AN AGENDA FOR ACTION:
The 2002 Doha Conference on
U.S. Relations with the Islamic World

SHEIKH HAMAD BIN KHALIFA AL-THANI

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The Saban Center for Middle East Policy
at The Brookings Institution
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THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY 
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NOTE FROM THE PROJECT CONVENORS

The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World was launched in January 2002, with the mission of promoting positive relations between the U.S. and Muslim countries and movements. With the generous support of the Government of Qatar, it convened the 2002 Doha Conference on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, held from October 19–21, 2002. The meeting examined the political, cultural, social, religious, and economic dynamics shaping relations between the Islamic world and the U.S. The conference was a unique effort, bringing together more than seventy leading policymakers, journalists, and scholars from the United States and over twenty five countries across the Islamic world (including Muslim communities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia). At Doha, they engaged in three days of discussion, exchanging ideas and perspectives in an exploration of new suggestions for policymaking.

The Doha conference comprised a series of plenary sessions and smaller task force meetings, designed to promote a more in-depth dialogue. Each session began with two opening presentations, one by a participant from the Islamic world and one by a participant from the United States. These speeches were followed by a general discussion among all the attendees. The speeches and discussions were often intense, but always fruitful. Along the way, we explored many of the most vital issues of concern between the U.S. and the Islamic world, including: the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Palestinian-Israeli violence, tensions with Iraq, globalization and the Islamic world, the role of the new media, the future of democratization, and the influence of the Gulf states on the wider Islamic world.

Given ongoing events, this kind of dialogue is especially valuable. As such, we are pleased to make available the various opening presentations made to the conference. They reveal not only the diverse perspectives on critical issues that facing the U.S. and the Islamic world together, but also the many areas of agreement and potential cooperation in the years ahead. Our hope is that through the continuation of such dialogues, we can continue to build strong bridges of friendship, which will help avoid the perils of any “clash of civilizations.”

We grateful to His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, the Emir of Qatar, not only for his government’s generosity in backing such an important outreach effort, but also for his personal participation in the conference. We are also appreciative of the support and participation of Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamed Bin Jasim Bin Jaber Al-Thani and the rest of the Foreign Ministry of Qatar. Ambassador at Large Mohammad Giham Al-Kawari merits special thanks.

We are also thankful for the generosity of the MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Education and Employment Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, Haim Saban, and the Brookings Institution for their support of the Project’s activities. We would also like to acknowledge the hard work of Dr. Peter W. Singer, our Project Coordinator, and our support staff of Mr. Scott Cory, Mr. Haim Malka, Ms. Ellen McHugh, and Mr. Sean Shechter.

Professor Stephen Philip Cohen  
*Project Co-Convenor*

Ambassador Martin Indyk  
*Project Co-Convenor*

Professor Shibley Telhami  
*Project Co-Convenor*
The attacks of September 11, 2001 were traumatic events in and of themselves. However, one of the most disturbing aspects was the aftermath. There were a wide variety of responses across what is known as the Islamic world (this includes not only the founding hub in the Middle East, but also other Muslim countries and movements in Africa, Europe, the former Soviet states in Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and beyond). These ranged from expressions of heartfelt sympathy for the victims to celebration of the attackers and denial of responsibility. Thus, the attacks were not only momentous on their own merits, but also in the way their after-effects raised a series of profound questions for both American policy and the broader relations between the United States and Muslim states and communities. The related challenges—ranging from the war on terrorism, the Mideast peace process, and human development—became the new center of global affairs and will be at the heart of international politics for years to come.

In many ways, the attacks and the varied responses to them were the culmination of a longer-term political process that has seen increasing alienation between the U.S. and the wider Islamic world. Polling has found anti-American sentiment to be fairly consistent in most Islamic countries, while the continuing violence in the Middle East, particularly between the Israelis and Palestinians, has hardened attitudes in recent years. In turn, American public attitudes towards the Islamic world have also been altered by the shock of the attacks and the continuing terrorist campaign against American interests around the world. The overall consequence is that there has been a deepening of tension between the U.S. and the wider Islamic world. It often complicated the relationships, policies, and perceptions between the U.S. and Muslim states and movements before the attacks and has even more so afterwards.

While suspicion and antipathy have now become the hallmarks of these relations, in reality the mainstreams of the two sides share both common foes and common interests. Finding this common ground is an essential element in developing a comprehensive, longer-term policy aimed at reestablishing good relations. This must occur even while addressing the immediate dangers, by eliminating the al-Qaeda network of terrorists that has attempted to sets the two worlds at odds.

Fundamental to the widening divide between the Islamic World and the U.S. is a relative lack of

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1 Dr. Peter Warren Singer is Coordinator of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World. Please note that this summary represents only the views of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World. It is a synopsis of the various threads of discussions at the 2002 Doha Conference. It is not reflective of any one attendee's personal views.
communication and interaction between their leaders and thinkers. Transatlantic dialogues have a long history; for American and European leaders and thinkers to gather and discuss their views has become a routine occurrence. Over recent decades, there has been a similar explosion of exchanges between American leaders and their Asian counterparts. By contrast, there remains a near vacuum in interaction and exchange between leaders and thinkers from the U.S. and the Islamic world. This absence of dialogue contributes to ignorance, misunderstanding, conspiracy theories, and, ultimately, poor relations. Most importantly, it renders more difficult the urgent task of finding common ground.

THE BROOKINGS PROJECT AND THE DOHA CONFERENCE

It was with this challenge in mind that the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World was launched in January 2002. Since then, its mission has been to promote better understanding between America and Muslim countries and movements. Among its activities are an analysis paper series, an initiative on education and economic reform, a visiting fellows program, and a Washington-based task force made up of policymakers and experts, which met more than ten times before the Doha Conference to explore critical issues and policy needs. One of the critical voids it discovered early on was the absence of high-level discussion between the U.S. and the wider Islamic world.

With the generous support of the Government of Qatar, the Project convened The 2002 Doha Conference on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. The meeting was designed to examine the political, cultural, social, religious, and economic dynamics shaping the relations between Muslim states and movements and America. The Conference brought together over seventy leading thinkers and practitioners from across the Islamic world and more than twenty-five from the U.S. They were a diverse group in both outlook and expertise, ranging from foreign ministers and other senior government officials to journalists, professors, and civil society activists.

Our collective goal was to exchange perspectives and to inform the wider policy debate. An important by-product was to help fill the absence of positive dialogue between the U.S. and Muslim states and movements. With its premium on frank discussion, the conference succeeded in breaking the ice. It received both positive feedback from the participants and widespread media coverage in the Islamic world. In particular, participants welcomed the opportunity for interaction and the sharing of perspectives not just between the U.S. and Islamic sides but also within the Islamic world, where it emerged that the perspectives of non-Arab Muslims was often quite different to those from within the Arab world.

The structure of the meetings encompassed public meetings, private plenary sessions and smaller "breakout" task forces. Each session had opening speakers from both the Islamic world and the United States. Substantial effort went into recruiting leading experts for these presentations and ensuring geographical and ideological diversity. The opening speeches were then followed by moderated discussion among the varied attendees, held off the record, so as to promote more candid and forthright exchanges.

AN AGENDA FOR ACTION

The discussions at the Doha conference were often heated, as the topics covered some of the most controversial issues in U.S.-Islamic relations. These included the impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks, Palestinian-Israeli violence, tensions with Iraq, globalization and the Islamic world, the role of the new media, the future of democratization, human development issues, Islamist groups in politics, and the influence of the Gulf states on the wider Islamic world. Yet, as the discussions developed, a surprising amount of agreement emerged. Not all
participants saw eye to eye; given the diversity of
views that was hardly likely. However, this forum of
open and honest discussion was able to generate
substantial, and often surprising, areas of concord.

The following points of discussion and agreement
involve only a brief summary of the findings of the
Doha conference. Several months after the conference,
it is interesting that these issues still remain at the cen-
ter of relations between the U.S. and the Islamic world,
and global order by extension. Most importantly, they
illustrate the vast challenges before us. In these chal-
lenges, though, lie great opportunities. As we look
towards the future, the issues discussed at Doha and
the potential agenda they offer may provide a direc-
tion for U.S. policy in coming years.

The Need To Better Relations
A central paradox facing America is that while its
power is at its greatest height, global esteem for the
U.S. is at its depths. The U.S. is widely perceived as
arrogant and anti-Muslim. This perception is height-
ened by both the rise of new media outlets in the Arab
world, as well as certain policies, in particular the
Bush Administration’s disengagement from the
Middle East peace process, which created the impres-
sion of a lack of concern for the Palestinian cause that
resonated in many parts of the Islamic world. The
resulting anger, combined with a preference for
conspiracy theories, has obscured the truth of al
Qaeda’s responsibility for the 9-11 attacks, which is
still widely denied or disbelieved.

Perhaps most illustrative of the worsening dynamic is
that a full year after 9-11, what Americans call a “war
on terrorism” is broadly interpreted as a “war on
Islam” by the world’s Muslims. Thus, America’s origi-
nal message, that tried to explain and justify its
response to an unprovoked act of aggression, has
somehow backfired. For the global power to be viewed
this way by the Muslim umma is harmful to both par-
ties and world stability in general. It is also disheart-
ening, considering their wide areas of agreement on
common interests and policy goals.

Human Development Is A Root Concern
Failing educational systems and economic stagnation
are two fundamental problems that hold back the real-
ization of human potential in many Muslim regions.
These issues are important in and of themselves, as
they affect tens of millions of struggling citizens.
However, the relative lack of opportunity for the next
generation of young Muslims may also fuel political
violence and add to global tensions. The need to build
human capital therefore requires urgent attention.

In this respect, the UNDP Human Development Report
has provided the foundations for a new agenda for
change in the Arab world. It is important that the report
is from Arabs, written to Arabs, much different from
past critiques of the state of affairs in the heartland of the
Islamic world. Its often-shocking data clarifies how the
Arab world is falling behind not just the West, but also
other developing regions across a number of areas
of developmental success. It gives force to arguments in
support of urgent socio-economic transformation.

Local Reform Movements Merit Support
There was general agreement on the need for political,
economic, and social reform within the Islamic world.
Given its size and interests, an essential reality is that
the U.S. is simply unable to stand aside from this
process. However, it should not impose its visions, but
should seek to encourage local reform forces, who bet-
ter know their own needs than outsiders. The central
challenge that will be faced in the coming years (and
therefore merits further exploration) is how exactly to
support these movements from the outside, without
destroying their internal credibility.

In some cases, states may be too big and their regimes
too resistant to press effectively for reform. An alterna-
tive strategy may be to encourage and support change
in the smaller states, where reform is more possible
and manageable. People within larger states can then
cite these effective counter-examples as evidence in
their own battles for internal reform. In a sense, this
would be a “periphery-first” strategy for advancing a
reform agenda in the Islamic world.
The rich diversity within the Islamic world also offers a potential hinge for reform efforts. The varied regions offer exciting examples of countries wrestling with all the critical issues, from how Islam and democracy can co-exist to how Muslim countries can become players in, rather than victims of, globalization. It is in the interest of all to encourage more intra-Islam discussions and forums, so that learning and exchange can promote better policies.

U.S.-Islamic World Relations May Not Be Unique
There was a clear demand from the Muslim participants for consistency in policy. Surprising was a call for the U.S. to treat the Islamic world no different than other regions when pressing on human rights. The U.S. should follow efforts in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe for successes and possible models on how to influence change and reform.

One possible example of this is the role of local civil society. An effective and low cost avenue of intervention is to seek to support and protect Muslim intellectuals (such as those civil society and academic leaders who call for change), akin to the backing outsiders provided to East European dissidents during the Helsinki process.

Islamists: Inclusion Is Better Than Exclusion
A particular issue facing many states is the rise of Islamist parties. This can be interpreted as a threat to stability or a reaction to dynamic social forces and the failure of governments to keep pace with change.

In dealing with burgeoning democracies, a general finding is that outside parties should support integration of Islamist parties into political system rather than exclusion. The key is that inclusion keeps moderates moderate, rather than forcing them outside the power structures, into possible violence.

The Need For Public Diplomacy
Conspiracy theories on one side and ignorance on the other hamper relations and complicate serious efforts to enact good policy. In particular there is a dire need for the U.S. to be more sensitive to the concerns of Muslims states and communities.

The U.S. must develop better public diplomacy, seeking to reverse this general feeling. Beyond the glossy pamphlets and T.V. commercials, there is also a need to create better understanding within the Islamic world of how American political processes work, which will help counter the widespread conspiracy theories and other unrealistic expectations that feed anti-Americanism.

In turn, Muslim leaders need to do a much better job of explaining the complexities of their own policy options and decisions to American opinion leaders, most particularly Congress and the media. Muslim civil society leaders should also seek to better connect with American counterparts, rather than acting in isolation or waiting to be contacted.

Ultimately, there remains a need for better outreach and connection between the peoples of the two groups. A challenge to this, though, is Washington’s recent decision to limits visas, particularly to young Muslim students. We need cross-cultural ambassadors in this generation more than ever, but the presently arduous policy produces the opposite.

A U.S.-Iraq War Will Have Great Consequences
A war between the U.S. and Iraq, followed by the occupation of a Muslim country by a Western is a momentous development in U.S.-Islamic world relations. It will definitely cause stress on local regimes and could lead to widespread anti-Americanism among Muslim publics. Many contend that the backlash might be surprising in its extent. It will be felt across the Islamic world, not just in the Gulf, but potentially as far as Pakistan and Indonesia. The effort will also widely be interpreted as part of an imperialist design.

Much will depend on whether the U.S. can succeed in promoting the emergence of a representative, pluralistic government in Iraq. Failure, combined with a
prolonged military presence in Iraq could have very negative consequences for U.S.-Islamic world relations. Conversely, success in Iraq could have a profound impact on political reform in the Arab heartland of the Islamic world.

The Importance of Pursuing Middle East Peace
One cannot understate the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on U.S.-Islamic world relations. Just as the U.S. increasingly views the Muslim world though the prism of a war on terrorism, the continuation of violence between the Israelis and Palestinians and the extent of U.S. involvement in efforts to stop it is the prism through which U.S. credibility is judged in the Muslim world. Indeed, the conflict and one’s position on it has become the new lingua franca for political discussion within the Islamic world, and thus overshadows dialogue about the need for reform.

While the views varied, there was general agreement that U.S. will be unable to make serious progress on any single issue—Iraq, war on terror, democratization, etc., until it is seen as also working for peace in the region. Therefore, it is a strategic priority to restart the peace process at the same time as the U.S. promotes its reform agenda in the Islamic world.

CONCLUSIONS: ONLY A FIRST STEP

The following sections include the opening speeches made by both American and Muslim speakers at each session. They provide an incredible resource, discussing in greater detail the issues that lie at the center of our relations and the varied perspectives on them. More importantly, they evidence that while the U.S. and the Islamic world may sometimes differ in our opinions, we can all agree on the utility of dialogue as a means to greater understanding.

The 2002 Doha Conference on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World was applauded as a great success by both attendees and press reports. However, none left fully satisfied that the job is anywhere near done. Our ultimate hope is that the conference is only the first step towards building informed and positive relations.

Perhaps the best point of conclusion is actually what was said at the Conference’s opening event. As His Highness, Sheikh Hamad bin Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, stated in his keynote address, “There is no alternative but to sit together and jointly arrive at solutions for our problems. Through such solutions, we can start planning for a joint future where we cooperate for the benefit of our peoples and societies to realize a better world for the present and future generations; a world based on a common belief in the principles of justice, human rights, and mutual openness among all peoples, nations, and cultures.”
PROGRAM OF EVENTS

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 19, 2002
5:30 PM WELCOME RECEPTION
6:30 PM KEYNOTE ADDRESS AND OPENING SESSION
   Keynote Speaker:
   His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa
   Al-Thani, Emir of The State of Qatar

Sponsors:
H.E. Sheikh Hamad Bin Jasim Bin Jaber
Al-Thani, Foreign Minister of The State of Qatar
Martin Indyk,
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
at The Brookings Institution
Shibley Telhami,
Professor, University of Maryland; Non-resident
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Stephen Philip Cohen,
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Speakers:
Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International
Sadegh Zibakalam, Professor, Tehran University

7:30 PM DINNER FOR SPONSORS AND ATTENDEES / PLENARY DISCUSSION: “THE FORCES
SHAPING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD.”
   Moderator:
   Rami Khouri,
   Senior Regional Analyst, International Crisis
   Group; Former Editor, Jordan Times

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2002
9:00 AM PLENARY DISCUSSION: “Martyrs
OR MURDERERS? TERRORISM AND
SUICIDE BOMBINGS”
   Moderator:
   Stephen Philip Cohen,
   Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Opening Speakers:
Sheikh Youssef Al Qaradawi, University of Qatar
Khaled Abou el Fadl, Alfi Fellow, University of
California Los Angeles School of Law

10:30 AM TASK FORCE A: “WHAT WENT WRONG,
IF ANYTHING? SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD”
   Moderator:
   Mona Makram Ebeid, Former Member of
Parliament; Professor of Political Science,
American University, Cairo

Opening Speakers:
Ibrahim Karawan, Professor, University of
Utah and Director of Middle East Center
Munira Fakhro,
Professor of Sociology, University of Bahrain

10:30 AM TASK FORCE B: “INFORMATION OR
INSTIGATION? THE ROLE OF THE NEW
MEDIA IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD”
   Moderator:
   Imad Moustapha, Director of Information
Technology, Damascus University
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<td>9:00 AM</td>
<td>Report of Task Forces by Moderators</td>
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<td>10:00 AM</td>
<td>Plenary Discussion: “Islam and Globalization”</td>
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<td>Ejaz Haider, News Editor, The Friday Times (Pakistan)</td>
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<td>Thomas Friedman, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, The New York Times</td>
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<td>Gehad Auda, Professor of Political Science, Helwan University, Cairo</td>
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<td>12:30 PM</td>
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<td>Hamad Abdulaziz Al-Kawari, Columnist and Political Analyst</td>
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<td>Shibley Telhami, Professor, University of Maryland; Non-resident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution</td>
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<td>FOLLOWED BY Roundtable Discussion: “The Challenges Ahead in U.S.-Islamic Relations”</td>
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<td>Thomas Friedman, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, The New York Times</td>
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<td>Hamid Ansari, Former Ambassador of India to Afghanistan, United Arab Emirates, United Nations</td>
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<td>7:30 PM</td>
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<td>Abdel Hamid Al Ansari, Dean of Sharia College, University of Qatar</td>
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INTRODUCTION:
Martin Indyk, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution

KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar.

MARTIN INDYK:
Your Highness, gathered here in Doha this evening are some 20 delegates from the United States and some 50 delegates from 25 Islamic countries. We are here as a result of your generous support and sponsorship of this conference.

In offering our heartfelt gratitude to you and to the state of Qatar, I want also to express appreciation for your enlightened leadership of your country and for your vision of a political and economic and educational reform process that strives to reconcile the deep religious and cultural traditions of your society with the demands of modernization and globalization.

Your Highness, we convene here at a time of great uncertainty and considerable anxiety. War clouds are gathering in this part of the world and in the United States we have been at war now since our nation and people were attacked in an horrendous act of unprovoked aggression one year ago.

One of the casualties of this war is understanding between our peoples. A great gap has opened up between the United States and the Islamic world and for the past year our discourse seems to have been dominated at times more by shouting at each other than by listening to each other.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 the Brookings Institution established under the auspices of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy a major project on U.S. policy towards the Islamic world. Through analysis and research, a visiting fellows program for scholars from the Islamic world, an initiative on private sector outreach to the Islamic world and a task force that brings together in Washington some 50 experts and policymakers on Islamic politics and U.S. foreign policy, we have been seeking to fill that gap with the kind of understanding that can come from the exchange of ideas backed by in-depth research.

Recognizing the value of such a project, Your Highness was quick to offer support for the effort. Qatar’s sponsorship was followed by funding from the Ford Foundation, the McArthur Foundation, the Economic Outreach Foundation and now the U.S. Institute of Peace.

In making this conference in Doha possible, Your Highness, you have provided us with a unique opportunity to engage in a dialogue with scholars from across the Islamic world from Indonesia through South Asia.
and the Middle East to North Africa. I believe this is the first occasion since September the 11th that so many scholars have gathered together from so many different countries with one common objective: to see if we can reach a better understanding of each other's perspectives and from this foundation to generate ideas for overcoming our deep differences and promoting better relations between the United States and the Islamic world.

This will not be an easy task. I'm sure that we will have some heated exchanges in the next two days, but I am confident that in the end we will be able to identify a way forward on a path that you, Your Highness, have already begun to light up yourself as you lead the way on behalf of your nation. For the leadership you've shown and for the support you've provided for our ambitious endeavor I want to thank you.

HIS HIGHNESS SHEIKH HAMAD BIN KHALIFA AL-THANI:

In the name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful, Mr. Chairman, your excellencies, honorable guests, esteemed audience, first I would like to welcome you in Doha, wishing you a pleasant stay and successful conference on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World.

The relations between the United States and the Arab and Islamic worlds are of paramount importance. We consider them as a vital foundation, which we seek to reinforce in order to realize our common interests and ambitions. We advocate the principle of dialogue aimed at deepening the scope of understanding and establishing the basis of mutual respect, friendship and cooperation between our countries and societies.

The significance of relations between our Arab and Muslim countries and the West in general and the United States in particular is neither new nor accidental to our strategic and political concepts. It represents a real expression of historical facts, which nobody can ignore or overlook the realities they involve.

Our relations with the United States are not dictated upon as by common interests and objectives only, but we are also in agreement with it on many basic matters inherent in our beliefs and ambitions.

A good deal of the founding principles of the American society, which are, in fact, pillars of contemporary Western civilization, are not isolated from the sublime values and tenets, which we cherish in our Arab and Islamic civilization. We believe in justice, liberty, equality, respect of human rights, equal opportunities, encourage the spirit of initiative and seek hard to establish popular participation as a basis for the decision-making process and conducting government and administration affairs in our country. Moreover, we are keen on laying the basis of our foreign policy on the principles of international legality, coexistence and mutual respect.

If these principles are sometimes not properly applied in some of our societies, this is not due to a deficiency in these principles and beliefs but rather due to the way they are applied.

These principles are derived from the teachings of our true Islamic religion, which instructs us to respect other heavenly religions and open up to their followers. We also derive from them our contemporary view of the West, its civilization and communities as a major partner in our endeavor to realize the objectives of development and progress in our country.

However, this partnership and friendship does not mean detailed conformity in viewpoints nor the loss of identity. Allies and friends could never agree on everything. What is important is that they need to be candid and deal with each other on the basis of friendship, equality and mutual confidence.

We agree with the United States on many issues and bearings and consider the close relations that bind us as strategic priority in our foreign policy.

From this standpoint we did not hesitate at all to condemn the September 11th terrorist attacks against the
United States of America and expressed our deep sympathy with the victims of those attacks and the resulting losses and suffering of the innocent civilians.

In view of the dimensions of this event, its style, immensity and the gravity of its consequences, we called for the necessity of a deep search for its real causes and motives of its perpetrators. However, at the same time we stressed and still do stress the importance of differentiating between terrorism in all its forms and guises and the legitimate right of peoples to defending themselves, liberating their lands as well as their struggle to regain their rights.

We equally emphasize the importance of not making the mistake of attaching terrorism to a particular religion or a specific cultural civilization or one nationality or people. I am referring here to the misleading attempts that have unfortunately spread in some Western political, informational and social circles, especially the American in the wake of last year’s events, which sought to brand Islam as terrorism. Islam as a religion and culture and civilization is clear of terrorists and terrorism.

As for those who try to practice terrorism under the slogans of Islam, they are no different from the rest of the extremists who engaged in preaching the calls to fanaticism and isolation in all religions, societies and countries, whether they are Oriental or Occidental, Muslim or Christian or Jewish or otherwise. Fanaticism if fanaticism and terrorism is terrorism, whatever slogans, calls, methods or the affiliation of its perpetrators might be.

Ladies and gentlemen, we call upon the United States to deal with the Arab and Muslim issues with a greater measure of evenhandedness, fairness and equity. Let me be explicit on this point; we are not asking the United States to give up its special relations with Israel. We call upon it as a superpower to perform its international, political and moral responsibilities and obligations towards the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict in accordance with the resolutions of international legality and exert the necessary efforts and pressures on Israel to end its occupation of the Arab territories in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan Heights and the Lebanese Shebaa Farms so that it could be possible to achieve comprehensive fair and durable political settlement based on the U.S. resolutions.

In this respect, we appreciate the conception announced by President George Bush as a basis for settlement, yet we are still hoping to see the practical mechanisms and timetables by which this conception can be put to application.

Honorable audience, you undoubtedly agree with me as to the difficult and critical circumstances prevalent in the Gulf region and the Middle East. Our world is at a crucial crossroad. Perhaps the question of relations between the U.S. and the Arab and Islamic worlds, which is the axis of our deliberations at this conference, represents the best audience for the importance of the issues we are facing and the urgent need for finding the adequate solutions for them. We hope to start here to make the first basic step required in this respect, which is indispensable and unavoidable dialogue.

I would like to take the opportunity to propose to you establishing a permanent forum for an Islamic-American dialogue for the purpose of discussing the vital issues of interest to our countries and peoples. There is no other alternative but to sit together and to jointly arrive at solutions for our problems. Through such solutions we can start planning for a joint future where we cooperate for the benefit of our peoples and societies to realize a better world for the present and future generations, a world based on a common belief in the principles of justice, human rights and mutual openness among all peoples, nations and cultures.

Thank you for your attendance and attention. I wish you all success in your mission. May the peace and blessings of God be upon you.

*Note: Transcript by Federal News Service*
THE FORCES SHAPING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD

FAREED ZAKARIA:

I have only a brief while, so I thought I would try to tell you how I see American foreign policy evolving toward the Islamic and Arab world in particular over the next ten years.

The fundamental reality America faces today is that it wields power of a kind no country has ever wielded in modern history. It is sometimes difficult to recognize this in America, and I can tell you in going to speak to American audiences it takes a while to convince them, to make them realize the power of their country in the world.

To give you one simple example, Great Britain at the height of its power, when it ruled one-quarter of the world, had a navy that was always required to be larger than the navies of the next two countries put together. That was the symbol of its superpower status, that it had a navy larger than the next two navies.

The United States currently has a defense establishment that is larger than the next 15 countries put together. The largest Air Force in the world, of course, as you know, is the United States Air Force. The second largest Air Force in the world is the Air Force of the United States Navy.

The American economy today is larger than the next three economies put together; that is to say Germany, Japan and Great Britain.

I say this not in a boastful sense as an American but simply to point out that this is now part of the structure, the reality of international life. It is very difficult to see how it will change in the next few decades. There is no potential rival in sight that has the capacity or the intention to change this. Remember, of those 15 countries that the United States has a larger defense budget, most of them are American allies. So if you look at potential adversaries, American defense spending is something like 15:1 if you think of China or Russia.

