Organizing Violence

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WHEN THINGS FELL APART



Order

I. Background

II. Thinking – or Tuesdays with Avner
   A. Stateless societies
   B. Societies with states

III. Answering

Part I: Background

Uganda 1981

- My work: Agriculture
- Uganda: Idi Amin gone
- USAID calls
  - Lead team to advise on the rehabilitation of export agriculture

Uganda 1981

- Out in autumn
  - USAID
  - Coffee
  - Robert Hahn
- Out again in Spring
  - World Bank
  - Implement earlier plan for auctioning coffee – after a validation trip: NYC, Hamburg, London, Geneva,…

The Political Environment

- Struggle for power in Uganda

SUDAN
DRC
KEY
Major Road
River
Border
Town
Capital City
Airport
Kidepo Valley N.P.
Nimule
Kaabong
Loyoro
Arua
Gulu
Moroto
Murchison Falls N.P.
Lake Albert
Masindi
Lake Kyoga
Soroti
Mount Elgon N.P.
Mbale
UGANDA
Tororo
Fort Portal
Mubende
Bombo
Jinja
Busia
Kampala
KENYA
Entebbe
Masaka
Kalanga
Lake Edward
Queen Elizabeth N.P.
Lyantonde
Mbarara
Lake Mburo N.P.
Lake Victoria
Bwindi N.P.
Kabale
TANZANIA
Lake Kivu
RWANDA

The Political Environment

- Struggle for power in Uganda
  - Effect on team
  - Effect on counterparts

- 1st reaction
  - Retreat to Nairobi

2nd Reaction

- Fled Africa
- For ten years, immersed myself in the world of coffee

World of Coffee

- Studied the world government of coffee
  - Bicameral legislature
  - Voting rules
  - Solved for the allocation of export rights
- Joined U.S. delegation

  Brawn: Brazil Brain: Colombia
- Interviewed, worked through archives in Rio, Sao Paulo, and Bogota

Learned from Latin America

Violence not an African problem!

Colombia 1989

- March 3: UPP presidential candidate **MURDERED**
- March 11: Lawyer for *El Espectador* **MURDERED**
- April 21: Bucaramanga radio news commentator **KILLED**
- May 4: Father of judge who indicted Escobar **MURDERED**, mother attacked.
- May 30: **CAR BOMB** Bogota
- June 3: Son of Pres. Barco's SYG **KIDNAPPED**.
- June 15: Medellin radio reporter **KILLED**.
- July 4: Governor of Antioquia **KILLED**
- July 28: Judge issuing warrants for Escobar arrest **MURDERED**.
- August 16: Magistrate ratifying indictments **ASSASSINATED**.
- August 17: …ctd…

Conclusion

- Violence NOT an Africa problem
- Is a development problem
- Figure it out

Part II: Understanding Violence

Thinking

- Center for Advanced Studies 1993
  - Political science + economic history
  - Wrote up coffee book + “Analytic Narratives”
  - Tuesdays with Avner
- What are sources of political order? How can order be possible?
  - Government, but no predation
  - Civilians put aside their arms
- What are its properties?
- When can political order become a state?

First Thought Through

Private Provision of Security

Or

The provision of security in societies without states

Set up as a Game

- Actors: $i \in (i,j)$
- Actions: w_i , or work
  $l_{i,}$, or leisure
  $m_{i,}$, or military activity
- Constraint: $T_i=w_i + l_i + m_i$
- Payoffs to i: $U_i=U_i(Y_i,l_i)$ where
  $Y_i=f(w_i)+g(m_i)f(w_j)$

Repeated interaction

With Repeated Interaction *can* have political order

- In repeated interaction, can play punishment strategies

  If one person steals at t=0,

  Then other can choose to punish:
  E.g. “Grim trigger”
  For t=1,2,...,∞, m_j>0.

