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THE 2012 SAKIP SABANCI DISCUSSION WITH ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TALBOTT: On behalf of several colleagues here at Brookings, and in fact, the whole institution, to welcome you all here this morning in both venues -- and I'll come to that in just a moment -- I'm offering this greeting on behalf of Martin Indyk, the vice president and director of our Foreign Policy program; Kemal Dervis, the vice president and director of our Global Economy and Development program; Fiona Hill, the director of our Center on the United States and Europe.

This is the eighth, believe it or not, the eighth Sakip Sabanci lecture here at the Brookings Institution. But not just here at the Brookings Institution. As you can all see from the screens in front of you, and as our colleagues 5,000 miles away, the distance that separates the Potomac from the Bosphorus, this is a two-venue event and we are about to have not just an interactive exchange with our guest of honor but also an intercontinental one brought to us by modern technology. And whenever I refer to that, my good friend Güler Sabanci and I always say in unison, *inshallah*. (Laughter)

We are going to hear today from Zbigniew Brzezinski. He is the latest evidence of what makes this a world class event now in its eighth year. And I say that because he is part of a sequence of very high quality public intellectuals and citizens of the world who have addressed this forum. We are, in our connection by video link with Sabanci University in Istanbul, very lucky to have Professor Meltem Müftüler-Baç as the moderator of the discussion at that end. And I will come to the way in which we're going to proceed in just a moment.

I should also say, speaking of technology, that this is the first of the Sabanci lectures that is going to be broadcast in webcasting on the websites of both Sabanci University and the Brookings Institution. I want to say a quick word about Sakip Sabanci. He was a shrewd entrepreneur, a brilliant businessman, a champion of

Turkey's democratic and economic reforms, a philanthropist, and of course, very importantly, an educator. His niece, Güler Sabanci, has become a personal friend of mine, an institutional friend of the Brookings Institution, and we are all deeply grateful to her and her colleagues for what we are going to experience today and we have experienced over the past eight years. Güler, in the years that I have known her, has often used the phrase "big thinking." She is a connoisseur and a proponent of big thinking. Zbigniew Brzezinski is a big thinker. He has written 16 books, a number of which have been translated into Turkish, a number of which have been used in the curriculum in the international relations course at Sabanci University, and the title of his latest book, *Strategic Vision*, could be the heading for not only all that he has written in his extraordinary career but also what he has done, including in his service as national security advisor to President Carter.

By the way, all of you in this room and perhaps when the camera is turned to Zbigniew himself you'll see that he's wearing a little button on his blazer which is a memento of his time working in the White House. It meant that the Secret Service never gave him a hard time when he boarded Air Force One.

The format today is going to be as follows: First, we are going to hear from Güler Sabanci herself. Then Zbigniew is going to give a brief summary of the book. And of course, he will focus in particular on the many passages in it which relate to Turkey and its increasingly important role in the world. Then he and I will initiate a conversation from these two chairs up here which will just sort of prime the pump for the real meat of the event, which is a conversation that involves all of you in this room and our friends in what I would suggest is the most beautiful city on earth.

Güler, I now turn the proceedings over to you.

(Applause)

MS. SABANCI: Thank you, Strobe, Dr. Brzezinski, Ambassador of Turkey. Yes, good morning to Brookings Institution and good afternoon to Sabanci University in Istanbul. It gives me great pleasure and joy really to see this distinguished audience on both sides of the Atlantic joining for the eighth annual Sakip Sabanci lecture here at Brookings Institution.

I would like to, of course, take this opportunity first of all to thank my dear friend Strobe for his contributions to realizing this -- I call it partnership now since it's the eighth one. Partnering with Sabanci University and Brookings Institution for this wonderful lecture series and also, of course, Professor Meltem Müftüler-Baç from Sabanci University for his contributions; my friend, Kemal Dervis; and who is here also with us, Professor Fuat Keyman, who is the director of the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabanci University who is the leader of this organization on the Sabanci side. And I'd like to thank all of them for their contributions.

Well, most of you have known and my friend Strobe has already mentioned about my uncle, Mr. Sakip Sabanci. I would just like to add that Mr. Sabanci was our honorary chairman of the Sabanci University of the Board of Trustees and he was a great philanthropist. But he was also a humanist. Sakip Sabanci was, for those who know him, has stood for freedom of speech all his life. He believed in free market and defended the free enterprise. More importantly, he recognized the importance of international collaboration in order to achieve lasting peace and stability and to leave a sustainable tomorrow for prosperity.

Since 2005, this lecture has offered a platform for many statesmen, dignitaries who cherish these principles and project them through their work. This year's lecture, our keynote speaker, we are truly grateful and honored with him, Dr. Brzezinski's speech comes at a vital crossroads. As we shall hear from the world's most eminent

scholar, Dr. Brzezinski in international relations, the world is going through a major global shift. The balance of power is no longer tilted in favor of the West, nor is it solely shaped by the unilateral interests of the United States and Europe.

Regional power blocks, such as BRIC, are major contenders to transatlantic engagement in their respective regions. They offer strong leadership and policy alternatives to the traditional western influence over their geographies. They demand more power and stronger representation in international organizations like the United Nations, IMF, and the G-20, as well as in regional formations, such as NAFTA and ASEAN. Just like these countries, Turkey is of paramount importance to the future of global orders. As our distinguished speaker notes in his recent book, *Strategic Vision*, it is difficult to talk about the future of the Americas or Europe's global leadership without mentioning the importance of Turkey's regional power for advancing their geopolitical goals.

It is obvious that Turkey, a European Union accession country and an important U.S. ally, will play a much greater role in global affairs over the next 25 years. We are extremely fortunate and honored today that we will hear from one of the most notable experts of global politics and security studies, Dr. Brzezinski about how exactly these events will unfold. I'm looking forward to listening to Dr. Brzezinski, and I wish all of you -- all the audience -- a successful and stimulating conference. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Strobe, Ms. Sabanci, Mr. Ambassador, ladies and gentlemen here in Washington and simultaneously in Istanbul. I must say I am of a generation in which to be able to say this is something very, to me, impressive. We really live in a new world which is uniquely interconnected, interactive, and hopefully, hopefully perhaps, increasingly cooperative. So it's a new era. And in fact, it's important to

emphasize that because what is distinctive in my judgment about the 21st century is that it will be either a very successful century on the global scale or it will be the worst century in human history. And I think when one thinks about that one begins to have a somewhat different approach to the problems that we face.