This new circumstance has actually been one that Americans have been late and reluctant to understand. Throughout the 1990s, Americans tended to hope that somehow they would have a kind of holiday from their superpower role. The Cold War was over, and it was possible to “go back” and indeed political campaigns in the United States were fought on the idea of...
bringing America home. A very famous campaign slogan from the 1992 campaign was “The Cold War is over: Germany and Japan won.” Well, nobody remembers that anymore.

And indeed in crisis after crisis, if you look at the way in which we initially handled the Balkans, the way in which we handled problems in Africa, the way in which we handled the Russians, there was a tendency to hope that somehow this would be solved by itself or by the Europeans or by somebody else—an attitude that we were encouraged to have by the Europeans, by the Asians whenever these crises would take place.

But the lesson of the 1990s I believe was that in the end if America did not act and did not intervene forcefully, the crisis persisted and problems did not get solved. That is simply, as I say, part of the reality of the structure of international politics. Thus we intervened eventually in the Balkans and we intervened in Russia and East Asia financially. We didn’t do it perfectly and we didn’t do it as early as we could have in many cases.

One of the aspects that this growing power has produced is an increased awareness that the United States needs to have goals that are somewhat longer term and broader than the very narrow day-to-day ones. And you see this most forcefully I would argue in the recent national security document that the Bush administration has released. This is the document outlining their own strategic thinking. It outlines goals that are, in the words we use in the United States, Wilsonian. It talks about not just peace and security but justice, democracy, liberty and it talks about them in very explicit terms and in a way that is quite unusual in a conservative Republican administration, traditionally thought to be very realpolitik in its orientation.

This has always been part of American foreign policy, this attempt to combine power and idealism, but over the last 50 years there has been one great exception and that has been in U.S. policy toward the Arab world.

Now, when I say that we have combined power and idealism, I do not mean that we have done it always or consistently or in every case, but if you look at American foreign policy toward East Asia, toward Latin America, toward Africa, the United States has pushed allies and enemies alike toward political, economic, legal reform and it has pushed them in ways that have often been very uncomfortable for those countries—but it has pushed them nonetheless. This is simply part of American foreign policy.

The United States cannot be France. It is not a country that will concern itself with its narrow self-interest. Now, it will do so sometimes, hypocritically you might say, because it does it in one case and it doesn’t do it in others. Fair enough, I say, you’re right. But it will still do it. One way of looking at that is that it does it 50 percent of the time; another way of looking at it is that it does it only 50 percent of the time.

The one great exception has been the Middle East and there are three reasons for this: oil, Israel and fundamentalism.

The United States has not wanted to upset the strategic status quo for fears of interruptions and instability in oil supply.

It has also found it easier to handle the problem of negotiating peace when it has had identifiable interlocutors on the Arab side. It’s easier to deal with a Mubarak than God knows what after him when dealing with the issue of Israel and the Palestinians.

And, finally, of course, the issue of fundamentalism. On this issue many Arab regimes have made the case themselves. Every time an official of the stature of a Martin Indyk would go to Heliopolis and in one of those palaces meet with Hosni Mubarak and in the middle of the conversation would raise an issue about political reform, Mubarak would snap back, “If I do what you want me to do, tomorrow the fundamentalists will be in power.” The conversation would usually end. I’m not saying this specifically about Martin but using him as a metaphor.
I would argue that September 11th, 2001 will change all this and that we will look back at that date as the turning point in America’s relations with the Arab world and to a certain extent with the Islamic world. It is, in a sense, the end of illusions. It is an end of the illusion that the current relationship between the United States and the Middle East is stable. It is the end of the illusion that many of the societies and regimes are stable. It is an end of the illusion that the United States enjoys a benign and respected image in this world. It is an end of all those illusions.

So now comes the much more difficult task of grappling with what it means to recognize all the problems, all the vulnerabilities, all the threats that we face, internally and externally. I think this relationship can go in two directions. On the one hand you can imagine very easily the clash of civilizations becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as more and more people poison the atmosphere, which feeds the fanatics and makes it easier and easier for them to grow and makes reform of the kind you have been doing in Qatar more and more difficult. That is one scenario and in that scenario the relations with the United States will always be troubled, will always be poisoned because this new reality, I argue, will take root increasingly and in greater measure, regardless of which administration is in power.

But there is another possibility and that is that the United States and the Arab world can be partners in a process of reform in which we can each learn from the other and we can help the Arab world in areas where we have know-how and you can help us to achieve a more harmonious relationship between these two worlds.

It is not impossible. Let me close with this thought. People look at the United States’ relations with the Middle East with the Arab public, the Arab street and cannot imagine how it can get better, how the poison can come out, how the tension can come out. Well, I ask you to go back 30 years and ask yourself in what countries would you find a poisonous attitude—real hatred—toward the United States? If the American secretary of state went to a capital, where would they throw stones at him? Well, I would argue the answer is—I’m talking about the early 1970s now—Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, countries like that. What was going on in those countries? You had very repressive regimes that the United States was supporting. The public hated those regimes and they hated the United States for supporting them. Thirty years later we have slowly pressed for economic reform, political reform, and legal reform in those societies. Today, when the American secretary of state goes to those places there will probably be some small protest, some small demonstrations about McDonalds, about Kentucky Fried Chicken, about Nike sneakers, but nothing more than that.

And fundamentally I think that is the model we should look for. If we can achieve a more normal relationship the Middle East and the Islamic world will be able to teach the United States a great deal but equally the United States will be able to teach this region a great deal.

Thank you very much.

SADEGH ZIBAKALAM:

Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim, in the name of God, the Merciful, compassionate, Your Highness, ladies and gentlemen, during the past 13 months we have heard a great deal about the 11th of September and its aftermath and how it has poisoned the relationship between the United States and the Islamic world.

Let’s see actually what has happened during the past 13 months. Let us take stock of the reactions both from the United States and the Islamic world, namely the Islamic leader, in particular the Arabs, have shown towards what happened on 11th of September in the United States.

The United States reaction is known and we all have seen it and it is very simple: to annihilate and to get rid of fundamentalism, to fight al-Qaeda, root and branch, wherever they are, whoever they are in every country.
After 13 months, after freezing al-Qaeda’s assets and the fundamentalist’s assets in more than 147 countries, what has the United States achieved? I think the United States has made Osama bin Laden a hero not only in the Arab countries, not only in the Islamic country but also in a predominantly Shi’a country like Iran. Until 14 months ago, 15 months ago; no one in Iran knew who Osama bin Laden was. But now in Iran, the bastion of the Shi’a fundamentalists, Osama bin Laden has become a hero.

Enough of the United States. What about the Arab leaders, what about the Islamic leaders, what about the Arab world? What has been our attitude towards the fundamentalists? Very simple: In our hearts we have admired them, with our lips we have condemned them, and that hypocrisy has actually helped to propagate and not to diminish the fundamentalism.

That also aside, there has been another official response towards the fundamentalist, and that is to dismiss them, to simply dismiss them as though they do not exist. Often Islamic leaders and politicians talk of the Islamists as though they have come from the moon, as though they have come from Mars. They often forget that, whether we like it or not, fundamentalism has been born in our own society, and by simply saying that they are terrorists, they are extremists, they are not representative of true Islam, they won’t simply go away.

They are our own children, they are our own brothers, they are our own loved ones. Rather than dismissing them and behaving as though we have nothing to do with them, we should ask ourselves more serious and more responsible questions:

Why were they created? What created bin Laden? What created Ayatollah Khomeini? What has created this sheikh or that fundamentalist sheikh? And what’s more important, what is the reason for their popularity?

Take Iran as an example. I’ve spent many years working on the causes of the Islamic revolution. For more than half a century their struggle against the shah was led by the secular forces, either Marxists or some sort of other leftist or nationalist forces. But then it appears that all of a sudden someone who outside Iran was unknown, a 75-year old clergyman called Ayatollah Khomeini, won. The people rallied behind him.

Now, whether we like it or not, it appears many of us don’t like fundamentalists. We should ask ourselves this question: what is happening throughout Muslim societies that produces fundamentalism and that makes a good deal of our youth support the fundamentalists? I think that is precisely what we have neglected.

We can understand why the United States neglected it because it’s not in a sense a United States problem. The United States has only adopted one policy towards the fundamentalism and that is to destroy it.

Now, not many of us know that there are other ways of approaching the fundamentalist; for instance, social and political and cultural reform. How much have we the Muslims, and the United States, and whoever else who opposes the fundamentalists, how much have we delved into carrying out reforms in order to make a fight against fundamentalists on a long-term basis?

Amongst 20 western nations that are the largest aid donors to Third World countries, the United States provides the least assistance. When it comes to the question of helping the Third World countries, including a number of Muslim countries, as a total aid to the Third World, as a percentage of the gross national product, the United States is helping less than Ireland, less than Portugal even, less than Greece.

Now, my colleague Fareed Zakaria talked of the huge might of the United States, but when it comes to the question of helping the others, the United States is actually the last one according to the facts and figures. This is also a fact as much as the facts of my colleague, Professor Zakaria brought up.

A great deal of talk and dialogue have been going on during the past 13 and 14 months: dialogue between
civilization, dialogue between Abrahamic faiths, dialogue between the United States and the Muslim world, what Muslims can learn from the United States, what the United States can learn from the Islamic countries, from the Muslim world. But we have failed to carry out the most elementary dialogue amongst ourselves; that is, the dialogue with the fundamentalists. Where are the fundamentalists? Why aren't they here? After all, they are the very cause of this conference. They should be here more than anyone else. Well, they are absent in this conference, they were absent in the conference that we had last week, they were absent in the conference that we had last month. The fundamentalists are always absent because we simply are not trying to have a dialogue with them, as I said, but because the way we treat the fundamentalists is as though they have come from Mars.

This is the attitude towards fundamentalism that so far we have adopted. If this is the attitude towards facing the kind of problems that fundamentalism has created, no matter what the United States does or does not do, and what the Islamic leaders do or do not do, I think fundamentalism will simply grow.

We saw the election in Pakistan last week. We saw the explosion in Manila and also in Indonesia. And it appears that we haven’t been able to defeat the fundamentalists.

I think the benefit of this gathering is really to delve into discussion more thoroughly and to examine the kind of attitudes, tactics, and approaches that we have taken since September 11th. We must first ask ourselves why are we observing the phenomenon of fundamentalism. And second we must examine the tactics and approaches that we have taken in combating fundamentalism and ask ourselves how successful these tactics have been. I think if there are any benefits to be gained from a gathering such as this, it must address these issues not formally and diplomatically but realistically, and in a very hard and direct conversation.

Thank you very much.

Note: Transcript by Federal News Service
MARTYRS OR MURDERERS?
TERRORISM AND SUICIDE BOMBINGS

OPENING SPEAKERS:
Sheihk Yousef Al Qaradawi, University of Qatar;
Khaled Abou El Fadl, Alfi Fellow, University of California Los Angeles Law School

YOUSEF AL QARADAWI:

From the most compassionate, peace be upon you and the blessings of God be upon you, ladies and gentlemen. It’s my pleasure to welcome you today to the state of Qatar to engage in dialogue together with an open mind and an open heart. We Muslims are ordered by our religion to engage in dialogue. We have no choice in this; this is part of the Islamic proselytizing.

As God Almighty says, call to the cause of your God using good and appropriate methods and the best methods of dialogue, and whoever reads the Holy Koran will find that it’s a book of dialogue of the first order and first class. There is dialogue between God and his creatures, God even engages in dialogue with Satan in long conversation or dialogues, which is repeated in many verses of the Koran.

I would like at the start of this seminar to say to you, ladies and gentlemen, that we are ordered to engage in dialogue, especially dialogue with the people of the book, i.e. Christians and Jews. And the Holy Koran orders us that we should not engage in dialogue except using the best methods available and says let us come to a mutual dialogue and agreement upon logical basis, taking into account what is common ground rather than what differentiates between our positions.

We Muslims believe in the humanity, in the common humanity, which common in one thing, to be worshipping the one God and be sons and daughters of Adam. This is quite clear and evident from the last sermon given by the prophet Mohammed before his death when he says, “You are all sons and daughters of Adam and there is no difference before the sight of God between Arabs and non-Arabs except by how pious they are,” and the Koran also reminds us that God has created us from men and women and made us into tribes and peoples so that we engage in dialogue and get to know each other.

I would like from this platform to make quite sure about one thing that the world seems to be engaged in, and that is the question of terrorism and violence, to say to you that we are against terrorism and violence. This is what we owe to God and through our belief in Him. This is the dictate of our religion.

But it’s very important here to decide and give definitions to what’s meant by terrorism and what’s meant by violence, because leaving such grave issues vague,
with the ability to each party to interpret in the way it sees fit, is of the utmost danger.

I would like here, in accordance to the fundamentals of my religion that I understand, to give you a definition of terrorism and violence. Violence is to use force, material force wherever possible instead of using the means of dialogue and conviction, and to use this force without any control by religion, law, or any system of ethics.

As for terrorism, this means to use this kind of violence with people with whom you have no quarrel. People who hijack airplanes, for example, they have no quarrel between them and the passengers. They only use the hijacking as means of applying pressure on governments. People who take hostages like the Abu Sayyaf group in Philippines, they have no quarrel between them and the hostages they take. People who kill tourists—as what happened in the Luxor massacre in Egypt—they have no quarrel with the tourists. People who killed the tourists in Bali, in Indonesia a few days ago, they have no quarrel with these tourists. The problem is with others, in fact. But when the problem is missing between you and those upon whom you inflict harm, this is terrorism because you are terrorizing them.

I would like to say that we condemn this terrorism and this violence. We condemn violence and we condemn terrorism more than what we condemn violence because terrorism uses violence against people you have no relationship with whatsoever. The people who hit the Twin Towers in New York on the 11th of September in the United States, did they have any problems with the people who occupied these two Twin Towers? And the planes that were used, the civilian passenger aircraft that they used as means and turned into a missile, they had no quarrel with the passengers on these planes. Therefore, this is terrorism. We condemn this violence. And even more so we condemn terrorism.

And I personally have condemned in the past and issued a Fatwah, a religious decree, 16 years ago when the Kuwaiti airplane was hijacked and the passengers were kept for 16 days on board and two or three of the passengers were killed. I said this is Haram, this is unlawful in Islam, because no bearer of sins should bear the sins of others and you cannot hold into account and punish people who are not responsible.

I also condemn taking hostages and the Abu Sayyaf group and I have also issued a decree when the 11th of September events happened. I condemned the perpetrators, regardless of their religion or their nationality or national identity. We condemn the act itself, which is illegal and unethical and illegal, regardless of the perpetrators.

So, therefore, this is what we believe in. It is very clear in this regard and in this issue.

I would also like to say that there are groups who try to mix between the concept of Jihad and terrorism. This should not be so. Some people want to accuse Islam as being the cause of terrorism because Islam calls for Jihad. Islam is not alone in calling for Jihad. Moses’ legal system and law also made legal Jihad and also Moses’ Sharia is far more strict than what the Koran says in regard. The Sharia of Moses allowed the killing of every living soul, and the Old Testament says “Do not leave any living soul breathing, alive.” The Koran does not say this. What the Koran says is attack and kill them, but once you make them weak enough, take them captive and do not kill them afterward. Spare their lives, in other words. The Jihad in Islam is a defensive Jihad and the Koran says fight those who fight you and do not transgress against others. It also says to fight on the path of Allah to achieve the right of religious freedom on earth.

Islam is not bloodthirsty as some people may think. In the Al-Azhaab Sura when the Battle of the Trench has ended, the Koran said God has spared the believers the evils of a fight so thank God that you were spared the fight.

Can we say after all of this that Islam is a bloodthirsty religion? Mohammed, who was one of the bravest men,
says always “Pray to God that you do not engage in battle, but once you had to, be steadfast in the fight.”

And in another saying, he says, “The most loved names to God are the names of slaves; to Allah and worshipper of Allah the names that Allah does not like and loathe are the ones which indicate war and fighting, like it was the custom of Arabs in the days of ignorance to name their children their name.”

This is what our religion talks about and when the Muslims get into the truth with the unbelievers, the Sura was revealed in the Koran to say that a great victory has been granted to the prophet Mohammed. One of the companions said, “Can we consider this a victory? How can it be a victory without fighting and without war?”

This is the concept Islam calls for and from this platform I would like to reiterate that our case and our issue with Israel. We did not start this, we did not start the fighting, we did not resort to violence. We were attacked in our very homeland and the state of Zionism started on blood and violence right from the day one. And unfortunately the West until today supported Israel, and still supports it. We have bitterly contested time and again that our war with Israel is not a war of religion and doctrine. We are fighting them for one reason: because they usurped our land and made our people homeless and spilled our blood.

We do not fight them because of their religion. There were Jews who lived amongst us for hundreds of years when the Europeans chucked them out of their countries and when they did not find a refuge anywhere except in the countries of Islam. We welcomed them and they lived in a dignified manner and they were amongst the richest people.

We do not fight them because they are Jews. We do not fight them because they are Semites, because we Arabs are Semites. And we Muslims we do not care about racism. If they think they are the chosen people of God, we do not believe in such concepts and we do not put priority to one race and we think before the sight of God, the most noble amongst people are the most pious. And all people have mixed with each other now.

So here remains a question: Are they martyrs or murderers? If we are talking about people who are our brothers and our sons in Palestine who are defending their country, people like Hamas and Jihad and al-Aqsa brigades, they are not murderers, they are not killers and it’s a transgression against them to call them so and label them so. They are people who are defending their homeland and their holy rights, which were attacked and transgressed against. This happens every day; every day they are hit with airplanes and tanks and Apache helicopters. Their sons and daughters and women are killed, their houses are destroyed, their farms are destroyed. They have every right to defend themselves and to stick their necks out for the sake of their freedom.

People who call them suicides are committing a transgression against them. This is a wrongful description. They are not suicides. They are the furthest away from the concept of suicide. The psychology of a suicide is totally different. A suicide is someone who is desperate and gives up hope on life and God and does not believe in the mercy of God. They are totally against that. These are people who can never be called murderers.

Yes, it’s true sometimes children are killed as a result of their actions but this happens not intentionally but unintentionally and it’s part of collateral damage in a situation of war. In Afghanistan in the latest war, which America is waging, many civilians have been killed. What did the Americans say? They said this was by mistake and this is collateral damage. This is what can be applied to every war.

Here remains an important question that was posed to me in Switzerland once. They said, “What do you have against American foreign policy?” My reply was, first of all, when there was a struggle between the two camps, two international camps, the West and the
East, our inclination, Muslims and Islamists, was with the Western camp because the Western camp is in our opinion the camp of the people of the Book, the Christians especially, unlike the other camp, which was based on atheism and denying the existence of God, so therefore our inclination and our hearts were inclined toward the West.

In the early days of Islam when there was a war between the Persians and the Romans, the atheists were usually inclined towards the Persians. The Muslims were more inclined towards Romans because they were people of the Book, they were Christians and also the Koran was revealed in this, making quite clear that the Romans were defeated in a battle but they would soon regain the upper hand and this would please the believers.

So therefore the believers felt happy when they heard that the Romans were the victorious party. Our inclination and our hearts are inclined this way as well towards Christians, Christendom and the West, not the atheist camp.

But unfortunately what we have against American foreign policy, and let me be frank here with you that this policy is biased completely and utterly towards Israel against the Palestinians. It supports Israel in an unlimited fashion with American money, American weaponry, American vetoes. The last veto when the Palestinians called upon the Security Council to send observers to quiet things down, the American veto was there and stood between them and achieving this goal.

I’m also against the American foreign policy, which responded to political scientists and philosophers who nominated Islam as an alternative enemy to the Soviet camp. When the Evil Empire collapsed unfortunately they nominated Islam calling it the “Green Danger,” the “Red Danger.” The Soviet danger is gone now, they are faced with the Green Danger.

Islam is not a danger. Islam is as the Koran calls itself, the mercy of Allah to humanity, and the prophet Mohammed was not commissioned but to be a sign of mercy.

And the American foreign policy in this regard is wrong and it should not look at the Muslims with this perspective. The American foreign policy until now remains ignorant of the passion of the Arabs and Muslims. Three hundred million Arabs and behind them a billion Muslims, now you see the American’s latest thing they do is they try to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This latest resolution is an affront to the feelings of Muslims everywhere in the world. We did not wish America to do this and therefore for the sake of this we are trying to say to American politicians, review your stance and take a second look at your position. It’s not good whatsoever to harbor all these evil thoughts against Muslims.

Osama bin Laden did this. So should the entire Islamic nation be punished because of the sins of a misguided few? And all Muslims from East to West they condemned Saudi Arabia and disowned Osama bin Laden. His own family disavowed him. The Islamic community, has it given bin Laden an authorization to carry out these acts? The Islamic Umma is not responsible and the way the United States is fighting bin Laden is not the right and proper or productive way. Bin Laden carries an extremist way of thought and this is a kind of thought, which goes through the minds of people.

The problem with al-Qaeda and their likes is not in their consciousness. The illness lies in their minds and we should correct the principles and the wrong principles in their minds. This is our responsibility being thinkers and people proselytizing the call of God.

The American government should review its stance and its perspective and we really hope its foreign policy towards Islam and Muslims and should stand by the Muslims against the Sharon policy. America should open the door to a real and balanced dialogue, which does not impose its will but listens and exchanges
views and asks and replies. America should not agree with those who say it’s inevitable that there will be a clash of civilizations.

If the intentions are hard and according to the golden rules, which we believe in, which says that we cooperate in what we agree on and be tolerant on the things that we disagree on, we really hope that the American policy should change, so that our tomorrow will be better than our yesterday, and we hope and pray to God that that should be the case.

And thank you very much indeed for your kind attention.

KHALED ABOU EL FADL:

The issue of terrorism and more particularly the provocative question of whether martyrs or murderers—like all provocative questions they intend to generate discussion. But the question itself is far too imprecise and generalized to identify what we should precisely be thinking about.

Some givens are important to remember before we start thinking about a coherent way to address this significant issue. It is undeniable, and I think it would take a particularly deluded person to deny that the field of terrorism and the field of writing and thinking about acts of terror is a highly politicized field that is full with intellectual hypocrisy. Furthermore it is full of diplomatic language that as a lawyer and as someone who teaches in a law school, and who is primarily concerned about legal categories, finds that perhaps it might be good politics but it’s quite often bad law.

So that is one element we are talking about something that is severely emotionally charged.

The second element is, at least among the people attending today, and in the serious intellectual currents in the world, I don’t believe there is anyone who is arguing that violence in all cases and under all circumstances is illegal. So I would like to get beyond the issue of hypocrisy and also the issue of whether someone is pro-violence or anti-violence. I think that’s an unhelpful way of thinking about this problem.

Furthermore, as the UN charter and general human practice has long recognized, most legal systems and most legal thinking and most political thinking recognizes, a right to self-defense.

So we’re not really talking about violence per se and we’re not talking about self-defense. But we are talking about the appropriate means for pursuing certain ends, whether these ends are self-defense or not, that are either something we can identify as moral or immoral. So in other words this is in legal terms the old category of the means for pursuit in warfare, whether there are certain means that transcend the bounds of propriety.

Now, in the Islamic context what troubles me as a Muslim intellectual and as someone who engages Islamic paradigms in a very different context than the context of Qatar, primarily in the United States, is that as a Muslim intellectual I recognize that core to the Islamic ethical paradigms is their universalism. And I’m not talking about universalism in the imperialistic sense, in the sense that they must dominate and be supreme. That is another rhetorical discourse that I find very unhelpful. But the fact that they must be accessible, to put it very bluntly, that the morality that Islam speaks of by virtue of the category of Dawa or under amr-bil-ma’roof and nayha ‘anil munkir or the vast array of moral imperatives that one finds solidly in the Koranic text, and so on, these various ethical categories or ethical imperatives that constitute the moral universe of the Koran, and so on, that the Islamic charge is to find the means to talk about them that are accessible to the non-Muslim and absorbable in the sense that a non-Muslim can engage in a discourse with Muslims about these moral categories.

And here the problem of terrorism becomes the most difficult. I will focus on the Islamic discourse itself—
and quite often there is a tendency for the politicization of the Islamic discourse and the supremacy of political categories in a fashion that marginalizes or sidetracks the ethical imperatives that Islam is charged with engaging the world with. So it would make very little sense to me to speak about an insular Islam or an Islam that only makes sense to Arabs or to people living in the Middle East or people living in Qatar alone. The very notion of a universal or an international religion puts a very serious burden upon Muslim intellectuals to find means of transcending political divides and this process of politicization.

Here there is enough blame to go around on all sides. Most definitely, for instance, right before I came to the United States a well-known Jewish intellectual deemed it fit to call me in his journal a Muslim extremist. So that’s on the side of the West you often find again this process, and we also witness a similar process on the Islamic side—particularly when it comes to the issue of Palestinian and Israel.

Let me say here that having lived in the West for the past 20-plus years there is definitely a tendency among Westerners, particularly Americans, to see Islam as beginning and ending only in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; in other words, to engage Islam as if it historically, theologically, metaphysically, epistemologically it begins and ends with how it impacts upon the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Quite often I have found that in teaching my law classes I tell students that take my courses, especially my class on human rights or my class on Islamic law, I tell students I intentionally will not discuss anything pertaining to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because I want students to get into the practice of thinking about Islamic doctrines and engage the tradition Islam outside the highly politicized context of Palestine-Israel, beginning and end.

But I also must confess that there are plenty of Muslim intellectuals who assist the West in adopting this highly simplistic way of thinking. So in other words whatever they say about the Palestinian-Israeli context one finds much difficulty in situating it in light of the overall intellectual tradition of Islam.

And let me be very concrete here and get then more to the point of discussion. We know that Islamic law has developed a tradition, a remarkable, fascinating tradition of juristic discourse, which I have spent about ten years of my life studying and writing a book on that was published by Cambridge Press. What seemed to trouble Muslim jurists most in this rich and diverse historical debate is the practice of targeting those who do not have the means for defense or do not have the means of taking, being on guard against an attack. The concept itself morally is intimately tied into the notion of victimization, and the notion that it’s derived to good measure from Arab notions of chivalry: that if you are going to attack and target someone they ought to know that they are the subject of attack and ought to be given due notice to defend themselves and so on.

The discourse with its multifaceted aspects, has created incidentally a strong Islamic moral imperative against the practice of mutilation and torture, the idea that a Muslim is beyond mutilating and beyond torturing and beyond engaging in certain practices that would, from the point of view of Muslim jurists writing in the pre-modern era, be considered uncivilized, and beyond what it means to be a Muslim. The spreading of a state of general insecurity and terror is something that is not to be taken lightly. It is contrary to the notion of Muslim appropriateness, or ethical appropriateness in that a Muslim does not stab in the back, does not commit acts of treachery, does not target the defenseless and so on.

I often hear from those (like the example of Daniel Pipes, for instance, in his recent article about me) who out of ignorance essentialize the Islamic ethical tradition by calling every Muslim who has an intellect an extremist. But when I hear Muslim intellectuals speak about the issue of suicide bombing, I am not sure how their statements fit in with the juristic, ethical, moral tradition of what I will call Islamic
notions of Chivalry, and rejection of certain forms or certain means of prosecuting warfare as fundamentally unacceptable to Muslim ethics.

