Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy in East Asia

A Discussion with CNAPS 2004-2005 Visiting Fellows
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[TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED FROM A TAPE RECORDING]
PROCEDINGS

DR. BUSH: Why don't we go ahead and get started. There's a lot to discuss and we don't have that much time to do it.

My name is Richard Bush. I'm the Director of the Center for North East Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings, and it's my pleasure to welcome you here. It's also my pleasure to be a colleague with our visiting fellows each year. We come to this point in the year, it's quite bittersweet for me because my five colleagues on the platform with me are about to leave Brookings and return home, go on to something else, and we've had such a wonderful time the past 10 months that it's really difficult to say goodbye.

I think it's been a wonderful year, and before they get away we wanted to get them to talk about their perceptions of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, hear what they really have to think, and that's the purpose of this afternoon's discussion.

Before I get involved with the substance of the afternoon let me mention that after our session here we're having a small informal reception, and you're all invited to join us. It will be just in the next room over. Also I'd like to mention that tomorrow afternoon at 2:00 o'clock Dr. Wenhui Zhu, our visiting fellow from Hong Kong, will make his individual presentation, and we welcome you all to attend that.

Let me just identify who's who up here. You have biographies in front of you, but starting on my right is Tomohiko Taniguchi from Japan, Zhu Wenhui from Hong Kong, Kun Young Park from South Korea, Liu Shyh-fang from Taiwan and Jing Quan from People's Republic of China.

The way we'll proceed is that I will ask my colleagues a couple of questions about how their countries view U.S. foreign policy and how they view U.S. relations with their countries, and at a certain point we'll throw it open for discussion.

So first is views about U.S. foreign policy, and I think I will start with Tomohiko, and ask you what do you find most positive about U.S. foreign policy? And when I say that I mean not just East Asia, but worldwide. You've had an opportunity to watch it firsthand over the last 10 months. What do you think?

MR. TANIGUCHI: Okay. I understand, Richard. And thank you all, ladies and gentlemen, for coming over to sort of our commencement ceremony.

[Laughter.]

MR. TANIGUCHI: This is going to be the last presentation of ours. If it's bittersweet for you, Richard, it's bitter, bitter, bitter for me to leave the Brookings Institution to go back to Japan.
But anyway, what do I find most positive about U.S. foreign policy? What I find most positive about U.S. foreign policy is its steadfastness in spreading democracy in the Middle East. It took Americans and Americans only to help post-war Germany and Japan to recover, as at the end of the day in the world. It is only those of you in this nation who really mean it when you say humankind can be changed for better, a nation can be reborn for better, and any people can be citizens of democracy. Americans are the last who would subscribe to cynicism. And I am behind the United States in its pursuit for democracy even in the most troubled region in the world.

Then the next question is what do I find most negative about U.S. foreign policy? What I find most negative about U.S. foreign policy is also its pursuit of democracy in the Middle East in general.

[Laughter.]

MR. TANIGUCHI: And in Iraq in particular, for again, when war devastated Germany and Japan were trying hard to recover, it was not only the benevolent support of the Americans, but also the readiness and eagerness of these people to grow that would later materialize the miracles, be it an individual or a nation. Where there is no self-esteem, no trust, there is no growth.

Investment in structures may be important. Yet what is even more critical for a nation to grow is investment in the hearts and minds of the burden bearer, the people of the very nation. Have the Iraqis gained as much self-esteem as would be necessary for them to start growing? I do not know. I rather doubt it, for it takes years even in the case of individuals to gain confidence, to gain self-esteem, not to mention for a nation like Iraq. A long fight, if not war, it, hence, must be by nature.

The pursuit of democracy in the Middle East does not ultimately fit nicely into election cycles in this country. You only have two years or less in achieving almost anything. People in the Middle East can change, if they indeed can, only slowly. I am concerned that the domestic cycle of elections would make U.S.-Middle East policies unnecessarily short term, hence, prone to failure, and the very failure would backfire on many fronts in the U.S. foreign policy and domestic policies, the results of which are beyond my concrete prediction.

Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much. So as I understand you, a good objective, perhaps the wrong target, perhaps poor implementation.

Let's get another view. Kun Young Park, what do you find positive about U.S. foreign policy and what do you find negative about U.S. foreign policy?
DR. PARK: What's positive about U.S. foreign policy? I think one of the impressive things is the tsunami relief effort led by the United States that boosted regional cooperation. From a broader perspective, I think that the goal of United States foreign policy in the second Bush administration, to spread democracy throughout the world, is positive.

From an economic perspective, I think U.S. foreign policy represents an interesting case that does not belong to any traditional paradigm of international relations theories. It's a good research subject and it's good for IR theories.

What's negative about the U.S. foreign policy? I don't know if democracy is creamy peanut butter, but when spreading democracy throughout the world, I think the United States should use a butter knife instead of cruise missiles. Many people died in Iraq. A lot of them didn't have to. I wonder if the Congress would have provided the President of the United States with the authority to invade Iraq if it knew that there had not been a link between al Qaeda and Iraq and that Iraq did not have nuclear weapons.

Some people might say that a world without Saddam is safer, but again, the question arises as to what about North Korea? Burma? Pakistan? I'm not sure if the United States is willing to attack these nations for the sake of human rights and democracy. I think, as in the case of the tsunami relief effort, that the combination of military and hard power and soft power will contribute to global peace and stability.

I don't know if this is relevant still today, but let me give you a quote from Richard Armitage. He said, "The biggest regret is that we didn't stop 9/11, and then in the wake of 9/11, instead of redoubling what is our traditional export of hope and optimism, we exported our fear and our anger, and presented a very intense and angry face to the world. I regret that a lot."

DR. BUSH: Okay, thank you.

Let's turn to Jing Quan. What about U.S. foreign policy would you give high marks and what about U.S. foreign policy would you give failing marks?

MR. JING: When I come here I always hear so many different voices about U.S. foreign policy from the White House, from Congress, from think tanks, the media, and public opinion. I have found that there are two major approaches to the foreign policymaking process: one is liberal, the other is conservative.