My book is entitled *Strategic Vision*, and the word "vision" I chose deliberately. I have in mind the proposition that any great undertaking has to be first stimulated by a shared vision. Some sense of what is possible, some sense of what can be anticipated, some sense of what can be conveyed meaningfully to others so that they can embrace it. But it is not a blueprint. It's a little bit like an architect projecting on the screen, for example, the vision of the building he's planning to shape. But that is the vision. It gives you a sense of what it will look like, what will it imply, what it will convey, what kind of emotions it will evoke. The blueprint, the detailed blueprint then follows eventually but one has to start with a vision.

I say this very deliberately because, for example, three weeks from now NATO will be meeting in Chicago. It will be reaffirming its importance and it is important and it is still needed. But I fear that unless that meeting also articulates some sort of a vision for the future, it will be essentially a formality, a reaffirmation of what is but not acknowledging that something more is needed if what is is to endure.

So this is what has guided me in my approach to the issue of global politics because the book is about global politics ultimately. And the book argues that global politics has been shaped for the last 600 years, essentially by a small extremity in the very west of the Eurasian continent. That small extremity in the very West of the Eurasian continent involves several West European countries which initially driven by greed -- I repeat, driven by greed -- engaged in transoceanic explorations which produced the era of Colonialism and Imperialism. They reached across the Western

Hemisphere, both north and south. They reached across the Pacific to India, even to China. Think of the special colonial arrangements on the shores of China. It even intimidated Japan.

But in the process these explorations driven by greed became also the sources of conflict. Among the sponsors, the different dynasties and states, and the conflicts involved not only collisions across the oceans but increasingly fed back to Europe. And thus the era of imperialism and colonialism worldwide then generated increasingly also conflicts on the European continent for control over Europe because that became essential to the effective exercise of imperial and colonial ambitions. And so we have the last 200 years of European history dominated by wars for the control over Europe. Napoleonic wars, First World War, Second World War, and then it's global extension and postscript, the Cold War, global hegemony was the issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. It all originated and was confined to the Western extremity of Eurasia and then in the course of the 20th century embraced also the United States.

But today, the world view political is becoming dramatically different. All of Eurasia today is the principal arena for global politics. In addition to the United States, it is the area in which the major powers of the world interact. It is also the continent, the super continent on which regional conflicts have global significance. Regional conflicts in their present shape and scope, such as in the Middle Eastern region. But regional conflicts which have the potential for greatly expanding and making these regional conflicts increasingly destabilizing for all of Eurasia. And you have also on this continent the results of the dramatic ongoing shift in the center of gravity of global power from the West to the East with rising Asian powers now being part of the global competition.

And the relations among them are far from stable. It is not impossible to

exclude the possibility that Asia in the 21st century could replicate the tragic history of Europe of the 20th century. Border conflicts, national ambitions, security fears, ethnic animosities, religious fanaticism. Questions of resources, such as water rights, maritime access; they're all yet unfinished business. But they're now part of global politics given the consequences of the collision among major powers in the central continent of the World.

So Eurasia is central to global peace, to peace understood traditionally, that is to say, to the avoidance of what transpired in the course of the 20th century. And Eurasia is also absolutely essential as a point of departure if there is going to be effective global cooperation. For some accommodation, some degree of balance on the Eurasian continent is essential. Given the rise of new Asian powers, two of them with populations well over a billion of people, several of them with atomic weapons with increasing ranges. Just think of what transpired last week in the competition between China and India. India tested nuclear capability delivery systems announcing upon the successful conclusion of the rocket test, that it has a range capable of reaching New Delhi. And then a few days later a client of China, rather than China itself, indirectly responded by testing a similar weapon and then announcing that it has a range capable of reaching New Delhi. And we know, of course, of a lot of other recent sources of tension in Eurasia, which emphasize the proposition that conflicts in Eurasia can have negative global implications.

That leads me to argue that essential in that context are policies in which the United States should play a major role to stabilize the interrelationships of the new globally significant realities on the Eurasian continent. And in the East I argued that the United States should not get involved in any Far Eastern or Asian conflicts; that no conflict between any Asian population is of sufficient consequence in terms of its potential outcomes for the United States to justify American engagement on the mainland of Asia

and military conflicts. In effect, I argue that the United States should replicate the policy of Great Britain, vis-à-vis Europe in the 19th and early 20th century. Balancer, influencer, but not direct participant in mainland conflicts.

The United States should use its positive influence to try also to promote, if possible, reconciliation between Japan and China and the United States has direct and important relationships with each. And the United States should strive to mediate an impossible conflict between China and India, perhaps participate as a balancer but not as directly involved. And above all else, the United States should strive to develop a relationship of a stable partnership with China if it is possible, thereby setting a precedent historically that a preeminent power facing a rising power does not end up with the two of them in conflict, but that it is possible perhaps to create some sort of a stable relationship in which preeminent powers need not struggle, particularly need not struggle because we now live in an age in which an outcome that spells destruction for the other is no longer possible. That we're now living in an age in which a collision between the two top powers will inevitably be mutually destructive. And that is also a new reality.

But I now turn to the West because the West now involves the Western extremity of Eurasia plus the United States. The United States secures the security of Europe and is engaged in the relationship of closed alliance with Europe. And including very much so with Turkey which has been a stalwart member of NATO. Probably more stalwart than any other member of NATO. And in that setting it is in the interest of the United States that Europe be vital and actively engage in world affairs and be capable of balancing the East so that on the basis of a balance in Eurasia we can then jointly address the global problems that will not be addressed if Eurasia is fragmented and dominated by wholesale conflicts.

And I argue in that context that a revitalized West is, in fact, of enormous

importance to the future of the world. Not only because of the need for an equilibrium on the European -- Eurasian continent, but also because the West has still a vital message for the world, regarding how political systems should be organized. Regarding what ought to be the relationship between the individual and society and the state regarding the centrality of law and of constitutions and of self-deliberation by a public composed of free citizens.

These principles do have potential universal relevance, though they have to be achieved with respect for different stages of historical development and for the legacies of different cultures. Nonetheless, it is a message of highly important potential relevance to the rest of the world. And hence the West has to define itself very much not only in terms of joint security interests but of joint convictions and joint commitments to certain fundamental notions regarding the role of freedom and dignity and personal self-fulfillment in the shape of modern societies. That is a relevant message. It is not the point of departure for a crusade but it is a message that can only be sustained in a setting of self-confidence and security and vitality. And to have that secured vitality, particularly the Europeans -- specifically the European component of the West, which embraces, of course, much more than that, especially in America. Has to be vital and energetic. And it needs to be revised. And I argue in my book that in that context, the deliberate effort to embrace more closely Turkey and Russia in a necessary precondition for vital West and the necessary precondition for the West that can be part of a larger Eurasian equilibrium.

