before that, before the election. Of course, a group of people solicit that kind of package and they all say, yes, we endorse that.

And the problem is whether you are going to honor that up to that election. So, every political party has its one calculation. When it comes closer to the actual substantiated package of the law, they begin to defect -- some begin to defect. So, there were negotiations going on.

The incentive for DPP, as I understand, to come to terms with other political parties on this matter was because it's the package. DPP likes that referendum so much. As I said, it's a package. It's not only congressional reform, it's a referendum for any constitutional revision. DPP has been pushing forward for direct citizen involvement in major political issues, including the revision of the constitution for such a long time. And there was hope that the whole political party would agree, right? So, that's one.

Second one is, DPP at that time has been very optimistic about their performance. At that time, they -- actually, they were the biggest political party. I mean, they think that their goal to work, you know, of crossing that majority line is not impossible. I mean, at the time it's -- you know, you see that mentality of that. They know that it is not -- it is going to put them in a disadvantaged position, they knew that. But they were saying that we are a progressive party and we want to move forward. We are in a disadvantaged position but we want to resort to the constituency by saying, help us. You know? We are doing reforms, and why don't you come and help us out. We are so close to that. That's the second.

And I think the package itself can explain why every political party finds some way to agree upon those deals. Things turn out to be very different, and I need to mention the law role of Lin I-hsiung. Mr. Lin has been very respected, and even president Chen Shui-bian has been very, very sort of respecting. And he insists so much, and the last point of this is about that downsizing. I think the biggest problem facing the downsizing -- not in that to both or in that single district. Because when you downsize from 225 to 113, every seat means a lot, means a lot. And you allocate those seats to others. You find the disparity is even more severe in refracting to that 11 seats, guaranteed 11 seats. You spell out a problem like that.

MR. BROWN: Thank you very much.

DR. LIAO: Okay. Because Professor Yeh mentioned about each party finds a certain kind of position in the package of the constitutional amendment. Actually, each party is only two. There's KMT and DPP. KMT at that time wanted to kick out the People First Party, and also New Party, because under the previous system KMT competed with these two parties. And DPP wants to kick out TSU, Taiwan Solidarity Union, because they're a small party that competes with the same constituency. Then they kick them out. A small party altogether cannot influence anything at that time.

MR. BROWN: Okay. Alan?

QUESTION: Alan Romberg, Stimson Center. Thank you all for your presentations -- really interesting stuff.

I have a question for Professor Li and also one for Professor Liao. For Professor Li, you talk about the relationship between executive power and the procuracy. But executive power is divided between the president and the prime minister, and there have been accusations both during the Chen administration and during the Ma administration that the president has involved himself in ensuring that their prosecutions against opposition politicians, and President Ma has said, no, haven't done that, I'm not involved in this. And I think in the Chen administration you get the same denial of presidential involvement, and yet there's a feeling that on the part of those being prosecuted that, in fact, that is what's happening or has happened. I wondered if you would comment on that.

And second for Professor Liao, I'm not sure how to apply the concept of leadership to your breakdown between follower and breaker. Is it impossible to have strong leadership in this system? Is a breaker somebody -- I don't quite understand the concept of breaker, frankly, but my sense is that one of the issues in the Ma administration has been leadership and whether there is strong enough leadership to overcome some of the obstacles that the administration has encountered I wondered if I could draw you out a little bit on that.

DR. LI: Yeah, actually you raise a question about a part that I didn't have a chance to present. This relates to the prosecutor general. This is a position similar to the United States Solicitor General. It's the leader of the team of the prosecutors.

In the year 2006, the legislature has changed the Court Act to make the appointment process of the prosecutor general into one that is being appointed by the president, with the advice -- with the confirmation vote by the legislature. That really takes the prosecutor general away from the Ministry of Justice's supervision. That makes the same law that the new amendment -- the legislature established something we called a *te zhen ju*, a special investigation group and empower under the direct supervision of the prosecutor general with a mandate to make investigation of crimes by high-ranking officials. That is including up to the president.

And that law says, you know, the president appoints the prosecutor with the consent of the congress. So, the president is himself -- supposedly cannot or would not be able to direct the prosecutor and the prosecutor general has a term of three years.

Actually, it was the very prosecutor -- the first prosecutor general appointed under the new regime of law by President Chen Shui-bian who later prosecuted President Chen Shui-bian. And of course now this is now -- there is another existing prosecutor general.

What's the real function of these special investigations? People have different feelings about this, the function. That links to the issue of whether the prosecutor should become an independent institution. Some notion try to push for a similar notion of special or independent prosecutors in the United States. We know the American experience along that line for some years, and that was not adopted any more. But the concept that the prosecutor can be another



branch or similar function of judges helped the prosecutor try to present themselves to be independent from the daily executive powers.

So, you see a host of issues for debate along that line. So, that's why I put, eventually, a circle with a question mark -- whether the prosecutors can be separated from the executive power.

DR. LIAO: Okay. Thank you for Alan's question. I think maybe putting the other way maybe will make it easier to understand. Like in the Western way, American textbooks like to categorize different personalities. One is bureaucrats, the other is a politician. Bureaucrats means they follow rules all the time, and if they see anything within their jurisdiction, they just see all kinds of pattern-ized ways of doing things. But politicians, they basically are rule creators, not followers. Because they come into the Legislative Yuan or like here, Congress. They know how the legislation passed by them. So, they are different mentalities.

In Taiwan, I think -- I used the routine breaker and routine follower because not everything is put into words, not black and white. But some routines, some patterns -- in Taiwan, currently the president -- you can see Chen Shui-bian. He can do something unpredictably because he thinks, okay, if the rule didn't say it clearly, not by a white and black in words, then he can do whatever he wants. But Ma Ying-jeou will follow even with no words, and he still follows previous patterns. So, implicitly we call certain shallow institutions not by words.

So, there's a kind of big difference. In Taiwan, because Chen Shui-bian act too much, then people choose another one because it's a big contrast.

I think it's either for good or for bad. But in the situation of crisis, we really need someone who he or she would dare to break the previous pattern, like the typhoon that happen quite often in Taiwan during the summer. Who should come forward first to order the military people to rescue people in the villages? It's not so clear. It's the prime minister? The prime minister thinks, okay, the high commander of the military people is the president, so it depends upon -- under that situation it really depends upon leadership. To think about situations, you've got information, you make decisions, you move forward. Break the unclear rules.

That's the problem in Taiwan right now. Both personalities so far are really good persons, but not really that politician-oriented. That's my opinion.

MR. BROWN: Okay, thank you very much. This has been a very rich discussion. I have a question I'd like to ask but our time has run out. So, I'd like to ask all of you here to join me in thanking our panelists for an excellent presentation.

(Applause)

(End of Panel 1)

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## Panel 2: Politics and Society

RICHARD BUSH: May I ask you to take your seats? I think we'll get started. And I think this panel should be as interesting as the last.

JOHN FUH-SHENG HSIEH: Okay, let's get started. The previous panel, we talked about the institutional regiment in Taiwan and now we move on to the behavior side of the story, meaning that we will look at how people behave, how they interact with each other, and so on.

And we're talking about all different kind of players, of course, in the political game. And of course the two topics are related in some way, and behaviors in a democracy is, to some degree, would be conditioned by the political institutions and so on.

For instance, on the previous panel we talked about the electoral reform in Taiwan. The rule has been changed from the old so-called single non-transferable vote system to the new -- it's called the mixed-member majoritarian system, and similar to the kind of system used in Japan and so on.

So, that's an effect. The number of political parties, the political fortune of the political parties and how people -- actually, the politicians involved, how they are going to face their constituents and how they are going to interact among themselves and so on. So, all these scenario are related.

But of course, in terms of the behavior side, there are a lot of other factors which were in effect, players behavior too, and in addition to institutions, there are many other cultural, socio-economic, and so on. And just one example, for instance, for anyone who knows anything about Taiwan, you could not fail to notice the importance of the national identity issue, for instance -- people supporting independence and unification and so on, and so this kind of system will very much affect politicians and even the voters and so on in Taiwan's politics.

And we have three distinguished speakers on this panel to talk about the various aspects of Taiwan's politics in a society.

On my right is professor Shelley Rigger from Davidson College, and she's very well known in Taiwan politics in general and political parties, particularly the Democratic Progressive Party in particular, and I think she's going to talk about party or something on this panel.

And then another speaker, Mr. Erich Shih, he is really the kind of celebrity in Taiwan and he's a TV anchorman and very well known. I think he used to work for the TBBS, now working for CTI TV. And I suppose that he probably will talk about media and politics and so on.

And then we also have Eric Yu, from the National Chengchi University. He's an

associate with the Election Study Center and teaches at the political science department there. And he's also kind of a very unique background because his field is not only about Taiwan. Actually, he studied the state politics in the United States and so very unique mixture of the specialties.

And now we start with Shelley Rigger for 15 minutes.

SHELLEY RIGGER: Okay. Well, thank you so much. It's a pleasure to be here, as always, and I will, I guess, stay here in my chair because I don't have any PowerPoint to show you -- sorry about that -- which is probably a really bad thing today because my mind is so racing after listening to the wonderful presentations this morning that it may be difficult for me to maintain a coherent, straightforward train of thought without having the, you know, discipline of the PowerPoint, but I'll do my best.

So, the place where I want to begin today is just by saying, you do not want to be a Taiwanese politician at this moment. It is an unbelievably -- Larry mentioned earlier today the idea of the critical citizen or the critical citizenry. Well, Taiwan doesn't have a critical citizenry, it has a cranky citizenry, a crabby citizenry.

President Ma Ying-jeou was just reelected in January with a healthy share of the vote. His popularity and approval ratings are now down in like the teens. So, even a person who can win an election, cannot be liked or loved by anyone, and then you have President Ma's opponent, who couldn't even win the election.

So, you know, you really don't want to be a politician in Taiwan today. No one is popular.

And maybe Eric, you could tell us later if you would say the same thing about American politics, actually, that no one's popular here. I think this may also be true to some extent. So, this critical citizenry may be a global phenomenon, but it's certainly a phenomenon that is on full display in Taiwan.

And one of the consequences of this kind of general unpopularity of politicians of all kinds is that it creates some mysteries for us to wonder about and kind of unravel in Taiwan politics.

For example, in the first panel Professor Yeh was talking about the worrisome phenomenon of super majorities in the legislature under the new system and the fact that at one point the KMT and its allied parties had over three-quarters of the legislature which actually gave them kind of carte blanche to do all kinds of things including, perhaps, some of the very valuable and useful constitutional amendments that were suggested by the first panel, but they did not.

They not only didn't use their three-quarters majority to amend the constitution, they actually failed to pass a surprising portion of President Ma's legislative agenda. And I agree with my good friend Da-Chi Liao that party discipline is getting weaker and I think ideological

coherence in political parties is also getting weaker.

So, I think the very passion of the panelists and the enthusiasm of the panelists in the first panel really underscores the degree to which Taiwan's democracy is still in the process of maturing and it is very much a work in progress. And the pieces don't fit together right yet.

All of that is also true for political parties, and so where I want to kind of direct our attention today for discussion later, I hope, is toward two big factors that I think help to explain why this kind of feeling of unsettledness and upheaval and the inability of political actors to kind of drop into slots that are meaningful and desirable to the electorate in a kind of enduring way. I think there are two big factors driving that.

One is just a general problem of new democracies, the challenge of continuing to evolve the party system after the initial rounds of elections, so that it continues to reflect the preferences, which are also evolving in the electorate.

And I think, obviously, again -- American politics illustrates this well -- it's always hard in a democracy for political parties to keep up with new issues, to know how to situate themselves relative to changing events and changing preferences in the electorate, but I think there are particular aspects of this that are especially relevant to new democracies.

And then I think for Taiwan, in addition to the more general problem of party evolution in new democracies, is the specific problem of cross-strait relations as a kind of cloud hanging over Taiwan politics at all times, and a cloud that people have, in various ways and at various moments, tried to kind of blow away or get out from under, but this cloud follows Taiwan people wherever they go.

And the major consequences of the cross-strait issue hanging over Taiwan politics are pressure and uncertainty.

So, just to say a few words briefly about the general problem of political parties in new democracies. This really came home to me at another conference that Larry Diamond sponsored last year, the one he mentioned before on comparing political development and democratic consolidation in Taiwan and Korea.

And then, also this semester, I've been teaching a course, which is a comparative politics course comparing Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. And I've really begun to see a lot of similarity in the frustration of party leaders in Korea and Taiwan and the frustration of voters in South Korea and Taiwan with the difficulty of kind of getting parties to align with the meaningful preferences and the actual issues that are driving politics now, you know, 15 to 20 years after the democratic transition.

And I think part of the reason for this is that the original agenda on which political parties in Taiwan, as in South Korea, were formed, the initial cleavage was over political change: do you want democratization or not? So, the DPP was born as a party advocating for democratization, political change, and the KMT, during the early years of the democratization

process, was the party that was skeptical about political change.

Taiwan also had another item on the agenda. The DPP was asking for political change, democratization, the implementation of the ROC constitution, and so on, but the DPP was also asking for ethnic justice. From the beginning, the DPP had the demand that the so-called native Taiwanese, right, *ben sheng ren*, should be treated as full citizens within the Republic of China.

The democratization issue was actually -- the DPP basically won that fight very early on. KMT acceded to the DPP's demands for political change, institutional change, so, you know, the DPP got what it wanted and that left, as John has just pointed out, national identity, which is kind of where the ethnic justice issue grew into or what the ethnic justice issue grew into, left national identity as the major point of differentiation between the DPP and the KMT.

This had a couple of problematic effects going forward for political parties. One is that the original agenda of democratization and ethnic justice created alliances across other kinds of issue areas that have made it very hard for the DPP, and actually for the KMT also, to develop new positions on new sets of issues.

So, essentially, Taiwan politics is still very lacking in a left-right distinction. When the DPP tries to, as it has done in the past, be a kind of social democratic center left party, it unsettles its own base because its base includes lots of capitalists who are -- who wanted democratization, who wanted ethnic justice, who had a particular identity that aligned them with the DPP, but they're not crazy about, you know, like tax reform. That doesn't seem like such a good idea to them.

Similarly, the KMT is also facing, as it tries to raise some new economic items on its agenda, and we saw that this morning too, I think, in Professor Yeh's presentation, getting pushback from within the KMT, because the KMT too represents a range of interests across the economic spectrum that make it hard for the KMT to push a particular kind of economic agenda.

So, on economic issues, the parties are kind of paralyzed in how far they can go because the original basis on which they were constructed was not economic, but fundamentally political.

