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WHAT SHOULD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS LOOK LIKE?

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. KHARAS: Okay, well, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Brookings. I'd like to get started. My name is Homi Kharas. I'm a senior fellow here at Global Economy and Development and welcome to this event on the Sustainable Development Goals.

So this is one of a half-dozen public events that Brookings is organizing under Kathy Sierra, my colleague in Global, as part of a lead-up to Rio+20. And, you know, what we hope to do and intend to do, I think, is to have short policy briefs on a number of the topics that will come up in Rio+20 and so, hopefully, the conversation that we have this afternoon will help us frame one of these briefs on the Sustainable Development Goals, which almost certainly will be part of that discussion.

So just to get everybody on the same page, I mean, the SDGs I think have been defined as being goals that would steer the world towards equitable economic and social progress that respects our planet's environmental boundaries. And I think those are the U.N. secretary-general's words, so I'm using that as the definition that we should keep in mind on the SDGs.

And the secretary-general has already announced that he would like these goals to be universal, meaning that they provide some guidance to all countries and that they be comprehensive, meaning that they cover the three core U.N. pillars of economic, social, and environmental dimensions of development. And so, with that in mind, we've structured the panel this afternoon to reflect those three pillars so that you'll get a perspective from each of the economic, social, and environmental points of view. And in addition to these pillars, we thought it would be useful to have a foundation, and that's why we invited Colin Bradford to lead off our discussion.

Colin is somebody with a long institutional memory and who was actively

involved in the birth of, the design, and the creation of the MDGs. And so, you know, he's a non-resident senior fellow at Brookings. He was the chief economist of USAID. He was a former head of research at the OECD, and I hope you'll reflect a little on the lessons learned from that MDG process.

And then, I'll ask Andrew Steer to speak. Andrew is the special envoy of the World Bank for climate change, but he will be leaving that position very shortly and is the incoming president of the World Resources Institute. And so, obviously, he'll give us a perspective from the environmental side. And formerly, he was the DG for policy at DFID. He's been in the field in Indonesia and Vietnam as country director for the World Bank, so I think he brings some practical experience.

He also, quite a long time ago, was the author of the World Development Report on the Environment, which the Bank did in the early 1990s sometime, if I'm right.

Oh, for the -- Rio? There you go. So, 20 years later, Andrew has still got that --

MR. STEER: Is still looking.

MR. KHARAS: -- same presentation that he will now deliver. (Laughter)

Then we'll turn to David Steven, on Andrew's right. David is a non-resident fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at NYU. He leads the team on the Managing Global Order -- geopolitics of scarcity -- and, more importantly, he has just written actually quite a thought-provoking piece on the post-2015 development agenda along with a colleague, Alex Evans, which I think is posted on his website.

MR. STEVEN: On the CIC --

MR. KHARAS: On the CIC website. That piece includes a number of different scenarios for what may emerge out of these SDG discussions, including a very intriguing scenario that he labels "The Car Crash." So I hope we hear something about

that.

And then our final panelist is Richard Morgan, who's a senior advisor at UNICEF. Richard, I hope, will give us a perspective from the human rights and social justice side of the equation. And I'm sure many of you know that UNICEF has been a very passionate advocate for equality of access and have openly questioned the value of having goals set at the national level, arguing that that hides very large within-country inequalities and that the whole process of national goal-setting ends up missing a big chunk of what the big issues are.

So each of the panelists I've asked to speak for, you know, five, seven minutes, something like that. After that we'll have a very short, structured kind of moderated discussion with them, and then I'll open up to Q&A from the floor. And I hope that we can close by 3:30 quite promptly.

So just before turning to the panelists, I wanted to just say a few words to frame this afternoon's discussion. And I think we should start by recognizing that for most people, I would say, the MDGs have really been quite successful. They've certainly been influential. They've certainly been the frame that many actors can sort of, you know, align themselves to. And I think if we were to ask would we have been able to have things like the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, with all these concepts of country ownership and alignment and managing for results and things like that, it would have been very hard to do it without some kind of framing, like the MDGs.

So I think that while a lot of people have issues about the specifics, taken as a whole this is viewed as being a successful exercise. And certainly if you think of what can I remember from international summits of 10 years ago, I think one can certainly remember that, yes, we did all agree on the MDGs and there aren't that many international events that you can say the same about.

So there's clearly a push to have more goals, but I think there's also a danger to that. And there are two that I want to highlight. One is that if we start now to already talk about the SDGs, well, we're not at 2015 yet. So we know we've got to start the discussion of post-2015 before then. But if we put too much effort into that there is a big risk of undermining the focus and attention on achieving the MDGs just at the time when actually, you know, for most goal-setting it's that you get a lot of action right at the end. So that would be a very sad outcome and I think that the process has to be carefully designed to avoid that.

The second observation is that the world, I think, is quite different today than it was then, and, again, in two ways. First, there's very little money that's really on the table today. And, you know, one of the things that brought the MDGs into focus and got the support of most developing countries was the fact that there were real resources being put on the table at Monterey. And that, I think, is probably -- you know, outside of perhaps some resource for climate change, very unlikely to be the case today. So we have to ask: what's going to be that key that's really going to make people want to participate in this?