In other words, I sometimes feel that when it comes to particular political issues the juristic, the moral, the ethical discourse is suspended, the systematic paradigms of discourse are suspended and it all becomes about politics, whether we can achieve a political end or not achieve a political end.

I approach the issue of suicide bombings distinctly from that perspective. For instance, whether that makes me a Muslim extremist or not, I fully recognize the right of Palestinians to defend themselves against violence, and I do not have any idealized visions of Israeli policy towards Palestinians. But when, as an intellectual living in the United States, I hear about a group that goes in during a bar mitzvah and slaughters a group of religious practitioners, I cannot fit it within my readings in Islamic ethics or Islamic law. I find a very difficult time deferring to such political paradigms, because it offends me to the core as a Muslim and as a Muslim intellectual.

And ultimately I ask myself this: It seems to me that the real conflict in the modern age and the real battle is not a battle of sovereignty or territory but it is a battle of morality. Real victory, in my view, is a moral victory. The moral victor’s ethical perceptions and paradigms will, a hundred years from now, be read, absorbed and shape the world. I do admit that often, as I look at specific political acts, I feel that they come at the expense of a Muslim, let’s even say Islamic, moral victory a hundred or two hundred years down the road.

Thank you very much.

*Note: Transcript by Federal News Service*
OPENING SPEAKERS:
Ibrahim Karawan, Professor and Director of Middle East Center, University of Utah;
Munira Fakhro, Professor of Sociology, University of Bahrain

IBRAHIM KARA W AN:
This question raised yesterday about crisis of identity or crisis of loyalty made me think of who I am before I talk, and in what capacity I am talking. And, of course, it is clear to me that I represent a lot of identities: I am an Egyptian, which is the nationality I have, and the passport I carry. I have worked in America for some 20 years. I am a Muslim by background, a social scientist by training, and a social democrat by ideological inclination if we want to go that far. I want to say that all these things matter.

However, in the study of the issue of socioeconomic development I think the major issue is to deal with conceptual lenses and attitudes and is not to find data, meaning the data is either available or could be obtained rather easily at the time we live. The Arab Human Development Report is an example. It could be expanded, it could be revised, it could be reassessed or applied to a wider circle of countries, to include, for instance, other countries that are not Arab.

But the more important thing is what is the approach, what are the organizing concepts. I would suggest to you that any approach used to think about this, to be effective must have four features.

It has to be politically legitimate. There is no way for an approach or thinking about this issue to be politically legitimate if it is seen as framed or imposed from the outside. Whether this should be the case or not is beside the point. It is a death sentence for a program of change to be characterized as lacking in some degree of representativeness, legitimacy, and authority.

One of the advantages of the Arab Human Development Report is that is presented as a report by Arabs about Arab conditions. It is not tailored around the preferences of one great power or the other.

However, because of that, forces that are against reform may simply accuse any program of reform of being inspired and dictated by these outside powers. This would be a very quick way of settling the scores and frustrating change. So we should be discriminating when we deal with these kinds of accusations and characterizations of what is reasonably true and what is used for political purposes to prevent desired change.

There will be cases in which there is a congruence of interest between American perspectives on reform...
regarding certain issues of regime, and societal perspectives in the Arab and Muslim world. That should not disturb anyone. I do not start from the premise that if something may vaguely please the Americans or correspond to something that they say that it should automatically be set aside. That is, in my judgment, a rather silly reason to reject any idea.

The second feature is what may be called the virtue of frankness, or even bluntness. Conditions are so bad that trying to get around things and to find obscure formulations for dealing with someone's potentially bruised ego is not helpful.

I am not in favor of, and in many of my writings I argue against approaches that try in a very comfortable way to put the blame for miserable conditions at the doorstep of some huge impersonal outside power or structure as if the actors that are domestic and regional are totally helpless and there is nothing that they can do about their situation.

Do structures matter? Of course, but why are we surprised that structures matter? The question is: within existing parameters, what can be done and how do we proceed towards it?

The third feature is the question of identifying the role of the choices. In this approach, you have to identify the role of the choices by political leaders and the quality of political leadership in shaping outcomes. Anytime we talk about the dominance of structures we absolve political and social leaders from responsibility for what is happening. It becomes an easy way to say this was unstoppable. When our leaders make at times mediocre, if not catastrophic judgments, we often say they were entrapped by outside powers.

The last feature should be to have a clear sense of the logic of time. The logic of time is that it must have a sense of urgency, of moving to deal with these problems fast enough and comprehensively enough that there will be any reasonable hope of constructive change quickly. Every society should decide its pace in that process but a sense of relaxation would not be warranted.

I would like to identify three issues in socioeconomic reform that I submit to you are crucial for any serious change or serious reform in these countries, the countries that we are discussing. The first one is the challenge of participation, pluralism, inclusion, or whatever you want to call it. I'm sure that the Islamic world in general is low, possibly very low on the freedom index that of the Arab Human Development Report: political rights, civil liberties, minority rights, freedom of the media, regime accountability. It is not uncommon for scholars and activists who draw attention to the dangers of that situation to end up paying a very high price in terms of loss of freedom but also in terms of character assassination, and I think the case of Saad Eddin Ibrahim in Egypt is an example of that.

Now, clearly the whole model of developmental dictatorship, the one that provides the tradeoff between socioeconomic development on the one hand and loss of freedom on the other hasn't worked very well. It ended up failing on both accounts. We need more open political systems in order to discuss economic and social decisions pertaining to development. These things are not separated at all.

I do not think that some of my American friends know what they are talking about, when they talk about the task of democratizing the Arab world overnight. I would settle for a more incremental approach, which has a greater chance of success, one that would have something modeled on the Latin America experience with political decompression first, then a degree of political liberalization, a relaxation of restrictions on political expression, political association, and then move towards democratization, meaning, as (Dr. Hamad Geman Abu Magd) used to say, we should not forego what is possible for the sake of the impossible just in order to feel a sense of ideological purity and that we are not compromising.
The second challenge that I think is quite important is dealing with what I call the climate of rage. I think there is rage among the youth and young adults in many Muslim countries, and the regime that does not grasp and recognize the rage is missing an important reality.

This is not something tailored around what is in the interest of the United States by some people who are fond of digging behind every argument to find what is the American interest behind raising it. This is something that has repercussions for regime stability, for societal stability, and which is very important for economic and social development.

You have time bombs ticking in many Muslim countries with unemployed, educated youths and young adults who have spent 16 or 17 years being educated and who have expectations of a better future than the previous generations. They complete their education to find that the state is unable or unwilling to provide jobs, and find the private sector is too small to accommodate a necessary growth in employment.

Figures indicate that something like 20 percent of young adults—it varies, of course—belong to that category. It is important to remember that it may be higher in some countries. Most of these youths and young adults live in urban centers, which have higher levels of inflation, greater gaps between the haves and the have-nots, higher levels of social provocation and frustration, and greater levels of politicization and mobilization than any other place in the countries.

If I were a policymaker in an Arab-Muslim regime my number one priority would be to have a solid database and political and social analysis of the implications of the rage that those people must feel and the likelihood that the higher level of politicization and mobilization in these urban centers would make them an explosive mix in these societies.

These are not illiterate peasants that you can subdue one way or another. They are people who are mobilizable, articulate and indignant. They have the means of comparing their conditions with other people. They know more about the corruption and the lavish spending habits of their rulers. They have a mixture of irritability, mobilizability and political restlessness, and it is from these ranks that any opposition movement would try to get support.

In Morocco, which is one of my favorite countries, the recently graduated and unemployed Ph.Ds, resort to the wonderful peaceful style of engaging in a hunger strike to send a message of their displeasure. In many other countries I assure you they will not stop at that level. They would resort to more confrontational methods and that would have to be dealt with, not just to curb terrorism but also to maintain stability, to provide a climate that is more conducive for economic growth and order.

And the third and last approach left to consider is the challenge of education reform. I don’t buy the argument that we should have an American high commissioner going over the curriculum in Arab-Muslim countries to find out which pages incite violence and which ones don’t, and then to delete the ones that are found to incite. These things must happen from within in order to meet the first requirement of legitimacy.

The concern is not just the issue of terrorism, even though this is very important. It is the concern with the culture of terrorism, the whole climate, the attitudinal climate that may lead to terror. It is one in which both governments and non-governmental organizations must be involved.

The interest in education and educational reform, curbing illiteracy is tied to a number of needs: meeting the challenges of globalization, absorption of technology, development, changing attitudes towards women (which is extremely important), social and political tolerance, information revolution, and access to knowledge. All these are dependent on education and educational reform, and there is no way that they can be independent of changes in the educational system.
I want to conclude by saying I don’t believe that we, Arabs and Muslims, should not deal with these things simply because somebody in America talked about it. This is for an Arab Islamic future. It is not to please somebody in the Pentagon. It should not be approached that way, because there exists the danger of someone exercising a veto on all desired outcomes by simply saying that someone in Washington may have proposed a similar program of change.

And the choice is not either doing nothing or absolute importation or whole importation of the American model; the whole discussion is, in my judgment, false and it doesn’t go very far analytically.

Thank you very much.

MUNIRA FAKHRO:

The Arab Human Development Report, which was launched last summer and describes the Arab region with a population of 280 million, as having fallen behind all others including sub-Saharan Africa. That report emphasized three key deficits in human development in the Arab region: the freedom deficit, the women’s empowerment deficit and the human capabilities/knowledge deficit relative to income.

A prime cause of this backwardness, say the report, is the people of the region are the world’s least free, with the lowest levels of popular participation in government. In addition, Arab youth who constitute the majority of the total population feel alienated in their own countries and feel they have no stake in them and so they turn to violence. Some think that those people accepted violence as a means of change because there is no other means available.

What the report indicates is that Arabs feel a sense of political and social frustration, which leads us to wonder why all those who took part in the 9-11 attacks originated mainly from the Gulf region. Could this mean that our sociopolitical situation leads us to such a culture of terror?

One must remember that the religious trend and its combative spirit had been exploited during the last century by the Western powers and more recently America to fight such doctrines as Communism and the Soviet expansion in Afghanistan. In this particular case one can safely say that the concept was American, the financing was Arab and the training Pakistani.

Many factors aggrivate the present situation, both external and internal ones. The main external causes are two: the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and the U.S. plans for a possible war against Iraq. The Israeli’s illegal occupation of Arab lands, as the UNDP report emphasized, is one of the most pervasive obstacles to security and progress in the region geographically, since it affects the entire region, temporally extending over decades and developmentally impacting nearly all aspects of human development and human security.

Second, the Iraq situation of today, which if not properly handled may develop into a far greater problem than we can envisage. This reflects on the whole Gulf region, including Iran. The region’s culture is primarily an extension of Iraq and all its facets of tradition, geography, history and religion.

As far as for the internal factors, the Arab Human Development Report is a prime testament to Arab grievances. You may refer to it as an example here. Let me tackle one issue that I find extremely important: our educational system, which requires a fundamental change, not necessarily as a response to events of September 11th since it has been a basic requirement long before that. The main deficit in such a system is that it’s too rigid and dogmatic. Since most of it stresses religious teachings and religious doctrines, the prevailing thought at present is the American stress on a major change in the educational system is to divert learning of Islamic culture and weaken Arab national unity.
The Americans might have been encouraged by the Japanese experience when the Japanese defeat in World War II led to the breakdown of their elitist educational system and the imposition of American style democratic model. Since it has worked in Japan, why can’t we have a shot at it? This will be conditional to efforts of the enlightened intellectual class within the Arab society. This process may need decades but since time is of the essence we have to start immediately our fight against backwardness.

Another aspect of reform, which will be mentioned very briefly, is to reflect on how the education of religious leaders needs to concentrate on the spirituality and morality of Islam instead of the small details of ritual and practice, which creates more division than unity and alienates other faiths of the world.

As an example, many of those religious leaders still divide the world into Muslims and non-Muslims—and this requires a continual educational process that will self-correct in due course and cannot be perfected in one day.

We have to provide the proper atmosphere to strengthen civil society organizations such as federations and trade unions.

9/11 ironically has positive aspects that brought to the surface an agenda that has long been waiting to be fulfilled. Firstly, the inevitability of reforming of the stagnant educational system, the establishment of civil society organizations and the openness of society towards women; secondly, taking a deeper look into our cultural environment and Islamic discourse. One aspect of it is to redefine terrorism and distinguish it from martyrdom.

Thank you.

Note: Transcript by Federal News Service
INFORMATION OR INSTIGATION?
THE ROLE OF THE NEW MEDIA IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

OPENING SPEAKERS:
Shibley Telhami, Professor, University of Maryland; Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Maher Abdullah, Journalist, Al Jazeera Satellite Network

SHIBLEY TELHAMI:

I have to say at the outset that I am a fan of the new media in the Middle East. I think that it’s much more good than bad. And let me say why I think this new media is much more reflective of public opinion than it is shaping public opinion in the region by talking about the dynamics that have given rise to the emergence of this new media. Then I will talk about the role of the state in the new media, the extent to which this media is truly independent or the extent to which the state remains a major factor in the success of this new media.

I see the new media as a function of a new market approach to the media that came with the proliferation of technology, the availability of outlets in every single home and the broad reach that the media can have.

In the past many states had near monopoly over the media and now every single Arab consumer has multitudes of options. The obvious question is which station is the Arab consumer going to watch. Clearly choice, the availability of choice, has resulted in a different kind of competition among the available media outlets to cater to the consumer, who is going to watch what station. And if you don’t provide the product that the consumer wants people aren’t going to turn you on. They have options. They no longer are forced to watch what the government puts on the air.

In that regard this changed the logic of the product that the media presents. It changed both the product and really the definition of the consumer. The product is changed by virtue of the logic of reaching the broadest possible market; that is, you’re trying to figure out what the consumer wants.

The size of the market has changed by virtue of the reach. For example, most stations in the past, whether they’re in Qatar or in Kuwait or in Jordan, sought to cater primarily to Qatars, to Kuwaitis, or to Jordanians. Now, the new consumer is defined by language, because anybody who speaks Arabic is a potential consumer of the product that the media presents.

In that regard, the language factor changed the nature of the consumer. We no longer think of the local consumer; we think of the Arab as the consumer. In essence, the market for the consumer of the new media is not the Qatari, it is not the Kuwaiti, it is not the Jordanian; it is the Arab, it is the Arab consumer.
I think there is a subtle change in attitudes because when the media is asking, ‘how am I going to get the broadest share of the market?’ they’re saying ‘how am I going to get the largest number of Arabs to watch across political borders?’ And so what you’re trying to find is really what is common, what is appealing to the largest number of Arabs.

This logic of the market is what explains which outlets succeed and which outlets fail in their reach. I think the success of Al-Jazeera, which really came after the initial relative success of stations like MBC, is explained by Al-Jazeera’s understanding of what the consumer wants. The other stations not able to produce equally what the consumer wants in terms of products. And in that sense I see the media as reflecting and catering to public opinion rather than shaping it.

Al-Jazeera is an interesting case in point because in the 1990s, certainly in the late 1990s, one can argue Al-Jazeera was the most friendly (of all the Arab stations) to Israel. It has, in fact, normalized Israel in the Middle East in the sense of having a representative in the Knesset and by inviting Israeli representatives to debate Arab-Israeli issues. In fact, it was accused in much of the Arab world of being essentially serving Israeli interests. That was the typical criticism of Al-Jazeera in much of the Arab world, and certainly in Egypt and in Saudi Arabia that was always the case.

That was at a time when there was a peace process, when, in fact, there was a lot of hope that this conflict was coming to an end. The political moderates in the Arab world were on the ascension and the people wanted to know more about Israel, people wanted to learn about what is this entity with whom the Arabs are making peace, which seemed absolutely inevitable.

So in a way I think what they did in the 1990s was a reflection of the political realities that were taking place, that the countries were not essentially different. With the collapse of the peace process and the beginning of the Intifada and the clashes and the bloodshed, obviously things soured in the Arab street, and in every single Arab state in terms of the attitude toward these issues, toward Israel and toward the Palestinian issue. In a way Al-Jazeera catered to that. Al-Jazeera reflected what people wanted to hear and see.

In my judgment, while obviously the media also helps shape opinion—I don’t think that it’s always a double issue—the success of Al-Jazeera is largely because it knows how to cater to public opinion better than others. If it were to change its methods and to change the degree of its coverage of Palestinian areas for example, or to change its tone I think people will turn it off and somebody else will come up with a product that will compete. Somebody else will be out there trying to fill the gap of public demand.

That leads me to three final points. What is the role of the state, who are the potential competitors, and are these media outlets truly market driven?

When I say “market driven,” I don’t mean necessarily they’re driven simply by profit because political influenced also means you have to worry about market share. Obviously, the original creation of Al-Jazeera was considered with the intent of making Al-Jazeera commercially independent within five years and therefore increasingly independent from government control. It clearly gets huge subsidies from the Qatari government.

Now, the reality of it is despite the incredible success—and I say it’s an incredible success because I don’t think even Al-Jazeera could have anticipated its success in terms of having the reach and the popularity across the Arab market broadly speaking and really beyond the Arab market even in Islamic and non-Islamic countries. I mean, it has had a global reach in some ways. And that does not yet translate into making a profit, nor does it translate into independence based on revenues from advertising.

Obviously there isn’t a huge amount of money in advertising in the Middle East. The primary reason why it hasn’t been able to reap the benefits of its success is the role of the state, and that is the bottom line. States
in the regions have directly and indirectly prevented Al-Jazeera from being commercial successful. If you are a major multinational corporation with businesses in Saudi Arabia and Egypt then you know that the Saudi government and Egyptian governments do not like Al-Jazeera. Even if they don’t tell you “don’t advertise there” you’re not likely to advertise there. You don’t want to jeopardize your relations and commercial interests with states in the region by advertising there.

That has led to a limitation on the available money for Al-Jazeera to be independent. So the bottom line is Al-Jazeera remains governmentally tied. In fact, if you look at all the new media, with very few exceptions they all are indirectly tied to governments because the Saudi pan-Arab media is almost all owned by members of royal family, even if it’s not under official government control. So you don’t really have a truly independent media (at least in television) that doesn’t have direct or indirect governmental ties.

The real question is whether this media can truly be independent. For now what’s driving it is the need to get the market share, and to get that market share you have to produce the product that resonates with the public but for what end, if it’s not commercial? Is there a point at which, for example, the Qatari government could decide that Al-Jazeera no longer serves its interests politically, that it’s detrimental to Qatari interests?

I would suggest to you that Al-Jazeera is useful to Qatari interests. For one thing it takes away from the more critical Saudi controlled pan-Arab media. So in that sense it is actually taking away market share and therefore projecting a different kind of point of view. And I think it is also helpful in a variety of other ways for the Qatari government. Is there a point at which this station might not be serving the vital interest of Qatar? And when you reach that point is it possible that its independence would be jeopardized?

We are going to have a very interesting test coming up in the next few months. If, in fact, there is war with Iraq and American airplanes are flying out of Qatar and you have large numbers of civilian Iraqi casualties, will Al-Jazeera have the same open coverage that it did, for example, in relation to Afghanistan? That will be an interesting test. I don’t know what the outcome will be but that will be a very interesting test. Let me end with that.

**MAHER ABDULLAH:**

I’m lucky in a way having worked for this outlet that you mentioned they’re all new and they’re all pan Arab, if the word carries any meaning anymore.

I wonder if the test is going to be for Jazeera’s authenticity or for America’s commitment to freedom of speech. Because after Afghanistan the pressure is no longer from the neighboring Arab states, it’s from that beacon of freedom of speech in the United States of America. How much the Americans are going to allow Jazeera access? Judging by what happened in Afghanistan, I think it’s going to be very bad. At the end of the day we might end up having to take the blame for it, but I think the blame will be squarely on the Americans, because the signs so far are not very encouraging.

I worked for MBC [Middle East Broadcasting Corporation] and MBC started off brilliantly. And by the way it wasn’t Al Jazeera that normalized the relations with Israel; that was the whole purpose according to Arab media of the creation of MBC. It was the normalizing station. That was the accusation. MBC (and my colleagues) conducted interviews with Israeli prime ministers long before Al Jazeera existed.

It is just that the overwhelming success of Al-Jazeera has sort of diminished everything else. Nobody wants to know what happened before.

I don’t see the competition yet. As a journalist from a personal point of view I wish there was competition for my salary sake! Because if there is no competition, no alternatives, lucrative alternatives, our management—
and I have another colleague who can testify to this—
keeps saying 'part of your salary is the honor of belong-
ing to this institution.' I want the money; I don’t want
the honor. If I can combine both, by all means why not.
So I desperately need as a journalist competition, if not
for the future of freedom of speech in the Arab world,
at least for our personal interest of having a decent
salary increase.

So I don’t see any competition. Actually the way com-
petition is going is totally in the opposite direction.
Everybody seems to be missing the major question,
which is what the people want. How can a boring,
news-driven station become the number one station
in the Arab world?

There is a story to be told here, and I hope our friends
can bear this in mind when they emphasize the appeal
of pop music. There is no question that it is very
appealing. I don’t know of any Arab youth who doesn’t
fancy Britney Spears. I do. But why is a heavyweight,
boring, news-driven station drawing all this attention
and all the audiences?

There are funny things happening with the new
media. For example, one of our programs was specifi-
cally targeted by the competition with a very popular
program. The program I present was challenged by a
program with a very popular, probably the most pop-
ular, female Arab presenter, Rasan Maghrebi. It was
put on the same time on the same day to draw audi-
ences away from Al-Jazeera. Now, here you have a very
rigorous, heavyweight program and then you have
Rasan Maghrebi, who is both very popular and who
presents pop music.

There is this wrong kind of competition. None of it
I think materialized. “Who wins a million” did draw
a lot of attention in the beginning, but every time
there is a crisis there is only one station and that
station is Al-Jazeera.

Again, we owe a lot of success to the Americans
because Jazeera is “born again.” Al-Jazeera was born
again not once, but twice. There was the initial launch
but it was thanks to the American attack against Iraq
in 1998 that we were saved, as it were. Then came the
Afghani conflict—saved again. So, we had a push
from the Americans to make us what we are today. I
don’t mean they intended it; I think they’re regretting
it and that is where the pressure is going to come from
in the near future, especially with Iraq being so
sensitive. Even the New York Times has already started
the war against the war in Iraq. The war had already
started in the states so you can imagine what kind of
reaction you are going to have from a free or so-called
free news outlet.

I think Al-Jazeera is not doing anything special in
terms of journalism. We are not brilliant journalists;
our appearance on the screen is not particularly out-
standing compared to our competition. For example,
I think MBC looks better on the screen than we do.
Our appeal is not the technique. Jazeera is doing
journalism following a textbook that every Arab
journalist studies at school.

I would say the reason for our success is political. I’m
not saying we’re bad; I’m saying technically speaking
we are not anything special. In fact, most of the doc-
umentaries that cause a lot of uproar and tension are
boasts and just translated and dubbed into Arabic.
But it is this degree of freedom that we are allowed
that makes us special.

This is not necessarily a final judgment on what
Jazeera is but I think this is also worth studying. Can
you succeed in a highly politicized area without a
great deal of freedom?

To go back to the title of this session—information or
instigation, and especially since we are talking about
dialogue with the United States—Al-Jazeera can never
represent the Arab or the Islamic world. Actually, the
Arab world has rejected us. Last week the information
ministers of the Gulf countries have decided to boycott
us. There is also a second-tier boycott—which is not
only boycott Jazeera, but also boycott the companies that
deal with Jazeera. This used to be applied to Israel; now we're imposing it on ourselves on our media outlets.

I'm going to sort of stray away a bit from the subject matter because, having lived in England for 22 years, I've absorbed some of the eccentricity of the British. But they always say—and I think it's a true statement—everything in life is a matter of perception. 'Beauty is in the eye of the beholder,' if you like. Most things in life are neutral; it's just you and me who sees it differently.

This is where perception is very important. It applies. You might say I'm an Islamist and emphasize this cultural thing. I'm going to talk about the new craze of having coffee without sugar. A waiter boils two cups of coffee: one for somebody who likes sugar (and the Arab people like sugar a lot in their coffee and tea) and one for a diabetic who can't take sugar in his coffee in his coffee. If the coffee happens to be very sweet—and I like sweet coffee—the person is going to find it very tasty and thank him for it. However, the diabetic will find it both disgusting and dangerous. The coffee is the same, but our needs and perceptions are different.

Covering news as to our relations with the United States is the same: It's very difficult for us to be neutral because I don't think the objective neutral journalist exists. It's how clever you are in sort of presenting your case.

We try to be objective, but I would like to say this: Most of what America does in the Middle East is perceived as an instigation by itself. We do not need as Arab media to instigate against the United States. Just by showing what the United States does to us, that's instigation enough.

Note: Transcript by Federal News Service
THE IMPACT OF 9-11

OPENING SPEAKERS:
Martin Indyk, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution;
H.H. Yusif Bin Alawi, Foreign Minister of Oman

MARTIN INDYK:

There exists a deep division in the United States government between three schools. The school that can best be characterized as the realist school that has its advocate in Secretary of State Powell, who basically believes in a Bush-41 version of this approach, meaning to take care of problems, but not to shake up the world or remake it in America’s image.

The second school is the opposite. The neo-conservatives—some would call them neo-imperialists are represented perhaps best by many of the people who have senior positions in the Pentagon, particularly Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith. The neo-conservatives do want to use America’s power to reshape the world in our image, not only to protect America and its interests, but to promote democracy and freedom around the world.

The third school is the old-line conservative school that is normally isolationist but in these circumstances is also interventionist. It’s a kind of isolationist-interventionist school. The Secretary of Defense himself, Rumsfeld, is actually more representative of this school. This school believes in the George Orwell notion of shooting the elephant, going out and taking care of the problem, whether it’s Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar. Then it retreats back behind high fences, because the world is an unsafe place for America and if we stay there and leave a big footprint we will inevitably reap the harvest of hatred.

What happens in this highly contested battle between these three schools is that in the end the president decides—and he has a foot in three camps, three legs, as it were. But what it basically amounts to I think is that he ends up just doing two, that is pursuing the terrorists and their supporters and maintaining overwhelming force. But the third part, promoting freedom, is more rhetorical than real, at least so far.

What does this mean in terms of some basic conclusions? First of all, the United States is acting now, not just reacting, in a bold and determined way. We can see that, when the president leads with these policies, he enjoys the support of the Congress and at least so far the American people.

Therefore my first conclusion is that American engagement in this way is going to shake things up in your part of the world, in the Islamic world.
The second conclusion, and this is just to underscore what Fareed Zakaria said last night, is that this action by the United States can produce positive change or negative change. It can help to generate the clash of civilizations that we fear or it can produce positive change in the Arab and Islamic worlds as well.

The third conclusion is that—and this is the challenge to all of us here—that given these realities, and I believe they are the realities coming from Washington, we need to find a way to make sure that they are used for good and that they don’t produce the clash of civilizations.