So, as the salience and usefulness of democratization disappeared, because Taiwan became a democracy, the DPP fell back more and more on national identity, and the argument I would make is that national identity is also becoming more and more problematic for both political parties, perhaps because, one might argue, the DPP has also, in some kind of fundamental sense, won this issue too, but like the issue of democratization, seeing the wind shifting in the DPP's direction, the KMT has moved along with it and the KMT, too, becomes a party that can manifest the right kinds of positions much of the time on the national identity issue.

I also think that for the first 10 to 15 years of Taiwan's democratic development after -- so, after 19 -- so, more like 10 years -- after 1987, when Taiwanese began going to the

Mainland, there were kind of two ways of thinking about national identity. One was, you know, do you sort of identify yourself as a Chinese maybe thinking that unification someday might be something that would make sense for Taiwan? Or do you identify yourself as a Taiwanese and really don't look at independence as something of interest to you -- or, sorry, don't look at unification as something of interest to you? And then there's the engagement, right, how do you feel about engaging Mainland China economically and socially in terms of people going back and forth, money going back and forth, activity going back and forth, versus a kind of skepticism about China which says, ah, you know, I want to keep that stuff to a minimum because it makes me nervous to think about Taiwan becoming too deeply involved with China?

So, for a long time, that sort of Chinese identity and that willingness, at least, to think about in theory the possibility, someday in the future, of talking about unification and pro-engagement, these things kind of aligned. And an unwillingness to consider unification as a possible future for Taiwan and that kind of Sino-skepticism also aligned.

I think what we see increasingly, especially with young Taiwanese, is that a strong Taiwanese identity is accompanying a pro-engagement attitude toward the Mainland, and that is a problem for both political parties because it makes it hard for the KMT to talk about unification, which is something that the KMT leaders sometimes think they need to do in order to be consistent in their own approach to their conversations with the PRC but also with Taiwanese people, and it's also problematic for the DPP because the DPP is then torn between its fundamental Sino-skepticism from its traditional base, and the need to appeal to a class of voters who are very Taiwanese in their identity but also pro-engagement in terms of the concrete policy preferences that they have for Taiwan in the future.

So, I think what we have is we have political parties that are kind of out of sync with the complex of preferences that they're facing in the electorate.

And it's not just ideological, it's also genuinely policy-oriented. You know, even if I agree with you ideologically, we don't necessarily share a view of how to get to our shared goal because—and this is my very last point—bottom line is, Taiwan is in an incredibly tight spot that is getting tighter all the time. Figuring out how to deliver the preferences of Taiwanese people, which are preferences for continued economic prosperity, good relations, that is to say, non-conflictual relations, with the PRC, without conceding much, if anything, in terms of Taiwan's sovereignty and autonomy is a very tall order.

So, I guess I would just conclude by saying, it's no wonder people don't like politicians. (Applause)

DR. HSIEH: Thank you. Let's turn to Erich Shih on media.

ERICH SHIH: Excuse me. I don't have PowerPoint with me today. Actually, I do not, but I just prefer standing while speaking.

And first of all, of course, I would like to thank Richard and Professor Diamond for first, inviting me to this conference and this is like a homecoming for me, because it's been

almost four years since I left Washington, D.C., but it feels just like yesterday.

And I was given the task of examining the functions of Taiwan's media, and I'm going to approach this issue by answering six questions. And the first question is, how have the news media evolved over the past 20 years? And I'll give you a quick summary. First of all, the 1980s and the 1990s, there is a lifting of martial law in the second half of the 1980s which led to the explosion, in terms of numbers of printed media. We have so many newspapers, we have so many magazines, and that exists in a very, very competitive environment.

And then early -- in the early to mid-1990s, we had the deregulation of the cable news media and for people who lived through that time, it was generally referred to as *di si tai*, the "fourth network," and of course in addition to the three major networks, Taiwan Television, China Television, and Chinese Television.

And then fast forward to the 21st century, we see a relative downfall of the printed media in terms of their ability to generate revenue, and there are a number of reasons. First of all, the economic performance in Taiwan was poor, it's as simple as that, in the 21st century. And second of all, the advertising revenue for Taiwan as a market has sort of went down and stagnated, and the yearly advertising market for communications industry in general is about \$2 billion U.S. or 60 billion NT, which is about the case for about 10 years.

And third of all, the advertising budget shifted from printed media to cable news operators or cable content providers, so it is harder and harder for newspapers to make money. In the past, before 1990 or before the 21st century, it was essentially a cash cow business, you print newspapers and you make money, but it was no longer the case.

And lastly, the cable news stations have become the primary source of news providers, and basically it is a unique Taiwan phenomenon, I would argue, and we'll talk about that later. And so first of all we see the relative downfall of the printed media, but also we have to pay attention to a newcomer, which is an exception to the rule and which is a success story, and that is the Next Media Group we are talking about: *Yi Chuan Mei Ji Tuan* And it includes Apple Daily and the Next Weekly tabloid magazine.

And the formula of their success is they're totally consumer-oriented, basically give what the readers want to read. And it includes, of course, among other things, celebrity scandals and government corruption and extramarital affairs of leading standing members of the society, and it's more like the *New York Post* Page Six on steroids. And it is basically what we have, which is the exception to the rule.

When the newspaper business and the magazine business is going downturn, we have this newcomer with a different perception of how to run the business and how to perceive what news really is and directly push it to -- deliver them to the consumers.

And this is the first question that I tried to answer, that the development of the news media in the past 20 years, and how do the media interact with the political system? I think there are -- it is, of course, no secret that basically in Taiwan all media takes a political position.



And for example, we have a news media whose position is already pretty entrenched or docked in, like the *United Daily News*, the *China Times*, and the China Television, and Formosa Television, *Min Shi*. And the position is well known: either you Pan Blue or you're Pan Green.

And there are also operators whose position is subject to the transition of power, of political power. For example, TTV, *Tai Shi*, it really depends on if the blue is empowered then it is generally a blue station. IF the DDP is in power, then it's basically a green station, which is also more or less the same for CTS, Chinese Television System, *Hua Shi*, until recently.

And also, in terms of political leaning of news media, we also have cable news operators, cable news stations. Basically, cable news operators, they are searching for a niche market as a function of advancement in technology, because when there are only three major networks, it's easy to understand that the chiefs of newsrooms, they're trying to focus -- trying to grab the biggest share of the pie.

But now with the advent and advancement of technology and especially cable news, and you have 100 stations and channels to choose from and you have 6, 8, 7 news channels that's airing news all day long, 24/7, then it is inevitable that you are no longer pursuing the biggest part of the pie, you are pursuing a niche market.

And a niche market, if I break it down, long story short, there are blue stations and there are green stations. And blue stations, for example, the ERA, *Nian Dai Dian Shi*, or Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, *Dong Sen*, and CTI Television, *Zhong Tian*; and TVBS -- they are considered pro-blue. And the pro-green stations are the Formosa Television, *Min Shi*; and SET Television, that is *San Li*. And it is kind of interesting to find that for cable news stations, the political standings is sometime -- is really a function of market force and you want to cater to the audience that you're going after. And probably 10 years ago, the blue-green split is about 60-40, and now probably 55-45, so you have a relative number of blue stations. You have maybe 4 blue stations and 2 green stations, and 4 blue stations will fight for 60 percent of the market and the 2 green stations will fight for the 40 percent of the market share.

But we also have an exception to the rule, a media that does not have any political leanings or, to hell with it, that is the Next Media Group. And the Next Media Group, it is suffice to say, that the -- for their -- the way they operate their success - the modus vivendi is by being nonpolitical and catering to the consumers, and therefore it is not as intellectually intensive as other newspapers, and this is what we have by looking at how do they interact with the political system.

And you have blue, you have green, you have "to hell with it," and for a variety of reasons deeply entrenched or given the political, who is in power, and of course then it's a function of market force and a search for your niche market.

And have the media improved in professionalism, the third question, independence, and impact? First of all, professionalism. Well, the professionalism of the media -- people who work in the media, professionalism is either stagnation or lower. The reason is very, very simple, which I'll talk about later. And it has a lot to do with the number of people

who's working for the news industry, and the number has remained relatively stable if not increasing a little bit, and that means, although a very competitive market, it does not weed away the weaklings or one of lesser qualities.

And also, inevitably, in terms of professionalism, people who, in the industry, their worldviews are not one of their strong suits, and in terms of understanding the United States or understanding the world, understanding the EU, well, probably not.

And in terms of -- and not many of the people who work in the industry have enough exposure of a foreign environment or a foreign media environment, and that is the constraint given by the -- what we see nowadays.

And in terms of independence, well, it's fair to say that there's less or none government control, especially in the printed media, and for the broadcasting media, that is a little bit different because there is a NCC, National Communications Commission, that oversees the electronic media, especially cable news stations, and usually the concern is one of a moral one, which means less body bag journalism, less sensationalization of news, and also it is independent in the sense that the viewers -- if you read newspapers or watching cable news channels, you have a wide range of political spectrum to get. And that means you can get a whole picture, probably, by looking at all the newspapers and all the television stations across the political spectrum.

But if you want to have a one shop for all or one stop for all kind of a media, you don't get it. You have to watch or read all of them.

And in terms of impact of the media, we finished professionalism, which is left a lot to be desired. And independence, well, it's independence in a different way, and in terms of impact, as a whole, it remains quite influential. And for printed media, even though it does not make a lot of money, but it is still initiate the daily news cycle.

And it is setting the issue, setting the agenda, and there is no question about it, and for cable news operators, it is basically doing the follow up of the news stories said by the major newspapers like the *Washington Post* or *The New York Times* or *The Wall Street Journal* here.

And the cable news does the follow up, or explore more deeply, or exploit certain stories that are said by the printed media, but on the other hand, even though political cable news stations do not have the wherewithal to really do big and substantial investigative reporting, one advantage is the political talk shows, and political talk shows we have talking heads being invited to the different channels and talking about political issues of the day, and they are influential in a way that, first of all, it has a strong impact on the powers that be, in terms of shaping or changing their policy position. And also, again, it has more or less an impact on tomorrow's edition of the daily newspaper. So, cable news is influential also in that way.

And also, in terms of a cable news impact, it has become very, very substantial. It is a unique Taiwanese phenomenon. For example, in the United States people don't watch

television news nor people read newspapers, and in Japan people read newspapers like the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, the daily circulation is about 11 million and *Asahi Shimbun* is about maybe 9 million, and for *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, it is about a million circulation a day.

And watching cable news television has become a daily routine and the chances are, if you go about strolling around the street and you go to see a mom-and-pop shop, and chances are there's a TV set hanging on top of the ceiling and the chances are, it is tuned to one of the cable news stations, and that's how the saturation of media and media influence comes from.

And is there a way -- is there a need to change the way media operates in terms of their professionalism, independence and impact? Of course, but it's virtually impossible. And long story short, first of all, there is no incentive to change the status quo because the people who are in the business most likely do not think there's anything wrong with it or there's anything you can do about it. And, secondly, in terms of the market situation, is we have an oversaturation of especially cable news channels.

And it is the number of cable news channels is unlikely to go down, and we have the next television belongs to the Next Media Group, which is vying for a position in the carrier, for example, while we see here, Comcast or Verizon FiOS, they are trying to build up a presence.

And also in terms of revenue and market share, because as I have said earlier, the annual budget is about 60 billion NT, \$2 billion U.S., and therefore everybody has only a small piece of the pie, and once you don't make a lot of money, it's difficult for you to reinvest in people, in equipment, so on and so forth.

And the perception of media's role over the years is, first of all, the tabloidization, which is championed and pioneered by the Next Media Group, and it doesn't matter whether you are more of an intellectual and a moderate newspaper like the *United Daily News* or *The China Times*; you are influenced by it and your coverage, to a certain extent, of certain news, is influenced by it.

And the same thing goes to, for example, *Liberty Times*. *Liberty Times*, of course we know, is pro-green, but their coverage sometimes -- well, actually, they have quite a strong coverage in terms of tabloid issues, and also the problem, aside from tabloidization, is the alienation of the upper crust of the society from mass media. And you hear very often that people who are of a higher education or of higher social status or standing, they will tell you, you know, we don't watch television, or we don't subscribe to cable services or we only watch CNN or English programming.

And lastly, what the government reform or industry changes may need to be considered -- well, long story short, given the fundamentals, first of all, the small market size and the oversaturation, which lead to any kind of substantive change, unlikely. And at the same time, because they are vying for such a small piece of pie, so the competition is fierce and cutthroat.

And in terms of government initiatives, the government is trying to put quality in the rating system, and they started to initiate a program, but we'll see how it goes because there's a lot of practical issues to be resolved.

And of course what the government can do is total deregulation of the market, for example, cable news, and which inevitably will lead to a consolidation and a consolidation means better resource distribution, but which, of course, given the political climate in Taiwan, it is not going to happen.

And in terms of a tighter regulation, you set a ceiling in terms of how many stations or channels are allowed or available in a given segment. For example, home shopping or variety shows or even news, well, it's not going to happen either.

So, in terms of industry, what the industry can do, long story short, of course, self-discipline, and we've seen the effect of that. And internal education, which is many organizations are doing that with different degrees of intensity and varying degrees of success and, of course, on job training, but, again, given the nature of the small market size and the fierce competition and the numbers of participants in the market, again, all the improvements are bound to be limited. And that's about -- that concludes my presentation. Thank you very much.  
(Applause)

DR. HSIEH: Thank you. The next one will be Eric Yu. He is going to talk about public opinion and elections in Taiwan.

ERIC YU: Well, I do need the PowerPoint. Okay, first of all, it is my great honor to be here and to make the presentation about Taiwan's election, and thank you, Richard, and thank you, Larry, it's always glad to see old friends here and also have such a great opportunity to meet new friends.

So, today I think I have been assigned the topics that relate to Taiwan's elections and Taiwan's democratic development. So, I know that with this audience, people won't -- people are familiar with Taiwan's politics and so I won't talk too much details about Taiwan's electoral politics, but I want to talk about one assignment that actually sometimes researchers neglect, which is the perception of the elections, and I do think that's kind of an interesting topic. Then I tried to find the data, because I'm a data person and to try to find the data to see, well, what kind of data that I can show to the audience.

Then I did find some data and I think it's interesting, so I would like to have this opportunity to share some data finding, data evidence with you. And I know that Larry probably will talk about the data about Taiwanese perceptions about democracy, then let Larry talk about that kind of broad issue. And I will just focus on two smaller issues that I will talk about, legislative elections and presidential elections.