Differences between liberals and the conservatives are fundamentally rooted in different theories of the way United States foreign policy works. Liberals tend to be more optimistic about the prospects of international organizations and international law, while conservatives tend to view the world in terms of the balance of power.

Actually, last year we all witnessed the campaign and the 2004 presidential election, the war in Iraq. The Bush administration's strategy of preemptive war and the practice of
unilateralism made foreign policy issues the centerpiece of that campaign. And the conservatives gave priority to military over multilateral instruments of diplomacy. Liberals emphasize more the need to rebuild America's international standing and alliances, and to solve the fundamental cause of virulent movements, especially terrorism.

[Technical interruption.]

MR. JING: So these differences actually underline the persistence of foreign policy controversies. However, in this process, different approaches not only interact with each other, but also adjust each other's positions so as to find a U.S. foreign policy that could better serve the U.S. national interest.

Understanding the differences does not hinder, but actually facilitates cooperation. American foreign policy actually is the better for it.

All the same, the token has two sides. Because of the different approaches, the United States and its foreign policy community are always split on some issues. While conflicting opinions prevail, consensus may not be reached, and consequently decisions may be delayed. This may result in incoherent policy. This can undermine the government's credibility in the eyes of its public and the allies, and may result in confusion.

For instance, with regard to the current North Korean nuclear issue, there are two schools of thought or two factions in the government. One favors demands for unilateral North Korean concessions and advocate an overall U.S. strategy of isolating North Korea. They prefer North Korea's regime collapse or change. Well, the other believes that the administration should attempt negotiations before adopting more coercive measures. So there is no chance for a successful U.S. policy towards North Korea without getting the various agencies in the U.S. administration behind a common position.

There are too many voices in the foreign policy making process. Other countries sometimes receive mixed signals from the U.S. They may take what they like and ignore what they dislike, or they misinterpret what they like and exaggerate what they dislike. This problem may lead to inefficiency in U.S. foreign policy.

Also, I agree with Tomohiko that democracy means different things for different people and different countries, different regions. So I don't think the United States can take spreading democracy to other countries as an excuse to support its policy of unilateralism and a preemptive approach.

Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much. I think that's an important reminder that process is important as well as substance, that in order to get good substance you have to have good process.
Shyh-fang, what do you think is good about American foreign policy, what do you think is not so good about American foreign policy?

MS. LIU:  As a political activist I appreciate my common values with this country because I really enjoy the bipartisanship that created a different kind of international or foreign policy, which is debatable and which can help the people in this country to understand how they can create more or better relationships with some other countries with different perspectives.

But my bias is that, in this country, most of the people think of the country as a superpower, and because they are a superpower, they would like all of the people around the world to share the same values as the people here.  We are told that we should share the values of freedom and democracy, but how can you judge the people in some other countries if they didn't share the freedom and democracy or some other common values?

So I would like to say that if the people in this country, no matter if they are in governmental organizations or nongovernmental organizations, can share the different perspectives gained by different political developments of other countries, it would be a good idea.

You know, my colleagues on this panel and I are from Asia.  Asia has a different kind of culture--although it's diversified and we are learning some common values to tell the people around the world how can we get a better life.  If a better foreign policy can help the whole of the country, I think that's our goal.  It needs time.  It needs some process.  It needs some justice to modify the development of the democracy around the world.

DR. BUSH: Okay, thank you.

Last but not least, Wenhui, what are your views?

DR. ZHU:  My background is economics, so I don't know too much about democracy.

[Laughter.]

DR. ZHU:  So what I'm interested in is the mechanism of this foreign policy decision-making.  I think the most positive aspect, in my opinion, is that they built in checks and balances inside of this mechanism, there is public participation and a bipartisan mechanism of the government.  So I think all of this contributed to these checks and balances to prevent U.S. foreign policy from moving too far away or to the extreme.

And another positive thing, if I can have some time to say it, is the flexibility and the continuity.  For 10 months in Brookings I found something, I found some solutions to my puzzle.  Before I came, we always observed some discontinuity of the foreign policy of the U.S. and when the new President comes to power, it changes, and then when other party comes to
power, it will change back. But when I stayed here and I attended different seminars at different organizations and foundations, actually I found that continuity existed inside the think tanks.

For example, the liberal thoughts may be more in this institution, and a conservative one may be more in the AEI. Hence, if their candidate becomes President, they will join their administration, but if they failed to win the election, they just stay in this building. I think that's a very good idea.

[Laughter.]

DR. ZHU: And it should be learned by other nations. So this is the positive. But the negative side of the foreign policy to me is too much domestic participation, or too much domestic political over-manipulation of foreign policy. For example, in the relationship between China and the U.S., we find a lot of noise without any substance. For example, from the perspective of economics, 80 percent of the discussions on the exchange rate are not related to the substance of the exchange rate. So that's the problem.

DR. BUSH: Okay. Thank you very much.

We've had a number of contrasts drawn between goals and implementation, between substance and process, between hard power and soft power, between government and public opinion, substance of policy and domestic politics.

I wonder if there are any questions out there on what we've heard so far. You don't have to ask a question now, but there may be something particularly relevant to what we've heard so far, and before we move on to talk about the relations of each of these parts of Asia. So I want to give people a chance.

Mike?

QUESTIONER: [Off microphone] My name is Mike Miyazawa. I have a question for Mr. Jing. You said there is a difference in approach between conservatives and liberals. Maybe that's true, there is some cosmetic difference in their approach, but I think there is a commonality beneath all these cosmetic differences in approach, and the commonality is [inaudible], most of them Americans, especially those people inside the Beltway believe that (A) ends justify means; and (B) might is right; and (C) victors write history.

So based upon this commonality among the liberals and conservatives, in most of the cases they come to one single voice like in the case of attacks on invasion of Iraq. A majority of the Congress supported the resolution for the U.S. President to unilaterally initiate an attack on Iraq. So do you have any opinion on this?

MR. JING: Oh, yes, I agree with you. Just now I meant this as the positive aspect of U.S. policymaking, because the token has two sides. The first aspect is positive because they
interact, compete, or conflict with each other, but they also adjust to each other's position, try to work out a mutual, acceptable or unified approach which can better serve the U.S. national interest. So I mean this as the positive aspect.