On our side, speaking as an American, I will say we need to be less arrogant, we need to be more sensitive, yes, we need to be more engaged in solving the Palestinian problem, we need to act more multilaterally and less unilaterally. But I would challenge you from the Islamic World as well to answer the question, what do you need to do, how can you promote greater tolerance in your societies, how can you encourage your governments to be more responsive to the needs of their people, to open up political space for their people, how can you respond to the president’s moral clarity?

Here, I use the occasion to respond to Sheikh Qaradawi this morning to say that it seems to me the most important thing in this regard, in terms of moral clarity, is to make absolutely clear: the phenomenon of Islamic extremism or terrorists who cloak themselves in the garb of Islam need to be condemned clearly. There is a great danger in clouding the issue by invoking the Palestinian cause in its name to justify it. When Yassir Arafat and Abu Masin and General Abdul Razzak al-Yihia, leaders of the Palestinian cause who are all of them religious men, say that suicide bombing is wrong not only because it does damage to the Palestinian cause but because it raises questions about the morality of the Palestinian cause, then perhaps we should all listen to them.

When Sheikh Qaradawi says that it’s a problem for the Islamic world, the terrorism that he condemned, and that the Islamic world should take care of it, then it’s the Islamic world’s responsibility. The question is what is he and what are others doing about it, particularly what are the political and spiritual leaders doing to respond to the challenge that Dr. Abou el Fadl gave them this morning.

When Sadegh Zibakalam says that the Islamic world should not evade the problem of fundamentalism, then the question is: what can the Islamic world do about it, what will you do about it, and how can we, the United States, help you?

Thank you very much.

H. H. Yusif Bin Alawi:

I would like to explain one thing, if I may, please, and that is relating to what some friends have understood from what I said previously about the democratization. What we witness today is that development, known as democratization in the Islamic and Arab world, which started a long time ago in many Arab countries, but democracy has not reached an ideal optimum level. This will take a long time.

What I was talking about was that the calls, which we get from the West, calling for democratization at this particular juncture of time in the Islamic world, this is due to certain political conditions faced by both the Islamic world and the west.

So therefore, my perception and understanding of this matter is even if we suppose that within a month from now, for example, the Islamic world was transformed into democratic countries, this change, this transformation in the Islamic world will not solve the problem, the problem existing already between the West and the Islamic world, which pertains to certain issues, the most important of which is the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Secondly, allowing for development in the Islamic world and allowing transfer of technology, if this is the
situation then democratic rulers, democratic rulers in the Islamic world will not tolerate as far as their own interests are concerned with the western interests and this will be the same situation, which pertains to the invisible struggle between Western Europe and the United States of America.

Hence, I understand the enthusiasm on the part of our intellectual brothers for the slogan of democratization in the Islamic world. What I want to say is democratic development is the result of interaction, civilizational interaction, which is led by a generation until it reaches the level required and it’s not a call spread in the media at all.

I hope, I sincerely hope that we should be part of the reality in this regard and even so some brothers do not seem to appreciate that in many Arab and Islamic countries, maybe in most of them or maybe in all of them there are forms of political participation in governments and decision-making. In my country the government is accountable before the Shoora council of Oman and these sessions are carried out live by live television coverage.

I believe that we ought to understand the features of democracy in the Arab-Islamic world more than the democratic necessities, which are called for by Western societies.

Thank you very much.

Note: Transcript by Federal News Service
THE GROUND ZERO OF TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM

OPENING SPEAKERS:
Daniel Brumberg, Professor, Georgetown University; Visiting Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Surin Pitsuwan, Member of Parliament, former Foreign Minister of Thailand

DANIEL BRUMBERG:

In many respects, I suppose that my thesis is that if the question is, is the Gulf the ground zero of transnational Islam I would say that it’s certainly a contributor but I would not see it as the ground zero of transnational Islam. I do not think, and we mean by the Gulf it’s a big place, is it a metaphor for Saudi Arabia, is it a metaphor for the Madrasa system, is it a metaphor for the exporting of Wahabi Islam or versions and visions of Islam inspired by the Wahabi tradition and the conservative clerical elite in Saudi Arabia.

We often hear mentioned, and our moderator, of course, mentioned it, of the central role that Saudis played and Saudi men played in the hijackings on 9/11 and certainly it would be very difficult to negate the important role that Saudi, one version of Saudi Madrasa conservative clerical Wahabiist Islam has played in creating and inspiring transnational radical Islamism is the term I think I would prefer, but it isn’t this necessarily the ground zero. I’m not even sure it’s the center of the storm.

When I started speaking about issues of radical Islam having—I’d really been working for many years on Iran and came back to this issue after 9/11 like so many of us did and I began to look into this whole phenomenon the metaphor I preferred to use, taking it from the media was a kind of metaphor of a perfect storm and a variety of versions of radical Islam, Islamic community, an ideology of resentment, as I’ve often preferred to call it, of resentment against the West, resentment against modernization that were coming from different directions and sort of reinforce one another and if you adhere to that particular metaphor then certainly the role of the export of a certain kind of legacy of Wahabiist thinking from Saudi Arabia is important but it’s far from I think the central issue. It’s a contributor factor in a very complex phenomenon.

And, of course, it was a natural as soon as the debate got caught up in the media for the simplifications to take place for the simple formula of, well, 12 or whatever, 15 of the hijackers were Saudis, therefore, ergo, and I’m very dubious about these simplistic formula. I’m not in any sense going to deny the importance of the role of semi-private funding of Madrasa schools and fomenting this ideology of resentment. I’ve been to Indonesia twice and I’ve met with leaders of the two most important Islamic movements in Indonesia, the
Nahdatul Ulama, using the Arabic expression, and Muhammadiya, both of whom complained vociferously about the role of Saudi money in promoting certain kinds of schools and intruding on the kind of local traditions of Islam and Islamic schooling, which were, they argued, quite opposite from the kind of vision of Wahabi Islam that was being espouses or, again, a Wahabiist inspired Islam espoused in these Madrassa schools.

And certainly we’ll recall the interviews with Muslim leaders from sub-Saharan Africa and other places who have made the same argument, who felt the intrusion of this and not the intrusion simply of the schooling but the money, which, of course, is a very important factor, particularly in weak or collapsed states when there aren’t states that are promoting reasonable education systems, public education systems.

So, this is a very important, but much of the roots of radical Islam and radical Islamic ideology and the ideology of resentment towards the West and towards modernization and towards what is often viewed as the materialist foundations of Western civilization, because the people espousing this sort of vision came up with the clash of civilization idea long before Huntington made it famous, comes from Egypt, comes from the legacy of the Muslim brethren, Hassan Al Bana first but really critically important, of course, the role of Sayyid Qutb in promoting an ideology of resentment that was largely based, and I think this is extremely important, on his own personal encounter with the West.

If you read in his book, “Sign Posts,” and you read about his experiences, you know, he didn’t kind of fundamental alienation, he went through—first of all, we had a sense that he was already prepared for it before he got on the plane but where did he end up. Well, one of the places was in Greeley, Colorado, which ain’t no big metropolis. It’s not New York. It’s not even Chicago. It’s a nice little town. And there yet he went through a process of alienation and bitterness that helped to set the stage for so much of his notion of Jahalia, of the unIslamic society, which was first reflecting his own alienation, of course, in the West but then transposed back to his experiences in Egypt where he felt equally embittered, equally alienated.

I think that if you look at the backgrounds, many of the people who are involved in Islamic Jihad first and later in al-Qaeda and organizations like this, and this is certainly true of Mohamed Atta, in a way Mohamed Atta is a kind of modern day Sayyid Qutb when you see his experiences first in Egypt, an engineer, radicalized in the university, son of a member of the intelligentsia, a lawyer, goes to Germany and gets involved in a local Mosque, is part of the society that surrounded him yet bitterly opposed to it, alienated from it, angry and develops this fierce sense of resentment and alienation.

We’re talking about a phenomenon that while perhaps in some indirect way is inspired by Wahabi Islam is distinct from it and distinct in several ways not simply as a reaction, because Wahabi Islam was, first of all, an internal reaction within the Islamic world against Internal developments that were not identified with colonialism of modernization. It later developed other accretions and notions but if you look at the radical Islam ideology of the networks that we often associate with the Gulf we’re talking about a transformation of a notion of Islam, which is in many respects fundamentally modern in its orientation.

Despite what is often a simplistic notion of what political Islam is in the Western press, the notion that it’s indigenous to and intrinsic to Islam itself, a lot is from the western notion of ideology and kind of comprehensive total ideologies. It’s not a part of a traditional Islam at all.

So, it’s evolution that is a result of a certain encounter with the West, born in many respects in Egypt and in the encounter of Islamists with the West both intellectually and directly, and then the way in which that particular tradition and that particular kind of radical Islamism interacted with, overlapped in terms of
networks, influence and money with Saudi Wahabi movements vis-à-vis a whole series of very complex networks and events in the late '80s and early '90s that joined up these two forces.

But, nevertheless, I think that if you look very carefully at al-Qaeda and look at the role of the leadership, particularly the number two in al-Qaeda, who apparently is really maybe number one right now, you will see that we’re talking about a kind of species of radical Islamism and radical Islamic resentment and ideology, which is related to but in its own way quite distinct from the Wahabi tradition, although strategically speaking it depends for financing and networking on bases of support from certain networks in Saudi Arabia that go into the Wahabi, the traditional clerics and so on.

I think that it’s important to try to see these relationships, at the same time disentangle those relationships.

Now, the question that Martin [Indyk] asked us to think about for this session is to what extent can we address this problem, to what extent can the Muslim world address this problem and at the risk of perhaps repeating some things that some people at this table heard me say a couple weeks ago, I think if you look at the core ideologues who represent this ideology, who articulate it and who move from this ideology, because I do see, by the way, a certain line, a certain logic, a movement from this ideology of resentment to the kind of violence. It’s a violent ideology. It’s an ideology of resentment that helps to set the stage for the kind of violence we’ve seen.

So I do think there’s a certain link there and these kinds of political ideologists who have created this vision of Islam, this radical vision, their numbers have certainly been spread by the funding, by support, by the networks and they are committed to the ideologies, and I think that it’s intellectually very hard to conceive of a way we can go about sort of convincing them to disown these sets of ideologies, and I think these are committed true believers, but I do think that the issue in terms of how to deal with these networks and these ideologists or radical Islamists, the issue is more how to reduce their political leverage and their capacity to sell their ideology to people who have not plugged into it. We have to deal with them militarily, politically, financially. The question of drying up the economic sources has been tackled, although I think that’s much more complicated than the Bush administration would like to imply sometimes.

But, I think that the more pressing issue is how to create a context in which the advocates of this ideology are not able to sell it as easily as they, in fact, can because I do think that one of the things we have to reconcile ourselves with is that the audience for this vision is in many respects far larger than I think many of us would be prepared to acknowledge. It’s a disturbing fact. And there are many aspects in terms of dealing with the audience. I’ve said this before and I know some people don’t always agree with me but I do think in terms of the context of the Middle East that the Palestine issue is still number one in terms of what has to be done to address the context in which they are able to sell this ideology, but there are other factors that have to accounted for as well.

I do think the issue of the influence of Madrasas and educational reform is a factor that has to be addressed, but having said that, anybody who has been reading up on the debate and the efforts of the leadership of Musharaf in Pakistan to deal with this knows that if he attempts overnight to change the status quo, if he attempts to reform the Madrasas in the space of a week or a month or a year he’s a dead man. I mean, really this is a long-term process. We’re talking five to ten years minimum—minimum.

Secondly, in terms of the question of Saudi Arabia there’s been a lot of simplistic thought coming from particularly some neo-conservative circles in Washington: “Well, it’s time to end the relationship. Let’s invade Iraq. It will be the major ally.” We’ve heard all this before. You’ll see a certain amount of cynicism coming from me when it comes to this.
But I think that one of the realities that the United States has to work with is it has to realize, it has to contend with is that we’ll be dealing with Saudi Arabia as it is, perhaps changed a little bit over time but not fundamentally different for a long time. The question of educational reform in Saudi Arabia is really integrally linked to the question of political reform and the state itself is based on an alliance between a political leadership and a religious leadership that if it’s undone the state as it exists now doesn’t exist. So, we can’t simply talk about, oh, reform your schools. We’re talking about in some respects reforming the very essence of that state.

This is not something that can be simply talked about. If Musharraf has a challenge in terms of reforming the Madrasa system it’s far more complicated because it’s such a foundation in many respects of the modern Saudi state.

The question of democratization has also come up, again something that could very easily backfire and certainly I believe in the case of Saudi Arabia a rapid effort to democratize the Saudi state would bring Islamic radicals to the fore in that state.

So, the question of democracy has got to be on the agenda but that’s also a 10, 15 or 20-year program. The simplistic sorts of solutions we’ve heard for dealing with this phenomenon in Washington have to be replaced with a much more long-term vision of how to contend with them.

In any case, I’m going to leave it at that because I know we have a lot to talk about. But I just want to repeat my thesis, which is that we have to see this as a complex perfect storm and that only one part of the storm has come from the Gulf and that this storm tends to come as much from the experience of Islamists in the West as it’s the experience of Islamists in the Muslim world itself.

**Surin Pitsuwan:**

I come from the eastern periphery of the Muslim world and I have my own theory, and that is you cannot take the Muslim world or the Islamic world as one unified body.

I do believe that here in many ways it is ground zero, partly because of the legitimacy of the message that is being sent out of here, because it is closer to the center of the heartland of Islam.

Because of the way in which Islam is being presented to the outside world, particularly to the periphery of the Muslim world, the title of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia is Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, sacred and most important to Islam. Every time his title is being mentioned in every heart of Muslim everywhere there is a question, “But where is the third one?” This is a legitimate question of Muslims everywhere. What happened to the third one? Whether is Haram or not, whether it is as important as Mecca and Medina or not, there is that question.

So because it is close to the heartland, because of the wealth that you have found in this region and I would argue because of the moral and spiritual burden and responsibility that you feel in this ground zero, you feel obliged to go out and help in your own way purify Islam in the entire Muslim world.

Now, the problem is this. Many of us in the periphery have had the experiences of innovation, adoption, adaptation, trying to accommodate various other differences in our own context. When Islam came to Southeast Asia it was already well informed, the society, by Hinduism, by Buddhism, by high culture of the Chinese.

So somehow through the human process you have to adapt and adopt and accommodate. So we have somehow evolved our own ways.

Now, all of us have our own context to operate—political, economic and social and cultural. It just so
happened I serve also on the board of the International Crisis Group. About 80 percent of the crisis spots in the world happen to be in the Muslim world.

So, we have problems of democracy, we have problems of representation, we have problems of good governance, we have problems of respect for human rights, for the rule of law.

In those contexts, the thrust of the message from here, the inspiration from here, the support from here became mixed in that environment, in Malaysia, in Indonesia, in the Philippines, in Thailand—I’m going to confine myself to only that part of the world where I represent.

So, you have this problem of how to face the challenge of the modern world, of modernity, of globalization with the kind of Puritanism that is being sent out from here, as Professor Brumberg said, with force with wealth.

Of course, the purification process has happened before in the Muslim world. Somebody said this morning this was a hundred years ago when Mohammed Abduh had to go through the same process but he was against colonialism.

So we ourselves are struggling. We ourselves are trying to find our ways to deal with the problems that we are facing, but with the frustrations, with the limitation of space, political and otherwise, in the system, with the sense of alienation, with the sense of being neglected. All these frustrations are percolating and are cooking in all those societies.

Now, partly because the same Puritanism from here could not be put into full practice in this region, therefore there is this tendency to go out and adopt a society and a community that would welcome them, therefore Afghanistan, therefore Pakistan, therefore other places.

Now, where the space is more open like Malaysia, like Thailand or for some time like Indonesia, the mixture somehow found itself in a constructive process participating in the political, economic and social and cultural context of those societies, but when the space becomes limited and where there is no other means to express yourself Islam has become the robe, the (in Arabic), the robe of God. You express your frustration through symbolism of Islam.

I think Clifford Geertz studied Indonesia, studied Morocco. He said the process of Puritanism, the process of puritanical process in any religion would somehow be a pre-face, a face that would lead to nationalism, that would lead to independence, that would lead to the struggle. So, inevitably we adopt the symbolism of Islam, we adopt the symbolism of Islamic teaching in order to inspire, many of us, to move into the process of the struggle.

Now, where would be the answer to this morning somebody said the U.S. is trying to create the world in their own image. I think we the Muslims are also facing the same problem; that is, we are trying to create Muslim society according to our own image, every one of us, including here from ground zero.

So how do we find the answer? So as to provide Muslims with ways and means and methodology and models and paradigms to face up to this problem, these challenges called modernity and globalization effectively, successfully I would say, and this is a rather controversial point, we have to look for where Islam has lived, lived successfully, contributing, confident. Where can you find that kind of Islam? It happens to be in some of those societies that are open for Muslims to live, to adapt, to adopt, to interpret, reinterpret.

Eventually the brand of Islam that is rather united, rather limited going out from here will have to give way to diversity of interpretations, because each and every one of us will have to face that decision on a daily basis, how to interpret my faith, my Islam as to make a decision on this very issue. Eventually, the educational reform that we are talking about will have to be the process of education that would give
us the ability to be a Mujaheddin unto ourselves, unto himself, unto herself. Would the leadership or what they call the clergy of Islam be willing to give that freedom, that space to those Muslims who are living in an open society?

I have seen it in my part of the world and I think in the West, I think in Europe, I think in America, I think in Australia, Muslims are living their own faith success-fully, effectively and positively and contributing and constructive.

We need educational reform definitely. We need also from the international community the kind of support and development, the kind of cooperation that would resolve some of the central issues and problems that are creating frustration and bitterness in the Muslim world; do something about the Arab-Israeli conflict because there is that third part that is missing in the heart of the Muslims.

I think we are at that point when we are talking about two independent states living alongside with each other, and I hope there will be an implementation of that concept and of that idea and the Arabs and Muslims have come around to accept that. As Ambassador Indyk this morning said, America will be engaged, will be more prepared to get involved, will be more sensitive—should be. I hope you would be engaged enough, involved enough, sensitive enough to go far enough to solve this one problem now.

So the issues, the problems that we are facing cannot be resolved by just one brand of Islam, whether it's Sunnism, whether it's Wahabism, whether it's Shiaism from the Gulf, but it will have to be part of a process long-term, like Professor Brumberg has said.

Muslims will have to turn inward, asking themselves what has happened. We passed on the wisdom of the Greeks to Western Europe. They have gone into enlightenment, they have gone into reformation, they have gone into industrial revolution—they have gone into industrial revolution; what happened here?

I think what we need is to complete that loop. Somebody mentioned about human resources development this morning, I think Ambassador Indyk. Cooperation in the educational process, in the exchange, in the cultivation of mutual respect and mutual understanding complete the loop. Maybe you can also help the Muslims through human resource development, not through imposition, but the Muslims should also be able to attain their own renewal, rational, progressive, effective, positive and confident rather than being buried in this, what someone this morning called crisis and bitterness.

So I would end with the maxim that Mohammed Abduh used, “Allah will not change the situation of any community unless and until they change something, the attitude, in their own mind.” And for those who come from outside, friends and allies from afar, you are part of this process, you are involved. No man is an island entire of itself, so send not to ask for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for all of us, for you, too.

Thank you very much.

Note: Transcript by Federal News Service
Inclusion or Exclusion?  
Islamism in Politics

**Opening Speakers:**  
**Martin Kramer**, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Editor, Middle East Quarterly  
**Nasr Taha Mustafa**, Editor-In-Chief, Saba, National News Agency of Yemen

**Martin Kramer:**  
In the title of this panel, we have been given these two alternatives of inclusion and exclusion for the Islamist movements.

The choice of words already tends to prejudge the issue: How can one possibly oppose inclusion? Isn’t the essence of democracy and equality summarized by the word “inclusion”? Isn’t exclusion something fundamentally undemocratic and discriminatory? How is it possible to advocate the exclusion of anyone from politics? After all, the inclusion of everyone, men and women, black and white, rich and poor, is considered the fundamental condition of democracy and one could argue also of modernity.

Needless to say, I’m sympathetic also to the arguments in favor of inclusion. In the Middle East I think many of us would agree that the authoritarian state has failed to fulfill its self-appointed role of bringing modernity to the masses and the authoritarian state. This state will always be limited in the public goods it can deliver. So eventually the state will have to find a way to accommodate the growing desire for wider participation.

But let me also state my own unequivocal view: The inclusion of Islamists has not represented a progressive step forward where it has been taken and in some cases it may actually constitute a dangerous step backward. It would be a mistake for the United States to press for the inclusion of Islamists even if democracy promotion becomes a feature of its Middle East policy.

Similarly, I think it would be a mistake to rush to the defense of Islamists whose conduct has brought the wrath of the state down upon their heads. Where Islamists have been tainted by terrorism the United States should not be bound by the fact that these same Islamists may sit in parliaments.

Anyone familiar with U.S. policy already knows that it does not include support for the inclusion of Islamists. I’m not stating anything but the obvious. Yet no one who speaks for U.S. policy has been prepared to rationalize it. So allow me to rationalize it. I’m not an official or prospective official; I speak only for myself. But since 9/11 the views that I hold are held much more widely than they were before. It’s an approach to Islamism that I should stress has nothing to do with
Islam per se and everything to do with the actual conduct of the Islamist movements themselves.

Let me not put too fine a point on it. To date almost every political order that has included Islamists and given them a space in which to operate has become a trouble spot or a breeding ground for terrorism. Some say, “include the Islamists,” include them in the game and they will moderate. The actual evidence to date is that the more space Islamists are given, the more threatening they become in the first instance to their fellow Muslims, including many secularists, but also to the United States.

Now, let me illustrate the point by a number of examples. In an earlier session someone mentioned Lebanon as being very exceptional in the Arab world. I too think unique in the Arab world. It actually has a measure of political pluralism, it has political parties, a relatively open press, it has elections. Lebanon’s predisposition is to include everyone and the Islamists of Hezbollah have been included in the system for a decade now. Hezbollah is formally recognized, its representatives sit in the parliament, and it has a standing invitation to join the cabinet of the Lebanese government.

Yet this has not deterred the Islamists. To the contrary, they have established a virtual state within the state. Hezbollah remains armed. It has taken over some of the most sensitive parts of the country. And it operates with minimal regard for the Lebanese state. It periodically nudges both Lebanon and the region to the brink of war.

Now, I know that some of you will say, “But they’re a resistance movement,” to which I would answer, perhaps they were a resistance movement but now they are a power unto themselves. Much like the PLO was in the 1970s, one could argue even more than the PLO because Hezbollah actually has strategic capabilities. I think this bodes ill for the future prospects of Lebanon as a state.

And what of the Palestinian Authority? Even under the less than ideal rule of Yasser Arafat, it has been less oppressive than any other Arab state. It tolerates a wider range of political expression than Syria, Jordan, or Egypt. And, of course, it tolerates the Islamists as well. The result here again is the Islamists of Hamas and Islamic Jihad have gained an influence, which is far in excess of their numbers. If Hamas is not formally part of the Palestinian government it’s only because Hamas chooses to remain outside, but they are entirely free to organize, preach, and demonstrate.

How have they used that freedom? They are armed to the teeth, they have grown terrorist appendages, which answer only to themselves and whose violence has infected the entire Palestinian body politic. But beyond issues related to their stance towards Israel, they have become an authority within the authority and they are a law unto themselves.

Now, you might say the two instances I just gave are exacerbated by the Arab-Israeli conflict and so they aren’t genuine tests. So let’s look beyond the Arab-Israeli arena. Is the situation any different in the Arabian Peninsula, for example? It would be presumptuous of me to speak about Yemen, given the fact that my colleague on this panel will do so, so I won’t. I would simply ask this: Did the opening of Yemeni politics a decade ago not create the space in which extreme Islamism now flourishes today? Is it a coincidence that in the 1990s Yemen pioneered the inclusion of Islamists and that today Yemen is regarded as a breeding ground for extreme Islamist terror?

Last night, one of our Kuwaiti participants drew a line between Kuwait’s relative political openness and the spread to that country of al-Qaeda, and I take that as a suggestion that perhaps Kuwait drew the line in the wrong place when it drew it to include the Islamists.

And how can we forget the political order that is the most inclusive of Islamists? I’m speaking of Saudi Arabia, which is a regime built upon an institutionalized inclusion of Islamists in the political order. No,
there are no elections in Saudi Arabia but the Islamist element, which is to say much of the Saudi religious establishment, has an allotted share of power. For a long time it was believed that the Saudi royal house had found the perfect formula for neutralizing the religious zealotry that created the Saudi state: bring the zealots into the tent, make them complicit in the modernizing project of the Al Saud, tempt them, co-opt them, and harvest those fatwahs of compliance with the ruling order.

I think we all know what has become of this experiment now that we’ve taken a closer look at it since 9/11. It’s not certain who has co-opted whom. The Islamists who are within the system have subverted it, using the immunities they enjoy to spread extremism and its terrorist offshoots across the world. The Saudi symbiosis has become an extremism machine. “Our Islamists,” the ones who were supposed to be safely under control, have been running amok.

So in short, political inclusion has not been an antidote to extremism. Quite the opposite: The more inclusive the system, the more likely it is to become the host of some cancerous Islamist movement, which combines both incitement and terrorism.

What about the moderate Islamist? Surely you realize that all Islamists are not alike, you will say. I do realize it. Obviously there must be differences among Islamists. A well-known American scholar has made a career of repeatedly urging that the U.S. government, “distinguish between Islamic movements that are a threat and those that represent legitimate indigenous attempts to reform and redirect their societies.”

This seems an eminently reasonable objective on paper, but in practice it means going out and measuring each movement and classifying it. Let’s admit the truth: The record of Arab and Western governments in classifying Islamist moderates has been a very patchy one indeed. Time and again Islamists who are regarded as moderates have turned out to be anything but that. That is because the idea of Islamism as a spectrum from extremism through moderation is a misleading analogy. Islamism is not a spectrum; it is more like an orbit. At times Islamists appear to be approaching us. At other times they appear to be moving away from us. But the thing to remember is that they are always in motion and that they will not defy the gravity of their idea. In particular, they can’t be expected to exit the orbit of the ideal Islamic state and slip into the orbit of liberal democracy. This is as likely as the conversion of these Islamists to another religion.

There are governments in the region that may decide to include Islamists. They may feel that the risks of exclusion are greater than the risks of inclusion. This might be particularly true in the monarchies, where there are certain agreed limits to the process of political change. In these settings a ruler may feel that Islamists can be compelled to play strictly according to the rules of the ruler. It’s hard for me to second-guess these decisions, even though many of them have gone wrong in the past.

The problem is that when the inclusiveness bargain goes wrong, when Islamists begin to violate the rules of their contract they often begin by assailing the contract of these rulers with the United States. In fact, it’s now happening across the region. The stability of the region and with it the discourse of live and let live are not being undermined by Islamists who have been excluded in places like Syria, Iraq, Libya or Tunisia; it’s being undermined by the most included of the Islamists. Where these Islamists have acquired certain immunities, they are wary about criticizing their rulers head-on. So the discourse of dissent has taken the form of a particularly virulent anti-Americanism and its main theme has been that the United States is waging a war on Islam itself. Those who make this claim are in a cynical way seeking to continue the work begun on 9/11.