So, first, I think Taiwan is kind of an election nation, right. So we do have elections 22 times over the past 20 years, since 1992, and almost every year we -- we have election almost every year except in 1997, 2004, and 2007, so that gave us a great opportunity,

because I work for election study center -- although I just came back to Taiwan for three years -- but that gave us a great opportunity to conduct surveys every year.

So, it's good to have funding to do surveys because we have elections, so that's also one of the benefits to have elections, at least for survey researchers.

So, one thing that we want to think about is the impacts of elections. Of course, election is kind of the essence of democratic development. And then I try to think what kind of -- if election, how election can be as, in academic jargon, can be an independent variable that effects Taiwan's democratic developments, and I noticed that, well, it seems to me that a lot of things are shaped by elections, and I will briefly talk about three major things.

One is a party system, and then political cleavage, and also -- well, in government system, because we know that, well, for example, like the elections in the mid-'90s, remembering that the Taipei's mayoral election was the first time that we saw the new party split from the KMT. So, elections, even the local elections, mayoral elections, make some kind of difference.

And in terms of political cleavage we do notice that the issue that divides the different parties and divide different camps, along with the ethnic identity, to the national identity. I think Shelley -- I always have great insight from Shelley's presentation and last time when I was at Stanford talking -- have a seminar with her, she mentioned that, well, it's kind of the transformation in terms of the China factor in Taiwan, so in the '80s, people talked a lot about ethnic identity. That's the China factor inward Taiwan, right, so we have Mainlander versus Taiwanese.

Then up to '90s, the late Lee Teng-hui periods, we start having a national identity problem that is also associated with the China factor, right, Taiwan becomes a solid nation to face China, and then it's kind of -- it's kind of China factored outward, it's not a kind of inward problem.

So, we do see the change of political cleavage along with the electoral politics. Then we also experience a government -- the divided government under Chen Shui-bian, which actually, as we saw of the elections, that is, we used the first past system for the presidential election, so we did have a minority president, and then we got a chance to experience divided government.

So, elections really shaped Taiwan's democratic development and gave us a lot of experience too about how we can have a stable political system and, again, although we have a lot of elections, but elections are still very important in Taiwan. We still have a relatively high turnout rate and elections are always unpredictable in a good way, not in a bad way.

And so, then we want to see the election matter or will elections matter in the future? So, in this talk, then I will briefly talk about -- try to -- I want to give you some insight from the viewpoint of the general public, so I will talk a little bit about Taiwan's public opinions on several key issues using the Election Study Center data, and then I will talk about the

perception about the change of electoral institution. Professor Yeh just mentioned about that, and I tried to provide another perspective about -- on the change of electoral institutions. Then I will talk about the perception of regarding the presidential election.

And so I think this as one of the research fellows from the Election Study Center, so I would like to share this kind of important data, historical data train. And I know that most of you who study Taiwanese politics are enough familiar with this data set.

This is partisanship dated back from 1992 up to 2011. So, we do observe that partisanship has been shaped by presidential elections. The green is the DPP line and blue is the KMT line. So, in the very beginning, before 2000, we do observe the increasing trend of the DPP. And up to 2000, the DPP remained kind of stable and KMT, of course, some up and down, simply because of those partisan splinters.

But I think the bottom line is that 2000 can be regarded as an important benchmark, and since then, if you add -- if you use the blue line and those small parties, small KMT splinters, you do observe the -- the kind of gap between the KMT and DPP. That's why people usually call -- that's the normal votes in Taiwan, in the sense that KMT has some edge over the -- over elections.

And about national identity, this is the question Shelley just talked about, the Taiwanese versus Chinese identity. No doubt about it, there is an increasing trend of the Taiwanese identity. So, I couldn't -- I don't see that the trend will stop anyway, but that's the effect that since 1992, we do see a lot of people starting to think about themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese or even both -- or not even both. That's a piece of evidence.

And the last thing is about the cross-strait relations, and two things we need to -- two things that I want to emphasize, is there is no market for unification, so both unification lines kind of decreasing, this is status quo, then unification for Mainland China, unify with Mainland China, this is the -- unify with Mainland China as soon as possible, but the bottom line is, no market for unification.

And we do observe a steadily increasing trend of the status quo. So, that gave both parties some kind of true strategy over the past 10 years, that is the sorting mechanism. And from the data, I think I had a paper about that, it's arguing that the KMT used to maintain the status quo to sort the supporters, and on the other hand, the DPP used Taiwan identity to sort the supporters. And beforehand, we do see that these two dimensions in national identity and cross-strait relations kind of conflate, but up to now, I do agree with the -- with Shelley's observations that they are kind of separate.

So, Taiwanese voters have different things to think about and Taiwanese identity might be an emotional feeling, but cross-strait relations includes -- when they think about cross-strait relations, they start to consider some practical issues and economic incentives.

So, again, it seems to me that both parties use different dimensions to sort their supporters and that's what we observe about Taiwan's party competition, especially over the past

decades.

And then, I think, there is something that I want to stress is asked by Professor David Brown last time when you visit the Election Study Center, you talked about, well -- well, people like to talk about national identity, cross-strait relations, what's the most important issues in Taiwan's elections? And I think the data from -- in the 2008 data and while I do apologize that I am not able to provide the 2012 data and it's still in the keying phase, and we will release it in two months.

So, at this time I can only use the data up to 2008, but in 2008, we think that -- the voters think that -- about 12 percent of the voters think economic development is the key issue, and cross-strait relations is number two, it's about 11 percent. And third important issue would be the political stability.

And I think I remember that when you came to the Election Study Center, my fellows also argued that economic development is usually the most important issue in the elections, and I'm not -- well, at least over the past few years, it's indeed the most important issue.

So, overall, two dimensions shape the party competitions, and people cared not only about those two dimensions, but also care about economic development. That's how we think about Taiwan's electoral politics.

And next, then I want to turn to the smaller issue, which is the Legislative Yuan election. I think Professor Yeh mentioned about the electoral reform in 2008, so I won't talk about it, and there's just some issues we want to think about -- is whether the new system can facilitate a two-party system, because there are more than 60 percent of the seats determined by the single member districts, and then we can use some formula to calculate the number of parties in Legislative Yuan dated back to 1992. And these are under SNTV system, and we do see that the number of effected parties, normally more than 2.5, but after the 2008, the effective number of the parties decreased significantly, especially in 2008. And this time, because we have two small parties, two minor parties, so the numbers just increase a little bit more than two.

But we want to reconsider whether it will facilitate the two-party system. Later on I will talk about is it good or bad to Taiwan.

And the major difference between the two parties from party's perspective is that under the SNTV, because it's multi-member districts, parties get to nominate multiple candidates, so the winning strategies try to nominate the right number of candidates, but under the current system, with a large proportion of the single member districts, the party needs to nominate the right candidates instead of nominate the right number of candidates.

So, that actually put the -- the two major parties become electoral machines, I will also talk a little bit about that. Well, I don't have time to share some of the data, but anyway, these are some data I drew from TDS, so for example, with the new electoral system, people think it's more difficult to elect ideal candidates because in the one-on-one election, you are not

able to vote sincerely sometimes, you need to choose the less -- your less disliked candidate. And also, they think that because it's a one-on-one election, it increases the division of our society.

And let me just skip -- about vote buying, it seems to me that it decreases a little bit, but not very significant. And compared with the old system, people don't think -- people actually don't like to go to vote because you only can -- you are not able to choose your ideal candidates, so that makes sense for me. And then we are -- it's about the quality of the legislative, but this is probably the question addressed in our major issues, these democratic elements. Some people think that it's actually better for Taiwan. And I need further investigation about the reasons, but that's the bottom line.

And then I want to briefly talk about the peoples' perception about presidential elections. And I tried to, because in 2004 we asked a set of questions, in 2008 we repeated those questions so we can do the comparison, and people don't -- do think that, overall, do think that the 2008 elections is a better one in terms of promoting ethnic harmony and in -- and you will be -- you won't be surprised that in 2008 people don't think the election is about Taiwan independence, but that means the electoral result will have no impact on peoples' opinion about Taiwan independence.

And 2008, more people do think that it improves -- the presidential election improved democracy comparing with 2004, and in 2004 you can see it's kind of controversial election. It did cause social instability and that reflects in public opinion polls. These are post-electoral survey results.

Okay, so, this is an assessment about the quality of elections. So, in this, more than 70 percent of the people think that the election is fair, so I think this is not 2012, it's supposed to be 2008. Okay.

Let me just address, just because I only have one minute -- let me just jump to the conclusion.

So, the bottom line is that did the election indeed reflect public opinion and shape party politics, and one of the questions that I want to ask is, did the new electoral system have broad impact? And I think Professor Yeh addressed the party competition. But the next question I probably want to ask, but I didn't get the chance to ask in the first panel, is whether the new electoral rule affects the balance between the executive and the legislative power. So, think about institution-wise, instead of a party competition, whether or not the new electoral rule strengthens the rule of the Legislative Yuan in the lawmaking process, or actually decreases its role in the lawmaking process.

So, I think that's kind of a -- I don't have the answer, so probably I need some experts on the Legislative Yuan to answer that question. And there are several slides I jumped over is to talk about performance, and I think in the recent elections, performance matters. The slides I want to show is that even though we know -- even though Ma Ying-jeou got reelected, but over time -- over his past four years, his bad performance indeed affect -- has a negative impact on other elections and people do think about economic development and do think about



the government's performance. So, it's not only about national identity, as people talked about before, but also the performance makes some difference.

And then there is a new institution, probably, I want to mention, is a bundle of elections. So starting from this time we try to bundle the presidential and Legislative Yuan elections and two years later, we will bundle all the local elections. With these kind of combined elections, national tie could play some significant role. Although I agree with Professor Yeh that 11 -- so, like for the Legislative Yuan elections, you start with 11 versus 0 in the very beginning. But if there is a big national tie in favor of the DPPs, who knows what will happen at the end?

So, that's the presentation I have and thank you for any questions. (Applause)

DR. HSIEH: Thank you. We still have about 35 minutes to go. Before opening up to the floor, let me just ask a question -- raise a question about national identity, around which both Shelley and Eric Yu, they discussed a lot. And in particular I was intrigued by the term used by Shelley, that is the third parties don't care that much about meaningful preferences. And I'm not so sure about what meaningful preferences are, but, of course, any society, when the parties emerge, mainly because people are different and for instance there are workers who want to have high wages, and so on, and then there are also the owners of the factories, they want to lower the production costs, lower the wages.

And these are diametrically different. It's hard to say which one is right or wrong, but as a result, of course, we see the parties emerge. One party, called the socialist party or labor party or something, and trying to represent the working class interests, and they also -- they can also win with some other party like conservative, and so they are trying to represent the owners of the factory. And these actually come naturally in many societies.

And then what happened in Taiwan, because we do see that even though in the elections sometimes people, as Eric just argued, that sometimes people may vote on the basis of performance, but generally speaking, if you look, the two major political camps are those political parties. The major dividing line remains, essentially, national identity. People are just different in terms of unification, in terms of independence or status quo and so on, and people come to the United States, actually, I taught in Taiwan for a number of years, and I remember that at one time one of my students came to see me saying that he's going to graduate. I said, congratulations. And he said that he is going to organize a socialist party in Taiwan. I said, good luck, I don't think you are going to succeed.

And if, indeed, those political parties are out of sync with the so-called public opinion or whatever, then how come no one else actually tries to form some kind of parties to attract the real voters? And my question is very simple, that is, is this really -- is this kind of a national identity cleavage not meaningful enough, or will there be some other alternative that we will see in the future? And I'm not so sure about this. I don't know whether Shelley or anyone else will have the answer.

DR. RIGGER: Well, one answer to the question about third parties, you know, we've seen a lot of information about third parties this morning already, and I think the moral of

the story is that there have been multiple attempts to create third parties that have foundered on, basically, the institutional problems. And that's, you know, under SNTV, there should be room for third parties, but you have this hegemonic KMT coming out of the authoritarian era that has the ability to dominate elections for the first several rounds. And so, to be a small party really puts you in the position of kind of the Japanese opponents to the LDP for 50 years. There's -- there has always been, in this system, a strong incentive to try to consolidate everyone against the KMT under a single flag, yet, nonetheless, in frustration, multiple third parties have emerged to try and kind of affect the direction of the political conversation.

And it's in some ways kind of really discouraging that in that kind of environment, what we get is an institutional reform that's designed to consolidate a two-party system. That is, single member district elections, because it makes it that much harder for that kind of third party or realignment to emerge.

In this most recent election in January, by far the most interesting economic platform was the one articulated by the PFP, which had a really interesting tax policy, really interesting kind of economic reform and kind of business reform, and I think it was because the PFP national campaign was so marginal that they kind of said to this one econ professor, you know, make up a platform. But the platform he made up was really cool and I thought, you know, if only the PFP could actually get big enough to raise these issues and put these issues into the debate.

Unfortunately, the way the system works, it's really hard to do that.

DR. YU: That's why I just raised the question to see, well, asked the question about whether we really want to have a two-party system, and indeed, with this -- with the current system, we won't be able to find a significant third party. We might end up having some minor parties, just like -- that resolved this election, but we won't have a significant third party at all.

But there's one concern, in 2008 -- 2009 I had conducted a survey asking about that kind of social issue, and at the time that the people really think that -- people don't like to be labeled as a socialist, or they do think that the government should not intervene in individuals' economic life, but it was a data in 2008 or 2007 -- it's not even 2009 -- but recently I think China factor also makes some kind of contribution in the social inequality issue.

I do -- I think those are post-electoral foreigners that are joining Taiwan. I did mention that Dr. Tsai Ing-wen's campaign also hinged on that issue, that is, well, when we engage more about -- with Mainland China, we do create some haves versus have-nots in Taiwan. So China factor may be related with the social inequality issue, and that may change the previous socioeconomic dimensions as political cleavage in Taiwan.

But I'm not sure about it. We will -- I want to see if -- how it develops and how it evolves. And maybe it's still about China, right, even though we do think social inequality is an important issue in Taiwan, but combining with the China factor, we might get back to the national identity issue again.

DR. HSIEH: Thank you. Now, I open -- okay, Larry.

LARRY DIAMOND: I'd like to ask about an issue that was in your slides, Eric, but that you didn't have time to really expand on -- you briefly alluded to it -- and that's the question of polarization.