I'm talking more specifically therefore of Turkey. My argument is that both for strategic as well as political reasons Turkey should be, and in my perspective is, in fact, objectively speaking, a part of the West. Turkey 90 years ago embraced a social experiment of enormous importance and of great ambition. A really remarkable experiment, one of the first in global history. Indeed, one of the two first ones. But more

successful than the other one. What Atatürk undertook in the early 1920s has been with stops and gasps and delays and then resurgence again implemented in an increasingly impressive and successful fashion. Increasingly impressive and successful.

It is not finished. There are still many shortcomings. One can point critical fingers at this or that aspect of the Turkish reality. But the trajectory is clear and has been sustained and at a very low human cost. Think of the other one, almost simultaneous Leninism, Lenin. The effort to transform Russia into a modern industrial society but based on the comprehensive ideology that was rigid and doctrinaire and implemented with extraordinary brutality and with enormous human cost.

It is impossible even for us to fully visualize that cost but one example to me is particularly meaningful. In 1937 alone, and there are full archival documentations for this in Soviet archives, in 1937 alone, by telegraphic instructions to different parts of Russia from Moscow, the NKVD, the secret police at the time, was instructed to eliminate enemies of the people by numerical quotas assigned for different parts of Russia, for different cities, for different oblasts as they were called at the time. And they were instructed to report on their achievement by certain dates. And all of this is available in the documentation. And it is interesting to note how some reported fulfilling the plan in total and some even indicated in the reports that they are ready to overfulfill the plans out of socialist commitment and determination. And the number of people executed in one year in the Soviet Russia in the process of its transformation was 775,000. Just think of that. City by city assigned quotas. Executions carried out. Decisions made usually by so-called troika, three officials of the NKVD determining who was to be executed among those who were arrested as counter-revolutionaries. That human cost still burdens Russia. That human cost still leaves a legacy of embitterment and confusion as to what that whole experiment has meant.

Turkey stands in dramatic contrast to that. And therefore, I would argue that on the level of philosophical political identity, Turkey is part of the West, in spite of the religious difference which is not, however, totally hermetic; that is to say parts of Europe are also Islamic in the Balkans and those parts of Europe are now increasingly part of the European Union. So there are precedents for religious diversity in terms of membership in Europe. And Turkey is of importance to European security given its strategic location, given its strength and vitality, and given its demonstrated commitment to the shared strategic interests of NATO.

So Turkey by definition is, I think, inherently positioned to be a significant player in NATO. I would view Turkey personally today as one of the four most important members of the NATO alliance, certainly right there with Britain, France, and Germany. And it should be viewed increasingly in the United States as such. Turkey is a model for the future development of Iran which has many social economic similarities to Turkey; many of the same social indices indicate the potential also for change there at some point in the foreseeable future. Turkey is critical to the stability of the Middle East. It is the most important largest democracy in the Middle East. And in that sense it is part of the complex of relationships that make the West. And the West, which engages Turkey, has immediate outreach to Central Asia. It has an alternative source of energy for Europe, and it encourages Russia to move in the same direction. And Russia can follow in the wake of Turkey's evolution.

I'll not speak of Russia at length, but let me note merely that I'm optimistic in the long run, somewhat pessimistic in the short run, but I do think that there is growing evidence also in Russia of the dynamic development of a western identity that is, in fact, becoming a civic society, particularly in terms of the middle class. And that's anticipated eventually Russia, especially when its readers begin to look at the map, not

with nostalgia in order to create some Eurasian union that Putin speaks about which would be a recreation of the Soviet Union, but looks at the map in terms of the future and ponders the implications of a vast but empty eastern territory of Russia adjoining the overpopulated, dynamically expanding China. I should think that would give Russians also some incentive to consider the benefits to the closer identification with the West.

So to complete these initial remarks let me simply say that I am both an optimist as well as advocate of an increasingly cooperative relationship between Turkey and the West that becomes meaningful in the security and political dimensions, eventually through membership in the EU, although there are real obstacles to that in the short run, but certainly also it is possible to envision great many intermediary arrangements which would begin to create a reality similar to that of membership actually in the EU. And the EU itself will probably be evolving from a union which is not a union into eventually some sort of a federation which has a unitary component in it, a looser outer element, and a great many other forms of association with countries that oscillate towards the EU and the Euro-Atlantic community.

So my fundamental point is simply this -- if we are going to have a century of cooperation that successfully copes with the new global problems, we need a new equilibrium on the Eurasian continent, which is the central arena on which the future of mankind will be decided, a Turkish and Russian participation in the West will be a positive contribution to making a good outcome more likely. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. TALBOTT: Zbig, that was terrific, both in its breadth and its depth. And what I would like to do is put a couple of questions to you here at the beginning and then very quickly go to Professor Müftüler-Baç to say a few words from her own perspective and then elicit perhaps three questions from the Istanbul audience and then

we'll switch back to this room.

Let me, if I could, first ask you to judge the relative ascent of Turkey compared to -- or I should say the absolute ascent of Turkey compared to what's happening elsewhere in Europe. I was struck in rereading the 25 or so pages in your book that you picked up on the end here which is the compare and contrast between Turkey and Russia by several things. One was your recollection that in the 19th century Turkey was called the "sick man of Europe." Here we are at the beginning of the 21st century and one could make the argument that Turkey is much further to robust economic health at least than any other country in Europe. Turkey is ascending while both individually and certainly collectively EU Europe is facing if not a crisis than at least severe challenges on its ability to manage its own future and the role it can play in the world. That makes it particularly ironic that the European Union would continue to resist the incorporation of Turkey into its own ranks. Would you comment on that paradox?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all you're quite right in saying that Turkey is remarkably successful. It's one of the three most successful European countries, that is to say Turkey, Sweden, and Poland. And they have something in common. They're not members of the Monetary Union. The Monetary Union has imposed a straightjacket on the European members of it in a manner which didn't sufficiently account for the basic differences in between economic arrangements, economic styles, even economic cultures of the north and the south particularly. I would think that if one looks carefully at what, for example, has happened in terms of Sweden and Poland which are much more closely related than Turkey is to this sort of European entity, they both avoid the dilemmas by having their own monetary systems, their own controls for the banks and so forth, yet being firmly committed to the notion of European cooperation and the deepening of it over time.