And then the second difference in the world is that when the MDGs were done -- and with all due deference to Colin, it was a relatively small number of people who actually thought about this stuff -- it wasn't, you know, it wasn't the biggest development issue in discussion of the time. Today, partly because of the success of the MDGs, everybody wants to have their say. And, in fact, one of the things that I think we've seen is that any time you get some framing, whether it's the Washington consensus or the MDGs, it inevitably excludes a number of different people. And then when they get an opportunity, they all want to have their say. So my guess is that this time around it's going to be a far more complex process of trying to gather all of those

voices, all of the people who've been waiting for the last 15 years or so for some space to open up for their voices to be heard will want to be heard.

Now, the success I mentioned with the MDGs is only in some of them. And we must acknowledge, I think, that in many of the MDGs there was very little impact. So I could rattle off slums, hunger and nutrition, and, you know, maybe even poverty, where if you say, well, what was the difference in terms of resources, leadership, you know, changing technologies, or delivery, or what? The goals themselves didn't really make a difference.

In others it did, but in some it didn't. So I think there's this challenge of making sure that we don't just think about goals as being something that wouldn't it be great if we got to this? It's not just something to be monitored. It's the most successful when they drive change in institutions, in behavior, and the way in which the world organizes to achieve these kinds of targets.

And inevitably, I think we going to end up with some framing where we will have to have a fairly limited set of goals, and to me one big question is will we use this lens of saying, well, where can we actually make a difference? To select goals? Or will we end up with just, well, this is important, so we'd better have a goal on it, even if there's nothing much that will change as a result?

So, with that and without any further ado, let me turn to Colin. Colin, MDGs?

MR. BRADFORD: Thank you very much. A pleasure to be here. Thank you very much for coming.

I'd like to pick up exactly where Homi's leaving off, which is that the current situation seems to be one of increasing complexity because already I think there's a potential that there are three streams of work that could be ongoing after Rio.

One is the post-2015 MDGs, and I've already participated in one group that now has 12 MDGs for the future. And we had a meeting in Paris a couple of weeks ago on indicators for that set of 12. So that is already underway, even before Rio. There is the Sustainable Development Goals themselves, which the secretary-general has already made clear that he wants to launch, which is in a way a different definition, as somebody pointed out.

And finally, there's this Sustainable Energy for All Goals -- on efficiency, renewables, and access -- which are already launched by the secretary-general and which are a differentiated set of goals. So I think the very real danger here -- and the brief history that I'm going to tell you concisely of the MDGs is one in which there's a potential now, for sure, for splintering. And that's what I think is the importance of the MDGs as I will try to tell it.

So, in the mid-'90s, as the series of U.N. conferences were being completed at the DAC -- I was the senior level representative of the United States USAID at the Development Assistance Committee at the DAC when I was in AID in the mid-'90s -- there were a group of us who perceived that there was now a vacuum in the vision of what international development cooperation meant. And so we inaugurated a year-long Group de Reflecion in the DAC among people at my level actually to try to come up with a new vision -- a post-Cold War vision for the future of international development cooperation.

It took a year and what ended up happening was that we drew from the series of U.N. conferences from Copenhagen, social development; to Cairo, population and development; to Beijing, women and development; and so on. And drew on those conferences for a set of seven goals, which you now are well aware of, on poverty, on gender equality, on primary education for all, free health goals, and a fairly mushy

environmental sustainability goal. And then later, in Monterey, the development cooperation aid side of it was added to the seven International Development Goals known as IDGs.

So this was approved in May of 1996, at the high-level DAC meeting of development ministers and heads of agencies and became the vision statement for the 21st century for the DAC bilateral donors. And as the decade went on, it turned out that Michel Camdessus, as head of the IMF, committed himself to a set of seven pledges which he distributed at the World Bank/IMF meetings, a card that I just showed you from my pocket, which had the seven IDGs on it. So he put the IMF behind the IDGs.

And then there was a historic document in the spring of 2000, which had the signatures of the head of the IMF, which then was Horst Köhler, the head of the World Bank, the secretary-general of the United Nations, and the secretary-general of the OECD, the first-ever document signed by the heads of all those four institutions called "A Better World For All," which had in it the International Development Goals.

So, between the mid-'90s and the spring of 2000, we have a story of the international development community defined as the bilateral donors and the main multilateral development agencies all on the same page, with the same vision, with concrete goals, a set of concrete specific benchmark targets, and a set of indicators to track those goals. All good so far.

Then in the fall of 2000, at the U.N. Millennium General Assembly there was a Millennium Declaration which, for all the looks of it, you would have thought was written being unaware of the fact that the IDGs existed. And so there was a brief period between 2000 and 2002 when the world was a bit at sea because the development agencies were following the IDGs on the one hand, and the U.N. had put forward a Millennium Declaration which was somewhat different on the other. And the United



States administration at the time -- the George W. Bush administration -- made a point in development committee meetings and other international forums of footnoting the fact that the development committee, let's say, endorsed the Millennium Goals as articulated in the Millennium Declaration in New York, in September, at the General Assembly, in September of 2000.