There is little that the United States can do to dissuade governments from giving these Islamists space or a platform. But it should be understood that the U.S. isn’t obligated by such decisions, and when the U.S.
succeeds in linking these Islamists with terrorism and the support for terrorism, it is perfectly within its rights to insist that governments choose.

The United States is not at war with Islam or even with Islamism but it can no longer be complacent about Islamists who have abused their inclusion to engage in or support a clandestine war against the United States. Inclusion cannot be bought at the price of America's own interests and the lives of its own citizens at home and abroad.

Sometimes I hear the United States discussed in the Middle East as though it were some abstract principle, a set of philosophical assumptions that should be entirely consistent and free of all contradictions. The United States has pretensions to change the world. But it's also a country like any other in that it has a number of people, some 280 million Americans of all faiths, creeds and races, whose security and well-being are the very first priority of the United States government. On their behalf the United States must sometimes follow policies abroad that contradict some generally enunciated principle by which Americans govern themselves, and frankly I see no fault in that.

The late Elie Kedourie used to say that hypocrisy cannot characterize a government. It can characterize an individual but not a government. A government must protect its people and their interests. The policies it pursues to achieve this may complement one another on a practical level even though they contradict one another on a philosophical level. In an individual it is a virtue to live consistently by principle; in a government it’s a dangerous indulgence. The most harmful regimes in the 20th Century ignored the interests of their own peoples, instead pursuing some self-appointed mission in the world.

So in conclusion I say this: By all means let the United States promote the idea of inclusion. That is the half of policy that is idealistic and, if you will, missionary. And let it at the same time accept the exclusion of the Islamists. That is the half of policy that is practical and legitimately self-interested. To promote any other policy would be an irresponsible gamble unbecoming of the world’s only superpower.

**NASR Taha Mustafa:**

Regarding today’s subject, we must first understand the difficulty of defining and understanding many concepts of Islamism. Before talking about inclusion or exclusion of Islamic movements, we must explore the reasons behind problems in Islamic understandings. This means that we have a problem in the Islamic world concerning the absence of freedom and the culture of authority is deeply rooted in the Islamic world and left its fingerprints on all ways of our life—social, economic, cultural.

Dictatorship: We suffer from it at the level of the state, the tribe, the school, the university, the family, in all aspects of life. One of the most important impacts is extremism and extremism on all its ways, not only religious or Islamic extremism. We had too many types of extremism—right, left, Islamic, et cetera.

We also suffer from backwardness in all its forms—scientific, political, cultural, economic. This also reflects on our daily life.

From the backwardness and extremism we have a distorted comprehension of some principles of our religion. This lack stems from the history, the recent history and its effect on our educational systems, especially in our religious education.

This also led to differences between all the sects and trends in Islam and if we take, for example, the political action, the political parties, human rights, Jihad, terrorism, dialogue, relationships with the West, elections, and economics we will find that we have too many views across the spectrum of the society and the gaps are very wide between the factions.

To that we can add that we have the problem of
Palestine, which also impacted on our lives as Muslims. Therefore, a just cause like the Palestinian cause, people suffering from occupation of their land, transformed outside to a pretext for political parties or the regimes to impose their own agendas.

I would like to ask how as Muslims we can be frank with ourselves regarding these questions. How can we review our traditional concepts, how we can modernize these concepts without hurting our deep belief in the Koran? How can we tackle the question of haram, the forbidden in our daily life? Extremism and violence no doubt are the result of all these things, and the lack of understanding, and of dictatorship and also of the occupation suffered by the Palestinians.

When we come to the Islamic movement and their experience in our region we will have two options, either inclusion or exclusion, but if we take the exclusion where will we end? I think that the result is the future is bleak, very bleak. If we choose inclusion, on what basis and what are the principles upon which we can build such an inclusion? We cannot discuss this thing in abstract. If we don’t discuss all the things that I mentioned before—education, dictatorship, especially education, we have a huge problem regarding education. But after the element of September when the United States started to tackle the question of education maybe we can reach a state of an absence of a dialogue. Maybe there is a problem regarding education and this bad understanding of Islam and Islamism is the result of a heritage of backwardness and a lack of understanding of the modern world. All these things need to be modernized and to be reviewed that will be adapted into our modern life.

Since I’m coming from Yemen, if we take the Yemeni experience, in fact, when it is said that Yemen is a hotbed of terrorism, it is not true. This means that Yemen has a long experience and dialogue with the Islamism and Islamists.

Since the 1970s the Islamist movement in Yemen is part of the dialogue sometimes within the government, sometimes outside the government, but always without any kind of violence or political disturbance.

The phenomenon of extremism is very limited in Yemen. What this means is that all the extremist elements, their influence is very limited, but if ten extremists will lead their attack on the Cole this doesn’t mean that extremism and violence is the rule in Yemen.

The political regime in Yemen is based on pluralism and democracy since 1990. Since the reunification of Yemen, it was able to absorb Islamists through the Islah government for four years in the government. After the 1997 elections, the Islah Party left the government. This means that this experience is good and mature and could be followed up. I know is that there is a dialogue between the representatives of the United States and the Islamist movement in Yemen, and the United States always encourages the Islamists in Yemen to participate in the government and to be part of the democratic process.

If we look to the example of Kuwait, because I think it’s also a mature experience, yesterday the Emir of Kuwait called for the confrontation of extremism and asked that of the members of the Islamist movements in the parliament. The phenomenon of extremism is not very important and does not dominate the country, but we can also discuss what are the reasons behind this extremism. Maybe it’s in part because the people do not understand really what’s going on. If al-Qaeda says that the infidels should be out of the Arabian Peninsula this means a shortcoming in their methodology and their comprehension of modern life and all things that we witness today.

So what’s the solution for these people: To wipe them out or to have a dialogue? I think should be discussed and we as Islamic countries are more concerned by this than the United States.

The criteria of inclusion is democracy, elections and legitimacy. This criteria should be the basis for dialogue with the Islamists.
Egypt has suffered from extremism, but those who follow the current dialogue in Egypt, within the Jama’ah Islamiya think this was a very good experience to a certain extent and it could reflect positively on the political life in Egypt. I think that the Egyptian government is part of this experience, if not sponsoring it, and it could lead to the elimination of the idea of violence in political life.

At the level of the Arab and Islamic world we have still a lot of time before Islamist reach power through elections or through violence. The reason is because the Islamist movement could not till now present themselves to the people or to the Islamic world. They could not convince the people of their methods because these movements are still absorbed by the heritage of backwardness and the indecision concerning their views in politics, economy and social efforts. No one can accept these Islamists as their legitimate government without having a clear understanding of the methods they would apply.

Finally, before going to discussion, I would like to talk about the United States and its relationship with the Islamic world. I think that the United States and the people of the United States do not have any conflict with or intend to wage a “civilizational war” against the Islamic world. There is no heritage of enmity or revenge between the United States and the Islamic world.

The second thing is that the American people are a loving optimistic, and positive people. They don’t have the vision or belief of superiority towards others. This is very good and could be considered a basis for dialogue with the Islamic world.

One thing must be clarified: the bias towards Israel, and against the Palestinians. This could endanger the interests of the United States in a vital region like the Arab and Islamic world. I think that the United States can play an active role in resolving this issue and avoid many problems that might occur. The United States is not the victim of the element of September 11th, which was the result of many factors. The United States should not hold the entire Islamic world responsible for what happened on the 11th of September because of the actions of some individuals.

We also need a dialogue among us, the Muslims, to study these extremist movements and to prevent them from developing. We need to adopt to what we can call the development of moderation in the Islamic world. And finally, we also need a dialogue with the United States in this regard, a responsible dialogue with no bias and prejudice.

Thank you very much.

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Democracy In the Islamic World

OPENING SPEAKERS:
Shaul Bakhash, Professor, George Mason University
Abdel Hameed Al-Ansari, Dean of Sharia College, University of Qatar

SHAUL BAKHASH:

Dr. Ansari and I were asked to speak to two questions: why democracy has had such a hard time taking root in the countries of the Islamic world and what the implications of this are for the United States. I will confine my remarks to the Middle East and North Africa, which I know best. I hope other countries of the Islamic world will be addressed in the course of the discussions.

I want to use as the “text” for my remarks the just-published, October 2002, issue of the Journal of Democracy, which devotes a number of articles to a country-by-country survey of the fate of democracy in the Arab world and North Africa. The survey, though incomplete, suggests that where democracy is concerned there are clearly pockets of positive developments. But the over-all picture that emerges from these articles is hardly encouraging.

There continue to be in the Arab world outright autocracies like Iraq and Syria. There are also traditional autocracies like Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia now there is a consultative majlis-e shura. There also exist traditional forms of consultation. Technocrats run the economic and planning ministries. But there are no elections; there is no free press or a press independent of the government; and power remains in the hand of the royal family.

In a number of countries, after a period of hopeful political opening and an expansion of political space, there has occurred a reversal to more repressive policies. This is decidedly the case in Egypt, in Yemen and to a certain extent even in Jordan. Algeria, just recovering from a vicious civil war that cost many tens of thousands of lives, is understandably experiencing a sharp clamp-down on political activity. Political parties continue to operate in Algeria. The press tends to be lively on certain, limited subjects. But everyone knows ultimate power rests with the army.

Some of the more hopeful developments are occurring in the countries of the Persian Gulf and in Morocco. Since 1996, Kuwait has had regular elections, a legislature with reasonable powers, and a greater degree of press freedom. Bahrain is about to follow Kuwait’s example on somewhat more restricted lines. In Qatar a very interesting experiment is being attempted with a new draft constitution that gives strong powers to parliament and the vote to women. Qatar, of course, also is the home of the Al-Jazeera broadcasting...
network. In Morocco reforms since 1992 have resulted in strengthening the rule of law, expanded powers for the legislature, space for an opposition party, and more guarantees for professional and human rights associations.

But all these openings are narrow—even in the countries in the initial stages of the transition to democracy. And all these openings are subject to limitations.

The reasons why democracy has not more easily taken root in the Middle East and North Africa are complex. But let me run through some of the possible explanations.

First, the tradition of autocracy is not new. It goes back many decades and precedes the period of independence. The parliamentary interregnum in the Arab world was brief and generally regarded as a failure. The free officer regimes that came to power in the Middle East in the 1950s produced leaders such as Nasser who were highly popular and enjoyed strong popular backing. But we would not call these regimes democratic. They were, rather, populist. They practiced a form of mass politics, not democracy. In many ways, the officers’ regimes resulted in even more repressive rule than the regimes that they overthrew.

A second cause for the weakness of democracy in the Arab world has been the strength of the state in relation to the rest of society. We think of many Arab states as weak; but these states have had sufficient strength to maintain internal control and to keep potential internal rivals on a tight leash. The state controls a vast bureaucracy and government revenues. It has extensive facilities for dispensing patronage, jobs, largesse, licenses for economic undertakings, and so forth. The state controls the military, the security services and the courts. Where real challenges to the state have arisen, governments have had little difficulty in dealing with them. Consider the Egyptian government’s successful suppression of the extremist Islamist threat it faced in the 1980s, or Algeria’s handling of its own Islamic opposition movement. A more interesting example is provided by Iran. The movement for democratic reform that emerged in the mid-1990s was broadly-based, strong in ideas and successful in successive presidential, parliamentary and local elections. It posed a serious challenge to the ruling conservative hierarchy. That movement is today not defeated; but it is seriously in retreat.

Third, the building blocks of civil society in the Middle East are weak. When we look at Middle Eastern and North African societies and, in fact, societies in the larger Islamic world we are faced with a paradox. The middle class and the educated class in almost all these countries has been growing.

Social bonds in most Islamic societies are strong. In the major cities in this part of the world, whether Djakarta or Cairo, Tehran or Damascus, urban society is vibrant and energetic. There is a palpable energy in the great cities and in the bazaars, among the merchants, shopkeepers and craftsmen and also in the universities and the seminaries. You would think that this were ideal ground for building civil society.

Indeed, where the opportunity has offered itself for political participation, such as the brief political opening that occurred in Egypt in the 1980s, in Yemen in the early 1990s, and in Iran in after 1996, the groups of citizens were very adept at seizing the moment, establishing professional and civil associations, engaging in electoral politics, establishing new newspapers, publishing books.

Yet this plethora of newspapers, civic and political associations, political parties, and the revival of electoral activity proved inadequate, as we have already seen, to withstand the crackdown from the state when it came.

Perhaps the very proliferation of professional and civil society associations was really a form of fragmentation, despite the outward manifestation of vigor; individually these associations were weak. With very few exceptions, for example, political movements in
this region have been unable to form large, inclusive political parties. Yet it is essential that political parties come into being if the democratic experiment is going to have a chance to succeed. Civil society-type associations and non-governmental political movements have not yet found the means to gain sufficient strength or leverage to protect themselves against an eventual governmental crackdown.

Fourth, even where the state allows elections, parliaments, and a degree of political freedom to non-governmental groups—again with rare exceptions—the government itself is rarely answerable to the parliament, and parliaments are rarely in a position to make policy.

The concentration of resources in the hands of the state means that the potential building blocks of civil society are themselves state-dependent. This includes the merchant and business community, the press and very often professional and civil associations. Newspapers, for example, may need assistance with expensive newsprint and the means to import it; merchants need access to foreign exchange and import licenses; lawyers and doctors wish to avoid interference by the state. Many governments in the region interfere try to control professional and civic associations.

The Moroccan scholar Abd al-Salam Maghraoui, in discussing the absence of real democracy in Morocco, even while great deal of political activity seems to take place, speaks of a process of de-politicization of society. By this I think he means that while there are elections, political parties, a legislature, and so forth, a political discourse in which the critical issues—for example concentration of power in the king’s hands—are addressed and in which citizens participate in a meaningful way does not exit.

In one of our discussion sessions this morning, on the new media in the Middle East, Shibley Telhami made the same observation in a different context. He remarked that the new media in the Middle East was making a significant contribution, as is the case, for example, with Al-Jazeera in Qatar. But he noted that this new media has yet to address the critical issues of “power, money and guns”: that is, the distribution of political power, the distribution of economic benefits and the control of the instruments of coercion. Once again, we have the trappings, but not yet the substance, of a free press.

The expectation has generally been that modest beginnings on the path of democratic transition will lead, by a series of gradual steps, to a more democratic or a fully democratic system. But the reality seems to be otherwise: very limited, meager steps towards democracy are regularly followed by reversions to autocracy.

The danger is that we will end up in the Middle East with states which allow a degree of political participation but which never yield or cede real power. Some years ago, Fareed Zakaria published an article in Foreign Affairs he entitled, I believe, “Illiberal Democracies.” He meant by this telling phrase a situation where there are elections, there are parliaments, but where we still do not have real democracy.

Dan Brumberg, in remarks he made at another forum, spoke to the same issue when he suggested that such a state of affairs—a degree of liberalism without real democracy, “liberalized autocracy, as he termed it—may perhaps represent a political system in itself. The depressing but possible outcome in the Middle East is that we will have governments that allow a degree of freedom but never cede real power; and that these “liberalized autocracies” will prove durable, at least in the medium term.

Finally, a word on the possible American role in advancing democracy in the Middle East. The Bush administration has recently begun to speak of America as the champion of democracy, not only in the Middle East but elsewhere in the world as well.

I remain very skeptical about both intention and practicality when it comes to such declarations. If
democracy means, as it does, an independent judiciary, political parties and the rule of law, common sense suggests an outside power is in no position to impose such an order on another country. An outside power might be able to encourage, on the fringes, moves towards democratization, but the critical impulse must be internal.

Secondly, up to now the U.S. has been very comfortable with autocrats and autocracies. The history of America’s cooperation with autocrats in the postwar era is long. In Asia, democratic transitions have occurred; but they have been due much more to the internal political and social dynamics of individual countries than to the role of the United States. The U.S. propped up and supported Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, for example, until the breadth and strength of the popular movement against him made it impossible to do so.

Thirdly, even at this very moment when, in the aftermath of 9/11, the United States is presumably making a new beginning, committing itself the promotion of democracy, we see the same pattern alliances made with autocrats in response to the exigencies of the moment. In Central Asia the U.S. has a number of new allies who certainly are not democrats. In Pakistan the U.S. has had little to say about the seizure by President Musharaf of extraordinary powers. The arrest of Saad Eddin Ibrahim in Egypt elicited only mealy-mouthed protest from the United States. These examples do not suggest that, in US policy-making, the democratic impulse will prevail over the desire to find allies—of whatever political persuasion—to advance pressing foreign policy imperatives.

ABDEL HAMID AL ANSARI:

To introduce myself, I have a Ph.D. in democracy and Islam. I teach this subject. I have been for the last 20 years in the college of Sharia, and I am proud of the fact that my government allows me to teach this matter and you will hear something about that. And to be frank with you, you will find a big side of our democratic right and because my religion dictates to me that I should be honest and frank with you.

Democracy as a high ideal represents what human beings longed for by the natural disposition of man. This represents the first, the best way of experimentation with the governing systems to run the affairs of the public in a peaceful manner.

Arab life, Arab political life has seen three different examples of political democratization. The first was the rule of Bilqis, the Queen of Saba in Yemen. We don’t know much about her but the Holy Koran tells us that she used to base her rule on the principle of Shoora.

Secondly, after Islam this is the state of the prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, which ran for ten years, followed by the rightly guided caliphs, which their rule lasted for 30 years. This was a democratic experiment and unfortunately did not last for long.

The third is the experiment modern Arab states had after they came into contact with the West. For more than a century or so this has been an experiment, which was full of flaws and failures. This called the Bahraini thinker Dr. Mohammed Jaber Al Ansari on the occasion of 50 years of the Egyptian revolution to wonder rather painfully and bitterly why has the first and the earliest democratic system, which was in Egypt, the royal monarchy in Egypt, which was based on the constitution of 1923, which provided an umbrella for national renaissance, development, education, which produced people like Faha Sen Al Akad, Al Hakim Tal Adhard, and also provided for an environment, under which both the Muslim brotherhood and the communists managed to coexist peacefully.

I will try and answer some questions in my presentation about the reality of democratization in the Arab world and the reservations people have against it and the experiments we attempted. Has the West really been an obstacle in the way of achieving
democracy in the Arab world? What is the relationship between democracy and terrorism, and democracy tolerant towards its adversaries or not, and what of democracy and human intervention under the system of globalization?

First of all, as far as the reality of democratization in the Arab world is concerned I don’t find a more revealing and honest thing than the Arab Human Development Report, which recorded a big retreat in the basic human rights in the Arab world, that the Arab world lacks in the fields of popular participation in the decision-making, and that democratic representation is either absent or made absent and the Arabs have failed in achieving a modern state.

Let me go into this with some detail and say that democracy is of three degrees. From the bottom upwards is the level of political freedoms. We find more Arab countries—this is invariably so—that they allow for freedom of expression in their media but they do not allow for public dissent and public demonstration unless it’s against the U.S. or Israel. And also the right of having proper judicial courts; we have exceptional judiciary and tribunals. Now we talk about Saad Eddin Ibrahim and the imprisonment of seven years, which was the sentence, which was passed against him as an example of not allowing the freedom of expression. Many Arab countries are still ruled by rules of emergency, states of emergency.

As for political participation most Arab countries allow both sexes to elect, except for Kuwait, who allows it for men and not women. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, they have not decided yet to give this right until now.

Having said that, even in the countries that allow women to vote in political elections, we do not find acceptable real representation in parliaments or high-ranking jobs in the government. Even in the legislature side there is a discrepancy. Maybe the common factor between all Arab countries is to violate the right of women to pass on her citizenship to her children if she marries a person who is not a citizen of her own country, and this is quite evident in our Arab countries.

As for the third level as far as political organization is concerned, which is the highest degree of democratic practice, there are very few Arab countries, which allow for political parties. And if this is done, it’s usually done under very strict conditions.

As for civil societies the organization of civil society face marginalization and they are usually looked at as of bad repute because governments usually always accuse it of being funded by organizations or governments outside. This is a result of the Nasserite era in Egypt in the ‘60s. Few organizations in Egypt and Syria face near suffocation. Now even the fact that these organizations provide for the lifeline for society, for any society, if they suffocate where is any democracy, any hope for democracy.

The third and the highest level is power sharing and finding reasonable and peaceful mechanisms to change power. The share of the Arab countries in this is very minimal. There are no mechanisms as such for power sharing.

And reservations in the Arab world against democracy: it’s unfortunate Arab regimes who raise the banner of democracy for more than half a century used to jump on these slogans and pass them over for many reasons and justifications.

In the ‘60s Arab socialism managed to control the Arab mind and called for the political democratization to be put on the back burner on the pretext that democratization is impossible to achieve without social justice.

Then there was another slogan, which says no voice should be louder than the voice or the cry of battle. This was another pretext, which said the political openness weakened the Arab’s ability to face outside challenges like the Zionist challenges. So it was a double loss. We did not become democratic and we were not up to the challenge of outside threat. So this is
usually referred to, explained by the lack of maturity in the Arab societies, because of illiteracy, which is an obstacle in the way of democratization.

Islam and democracy: Islam as a religion calls for freedom, justice and equality and accepts democracy on the basis that the common denominator is one between all humanity and human beings by their very nature and the way God has created them long for such freedoms.

But the question is what is the position of Islamists vis-à-vis democracy. There are two tendencies. The first one, which is held by the extremist groups, which is one of rejection of this principle, which looks at this as a bad Western product, which makes governments or the rule of God supreme to the rule of man and also the other tendency, which looks at the people as a source of all powers and accepts and recognizes the rights of women and the minorities, but within the general context of al-Sharia and what is enduring of its principles. This calls for adopting some formalities and mechanisms of democracy and adopted them to Muslim societies. I don’t think this contradicts Islam.

Fourth, has the West acted as an obstacle against democratization in the Islamic world? The Arab, pan Arab nationalist thinking was inclined for such Justifications and the question remains did we have really a leading experiment, which the West put obstacles in the path of and was democracy an integral part of the pan Arab discourse, whether in opposition or in government and also wasn’t the other was always treated as someone who was thrown into prisons and jails and wasn’t the leader of the political pan Arabs party was the dominant trend. And even the young democracy system, which was born under the early days of British occupation, was set upon by the revolutionaries and killed and nipped in its bud.

And now the West encourages us to have an open political system and tries to encourage us through its investment and aid, which links to political openness. We accuse the West of interference when we hear these things. We are the ones who wasted our sources and resources in wars between ourselves and others.

Fifth, democracy and terrorism. Terrorism before being an aggressive behavior, it is a sick thought at its heart, a culture that captured the mind of a human being who lived a desperate childhood. Go back to the records of terrorists, you find that it is always a desperate childhood and retarded civilization and culture that took hold of this desperate person. Therefore he is not governed by any religion or education. This is prevailing in all peoples with all the different civilization. Therefore I do not agree with the approach that associates terrorism with the absence of democracy as a political system.

My proof is number one that terrorism is not confined to non-democratic countries but also extends to the highest democracies. A lot of strategies, approaches like the neo Nazis in Europe—they live in free or liberal atmospheres. A large number of our terrorists from our part of the world have lived in relatively democratic areas.

I have found that the infrastructure and the intellectual infrastructure of a terrorist does not include any concern with the human rights or any democratic value. Their ideology is based mainly on disrupting against the democratic concept of democracy. This reminds us of what Kissinger said in his article: that the terrorists on the 11th of September were not motivated by certain injustice but rather general hatred. There isn’t any specific injustice but general hatred; therefore, hard-line approaches, even if they go into the game of elections in an attempt to reach the authority and destroy democracy.

The question now, how far can democracy be tolerant with its enemies? The neo Nazis in Europe and the hardliners and radicals in our region, they are very good at using and abusing this tolerance in democracy but does democracy have any other choice than to be tolerant even in confronting those who are abusing it? Obstacles to democracy are democratic.
Democracy was understood in Arab countries as a fruit to be picked and not a seed to be planted, watered, and nurtured. Democracy is possible in a culture of a civil society. It’s not enough to have constitutions or establishment as an institution because eventually they will end up as something former, because democracy includes social bringing up and open education and free media and learned practices. Democracy is made in the minds of human beings first.

Therefore I think that the main reason behind the failure, the chronic Arab failure in having a real democracy is the political elite was focused on the main infrastructure, political infrastructure without thinking of nurturing the values of democracy in the social values in terms, in the form of starting from the first years of any child. The respect of human rights begins at home and in the respect of rights of women and children.

These concerns are not getting enough and attention from the Arab countries. Therefore, the tree of democracy has not been able to have its roots deep in the Arab soil and therefore it was subject to the winds and it was uprooted with the first wind.

Our education is not based on democracy. Our education is unilateral and our media is mobilizing and our religious institutions are instigating and will not be set straight unless we reconsider all the social structure, education, culture and media and the correct understanding of religion. Respect of human rights, as we said, begins at home from the respect and appreciation of the woman and the wife and the respect of the rights of children.

The final point is democracy and human intervention under globalization. Globalization is infamous in the Arab world and in order to be supported by the people you have to attack globalization. Under globalization any government has an absolute right to do whatever they wish with their people—with of coercion and violation of their basic rights, because such violation will affect in one way or another on others and other communities and societies. It’s enough to see the large numbers of refugees running away from our countries to Europe and others. This requires an international social contract that gives priority to the respect of human rights, particularly when this is used as a cover for violation of such rights. But in all ways this should be through legitimate intervention like what the United States did in asking the Security Council to intervene to have the democratic election of a president of Panama and intervention in liberation of Kuwait and of Afghanistan.

Thank you very much.

Note: Transcript by Federal News Service
Now, the globalization system that we have moved into since the late 1980s is also characterized by one overarching feature. Only it’s not division—it’s integration. In this new system all your threats and opportunities tend to flow from who you’re connected to and this new system is also characterized by a single word, the “Web” the “World Wide Web.”

Over the last 15 years or so we’ve gone from a world of division and walls to a world of integration and Webs. In the Cold War we in the United States reached for the hotline, which connected the White House and the Kremlin. The hotline was a symbol that we were all divided but thank God at least two people were in charge, the United States and the Soviet Union. In globalization we reach for the Internet, which is a symbol that we’re all connected and nobody is quite in charge.

I know a lot of people think the United States is in charge. I’m afraid that is not the case. The internal logic of the globalization system I would argue exactly mirrors the logic of the Internet; that is, we are all increasingly connected but nobody is quite in charge.

Two Filipino college graduates could put their Love Bug virus on the World Wide Web and melt down ten million computers and $10 billion in data on seven continents in 24 hours because we are all increasingly connected and nobody is quite in charge. The Love Bug virus was to the globalization system what the
Cuban missile crisis was to the Cold War system. It was the moment that illustrated our core vulnerability. The Love Bug illustrated our vulnerability in a world connected with no one in charge, and the Cuban missile crisis illustrated our vulnerability in a world divided between two superpowers with nuclear arms.

There are five key features of the globalization system. Feature number one is how power is structured within this system, which I would argue is different from the Cold War system. Power in the Cold War system was structured exclusively or virtually exclusively around nation states. What that meant was that you and I acted on the world stage through our state and the story of the Cold War was the story of states balancing states, confronting states and aligning with states.