I think that the present inclination in Europe is to face this problem and my hope is that the end result is going to be, in fact, a union that merits the name union. As you recall, the European community transformed itself into a union but the paradox is that the European community involving mostly Western Europe was much of a union, whereas the European Union has become much more of a European community with all of its internal dilemmas. I think Turkey's success demonstrates also something else, namely that Turkey is at a still relatively early stage of advanced takeoff in the quest for modernization and industrialization and urbanization. And you tend to have more momentum in that phase than some of the more sedate West European countries, not to mention those southern countries which have their own peculiar Mediterranean traditions of banking, of reactions to publicly imposed tax systems and so forth. Or perhaps I should say nonreactions.

So Turkey had certain objective advantages. But beyond that I think Turkey demonstrates the ultimate wisdom of the Atatürk formula which is national mobilization reinforced by a sense of national patriotism and focused on a deliberate emulation of what was the most successful state in terms of social political development on the continent of Europe earlier in the previous century, and that was Germany. And that reduced model was heavily focused on Germany and I think it has been remarkably successful in that respect. And I think if things work out with Iran reasonably well, assuming we avoid a catastrophe, I think Turkey is the logical example, the model for Iran in the subsequent phase of change, which is another reason why it's important to think of Turkey increasingly as in the forefront of a more vital energetic Europe.

MR. TALBOTT: Picking up on the dynamics between Turkey and Russia and some similarities but some very marked differences, virtually all of which cut in favor of Turkey, I recall that when, as it became increasingly apparent that the European Union

was not going to open its doors to Turkey full accession anytime soon, President Putin, then Prime Minister Putin, now of course president again, was strongly tempted to play on what he would characterize, and so would others, as their rejection or rebuff to Turkey as an opportunity for Russia to develop a kind of commonality of outsiders, vis-à-vis Europe. I think what I hear you saying is that in addition to being a model for Iran, Turkey could turn the tables on Russia and be a model for some of the more positive strains that you see underway in Russia. Is that correct?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: That's an interesting thought. I hadn't thought of it frankly, so let me acknowledge the fact that I haven't thought of it; you have thought of it. But I think you have a good point. I think you have a good point. I think you're quite right. I have never been concerned about the kind of accommodation that Turkey and Russia have had because I knew that on both sides it was based, still to some extent, also on an awareness of history and that is to say neither one is prepared to be subordinate to the other. And the sort of inconclusive character of the many conflicts between the two provide in a sense a psychological source of reassurance to each. That being closer doesn't mean that one is being subordinated to the other.

Nonetheless, I have no doubt that, for example, the thousands, tens of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands of Russians who visit Turkey have to ask themselves, why can't we be like this? Why haven't we gotten to that stage? Because Russia is really still a country of contrast. Yes, Moscow, Petersburg, several other cities, magnificent. But then you go to the rest of the country. Hospitals without hot water, considerable deprivation, no system of communication other than rather traditional type of trains and very unreliable air service. All of that I think an average Russian visiting Turkey has to ask himself, this is a model of deliberate social transformation with a vision and a sense of purpose and with an energy that's disciplined and self-fulfilling.

And last but not least, democracy. Turkey still has problems in the area of democracy. We all know what they are but it is fundamentally a state on a democratic trajectory with significant attainments in the area of democracy. And that, too, is a model for Russia.

MR. TALBOTT: Thank you, Zbig. Meltem, will you permit me to be on a first name basis with you in the spirit of this conversation and can I turn the proceedings over to you and your colleagues there in Istanbul?

MS. MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ: Okay. Thank you. Well, let me just first start by noting that since we didn't have the chance at the beginning to thank Mr. Brzezinski for this delightful talk and we are very happy to host him at our annual Sakip Sabanci lecture series. We have been basically following your work, Mr. Brzezinski, for the past whatever years and the last contribution that you had from the most recent contribution, let's say, the *Strategic Vision*, comes at a very timely crossroads, let's say, on global balances and it's very sharp in its forecasts. Nonetheless, we have questions. We have a number of questions that our students would like to pose you, but before I actually pass the floor to them I would basically like to point out a few, let's say, points on the restructuring of the global order that you're talking about.

First, is the U.S. in decline? In your work that doesn't seem to be the case. You don't necessarily think the kind of thing that the U.S. is in decline. If not, if the U.S. is not declining, then can the U.S. actually save Europe from decline? Because it's obvious that Europe is actually in decline.

And that takes me to the second point which is a little bit tied to some of the questions that Mr. Talbott Strobe has raised on Turkey European relations. Now Turkey and European relations has been ambivalent at its best, frustrating at its worst. And now the current situation that we are at, specifically the looming question in our

minds is what does the EU have to offer Turkey today? I'm not even going to go into the details of the negotiation process.

A third point that I would like to actually raise is connected to the role of China. Now, when you look towards the future in the Strategic Vision analysis, you don't tend to actually see beyond 2025. The world is not going to be predominately Chinese but it's going to be largely, possibly chaotic with wider uncertainties. Now, if this is so, if in the next 20 to 50 years we are actually looking into a more chaotic world, you know, beyond what you have actually covered in your talk, what do you think could be the precise impact of that chaos or chaotic world would have on Turkey?

And the last point before I actually, you know, again turn to my students is this -- can the U.S. remain a preponderant power or powerhouse if it doesn't get its house, its own house in order? So these are basically the four things that I would like to raise. And I would like to actually now turn the floor, if you don't mind, to the students and get the students. Would that be okay for you?

MR. TALBOTT: Meltem, it's Strobe. Could I suggest perhaps since you put four questions to Dr. Brzezinski, he might take a crack at those. He's got infinite capacity, I'm sure, to keep all these in mind.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I hope you wrote them down.

MR. TALBOTT: I did. Yes. First, is the U.S. in decline itself? That was with a question mark after it. Then there was a statement, Europe is in decline. Can the U.S. help Europe overcome its own current crisis? And then there's the prospect of chaos in the East.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, let me deal with one at a time.

MR. TALBOTT: Okay, fine. I was about to get in the same trouble you were.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Is the U.S. in decline? Relatively speaking, yes, simply because others are developing more rapidly. In that sense, the advantage the United States has had is declining, even though the U.S. is not declining. If the U.S. is declining less rapidly, it is still advancing but it is not advancing as rapidly as some others. And that's a reality that's inevitable. Other countries at a later stage of development always develop more rapidly early on. The question for the future is can they sustain it? We don't know the answer to that. We're not sure. Will China be able to maintain that pace of growth? Perhaps. In which case there will be a very complicate American-Chinese relationship that we have to handle responsibly. But perhaps it might not.