The negative aspect is when those controversies, those conflicting viewpoints prevail, especially when there is no very high time pressure, then this might result in incoherence of policy toward some issue such as the North Korea nuclear issue, and it may create some deadlock, stalemate on the issue. That is the negative aspect.

DR. BUSH: Any other questions on the first part? Pete.

QUESTIONER: The Bush administration foreign policy has, as everybody knows, been fairly heavily criticized in many parts of the world, but in many ways Asia's an exception. Our relations with Asia seem to be much more popular there than, let's say in Europe and so on, and my question to you is why? What's the explanation for generally the positive reaction to this administration's policy and your part of the world, much more so than other parts?

DR. BUSH: Who wants to—

DR. PARK: That's actually what we're supposed to discuss after this.

[Laughter.]

DR. BUSH: I think there's a distinction--I mean I think your question sort of washed over into the second part, but you know, if you just take the part about American foreign policy in general, is there a reason why Asian countries have a more positive view of it? The Japanese Government was supportive of sort of the U.S. war in Iraq, and the South Korean Government sent 3,000 troops, and so on.

MR. JING: I have some viewpoints. You know, three years ago we discussed whether the U.S.'s strategic emphasis has transferred from Europe to Asia. Well, after some debate, people still believe the U.S. emphasis is still on Europe, not on Asia. But when I attend seminars people always talk about those issues in Asia related to personal liability, that there may be too many hot spots, too many controversial issues in East Asia such as the North Korean nuclear issue, which directly threatens U.S. security interests. Also the Taiwan issue which might--the danger is real, which might drag United States and China into a conflict. And that Japan's relations with the United States with China and China's rights, China's relations with ASEAN.

So I think there are many issues which really deserve debate and really deserve the emphasis, but I think the United has struck a balance between Europe and Asia. I don't think the United States just puts too much emphasis on Asia but not Europe -- I think it has struck a balance.
MR. TANIGUCHI: To answer more straightforwardly to your question, Peter, each and every nation in this part of the world desperately needs the United States, the degree of which is more enormous than elsewhere. As a balancer or as, you know…

DR. PARK: I'm not sure, Pete, what you mean by Asian nations. I don't think the majority of Asian nations support the Bush administration's foreign policy. I think Japan and Taiwan are the two strongest advocates of the Bush administration's foreign policy. I think that has to do with the emergence of China that is perceived to be having a managed intention as far as, for example, Japan and Taiwan security is concerned, and I think the Bush administration is perceived in these countries, China and other countries in Northeast Asia especially, as favoring Japan at the expense of China and other countries.

There is a perception that Japan has been involved to become more active and aggressive in its relations with its neighbors in Northeast Asia, so I don't think Asian countries support the Bush administration's foreign policy, but some portion of it is supported, and it has to do with Japan-China relations.

DR. BUSH: Let me ask a short-answer question to each of you. Is the public in your country or place more negative about U.S. foreign policy than the government is?

MR. TANIGUCHI: Definitely, yes.

DR. BUSH: The Japanese public is less positive about U.S. foreign policy than the Koizumi administration?

MR. TANIGUCHI: Right.

DR. BUSH: Wenhui?

DR. ZHU: It's the same in Hong Kong.

DR. BUSH: Kun?

[Laughter.]

DR. BUSH: Then South Korea is a true democracy. The government is--

DR. PARK: Yeah.

[Laughter.]

MS. LIU: My answer is no, because there is not wide-spread anti-Americanism among Taiwanese.
MR. JING: Definitely it would be yes [in China].

DR. BUSH: Another question on this part? Why don't we move on, and the question now is: What are the good points about your country or place's relations with the United States, and what are the bad points about relations with the United States? We'll start with Jing Quan.

MR. JING: Thank you. I have three points on the U.S.-China relationship. First, we're going to say that on both sides the highest paramount leader attaches much importance to the bilateral relations. I can say high-level exchanges and communications are frequent and very productive. President Hu Jintao and President Bush have established a working relationship and are maintaining very frequent contact through letters, meetings, and phone calls.

Last year Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing had altogether 16 phone calls with the U.S. Secretary of State. And the military exchanges are warming up. The People's Congress of China has formally established the exchange mechanisms with both the U.S. Senate and the House. And trade and economic ties are very close, despite some disputes. Both sides attach so much importance to U.S.-China relations.

Second, during last year's presidential election campaign, U.S.-China policy, for the first time, was not a target for hot debate for the first time since the end of the Cold War. It shows that U.S.-China relations have become more and more mature than before, and the Republican and Democratic parties have reached a sort of consensus on how to manage the relations with China. I think there is a consensus that the United States should engage with China.

Of course, the approach of the United States toward China is always containment plus engagement, but engagement nowadays already has become a type of consensus. That means a prosperous, a strong China is also in the interest of the United States, while maybe there are still some disputes or debates on whether we should contain China.

The third part is all facts since the end of the Cold War shows that our converging interests of China and United States have increased rather than decreased, and the areas of their cooperation have expanded rather than reduced. Nowadays there are at least three common interests. The first to maintain the peace and stability in the region; second, trade and the tangible economic interests; third, fighting against terrorism, fighting against the international plan, nonproliferation, those kind of things, disease.

And what are the bad things for U.S.-China relations? The first, of course, the Taiwan issue, that is the real danger. And this is the most important, sensitive and worrisome issue in U.S.-China relations. If there is one issue in our relations that could possibly destroy the whole relationship, it is the Taiwan question. However, there are still some uncertainties on these issues such as Taiwan's constitutional reform and the U.S. relationship to Taiwan. So I think the two sides should probably handle this issue, try to control the situation, not allow this issue to escalate into a crisis or conflict.
The second part is that the two countries have different social systems. They have different perceptions on human rights, religion, and the Hong Kong issue. Every year these two countries spend too much time debating on these issues. All people in United States say, "We have to base our foreign policy on our values." Well, people in China argue that stability is the first and foremost thing for China's development. China has its own agenda of the legal construction and democratization, and the United States should not interfere with China's internal affairs.