In the globalization system, instead of there just being one balance to keep track of, there are now three power balances that I believe shape international relations.

The first is the balance between states and states. For all you realists out here the balance of power between states still matters, whether it's Iraq balancing Iran, China balancing Russia, Japan balancing Korea. The balance of power between states still matters. That's one of the things shaping international relations today.

But there are two new balances in the globalization system that I think are critical to understand. The first is the balance between states and what I call the “super markets.” The super markets are the 25 largest global stock, bond and currency markets in the world today, which in some cases are more powerful than, and in some cases the equal of, nation states in terms of shaping international relations. Who ousted President Suharto in Indonesia? I would argue it was not another superpower; it was, in fact, the super markets, which created the underlying conditions for Suharto's ouster.

The United States, I often say, can destroy a country by dropping bombs. The super markets can destroy a country by downgrading its bonds. So take your choice.

Jody Williams won the Nobel Peace Prize five years ago for organizing a global ban on landmines against the wishes of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. She was asked afterwards how she did it. And she had a very short answer: e-mail. Jody Williams basically used e-mail to galvanize a thousand NGOs on five continents into a global movement against land mines. She was a super-empowered nice woman.

Unfortunately, there aren't just super-empowered nice guys and nice gals in this system. There are also super-empowered angry men and women. When I wrote Lexus and the Olive Tree in 1998, I profiled two super-empowered angry people as my example. One was a guy called Osama bin Laden and the other was a guy called Ramzi Yousef who was responsible for trying to blow up the World Trade Center back in 1993.

Why did I focus on them? I started thinking about bin Laden after the attacks on the American embassies in East Africa, because as you recall, President Clinton fired 75 cruise missiles at Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan after that. And when I saw that happen I said to myself, “that is amazing. We, the United States, just fired 75 cruise missiles at a person. We, the United States, just fired 75 cruise missiles at a million dollars each at a person.” That was the first battle in history between a superpower and a super-empowered angry man. To me September 11th was the second battle.

So now we have states and states, states and super markets. Thirdly, though, and unique to the globalization system we now have states and what I like to call super empowered people. You see, what happens in the globalization system when you blow away the walls, and you start to wire the world into networks—what happens is that individuals today can increasingly act on the world's stage directly, unmediated by a state.
analyze as an international system and so difficult to manage. That’s the first part of the system.

The second part of the system—and this gets into the economic weave so I’ll go over this quickly but it’s important to understand—is what happens in economic terms when the walls fall. What happens in economic terms when the walls fall and the world gets wired into networks is that the speed at which you move in—whatever you do, whatever product you make, whatever good or service you sell—the speed at which you move from innovation to commoditization goes into hyper speed. Whatever it is you make, sell or do, the speed at which it goes from having a high value added and is protected by “high walls” to becoming a commodity that anyone else can make, sell, or do—and where the only differentiation is price—increases. Globalization supercharges the speed at which products and services go from innovation to commoditization.

The best example I can give you is Compaq Computer. It’s a very interesting story where Compaq Computer came from. Back in 1985 Intel came out with a new chip called the 386 chip, which was faster than the 286 chip. They came to their biggest customer, IBM, Big Blue, and said, “Make a new computer; we just came out with a new chip.” IBM said, “Excuse me, we just made a new computer based on the 286 chip called the IBM AT. ” Remember the IBM AT? AT stood for Advanced Technology. And IBM told its customers if you buy an IBM AT you won’t need to buy a new computer for five years. So they said, “We’re going to pass on the 386 chip.”

A little company in Houston, Texas named Compaq which spelled their name funny, with a “Q” on the end, said, “We’ll take that 386 chip” and in the space of 24 months they ate IBM’s lunch. They almost destroyed IBM’s PC business by being the first adaptor of the 386 chip. They caught IBM with its walls down.

Now, the best illustration I have for you on this, and this is an important phenomenon to understand because it affects everyone—Arabs, Americans, Europeans and Asians—is an ad for the Sony digital camera which I came across while doing my book. I saw this ad in an airline magazine and the first thing I said was, “that’s amazing. I didn’t know Sony made cameras. I thought they made CD players and Walkmans and stuff like that.” Well, it’s very interesting; Sony makes a digital camera now called the Sony Mavica camera.

And the ad had three pictures in it: The first was of the Sony Mavica camera and under it, it said “This is now your camera.” Next to it was a 3.5 floppy diskette and under that it said “This is now your film” because everything had been digitized. Next to that was a computer with a baby picture on it and under that it said “This is now your post office.”

You can do a whole business history of the modern world from this ad, and what this ad is telling us. The first thing it’s telling us is that somebody at Sony headquarters woke up in the mid 1980s and said, “Hey, what are we? What are we? We are just a big factory for digitizing things. It happens we’ve been digitizing music and video all these years but what the heck, when we can digitize one thing we can also digitize your baby pictures: we can be Kodak.” One day in 1985 Sony woke up and said, “We are Sony and we are now also Kodak.”

Then somebody down in the shipping and receiving department of Sony headquarters said, “You know, while we’re being Sony and Kodak, why don’t we use modems to transport these digitized baby pictures around the world to your kids from Qatar to Cuba to Salt Lake City. Why don’t we also be Federal Express?”

So in one day Sony basically said we are Sony, we are Kodak and we are Federal Express.

I was thinking after I saw that ad, “what do the people at Kodak think about this?” So I’m driving in my car one day and I hear an ad for Kodak and they’re advertising all their computer online services now. If you listen to Kodak they now talk like a computer company.
I had to go to Houston for my book to talk to the people at Compaq. While I was there I asked them how they felt about Kodak going into the computer business and they said, “Oh, we don’t really care about that, because at Compaq now we’re a learning company. We do innovation. We do business solutions. Yeah, look at our ads. We don’t even show pictures of the computers anymore in our ads.” I said, “Oh, that’s very interesting; you do business solutions.”

Geez, you know, I went back home and I’m playing golf with a friend of mine. He works for Price Waterhouse Coopers the business solutions people. I asked him how he feels about Compaq going into the business solutions business. He says, “We’re not worried about Compaq. At Price Waterhouse we’re now doing tax advice and tax derivatives. We’re driving Goldman Sachs crazy.” He suggests I go home and read a book about it. I go home, tell my wife I’m going to Borders Books to pick up a book. She says, “Don’t go to Borders, go to borderless books, Amazon.com.” So I go downstairs, I call up Amazon.com, and what do I see? Amazon is now selling CDs. I say, “Wait a minute, wasn’t that Sony’s business?”

You see, when the walls fall everyone is in everyone else’s business and when that happens the speed of innovation, the speed at which you will move from having a high value added product or service to having it turned into a commodity gets turbocharged.

I was telling this story to the booksellers of my publisher, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux. A guy raised his hand and he said, “Mr. Friedman, I have to tell you a story. I’m the chief Farrar, Strauss & Giroux bookseller in Chicago. I went into Brooks Brothers the other day to buy a men’s suit. I’m in the suit department and what do I see but they’re selling Michael Jordan’s new book, For the Love of the Game, for $45 on a stack of men’s suits. I went up to the head of the men’s suit department and said ‘How would you like it if I sold men’s suits in my bookstores? What are you doing selling books in the men’s suit department?’ He said to me ‘Have you looked at your Con Edison electric bill lately? Con Edison is selling the Michael Jordan book for 40 percent off and you can now charge it on your electric bill.’”

When the walls fall we are all in each other’s business. Compare today’s global economy to the global economy of the 1950s. The global economy of the 1950’s was a lot like the train from Cairo to Alexandria. If you missed the first one, you got the second one. If you missed the second one, you got the third one. If you couldn’t afford a ticket, you rode on the roof or you hung on the side, okay. If you didn’t want to hang on the side, you rode your bike. No more. Today’s global economy is like the bullet train from Tokyo to Osaka: you miss it and it’s gone.

Now, very quickly, the third part of this system is what I call the “golden straightjacket.” The golden straightjacket embodies all the rules of the globalization system: rules about privatization, inflation, deregulation, deficit to GDP ratios, et cetera. It is the only model on the rack this historical season.

In the Cold War, we had the Mao suit, we had the Russian fur cap, we had the American Stetson. In globalization there’s only one model on the rack: the golden straightjacket.

Two things happen when your country puts on the golden straightjacket. Your economy tends to grow from more privatization, deregulation and foreign investment, and your politics shrinks. Your economy grows and your political choices narrow to the political equivalence of Pepsi or Coke, basically to mere nuances of taste. Would somebody please tell me what was the difference between John Major and Tony Blair on economic policy when they campaigned? Paddy Ashdown, the third party leader in Britain at the time, had it perfect when he listened to Tony Blair and John Major, he said, “synchronized swimming—synchronized swimming.” And when I look at opposition ruling parties and it comes to economic policy today where they’ve put on the golden straightjacket what I see is synchronized swimming.
The fourth part of the system is a new energy source. What happens when governments are increasingly in the golden straightjacket with limited budgets? If you want to get the energy to grow, if you want to get the capital to grow, then you have to tap into what I call the "electronic herd." The electronic herd is all those global investors out there, from you at home trading online on Ameritrade to E-trade to the big global banks and multinationals. This herd existed in the Cold War system but that world was too chopped up and divided up for it to really have the impact it has today. As the walls have gotten blown away this herd is the energy source that you have to plug into if you want to grow. Plug into it right and it will light up your country. Plug into it wrong and it will burn a hole through your financial system, your culture and your environment faster than anything we've seen in the history of the world.

And that brings up the last part of the system, which is 'how do I relate to the herd? How do I plug into the system?' I like to compare countries to computers. Basically we all have the same computer today, for the first time in history: the free market computer. It's really the only computer out there right now. Russia's got it, China's got it, Qatar's got it, Egypt's got it, Japan's got it, and Mexico has got it. We all have roughly the same computer, the free market computer. What differentiates countries is whether you get the operating system and the software to go inside that computer so when you plug into the electronic herd you get the most out of it and you cushion the worst. Operating systems, in my view are all the economic rules of globalization that we've talked about. And software—software is hugely important, software is the rule of law, regulatory agencies, free press, and democratization. All of these things are necessary.

Russia to me after the Cold War was like a computer that plugged into the electronic herd with no operating system and no software inside. And they said, "Hey, this looks easy, let's just plug in," and once they did and the herd surged, as it inevitably does, it burned a hole right through the Russian economy.

Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, plugged into the electronic herd but with a very slow operating system, one that I call Das Kapital 1.0. Now, Das Kapital 1.0 is great for getting your country from $500 per capita income to 5,000 but when you want to go from 5,000 to 15,000 and the herd moves from a 286 chip to a Pentium III and you're still running Das Kapital 1.0 what happens to you is what will happen if you go home tonight and try to run Windows 2000 on your kid's old 286 Compaq computer. A little sign comes up on your screen that says you have misallocated all your resources, you cannot move capital, and please download new operating system and software. That is what Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, Korea all have been doing rather successfully since their economic crisis.

Those are the rough parameters. This all in hyper-speed, so please don’t criticize me for leaving something out of this system.

Now let's look at how this system is effect by what's happened since September 11th, and then how it's relates the Arab and Muslim world.

Is globalization alive and well since September 11th? John Gray told us globalization has been dead since September 11th. That is absolutely false. If you take away one message from this session, it is that globalization is alive and well. The biggest reason it's alive and well is because the two biggest countries in the world, India and China—one out of every three people on the planet—have embraced globalization with a vengeance. Not only have they embraced it with a vengeance they have discovered the true secret of succeeding in globalization. That is the ability to "glocalize", to take the requirements of this system and adapt them to their own culture and their own requirements and still move forward.

I am a determinist. I believe there is just one road to economic success today. And when I meet people around the world and they tell me they've discovered the third way or the fourth way or the fifth way, I check my wallet. Yes, I check my wallet. I came in here with
$50 and I’m going to leave with $50, because trust me, if you think you’ve discovered the fourth or fifth painless way to succeed in this system you are lost. There is one road but there are many speeds. Every society and culture has to adapt at the speed that is suitable to its own culture and social cohesion. The key thing is to keep going forward. I believe India and China have done that.

The second reason globalization is alive and well is that for these societies it has become a tremendous source of dignity—not of embarrassment, not of impoverishment but of dignity. I was in India a couple months ago. I interviewed Nandan Nilekani, who is the CEO of Infosys, which is India’s biggest software company and he said something that really struck me. “So many Indians come and say to me now, “when I walk through immigration at JFK or Heathrow they treat me better. The immigration guys look at me with respect. “You come from a brainy country,” they say to me.” The image of India has changed in the last decade from a Third World country of snake charmers and rope tricks to the software brainy guys and that translates into a lot of collateral benefits.

So don’t think that globalization is just something white guys in the West have mastered and is a source only of indignity for the developing world. It is not.

The third reason globalization is doing so well—and this gets to the underlying economic determinism or technological determinism of my argument—a lot of people (and do not, in my view, make this mistake) have confused the explosion of the dot-com bubble for the explosion of the globalization system. That is a huge, huge mistake. These are two completely different phenomena. It is true the dot-com bubble has exploded. It is true that in New York City today there are no longer five different Web sites where you can get 100 pounds of dog food delivered to your house in 60 minutes. It’s true that has exploded, but there is still one Web site that you can use to get 100 pounds of dog food delivered to your house in an hour. The underlying dot-com revolution is alive and well even if the bubble has exploded.

Now, why am I such a determinist about globalization? Because I am not an economic determinist. I am a technological determinist. I believe that globalization is 90 percent driven by technology. I borrow here a concept from strategic studies theory. There’s a concept in strategic studies which says capability creates intention. If people have tanks, planes and gunships they will use tanks, planes and gunships. I believe the same applies to globalization. If I have a cell phone that allows me to call all over the world at zero marginal cost I will call all over the world at zero marginal cost, whether there’s a WTO or not. If I have a Web site that allows me to have clients all over the world, competitors all over the world and suppliers all over the world at zero marginal cost I will go into business globally whether there is a WTO, a Washington consensus or not. The underlying drive of technological innovation has not stopped. So that’s the source of my argument.

Where do the Arab and Muslims worlds fall into this? It’s clear there is certainly nothing about Islamic countries that indicates they can’t succeed in globalization, since some of the most successful globalizers are from the Muslim world. Malaysia has been enormously successful at globalization. Indonesia, and most importantly the second largest Muslim country in the world, India, have been enormously successful at globalization. And I can’t resist but to point out that the wealthiest man in India today is a Muslim software entrepreneur, Azim Premji, the founder of Wipro.

If you think there is some Islamic allergy to globalization, I think you’re completely wrong. It entirely depends on the context within which Muslims are living, and whether their governments have created the software and operating system to best enable them to tap into this system.

What about the Arab world? Well, as I look around the Arab world, again I see much differentiation. I see enormous innovation on the periphery in this small, fast, more legitimate government. I see it in Dubai with its innovations on service. I see it in Qatar with its innovations in media. I see it in Bahrain. I see it in Jordan. It’s very interesting, only the fourth country in the world, there are only four countries in the world
who have a free trade agreement with the United States. One is Mexico, one is Canada, one is Israel and one is Jordan. So we have an Arab country that is one of only four countries in the world that’s organized itself to have a free trade agreement with the United States, which is a huge adaptation of its software.

I see a lot of innovation on the periphery. Where the Arab world it seems to me is dead is in the big states in the middle—Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. That is where you see the least globalization. These are the countries that have been most on vacation from globalization—where you see the least adaptation in terms of operating systems and software in order to really tap into the system.

Why are they dead? I think the UN Arab Human Development Report has it exactly right. It is because of a deficit of freedom, a deficit of modern education empowering young people with the skills they need to tap into this system and a deficit of women’s empowerment, and a deficit of trade. I know you’ve gone over the Arab Human Development Report so I’m not going to spend time talking about it.

But precisely because the Arab world is dead at the center when it comes to globalization, it doesn’t surprise me that the Arab Human Development Report found that 51 percent of older Arab youth want to emigrate. I believe they are connected enough to know what is going on “out there.” They are connected enough to know they’re missing the train from Cairo to Alexandria. I believe it produces a lot of the anger, rage, humiliation and most importantly what I call the poverty of dignity. The Arab world is wealthy in many, many things. I believe there is a huge poverty of dignity in this part of the world, particularly among young people who feel that they are not empowered, not skilled, and that the world is passing them by.

And, of course, what do we do when we feel that kind of fear? We do one of three things: We freeze, we go mute; we take flight into everything from religion to conspiracy theories; and lastly we fight, we lash out at others. I think you see all these behaviors happening here.

What is the solution? The solution, in my view, is very simple. Over the last year since 9/11 a lot of Americans have come up to me and said some version of the following: “Whoa, Islam—that is a really angry religion.” To which I say: No, I totally disagree.” But what I do agree with is that there are a lot of angry Muslims. There are a lot of angry Muslims because as a faith community they live in some of the most repressive societies that give the fewest opportunities to their women and the fewest opportunities to their young people to achieve their full potential in this globalizing world.

And what is religion? Durkheim taught us this a long time ago: it is just a mirror on your life, it is just a mirror on your society. Show me young people or a society that is going forward, where people have a sense of opportunity and I’ll show you people with a very optimistic interpretation of their religion, whether it’s Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism or Islam. Show me people living in a state of repression with shrinking opportunities and I’ll show you an angry religion with escapism and fatalism deeply built into it, whether it’s Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism or Islam. Religion is just a mirror on your life.

It seems to me the answer is to change the context within which people live. Here again I have to point to India, the second largest Muslim country in the world. Indian Muslims, as you all know, have their grievances. They have political grievances and economic grievances, but there is one towering fact that stands out to me since September 11th and that is that there isn’t a single Indian Muslim in al-Qaeda. There isn’t a single Muslim from the second largest Muslim country in al-Qaeda. And the reason for that I believe is very simple: it is because the wealthiest man in India today is a Muslim software entrepreneur. It is because the president of India today is a Muslim. It is because in a place like Hyderabad you have Indian Muslim women demanding the right to pray alongside men in the mosque at Friday prayer because they are empowered and protected to do so.

Context is everything. Change the context within which people live their lives. Give them economic opportunities to achieve their full aspirations, give
them enough constitutionalism and rule of law so that they can resolve their grievances with some degree of fairness and equity. Guess what: they don’t want to blow up the world—they want to be part of it.

There is no science to this. It’s as true for Hindus as it is for Muslims. It’s as true for Americans as it is for Chinese.

Let me say in conclusion I did a seminar the other day with Larry Summers, the president of Harvard, our former Treasury Secretary, and Larry said something that really struck me. And this may seem an odd comment to you, but he said, “In the history of the world—in the history of the world no one has ever washed a rented car.” Okay. I happen to believe that is one of the most important truths of our time: In the history of the world, no one has ever washed a rented car.

Why is that important? I think so many Arabs and Muslims today feel they are just renting their governments, that they have no real ownership over them, and as a result they don’t feel real responsibility for solving the problems. I look forward to the day when every one of these people own their own cars, when they all own their own countries, because when they do I have no doubt that Arabs and Muslims will respond like every other people on this planet have. They will want to wash those societies, they will want to improve those societies, and they will want to care for those societies. What I look forward to today is when you all own your own countries.

**GEHAD AUDA:**

It’s an honor to join Tom Friedman on the same panel, though I am afraid that I am going to disagree with him because I’ll be more rooted in history of the Muslims and Islamic movement. History of the Middle East is something that is very significant for understanding the challenges of the present.

My talk is entitled “Globalization with Passion: Anatomy of Mistrust.”

Capitalist globalization comes in many forms and fashions and so does anti-globalization. Globalization and anti-globalization do not categorically negate each other. Both at essence are modern and are generically capitalist. They disagree on a level of international conduct and benefiting social force. Anti-globalization is rooted in nationalism, espouses ideologies that honor norms of sovereignty, human rights, local sustainable development and the like. However, both globalization and anti-globalization constitute a parcel of thesis and anti-thesis.

Here today I will try to chart the meaning of Islamic globalization as an alternative globalization strategy and as a counter-globalization. Islamic globalization is a different animal that emanates from the religious truth that Islam is the final word of God.

The Ottomans came to build a global Islamic empire, the largest, the long-lived empire, Islamic empire in history. The Ottomans came to build a global Islamic empire to reinvigorate the communication of the message of Islam to the world and to defend the faith. This action reversed the tendency towards the emergence of Islamic territorial kingdoms during the late Middle Ages.

The Ottomans revered the word of the Islamic universal God. The westerners settled with Treaty of Versailles that calls for the respect of the norm of territoriality. The conflict in the modern international relations has been set in motion since the 16th century between the Ottomans and the Westerners.

Capitalism emerged from the local city to national market to international conflict over resources to globalization of finance. That continued up to the beginning of the First World War. At the same time, the Ottoman empire made sure to disassociate the empire from the forces of Western production. They imported only technology of war from Germany and France.
Westerners have built an international society of states while Ottomans engulfed and suppressing the national feelings of the Muslims. No one of the Islamic world cried after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

Some Muslim forces were stunned with the revelation of Sykes-Picot Agreement and took that as a sign of the role of the Westerners in collapsing the Ottoman Empire.

Hassan El Bana formed the Muslim Brotherhood Society in 1928 as a direct reaction to the abolishment of the Islamic khalifa of 1924. With El Bana, new fundamentalism commenced. The Muslim Brotherhood has been believing all along that fundamentalism encourages the transformation of national Muslim societies into societies of believers and hence it would be easy to thwart the conspiracy of territorialism and unify the Muslim societies and to restore the Islamic khalifa once again.

With the Muslim Brotherhood the link between Europe and Zionism and the establishment of Israel was schematized and advocated. They were among the pioneer Arab forces that entered Palestine in order to prevent the Israeli state from being established in 1940 and 1948.

Sayyid Qutb, one of the leading members of the second generation of the Muslim Brotherhood, was the first to develop a full-fledged anti-American feeling and conceptualization beginning in the 1940s and 1950s.

Qutb’s radicalization was the result of the trip he made to America where he stayed about two years. He came out of the experience seeing America as the source of all evils, which it should be resisted at all cost.

While he was in America, Qutb was attracted to the American capability of large-scale production. But this attraction left him puzzled over the meaning of such progress in the view of the Koran. His conclusion as pointed out in the Shadow of the Koran was that this material advancement is the road to decline, because it is not based on the faith of God. Qutb came out of his American journey believing that America lives in Jahiliyyah.

Jahiliyyah, according to Qutb, is an all-encompassing societal concept and indicated the case of the denial of divine guidance of Islam. Henceforth in order to turn this situation around, a strategy of creating a society of young believers who would able to shoulder the task of fighting the jahiliyyi society should be adopted.

The issue of development during the ‘60s in Egypt was immaterial to Qutb and his young believers. This group of people only set their hearts and aims on global quest for liberating Muslims and the world from Jahiliyyah.

This concept informed two major international events: the first in Afghanistan, and the second with the sad episode of September 11th. In the first instance America armed the Muslim fundamentalists in order to teach the Russians a lesson in Afghanistan that eventually sealed their fate as a superpower. Second, bin Laden, who was America’s darling during the Afghani war, ordered some of his colleagues from the al-Qaeda organization to undertake the attacks of 9/11 on New York and Washington.

Fundamentalism is serious in attempting to undo capitalist globalization, to undo what Mr. Friedman advocates. For example, El Zomar is a leading fundamentalist from a Jihad organization who was implicated with Omar Abder Rahman in 1981 for attempting to launch an Islamic revolution in Egypt. He’s still in prison. El Zomar wrote in 2002, “Globalization carries with it a culture that sees Islam as an enemy. Islam is an alternative global strategy. We have to be ready for the coming wars in the 21st century.”

Thank you very much.

Note: Transcript by Federal News Service
**Opening Speakers:**

Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, Director U.S.–France Center, The Brookings Institution

Jamil Mroue, Editor, The Daily Star

**Philip Gordon:**

This is a huge and hugely important topic, and what I think I would like to do is just focus in on four questions that I think are at the heart of this to promote this discussion. First, why Iraq, where did this come from, and why now, which are questions one often hears in this part of the world and elsewhere. Secondly, why we need to act, why is it Americans think that the status quo is unacceptable and something must be done? Third, where do things stand? I’ll try to describe where I think things stand in Washington and New York. And then finally this question of the day after. What would one do in Iraq and in the region if this regime is removed?

The first question, why Iraq and why now: I want to address that because we sometimes face this criticism as if this came out of the blue and somehow Americans just decided that they felt like removing a regime in the Arab world. Of course, it hasn’t come out of the blue. For 12 years since Iraq invaded Kuwait the United States and other countries have been looking for a way of dealing with this unique problem, which is a combination of a dictator that has shown his capacity for aggression and also his great thirst for developing weapon of mass destruction. That was the problem that made it unique.

And we tried—we, the Americans and the rest of the world—all sort of different approaches. First we tried the route of UN resolutions and inspections and it made a lot of progress and it went a certain way until the regime stopped cooperating. Inspectors have now been outside of the country for more than four years and there’s great suspicion that weapon of mass destruction programs are going on.

We tried sanctions. Indeed, they’re still in place. But we’ve seen a lot of resistance to the sanctions both because of their impact on the Iraqi population, the humanitarian situation but also because of the fact that they’re eroding. People are no longer on board for sanctions after 12 years. The failure of compliance with sanctions causes great resentment in the Arab world. Now Saddam Hussein and the regime are making some $3 billion a year in illicit oil sales because the neighbors aren’t cooperating with sanctions.

We tried support for the opposition. That hasn’t worked out very well.
We’ve even tried at various times small doses of military force, whether it’s through the no-fly zones or something like Desert Fox four years ago, which was four days of bombing to try to allegedly degrade Iraqi capacities, but that didn’t work either.

What I’m trying to say is it’s not as if the United States has just suddenly decided, or there’s some new aggressive regime in Washington that feels like intervening in the Arab world. We’ve tried a lot of different approaches. People in this part of the world or in any part of the world aren’t very satisfied with those approaches and they’re not working.

By the time the Bush administration came to office it was convinced that these approaches weren’t working and it really decided to look at the problem again. But even under those circumstances in the first year of the Bush administration there wasn’t the move towards forced regime change that a lot of people expected. Even for an administration as tough and determined to act in Iraq as this one there was great hesitation to do it.

What tipped that, and this leads me to the answer of the question of “why now.” Why is it different than year in the 12th year after the invasion of Kuwait than in the 11th or the 10th or the 5th year? I think September 11 has a lot to do with it. And let me quickly say that’s not because I think (or most Americans think) there’s a link between the Iraqi regime and September 11. I certainly don’t think that and those who have tried to show it have failed. But I think those who demand to see this link before they want to talk about regime change in Iraq are asking the wrong question.

September 11th was relevant and I think affected the debate in two different ways. One is it was a reminder that there are actually people out there willing to commit great violence and a reminder of what weapon of mass destruction could do if used. It’s no longer a theoretical debate; we’ve seen that it’s possible to kill lots of people on one day and there are people willing to do it.