Secondly, is the United States capable of improving its performance domestically? I think it has residual capacity to do so but it requires much more national recognition of the seriousness of the domestic problems of the need to overcome some of the bottlenecks in our society and to address some of the contributory factors to the negative manifestations in American life which range from cultural aspects to the deterioration of American infrastructure and so forth.

In my book I tried to provide a short analysis of the main areas of American "deterioration decline" and of continuing assets. The assets give us the capacity for mobilization, but that will only come if the political elite begins to be wiser than it has been in recent years when we have more leaders in public policy deeply engaged with what needs to be done, let's say like Dick Gephardt here and others like that who have a sense of what is needed. But we are right now in a political phase in which we are more polarized and more gridlocked than ever. And I think the gridlock can ultimately be broken only from the top down; that is to say by an imaginative, creative, in some respects visionary president. And my hope is that we'll have that advantage in our

political life in the foreseeable future again with a sense of security and perspective.

I'm not going to be making a political pitch but I think this election is quite important in that respect.

On Europe, you know, I'm not sure that Europe is declining. Europe is stalemated right now but to say it's declining it's a little strong. Sure, you know, recession is statistically a decline but it's not a manifestation of an overall decline. You can look at certain European countries and I think most of the world would envy the opportunity to be like them. So yes, there is a political problem in Europe. There's a serious economic problem connected with some of the structural deficiencies of the European Union but it's interesting to me that more and more European statesmen are beginning to say the remedy to this is a stronger, more integrated union together with more emphasis than on growth, but growth that is socially responsible and is not designed simply to maximize profits either in the city of London or on Wall Street, which is one of the major problems that we face.

MR. TALBOTT: But I think I understood you to both say and write that by definition a stronger and more integrated Europe would include Turkey in the EU. And Meltem asked given the troubles in the West and the relative and absolute health and progress that Turkey is making, what does the EU have to offer Turkey at this point?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: You know, I don't think Europe has to sell itself to Turkey. I think the Turks can make an objective national assessment. Are they're better off completely on their own in an extremely unstable region of Eurasia? Or are they better off being associated with the West which shares certain fundamental values, certain concepts of social organization, and can, with America particularly involved, provide additional elements of security? If I was a Turk and I looked in one direction at Iran and another direction at an uncertain and unpredictable Russia, if I looked towards

unpredictabilities of Central Asia, not to mention Pakistan and India's relationship, and if I look at the Middle East -- Israel, Palestine, Egypt environment, I think I would want to have some friends.

MR. TALBOTT: So you've suggested an answer to Turkey as it faces this choice, choice being one --

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I think it would be a mistake if the Turks thought that the West has to sell itself to Turkey, just as I don't accept the notion that the Turks have to meet some extraordinary standards to justify being part of the West. I think there is a mutual interest here that should be self evident to any intelligent observer of the global scene.

MR. TALBOTT: Meltem, do you want to call on your colleagues for a couple of questions?

MS. MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ: Yes. Thank you. Thanks a lot for the answers. I'll actually turn first to our students. Let me actually start with -- and let me say a few words about our students. (Inaudible) is actually a master of European Studies student at Sabanci and she has recently benefitted from an initiative that Ms. Sabanci began with the Central European University. So she's just back from Budapest. So (inaudible), your first question.

SPEAKER: Mr. Brzezinski, first of all I would like to thank you for being with us here today.

My question is as follows. In your conceptualization of the Strategic Vision you foresee a pattern of cooperation between the United States, the European Union, Turkey, and Russia. If this is to be the case, what kind of an impact will this new strategic vision have on Turkey's American relations? Thank you very much.

MR. TALBOTT: I would hope --

MS. MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ: I would hope --

MR. TALBOTT: We've got a good flow going here.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I would hope it would strengthen that relationship.

MR. TALBOTT: Meltem, let's let Dr. Brzezinski respond to that very good question. And by the way, it will interest you to know if you didn't already that Güler Sabanci and George Soros have worked out a joint program between Sabanci University and Central European University.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Excellent. Excellent. Well, I would hope that this would be a mutually reinforcing relationship in which we would each increasingly perceive the advantages of the relationship with the other. I don't know whether you have something specific in mind but if we look at the American-Turkish relationship outside of the European issue, it's been a remarkably close relationship. We don't always agree on everything, which is normal, absolutely normal. I thought it was perfectly all right for the Turks, for example, not to decide that they want to join us in that adventure that we launched against Iraq in 2003. And there will be other occasions when we may differ. We may have some differences, let's say, between Turkey and us on Iran. I don't happen to be an advocate of a conflict with Iran but I can see that there could be some differences between us and the Turks regarding what kind of an arrangement with Iran is feasible. That is part of a normal, mature relationship between two countries that are guided by rather similar political principles and fundamentally common security interests.

MR. TALBOTT: Next question, Meltem.

MS. MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ: Let me actually also introduce Batwan. Batwan is -- he's just finishing his political science masters here and he is actually moving into NYU to get his Ph.D. in political science. So he's actually the next generation of IR scholars, and he has a very prestigious fellowship. So we're very happy for him.

SPEAKER: Mr. Brzezinski, thank you for your speech. My question is the new strategic dynamics that you've explored in your vision of the Eurasian continent would be directly affected by the Arab Spring and the developments in the Middle East. And of course, this brings forth a new challenge for policymakers. You've also stated that Turkey might be a model for the future of Iran if a conflict can be averted. What are your possible scenarios for the unfolding of the events in the Arab Spring? And do you think that this model of social transformation would work for the Middle Eastern states? Thank you.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: What was the last part of your question? The last part of his sentence?

SPEAKER: I'm asking if, like, what do you foresee in the Middle East?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, let me talk specifically about the Middle East, the so-called Arab Spring. First of all, it's called Arab Spring but it's very diversified in its manifestations. You know, you can look at Egypt which is, first of all, a really significant piece of our collective human history. I mean, this is a country with enormously profound traditions and these begin to assert themselves. You see it even in the differences in the degree of rationality on the part of some of the major political movements. What passes for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is dramatically different for what passes for the Muslim Brotherhood in some other parts of the Arab world. So first of all, there's diversity.