So already the United States had pulled itself away from the IDGs and there was a division and a fissure. So what happened, as it turns out, there was a large World Bank conference held in March of 2002, just prior to Monterey, in which this fissure became clear. Mark Malloch Brown stood up from the U.N. and said that he thought the World Bank should follow the Poverty Reduction Strategies -- the PRSPs -- and the U.N. should continue to follow the IDGs. Where that left the bilateral donors was not clear.

But it became clear to a number of us in that meeting that what the world needed was not two sets of goals -- and the Bretton Woods Institution is going in one direction, and the U.N. in the other -- but rather, a single set. And so, in the end, a task force was formed that afternoon consisting of the four major multilateral agencies and, in the end, the set of MDGs which corresponds almost identically with the IDGs was formulated for Monterey, was approved in Monterey in May 2002 and again in September 2002 at the Johannesburg Sustainable Development Summit.

So in the end, the world has had a single set of MDGs. And the story often is that the MDGs were promulgated in 2000, which isn't actually true, but never mind. The important story is that the world during the 21st century has had a single set of goals which we now know as the Millennium Development Goals. And I think it goes without saying, from everything that Homi said at the very beginning, there's been tremendous advantage to this. I mean, I can't thank all of you enough who were in the NGO community who have supported this fulsomely and from your various points of view

and involvements and activities.

It's been a worldwide mobilization effort that has taken place and it was quite an unusual set of circumstances. And I'd like to close by just differentiating and emphasizing what Homi's said.

The current circumstances are really quite different. I mean, what we had then was a deliberately articulated, single strategic vision which was designed to communicate with parliaments and the public about where the development effort was going in the future. It was a single set of goals, it was an integrated strategy across many sectors, and was deliberately a mobilization device. And it had a single focal point for its articulation and implementation -- or monitoring, at least -- which was the Development Assistance Committee at the OECD where the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations sit with the bilateral donors.

Today we have a completely different set of circumstances. We're in a period where there are these multiple work streams which are already underway, as I mentioned at the start. You have, I think, an interesting but difficult and complex debate in the post-Busan world about what the Global Development Forum should look like. You have, despite all the efforts we've made to make the G-20 the pivot in the world for a number of global issues, the fact is we do have what Richard Haass has called, "a world of messy multilateralism."

We have a world of new social media, so there's a polarization of opinion in which everybody's opinion counts, as Homi said. And which makes getting leadership incredibly difficult. And finally, we have, as you see in the United States, but in other countries as well, a real polarization in politics. So I think the challenge for strategic leadership envisioning the future now is very much how to put the world on a single set of goals still, again, in a much more complex environment. Thank you.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you, Colin. It was really, really interesting. So, Andrew?

MR. STEER: Good. Three questions. First, have the MDGs been useful? I want to side with both of these gentlemen overall, very much so. Lots of papers being written on the subject right now. One, two years ago by Richard Manning started it off, now lots of them. But those of us who were actually on the front line saw this very much in practice. I mean, we were living in Vietnam at the time. The Vietnamese government looked at the MDGs, they said, wow, these are interesting, but they're too easy. So we're going to have some tougher ones for ourselves. They came up with a whole set of Vietnam development goals, consulted all around the country, had a really major effect. Very, very positive effect.

We then moved to Indonesia for five years. Erna Witoelar, the ex-minister there, out of the NGO movement, MDG ambassador throughout Asia, really chivying people. And, you know, you talk to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, he's aware of the MDGs. So some people say they only affected donors actually in some countries; they really affected on the front line, too. But, obviously, for donors it was clear.

I then went to DFID 2008. Remember Gordon Brown came to the United Nations? He said we have a development emergency, and that precipitated the following year a huge special meeting. Now, he couldn't have said that had he not had the MDGs. So very important, although, as Homi says, by no means have they all been implemented.

So, question number 2, how's the world changed and what's the implication? I think it's changed, as also these two gentlemen have said, in two or three pretty profound ways. One -- and that affects not only the substance, but also the

process of how we move forward.

First, sort of politics, power, and the emergence of the middle class. Radically different. Ten years ago, believe it or not, guys like Colin, sitting in offices in Paris, could come up with these. No longer. This has got to be managed in a very different process. Just imagine the idea in today's world that DAC, a rich person's club focused on aid, could now in any way be driving the agenda.

By the way, what you did 10 years ago was fantastic. It was a real gift. It's not going to happen again, nor should it. Aid is trivially unimportant today compared to what we hoped it would be 10 years ago. It's not trivial, I don't mean that. It actually plays a very important role, but it will no longer deliver it. It will not be the driving power.

The emergence of the middle class. Yes, people do care about access to basic education and literacy, but they also now increasingly care about issues of urbanization, of urban blight, of the quality of tertiary education, of youth unemployment. And unless we find some ways to incorporate those concerns, they're really not going to get any traction.

Second big way that the world has changed is we've moved towards, really, a full world and a riskier world. I mean, since the MDGs became -- they're supposed to be from 1990, remember? Think, I mean, GDP and the world is well over double. There's twice as much cement in buildings today, twice as many roads, 50 percent more carbon emissions. We now know with a good deal of confidence that actually we're breaking through all of the boundaries, all the objectives on climate change. We're not going to reach the 2 degree world that the world has agreed should be the limit.