The third problem is the two countries still have a deep mutual suspicion towards each other. In the United States, some people are still very suspicious of China's military modernization and the real strategic intention, especially in view of China's rise. In China also some people doubt whether the United States tries to contain China's development, whether the United States will let China enjoy the opportunity to concentrate on economic construction. To a certain extent suspicion and mistrust still play very significant roles in both countries' policymaking process.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much.

Shyh-fang, what's your view about U.S. relations with Taiwan? What's good and what's bad?

MS. LIU: Before my points on the future of Taiwan-U.S. relations I think I want to add to what Pete asked about how to compare the U.S. and European countries and U.S. and East Asian countries. I would say that most of the East Asian countries have their political struggles domestically. And because of cultural reasons, because most of the Asian countries’ people find it kind of immodest, you know, to criticize the different views of foreign policy that are not part of our culture.

To use Taiwan as an example, most supporters of the ruling party, the DPP, really appreciate America because way back to the 1970s and '80s we were suffering from human rights violations, we were suffering from a dictatorship. With some help of the democracy and the system help of the United States, we survived those human rights violations, and we began our democratization process. Most Taiwanese really appreciate that Americans can tell us how to perform democracy in Taiwan.

I am kind of optimistic about Taiwan-U.S. relations because the people of both nations share the same values. But there are two key elements in Taiwan and U.S. relations here. First of all, I would like to say that the foreign policy is an extension of national policy or domestic policy, and I view that policy as the fundamental prism through which both Taiwan and U.S. foreign policies shall be analyzed.

While there has been no major shift in the most fundamental policies with the power change from the Democratic party to the Republican President George W. Bush, the transfer of power in Taiwan from the KMT to the DPP has indeed caused fundamental changes. I
therefore expect more discussion in Washington circles among governmental bodies and nongovernmental organizations concerning the future of development of the Taiwan-U.S. relationships.

The TRA and the three joint communiques are the basic elements in any evaluation of foreign policy with regards to Taiwan-U.S. relations. For more than 25 years the main political objective has been to maintain the status quo. This has not changed even though it has been challenged by both China and Taiwan, but from completely different perspectives.

There needs to be more discussions on how to maintain the status quo with regards to stability of the Taiwan Strait and democratic development in Taiwan. Secondly, my view is that building more mutual trust between the two ruling governments in the United States and Taiwan is vital. Since the transition of power in Taiwan, there have been a few exchanges of views by higher-ranking officials and/or officers. But this exchange needs to be different and regularized. Irregular visits and meetings have just been used to convey messages, not to discuss in detail current and/or future policy and strategy.

Take an example. Since the passage of the anti-secession law in March by China, the Taiwan and U.S. relationship has improved. The government of Taiwan appreciates President Bush's urging President Hu Jintao to talk to Taiwan's elected President Chen Shui-bian and his cabinet members after China invited two opposition leaders to Beijing in April and May 2005.

U.S. foreign policy could be checked and reviewed for transparency and accountability by the long-time bipartisan political system. However, Taiwan will face major challenges from the rising power of China and the divided political powers of Taiwan over the next decade.

Therefore, to create dynamic, regular interactions between Taiwan and the U.S. could strengthen future relations. Regular Taiwan-U.S. interactions are even more important today as China continues to try to isolate Taiwan politically and economically in the international arena, such as with the WHA and ASEAN+3, while at the same time seeking to bind Taiwan to China economically from special incentives for Taiwanese industry.

Along with those two key elements in Taiwan—U.S. relations, the other important factor blocking relations is always Taiwan and China relations. Taiwan should never have been a bargaining chip in the U.S.-China relationship. Any such use of Taiwan would go against the will of the people of Taiwan.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much. Wenhui, how do you evaluate Hong Kong and China's relationship with the United States?

DR. ZHU: In my opinion, the positive side is that I found a great contrast between Washington and New York. Actually, for the past several months most of us observed some very strong anti-China sentiment inside Washington. I think this is the mainstream inside of DC. But last week I presented to a Chinese investment company in New York. More than 300
investors, mainly institutional investors from U.S. base and the world attended that meeting, and the organization, the organizer of the meeting invited a former ambassador to speak there. And he spoke that anti-China or China-bashing speech.

But to my surprise, 90 percent or even 95 percent of the participants in that forum criticized the former ambassador and think he's ridiculous about this.

So the most positive aspect of China-U.S. relations is, I think, that economic progress or economic exchange between the two countries provide us with a very sound basis for the future development.

For the third point, in my opinion, there is a misunderstanding or misperception of the Chinese attitude towards the U.S.--for example, Jing Quan mentioned the suspicion of China towards the U.S., also the U.S. suspicion towards China. Actually, I have a lot of nationalist friends in Beijing, most of whom I knew maybe 10 years ago when I began to publish my papers in a famous magazine, a journal, *Straight Edge*. I knew most of the management. And I've talked to them. But one problem is that they never have had a chance to visit the United States. And in my opinion, if they had more chances to visit here, they'd have a changed attitude.

I have my own experience. I have my daughter to lead me here. She's only ten years old. And when she returned to Beijing last month, she told me, "I will go to United States again and I want to immigrate there."

[Laughter.]

DR. ZHU: I think that's the friendship and that's the friendly environment in her school that gave her the impression that the United States is friendly.

So I think the most important thing in the future is to enhance the bilateral or the private communication between the two peoples, and especially the United States should invite more of the nationalists in China to come, but one problem is the visa. So if the visa restrictions are loosened, more and more Chinese will come. I think that will help in the future.

DR. BUSH: Okay. Kun, how would you evaluate U.S. relations with the ROK? What's good and what's bad?

DR. PARK: Not only Wenhui's daughter, but also I want to live in the United States.

[Laughter.]

DR. PARK: I think that's the power of--the soft power of the United States.
What's good about the relationship? I think a shared value, a shared belief in democracy. I agree that democracy means different things to different people, but we also have to recognize that that kind of argument has been used as a pretext for authoritarian rulers for repressing people. So we need to understand there are both sides of the story.