September 11th, plus the anthrax attacks that took place in Washington and elsewhere afterwards—again not because we think Saddam Hussein or Iraq was behind the anthrax attack (that’s a different matter)—but because we saw (living in Washington) how very easy it was for someone with even a small amount of biological weaponry to create great havoc and to kill people. It reminded us that it could be much, much worse.

That’s one point. The second thing that I think was relevant about September 11th vis-à-vis Iraq was that it was a reminder of the danger of the status quo. We’ve already talked about this at this conference, how 9/11 sent a message to the U.S. that the old deal where we didn’t really care what was happening domestically in the Arab world was fine as long as security interests were met.

September 11th reminded the United States that that status quo is no longer acceptable and the situation in Iraq is part of the status quo. Part of it is we have sanctions on Iraq and have had for years. It’s creating great resentment in the Arab world. So long as Iraq is a potential threat to its neighbors we need to keep our troops in Saudi Arabia and that seems to be resented in the Arab world so this can’t go on as is.

I think those were the factors around 9/11 that tipped the United States from a situation of frustrated but unwilling to act, to the next step: being genuinely ready to deal with the problem.

The second point: what is the case for action? Why do most Americans feel that something must be done about Iraq other than maintain the status quo and that something might include a massive military force to change the regime.

I hasten to add that not many Americans undertake this lightly, and I certainly don’t. If you make the case for regime change—there are some out there who suggest this would be a cakewalk and it would be easy and everyone will welcome it. I think it’s much harder than that. But nonetheless I think we should take seriously the case for action.
First, the most important, the central part of this case, it seems to me, is the Iraqi nuclear program. That’s what makes this different from other situations. I don’t think anyone can doubt that the Iraqi regime is interested in pursuing and building nuclear weapons. They’ve shown that desire. They’ve foregone tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue apparently to keep inspectors from stopping them from having a nuclear program. There’s a credible threat that within one year, five years, who knows how long, Iraq will get nuclear weapons if nothing is done. And this is seen as unacceptable in the United States, again not because anybody thinks if Iraq had a nuclear weapon it would somehow just decide to attack the United States; that’s not the issue again.

But Iraq has certainly show itself interested in, capable of, and wanting to dominate the region, whether it’s through invading Iran or invading Kuwait or using its weapons against other neighbors. And that’s what we have to think about when we contemplate the prospect of an Iraq with nuclear weapons. If Iraq had nuclear weapons and invaded Kuwait again, or any of its other neighbors, would we be as ready as we were then to dislodge it from whatever country it might have wanted to occupy?

For those of you who say the United States is keen on aggression and using military force, I remind you that the last time this happened, when Iraq out of the blue invaded Kuwait, 47 senators didn’t want to use military force under those circumstances when Iraq didn’t have nuclear weapons. Imagine if Iraq did have nuclear weapons and there the risk is that we would be deterred from dealing with an Iraq bent on dominating the region.

The second part of this case I think is about the other weapons of mass destruction, the chemical and biological weapons that could come into the hands of terrorists if nothing is done to stop their production or to change the regime.

Iraq has admitted in the past not only producing but weaponizing anthrax, Botulinum toxin, and afla-toxin. Iraq is known to have produced Ricin, Sarin, plague, including genetically enhanced strains of these things. By 1991, we now know Iraq possessed ten billion doses of biological weaponry.

So there can be no doubt that this regime is interested in having such weapons. The question and the link to terrorism is the threat that it would share these weapons with terrorists or al-Qaeda.

I share the skepticism of those who say why would it have any reason to do that. I believe that’s right. I believe there’s only a small chance that it would see a self-interest in sharing chemical and biological weapons. At the same time, I’m not very comfortable with (and I think most Americans aren’t very comfortable with) the notion that if nothing is done the regime can produce again tens of thousands of tons of chemical and biological weapons. The weapons could get into the hands of a group like al-Qaeda, which has shown clearly it is very interested in having such weaponry, and is on a quest to possess them, is capable of using them and has the resources to purchase them. That’s something we really need to think about and we can’t be comfortable about.

A third point: It gets to the politics in terms of the case for doing something about Iraq. The politics, as we’ve said several times here, is that the status quo is no longer acceptable. The status quo in Iraq, which is the alternative to doing something, I remind you, means the suffering of the Iraqi population under a brutal dictator, it means continued sanctions if we want to use that route to stop weapons of mass destruction and all the humanitarian consequences, it means resentment of the United States, it means troops in Saudi Arabia, it means flouting of the United Nations and international law. If we’re satisfied with that, fine, let’s just leave it like it is, but I think we do need to take seriously the case that at least action in Iraq would deal with this problem.
Finally, even if you’re very skeptical about all of these security threats and if you really think, as many serious people do, that acting in Iraq would be worse than not acting, that we would create more problems than we solve, I at least ask you to consider the notion that without the credible threat of force we have no chance whatever of dealing with the Iraqi disarmament question. And for those around the world, whether it’s in the Arab world or Europe or anywhere else, who say let’s use diplomacy and pressure to get Saddam to disarm, we all agree, I think everybody, almost every country in the world agrees that we should pressure Saddam to disarm.

But let’s be realistic; the past 12 years have shown that the only possible way of persuading Saddam Hussein to give up his weapons of mass destruction, according to UN Security Council resolutions, is under the credible threat of force. And, if we end up in this case getting Iraq to give up some of this weaponry, the people to thank for that, whether we like to admit it or not, would be Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld, who made this threat of force credible.

We saw that recently. After the Bush administration seemed to get credible about using force and a country like Saudi Arabia suggested that maybe the U.S. could even use its bases, that’s when Iraq agreed to have the weapons inspectors go back in.

We have to be honest on this point; there’s no other way that we’re going to get disarmament unless there’s a credible threat of force.

Two more things and then I’ll conclude. First, just a brief description of where I think this issue stands right now. It looks very much like the Security Council in the next week or so will pass a resolution along the lines that a lot of us have suspected along, which is to say the United States would back off of its insistence that this UN Security resolution threatens automatic use of force if Iraq doesn’t comply, but in exchange for that the inspection regime would be much tougher and it would put a very short timetable on demanding proof that Iraq admits what weapons of mass destruction programs it has and to start giving them up.

If that’s right, and I think it is, we’ll see this resolution in the very near future. One of three scenarios is possible. Either Iraq refuses to cooperate and it just says forget it, we’re not doing that—in that scenario we’ll go to war and there will be widespread international support for doing so. The other extreme is we have an Iraq that cooperates fully, that says, “All right, we get it, we’re afraid of the threat of force, here’s all the stuff.” That’s unlikely but it’s possible, and if that happens I don’t think we go to war.

The more likely scenario is something in between and that’s where this gets very difficult. It’s where Saddam Hussein will say, “Okay, the inspectors can come,” and he’ll let them do a little bit and he’ll turn over something but he won’t cooperate fully. That’s where we’ll see I think the divisions between the United States and others when the regime won’t turn over one or two scientists who were affiliated with the nuclear program or wants to close one palace or two. The Americans will be much more ready to act, and the others won’t, and that is when the most difficult diplomacy begins.

My conclusion on this point—and what I want to stress here—is I believe the United States has not necessarily decided to go to war. Some people think that this decision has been made and no matter what happens Bush is going to pull this trigger this winter. Maybe, but I think that with support of the international community and insistence on disarmament and progress towards real disarmament in Iraq could forestall the invasion. I think the secretary of state said that very clearly on U.S. television yesterday. He said the issue is disarmament and that’s the priority and that’s what we’re focused on, and even the president, if you look at what he’s been saying, he has been saying Saddam Hussein must be disarmed; he is not saying Saddam Hussein must go, even if that’s the longer term goal.
The last point is to raise this question of what do we do after, what we call the day-after issue, what would happen in Iraq if we are obliged to use military force. Again, we can’t go into great detail on this but let me just note two things about it. On one hand you have the option of going in with a massive American and international force to try to keep stability in this country, because everyone recognizes the risk of retribution and ethnic tension and all the rest. You’ve seen the leaks to the *New York Times* and elsewhere of a possible hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops, military rule under General Franks and then a general transition to civil authority, local authority, and trying to set up some form of government in Iraq.

That’s obviously an enormous challenge but if you think that one is the wrong approach and a bad one because of the risk of resentment and U.S. forces in the Arab world think about the alternative, to lop off the regime and not put in a stability force and just hope for the best because you’re trying not to leave a big footprint or have an American presence in the region. Then you run the much greater risk I think of the instability, as we saw in 1991 the ethnic clashes and so on.

The bottom line is that this is a tremendous challenge that we should not take lightly. But for me at least it underlines the absolute importance of the United States rallying international support, doing this through the United Nations, getting legitimacy for the operation and getting the support of its allies—financial, political and human. And under those circumstances I do believe it’s possible to set up some sort of new structure in Iraq where oil revenues would be shared and have some sense of stability in the country.

I will say this, and I’ll conclude: There’s not a desire in the United States for imperial rule. I don’t detect any instinct that we want to occupy an Arab country and take over and run this part of the world. On the contrary, I actually think there’s an instinct against that. But there’s also, as I’ve been trying to stress, a sense that this status quo is unacceptable and therefore the appeal to the rest of the world to join in on trying to do something about this problem. There should be a common goal of the United States and its friends in this part of the world either to change that status quo through real disarmament or to change it by the elimination of the regime and the liberation of the Iraqi people.

Thank you very much.

**JAMIL MROUE:**

I’d like to thank the Brookings Institution for this project. I think this is a very interesting beginning for a dialogue. I think that like antibiotics it has to be a course and not one shot for it to work—and I hope that you will have the stamina to stay the course.

I will start with the day after and from our perspective in this part of the world (as far as I could discern it). Of course, I cannot talk about the musical chairs or the multifaceted aspect of it in Syria, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia.

Let me say first that September 11th could have all kinds of interpretations vis a vis Iraq but the bottom line is that the U.S. is proactive. Now, proactive does not mean that it has an aim nor a vision but that it is moving onward, that it wants to be engaged, that this part of the world is not going to be “left to neglect.”

Let’s talk about invasion versus non-invasion so that we sort of recognize the terrain. I don’t like the word “invasion.” It is not yet there. But I don’t know what we can call a situation that is as if a child looks at a map and a board game and you have fleets all around here and stations of troops all around there and that suddenly in the last year or so you have another tier in Central Asia and Georgia—I don’t know what that is but I know that that is military presence and that is diplomatic muscle and we are already in the phase of dealing with military/diplomatic stretch of the old Clausewitz term.
We are there. I don’t think that we need to hear the bombs in Iraq in order for us to wake up to the fact the Americans are here, the Americans are angry, and they do not know what to do. We heard three interpretations yesterday from Martin Indyk. This trinity of interpretations is puzzling. The play of roles in Washington is dangerous. And, of course, this impacts us directly, all of us.

General impacts: The motivation for America is clear. We recognize it. They recognize it. But we’ve heard from my colleague an Nth form of explanation, because it’s a big thing for them. There are others, hundreds of others, but in essence one common factor in all of this is the neglect and complete absence of what will be the role for the party, the theatre, the people who they will be working with the day after. We have a few words about democracy that are not tied to anything.

Yes, we want democracy in Palestine: translated, kick Arafat out. I don’t think a lot of people in this part of the world would mind that. But what they mind a lot that it is happening by the Americans without continuing the sentence. What is after that, getting rid of Saddam? Allowing and taking into account September 11th, you guys are ten years too late. I have heard spinning theories of conspiracy about how Saddam is left there to control the area, how there is an under the table deal. Where is America’s diplomacy? But in the end our perception of how we’re going to live with your new kind of input is what is creating the tension.

Why is it creating the tension and the dilemma? The facts of the Cold War, piled up over the facts of the last ten years, have created two strands of activity in this part of the world. Yesterday, we had a meeting that discussed media and that was basically discussing Al-Jazeera. In essence by implication and by talking about Al-Jazeera we found out that the two areas of activity: fundamentalism or that brand of Islamic activism in general and as far as you want to take it all the way to bin Laden, and on the other hand the status quo. The status quo is sick. It is sick with bureaucracies, it is sick with outdated laws, it is sick with the heavy inertia of the Cold War; it is sick with sick leaders and also it is sick with a very skeptical, a very doubtful, a very unsure civil society that does not trust what the West is doing and therefore says to itself, like the proverbial head in the sand, “let me just lay low and we’ll see what happens.”

Yes, there are a few people who are making headway into NGOs and so on, because those are the current tools of what is available. I read somewhere America has invested from 1993 to 1996 about $300 million on NGOs. It is about one-tenth or something like this or one-fifth of what they had spent in Eastern Europe, but it is a large amount.

But the impact is not there. We have the trends—the current is Islamic fundamentalism. These people are active. These people are there. These people would react. And these are the people whose agenda needs to be faced.

You can take care of it in more ways than the one of the established order. In fact, in many ways the established order in my mind is a multiple diplomatic end-run that America has conducted in this part of the world. On the other side we locally have to take care of fundamentalism, and President Bush and the instinct of democracy is right: What stops fundamentalism is the society that spawns it—not the CIA, not security, not even our own security cannot stop it. The tools of that brand are personal decision made in closed circles with the potential of causing a large amount of damage. But what do we do about that?

I’ll very briefly take the example of Lebanon. I want to look in the face of Hezbollah and tell them, “Look, you guys, just lay it off. The Israelis are out, we want to go home. We want to work.” But when they look back at me and say, “You want to work, right; you want to work on what basis?” “The law.” That’s my proposal: I want to reform the law so that we can participate in peaceful change of an open society like Lebanon. “Ah, you want the law? Okay, part of the law is investment, is globalization and so on. Okay, your interface is UN resolutions, baby. You go and talk to the Americans to put 425, 338, 242 in place. Then you have an argument.”
It is not a case of going back to the elephant and the Palestinian cause but believe me, the underlying factor that prevents people like myself and hundreds and thousands and hundreds of thousands of others to be more active in the public arena is something like that happened yesterday, which is a subject of an editorial (no advertising here for the *Daily Star*). What do you tell those people who tell you look at the Israelis, they are setting the agenda, the whole thing is a hoax. Of course you don’t believe that but what is the counter-argument? What can you do?

I don’t have answers at this stage. I think this conference can pose questions, can explore areas but I think that we need to take into account the motivation of America to move in the direction that is professed, that it is going to go, but also do take into account that there are genuine reasons that relate to the security of the Jews, to the security of Muslims, to the security of Christians and national minorities in this area. We need a deal and we need a deal because the political systems that we have cannot sustain the numbers that we are. The slogans that activate this part of the world are dead now in the echoes of pre-Cold War. In fact, we were dealing with a hundred million people. Today we are dealing with almost 400 million people and if you include in this mess Turkey and Iran we’re talking about something else entirely.

We need your help, yes, we need your understanding, yes, and we need to be gentle. This is an area that is really, really in trauma and we need to be gentle with it.

Thank you.

*Note: Transcript by Federal News Service*
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD IN U.S.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS

KEYNOTE SPEAKER:
His Excellency Sheikh Hamad Bin Jasim Bin Jaber Al-Thani, Foreign Minister of The State of Qatar

MODERATOR:
Martin Indyk, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution

PANEL SPEAKERS:
Shibley Telhami, Professor, University of Maryland; Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Thomas Friedman, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, The New York Times
Abdel Hameed Al-Ansari, Dean of Sharia College, University of Qatar
Hamid Ansari, Former Ambassador of India to Afghanistan, United Arab Emirates, United Nations; Former Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University

H.E. SHEIKH HAMAD BIN JASIM BIN JABER AL-THANI:

Thank you very much for this introduction. In the name of God the most compassionate, the most merciful, ladies and gentlemen, our dear guests, I would like in the beginning to thank you all for attending and participating in this conference, which was a pleasure for us to hold in Qatar and Doha.

I also greet all those who took part in organizing it securing it, and achieving its aims, especially Ambassador Martin Indyk and our friends in the Brookings Institution. I thank them all and hope that this conference will be a beginning for more to come in the future.

We have followed with great interest your deliberations in your conference and the discussions that took place concerning the relations between the United States and the Muslim world, which is of great importance for us and the repercussions of it politically and economically is great for our area. These relations are of a historic nature and expand to many fields of human activity under the current circumstances, the difficult and complex ones that our area is witnessing in the Middle East and in our Gulf area and from which we suffer the repercussions.

We will do our best to make sure that our relations will run smoothly and remove any obstacles in the way of developing them and we are keen to develop all the many common areas of interest between us and also work to get rid of any problem that might occur.

This cannot be done in our view except through constructive dialogue based on truth and honesty and a frank exchange of points of view. Despite any problems that may occur we are totally convinced that what combines us is more than what separates us and keeps
us apart and we have to work together to confirm our belonging, despite the differences in our religious or other affiliations and the peculiarity of our cultures, which, of course, everyone would hold dearly and adhere to and are belonging to one common human civilization, which will allow interaction between us and in an atmosphere of openness and cooperation.

This does not mean that we will not differ on certain political aspects that the United States might take regarding one important issue at least concerning us as Arabs and Muslims. These differences emanate from the principles of friendship that we believe in and from our keenness and honest will to improve these relations.

And like His Highness has confirmed in the opening statements that the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a central issue to the Arabs and Muslims, which requires a permanent and just solution based on the resolutions of international law and the principles of human rights and the right of people to defend against occupation and live a dignified life in their own homeland, we were hoping that a session or more of your conference should have been devoted to discussing this important issue and discuss the means to get it out of the deadlock that it finds itself in. This is, in our view, a very important factor, the repercussions of which will affect us and affect the relationship with the United States and the Muslim world directly.

But from the perspective of a Gulf state, and the United States relations with this area I would like you to take into account what I said. We hope that the Israeli-Arab conflict will have a special session devoted to it in your coming conferences in the hope of reaching a solution or maybe a political vision, a common political vision towards this central issue and the foundations required to solving it through peaceful means and dialogue.

Emanating from this principled adherence to the way of dialogue as a means of solving the problem comes His Highness’ suggestion before your conference to establish a permanent forum for dialogue between the United States and the Islamic world. This reflects the great importance His Highness attaches to the traditional relations between our countries, societies, and our people, and to the importance of the relationship between the United States of America and the Arab-Muslim world, and to be based on the right basis of openness and mutual trust and cooperation. We really hope that your conference will be a step on the path that we all aim and look for and hope that our mutual cooperation will bear fruit in the future.

I thank you once again for your attendance and I wish you all the success in your endeavors and may the peace and blessings of God be upon you all. Thank you.

**MARTIN INDYK:**

Thank you very much, Your Highness, and thank you and please convey our appreciation again to His Highness, the Emir, for your sponsorship of this conference, which we have been engaged in over the last two days. It’s been a very fruitful dialogue and an intense one, often heated, but I think that we have all come out of it wiser than we went into it and we have laid I think a good foundation to take up the challenge that the Emir has set before us of this concept of a permanent dialogue and something, which we will pursue together with you.

Ladies and gentlemen, what we wanted to do in this coming session was to focus on some of the key issues that have emerged from our discussions and we have a group of the delegates here before us to discuss these issues. I will introduce them very quickly and then I will act as moderator, asking them each a question before we open the floor to discussion.

First of all, Dr. Abdel Hamid Al Ansari is known to many of you in the audience. He is the dean of the Sharia College at the University of Qatar, a great expert in Islamic jurisprudence and a courageous commentator on the issues of the day, particularly the issues we’ve been discussing at this conference.
Thomas Friedman is the *New York Times* foreign affairs columnist, three-time Pulitzer Prize winner, a very well-known figure in this part of the world for his very powerful columns on the Middle East condition; also the author of several very important books, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, his first, the second, which is well-known here, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, and the third one just published now called *Longitudes and Attitudes* about the period, the year since the September 11th terrorist attack on the World Trade towers and the Pentagon.

Shibley Telhami, professional at the University of Maryland and a non-resident fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, is also the author of many scholarly articles and books on the Middle East, including a book that is about to come out next month from Westview Press, which is called *The Stakes: America and the Middle East* and we all look forward to seeing that.

And finally, Ambassador Hamid Ansari, who served as India’s permanent representative to the United Nations and recently was the vice chancellor of Aligarb Muslim University in India, and has had many other high diplomatic posts serving his country, India.

Let me go first to Dr. Al Ansari and ask you, sir, about the question that we have had a lot of discussion about during this conference, which is the American concern in terms of its relationship with the Islamic world that there be a greater process of modernization and democratization and the resistance, apparent resistance that there is in the Islamic world to this process of democratization. And the question is a simple one: Are Islam and democracy incompatible?

**ABDEL HAMID AL ANSARI:**

Thank you for this question. I would like to clarify, as I clarified in the session yesterday, that Islam is a dimension and a symbol of freedom, justice and equality and the consultation and which agrees and matches with the democratic principles of democracy. There is an agreement in essence in the Koran. If there is a difference it may be in the details and the framework and the boundaries. We know that the Islamic Sharia it has its own fixed principles and variables, but the fixed principles are related to diction, to the worshiping but the principles are related to the same.

As far as political affairs are concerned or as a diplomatic and social system or an economic system, the Muslims have their liberty, full liberty to choose the social system that suits them, as long as this system does not contradict with their legitimate principles.

And I have learned the Islamic Sharia and I teach a course in democracy or the Shoora in Islam for more than 20 years and I believe that the state, my state here or the country allows me to enrich the mentality of their students and to let him accept the other principles.

Emerging from my teaching and my learning I found there is no substantial difference between Islam and democracy. There are certain trends, which are very few but the fanatics sometimes say they would result in a certain conflict, but this is not true.

We can go back to the true text of Islam and if we refer to the prior experience of Islam before in the political system, on the Shura, on the Consultation and all other prayers and the first constitution in Islam it was in Medina. It was in between the Muslims and the Jews in Medina and so that they should all cooperate and they should also participate in different political, economic affairs and even to defend Medina.

We consider this institution as the first constitution for a state that has been based on a social distinction between Muslims and Jews and this continued, this stated contract continued for more than 30 years. But after that, if there were some differences and as Muslims today cannot apply the democratic experiment that matches with the principles of Islam and the spirit of the age. This is the responsibility of business but not the responsibility of Islam.
We could not manifest the right face of Islam and from this there has been the misunderstanding in the West or in the United States. They talk about Islam as a violent religion, as a religion that contradicts modernity and civilization. I believe that is untrue based on Islamic principles.

**MARTIN INDYK:**

Thank you very much, Dr. Ansari. Tom Friedman, a lot of the discussion in the conference has been about the question of the anger in the Islamic world towards the United States and, of course, the anger of the United States in many ways towards the Islamic world. This is something that you’ve written a lot about and you’ve focused on one thing in trying to explain to Americans what is the reason for the anger and the hatred that we have witnessed and that has so surprised us, and that is what you call the “poverty of dignity.” And I wonder if you could explain what you mean by that and what you think the United States should be doing about it.

**TOM FRIEDMAN:**

Well, I believe, Martin, that what motivated the hijackers on September 11th no doubt was many things and since they didn’t leave us a note we can only speculate. Clearly, the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict is one of these things. Clearly, the American presence in Saudi Arabia is one of these things.

One of the things that’s always struck me is those issues have been out there, they’ve produced anger and rage in the past. But I think that what really 9/11 is most deeply about is what I call the poverty of dignity, not the poverty of money. These young men are all from middle to upper middle class families. They were not hungry, they were not starving. I think that what they were starved for most was dignity.

I think that what frustrates them is that people in America who are ignorant about the Middle East and ignorant about Islam have often in the last year come up to me and said, “Wow, Islam, that’s a really angry religion.” And my answer has always been, “I don’t think so.” But I do think that a lot of Muslims are angry today and I think a lot of young Muslims are angry today because as a group, as a faith community they live in some of the most repressive societies, that are least empowering of women, and give their young people the fewest opportunities to achieve their real aspirations, a real sense of dignity in today’s globalized world.

What is religion? It’s just a mirror on your life, on your conditions. And show me a group of people of whatever religion—Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Jewish, Christian—who are living in a state of repression or a state of frustration and I’ll show you an angry religion. And show me a people who are living in a forward-looking society with opportunities for economic advancement and for job advancement and I’ll show you people with an optimistic looking religion.

So I was thinking about your question the other day, Martin, because I called home. I have a daughter who’s 14. I called home the other day and I could tell she was really excited. She really wanted to tell me something. I had a feeling what it was because I knew she had taken a math exam three days earlier. And the first thing out of her mouth was, “Dad, I got 94 on my math exam.” Now, I could have given my daughter a choice. I’d say I’ll offer you either $940 to fail your exam or give you a 94 on your exam; which would you prefer. I have no doubt I could offer my daughter $940 and what she’d much prefer is the 94 on her math exam, because I’m a big believer in the desire for recognition. I’m not a psychologist but I believe the deepest thing that motivates human beings, whether they’re from the Middle East or from the middle West in America, is the desire for recognition, a desire for affirmation or their own dignity and their own capabilities.

I don’t know about you all but when I really get mad, it’s not when someone disagrees with me, but it’s when someone really diminishes you or you feel diminished.
by that person. I believe that the context, the global context is one today where too many young Arabs and Muslims feel diminished, feel diminished by the world, feel a sense of lack of opportunity and lack of achievement and I do believe that accounts for a lot of the rage.

What can we do about it? Well, obviously the main answer to this question has to come from people here, but I think there are several things that we can do to help. Number one, I think it’s very important how we as America address this part of the world. I’ve learned as an author there are basically two kind of critics in the world. On this any author is an expert. There are critics who criticize you because they really want you to fail and there are critics who criticize you because they really want you to succeed. And people can smell the difference from 100 miles away. In fact, they can smell the difference from an ocean away.

Now, first of all, I believe as Americans we have to be very careful how we talk to the rest of the world and how we talk to the Arab and Muslim world. If we persuade people that whatever criticism we have of society or government here, we’re making it because we want to see positive change, because we want you to succeed, I think people here will listen all day long. If we talk to people here with contempt, if we ooze contempt, if we, as our Secretary of Defense speaks about the so-called occupied territories, which is basically another way of expressing contempt for the feelings of a billion people, I’ll tell you when you criticize people and they sense deep down you want them to fail, you can’t tell them that the sun is shining. You criticize people in a way that you convince them you want them to succeed, they’ll listen to you all day. Criticize them in a way where they really think you ooze with contempt for them and you can’t tell them the sun is shining; they won’t listen to a word you have to say.

Let me just close by saying we are now debating the question of Iraq, and I don’t know whether the United States is going to go into Iraq or not into Iraq, whether we’re going to invade or not invade. From my own point of view there is only one justification for America invading Iraq: that if we do go in we should be going in under the banner of wanting to help the Iraqis implement the Arab Human Development Report. That to me is the flag we should be there for, under a report that says the Arab world is experiencing a lot of problems today because of a deficit of freedom, a deficit of women’s empowerment and a deficit of modern education, that this is the conclusion of Arab analysts of their own society. And if we are going to go into Iraq it seems to me it should be for one reason, to help them overcome those deficits and implement that report.