The U.S. Navy, we understand, is planning on a 1.3 meter rise in sea level. You can just imagine the impact that would have. And you've seen all the

estimates, so I don't need to tell you about the impact of water shortage and so on.

So the third way I think the world has changed is in our understanding, which is related to the first two, of really sort of indicators of well being. I think we've learned a lot about the importance, for example, about security, personal security, but also then food security, energy security, climate security. These are issues that absolutely have to be sort of factored in. And that's why some of the emerging indicators look so attractive, and they are.

I sit on Ban Ki-moon's high-level panel on sustainable energy for all. Three crystal clear goals that actually address all of these things: universal access to electricity by 2030, doubling the amount of renewable energy by 2030, and doubling of the pace of energy efficiency gains each year up to the year 2030, from 1.2 percent to 2.4 percent. That's the kind of indicator that captures the economics, it captures the environment, and it captures the poverty as well. That's the kind of indicator that we need to now find in food, for example; we need to find in some of the other indicators as well.

So question number 3, what are some of the tough choices that countries and citizens are going to have to make in putting together these goals? First, is it for all countries or is it just for low income? Is it for the 7 billion of us or the 1 billion, if you like? I think we have really little choice on that. It has to be for the whole lot because of the reasons of the shifting politics.

Question number 2, should this apply to individual countries or can it apply to the world as a whole? And remember, when the MDGs were originally set up, not everybody understood them to apply to countries. They actually thought it applied to the issue as a whole. Now, my view is that you're going to need both on issues like universal access. Obviously every country has to do it. But on issues relating to climate

change or on issues relating to the price and availability of food we may well want some kind of global goal. And there's no reason at all why we shouldn't do that and have all countries working together for a goal.

Question number 3, compulsory or voluntary? Having sat, as many of you have, for many, many hours at the UNFCCC negotiations, I think the idea making these compulsory or binding is an amazing long shot and I would have thought they have to be voluntary and aspirational.

Question 4, should this just be outcomes or should it also include inputs or enabling environments? And views differ on this very much. For example, growth is an outcome. Free trade is a means or an enabling way of getting there. Forests left standing is an outcome. The number of hectares as protected areas that is an input or enabling environment. Personally, I would think we've got to stick to the outcomes, but not all, by any means, believe that that is the case and, consequently, a lot of issues relating to governance are very attractive to some people.

And then finally, we've got to decide, as Colin was saying, is it one process or two? Do we keep sort of MDGs for the poverty focus and then have the SDGs for the more sort of sustainable development or sustainability? I think it would be a real shame if we went down two different tracks.

But just finally, I mean, it does seem to me that the key principle has to be that of measurement. And in the environmental field we're actually very lucky now because of remote sensing and so on. We can measure things that 10 years ago even we simply couldn't measure. We've got very, very good measures of some things, so that puts us in very good stead.

And if you look at the environmental indicators that were included in the first MDGs, rather fuzzy for the most part. Consequently, very little happened. We

treasure what we measure. So these goals need to be time-bound. They need to be quantifiable, and they need to be verified. Thank you.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you very much, Andrew. David?

MR. STEVEN: Right, thank you. I'm going to try and give an overview of some of the developments and some of the differences between the SDG and the MDG debate. And I'll try to distinguish between the things that I believe and a kind of broader perspective of what I expect to happen. And I'm also going to pick up on some of Andrew's points and maybe have a slightly perspective on some of them.

I think my first warning is that we need to be aware of the curse of the sequel. Sequels are very rarely better than the original film. (Laughter) And I've sat in a lot of discussions where people assume we're just going to do the MDGs and we're going to do them better. And I think this is a very dangerous starting point.

We've heard the long history of how we got to the MDGs. I always think it starts in 1990. You can pick other dates, but that was when the World Development Report first was talking about halving global poverty, which became the headline indicator. So it was a dozen years -- 12 years -- from that point to the point where we actually had consensus and agreement on goals. And we're now talking about agreeing a new set of goals by 2015, just a few years away.

I think my second warning is that we need to be aware of wishful thinking. There's a huge amount of wishful and fuzzy thinking in this debate at the moment, particularly in the debate about Sustainable Development Goals. The Colombians aside -- the Colombians had the original or pushed the original idea of SDGs onto the international scene. The Colombians aside, I would say that very few -- there aren't many governments behind the SDGs. And those that are, are fundamentally not serious in their advocacy of those goals.

Now, what do I mean by "not serious?" I mean that their environmental ministers, often freelancing, are pushing quite strong positions on the international stage, positions that I do not believe they could convince other ministries of within their own government. I think when finance departments, when treasuries hear what their environmental ministers are proposing on the world stage, I would suspect there will be a considerable amount of disagreement.

These kinds of negotiations have the dynamic that is the reverse of a game of chess. In a game of chess, as you move towards the end game you take pieces off the board and the game becomes simpler and clearer and easier to understand. In this game, at the beginning there's a couple of pieces on the board and we can all very easily come to agreement, but the nearer the SDGs get to actually being agreed and implemented, the more interest groups are going to be rushing on this board and many of them are going to be enormously hostile to the concept. And if we ignore that, then we fool ourselves.

So SDGs currently framed by the secretary-general, by the high-level panel on global sustainability as having three dimensions. Being comprehensive, as we've heard; economic, social, environmental, and all of the interactions between the two. So, in other words, goals that cover all aspects of human life.