But as far as South Korea is concerned, I'm proud to have--my country has a mature democracy, and has good relations with the United States, the leading democracy in the world.

To talk about the alliance, which is better than it looks, one of the clearest examples of the strong sense of commitment to each other is South Korea sending its troops, the third largest among the allies, to Iraq to help U.S. effort there. And also President Bush and President Roh have agreed that the two allies should resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, while showing a strong solidarity not to allow North Korea to have nuclear weapons.

What's bad about the relations? I don't think it's bad, but it's a little stupid.

[Laughter.]

DR. PARK: I would imagine lack of--or apparent lack of coordination on military policy. Since last February the United States has strongly demanded that North Korea return to the negotiating table without any conditions. That's good, and that's the way the United States should go. North Korea has complained about the Bush administration's use of phrases like "outpost of tyranny" to describe it.

I think North Korea's complaint is reasonable if, and only if, the United States considers North Korea a negotiating partner. If the United States does not consider North Korea a negotiating partner, that's okay, that's understandable because North Korea is one of the least respectable nations in the world, and there is an argument, and elements of truth in an argument that North Korea has used meetings such as intra-Korean minister level meetings that are taking place right now to appeal to Korean nationalism, and to extract concessions from Seoul. But if the United States is interested in negotiation with the North, I think the U.S. should keep the emotion and hatred to itself. I think it's the duty of a prudent and able diplomat.

President Bush has recently used the courtesy title, "Mr." in referring to Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-il has responded by saying that he has no reason to think badly of "Your Excellency, President Bush." And he said if the United States recognizes North Korea as a negotiating partner and respects it, North Korean can return to the negotiating table even in July.

But last Monday, the Under Secretary of State repeated Washington's definition of North Korea as one of the "outposts of tyranny," and the Secretary of State, in Brazil for a conference on Iraq, has also made similar remarks. This may have been intentionally designed to bewilder, baffle, or confuse North Korea. The problem is it also baffles and bewilders and confuses your own teammate, South Korea. That's the stupid problem.

[Laughter.]
DR. BUSH: I would venture to say that it confuses and baffles some people in Washington, D.C. as well.

[Laughter.]

DR. BUSH: Tomohiko, you can have the last word on Japan's relations with the United States, good or bad.

MR. TANIGUCHI: Okay. Let me go on to the discussion of what's bad and what's good. Let me just briefly say that I'm not so sure, entirely so sure on the point whether there are as many types of democracies as the number of nations. Democracy is, at the end of the day, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, rule of law, checks and balances, due process of law, and open and fair elections.

My point really was for a nation to grow to democratize itself, it will need self-esteem more than anything else, and it will take years, perhaps longer than the 2-year, 4-year election cycles. That was my point. I think democracy is democracy.

Now, what are the good points about my country's relationship with United States? No news is good news.

[Laughter.]

MR. TANIGUCHI: The mad cow disease issue aside, both of the nations have had virtually no trade conflict whatsoever for the first time in anyone's living memory. That is good point number one. Number two is that Japan is now set to be one of the U.S.'s “mega allies,” quote, unquote, comprising only Britain and Australia in addition to Japan. It is up to you whether you think it is a good thing or a bad thing.

I for one endorse this development, as a dry-hearted economic journalist, as Japan's risk management policy. With the rise of China, and indeed the nuclear ambition of North Korea, East Asia is headed for some of the most uncharted, hence, uncertain waters in the region's entire history of the modern era. As far as security goes, Japan has decided not to become an independent actor, but to tie itself more firmly than in the past to United States, which is Japan's longstanding insurance policy provider.

Now, what are the bad points about Japan's relationship with the United States? There aren't many really, but then do I want Japan to do more with the United States?

First, given George W. Bush's rock solid confidence in Japan's Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi must be said to have grossly under-utilized that very confidence. He is the first, indeed he may be the last, Japanese Prime Minister who could ring up U.S. President each and every morning if he so wishes. He could have a pep talk, which he is rather good at, but he
could even share intelligence. Already he is George Bush's *shiba inu* dog, if Tony Blair is Bush's poodle.

[Laughter.]

MR. TANIGUCHI: And what is wrong with that? As Koizumi is scheduled to leave the office in September of next year, and as the results of the 2008 elections in this country remain unpredictable, I would also like the bilateral relationship more firmly anchored by economic realities. For this reason such actions as having an American as its head are welcome, more to be followed. More U.S. buying into Japan's corporations must be encouraged, not discouraged. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much.

We have about half an hour till the reception, and so plenty of time for questions. For those of you standing in the back, there are some seats in the front. Who would like to ask the first question? Eric. Wait for the mic, Eric.

QUESTIONER: Eric McVadon, a consultant. I wonder if you could offer the views from your country about the U.S. and its relationship with the UN. That of course is getting a lot of attention now because of the Bolton nomination, but that's not the only thing going on in that regard.

MR. TANIGUCHI: There's a wide discrepancy on that point between Japan and United States. For Japan, for many, many years, the United Nations has been a symbol of progress and a symbol of unifying the nations and the world, so it's basically been a very good thing, and that's why Japan is—

QUESTIONER: Basically been what?

MR. TANIGUCHI: A very good thing. One of the things that I have learned very clearly over the last 10 months is that in Japan, the United Nations has been viewed increasingly as a symbol of corruption, as a symbol of bribery and so on and so forth. So there is a huge discrepancy on that point.

DR. BUSH: Who else would like to?

DR. PARK: One of the gentlemen sitting in the back mentioned that there isn't a great distinction between liberals and conservatives as far as U.S. foreign policy is concerned. And I agree with you, but there is an exception that liberals are more--I mean they want United States foreign policy to become more institutionalist, rather than take a unilateral posture. So the Bush administration, two or three years ago, was more conservative in its unilateral approach, but I'm worried that if Mr. Bolton gets a job at the United Nations, the tendency may continue like the one three or four years ago.
DR. BUSH: Other comments?

MR. JING: I think, you know, before Iraq War, without the authorization of the UN, the United States unilaterally attacked Iraq, and maybe that is also why so many Chinese people hold a negative attitude on the Iraq War, because there is not any justification, nor any authorization from the UN. But after the Iraq War, when the United States is facing some difficulties in rebuilding Iraq, the United States again tried to use the UN as a tool.