- If future losses given sufficient weight, then m_i=0,at t=0

- This claim follows from the “folk theorem” of repeated games

Yields Following Trespass



As An Africanist, I Liked That

Provided an underpinning for one of the great contributions from African studies:

Evans-Pritchard's, "The Nuer"


MALI
Tombouctou
NIGER
CHAD
Khartoum
ERITREA
Asmara
Bamako
BURKINA FASO
Niamey
Ouagadougou
SUDAN
Lac 'Assal
(lowest point in Africa, -155 m)
N'Djamena
BENIN
NIGERIA
Abuja
Addis Ababa
RIFT VALLEY
ETHIOPIA
COTE D'IVOIRE
GHANA
TOGO
Yamoussoukro
Lomé
Lagos
Accra
Porto-Novo
Abidjan
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CAMEROON
Bangui
Malabo
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Yaoundé
Gulf of Guinea
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
São Tome
Libreville
REP. OF THE CONGO
GABON
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
UGANDA
Kampala
GREAT RIFT
KENYA
Nairobi
Annobon
(EQUA. GUI.)
RWANDA
Kigali
Lake Victoria
Mt. Kilimanjaro
(highest point in Africa, 5
Brazzaville
Bujumbura
BURUNDI
Kinshasa
ANGOLA
(Cabinda)
Lake Tanganyika
Dodoma
TANZANIA
Dar es Salaam
Luanda
Lubumbashi
Lake Nyasa
Moroni
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA
Lilongwe
MALAWI
Namibe
Lusaka
St. Helena
(St. Helena)
Juan de Nova

The Six Provinces of Southern Sudan
Chad
Central African Republic
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Uganda
Kenya
Ethiopia
Southern Sudan
White Nile
Upper Nile
Bahr el Ghazal
Wau
Lakes
Rumbek
Jonglei
Blue Nile
Sobat River
Tambura
Western Equatoria
Mundri
Maridi
Nzara
Yambio
Juba
Eastern Equatoria
Yei
Kajo Keji
Lokichoggio
Kaya
Source: FEWS
FEWS, September 1997
Revised by OFDA 1999

Figure 1

The Nuer LOVE Cattle



They covet cattle, E-P noted. But they do not steal each others'

Why?

NOT because they have chiefs

But: because they have deterrence

Return to the game

Yields A Structure of Payoffs



Shadow of the future

We liked that ----

- Had a model
- Had a relevant case – a canonical one
- But: Troubling thought – and therefore more Tuesdays with Avner

What if Development Took Place: What if economic growth?



Examples

- Diamonds
- Oil
- Foreign aid
- Drugs

First Best Therefore Unlikely

- Therefore we looked at two other equilibria
- Neither first best. But:
  - One with peace
  - One with prosperity

Peace

- $m_i = 0$
- Implies:

$$T_i = w_i + l_i + m_i$$

- Or that better to be poor

Prosperity

- $f(w_i)$ ↑
- Implies

$$T_i = w_i + l_i + m_i$$

- Or that better to be prepared to fight

Think what this implies



People Like Both



Look at the Layout



Implies Political System (Statelessness) Constrains Level of Welfare



One Implication

- Demand for change in political institutions
- Demand for the state

Examples

- 12th Century
- Rule by Families
  - Rise of Prosperity
  - England-France

More Tuesdays with Avner

Thinking about the state

Our strategy

- Posit a 3rd Actor
  - Call this actor G
- Also values income and leisure
- Doesn't work for a living
  - Rather: income from m
  - That is: from the use of force
- G a specialist in violence

First Question We Asked

- Are there conditions under which a specialist in violence will choose to use force to protect rather than prey upon private citizens?

OR

- Are there conditions under which will promote the production of wealth rather than secure its redistribution?

2nd Question

- Are there conditions under which private citizens will choose to put down their arms and refrain from raiding; pay taxes; and devote their time to production and leisure?