Secondly, I do think that Western reporting on the Arab Spring has been ecstatic, deeply emotionally engaged, extremely sympathetic but analytically rather deficient. The whole notion of Arab Spring implies that it will be followed by an Arab Summer, the blossoming of the consequences of the spring. But we may be witnessing before too long a rather new climatic development, namely that the spring is followed by

winter. I don't see in some of the manifestations of the Arab Spring, which incidentally is a terminology deliberately designed to link that experience with the experience of Central Europe 20 years ago to some of the same manifestations that were present in Central Europe 20 years ago, namely the movements had highly crystallized democratic ideology; that they were self-consciously democratic; that they had outstanding leaders that knew how to articulate these concepts in a way that was compelling to their followers. I think of Habul. I think of Awensa. I think of others. There were aspirations for close association with the rest of Europe, which also gave a strategic and geopolitical sense of direction for these movements.

These elements tend to be by and large absent in the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring to me is a positive political development but essentially populist in its manifestation and sole definition. It is not yet democratic. Democratic slogans can be mouthed but unless they're institutionalized and expressed through some deliberate definition of what a constitutional system ought to be like, they tend to remain slogans. And I fear that in different degrees that's going to be the problem for most of those who have participated in an Arab Spring with fortunately the highest probability of a more favorable outcome being present in the most important participant of the Arab Spring, and that is Egypt. Because Egypt does have certain traditions. It does have a certain tradition of moderation and accommodation and diversity.

But even there in Egypt it is going to be very difficult. And I suspect we'll go through a phase in which there will be some real tensions regarding the religious definition of the state and perhaps regarding the role of the military. Because the role of the military is relatively anomalous today. If you look at the Turkish military and if you look at the Egyptian military, for example, the average age of the top Egyptian military leader is about 20 years more than the Turkish. I think there may be very well some real

ferment below at the level of colonels and lieutenant colonels. And if something were to be all of a sudden stirred up by some collision, we could see the emergence of a young group of officers, this time with beards rather than without beards. And that might be another phase which is rather unpredictable in consequences and which means that the Arab Spring is still not disciplined in the sense of having a coherent sense of direction that one way or another, the Atatürk Revolution gave the Turks a sense of direction and focus and purpose. It's still a much more amorphous populous phenomenon and will take time for it to settle down.

MR. TALBOTT: But insofar as all of the countries we're talking about under the inadequate rubric of the Arab Spring are Islamic countries, surely the presence and the proximity and the example of Turkey as a secular democratic modern state has got to be a positive.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Oh, yes, absolutely. It is a positive but at the same time, you know, the Arabs are not Turks. And the emotional connection between the two is somewhat ambiguous. And the Egyptians have a great deal of pride in their own history. So, for example, the Egyptians, and I've talked a lot to the Egyptians, don't like to be told that, well, maybe you ought to take a look at Turkey. They say, oh, no. We have our own history to look at.

MR. TALBOTT: Including with a lot of Turks involved in their history. Right?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: That's true. And also ambiguously.

MR. TALBOTT: Meltem, I know you have a couple more questions ready to go there but I'm going to turn to the audience here in Washington if that's okay and we'll try very hard to get back to you before the noon hour on the Washington side.

MS. MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ: That's fine.

MR. TALBOTT: So could I, yes, sir, right there. And please identify yourself and be as concise as possible and with a question mark at the end of your concision.

SPEAKER: Thank you. My name is (inaudible) from (inaudible) Daily Newspaper.

Dr. Brzezinski, you said that Turkey was the stalwart member of NATO although one gets the feeling that Europe treats it as an associate member all along. But my question to you, this formidable membership, how is it likely either to push Turkish interference in Syria or rein it in? Thank you.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, certainly the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO can give it greater assurance that it'll not be alone if it decides to do something more assertive. But that's not an argument necessarily that Turkey should be more assertive. It merely is a statement of the fact that if Turkey chooses to be assertive, in all probability it will not be alone in large measure because of the NATO links, not only to the United States but to some of the more active members of NATO in Europe.

Now, what position Turkey should take, I have said publicly and I'll say it again and it's not a satisfactory answer to probably most of you, my position is that that is an issue of self-sensitivity to the region that we in the United States and maybe we in the NATO alliance should be guided by the best possible Turkish assessment of what is feasible and desirable in the region and not be dictated to it from the outside. I don't think we are in a good position to make the right judgment regarding what needs to be done. And I do have to say that in my view at least, Assad is not Qaddafi; Syria is not Libya. This is a much more complicated problem. But even more complicated by the relationship between Iran and Syria. And given the insensitive negotiations with Iran, and even the more sensitive problems that Iran poses, I think we have to be very careful not

to create circumstances in which there is a region-wide eruption of violence that spans Iran and Syria, and in-between Iraq and perhaps elsewhere as well.

MR. TALBOTT: Thank you Zbig. Another from this audience? Yes, sir.

MR. GUERRA: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Brzezinski. My name is Francisco Guerra. I am a political advisor to the EU Turkey Parliamentary Committee for the socialist and democrat groups in European Parliament.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Can you speak up louder?

MR. TALBOTT: Put the mic a little closer to you.

MR. GUERRA: Now okay?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Right. Better.

MR. GUERRA: Thank you. I said, well, I'm currently here in the U.S. Congress in three weeks and I took the opportunity to discuss EU-Turkey relations with American experts. What I heard from them really surprised me. To sum up they said because the Turkish government wants Turkey to become a regional power, now for the U.S. Turkey's accession to the EU is no longer a priority. You said Turkey is a part of the West but the question is should it also be a part of the European Union according to you? Let me say -- did you hear? Okay.

Let me say also another thing. You said the Union should evolve into a federation; we hope so. But like they say, be patient. The U.S. needed almost 100 years and unfortunately, civil war to become a civilization. We don't need a civil war but I think we will need time. Thank you.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, everyone needs time. That sort of basic law of life. But insofar as Turkish membership in the EU is concerned, it is obviously not something regarding which America has any decisive voice but it certainly is entitled to a point of view. And my own

Point of view, because I can only speak for my own, is that it is desirable that Turkey be a part of the European Union and that the Europeans themselves recognized that as a fact some years ago when the negotiations with Turkey were initiated on the premise that Turkey eventually would be part of the European Union.

Now, we know that there has been a change of mind on the part of particularly two European states in part because of domestic reasons connected with immigration, which is a specific problem but a transitional problem. I think in the long run I think Turkey probably will be part of the European Union because Turkey is consolidating those aspects of its own social political arrangements which are necessary preconditions for membership in the European Union. And I think the European Union, once it overcomes its present structural problems, will realize that a larger union gives it more vitality, more opportunity for development, greater security, and a greater voice in world affairs. Because if we're going to deal with the problems of the world that we're going to be facing this century, we really need some degree of genuine balance between the West and the East, common platforms in which major parties in the decision-making process can overcome the endless complications of making decisions on extraordinarily complicated problems affecting all of humanity. That's not going to be decided on the U.N. model in which every country has the same vote irrespective of the amount of influence and power it has. It's going to be decided, in effect, by the major parties to the global condition, major states, or coalitions of states. And this is why a large European Union, in my view, connected closely with the United States, is a source of potential stability on the Eurasian continent and a fitting partner for dealing with China and India and Japan and others in reaching decisions that increasingly will be necessary if this century is to be a century of success, but even more importantly of survival.