Second, goals that are universal. They cover, you know, 7 billion people -- probably 7.3 billion people in 2015, 8.3 billion people in 2030, in a world that will be moving very, very quickly. There's a stat that I'm sure probably isn't true, but is said often about India, which is 80 percent of India in 2030 hasn't been built yet. That gives you some idea of the scale of the challenge that these goals have to be able to encompass. And goals that are at least binding in some way is what many -- I mean, I think aspirational goals, like Andrew, are more likely, but many people are talking about a



binding set of goals.

I cannot imagine any G-20 country that is going to sign up to that kind of package within the time scale that we're talking about. And that's the kind of wishful thinking I'm talking about.

So what do we have on the table? Well, I think the main thing -- and I'd see this as part of the SDG track, as it were. The main thing have on the table are these Energy for All Goals. They emerge a bit like the MDGs from a long debate amongst a community of organizations of experts of various kinds that would be involved in the implementation of those goals. So there has been that -- like with the MDGs, there has been that process of consensus building.

They also have considerable political heft behind them, but we shouldn't overestimate that. I'm slightly out of date, but certainly a few weeks ago the Rio text -- and I think all of the energy text was square bracketed at the behest of the G-77, with the Venezuelans in the vanguard because there is, among certain countries, deep suspicion, even about goals as anodyne -- not anodyne, but as easy to accept as the energy goals.

And we also have in Energy for All the potential of triggering new types of partnership and I think that's the most innovative dimension of these goals. There's a potential there to trigger the private sector and government and other actors to work together in new ways to actually implement these goals on the ground. So there is some pathway for implementation.

So, technical consensus, political heft, and a pathway through implementation have come together in that set of goals. I think it's going to be very difficult and take a long, long time to build those kinds of conditions in other sectors where that work hasn't even started yet.

So Rio is a mess. Rio is a horrible mess at the moment, and I think we

should have very low expectations of what will emerge from the Rio text. The goals need to encapsulate a consensus. That consensus doesn't yet exist and I think Rio will, at best, point the way forward and Rio could be the place where we see some kind of car crash on this issue.

So what could we hope to happen? Well, I think we have to look quite hard at what the high -- this new high-level panel on post-2015 is going to accomplish. We know it's going to be chaired by David Cameron from the UK. We also know that it's going to be chaired by two other heads of state, one from a middle-income and one from a low-income country, though the names haven't been announced yet. And we hope -- I think we should hope -- that coming out of Rio it has a clear mandate and a mandate that covers both the development and the -- the post-MDG and the SDG questions.

But I think the panel should focus first on the poverty issue. I think the poverty issue is much, much clearer. There is already a lot of consensus there and there is a big political opportunity in poverty. If you look at the figures we expect to have something around 880 million people living under the current absolute poverty line in 2015. I've seen varying figures, but that gives you an idea of the scale of the task. And we have an opportunity having more than halved poverty in the period of the MDGs to move and actually move towards the abolition of absolute poverty in the period up to 2030. That raises enormous challenges for what development means in some of the most difficult environments in the world. It raises enormous questions, also, about how to seize opportunities in places like Africa that are crossing a demographic threshold and are poised for very strong growth if they can strengthen the institutions and build out to global systems to make use of what is a huge amount of (inaudible) labor.

So I would ask the panel to focus on some absolute goals for poverty in the expectation that that could eventually be folded into a broader SDG framework. I

think what that will look like is a small number of headline goals, and we must resist outcome goals becoming too broad. Every interest group here is going to be trying to hang its own pet issue onto a post -- a new MDG framework. But I think that that will probably be undergirded by some more complex areas that look at the capabilities needed to promote growth. And I think the headline goals can do the work of signaling, of creating a common strategic language of advocacy, and the capabilities can be -- they don't necessarily need to be measured in the same way, they can be peer-reviewed, and they will start to talk about the enabling environment that is needed to make that progress on poverty happen. I think the work done by the G-7+, a group of fragile states which has begun to define what it thinks needs to happen if poverty is to happen in those countries, is a very good basis for starting on that.

I think if the panel could build confidence by coming up with something clear on poverty in an interim report, it could then move on to the much, much, much, much more difficult issues that SDGs raise. Somebody from the U.S. Government was saying the other day post-MDGs, we're talking about like 1 percent or 1 or 2 percent of the global economy, SDGs we're talking about 98 percent, and that's the scale of the complexity that we have to look at.

I think a comprehensive framework is a folly. Even to try and pursue that is going to suck up a lot of bandwidth; absolutely no results at all. I think we should be looking probably at a fairly loose family of SDGs, at least initially. The Energy for All Goals would be a first member of that family and we could begin to add in other members of that family as the consensus necessary to develop them exists. I think just to imagine a Big Bang that we will get agreement on everything by 2015 is implausible.

And I think we should be asking the panel to look at an innovative way at whether numerical goals are always the best for some of these issues. There may be

similar instruments that are not goals that can do the task more effectively, particularly when we look at some of the planetary boundaries that indicate that our growth model is fundamentally unsustainable.