So, the questions are the following: Number one, is the political system in Taiwan more polarized politically than it was 4, 8, 12 years ago? Number two, if it is more polarized, obviously it would be between the two political camps, but what's the basis of it? In the U.S., it's become more -- actually, more ideologically coherent in both parties and more militant. I mean, polarization implies poles. So, what's the continuum of divergence or opposition? Is it becoming ideological in the more conventional Western sense, which it has become in Korea, by the way? Or is it -- that is left-right -- or is it the national identity or ethnic identity?

But then you've suggested, each of you, that in some ways the edges have been softened of division on the cross-strait issue. And if there is growing polarization, I'll tell you, this guy there is responsible for it. (Laughter)

That's a joke to say that -- to ask Erich about the other part of the dimension here, which is there's a theory about politics in advanced industrial societies, and it's very, very prominent here in the United States, that a major reason for growing political polarization is the loss of a common space of dialogue and information. That is, the fragmentation of the media sector into what are called, both in terms of cable television and the Internet, and again with the Internet playing, apparently, a much more important role now in politics in Korea than it plays so far in Taiwan, but whatever it is, you spoke about it very dramatically in your presentation. You've got so many niche markets that everybody's living in an echo chamber of information and opinion, nobody is really kind of taking on a wider set of opinions and information and getting a more nuanced view of things.

So, is there polarization? And is the fragmentation of the media market part of the reason for it?

DR. HSIEH: Shall we start with the person who should be responsible for this?  
(Laughter)

DR. YU: Okay, and about polarization, I always argue that in Taiwan, although Professor Liao might say a different word about it, but I don't think polarization is a major issue in Taiwan, although I just put it on the slide.

Maybe politicians polarize, but not among general public. But recently we do observe some kind of change and -- well, so first of all, I always want to mention that the reason why there is no polarization is because two parties emphasize different dimensions, as I just mentioned, that the KMT just tried to say, well, they are also Taiwanese. So, they try to observe those supporters from -- that categorize themselves as Taiwanese, but also they focus on the cross-strait relations by arguing that they are the parties that want to maintain the status quo.

But the DPPs, on the other hand, although they -- previously, not this election, -- they try to emphasize that they are representative of Taiwanese, which is actually supported by the increasing proportion of voters, but the problem is that the DPP didn't kind of penetrate to the KMTC issue, which is the cross-strait relations. So, that's probably where we do see -- that's probably the reason to explain the success of the KMT's campaign in the 2012 election.

But the bottom line is, they are competing on two different dimensions, not actually polarized on any single ideological dimension. That's the thing -- that's one of the things that I observe, and the voters don't -- but politicians try to make some noise via the media and they try to paint that the two groups kind of polarize, and we always need to kind of differentiate division and polarization. So, now we only have two choices.

So, divisions kind of are -- political divisions are the inevitability between the two because we need to -- we only have two major parties. But does that necessarily mean polarization? I kind of suspect it about it, especially among voters.

DR. RIGGER: Yeah, I think that's a really good answer. And polarization and differentiation are two different things. Parties have to differentiate themselves, otherwise voters won't know what to do. But how do we recognize when differentiation is polarization?

But Dafydd Fell has written usefully on this topic making the point that both major political parties in Taiwan are divided between a faction that focuses on winning elections and a faction that focuses on maintaining a kind of ideological purity. And I think this year in the DPP you saw just full out warfare between those who said the goal of a platform and strategy is to win the election and those who said, if winning the election requires selling out our core ideology, we don't want to win. I mean, I don't know that they actually said "we don't want to win," but they talked themselves into believing that they could choose purity over other goals and they did, and, you know, so I think Dafydd's argument, although he applied it to elections in the '90s, is still very useful now.

DR. HSIEH: Erich, do you want to say a few words about media?

MR. SHIH: Well, it is interesting regarding the national identity issue, the political polarization, and also the practicality of the electorate as a whole, and in the past I have -- I firmly believed in -- that if a society is divided, it's divided as an entire one. There's really no future to speak of unless you have that fundamental question resolved. It is like the Civil War in the United States. If you don't have a Civil War or the ending of that Civil War, you cannot set forth a fundamental path for the nation, and hence, the developments in the United States as we know today.

In the past, I firmly believed in this struggle between the two, and the status quo or unification, and/or a push for a Taiwan identity and Taiwan independence, and it was, of course, fueled and helped, aided and abetted by the news media, and especially political talk shows and in newspapers with a strong ideological leanings and also the radio talk shows.

These are all very important and we've seen the combination of all of these three during Chen Shui-bian's years between 2000 and 2008. But I think ironically, I think, it is also because of President Chen and his policy of division or his politics of division that actually made most of the people realize that in eight years, people realized that the ideology you championed, that is Taiwan identity and especially Taiwan independence, is not going to work.

And it only took eight years to spend -- it only took eight years for people to become disillusioned about the idea that you believed in for your whole life. It's really remarkable. I mean, usually it takes a generation or two, but in President Chen's case, well, he really pushed it to the brink, and people realized that in eight years, your policy and what you believed in is not going to work.

And that, interestingly, leads to the practicality of the electorate. People are still -- believe in national identity, you have your own views and I have mine, and people are still polarized, because watching a political talk show or reading newspaper editorials or listening to talk radio is like group therapy. It is essentially like group therapy. If you're pro-blue, you don't listen to the radio talk show on the green station or the political talk show in green television stations, or you just don't read *The Liberty Times*, and vice versa.

DR. DIAMOND: I don't watch Fox News. (Laughter)

MR. SHIH: But I think Taiwan is not -- is small to -- is not big enough to set its own agenda and it is small enough to feel that the surroundings, and especially the influence of Mainland China, on real terms, in practical terms, have on the daily lives of Taiwanese people or people in Taiwan.

And so, therefore, even though you have national identity issues remaining to be solved, you have polarization that is still in existence, but the 2012 election really manifested the practicality of the electorate, that is, we can set aside those very important issues, but those issues are still very important, but they are not on top of the priority list, they are not on top of the to-do list.

And so, this is, in a way, is a legacy, one of the biggest legacies left by President Chen, is it took eight years to destroy a dream, and for people, in eight years, to become very, very practical. Thank you.

DR. HSIEH: Yeah, but I think the word 'civil war' is probably too strong and of course there has been some kind of hostility between the two camps and so on, but I think Taiwan is still in much better shape than a society like Northern Ireland, for instance. In Northern Ireland, at least before the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, you are either in the UK or in the Irish Republic. It's hard to find the compromise position.

But at least in the case of Taiwan, between the so-called independence and there's something called a status quo, so that's probably not the best choice for many people, but that's the second best, the kind of option they can live with. That's also why, even though there seems to be some kind of hostility when people -- when you turn on the TV and so on, but you talk to

the people in the streets, you don't really feel that way, and you also don't see casualties in the elections or something. At least Taiwan's elections have been very peaceful, very smooth.

And I think that's probably -- I take a little issue with Erich here, that is, you know, it's kind of a hostile situation somewhat, but generally speaking I think Taiwanese society is still quite peaceful and somewhat harmonious.

DR. YU: Can I add one evidence of polarization? There is also one thing that I want to share with you is about how both parties solve the intraparty competition, and that's the way to think about where the parties are ideologically. And I think both parties now use the polling primary to decide their candidates, the candidate for Legislative Yuan, and this is a way to delegate your power to the general public to decide your candidates, so both parties tend to become a political, electoral machines.

So, in that case, how could you expect that the parties try to maintain this ideology, keeping in mind that those polling primaries usually takes place in those parties districts, because multiple candidates want to compete within the party, because once he or she can win the nomination, he is surely -- he is kind of guaranteed to win the general election.

But even in that kind of case parties try to use the polling primary to, number one, try to find someone who is really electable, second, to resolve the intraparty conflict.

So, you can -- if a party is willing -- if both parties are willing to delegate their own power to the general public to decide their candidate, so I don't think that the parties are kind of ideologically driven. They are mainly focused on winning the election rather than to elaborate, say, on some ideology.

DR. HSIEH: Thank you. Next question. Yes.

QUESTION: Hi. Nadia Tsao with *The Liberty Times*. I just have a question for Shelley. You just mentioned you got a study on Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, and we know that in Taiwan's democracy, China is a given factor, like, you know, constitution reform is restrained by China factor. But could you tell us, when you do the comparison, what's the common ground or similar question that Korea, Japan and the Taiwan face? Because they're just different, you know, environment, but we also see their similarity that no system or politician or party can satisfy their voters, and they seem to face similar problems. So, could you give just a very simple analysis? Thank you.

DR. RIGGER: The question takes us a little afield from the day so I'll try to be brief. One thing that I think is very interesting that unifies those cases is the idea of being an abnormal country, which doesn't sound very nice, but is actually a kind of discourse that's used in the region, that Japan is an abnormal country because it doesn't have a military, it doesn't take responsibility for its own fate in the way that countries typically do. Korea is an abnormal country because it's divided. And Taiwan is an abnormal country because it is either divided or it is still in an ambiguous relationship that makes it impossible to resolve itself.

So, I think that in each of these countries there's a kind of transcendent debate that hangs over all other issues, and I was really interested in how Eric -- I copied down one of his slides that said that behind the economic issues, we see China's role, and I think behind a lot of issues in Korea, we see the problem of unification and the problem of unification, which often manifests itself in the debate, actually, about Korea's relationship with the U.S., not with North Korea.

And in Japan, behind a lot of issues, is the problem of, are our economic troubles somehow prompted by or created by our failure to be a normal country, right, someone like Kobayashi Yoshinori, the manga artist who also writes about Taiwan, he wants to say all of our problems can be traced to our masochistic outlook toward history.

So, you know, I think in all of these places you have some really interesting issues that kind of overhang the standard kind of economic policy stuff.

And then the other big similarity that I have fun with my students is electoral reform, and party building, and what we see is that all three countries do kind of similar electoral reforms in an approximately similar timeframe with very similar objectives, which I would argue, in all three cases, are slowly materializing. So that as a political scientist, you know, some of us speculated about what kind -- what would be the kind of output changes associated with particular institutional reforms, and we're actually being proved mostly, kind of right, at least in terms of all three countries settling into two-party systems, that are more and more focused on economic issues and -- but with these weird overhangs. So, those are the things that I see.

DR. HSIEH: Thank you.

QUESTION: Gerrit van der Wees of *Taiwan Communiqué*, again, I had a question for Eric Yu. You talked about the increase of the status quo. About a year ago, TVBS had a poll, which showed that -- answer to the question, if you had a choice about issue preference, and then the support for independence is like 68 percent, so isn't the status quo really an artificial construct shaped by the Chinese cloud that Shelley was talking about?

I also had a question for Erich Shih. In your whole presentation about news media in Taiwan, you did not discuss the increasing Chinese influence on news media. There has been a lot of talk about that, embedded advertisements, the ownership of news organizations like your own and like *Want Want* by parties directly or indirectly controlled by China, a lot of additional news broadcasts on the radio, AM frequencies from China over the past year. So, what is your view on the encroaching influence of China on media in Taiwan?

DR. YU: By the way, are you talking about those conditional questions asking if, for example, like if Taiwan could be an independent country if China won't attack Taiwan?

QUESTION: The question was, if you have a choice about issue preference: independence, unification?

DR. YU: Right. I do agree with you that if people have preference under certain

conditions and you do observe a lot of people who will support Taiwan independence, that's for sure, and those questionnaires are also included in multi-poll academic research.

But the problem is that in those questionnaires, we always kind of give that condition as a certain environment, but in fact, those conditions are not certain environment, right? So, that's why people try to put themselves in a safe way by arguing maintaining the status quo, because, number one, they are kind of ambiguous about the two different values -- should I pursue the economic interests in China or should I maintain my soul in the sense that to maintain myself as a Taiwanese.

So, they are kind of ambiguous between the two different values and they are uncertain about certain information, for example, if Taiwan claimed independence, does China guarantee attacking Taiwan? Maybe not, right, but although they try to -- China has always tried to make such arguments.

But there are a lot of ambiguous and uncertainties among -- in the cross-strait relations. So, when you have the questionnaires, the fixed conditions, well, of course people are easy to answer those kind of questions and are willing to express their deep feelings, but that's not an ideal world at all. The ideal -- that's only the ideal world. The real world is that people are not -- are ambiguous about different values and uncertain about information. And that's why people try to settle as the status quo.

MR. SHIH: Well, I think the 68 percent question is both real and is moot. The reason is very simple, is because we live in the real world, and that is a question that is not based in the real world or real circumstances or -- for example, if you asked a Pole -- the Poles, the Polish people, back in the 1920s, do you want to eliminate the Soviet Union? Yeah, 90 percent would say yes. Do you want to eliminate Germany Weimar Republic? Ninety-five percent would say yes. And if you asked the British, back in the late 1980s or early 1990s, do you want Germany to remain divided? Well, 95 percent would say yes.

But it doesn't matter, it's a moot question because we live in a real world and you have to consider the course of action and the choice you make, and thus the result of what we see today, Taiwan being what Taiwan is.

And secondly, with regarding to the increase of Chinese influence, and first of all, I have to say, these are my personal views and it is in no way representing the organization that I work for -- this is a disclaimer -- but I think it is fair to say that the influence by Mainland China is proportionate, by and large, to its standing in the world.

And I remember when I was a reporter back here in Washington in the mid-1990s, if you read the daybook by Reuters or by the Federal News Service, you hardly see a word about China. And then, remarkably and unbelievably, the word China started popping up, popping up, popping up, and nowadays we're not talking about China as a -- as if whether it will become a great power. It has already become a great power. You're not talking about, should we engage China or should we contain China, we have to engage China and it's just a matter of how we deal with it.



And Washington is one of the perfect examples, because this is a center of the world and it reflects the power distribution of the rest of the world, and if China becomes a big issue in Washington, then it is a big issue in the rest of the world. And in that case, I think it is only fair to say that China's influence on Taiwan in the news media is proportionate to China's influence on any other society, be it in Pakistan, be it in South Korea, or be it in Japan, or be it in the United States. And you just look at it differently, but the influence, as the People's Republic grows stronger and bigger, it will become a part of your calculus.

And it is very simple and it has nothing to do with whether you like it or whether you don't like it, it's just a fact that is there, that you have to be aware of, and that you have to deal with.

DR. HSIEH: Okay, we have only about two minutes left, so let's have a very brief question and a very brief answer.

QUESTION: Thank you, my name is Genie Nguyen with Voice of Vietnamese Americans, and thank you Mr. Shih, and you, for your very candid answer, personal view. And let's be real. So, my question is the status quo that Taiwan has tried to maintain.