MR. TALBOTT: Any other questions? I'm looking at Dick Gephardt.

Marvin. And then we'll go back to Istanbul.

MR. KALB: Marvin Kalb, a guest scholar at Brookings.

If I understood you right, Zbig, you said that in your vision there would be no American boots on the ground in Asia. I believe that you did say that. And I'm trying to understand exactly what that would be. Would that mean that the American boots already there would all be withdrawn and that an American president would never find an issue important enough to submit American troops to war in Asia? Could you help us out?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I specifically said mainland. I specifically said mainland. I consider our treaty obligations with Japan, with South Korea which is an extension of that and a legacy of World War II, to some extent the Philippines, as being essentially the outer posts of our presence in the Pacific Ocean area. But when it comes to the mainland, I do not envision any situation in which it would be in our interest to be involved, for example, in some fashion in a Pakistani-Indian war, or in an Indian-Chinese war, or even in a Chinese-Vietnamese war. I don't see any reason for it. I don't think it will serve our interests and I think we can try to mediate, to balance, to offset the probabilities of conflict and do some more effective -- one, we avoid mutual demonization with the Chinese into which we're beginning to slide and which could be very destructive for both of us. And particularly be successful if we use the partnership with China to promote what is desperately needed in Asia, which is a Chinese-Japanese reconciliation on the model of the Franco-German reconciliation which we actively promoted in Europe. We ought to try to contribute to stability in the wake of the Afghan War by promoting some sort of a regional umbrella following our disengagement so that the country doesn't deteriorate into civil war again and sucks in India and Pakistan. But we can do this from the outside without military involvement.

MR. TALBOTT: Meltem, back to you.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Let me just add one more thought to that. I don't think there is any Asian country that can dominate the mainland on its own. That's also a factor, even China.

MR. TALBOTT: Meltem.

MS. MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ: Yes. I turn the floor to Shanazi Mus a colleague of ours from Coach University.

SPEAKER: Dr. Brzezinski, thank you very much for an extremely inspiring talk. I have two questions for you. The first question is related in the new equilibrium in Eurasia, clearly one of the key factors is going to be energy politics. And with rising energy demands from both East and West, how do you foresee energy politics unfolding in this region? And as for Turkey, Turkey on the one hand has this quest to become an energy hub, yet at the same time it has enormous energy dependency to Russia, to Iran. So what role do you think Turkey is going to play?

The second question is what is your assessment of the current state of Turkish-Israeli relations and their implications for Turkish-American relations and the new equilibrium? Thank you.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, as far as the first question is concerned, I think the key word is diversity. Diversification of sources is essential. And I think Turkey has a major opportunity to play that role. I hope the ongoing negotiations between Turkey, Azerbaijan, indirectly Turkmenistan, and of course the European Union bear fruit either through the actual implementation of the Nabucco pipeline or through its possible alternative involving the Azeri-Turkish initiative to have in effect a connecting link which feeds both gas and oil from the sources. That is Azerbaijan, particularly Turkmenistan, maybe Kazakhstan even, into various connecting links in Europe. I think that is essential

because that creates balance between this and the dependence of Europe on Russian oil.

At the same time, if that happens and if we avoid a war with Iran, it is, I think, very likely that increasingly the Middle East would be a major source of supply particularly for the Far East, for China, for India, for Japan. The United States will be probably trying to expand to the extent possible its own internal independence in the area of energy. So intelligent diversification I think is essential. And the link between Europe and the sources of energy in Central Asia as a balance to its dependence on Russia is a particularly important element in Turkish role in Europe and it sends a message to the Europeans that they really need Turkey in a constructive relationship with Europe. And that may be a useful reminder to some of those European states which in my view are exaggerating cultural religious differences and, of course, are maybe overly worried about the immigration problems.

As far as the Turkish-Israeli relationship, I think the fact of the matter is that it would be desirable for the region, for both of them and for their connections with the outside world, for them to have a cooperative and friendly relationship. Unfortunately, the incident that transpired a year or two ago with which we're all familiar has made this very difficult. I think the fact of the matter is that there was a tragedy involved, people were killed, people were killed in a manner which probably was avoidable with better planning, more discipline, and less inclination to use force immediately. And I think that creates the preconditions for the parties involved to address this issue in a fashion in which there is an acknowledgement of responsibility and a regret for what transpired and some mutual reassurance that this is not going to be repeated ever and that there is some compensation. No compensation is ever enough for the families of the victims.

MR. TALBOTT: Meltem, another question from your side.

MS. MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ: Yes, thank you. I'll turn to Medevish. Medevish is graduating from our undergraduate program of political studies and she is starting in the fall her Ph.D. in political science at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. So another next generation. Medevish.

SPEAKER: I would also like to thank you for your speech. My question will be about the new global structure and democracy.

MR. TALBOTT: Could you hold the mic up a little? We're having a little trouble hearing. Just hold the mic a little closer.

SPEAKER: Is it okay now?

MR. TALBOTT: Yes. Yes. Better.

SPEAKER: Okay. In the new global structure we are witnessing the rise of new global powers including BRICs, Argentina, and Turkey as you have mentioned. But even though they are increasing their shares in global wealth and power, we can see that they still lag behind consolidated democracies of many European countries in terms of democratic practices, human rights, and gender equality and so on. My question is do you think that in this new global world order there will be less emphasis on democratic values and norms and practices or not? Thank you.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I think democratic values and norms are to some extent, as I've tried to suggest, a reflection of increased political maturity of societies. That is to say societies that are self-governing on the basis of law, established principles based on the principle that all are equal before the law and authorities are not supreme and justified in engaging in arbitrary actions. Our societies are reaching a higher level of development. But this cannot be imposed by doctrines. This is one of the things that was so fundamentally wrong with communist doctrine. They did not only believe that it was the sort of universal statement of self-evident truth but that it had to be imposed

immediately, forcefully, brutally. And this is why it was such a disaster.