But that's just one view of what should happen. I think, just to conclude, I think what is very important, both on the poverty side and on the sustainable development side, is that early, soon, very, very soon, over the next few months we begin to see some concrete options on the table. At the moment, many people are arguing very, very passionately about something they vaguely imagine in their heads, but they haven't clearly defined. So people will argue about whether inequality should be in this framework without actually saying what a goal to reduce inequality might look like. You know, by 2030, we're going to halve the level -- I mean, it's quite difficult and we need to get specific about these issues in order to ground the debate in something real and then begin to address what are quite enormous political obstacles to reach an agreement.

Thank you.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you, David. Richard, that sounded at the end to be a direct challenge to you. I mean, don't just talk about inequality, get specific with something on the table.

MR. MORGAN: Happy to get specific. Thank you for the tee-up. I see it as an opportunity.

And, in fact, when David started to talk about 1990, I was thinking: great, he's going to talk about the World Summit for Children, which is actually where most of the goals did originally appear, several of them, in fact. The distinction with the World Summit for Children was that it wasn't a U.N. intergovernmental meeting. It was a meeting of 71 heads of state and government at the U.N., took place in the U.N. General Assembly, but it didn't actually have official status. But they did come out with a

declaration, which was, again, a precursor.

I think, in fact --

SPEAKER: Panelists, talk a little louder. Trying to reach 7 billion people and you're (inaudible) to each other.

MR. MORGAN: Okay. Am I miked? I thought I was miked.

The World Summit for Children contained the precursor of the MDGs, which is why I got excited about the reference to 1990. I do, however, agree that the World Development Report of 1990 was a major conceptual breakthrough and basis for what came after.

We started looking two or three years ago at our databases. UNICEF provides data for MDG monitoring for about 18 of the indicators in the MDGs: health, nutrition, water, and sanitation, and so on. And when we started disaggregating in our databases we found not only was progress uneven across the goals and targets, as has been mentioned, but, in fact, there was greatly varying performance when it came to internal disparities within countries for particular goal areas.

We found great stratification in MDG 1, the nutrition target; in MDG 4, the child survival and mortality target; and MDG 7, in water and sanitation targets based on location -- rural/urban -- and based on wealth of household. So, for example, if you compared the poorest quintile of households by wealth and the richest, you would find the children in the poorest households were two to three times more likely to die before their fifth birthday and to be malnourished compared to the richest ones. And this holds true across most countries for which data are available.

When it came to education, UNESCO's data shows a clear stratification across five variables: the three I've mentioned -- location, wealth -- sorry, the two I've mentioned, plus gender, plus ethnicity, and plus disability. So a child who is rural in a

poor family, who is a girl normally, who is from an ethnic minority group, and who is disabled has a tiny percentage of the years of learning as her opposite number in a rich, urban family. So these evidences of persisting disparities. And in fact, when we looked at trends we found for some indicators these disparities were actually even growing, even when countries who are making overall progress.

So if you take stunting, which to us is probably the equivalent of GDP growth on the economic front, stunting being the clearest manifestation of a failure for social progress, literally embodied in the bodies of children and people as they grow. Stunting, India has the largest number by far of stunted children and much higher rates in Sub-Saharan Africa of stunting. And you find in India each wealth quintile of households are making progress in reducing stunting over time. But the higher -- the better off the quintile, the faster the progress, so the gaps are actually widening as India makes progress in tackling its structural malnutrition problems.

In Nepal, the picture is even worse. Because even though Nepal as a whole is making progress on reducing stunting, the worst-off quintiles are actually deteriorating. So if you only were to look at the average for that indicator for that country, and this holds true for other indicators and other countries, you'd be fooled into thinking that, you know, people towards the bottom of society were making progress. In fact, they're not. The gap is either widening or those people are being left behind or both.

So this made us feel, as Homi has already said, that perhaps it can be an illusion -- illusion with an "I" -- to look at national averages. They can mask as much as they reveal and that you run the risk of actually winning a statistical victory while hiding both a moral and empirical failure, where the poorest sections of society are either being left behind or are, in fact, regressing.

So it made us feel that perhaps a construct that only -- that looks

primarily at global and national data is not one that's really going to tell you what's happening in the lives of people, of the people for whom progress is, in fact, intended. So our thinking, and this is a case we're making within the U.N. group of agencies that are working on the issue, is that we actually ought to have a framework that is agile and flexible enough to capture -- and this to answer the challenge that David put -- to capture the specific dominant inequalities for a given goal area.

So if you're looking at education, yes, the dominant inequality has been gender. Increasingly, it's less the case that it is a gender issue, boys and girls. That's one success of the MDG era that the gender gap has radically narrowed for virtually all countries in basic education enrollment. But when you look at learning outcomes, factors such as location, ethnicity, wealth of household, and ability or disability are much more dominant inequalities.

Gender, on the other hand, is virtually insignificant as a determinant of child nutritional outcomes. So if you were looking at that indicator you wouldn't look at gender, you'd look at the other factors that are associated with children being left behind and tending to be stunted or otherwise undernourished. So I think the challenge there is to understand well enough what are the characteristics of inequality and then to focus on what would be the dominant inequality, either across a large group of countries or specific to individual societies.