From everything that you just presented, is it real? Can it ever be real to stay status quo? And for that, the democratization of Taiwan, can it ever be true? So, back to the fact that you admit that, China is there in Taiwan and everywhere in that part of the world. So, the recent election –

DR. HSIEH: Could you be brief?

QUESTION: -- so the recent election, the result was already decided for Ma to win before we even have an election. So, then, come back to the global situation, especially with Dr. Rigger and her book about Taiwan, small island but global power, how would Taiwan see itself in the context of the southeast Asian sea? Because Taiwan plays a key role in that. So, with that, would you ever be status quo if China wanted to take over Taiwan, just because of that position in the South China Sea?

DR. HSIEH: Okay, thank you. Okay, very brief, 30 seconds -- this is direct to Erich, right? Yeah.

MR. SHIH: Well, I'll try to give you a very, very brief answer. The status quo in Taiwan is a slowly evolving proposition and such can be compared to the socioeconomic transformation of Mainland China. And honestly speaking, we don't know what China's going to be in terms of -- put economic development aside -- in terms of a political system and how it's going to evolve and the one-party rule. We just don't know.

And both sides are evolving, and so the outcome of the interaction of the two is really is very, very difficult to judge, and you can claim that China is getting bigger by the day, and so if it wishes to use force to resolve the Taiwan issue, then, yes, China can. But you can

also argue that China does not have the wherewithal to initiate a military strike to resolve the Taiwan issue without breaking down its own society first.

And so you also have a different proposition that is gaining in popularity, that Taiwan's democracy, Taiwan's path to democracy and development, has become a role model for the Chinese society as a whole, and one is getting more optimistic that given the stable environment that China needs for itself to grow, Taiwan would become more and more influential, not in terms of how powerful a military it is or how powerful economically it is, but what Taiwanese society of Chinese roots that adopt democratic electoral system that actually works can go a long way of impacting the future of domestic politics on the Mainland.

And so, on both sides, it's gradually evolving, so it's really, really difficult, if impossible, to make a judgment and saying that, well, this will be the end of it or that will be the end of it. We just don't know.

DR. HSIEH: Thank you. That's the time is up, so we have to stop, and let's thank the speakers for their excellent presentations.

(Applause)

(End of Panel 2)

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### Panel 3: Implications of Democratic Consolidation

ALAN ROMBERG: I think we've been treated to an especially rich set of comments and analyses this morning, for which I certainly am grateful and from which I learned a lot. In essence, this session is sort of the "So what?" session. Right, so, what are the implications of this? What does this mean for foreign and domestic policy? What about the perceived legitimacy of the system?

And for this, we have three outstanding presenters. I'm not going to go through their bios even really in short form. I think you all know them.

Professor Ho Szu-yin, who's one of the leading academics in Taiwan on domestic policy, including public opinion, as well as having served in the National Security Council. So he has a lot of experience in government beyond his academics.

Richard Bush, who has been in and out of government, can't hold a job, although, he's been here 10 years, I see, so, that's pretty good -- who will talk about foreign policy and the implications of that. Here, of course, is the director of CNAPS, the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies.

And Larry Diamond, whom you all know, as along with Richard, a cosponsor of this program, where from his position as the director for the Center for -- it's a mouthful, Larry -- Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

LARRY DIAMOND: If you want to endow, we'll shorten it to the Romberg Center. (Laughter)

MR. ROMBERG: We can negotiate. And, as I understand it, Larry, you're going to focus on your Asian Barometer and as part of that, how democracy is perceived by those living in it in a democratizing system.

One comment I can't help but make at the beginning of this is to go back to something I think it was Shelley who said this morning, which is that democracy in Taiwan is a work in progress. Maturing is adjourned. It's an ongoing thing. It's certainly flourishing how mature it is at this point; I think is something that we might talk about and particularly in thinking about how it affects policy. But, anyway, without further ado, let me just go in the order which I mentioned and start with Ho Szu-yin talking about domestic policy. And, as I understand it, we've got about 15 minutes if you need that much, and if you don't, you don't have to use it.

SZU-YIN HO: Okay, thank you.

When I was preparing my talk and my organizing concept, there was Economist Arthur Okun's *Equality and Efficiency*. Arthur Okun was the top economic advisor to President Nixon, so his book was a must for fellow graduate students of my generation. So, I'm going to use those two concepts: equality and efficiency.

There's no question. Before Taiwan's democratization, the emphasis of the KMT authoritarian government, you know, was efficiency. And the efficiency, the achievement of efficiency now was based on agreement and political arrangements arbitrated by the KMT at the top of the two power structures.

Now, one power structure was dominated by a very able, very competent men like K.T. Li, should I say authoritarian bureaucrats. They did a wonderful job in growing Taiwan's economy. Then the other power structure now was formed by the local factions in coalition with the KMT central party. And the power arrangement between these two was the local factions should provide all the power needed by the bureaucrats, who would grow Taiwan's economy and share the benefits now with the local factions. And this major exchange was the rock bed of -- should I say, the political foundation of Taiwan's economic growth.

With democratization, starting in late 80s, this great arrangement, power arrangement, was totally overwhelmed. The bureaucrats could no longer take for granted the support from the local factions and the local factions simply didn't have incentive enough to be supportive of the KMT, thus, a lot of important governing decisions really could not be delivered.

So, from that, I observed then some change in the rules of the game, and most of this observation was garnered when I was in the government, and this is how I perceive foot soldier in politics. Not necessarily myself, the high bureaucrat, in the face of legislative interpolation, any legislator, whether in whatever important committee, high echelon of the decision-makers or lobbyists for any particular specific special interest group. I made all this on-site observation. I took a lot of notes to observe their behavior, and I feel very fortunate to that in serving the government for that two years.

So, the first changed rule was to level the playing field. In the past, before the democratization, in the power arrangement I just mentioned, the state capital and the businesses could really not dominate, say, environmental protection interests. And -- but this is not the case anymore. The environmental protection groups now could use the environment impact assessment to really address, now, their concerns. If they couldn't get their way, they could easily mobilize and concern the local people, especially in the development of industrial parks or the coastlines. So, this has become a leveled playing field, and so happen to say Awakening Foundation, which is a women's rights advocacy group.

For this talk, I interviewed -- it's a present colleague of mine in the university. She talked about how the Awakening Foundation could use the newly opened political process to pass a major piece of legislation. Simply, it made the coalition with simple (inaudible) within the agencies, with legislators, with politicians, and then immobilized mass support for its causes. Now, a wonderful story, and this is what I say a leveled playing field.

The second change of the rule of the game was what I'd call an unsafe margin, particularly American politics jargon, argued enough by (inaudible). So, basically, the legislators would feel that they are extremely unsafe electorally, and, so, I made some calculation.

For the 2012 legislative election, all of the 73 -- Professor, you had mentioned that right now, we, Taiwan, have 73 electoral legislative seats. Only 11 percent of them were decided up by less than 1 percent of the constituency votes and 15 percent was decided between the 1 and the 5 percent. So, it can be said to be moderately safe. And 75 percent of the election of the legislative seats was decided by 5 to 10 percent, which means 75 percent of the legislative seats can be regarded as quite safe, yet, the legislators feel that they are unsafe at any margin. Thus, the legislators can be easily subservient to interest group pressure, whatever, they perceive the pressure.

Thus, Da-Chi mentioned earlier this morning, that party discipline, or should I say party coherence, is on the decline. This is because this electoral connection, they just don't feel safe. And then, of course, there is this -- what I'd say hyperactive media, as introduced by Erich Shih, and from the government perspective, in the government, we know very well if any Wednesday -- Wednesday is the day of the Next Media, when they publish weekly tabloid.

So, if the theme of that issue of tabloid was a celebrity's extramarital affair, people in the government would say "Phew" -- you will be safe for the week. (Laughter) And so, really in daily operation, Wednesday is the watershed of that working week, and then if something else pops up, say corruption of government officials or some scandal by a government official especially in the central government, then the government will have to spend a lot of time to -- usually the meeting starts on Wednesday morning, 6:30, to prepare for, say, clarification, all sort of things, and you need to spend a lot of time in dealing with media. However, the media wants to report the government dealings. So, that was very time-consuming, energy-consuming exercise.

And then there is just what I'd call autumn politics or outside-in politics. I'll give you one example. Now, in 1995, the UN has this Women's World Conference. This is annual conference, and in 1995, that particular conference passed some declaration regarding women's rights and whether it's (inaudible), work pay and all these things, and then the Awakening Foundation together with its sister organizations picked up the momentum, put pressure on the government agencies and mobilized a grass roots supports, and then, some changes later, there was this major piece of legislation regarding the women's rights.

And this outside impression is very, very important. Of course, China and the United States could exert such influence implicitly or explicitly, and this is the daily situation the government has to face. Thus, given this daily grinding faced by the government officials, there are two sets of consequences as I observed them. First thing is there is inflation in government.

That is -- I'll give you several examples. There's an over-building of infrastructure projects all under the name of egalitarianism or equality, as I earlier mentioned. Right now, Taiwan has 11 airports and we have only 14,000 square miles. So, I calculated this morning. This means for every 1,200 square miles, we would have one airport and that is 36 miles. So, you can imagine from here to Alan's house, we can have an airport. (Laughter) So, this is definitely inflation measure of governing.

Then we have after building of these airports, we have this high-speed railway and they're taking away the business of these airports. And then we have numerous exhibition centers. Sometimes, a county or a city could have two.

And then auditoriums. When I was preparing my note last week, I encountered a report saying that within six miles of the Gueishan City Government, there are four first-class auditoriums. So, so much for the infrastructure. (Laughter)

And then there's, of course, overbuilding of universities. We now have 163. It's easy now for any high school graduate or high school student to be registered in any university. In the university, he can do well. So, the high school graduate registration rate in the university now is 92 percent. So, that basically now cheapened the degree -- the college or university degree. That's why we are having so many graduate students, and I believe and my colleagues from Taiwan are seeing more and more graduate students now.

And then we are overbanked. We now have 37 banks, and, of course, all these numbers were the result of the rapid democratization in the early '90s.

But, on the other hand, political life is getting better. As I suggested, we now have better environmental protection, better protection for women's right. We have better health care, and we have better social safety, social security, and have less vote-buying. We have better justice, as I mentioned earlier this morning. So, we do see some political aspects, some aspects of our political life are truly improving.

So, I just said there's one set of outcomes of rapid democratization, mainly in monetary terms, but then there's another set of outcomes. What I generally put it at, under the umbrella of governing, effects for governing. So, I'm now seeing a gingerly moving bureaucracy. In the past, bureaucracy was very active at the least, and based on what I read, from the autobiographies of say K.T. Li or (inaudible). But now, the bureaucracy is quite timid, largely because they are under tremendous constraints. Then I also see a legislative politics. When I say I saw, it's basically any politician, what is seen in his daily life or a bureaucrat for that matter.

Now, legislative politics, that impresses more, whether it's, should I say showmanship, rather than deliberative efficiency. And then I also see the decline of political trust and advocacy. The TDS of election studies, and, oh, by the way, when I asked the Election Study Center -- and Eric is a part of it -- to provide me some data, and I was asked to give some advertisement for free. (Laughter) And then my university's election study center is probably the best and it is the best, and then I got this data from them.

So, there are measures now for external efficacy, and no need to explain that term. So, people were asked: Do you think the government would waste tax money? Now, in 1992, the number was 57 percent; in 2008, 79 percent. Then the question: "The government really doesn't care what I think." 2001, 36 percent and 2008, 49 percent. "The policies adopted by the government really do not take care of people's welfare." In 1992, 24 percent; 2008, 44 percent.

And then the “Most things done by government are incorrect”: ’92, 42 percent; 2008, 72 percent. So much for the external advocacy.

And then for internal efficacy, we ask: “Politics is just too complicated for me.” 2001, 65 percent, and this one actually is pretty stable; in 2008, 72 percent. And for “A person like me, I cannot influence government”: 2001, 30 percent and 2008, 37 percent. Internal efficacy really doesn’t change that much, but when it comes to political trust, it’s even worse than the external advocacy, political trust.

“I don’t believe now what the government says.” Now, in 1992, 21 percent. In 2008, 59 percent. That’s why the government, when I was in the government -- and the government still does that -- we just kept telling people now, we are doing this for this, but people just believe otherwise. No, can’t do much.

DR. DIAMOND: (inaudible)

DR. HO: Oh, yes. Thank you, Larry. And but then the interesting thing is, presumably, high advocacy or high political distrust would lead to a low political participation rate, and I used the legislative election turnout rate, and I just found that the LY turnout rate declines not as sharply as the political trust or political advocacy.

So, the turnout rate, in 1992, it was 72 percent, which actually, was very good, but in 2008, it’s down to 59 percent. That’s still not bad compared to American congressional election. And then actually now when I was preparing this talk and I saw a lot of similarities between American politics and the Taiwanese politics, but, unfortunately, Taiwan is too small, too new as a democracy. Thus, and now we are facing barriers or facing problems that the United States now spent over two centuries to find out some possible solutions, and we are very much compacted.

So, several things down the road. The first thing is now you can imagine both the United States and China will exert still more influence on Taiwan. For the U.S., the beef issue -- you can imagine that. And for China, various issues, especially economic issues.

Now, I would say that economic issues with China have always been some security concerns, as well as some truly interesting economic concerns. Now, that is what we call Samuelson theorem in economics. I’ll skip that. So, that’s one thing, more outside influence in Taiwan’s politics.

Then the second thing I’m most concerned with is crisis management capability of the leadership, including not just the president himself, but also the top legislators, and the capabilities of the institutions.

We heard this morning to deal with crisis. If the crisis, I suppose, is acute enough, there might be some rallying around the flank mentality, helping the government to overcome institutional deficiencies. But if the crisis is chronic and then I would get the same kind of sinking feeling when I was in the government.

The third thing is, what I have here is we -- okay, I'll be done with this one -- that is up until this point of time, Taiwan's democracy has the fortune of having a quite robust economy, but what if economy really goes down? What if the world economy really slows down? That would, of course, influence Taiwan's export markets, and Taiwan's economic growth would go down, as well. Now, remember, exports account for over 120 percent of Taiwan's GDP. So, we can be subject to the trade winds in the world economy and bad economics can really, really bring out bad politics. So much for my talk. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. ROMBERG: Thank you. Richard?