MARTIN INDYK:

Thank you. That’s a nice segue for me into a question I want to ask Sheikh Hamad. We just had a session in our conference on Iraq and what emerged from that was a clear divergence. Americans, under the leadership of President Bush, are concerned about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and in addition to that the fear beyond him acquiring nuclear weapons is that he will give the weapons of mass destruction he already has to terrorists and that the next attack on the United States will be far more devastating than the last one we suffered a year ago.

What we heard from the participants from the Islamic world was a much greater concern, not about weapons of mass destruction but about the kind of instability that we would generate by going into Iraq to take care of the threat that we now envisage. In other words, they feel it seems more threatened by our actions than by Saddam’s actions.

Now, you live in this neighborhood. Can you explain to us why this should be such a discrepancy between the fears of Americans and the fears of people in this part of the world?
H.E. SHEIKH HAMAD BIN JASIM BIN JABER AL-THANI:

Thank you, Martin. I will speak in Arabic and I also would like that you consider me not as a foreign minister of Qatar so I can have better room to speak. So please, assume I am an ordinary Qatari guy coming to this wonderful gathering and saying what I have to say.

MARTIN INDYK:

For the next ten minutes.

H.E. SHEIKH HAMAD BIN JASIM BIN JABER AL-THANI:

So it’s not the position of my government, it’s not the position of the foreign minister of Qatar.

MARTIN INDYK:

Fine, thank you.

H.E. SHEIKH HAMAD BIN JASIM BIN JABER AL-THANI:

As for the question of Iraq, it is very important for the people in this region, extremely important, because Iraq represents a regional power in the area. We disagree with the principle of regime change in Iraq. We are not disagreeing with this as a principle or a government or a person. This should not be done except through the international court of justice, international law, or international resolution. So therefore we think the principle of regime change is wrong.

If Iraq represents a threat as far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned, as the United States has claimed, there must be overwhelming, clear-cut evidence. This will not come except by the return of inspectors, and reporting and saying that such weapons do exist or they don’t exist. If they do exist then Iraq has to get rid of them or it will be in breach of UN resolutions.

Myself as an ordinary citizen in this area, Israel is a neighbor, Pakistan is a neighbor, Iran is a neighbor and India is a neighbor. They have or all aim to have weapons of mass destruction. Israel, it is well-known, possesses such weapons. But we don’t care and we don’t say it’s a threat because this is not a threat to America. America may not consider it a threat but we consider this as a threat because we live in this area. If you want Iraq to get rid of its weapons and you want cooperation from the area then there should be cooperation on your part in this area to make another country get rid of its weapons of mass destruction. We want the entire area to be free of weapons of mass destruction. This is a principle that most of us sign a memorandum at the United Nations to this effect.

Arab people have many reasonable questions in my estimation like the United Nations resolutions on Iraq. Before I go to that area let me talk about terrorism first. I think it's wrong to try and link Iraq with the issue of terrorism. I am not defending Iraq. We disagree or agree with Iraq on many things. But the idea of linking Iraq to terrorism contradicts what the Arab Ba’ath party says. We cannot put them under the same roof and same ceiling, because as far as we know there is capital punishment for anyone who belongs to such religious affiliations or organizations like al-Qaeda. I am not for or against this. What I am saying is we are against anybody who commits acts of terrorism against any religion whether Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, Muslim or anything.

The second question, the ordinary citizen here says or wonders, there have been many United Nations resolutions, many decades have passed without any implementation, why there was no implementation, why there was no international coalitions formed to enforce the implementation of such resolutions. If we are in an international coalition against Iraq, we may
agree or disagree, one day we were with this coalition to liberate Kuwait. Now we are also with all the United Nations resolutions, with which Iraq should comply. But we at the same time say the ordinary Arab citizen feel that there is no justice, there is a great injustice. It’s been said that Iraq committed aggression, Israel didn’t, but Israel does commit aggressions against the Palestinians on their own homeland.

How do we get to a solution for this issue without having to go to war? You know what repercussions war can have, not only socially and economically but also on the political level for this region.

I am here talking in my capacity as a private citizen, remember, but the way things are run in the region may change and these changes may occur because of many reasons, not necessarily because of the Iraqi case only, but maybe because of unemployment, bad educational system, there are things that are for us, are things against us. We must admit to both, to the existence of both.

So therefore we prefer it if another approach, a peaceful approach is implemented through the UN resolutions against Iraq. And even if strict implementation is applied we are for it—but this requires Iraq first of all to accept the UN resolutions and the new one on the way. At the same time we refuse the call for change in regimes because this is against what we believe in. If there are resolutions we will call upon Iraq to implement them as part of the international community, but if Iraq implemented them without any obstacles then there should be a time limit to close this file.

This is what I imagine people want to hear from us. When we hear some statements coming out of the West, especially the United States, one day we hear something about Iraq and its link to terrorism, then we hear something about removing Saddam Hussein from power because Iraq poses a threat, because it has ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. We must say what we really want from Saddam Hussein and be very clear about it. Then we will say to Iraq this is what you are required to do, one, two, three, four, whatever.

And, of course, this is my point of view as a private citizen, I repeat, and not in my official capacity. If Mr. Martin Indyk allows me, if there is enough time, I would like to make a few comments. Do you want to me to continue or to let them—I had some other comments on what has been said, not on the Iraq issue. Do you want me to do that or would you like to continue with them and later I will have the opportunity?

**MARTIN INDYK:**

Since you’re not a foreign minister I will ask two more questions and then I’ll come back to you.

**H.E. SHEIKH HAMAD BIN JASIM BIN JABER AL-THANI:**

I want to show that I am a democrat. (Laughter.) Okay, I accept.

**MARTIN INDYK:**

Thank you. But I promise I’ll come back to you.

**SHIBLEY TELHAMI:**

You should have the last word, Your Highness.

**MARTIN INDYK:**

One of the issues, Shibley, that came up again and again in the discussions was that if the United States wanted to have better relations with the Islamic world we needed to do something to solve the Arab-Israeli problem or in particular the Israeli-Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli problem seemed to be
blamed not only for poor relations between the United States and the Islamic world but also as a retarding factor in Arab and Islamic development.

So I wonder if you could comment on that, what you took away from that discussion and what you think the United States should do about it.

**SHIBLEY TELHAMI:**

Thanks. First, I want you all to know that had His Highness said he’s talking as a foreign minister Martin was prepared to say because you’re a foreign minister you must have the last word, so let me move on to the next two.

So let me take this issue about reform and the relation of the Arab-Israeli conflict to reform the back way, beginning where Tom Friedman ended about the U.S. role in bringing about reform. Tom suggested that it might be worthwhile if, in fact, we could bring reform in Iraq. That would be the one justification that might be reasonable for war with Iraq.

Personally, I do not think it is possible to bring about democracy through war. Therefore our role is much more limited than we think. Not just because of the principle but I think it’s illogical and it goes against the logic of forcing people to accept democracy. It’s a contradiction in terms.

People give Japan and Germany as the example and I think there are huge differences in these cases. The first difference is that democracy was the outcome of the war in the case of Japan and Germany, not the purpose of the war.

Second, Japan and Germany had democratic traditions. And more importantly, they had industrialized economies that in my judgment are prerequisite for Western style democracies, which the region does not yet have.

Third, I think whereas in the case of Japan and Germany you had relatively a relatively homogeneous population, that is not what you have in Iraq. You have a disintegrative instinct and therefore you have to keep it together rather than an instinct to come together that you would just help cultivate.

Finally there is the difference, which is in the case of Japan and Germany it was really the end of an exhaustive war. In the case of a war with Iraq, it would only be a beginning of a struggle. That is fundamentally important and let me tell you why, because if it is the beginning of a struggle we know how states behave. I’m still a real politic person about the priority of states. If we think about what America is likely to do when you have 75,000 forces to be kept there for a decade, going against disintegrative forces and possibly a lot of neighbors who are going to meddle, you’re going to protect the American forces, that’s going to be the priority that the American public will demand. You’re going to have to still fight the war on terrorism, which, as you suggested with the poverty of dignity, is likely to expand. That’s going to be a priority.

In addition to all of that you’re going to have the possible at least short-term oil crisis that is going to lead you to make deals with governments in a way that will go against your instinct to advocate democracy.

I think this is true not only in Iraq, but if we think about what the choices will be in the rest of the region. Take Jordan as an example: public opinion we all know is very much against the war. Governments in the region have a choice to make. One choice is they can join or at least be apathetic or sit it out and act important in front of the public. Either way they’re going to infuriate the public. The choice for them will be either to reflect the public opinion and oppose the war or repress the public opinion by joining the war.

I needn’t tell you what choice our government is likely to make if we have that choice. We will choose support for our policy and repression over opposition to our policy and reflecting public opinion.
I can give you the example of Pakistan where we certainly want to see democracy in Pakistan. But now that we’re fighting the war on al-Qaeda the reality of it is that a year ago Pakistan was slightly more democratic than it is today and the opposition forces that we want to see defeated in Pakistan are stronger today than they were a year ago. That is just the reality of the sort of deals that you have to make when you’re fighting a very serious war on terrorism and that is likely to be the serious issue even more after the war.

So the reality of it is even if we wanted to bring about democracy, even if it was our right to do so, I think the most likely outcome the morning after is that we’re going to have more repression in the region than not.

Now, this ties to the question that Martin asked because I think it is true that governments historically have used the Arab-Israeli conflict to deflect pressure domestically. Nonetheless, you have to ask the question of why do they use it. Well, they use it because it resonates. They use it because people think it is important. They use it because people are willing to swallow the absence of reform because they think that is a priority.

Today even besides using it there is the outcome of the fact that our policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict is not popular. The public wants to see governments intervene in the Arab-Israeli issue and the governments are not able to intervene. They see the pictures of the West Bank and Gaza every day. They demand of their governments to intervene. These governments don’t intervene. They can’t intervene. They can’t do anything. They’re helpless.

And as a consequence you have public pressure and the impotence of the governments to deal with the Arab-Israeli issue and the indecision of how are they going to deal with it. Again, it is a force that extends the repression system, not relieves it, and therefore it is a problem, it is a structural problem, it’s a profound structural problem.

Now, having said all this I don’t think it is the only reason why we have repression in the Middle East. I think that the Middle East must reform for its own good. I mean, all these reports are right and it’s depressing to watch and for people who love this region, this region has to change for its own good. It has to change politically, it has to change economically and it has to change in its educational system. That is important not only for the Middle East but actually for the rest of the world. I do buy the argument that the absence of democracy is problematic for the rest of the world. I do buy the argument that it is somewhat our business now. It’s no longer just the Middle East’s business, because there is a consequence. The real issue is how to bring it about; is it our business and to the extent that it is how do we bring it about.

I do not think that we have the power to change the system in the region. No state has that power. We have the power to change the configuration of power in the region; we have that power. We can, through war, change politics overnight. And the morning after the war with Iraq, the Middle East will look very different from the Middle East the day before, no question about it. But we cannot predict the outcome. We can reshuffle the deck but we don’t know how the cards are going to fall. There is no way we can do it and it could be a lot worse and it could be somewhat better. More likely it will be worse.

In my judgment while many of the governments in the region are part of the historic problem, they must be part of the solution if we’re going to move forward incrementally. I think it has to be a collaborative effort, I think there is a mechanism for win-win and that has to begin in my own judgment on the economic arena. I think if you look at the cases of the Asian tigers, people use them, these governments began as dictatorships and the way they first moved was through economic liberalization. That is an issue where there is a win-win for the governments, for the region, for the rest of the world. You can help bring about economic reform. Economic reform changes politics. The business people aren’t going to do business unless there is
more legal reform and businesses aren’t going to succeed unless you have a better skilled labor force, which creates demands for more education and the more individual participation in the economic system—and you have more demand for political participation. It all goes hand in hand.

Now, I think that we as an American people have a right to have a foreign policy that demands certain standards. We, for example, on issues of human rights we certainly have a right to do that, we have a right to take positions on it, but we have to understand our limits and I think we have to be practical about the approach we take in moving the issue forward. And the Arab-Israeli conflict is related to the issue of democratization in the Arab world.

**Hamid Ansari:**

The first thing is that using the expression “Islamic world”—as if there was a kind of monolith—is a bit of a misnomer. There is a spiritual unity amongst Muslim people in all parts of the world. There is a considerable amount of cultural affinity but it is not of the same order. Beyond that, in political matters, in social organization, and in economic policies, there are wide disparities. In South Asia, where I come from, Southeast Asia, West Africa where there are substantial Muslim populations—perceptions are different, problems are different, solutions are different.

The question of reform: again if we take it as one catchword we get nothing out of it. We are talking of reform in what sense? Do we talk of reform in political sense? Do we talk of social reforms, are we talking of economic reforms, are we talking of political reforms, are we talking of constructive new thinking in the realm of matters religious, for which there is a term in Islamic terminology: Ijtihad. Each one of these has a different aspect and therefore a different solution.

But if I get the sense of your question right, what you are asking about, I think, is the last part or Islamic reformation. The interesting thing about the Islamic world is that this question of reformation has always been on the agenda. I know that in South Asia, at least specifically in India for over 200 years, Muslim thinkers, mainstream Muslim thinkers, have been addressing the question of how to respond to a new situation. Now, the new situation at that point in time was the imposition of British colonial rule over India and there is a whole body of literature from very eminent religious scholars who responded to that question. This went on right through the 19th century and to the beginning of the 20th century. So the process of constructive thinking has always been there.

Now, it is another matter if we were to make a judgment, whether it was adequate? That is question number one. Question number two is that today, when we are living at the beginning of the 21st century, has
that thinking advanced sufficiently. And if I were to hazard an opinion, I would say not sufficiently because it is not a question of thinking in a vacuum. One is living in time. Thinking has to be time specific, situation specific. There are challenges in the world that every society is facing, including Muslim societies wherever they might be.

I think the judgment is pretty accurate that a good many Muslim societies have not responded adequately. There are excellent exceptions also. Some were mentioned in the discussions yesterday and today. But most of them have been somewhat tardy in their response. And therefore the question goes back to why are they tardy. My impression is that they are tardy because of the lack of this concept of innovative thinking, of Ijtihad.

Theoretically it is there but people are somewhat reluctant to use it, because there is another concept that comes in and that is the concept of consensus. Historically what has happened is that the quest for consensus has tended to dominate and deter constructive thinking, and the requirement of our times is that we reverse the process; do the constructive thinking and then see how quickly we can develop a consensus, because the objective reality is that there is a quickening of the pace of movement of things and therefore there has to be a quickening of the pace by which we respond.

There was a discussion, a lively discussion, this morning on the imperatives of globalization, and the point is we are no longer living in isolation. We are living in an integrated or a fast integrating world. I don’t buy the concept that we are living in a global village, but I think we are living in a global city. And the global city therefore compels us to observe certain rules of the global city. Over a period of time, the last 20 or 30 years, the international community has been working, and each one of us is part of it including all the countries of the Muslim world, over a set of norms that are broadly acceptable. Human rights are one such example. Another is non-discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, sex, religion, and there are several others like this. There is no difficulty in accepting these and as far as the record goes nobody has dissented. But the question is: are we implementing them, and if we are implementing them with what degree of thoroughness?

The Arab Human Development Report was referred to in the discussions. There was also a dissent about its validity. But the point is that these reports—whether it is the Arab Development Report or the Human Development Report that has now become a benchmark for its objectivity—do reflect with a fair degree of accuracy the state of play in individual societies.

If we simply were to make these into a kind of measuring rod and then see where the deficiencies are, and go about correcting them. But there are two ways of correcting deficiencies. Either it is done by a cooperative effort or it is done through a prescriptive, imposed, formula.

I don’t think—and the majority of people who participated in the discussions the last two days don’t think—that the prescriptive, imposed, formula produces the result. It has to be an induced cooperative effort and I think there is enough sense left in the world, enough sense in common well being, to be able to develop that kind of consensus. It might be time consuming, but if we move away from it where do we go?

After the Second World War and in view of the experience of the inter-war period when the League of Nations was first created and then it crashed like a pack of cards, a new system was developed and the United States was right up front in creating it.

Now we have had 55 years of that new system. In the post-Cold War period it has developed a new vitality. Let us give that system a full chance and let the products of that system take over as the new norms of international behavior nationally and internationally. I think we will get much better results, I think we would be able to carry most people with us and I think we would avoid creating the impression, which again we heard in the Conference, that an attempt is being made to impose a new arrangement.
MARTIN INDYK:

Thank you. Thank you very much. I agree that that is one of the conclusions that came from the conference. There was a very real desire to have the United States encourage those thin, small voices that are looking for support when they call within Islamic societies for change for greater liberalization, political reform, but a very real sense that if it’s dictated by the United States that this will only make their task more difficult.

The former foreign minister, soon to be the new foreign minister. You wanted to make some comments on this?

H.E. SHEIKH HAMAD BIN JASIM BIN JABER AL-THANI:

Yes, I will still insist that I am speaking on my own, that I’m not a foreign minister.

What I would like to clarify right from the start, people have spoken and Dr. Hamid has spoken about the concept of Shoora. Shoora in the Islamic world has been misused in our part of the world. Is it a binding concept or not binding? We think it’s binding and it should be binding, so therefore it’s like a parliament. The resolution passed through a majority should be binding.

But when the oil wealth suddenly befell upon our area—most of the countries in this area compared to some oil producing countries outside the area—have done a bad job in utilizing the wealth and I cannot give them more than 30, 40 percent of marks. The reason for this is there was no education. This area needed everything almost, starting from clothing to food to medical care to education. So therefore the oil wealth was used sometimes properly, sometimes inappropriately.

This, the wealth was simple that some countries, for example, the United States and others made a fortune out of our fortune, because they had infrastructure and they had everything there to make great advances.

I am not outside the scope or the realm of the theme of this talk. After World War II there was a semi-agreement that this area was nothing more than a gas station, a petrol station. You get your oil and the people are nice and leave the status quo as it is. And there was competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, there was a role required from these countries. So therefore things were going okay, we did not hear about democracy or a need for change, except after certain things happened in the United States, especially.

I am for change. I am for democratization. But these countries should set a timetable and should not be forced to get into democratization. This is what we are trying to do in Qatar when His Highness the Emir took care of organizing elections and aiming for a parliament. We are trying in a way to rehabilitate our country and help our people accept these changes.

We are with the concept that democracy should spread in the region. But why now has America has started to press us in this direction?

As the Americans, we united on the same purpose in Afghanistan. This is part of a thing, which we can be condemned for. When our sons went to Afghanistan we as governments we supported them and said, “Yes, you are going to defend Islam.” In reality things were different. They went because America had a quarrel with the Soviet Union and they wanted to fight it out in Afghanistan. The aim we declared was different than the one we wanted to cooperate with, with the Americans. It was under the table. We were raising the banner of Islam, claiming that we were defending Islam and Muslims, whereas the Americans had another purpose and that was to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

Here our interests met at that juncture. But when the war was over and we found that all these fighters had strayed from the straight path, they didn’t know what to do. Their role was over, they should have come back into the civil society. The war was over. But we went back to exporting some of them. Most of them went
with the sincere intention to make Jihad. They did not go there to serve the purposes of the United States. They went there because their brother Muslims asked their help. But they were used by their governments and other countries. Once they finished their role they suddenly became terrorists. Some of them are really terrorists. This is what we saw in September 11th, which they committed an act, which is unacceptable by any reason. Who was the reason? Their governments were the reason. We—their governments—we could not understand what was the whole thing or we didn’t explain it enough to our people.

The same thing applies to Pakistan. Here I reiterate that I am speaking in my personal capacity to be honest and enrich this discussion. Pakistan played a great role for the United States. After the Cold War was over Pakistan became a country, which was undemocratic, and that should not possess nuclear weapons whereas India did. There was injustice even amongst the allies. So therefore until September 11th America was not on the side of Pakistan. Suddenly since September 11th, Pakistan became an acceptable regime again.

In my opinion, if I was faced with a country, which has nuclear weapons, then I should have them, or else the entire area should be freed from such weapons.

The important issue here is how do we start this change. Do we start the change because America wants change or because we need the change? I think we need the change in the area, regardless of what America wants or America does not want. We need change. Change, how does this change come? It comes through an educational process.

Note: Transcript by Federal News Service
THE BROOKINGS PROJECT ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World is a major research program, housed in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. It is designed to respond to some of the profound questions that the terrorist attacks of September 11th have raised for U.S. policy. The project seeks to develop an understanding of the forces that led to the attacks, the varied reactions in the Islamic world, and the long-term policy responses that the U.S. can make. In particular, it will examine how the United States can reconcile its need to eliminate terrorism and reduce the appeal of extremist movements with its need to build more positive relations with the wider Islamic world.

The Project has several interlocking components:
- A Task Force made up of specialists in Islamic, regional, and foreign policy issues (emphasizing diversity in viewpoint and geographic expertise), as well as government policymakers, who meet on a monthly basis to discuss, analyze, and share information on relevant trends and issues;
- A Visiting Fellows program that brings distinguished experts from the Islamic world to spend time in Washington D.C., both assisting them in their own research, as well as informing the wider work ongoing in the project;
- A series of Brookings Analysis Papers and Monographs that provide needed analysis of the vital issues of joint concern between the U.S. and the Islamic world;
- A series of Regional Conferences, which will bring together local experts in the Middle East and South Asia with their American counterparts. This component will not only provide an opportunity for scholars to discuss their own diagnoses of current trends and possible responses, but also promote a much-needed exchange of ideas and information;
- An Education and Economic Outreach Initiative, which will explore the issues of education reform and economic development towards the Islamic world, in particular the potential role of the private sector;
- A culminating Brookings Institution Press book, which will explore U.S. policy options towards the Islamic World. The aim of the book is to synthesize the project’s findings for public dissemination.

The Project Convenors are Professor Stephen Philip Cohen, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow; Ambassador Martin Indyk, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy; and Professor Shibley Telhami, Professor of Government at the University of Maryland and Brookings Senior Fellow. Dr. P.W. Singer, Brookings Olin Fellow, serves as the Project Coordinator.
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Saad Bin Talfah Al-Ajmi
Former Minister of Information, Government of Kuwait

LEBANON
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Director, Fares Foundation; Founder, Lebanon Policy Studies Center
Jamal Mroue
Editor-in-Chief and Publisher, The Daily Star

MALAYSIA
Karim Raslan
Senior Partner, Raslan Loong

MOORECO
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Abdelhadi Boutaleb
Former Adviser to King Hassan II; Former Ambassador to the U.S.

PAKISTAN
H.H. Yusif bin Alawi
Foreign Minister of Oman

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Mahdi Abdel Hadi
Director, Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

PHILIPPINES
Amina Rasul-Bernardo
Fellow, Asian Institute of Management, United States Institute of Peace

QATAR
Abdul Qader Al-Aamri
Former Ambassador to the U.S. and Algeria
Maher Abdullah
Al Jazeera Satellite Network
Abdel Hameed Al-Ansari
Dean of Sharia College, University of Qatar
Mohammad Giham Al-Kawari
Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Khaled Fahd Al-Khater
Director of Strategic Studies Center, Doha

Ejaz Haider
News Editor, The Friday Times

Khaled Fahd Al-Khater
Director of Strategic Studies Center, Doha
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Institution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Ahmed Hassan Makkawi</td>
<td>Research Fellow, Zayed Centre for Coordination and Followup</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jamal S. Al-Suwaidi</td>
<td>Director, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>Khaled Abou el Fadl</td>
<td>Alfi Fellow, University of California Los Angeles Law School</td>
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<td>Hady Amr</td>
<td>Senior Advisor, Search for Common Ground</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Daniel Brumberg</td>
<td>Professor, Georgetown University and Carnegie Endowment Visiting Fellow</td>
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<td>Shaoul Bakhash</td>
<td>Professor, George Mason University</td>
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<td>Stephen Cohen</td>
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<td>Steven Cook</td>
<td>University of Pennsylvania and former Brookings Research Fellow</td>
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<td>Thomas Friedman</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Correspondent, <em>The New York Times</em></td>
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<td>Philip Gordon</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Director U.S.-France Center, The Brookings Institution</td>
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<td>Mouafac Harb</td>
<td>Program Director, Radio Sawa</td>
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<td>Martin Indyk</td>
<td>Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution; Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel</td>
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<td>Dafallah El Hag Yousef</td>
<td>Fellow, University of Khartoum; Former Chief Justice of Supreme Court</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>Imad Moustapha</td>
<td>Director of Information Technology, Damascus University</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Surin Pitsuwan</td>
<td>Member of Parliament, former Foreign Minister of Thailand</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Hicham Djait</td>
<td>Professor Emeritus, University of Tunis</td>
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<td>Ahmed al-Ghudaibi</td>
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<td>Ayse Saktanber</td>
<td>Professor, Middle East Technical University</td>
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<td>John Paden</td>
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<td>Jillian Schwedler</td>
<td>Professor, University of Maryland</td>
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<td>Peter W. Singer</td>
<td>Coordinator, Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World; Olin Fellow, The Brookings Institution</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Nasr Taha Mustafa</td>
<td>Board Chief and Editor-in-Chief, Saba, National News Agency of Yemen</td>
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The Saban Center for Middle East Policy was established on May 13th, 2002 with an Inaugural Address by His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan. The establishment of the Saban Center reflects The Brookings Institution’s commitment to expand dramatically its research and analysis of Middle East policy issues at a time when the region has come to dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda.

The Saban Center’s purpose is to provide Washington policymakers with balanced, objective, in-depth, and timely research and policy analysis from experienced and knowledgeable people who can bring fresh perspectives to bear on the critical problems of the Middle East. The Center upholds the Brookings tradition of being open to a broad range of views. Its central objective is to advance understanding of developments in the Middle East through policy-relevant scholarship and debate.

The Center’s establishment has been made possible by a generous founding grant from Mr. Haim Saban of Los Angeles. Ambassador Martin S. Indyk, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, is the Director of the Saban Center. Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack is the Center’s Director of Research. Joining Ambassador Indyk and Dr. Pollack in the work of the Center is a core group of Middle East experts, who conduct original research and develop innovative programs to promote a better understanding of the policy choices facing American decision makers in the Middle East. They include Professor Shibley Telhami, who holds the Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland; Professor Shaul Bakhash, an expert on Iranian politics from George Mason University; Professor Daniel Byman from Georgetown University, a Middle East terrorism expert; Dr. Flynt Leverett, a former senior CIA analyst and Senior Director at the National Security Council who is a specialist on Syria and Lebanon; and Dr. Philip Gordon, a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings who specializes in Europe’s and Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. The Center is located in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings, led by Vice President and Director, James B. Steinberg.

The Saban Center is undertaking original research in six areas: the implications of regime change in Iraq, including post-war nation-building and Gulf security; the dynamics of the Iranian reformation; mechanisms and requirements for fulfilling a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; policy for Phase III of the war on terror, including the Syrian challenge; and political change in the Arab world.

The Center also houses the ongoing Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, directed by Dr. Peter Singer, Olin Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings. This Project, established in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks, focuses on analyzing the problems that afflict the relationship between the United States and the Islamic world with the objective of developing effective policy responses. It includes a Task Force of experts that meets on a monthly basis, an annual Dialogue between American and Muslim intellectuals, a Visiting Fellows program for experts from the Islamic world, and a monograph series.