So we really come out at fairly much the same destination, as has been mentioned. A small set of global goals to keep it simple and comprehensible, bringing together the different strands, the three pillars -- of which I appear to represent the social, but also the environmental and the economic -- but then use that small group of core global goals to say to countries please -- because the U.N. says "please"; it doesn't say "you must" -- please then try to understand what are the dominant features that cause

people to be left behind. Is it ethnicity because of discrimination? Is it rural, remote, or inner-urban because of lack of investment in basic services? Is it gender for social reasons? Whatever it is, those are the areas in which you should look at disaggregated data.

I do agree with what Andrew was saying that we need to distinguish, for both simplicity and conceptual clarity, outcomes on the one hand and enablers on the other hand. But having said that, I would suspect that we differ as to what outcomes are because, from our standpoint, economic growth would not be an outcome. It would be an enabler of human progress, yielding resources by which to invest in people as a basis for human progress. So there may still be a debate, having agreed on the distinction between outcomes and enablers, still a debate about which indicators and targets fall into which category.

The final point I would make is that in order to support a construct where goals and targets and indicators are both specified locally, they should also be owned locally. In other words, we'd like to see more effort not only in continuing the current program of household surveys -- some funded by the U.S. Government through the demographic and health surveys and some by the U.N. through multiple indicator cluster surveys, that needs to continue and probably become more frequent, for example, a three-year basis -- but that could and should also be complemented by the use of social media to enable people to do their own monitoring. For example, is the water point functioning? It's no good having a household survey every three years verify that there is a water point if it isn't working 80 percent of the time. It's no good having children in school if the teacher isn't turning up or there are no books. And it's equally no good having a health facility if there are no basic drugs.

Those are the types of situations that people's use of social media in



their own communities can give rapid, real-time feedback on. So we're looking at ways of complementing the MDG monitoring systems that exist now and should be continued and invested in in the future, including for new goals that may come, with bottom-up monitoring which would not only give people the ability to say what's going on in their own communities and their own lives, but also more ability to control and to hold their local service providers accountable for the services they are either getting or not getting.

Thank you very much.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. Thank you, Richard. So I think we've heard three very compelling statements about how things should move forward. They're not all consistent and I want to -- but very quickly, and I'll just ask one question of each panelist and then throw it up.

And so, Colin, I wanted to start with you because you talked about communication and discourse. And in your history you talked about the DAC and the development finance institutions. Today you can't imagine anything like this, as I think Andrew said, without the developing countries themselves and, perhaps even more importantly, you know, the dynamic emerging economies. I mean, China, India, Brazil; why should they sign on to something like this?

So take us through very quickly a process. How would you get them involved and how would you get this enormous not just NGO, but civil society more broadly, and individuals and corporations, who are all part of this new partnership for development, how are you going to get all of them involved?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, that's a daunting task. I mean, it is the case that, as my colleagues have implied and, indeed, has stated, that one of the great faults of the way the IDGs were formed and the MDGs then morphed, became into being, is that this was a highly circumscribed set of people who were involved in it. It's not that

there wasn't efforts to outreach and side meetings and things like this.

So I think the -- I'm not sure of the answer to the question, Homi, but I think the sustainable energy goals for all are a very promising core start, as David said and Andrew also implied. And I think that what you're going to find is that this debate/discussion is going to go on in multiple sites. It'll be interesting to see how the global development forum is defined, but as I understand it the two main nodes of it are still the OECD DAC as a source of data for one thing and experience on the other, but also the UNDP and the -- as the kind of focal point in the development group at the U.N. And I just think we're going to have debates given the length of time that it's going to take, which is three years, I think you're going to have debates everywhere. And I do totally agree that this is about the 9 billion in 2050 or the 7 billion now or the 8.3 in 2030. It's about the world. It's not just about development. And so every country is in a process of development, in fact, you know, even the most advanced countries.

And I think the discourse needs to be broad. I mean, what happened, you know, with the MDGs, the IDGs at the DAC, without us really realizing what we were doing is that we really were changing the discourse from a discourse that had been dominated by economics up through the mid-'90s and in which finally the health discourse, the education discourse, the rights discourse, and the environmental discourse, you know, sort of gained more equal footing in the development discourse, and it pluralized it. All of this, I think one of the great challenges in all of this is that problems are connected, that they're all multi-sectoral and multi-ministerial, so.

MR. KHARAS: That's very broad, Colin. What's in this for China? Why should China engage in this discussion?

MR. BRADFORD: Because I think -- my intuition about the leadership, if you imagine yourself as being part of the 500 -- one of the 500 people running China, I

think you're going to feel the imperatives of inequality. You're going to feel the imperatives of reducing poverty. You're going to feel the imperatives of dealing with energy transformation and the scale of change needed in China in energy. You're going to be concerned about air pollution and health. You're going to be concerned about climate change. And you are going to be concerned about the global agenda.

MR. KHARAS: And having an international consensus will help that domestic politics, you're saying?

MR. BRADFORD: Precisely.

MR. KHARAS: Fine. Thank you. Andrew, you outlined a very clear set of Energy for All Goals. And then you backed away and said, but let's not have a separate set of just this. Let's complicate it with all these other horribly messy things on inequality and poverty and, you know, slums, and this and that. Why not just go forward with Energy For All Goals and have a two-track or a multi-track system where we've got some well-defined goals, move forward, try to get a quick win, and set those in place? Why do we need the whole program?