Democracy is a process of self-development. But I think it is a process in which people acquire maturity and responsibility, identity, and mutual dignity. And that is, I think, hopefully the inevitable course of humanity. But that has relatively little to do with the distribution of political power. The fact of the matter is that effective political power today in the world is concentrated in Eurasia as a whole plus America. And America is involved in Europe for a variety of reasons and it is entrenched on the edges of the Pacific Ocean. And therefore, these are the powers that have to work together in trying to reach a stable relationship in which internal conflict, which can be sometimes very contagious, is confined and in which their ability to address new problems is enhanced. That is the challenge. This is why a response to it has to go beyond the immediate issues but be guided by some sort of larger vision that is sufficiently mobilizing that generates movement in the direction of the needed response. And that, unfortunately, is not necessarily related to the question of democracy. But when we speak of the West, yes. Democracy is a condition, precondition of participation in the West because the West and the diversity of ways has embraced these concepts in a way that does indicate that they really reflect the most advanced stage of human development on the political level.

MR. TALBOTT: I'm going to take one last question from the audience here. And I'm looking for a little gender diversity on this side comparable to what we have seen on the Istanbul side. Yes. Thank you.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible) Johns Hopkins University.

Actually, my questions -- I have two questions. The first one is on Turkey-Euro relations. Do you think that accession to the European Union is still the number one priority for Turkish political elite? And my second question is on civil military

relations. Why do you think we observe some changes in Turkey recently on civil military relations? Do you think that these are caused by internal factors or some external factors are at play? Thank you.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: What was the first question? What was the first question?

SPEAKER: Do you think that accession to the European Union is still the number one priority for Turkish political elite?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Are you asking me whether as a matter of fact it is still a first priority?

SPEAKER: Exactly.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all, I have to defer to Turks. I mean, this is something they have to decide. My sense is that it's not as much of a priority as it was some decades ago when there was much higher expectation of more rapid movement. Moreover, in a way Turkey has been successful in its own way and therefore, it diminishes the sense of urgency. And maybe there is some offended pride also. But I would say personally that if one looks at the larger picture, clearly closer association, more mutual engagement with the West, is in Turkey's interest. And this doesn't have to be defined all at once and in every respect by membership in the EU. There are many other ways in which the countries can become closer, especially if Europe itself becomes a series of concentric circles, inner core, outer core, wider core, and so forth. And, of course, the American-Turkish connection. I think it's a very good thing that Obama and Erdogan have a personal relationship in which they talk to each other with real frankness because Turkey is now really one of the most important members of NATO and is part of the West without that yet being institutionalized formally.

Now, insofar as the civil military relationships are concerned, well, you

know, very well that there have been episodes in modern Turkish history since the Atatürk initiative was launched, in which the military felt compelled to take over political power. But what has been unique about that, irrespective whether it was in every case justified or not, what was unique about it was that the military nonetheless was genuinely imbued, generally and genuinely imbued with the notion that if they do that, they do so out of necessity and only on a transitional basis and not as an enduring continuing reality. And that mitigates the severity of that problem.

More recently I think there has been some tendency within some segments of the military to be concerned that the AK party may be, in fact, trying to reintroduce the religious factor into Turkish factor, so to speak, by the back door. Again, it is not for me to judge how correct that suspicion was, but it has precipitated what appears to be some discussions, consultations, expression of worry, within the military segments on this subject which could give the appearance, perhaps, of considering perhaps again the "necessity" of temporary intervention. And that would be unfortunate because that would be occurring at a time in which the democratic process, the electoral democratic process, has taken roots in Turkey, has proven that it is vital and enduring. And in which I think there is an attempt being made to strike a reasonable balance between the reality of more than a thousand year long traditions religiously and the realities of a modern democratic secular state. That is a very complicated process and one which would probably not be enhanced if the military asserted itself in some fashion reminiscent of the past. So I can see how these issues percolate in Turkish society and create periodic concerns, but on the whole my sense is that the notion of a secular democratic civilian authority is now predominant in Turkey and that is a very positive development.

MR. TALBOTT: Zbig, before we close this superb session I am going to

ask you one question. You have both from the lectern and in this conversation twice said that what is at stake in the 21st century is not just whether we continue to progress and succeed in the human enterprise but whether we can survive. What do you see is the principal threat to our survival?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, it could be a variety of threats. Now, obviously, the one that is most mystifying and for which we don't yet have definite clear answers but a lot of worrying indicators, is climate change. Climate change literally could mean the end of humanity if temperatures worldwide reach proportions in which it is impossible to maintain vegetation, impossible to maintain stable conditions for not only just food growth but even for normal economic operations. If we have on top of that spread of new diseases, continued restlessness of humanity driven by increasing resentments and impatience, and then on top of it some sort of calamities involving wars in which then weapons of mass destruction are employed, this could become a horrendous, horrendous century in which the scale of the suffering, the damage, is simply impossible to calculate. I'm not some sort of an apocalyptic pessimist but I do recognize that there are serious dangers on the horizon that need to be averted and they can only be averted by genuine global cooperation and genuine global cooperation is not a mechanical vote in the U.N. among 200 highly symmetrical countries but it is only possible if the major influential forces in the world which are centered in Eurasia plus the United States are relatively stable and balanced and are induced into a cooperative relationship out of self interest. I think that seems to me almost self evident. That doesn't mean the traditional politics is out of the way; it isn't. Traditional politics are very much a complication to that process and a danger. And this is why some of the things I tried to outline in my sense of what the strategic vision for this century ought to be, tried to balance these two in a fashion which hopefully leads to common responses reflecting a degree of political

maturity, at least significant portions of mankind are reaching.

But it's not a one way trajectory. I mean, some of the things even in the United States indicated this would not be an easy process. If you look at the discussions about the world and the United States today, they are really on the public level, conducted on a remarkably abysmal level with minimal of information about the world. With little awareness of the problems that we face. Try to explain this to the American people. I mean, look how difficult it is to deal intelligently with one specific issue, Iran. And how easy it is to create a mood in a country in which suicidal policies justified by Messianic arguments, are going to create an explosion, the consequences of which are inherently unpredictable.

MR. TALBOTT: Well, that is -- while a sobering conclusion, it's also an appropriate one, not least because the solution side of the proposition that you put forward depends very much on great universities, like Sabanci University, think tanks like the Brookings, collaboration within and between those sectors, and I might add intellectual leadership of the kind that you've demonstrated here yet again as you have throughout your whole career.

Güler, I want to thank you. I want to thank our colleagues in Istanbul and all who participated in the conversation today, but most of all I want all of you to join me in thanking Zbig not just for being with us but for his strategic vision.

(Applause)

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