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much. First of all, I'd like to rectify names. We should have entitled my part of this external policy, not foreign policy. So, it's more neutral. Second, a disclaimer or a statement of humility. It's a bit presumptuous for an American to comment about another democratic system, even when our democratic system is working well. But ours is not working well. I would just cite the title of a book that my colleague Tom Mann and Norm Ornstein of AEI just published. The title is *It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism*. I think they're worried. But it's my conference, so, I'm going to make a few remarks, and I don't even have survey data like Ho Szu-yin and Larry Diamond.

We've seen a couple of recent cases that exhibit how the public or parts of the public in Taiwan have an impact on the island's external policy.

First of all, there was that case in October last year, where President Ma -- I think in a moment of candor -- told the public that in the next 10 years, we may actually do a peace accord with the mainland, but it's going to be under these conditions. And he was then very quickly roundly attacked by all in sundry, and there were charges that he was selling out Taiwan and so on, and his ratings in the polls declined, and there was some concern that he might lose the election for that one remark alone.

And more recently, we've had the "One country, one China, two areas" comment of Honorary Chairman Wu Po-hsiung in Beijing, and that set off another flurry of public comment and public criticism. And then to be a little parochial, we have the issue of American beef, where, since President Ma's election, there has been a lot of criticism of his intention to solve this problem. And that's only the latest manifestation of this beef issue; there are two others that come before it. And I could go on and on.

But what we seem to have here is a deep rift between policy on the one hand, how government seeks to use its resources to achieve certain goals, and politics on the other. The one is deliberative and whether government officials come up with good policies or not, I believe they're trying their best, and then the political reaction to it, which is sometimes a little hyperventilated. And in each case, you have legislators, you have people in the media, you have the opposition parties, you have civil society, attacking the administration and its policies. As I say, often in a hyperventilated way.



Now, on the other hand, let's be clear, this is what we expect in a democracy. We expect those who oppose a policy to express their opposition in whatever ways that they can. It's up to the executive to be accountable for the policies it pursues and to justify them. In Taiwan itself, we all understand the anxiety that the public or some of the public feels about China, and this is based in part on a history that at least some people still remember.

On the other hand, it's not always clear that the criticism that we hear, on issues like American beef or peace accord and so on, have a sound basis in fact or good sense. So, is ractopamine, in small quantities in American beef or anybody's beef, really that dangerous? And at least some good science suggests that it's not dangerous. Were the warnings against the peace accord that credible when you take into account Ma Ying-jeou's conditions? I mean, I actually thought that the conditions he laid out pretty much made a peace accord impossible, but nobody seemed to pay attention to that. (Laughter)

Now, I must admit that I'm torn here and that I've created a contradiction for myself because on the one hand, as an American who on the beef issue is sympathetic to the administration and the actually believes that ractopamine in American beef is not the sole issue -- shouldn't be the sole issue in U.S.-Taiwan economic relations. In fact, there are other ones that are more important. I also believe that Taiwan's democratic system, generally, is its best defense against misguided policies towards China and is also the best mechanism for encouraging Chinese restraint.

So, how do we resolve this conflict? The answer, I think, lies in thinking more clearly by those concerned about the substantive basis for criticizing the administration on Taiwan. There may be good reasons for Taiwan to be cautious about a peace accord, for example, but I'm not sure that those reasons were the basis for the public's criticism; I think there were other motivations involved. The critics may have had the right instinct, but they may not have had the right reasons for their criticism.

So, the question comes down to the quality of discourse. Is the public well-served by those who conduct that discourse in the way it's being conducted? There's a related question: Do those who oppose policies of the Taiwan administration -- whether it's blue or green -- are they honest about the costs to society of their opposition, or are there other factors that should be weighed? This, of course, I think we're seeing here a problem of any democratic society, that noisy minorities have a disproportionate impact on the more silent majority, and as other speakers have indicated, we may be seeing just one example of a worldwide phenomenon; it's not Taiwan-specific.

But if the character of political discourse is the problem here, what might be done to improve it? Now, some of the answers that come to mind or that have been offered -- I mean, certainly, I think any administration has to do a good job in explaining its policies. Even though more than half the public may feel that it's lying, you still have to do your best to explain what you're doing. You can't concede the debating ground to the opposition.

Another idea that's been put forward, at least by the DPP side, is more reliance on referenda and initiative. In a way, this isn't surprising. This was an idea promoted in the early

part of the 20th century by political reformers in the West, who felt that their political systems weren't working in the public interest, and so, you had to create new mechanisms to at least complement in direct democracy. But I think that referenda and initiative are subject to manipulation and distortion just like indirect democracy is. Special interests can twist them to their own benefit. Larry could probably tell you sort of scary tales about –

DR. DIAMOND: About California, yes.

DR. BUSH: Yes. Now, another possibility for Taiwan is that maybe the legislature should be given more say about the actions of the executive branch. Of the 16 agreements that the Ma administration negotiated with Beijing, only ECFA was subject to a vote. However, if the legislature itself reflects the general low quality of discourse, then I'm not sure that's a good idea.

We've heard including in the campaign, but otherwise, the idea that we need a Taiwan Consensus. And Tsai Ing-wen, of course, was the person who put it forward, but before her, Dr. Su Chi said it, as well. So, this is sort of cross-party idea, and it's understandable that people should want more consensus. A divided Taiwan is probably not a Taiwan that can well protect its interests. It is true, also, that sometimes the absence of a consensus has been used as an excuse for non-action. The big question in talking about the creation of a Taiwan Consensus is how you go about it. It's easy to say, it's hard to do.

So, my bottom line is that if the political process that we see in Taiwan today, for all its complexity, for all its issues -- which we've discussed a lot today -- if that political process creates suboptimal policy outcomes either externally or internally and that these outcomes arguably undermine the public interest, maybe what's needed is to work on that process as the debate on policy sub sense goes on.

Now, what I'm sort of asking for, I think, is to improve the quality of the various institutions at play here, the legislature, parties, media, civil society. If those institutions are improved, then the interaction between politics and policy may improve, as well. I don't know if this is possible. I'm actually pessimistic about the prospects of improving political institutions here in the United States, and there's a limit to what any American should say about another and friendly democratic country. But the stakes aren't small, particularly for Taiwan. If Taiwan were New Zealand, then maybe this would be immaterial and Taiwan could get by just fine without strong political institutions. But Taiwan's not New Zealand, unfortunately, and China is not Australia. Moreover, whether and how Taiwan addresses these problems is important not only for Taiwan itself, but for the reputation of democracy more broadly.

MR. ROMBERG: Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Thank you. (Applause)

MR. ROMBERG: Larry, tell us about faith in the democratic system.

DR. DIAMOND: Well, I may need some help finding my PowerPoint here, because this is the last one... Okay. Well, thank you, Alan, for your sharing of this session and some of what I have to say – well, some of what I'll say now at the outset really echoes what my colleagues have said. I must say, I've been struck, over the course of the day so far, at how much of what we have talked about reflects a general set of problems and trends with maturing and mature democracies around the world, and how much of what both Szu-yin and Richard said could be said about the United States, and you both mentioned that.

And so, I think we're living in an era of intense media penetration and competition, a new era of Internet politics, an era in advanced industrial democracies, and Taiwan is now one of relatively educated and information-saturated citizens. And if you look some of the survey data, including what I will present to you, it tends to promote skepticism, even cynicism, and certainly distrust. And one of the striking things is that it kind of, in a way, turns a bit the classic work on this civic culture by Almond and Verba on its head -- is that there is just a striking inverse correlation between education and trust in political institutions. People who are not well-educated, who are of lower incomes, tend to be much more differential, and if you look across countries in Asia, as you'll see, the lower-income democracies like Thailand and the Philippines, Indonesia, much higher levels of trust, deference to officials. Therefore, they've got more scope to do things and not be eaten alive. Korea, Taiwan, Japan, look a lot now like the United States, Western Europe, and so on.

And so, I think what you both were saying is actually even more sobering than it might appear. If you're just looking at it in the Taiwan context, because I really think a lot of it, including what you were saying at the end, Richard -- which you and I were both thinking we could really be saying this about the United States -- reflects problems now that are intrinsic to the model of democracy at the kind of moment in societal evolution that we're at. And so, this, perhaps, reflects back on us as political scientists. We really need to think deeply about democratic institutions in general and not just in Taiwan.

Well, with that, my first point is the good news, there's reasonably high support for democracy in Taiwan. I'm basically going to rely on three rounds of the Asian Barometer Survey. The first that was done about a decade ago on a limited number of East Asian countries, the second around 2005-2006. In Taiwan, it was 2005. The third round was just completed in the last couple of years. In Taiwan, it was done in 2010.

And so, the first slide combines three measures of support for democracy; it averages them. Do you think democracy is preferable to any form of government? The second is: Is democracy capable of solving the problems of our society? Third, do you agree or disagree: Democracy may have its problems, but it's still the best form of government.

I'll give you the average agreement of those three items. In the second, which I have come to believe as a political scientist is the single most revealing and reliable indication of, in a way, democratic consolidation -- that is, the irreversibility of democracy is, to what extent when you give citizens a bunch of authoritarian options? And generally across time and across countries, we give them three: Would you rather have the military come back and rule? Would you rather have a single party only allowed to contest for power? Or would you rather get

rid of parliament elections and have a strong leader decide? The percentage of respondents in a random national sample who reject all three of those options I think is a very valuable barometer of in a way commitment to democracy, even among a fairly cynical public.

And so, here's the data from the third round of the Asian Barometer. You'll see on the far left side Taiwan, and it has about 66 percent average legitimacy in terms of those three items, in part for reasons that are still a bit mysterious to me. When you ask people in Taiwan, "Do you think democracy is the best form of government or that sometimes an authoritarian government can be preferable?" and there's a third item, basically, I don't care between the two of them, the percentage is always uncharacteristically low particularly relative to other countries. But it's higher on the other two items. So, it's 66 percent average support on the democratic legitimacy items you saw, but 74 percent of the public now in Taiwan rejects all three authoritarian options.

Interestingly, that's exactly the same percentages in Korea, although Koreans are a little higher on the democratic legitimacy, and what you see is that in the other democracies of East Asia, the Philippines, Mongolia, Thailand, and Indonesia, it's the reverse. They're very high on the democratic legitimacy items, but many of them are willing to entertain one or more authoritarian options. And, in fact, in Mongolia, only 38 percent of the sample rejected all 3 authoritarian options that was put to them.

Now, I'll just say parenthetically -- I'm really not going to go into it unless you want to talk about it -- I've got strong views about it and speculations about it. Singapore's an outlier. They think their system is democratic, they love their system, they're supportive of it. I think public opinion in Singapore is beginning to change. I could say a lot more, but this isn't a conference about Singapore.

If you look at the trends over time, in two of these items, democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government and democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society. You do see, interestingly, a positive trend across these three surveys. With each of these items of democratic legitimacy, steadily increasing from 2001 to 2005 and then 2008.

On the other hand, I've left out an item where Taiwan doesn't look so good. It actually fares the worst among all of the countries we've been looking at. This is the data from the third wave. If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important? And basically, they have three choices: democracy is more important, economic development is more important, or weighting them equally. We tried to present this as optimistically as possible by taking the equally important as a good enough level of support for democracy, but, even so, 76 percent of the sample in Taiwan, and that is the highest of any of these samples here, say economic development is more important.

Now, I just threw in Vietnam there to give you a little surprise because, again, the communist countries, Vietnam, Cam-- well, excuse me, *faux pas* there. I almost said Cambodia, but if you've been to Cambodia recently, you'd understand why. But China also, again, their people kind of think that their system is democratic. In any case, these are the percentages who actually accept each authoritarian option, and, so, having a strong leader is not surprisingly the

one that garners the most support. It's 15 percent in Taiwan. Only one political party should be allowed to contest and hold office, 9 percent military rule, 4 percent. But you can see that these numbers are very, very small compared to the proportions willing to consider these things and say -- the Philippines and Mongolia, particular, and to some extent also Thailand. And then this is how Taiwan in the second survey compared: it's now up to 74 percent. Keep in mind, the percent rejecting all three authoritarian options compares with some other countries in this survey.

The trends in support for authoritarian options are in decline; I show you two of them here. And again, so, support over time since 2001 for democracy is going up. Willingness to entertain authoritarian options was never high, but it's steadily declining. So, I mean, there's a lot of kind of worrisome and discouraging news; let's at least celebrate the good news here from public opinion trends in Taiwan.

Now, the third round of the Asian Barometer adopted a different additional technique for trying to get at system support. We went back to David Easton's concept of diffuse support for the political system and tried to detach the word democracy from it, and just say, to what extent do citizens in any of these countries feel pride in and support for their political system. And here, Taiwan does not fare well. We developed a five-battery item to look at this, and I'm going to give you the five items. These slides were prepared by my longtime friend and collaborator, co-author Chu Yun-han.

Item one in this five-battery survey of general systems support: "In general, I'm proud of our system of government." And only if you combine agree, sort of agree and strongly agree, you get about 40 percent in Taiwan, and that's lower than Mongolia and the Philippines, much lower than Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam. A little bit higher than Korea, if you want to know the good news. Keep in mind my theme: critical citizen, skeptical citizens in many ways not very satisfied citizens. "A system like ours deserves the people's support, even if it runs into trouble." There, the level is up to 50 percent, but the pattern is the same, higher than Korea, lower than the others. "Over the long run, our system of government is capable of solving the problems our country faces." There, inexplicably to mean Taiwan is at the lower, 42 percent. Again, this was taken in 2010 and considerably lower than the others.

"Compared in the other systems in the world, would you say our system of government works fine, needs a little change, needs major change, or should be replaced?" So -- these are the ones who give the two more optimistic responses, and that's about 12 percent in Taiwan, and it's far, far lower than in any of the Asian countries for which we had data by the time we did these slides.

"And, finally, I would rather live under our system of government than any that I can think of." And, here, since many of the people in Taiwan are probably thinking of the mainland as a comparator, it rises to 60 percent, significantly higher than in Korea, about the say now as Mongolia and the Philippines, but dramatically lower than Singapore, for example. And so, if you look at the overall average, standardizing it on zero as being a kind of neutral response, Taiwan is a little bit optimistic, but not very much, and Korea is the only country that fares worse than Taiwan.

On the other hand, if you just ask people in Taiwan: “Are you satisfied with the way democracy is working in our country and do you think that Taiwan is a full democracy, a democracy with minor problems, a democracy with major problems, or not a democracy at all?”, people in Taiwan, 61 percent, do perceive that it’s a pretty serious democracy and in 2010, the number had risen dramatically from previous surveys. More than two-thirds of people in Taiwan said they were satisfied with the way democracy is working. Now, that might have had something to do with climbing out of some of the political troubles of previous years and at least a perception, then that, perhaps, the economy was rebounding. But you can see these numbers actually are much better than some of the peer democracies of the region, and also that there was a dramatic improvement in satisfaction with the way democracy is working, from 48 percent in 2001 to about 56 percent in 2005 and nearly 69 percent in 2010, and that perception of a relatively full democracy, again, a sharp increase between 2005 and 2010.