So I think the United States approach to the UN is just according to what the United States really needs, and at what time, under what circumstances. So sometimes I think the United States will take the approach to use the UN as a tool, but sometimes it just ignores UN's role.

The delay in confirming John Bolton shows the liberalist approach. They are much more for international institutions, cooperation, and negotiation, while the conservatives pretty much more emphasize unilateral use of power and balance of power.

So I think from time to time, the UN will become a tool of the United States; sometimes when United States is facing difficulties, its unilateralism will emerge again.

DR. BUSH: Steve?

QUESTIONER: Hello. Stephen Costello. I wonder if you would talk about the trend of U.S. influence in the region in general? We all remember I think 3 years ago when President Hu Jintao and George Bush made back-to-back visits to the region, particularly to Australia, and there was a lot of talk about waning U.S. influence, both soft and hard power, and the rise of Chinese influence. And I just wonder what you think about that trend in your countries and in the region at large.

MR. JING: I think when I started here at Brookings, among my colleagues and friends there is a consensus that United States' soft power is declining, and U.S. hard power is increasing. I think that is also my impression.

And also I think currently the hard-line conservative approach in U.S. foreign policy is dominating the foreign policymaking. And also, you know, I met some friends from the Middle East, from Africa, from Latin America. Their consensus is an anti-United States sentiment, and the root cause is that the United States puts less emphasis on its soft power, and maybe they think it takes time and no current, imminent threats from terrorism, and it has to use hard power to solve or control that issue. But what I believe is that the United States should attach more and more importance to its soft power.

Some people in United States consider China's rise as China is eating a free lunch from the United States in Asia, and is trying to squeeze the United States out of Asia. I don't think
China has that intention. And China's former Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan spoke in Vietnam, in Hanoi, and said that we welcome a constructive role played by United States in Asia. We try to exist and cooperate, coordinate with the United States. Our intention is not to squeeze, not get the United States out of Asia, but try to coordinate with the United States.

DR. BUSH: Other views? Tomohiko?

MR. TANIGUCHI: If I can say a few words about Australia; Australia has long been a nation that Japan, I would say, has long taken for granted, because for Australia, Japan had long been its number one export target, export market, but now it's coming to be China. So the influence of China has been acutely felt in countries such as Australia.

And in my view, the way in which Australia has found itself in this part of the world is not dissimilar to the situation wherein Japan is increasingly finding itself. Economic dependency on China is growing, but at the same time, Australia and Japan are strengthening their ties with United States. Indeed when what's called an East Asia Summit is proposed, it's been Japan that's drawn Australia into the framework, and so Australia is going to be the full-fledged partner, full-fledged member of this caucus from the beginning, well, in large part to offset the increasing influence of the Chinese. That's the dynamic of geopolitics in East Asia.

DR. BUSH: I agree with what you said, Jing Quan, about hard power and soft power. I would note even on the hard power side that global posture review may lead to less U.S. military presence in East Asia, particularly South Korea, and that may have an impact on our influence as well.

Mike?

QUESTIONER: Michael McDevitt. If I may, I'd like to conduct a mini poll of the five of you. After 10 months in the United States, certainly you've all at one point or another discussed U.S. policy toward North Korea, and we've heard a little bit about that today. So my first polling question--I'd just like you to raise your hands--is how many of you think that North Korea is actually willing to trade away its nuclear weapons program?

[Jing, Park, and Zhu raise hands.]

QUESTIONER: For the three of you who raised your hands—

DR. PARK: I am not sure [hand only half-raised].

[Laughter.]

QUESTIONER: For those of you who responded in the affirmative or not so sure, how many of you think that they're willing to keep any agreement they make with regard to trading away their nuclear weapons program?
MR. JING: Conditions, as long as U.S. is sincere.

[Laughter.]

QUESTIONER: And the final question of my mini poll is, how many of you are willing to live with North Korea as a nuclear weapons state?

[No one raises hand.]

Thank you.

DR. BUSH: So, Mike, what are the implications of those answers for—

QUESTIONER: The implication to my question is, now put yourself in the position of trying to make U.S. policy, and come up with a reasonable, satisfactory approach to the very difficult problem.

DR. PARK: I think the verification is the most important thing, but in order for the United States to verify, you need to have your embassy in Pyongyang, and then people go there and verify them. I think in North Korea nowadays that they really want to have normalization with the United States. That's the major security guarantee for them.

But several days ago Mr. Hill gave a speech at the Congress, and when the Congress asked him, "What is the precondition of the normalization," he said, you know, North Korea solves its human rights problem, its nonproliferation problem— Well, if those problems disappear, then we can normalize our relations with North Korea. I don't think that is the correct approach.

DR. BUSH: Next question.

QUESTIONER: I have a simple question, but the answer could be real complicated. In all the Asian countries except China - Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other nations would find a very interesting phenomenon, that is, those countries' economic relationships with China are much warmer than the political relationship with China. I know there are many answers for this, but what do you think is the most important reason for this kind of phenomenon?

DR. ZHU: I think actually we need to look more broadly than this bilateral economic relationship with China. If we look at the trade supply chain, actually we found most of the imports from Taiwan, we export to United States. So the U.S. is the final destination. So if you look at the whole picture, their original source is Japan, and then they are shipped across Hong Kong, then assembled in China, and exported to United States. Everyone inside the region gets the trade with United States. I think that's the situation.
MR. JING: In the broader sense, you know, I used to work in the Chinese embassy in Thailand. I know Thailand's strategy is to have a dance with China and to have some disco with United States.

[Laughter.]

MR. JING: We understand the situation of those small countries, those ASEAN countries. That is what they really need, actually, to have to have very positive relations with those big powers. And when they, you know, deal with economic issues with China or with other big powers, they may apply the liberalism approach. And when they deal with political issues, they may apply a realist or nationalist approach. And when they deal with culture, people-to-people exchanges, they may apply a constructive approach.

So I think they put much more emphasis on different aspects.