Political order

- When both the government and the citizens choose those actions
  - Specialist in violence: Protection
  - Citizens: Setting aside arms
- Note stress on choice

The State

When those choices prevail in equilibrium

can say there is a state.

Quickly

- Three actors
- Again repeated play
- The “punishment phase”
  - Specialist in violence turns predatory
  - Citizens resume the use of arms
  - Result: High insecurity – and low income

Look at the problem from the point of view of G



(Some of) The conditions for G to Adhere to the Equilibrium Path

- Conditions on tax revenue
  - Not too high
  - Not too low
- Conditions on discount rate
  - High levels of patience
- Conditions on payoffs off the equilibrium path


Payoffs
+
0
-
Temptation
Tax revenues
Punishment phase –
state failure
Time

Note

- These are the conditions under which a state becomes possible.
- These conditions also represent the conditions under which states will fail.

Order

I. Background

II. Thinking – or Tuesdays with Avner
   A. Stateless societies
   B. Societies with states

III. Applying, or Returning to Africa

Some “Facts”

- 46 countries 16 years (1970-1995)

- Indicator: Report of Militias

Revenues

Figure 6.1: Government Revenues





An Example

Figure 6.2: Fall of Government Revenues, Sierra Leone



Discount Rate

- Ability to be patient

Country	Date	Duration	Election		Outcome: Incumbent	
			Month	F&F?	Ousted	Retained
Benin	Feb-90	1 week	Feb-91	yes	√	
			Mar-96	yes	√	
Congo	Feb-91	3 months	Aug-92	yes	√	
Gabon	Mar-90	3 weeks	Dec-93	no		√
Mali	Jul-91	2 weeks	Apr-92	yes	√	
Niger	Jul-91	6 weeks	Feb-93	yes	√	
Burkina Faso	Aug-91	2 months	Dec-91	no		√
Ghana	Aug-91	7 months	Dec-92	yes		√
Togo	Aug-91	1 month	Aug-93	no		√
Zaire	Aug-91	1 year	--	--		
CAR	Oct-91	2 months	Aug-92	yes	√	
Chad	Jan-93	3 months	Jun-96	no		√


Party Systems by Period
70-74
75-79
80-84
85-89
90-95
Percent Observations
0
20
40
60
1
2
3
1 = No Party System 2 = Single Party System 3 = Competitive Party System
Graphs by Period

Figure 6.3: Political Reform and Militarization





And in an environment …

- Minerals
- Gem stones
- Timber
- Petroleum


Payoffs
+
0
-
Temptation
Tax revenues
Punishment phase –
state failure
Time

Late Century Africa

The Bottom Line: A Perfect Storm

- Revenues:
  - 1973, 1979, 1982
  - Response
- Discount rate
  - External Risk: Debt crisis to Fall of Communism
  - Internal Risk: Political Reform – the Curse of Democratization
    - Zambia Kenya Togo
    - Rwanda
- In an environment where punishment phase not unpleasant

Estimation Problems

- Sample bias
- Time Series with limited Dependent Variable
- Endogeneity
- Time dependence
- Cross sectional dependency

Probability of Report of Militias

	Pooled Logit	IV Probit	Conditional Logit
Revenues	-0.03944	-0.34154	-0.01707
	(-2.04)	(-2.468)	(-0.609)
Petroleum	-0.00031	0.00061	-0.00079
	(-0.328)	(1.568)	(-0.349)
No-party system	-0.45859	-0.48382	-0.7877
	(-1.166)	(-4.272)	(-1.616)
One-party system	-1.0167	-1.49197	-2.1664
	(-2.004)	(-3.743)	(-4.071)
Privileged region	1.4032	0.69273	
	(2.491)	(2.858)	
President from non-privileged region	-0.56693	-0.40507	-0.80671
	(-1.679)	(-2.396)	(-2.027)
Neighbor average	0.09183	0.16148	-0.05167
	(1.401)	(2.758)	(-0.595)
Number observations	1048	1012	813