Now, we have also wanted to look at something I take very seriously. Okay, take out the word democracy and just look at what people believe in, what they value, and to what extent -- if we get away from the social desirability factor, which is something that worries us in this public opinion research of democracy being, to quite the title of a book that Brookings published by a Mainland Chinese scholar, *A Good Thing*, and go to just the substance of it and whether people are committed to liberal values -- many of these items were developed many, many years ago by Professor Hu Fu in Taiwan, who was Chu Yun-han’s academic mentor and has really inspired many of the concepts and instruments we use in the Asian Barometer. And so, here are six of them: you know, equal rights for women. Some of them are kind of putting Confucian-style statements to people and seeing if they accept them or reject them -- government leaders are like the head of the family, we should allow follow their decisions; harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.

Let me say about public opinion research, there is generally at least a modest response by us toward agreement. And if you phrase more or less the same item in two different ways, you’ll always get a higher level of support for the concept if you phrase it in the agreement mode than getting people to embrace the concept by disagreeing with the statement. So, keep in mind that agreement or disagreement can affect levels, but these are the trends and then I’ll unpack them a little bit.

These are the four items for which we have data at multiple points of time between 1984, when Professor Hu Fu and his team started asking these items, through 2010. And you see that the item that gets the most support -- and it’s impressive because they have to disagree with the statement to manifest this sentiment -- they disagree with the idea that the government should decide whether certain idea should be allowed to be discussed in society. And that support, basically for pluralism of ideas, has grown from about 42 percent in 1984 to about 65 percent in 1996. Then all of this dipped in 2001, for reasons I still don’t understand. It may have had something to do with a methodological difference, but it then is up to about 72 percent.

Judicial independence, so -- Professor Li, Professor Yeh, you’ll like this one -- when judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the Executive Branch. Only

45 percent of the public disagreed with that in 1984, and by now, it's up to about 60 percent. So, again, there's growth, but on a couple of items, there's much more equivocation and generally still not strong liberal commitment. One is nervousness about a lot of groups organizing. Maybe this is because people are just generally nervous about too much protest in the streets, or too much division in society. So, only today --2010 anyway -- 44 percent disagreed with the statement: Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organized lots of groups, and then there was a similar statement you see there.

If you average actually all six of the items we have in terms of underlying liberal commitment to democratic values, you see this trend that you see here about an average level of 46 percent in 1984, up to 61 percent in 1993, kind of dipped a little bit, but it's been steadily climbing since 2001, and is now 64 percent. Personally, I take this as a sign of a maturing democracy that's more or less with some important qualifications, but I think we'd have them here in the United States. The last thing I'd want to do in the United States is have a referendum on the Bill of Rights. (Laughter) In any case, it's about 64 percent.

Now, let's go to trust and democratic institutions, which has been mentioned here, and you see three time periods, and basically in each case, though with a slight decline, the institution that is most trusted is the civil service, the bureaucrats who are now democratic bureaucrats, but that's only about half of the public. And newspapers -- and, by the way, TV is a little bit similar here in terms of levels of support -- had about a third in 2001; it's down to 22 percent now. If I'd know you were going to be here, I would have put the TV in. (Laughter)

The courts started at 41 percent. They've experienced a significant decline. The level of trust is now at about 30 percent of the public, and not surprisingly, political parties: there hasn't been much of a decline, but when you start with 16 percent trust, there's not much room to go down much farther. Although in Europe and some countries, it's less than 10 percent, if it makes you feel any better.

These are the trends in institutional trust. They've been somewhat stable, but with the courts experiencing the most dramatic decline, this might have to do with the trial of Chen Shui-bian on the feeling that, by some of his strong supporters anyway, that maybe he was victimized.

So, here are my conclusions as I come to them now. Does Taiwan have a democratic culture? In many ways, yes. I think it's a culture that in its broad contours is certainly consistent with democratic consolidation and democratic maturation. There's no desire for any authoritarian option. In fact, there is emphatic, consistent, and growing rejection of any form of authoritarian alternative. There's substantial, but in some ways uneven support for democracy. Perhaps a little bit more worrisomely, there's weak diffuse system support, that, as people in Taiwan are not strongly and universally proud of their system. There's been growth of liberal values, but there's relatively low and in some ways declining trust in political institutions.

In short, in Taiwan, the citizenry has become a kind of familiar, predictable, postindustrial collection of skeptical democrats, and, indeed, there's a new book coming out evaluating the whole civic culture thesis of Almond and Verba using the World Values Survey

that Russ Dalton is co-editing. And that's the main theme of it, that everywhere you look in Europe and advanced industrial democracies, you find this pattern of skeptical democrats. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. ROMBERG: Terrific set of presentations. I'll just ask one question. It seems to me that some of what you have said and some of what we heard this morning suggests that opinion changes pretty quickly in Taiwan, maybe over one or two events. If you looked at the polls during the election campaign, Richard mentioned the peace accord issue, and, actually, it was even, if I may, more benign than that in the sense that what President Ma said is, we'll have to consider a peace accord, not even reach one.

DR. BUSH: That's right.

MR. ROMBERG: So, and when Tsai Ing-wen was seen to have taken the 18 percent interest rate, all of a sudden, her numbers dropped. So, my question is: Is there something about the quick turnaround? And right after the election, Ma was at his highest popularity rating, support rate, since he had taken office, and now we're down, as people have pointed out, to 15, 17, 19 percent support rate. Is there something special about Taiwan or is this a phenomenon that we see lots of places?

DR. BUSH: Let me just give a quick answer. I don't know how general it is, but it seems like in Taiwan, there's something of an automatic plebiscite on just about any issues, or a very rapid plebiscite. And it's not done through a vote, it's done through the narrative created by the mass media, which can operate at any time of the day or night and operates by its own rules.

DR. HO: I would think that a public opinion anywhere is quite erratic and it goes up and down in time. And I'm more familiar with South Korean public opinion other than Taiwan's, as we have some common friends over there doing this stuff. And, basically, it's the same, and I found that this can be very constraining, largely because in a democracy, or presumably, theoretically, you should cater yourself to public opinion. Well, that is the bottom line of democracy. But then when public opinion goes up and down so fast, you sometimes just don't know how to adjust your policy accordingly. That's one thing.

The other thing is when public opinion fluctuation is expressed in the media, has such a political impact, and the legislators know where just to follow through and put a further constraint on the maneuver room of the administration. That is the problem. That's why I just don't think we can really solve varying questions facing the country of high importance.

DR. DIAMOND: Yes, I want to make two points. One is that we need to distinguish different types of public opinions. So, the most perishable form of public opinion is attitudes towards officeholders, basically approval rates, which are highly sensitive to events and to economic performance to whiffs, even hints of scandal in the media, and, generally, among skeptical publics, tend to head only in one direction from inauguration and the honeymoon effect. And if you just graph the trajectory of approval rates for Korean presidents from the moment they're inaugurated and then over the five years until they leave office, I mean, the trend, it starts very high, it may oscillate it a bit, and then it's just like until they leave, when the



public's ready to crucify them. Maybe it turns up a little at the end, but there is that effect, and one is tempted to think maybe this is peculiarity of presidential systems, but look at what's happened in Japan, and the average level of popularity of a Japanese prime minister, and you see the problem.

So, my second point is that I just think, first of all, we really need to do more comparative analysis. And one of the ways in which we're in a new era is that I think Eric actually shrewdly prepared himself very well for studying Taiwan politics by getting his Ph.D. in American politics, because the barrier between sort of third-wave or emerging democracies and established European and American democracies, I think that's melting away. They share a lot of similar features.

One is this difficulty of maintaining popularity and trust in the white-hot glare of media skepticism, intense competition, the blogosphere, and so on. And the second is even in the United States, but especially in smaller countries like Taiwan, there's so much about public policy that affects people's welfare that's basically out of your control. It's out there in the global economy, and Barack Obama could lose the election this November because of the unraveling of the euro zone. So, if that can happen to Obama, imagine what can happen to a president of Taiwan. So, it's really hard to govern a democracy these days in an era in which the world economy is not doing all that well. And in an era of globalization, I don't think it's just the China-Taiwan relationship, it's globalization. That's just a distinct element of a larger problem that everybody's wrestling with.

DR. BUSH: Could I follow up a little bit?

MR. ROMBERG: Yes.

DR. BUSH: Because I thought where you were going was there's a certain class of issues that can change very radically in a short period of time. But were you going to say that there are others?

DR. DIAMOND: Yes. And so, yes, there are others like if you look at preferences on the cross strait issue, actually, they evolve, but they don't go up and down like this radically.

DR. BUSH: Yes, yes.

DR. DIAMOND: That's the rest of Eric's chart. And then if you look at support for democracy or underlying values, they evolve, they trend in a certain direction or not, but in any defined period of time, they're remarkably stable, and then you saw even over long periods of time, they can be very stable. So, what people's feelings and opinions about individuals or very specific policy issues may shift a lot over time, but they're underlying value orientations and orientations toward kind of big policy issues tend not to.

DR. BUSH: Just a follow-on observation, that it then becomes very important on election day which category of issues is the most salient. Is it the sort of day-to-day stuff or the underlying balance of sentiment?

DR. DIAMOND: Well, that's up to the politicians -- how they're going to engage.

MR. ROMBERG: I wonder how broadly, if I may just keep this going a little bit and go to Szu-yin on this, a number of the negative changes you saw, big changes, were in the year 2008, and we know at that point that the economy, trust in government, and so on were big political issues in Taiwan. And maybe it's a question to put to Eric Yu, wherever you are sitting - - there you are -- to take the pulse of some of those same questions now or it would have been useful maybe in between sometime because now we might be back in some of the same ditches, but I wonder if you feel that some of those results may have been a function of the time that those particular polls were taken.

DR. HO: No, actually, some of my political trust mention, or political advocacy mention, from dated back to 1992, so the trend is like that, and we're still waiting for 2012 survey results.

MR. ROMBERG: Okay. Questions from the floor, please. And please, if you're addressing to somebody, in addition to identifying yourself, please identify the person on the panel.

QUESTION: Yes, Nadia Tsao with *Liberty Times*. Thank you for the interesting panel. I have one question for Larry, one for Szu-yin.

Larry, if you were talking about the maturing process for a democracy, and can we look at Europe as a model that the problem we're going to face in the future? And since most of European countries are considered a mature democracy, we see some backlash now in Europe. So, is that the trend we should worry about?

And for Szu-yin, we can understand for the changing or democratic, DPP's government, when Xi Jinping was elected it was not a media-friendly environment, and he was elected in a very small margin of a winning. Before, President Ma with the two mandates in two elections, why the government is still so vulnerable to the media? We see that there's a support for it, the government is supposed to be a strong mandate compared with the previous government, but it seems like this government is even more fragile to the press from the media. Thank you.

DR. DIAMOND: Well, I think if I were to identify the two biggest challenges Europe is dealing with, one is the challenge of diversity due to immigration, and managing that, and the second is the fiscal crisis of the state in Europe, and I think European democracies, basically the EU, are in very, very deep trouble. And I think there's a basic lesson for the United States, which is some years behind having to confront it, but maybe not all that many, and for Taiwan and Korea, again, other maturing democracies around the world, if you don't want to wind up like Europe, get ahead of your social entitlement spending and your fiscal commitments before they drive you into bankruptcy. And it's something we haven't done yet in the United States. I hope we don't wait too long.

But in Taiwan, we haven't talked about this yet. It is something we talked about a year ago at our conference comparing Korea and Taiwan. This is something people in Taiwan really should be debating about on your TV station, and maybe they are. Taiwan has one of the lowest birth rates in the world, and so, this has a radical effect on the dependency ratio of people who are basically in retirement and possibly dependent on the state to some extent for retirement, security, and for certainly health expenditures relative to the wage-earning population. And so, it's not difficult to project where this is headed. Demographers are really good at this, and unless there's massive immigration into Taiwan or a dramatic change in the birth rate, we can pretty well project where this is headed. So, this is now a major challenge for public policy that's not particularly wrapped up with party differences, where responsible public policy could enable Taiwan to get ahead of the demographic curve, educate the public. From what's been said today, I know that may sound like a significant challenge, but educate the public about the underlying public policy issues and adjust public expenditures and public policies in ways that are sustainable.

And the second issue that Europe is facing is immigration and the difficulty of managing it. The second one that I'm at least raising here now, and with that, I think Taiwan has and is going to have some degree of immigration from lower-wage, less-developed economies in Asia. And then it has to decide, does it want that to be from Mainland China? And then they'll be people who will celebrate that because it's the language and culture and so on, others who will worry about that it may bring certain types of destabilization or infiltration. If not there, then from Vietnam, from the Philippines, from where? But this shouldn't happen randomly; it should be a matter of deliberate, reasoned policy planning and debate.

DR. HO: To answer your question, if President Ma, after his reelection had not proposed in the hike of gas price, or had not proposed the hike of electricity and the utility price, and would, again, have dodged the American beef problem issue, then I would think that he would still have quite a high rating. So, the point is the voters are not happy with the extra money. President Ma's administration wanted them to turn more money to the government. And so, they're not happy.

So, by the same token, I'm very concerned about Taiwan's economic future. President Ma already has a second term in pocket and he is not very popular, in the high teens for his popularity rating and if he caves to the public opinion pressure, then he wouldn't do anything, and then would make Taiwan's economy less competitive in the long run. That is the problem.

I'll give you one example. Alan and I went to a conference in Seoul. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade told us that since 2002, Korea decided that Doha round was going nowhere. So, they decided that they must have FTAs. So, for 10 years of time, 2002 to now, Korea already has signed eight FTAs covering 45 countries. And my own research has showed that Korea exports has benefited from FTA coverage. I think the percentage is about 36, and in Taiwan, it's 5 percent. If you want to look at any commercial dyad in the world, Taiwan and Korea are two brothers. Then you can see why Taiwan's HTC is lagging behind Samsung and things like that. And then that was the concern when I said bad politics would bring out bad politics and would bring out bad economics. Pretty much Larry said earlier for the European countries.

MR. ROMBERG: It seems to me what we're hearing from the panel is a plea for courageous and responsible leadership, but it's hard and I think we've heard that, too. Eric?