DR. BUSH: Kun, South Korea here is a little bit unique I think because its both political relations and economic relations with China are quite warm or positive.

DR. PARK: I'm not directly addressing your question but a related one. I got a cold. I had to cough. I took the medicine, and it takes effect now.

[Laughter.]

DR. PARK: I'm a little drowsy, but the United States is Korea's old friend. We have shared a friendship for more than 50 years. China is a new friend, and I think most South Koreans are fascinated by having a new friend who we don't know a lot about.

I want to mention that in Korea there is a saying that the best friend is an old friend. So you guys are our best friend. And also they are asking that you respect our right to have a new friend. I think that's the trend, especially among younger generations in South Korea.

DR. BUSH: Dr. Chen?

QUESTIONER: Chen Wen-yen from the Formosan Association for Public Affairs. There's a great debate now in the United States as to the nature of the rise of China. I was just curious how Korea or Japan or China itself perceive them as arising as peaceful or as threatening?

DR. BUSH: Well, Jing Quan, we'll have you last. Okay. Tomohiko?

MR. TANIGUCHI: Every aspect of the relationship between Japan and China is mixed. The economic dependence of Japan's economy on China is constantly growing. China is now the number one trading partner for Japan, exceeding the United States. It's the prime recipient of Japanese foreign direct investment, already surpassing the United States.
But as the previous questioner pointed out, the political relationship between the two nations has been in great stalemate. But if you look at the geo-strategic situation, what's worrying, obviously, is China's lack of transparency in its military conduct. No one can tell for sure whether Chinese military is going to be as accountable a military as what you have in this country or what we have in Japan.

So in my view China poses simply uncertainties. China could become a full-fledged democracy, prosperous industrial nation. There's one possibility for that. But there is another possibility that China could become a hegemonic, undemocratic nation in 20 years time. Maybe we are at the crossroads, but we must be prepared, so that's a cautious view.

DR. PARK: I think a fair assessment would be if we, including the United States, consider China as a threat, and treat China like that, then China may be forced to become a threat to the international community. But if we consider China as benign, if we treat China like the benign one, there is a probability that China becomes a secure member of the international community.

I'm not saying this is the correct prediction, but I think it has policy implications for the United States especially.

MS. LIU: I think it's complex. As a Taiwanese, as a neighbor of China, when they passed a kind of anti-secession law, we think it's threatening, but when they invite some businessmen to China, I think it's a good thing because we can make some money in China. So as the Taiwanese Government talks about how can we have a good relationship with China, should we have a precondition? China has to, you know, tell the neighboring countries that they have rights in the Western Pacific Ocean. Then we can see other future trends of China arising peacefully.

MR. JING: Okay. My comment is, first, you know, recently the DOD is just preparing for the annual China report, but there are some controversial issues. The CIA and State Department, they would not agree about the Chapter 2, what is the implication for China's military capability, and the report was returned to the DOD for a full revision. But Rumsfeld's speech at Singapore’s Shangrila dialogue really showed the United States' concern about China's military capability.

I think generally speaking, United States is exaggerating China's capability and China's intentions. And second, maybe this kind of rhetoric is to try to justify United States' military expenditure. And third is that the capability is changing. You have to put more emphasis on intentions, because capability comes from intention but cannot determine intention. Only intention can determine capability.

We Chinese people, we stay in China. We don't have any sense to disturb any people or any country in other region. And why? Why should the United States try to create a kind of
atmosphere, or try to force us to accept that China is a threat or China’s rise is a threat? But I have to admit that when some countries increase capability, you have to tell the other countries clearly about what is your intention. That is why Mr. Zheng Bijian developed the concept, the ideology, the theory of China's peaceful rise. But one obstacle for this theory is how we view peaceful rise, how you deal with the Taiwan question. And after one year's rethinking, I think several months ago China gave a new theory that when we face the Taiwan question and when we are forced to choose between economic development and sovereignty and territorial integrity, which we should choose? The answer is sovereignty. If there is no sovereignty, economic development will be meaningless.

So I think first other countries just exaggerate China's intentions. The Chinese people and the Chinese Government don't have any sense, any willingness to threaten any one. Second, you know, China has to clearly tell the other countries its real strategic intention.

DR. PARK?: By the way, Jing Quan, my colleague, capability can determine intentions, I think. If you see a very expensive Gucci handbag, but you don't have anything, you have nothing in your pocket, you don't have intentions.

[Laughter.]

MR. JING: I believe it can influence, but not determine. It is not the ultimate determining factor.

DR. BUSH: I would note that Mr. Zheng Bijian, whom Jing Quan referred to, spoke to Brookings last Thursday, and his very interesting speech is on the Brookings website.

Sonia, you had your hand up.

QUESTIONER: My question was, if the six-party talks were to resume in July, would Japan's position towards North Korea continue to depend on the abduction issue, and if there were going to be any economic incentives on the table to North Korea, do you think that Japan would take part in that?

My second question was, seeing as the Koizumi administration will be ending next year, do you think that there's any room for Koizumi to engage North Korea as it did in previous years, as it did twice in the two summits that were held?

MR. TANIGUCHI: Well, at the moment the Japanese Government is waiting to see whether North Korea is coming back to the six-party talk table. If it comes, it's going to be too important to risk. As you pointed out, Japan has rather single-mindedly focused on the single issue of abduction. I for one have been pretty much troubled by that, because it has, I think, ruined Japan's capacity to deal broadly with North Korea. But gradually over the last three years, Japanese television networks have broadcast this same story over and over again. Enough is enough. The saturation point has come, I think. So the Japanese Government has
given greater room to deal with North Korea in conjunction with broader agendas that United States and others have set. So that's my point number one.

And the number two, Koizumi. I think the Koizumi Government is going to see once again whether this half-broken house is going to be put into order once again, the six-party talk is going to regain its momentum. Before that happens, I don't think anything can be done from the side of the Japanese.

MR. JING: Can I add one point? Japan's position in the previous six-party talks, you know, is, no [inaudible], it's on issues. I think if the talks resume in July, in the near future, I think Japan should promote contribution to the talks, also including Russia. Nowadays you can say just China and the United States and South Korea played a major role.