DR. YU: I have a question, especially to Professor Ho, because you were in the government. So, we heard quite a lot about public opinion, long term and short term. And I always remember, as a student of American politics, I always remember my advisor Bob Shapiro's two major themes: one is the rational public, so, in the long run, public opinion kind of goes as rational way, predictable. And he also argued, politicians don't pander. So, politicians always find a way to deal with the short-term fluctuation about public opinion. So, as you were in the government, I wonder how you deal with the public opinion, especially, for example, like the import of the U.S. beef, how could you evaluate the certain impact when you come to introduce such policy?

And I do think that the other thing that I want to ask is about Europe and about the role of elections because you mentioned a lot of over-expenditure and it seems to me that Taiwan, because of the elections, so, Taiwanese politicians like to kind of over-expend, promise a lot of things and how the central government tried to deal with that?

And also, you mentioned that Ma Ying-jeou has a term. Well, this is his second term, so I think you implied now that he doesn't have any baggage to carry. So, he wants to do whatever he thinks is good to Taiwan. But legislators do face reelection pressure. So, it seems to me that Ma Ying-jeou sees something very different from what the general public sees. So, I wonder are both perspectives necessarily go with the contradictory way?

DR. HO: Your first question, when I was in the government, how I dealt with the public opinion when it comes to American beef issue, right? And, actually, your director will tell you that I assigned a survey project to your institute to see the public opinion regarding the American beef, and you did that, right? Okay, you helped that. Okay, and then, actually, the picture now was pretty good. Based on the distribution, I had no qualms of pushing ahead in the beef issue, but then again, when the politicians, the legislators ceased this issue, then the political dynamics change overnight. So, that's one thing.

The second thing is basically, I think a democracy is inflationary, no question about that. That's why in the early 90s, Taiwan's government debt to GDP ratio was in the low teens, and then going all the way to 40 percent last year. So, it's not as bad as Japan, and Japan is about 263 times, so -- percent. So, we're not that bad, but we have a very, very bad demography, probably the worst in the world. So, you can imagine this ratio can after some threshold point can grow exponentially, and that would be bad enough for Taiwan's should I say democratic balance.

What was your third question?

DR. YU: The third question that I asked is that, well, we mentioned (inaudible).

DR. HO: Oh, yes, yes, yes, yes, I didn't have time to present that because Alan –

MR. ROMBERG: I cut you off. I apologize.

DR. HO: Yes, yes. No, actually, it's only natural for the president to have very different time horizons with the legislators. So, a lot depends on how the president can exercise his power and I have to say that I have a lot of respect for the president simply because he is so much self-restrained in exercising his power, but then there's this downside that politicians won't be afraid of you. So, there's up side, there's down side, and you don't know. So, that's why now generation after generations of graduate students would still read Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power*. That's a perennial classic.

MR. ROMBERG: John?

QUESTION: John Zang with CTI TV. I'm a colleague of Erich Shih. I'm here to hear how Taiwan democracy has matured over the years, but throughout the day, all I hear are basically the problems, so defects of Taiwan democracy instead of how it has improved over the years. So, can anyone tell me aspects or areas in which Taiwan democracy has actually matured instead of growing problematic? Thank you.

MR. ROMBERG: Larry, go ahead.

DR. DIAMOND: Well, I think we've heard some reflections on this over the day that there has been a certain degree of professionalization of the judicial system and that's ongoing, for better or for worse. And I guess what I'm going to say is controversial, but any time that a political system can wrestle with the challenge of alleged high-level wrongdoing by the former head of state in terms of corruption -- I guess it's a Rorschach test, whether you think that's progress or regress, but it would then fall upon, I guess, others to assess whether there's been reciprocal justice for all, people who've been responsible for corruption.

One of the things that I wanted to have addressed here, but probably didn't even press it very hard, was how well the control you want is done and to what extent the institutions of horizontal accountability are functioning well. There's been reference to certain degree of professionalization of the Lifa [Legislative] Yuan, its committee system and its capacity. I think Taiwan moved backwards in terms of functionality by reducing it so radically in size, but my guess you might speak to this, Richard, that in terms of institutional functioning, it's a much more professional and capable body than it was, say, in early to mid-1990s, when democracy was really getting going.

And we've beaten up on the media, but, I mean, the media is pretty free and it's not under government control, and so, at least there's a lot of pluralism in the media and civil society. And there are a lot of groups in civil society that have been pressing for extension of rights and freedom and cultural expression and so on. I mean, just to walk on the streets of Taiwan is to experience a very pluralistic, dynamic, liberal, frankly democracy. I think it's a very appealing society. So, I mean, that should be said, too.

DR. BUSH: John, I would supplement what Larry said, first of all, by going back to his presentation, and that is that on certain democratic values, confidence in the system, we've seen over the last decade a gradual and positive trend, and you can't have a mature democracy if the people don't believe in it. And this was a period that was extremely contested.

Second, I would say that if you look at if you combine the vote in the last election, of President Ma and James Soong on the one hand, and Tsai Ing-wen on the other, if you look at the party vote for the blue parties on the other hand and the green parties on the other, for all the complexity of the election, for all the back and forth, I think the result actually may have reflected well the balance of sentiment in the society about the most salient issues: what to do about China, do we emphasize growth over equity, these things. And those get distorted in some elections, away from that basic balance, but this one, this one, I'm not sure was too bad.

MR. ROMBERG: I would just add to that that although I was the one who said it is still maturing, and I do believe that, it is also very vigorous and I think the fact of the way the elections are conducted, there may be some problems here or some problems there, but I think there was no real complaint that this last election, for example, was anything other than legitimate and a reflection of the will of the people. So, yes, huge changes if you take where Taiwan started to where it has come. There's a lot.

Professor Yeh?

DR. YEH: Thank you very much. I guess some of you have talked about recent debate and also approval rate about President Ma Ying-jeou, particularly that American beef and also recent policy change. Whether that kind of fluctuation, sort of certain fluctuation in terms of approval rate, it's a confirmation of maturing democracy or is a counter-confirmation of maturing democracy and I think I would like to provide some of the institutional aspect to that.

Bear in mind, this is special arrangement of the election, that is in order to combine legislative election and presidential election so to put the presidential election almost two months ahead, creating a space of the presidential next election and the presidential elect. So, from January 14 up to May 20, the current president, what will the current president do? It's kind of fuzzy. He is the next president, oh, here is the last several days of the first president. So, there was quite a sentiment of the citizen to see what a change. I mean, before the election, you didn't take up this issue, American beef, like to increase the electricity bill, lots of things like that. But immediately after the election, you make lots of change, and people, of course, believed that this may be based on rational discussion.

These issues are, you know, general issues and should be addressed somehow, but you have the kind of strategic manipulation in that way. I mean, before the election and after the election, and you are going to do that now, not even until you take off, you're sworn into office for your second term. So, I mean, this kind of institutional backdrop actually to some extent refresh that citizens are actually very, very smart. I mean, they know how to punish a politician who has been so strategic in that way. So, I would say I don't see that as irrational or in some way I would say at this, one way to let a politician know that we are still very attentive to what

you had been doing. So, I don't see that as a very negative aspect of Taiwan's democracy. Here, we look into the current institutional specific.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you very much. I know this is not about Mongolian democracy, but because I happened to see the chart, especially I was surprised by the percentage of the respondents in Mongolia who chose to say that they wouldn't reject the three forms of going back backwards from democracy, I guess. And I noticed that one thing that could be a factor may be that the -- I noticed that Mongolia was the only country which has the parliamentary system of government among the countries. All seem to be presidential systems except Thailand, which is, of course, a royalty. And I thought that this may be one of the reasons that people thought that because they think they watch on TV every day is the fights in parliament, and we may be the second country in East Asia after Japan which changes prime ministers very frequently, and then maybe this was one reason that people chose to say that they want a strong leader, meaning that they want a presidential system. Because if you ask the question, do you want a presidential or parliamentary system, the presidential system is the one which is favored. But this was a choice which was made very conscientiously after the transition to democracy because the country didn't want to follow the Central Asian republics where they also chose their presidential form of government.

MR. ROMBERG: Okay, well, thank you very much.

QUESTION: Thank you.

DR. DIAMOND: Yes, in the next survey, we should find a way of disentangling that, but there are several parliamentary systems in Asia now, Japan, Thailand, well, Malaysia, but it's not yet a democracy. I'm hoping it will become one this year. And I'm not sure how much difference it makes, except in this regard, you could be right that this is at least what some people have in mind. I do think on the basis of other data, as well, that liberal values are significantly weaker in Mongolia than they are in Korea and Taiwan, but they seem to be strongly related to levels of education and income and Mongolia is a less-developed country, so, you'd expect that.

MR. ROMBERG: Jay, over here.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. First, just a very quick --

MR. ROMBERG: Why don't you tell them who you are?

QUESTION: Jay Taylor, writer. First of all, just a very brief observation. I think I may be the only person in the room who can recall the hatred for Franklin Roosevelt and Eleanor and the hyper partisanship during the Truman and MacArthur period, all of which I think reinforces again Professor Diamond's theory of skeptical democracy. But it also, even looking back further, it raises the thought there is something inherent in this, something inherent in human psychology and, perhaps, even something more even fundamental about the dualism of the nature -- there's something inevitable about it, that if Adam and Eve, well, when they left the Garden of Eden, one become a Democrat and one became a Republican. (Laughter)

But my question has to do with the effect on the mainland, just any observations you have. We all hear from Taiwan about the 3 million mainlanders, for example, they came last year, how they seem to be fascinated by any sign of this democracy and they're stuck frozen sometimes to their televisions watching and taking in all the criticisms of government leaders. Any observations on this? And others argue that well, they're turned off in the mainland basically because of the chaotic nature of Taiwan democracy.

DR. DIAMOND: I mean, I have found -- we published an article by my colleague Chu Yun-Han in the *Journal of Democracy* just a couple issues ago, which I thought made a very persuasive, interesting, and significant case, that the experience of democracy in Taiwan is having a very, in the long run, pro-democratic impact on Mainland China, and there are several elements to this. The media has a lot to do with it. And I think -- so, I'm delivering this analysis secondhand now, but to the extent it's correct, a lot of people across the strait are picking up Taiwan cable television and others are watching it when they visit.

Apparently, a lot of people from the mainland wanted to be in Taiwan during the election or in the weeks before just so that they could go out for an early dinner and then race back to their hotel room and lock themselves in the room and watch cable TV. And I think that the example of freewheeling debate and even the ability to, if I may say so, abuse the president without fear or favor, it's something that a lot of people in the mainland -- I'm sure some find it chaotic, but others find it kind of exhilarating. And my own view is, I felt this many years ago, I have continued to feel it. It's one reason why I am so passionately an advocate of cross-strait social and cultural exchanges and so on. I think this is going to wind up being one of the most subversive factors for authoritarian communist rule in China.

DR. BUSH: Just a quick supplement. I think that there has also been an ambivalence in China with respect to Taiwan's democracy when people look at the outcomes that it produces. The first example of this was -- or one of the biggest examples was -- Chen Shui-bian and the policies that he pursued and the fact that he got reelected in 2004. But President Ma Ying-jeou's election in 2008, I think, gave people on the mainland more confidence that, over time, as a democratic system matures, or as Taiwan matures, that it finds its balance point. And so, you have a scholar like John Manture in Shanghai, who I think is the Taiwan specialist on the mainland that I respect the most. He has a lot of confidence in the Taiwan system and says let's not worry on a day-to-day basis about this or that, the trend is very good.

MR. ROMBERG: Yes, please.

QUESTION: Hello. Good afternoon. I'm Sandy Lu from George Washington University. I have a question for Mr. Larry Diamond, is that one of the interesting conclusions you've mentioned is that we diffuse system support in Taiwan. So, I basically have two arguments about why this happened, like why people are not so proud of the current system.



And the first argument is that as a younger generation, I think Taiwan is now in a time of democratic consolidation, so, the democratic values have been embedded in our minds. So, in comparative with older generations, we don't fight against authoritarian rule in the past.

And my second argument is that do you think with this weaker diffused system support, well, in fact, would Taiwan be a weaker stance when dealing with cross-strait relations? And also that do you think it's because the current government, KMT, doesn't pay much attention to democratic values when they're interaction with China? So, as a result, like people are not so beware of what we have now.

DR. DIAMOND: Wow, those are really challenging questions. I think that you may be right that precisely because democratic values are now well embedded in the normative and psychological system of Taiwan that a lot of people feel free to say I'm not that proud of what's going on now, while at the same time saying we strongly believe in democracy.

Again, I have a theory, I'm sorry to keep coming back to this, that in a media environment that's heavily kind of focused on scandal, you said it yourself, where the old mantra of the media in general if it bleeds, it leads. So, you search for the negative or the melodramatic. I just have a hunch that this is part of what's driving people saying I'm not that proud of our system. There's a lot of negativity and so on, but maybe it also has to do with just a feeling. It might be a warning sign, actually, that people are worried about the future, what Taiwan's place is going to be in the world and vis-à-vis China.

I do think this, and it kind of plays off some of what's been said, and I think each of you should react to it, but it's a different way of phrasing something that Richard said. I think on many of these issues, Taiwan has less room for maneuver and mistake than a normal country in the world. And so, you asked: Will Taiwan be weaker with respect to cross strait relations? I think if there's one thing I can say that I deeply, deeply believe, that I hope maybe will get back to people watching this in Taiwan, it's don't let that debt-to-GDP ratio go from 40 percent to 80 percent. And that's a metaphor for other kind of fundamentals of political economy and responsible social and international policy, that the fundamentals are so important to Taiwan's survival and people's faith in it going forward. And you certainly wouldn't want to get to a situation where the birth rate being so low, you then had extremely significant outmigration from Taiwan, as well. It could really begin to generate a very worrisome downward spiral.

So, I think I would turn your question around in a positive way and just say that on getting ahead of the curve on basic social and economic policy challenges, that we can pretty well predict could become very, very threatening to Taiwan, just by looking at what's happened to other advanced, industrial countries in the particular circumstances of Taiwan, and not doing what politicians normally do -- including politicians in the United States -- which is kick the hard decisions down the road to the next administration. I think it's going to be very important for Taiwan's continued vitality.

MR. ROMBERG: Did you want to say anything else?

DR. BUSH: No. I agree.

MR. ROMBERG: There's agreement, by the way, here, too, what Professor Diamond said.

If there are no more questions, I think I will call this session to a close with a request that you join me in expressing appreciation for the terrific presentations and comments by our panel.

(Applause)

(End of seminar.)

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