DR. BUSH: Mike?

QUESTIONER: Will I get another question?

DR. BUSH: Quickly.

QUESTIONER: This is a quick one.

DR. BUSH: Okay.

QUESTIONER: Jing Quan, you indicated that if China had to choose between sovereignty and economic development, the choice would be—

MR. JING: Forced to choose.

QUESTIONER: Forced to choose, I understand, forced to choose. Now, if the government was forced to choose between reconciling the internal discontinuities going on in China or sovereignty, would it choose between sovereignty or reconciling internal problems such as the disparity in income, the lack of social safety nets and all of those sorts of things?

MR. JING: I guess, you know, this question is always the most important and sensitive issue for China. It's not simply an issue of sovereignty, it's related to history, to humiliation, to China's reputation, to China's--you can't say it really it's to the regime, isn't the same, and to the regime's power. So we cannot compromise on this issue. Any Chinese government cannot compromise on this issue. They cannot afford the possibility of permanent loss of Taiwan.

But on the other hand, no one in the world has more willingness than the Chinese people to use peaceful means to solve this issue. We have already clearly reiterated many times that we will try our best with the most sincerity to achieve a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution of the Taiwan issue. But, you know, if someone insists that Taiwan move toward independence, we have to stop that trend.
But you know, China's behavior also changes a lot. In previous years they maybe applied more deterrence, but nowadays they apply more persuasion coordination. Plus they apply more incentives, economic encouragements, and I think that is a good thing.

In the future I think relations between Taiwan and between the Mainland are optimistic, but there are still a lot of uncertainties. [The Taiwanese opposition leaders’] visits to China just, you know, set up a bridge. And I think now the ruling government, the DPP ruling party, should take advantage of this bridge, not just ignore the bridge, or just burn or destroy this bridge. I think they should move to the middle line and try to work out relations, because Taiwan's security ultimately relies on whether it could work out favorable stable relations with the Mainland.

DR. BUSH: Question back there?

MS. LIU: Excuse me. Can I add some?

I have a completely different perspective of this question compared to my Chinese colleague here. I would say that there's just a simple answer. If you want Taiwanese to choose the different political system, I think 99 percent of Taiwanese want to choose their political system. If you force Taiwanese to merge into China in a kind of system without any democracy; I don't think American people will agree with that. That's why we would keep our sovereignty as independent as possible. And no one people can ask the people, all the people of Taiwan, to choose to be independent unless they make their own decisions.

I think it is the core value of the democracy. Everybody in this room understands it very well. That's why we would tell the people, I mean my neighboring country in China, that it's simple. We don't have any argument with the shared common value with Americans. But how come most of Taiwanese people won't be part of China? I think the people of Taiwan fight for survival, and the people of China just fight for not losing face with regard to the Taiwan issue.

MR. JING: Just one point. I don't believe democracy is equal to independence, and on this issue, I think the United States and China share the common interest that we oppose independence. Publicly, the United States President and other government officials will say we do not support independence, but when leaders meet together, they say, "We oppose Taiwan independence." And United States leaders sometimes say, "I strongly oppose Taiwan"—why? Because there is a real danger of dragging this into the conflict. They know the consequences. And I think every country will place the highest emphasis on sovereignty, not just China. And of course, we will try to shape political integration through economic integration, but we also recognize this is a long process, and if we cannot stop this problem for the time being, maybe just keep the status quo. That is our position.

DR. BUSH: You've been very patient back there.
QUESTIONER: I think that the position of Korean Peninsula is a main cause of the conflict among East Asian countries, that if time to think about the future of the Korean Peninsula, I mean that we should think about the future of North Korea. I believe along with many South Koreans, that engagement or cooperation in North Korea will make North Korea change, and also South Koreans can accomplish unification in the future.

In the sense that nowadays that there are talks between South and North, and then these talks, we would have the stability in Northeast Asia because it will be eventually changing North Korean and then it can solve the nuclear issue.

But the South Korean perception is quite different from some of the American perceptions of North Korea. So it's time to think about unification of the Korean Peninsula, how it can help the stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia, and then how can it be accomplished by the cooperation among Japan, China and South Korea, and also the USA?

So could you give me some comments about the engagement and then cooperation between South and North Korea, unification, and also the nuclear issues? I want to hear from the other countries.

DR. BUSH: I think we can have a whole program on that subject. Does anybody want to provide a short answer, and then maybe you can continue the discussion in the reception?

MR. JING: I will just provide you some perspective from China. China hopes that North Korea will follow China's path of economic reform and opening to the outside world, and that China has tried such effort; I think you are pretty clear about this.

And second, China's willing to support the eventual integration or reunification between North and South because China has the same problem. We understand the feeling of Korean people.

And third, when you apply a bargaining strategy you have to include persuasion accommodation and coercion together. No, there is too much coercion but not enough—too much coercion and persuasion, but not enough accommodation.

In terms of arms control, you know, the imminent threat, you have to apply accommodation, enough accommodation. That means a not-perfect deal is better than no deal at all. And you have to offer some sincerity with North Korea. Treat North Korea as a normal sovereign country. You have to respect your enemy and leave your enemy a face-saving way.

DR. PARK: I wish I could have a North Korean colleague today for a lively discussion. I think there should be a distinction between appeasement and engagement. Appeasement is a policy of a weaker player. Engagement is a strategy of a stronger one. Believe me, that if United States and other nations in East Asia can help us to deal with North Korea, we will make
their country very secure and stable, and probably make it a democratic nation, not in 10 years, but it takes time. But I think it would work.

And the most important thing is, engagement will change the identity and values of North Korea. So help us.

[Laughter.]

DR. BUSH: On that note, it's time to close the program. Let me express a couple of elements of gratitude.

First of all, I'm very pleased that the crashing of the sign didn't result in a workman's compensation action because it would have caused a lot of trouble.

Second, thank you all for coming, and for making this a very lively discussion.

And finally, thanks to each of the five of you for being such wonderful colleagues over the last 10 months, and we wish you very well as you go on in your careers, and you will always be a member of the Brookings family.

Thank you.

[Applause.]