MR. STEER: I'm very supportive of this idea of starting with what is, you know, reasonable and not aiming for anything comprehensive. So I would absolutely see a relatively modest number of major themes, as I was talking about. Energy security's one, three very clear indicators for that. Food security's one, and the indicators under food security would not only include nutritional improvements in among the world's, you know, 1-1/2 billion poor people, but it would also be, you know, what's the price of food that middle-income people around the world are going to be able to get? You know, to what extent is there diversity in the genetic structure?

You think -- I was struck by the -- it was a very nice story about the chessboard, and I wasn't quite sure where you were going with it. You know, you're

finished when there's one as if there's some one goal. But to give a different analogy, in my youth I used to be a pilot in the Air Force. And the airplanes back then were much more primitive than today. I mean, actually the dashboard, pretty straightforward. You go in today; it's much more complicated now. The world today is much more complicated than it was.

But here's the point. The point still is, at the end of the day, not everybody needs to know a thousand pieces of data from a thousand indicators. You need to know are you heading towards the destination. Well, that requires you know where the destination is. You need to know your speed, you need to know your height, and you need to know whether or not you're going to hit anybody else. And so those four or five pieces of information are all you need.

Now, the question is can we find those four or five pieces of information? And that one about making sure you don't hit anybody is actually increasingly important because we are in a riskier world. We really do face the prospect of dramatic rises in food. So if we can't incorporate that into -- so back to what I was saying. That's why I like this idea of the different -- sort of different types of security.

One final thing, a comprehensive inclusion of the valuation of natural capital into the national income accounts goes quite a long way. And the biggest sort of campaign that we in the World Bank are waging, leading into Rio+20, is that the commitments that were made in the original Rio -- where if you read Agenda 21, countries committed to actually value natural capital in their national income accounts -- we're wanting that now to really cross the threshold. So we have this campaign 50-50: 50 countries to stand up in Rio and say we're going to take this seriously. We're not going to have the numbers on page 57 in a footnote of our national accounts. We're actually going to have them on page number 1. And then 50 private companies to say

count us in, too; we want to do the same. So that kind of sort of comprehensive approach using money as a numerator, I'm not saying that solves all your problems, but that actually can be very helpful, too.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. So, David, you concluded by talking about the high-level panel and what you hoped it would accomplish. We've had hundreds of high-level panels and do you really think that this really important process should be hinged on the outcome of a high-level panel? Do you think it's going to deliver that?

MR. STEVEN: That's a really good question. We've had hundreds of high-level panels and I've helped fail to deliver on a number of those panels, so there's no question that it's hard to get this process right. We're going to have a panel with three heads of state. I suspect that -- or I hope, anyway, that many of the other panelists won't be serving government ministers, but it's very easy for this to degenerate into a negotiation. Panelists are always told they represent themselves and then they tend to come with country positions, so it's difficult.

I think past panels have made a big mistake in that they haven't done some core analytical work early enough in the process. And I think there are a number of tasks that this panel needs to get underway very early. I think it needs to really bottom out what the MDGs were and why they worked, where they worked. Are those causal pathways? Which I don't think are simple. And I've read quite a lot of the work on the impact of the MDGs and I don't think we've yet captured the full picture of how normative goals can actually lead to policy impact.

I think the second thing they need to do is for both the MDG world, the poverty world, and the broader 7 billion is actually get some geography of how these problems split out, particularly for poverty. We can begin to have a fairly clear idea of where people will be living and what kind of challenges they will be facing.

And I think they need to do this work of getting the new options out on the table as early as possible. It's actually not important that panel agrees, but it's important that panel turns this debate into something that's about something real and tangible.

And then finally, this point that I've made before and I will reiterate again, I still do think they should look at the poverty question first before going on to the harder SDG question. These issues around inequality, I think, have one thing in the poverty debate, you know. People are beginning to talk about getting to zero goals. Getting to zero goals forces you to think precisely about the very hardest problems, the people who face multiple obstacles to escaping poverty. Getting to zero you have a job that gets harder every day that you succeed because you begin to reach people for whom, you know, the escape from poverty is enormously difficult. That's quite different from the inequality questions for the 7 billion people. And I fear that if we rush to the 7 billion we will simply lose that focus on the poorest of the poor.

The sustainability stuff is then, I mean, I think incredibly important, more important. You know, we clearly are hurtling to the brick wall and on the road to sustainability issues, but we shouldn't assume we have the consensus for the goals and we shouldn't let the panel get so stuck in those questions that it can't make any progress on anything.

MR. KHARAS: Thanks. So, Richard, when you were talking about inequality you gave a very, you know, measured commentary on how inequality is -- we've got to understand it and inequality is -- you know, some types of inequality are important for some indicators and other types for other indicators. But, you know, the reality is that, at least in the U.N., a lot of the inequality discussion is actually being pushed by a human rights agenda and approach to development that really comes at this

not from that kind of, you know, metrics of how these things should be done, but a very different, you know, almost legal approach to development, of a human rights-based approach. How are we going to bring that in and is it -- do they share your more nuanced kind of view on inequality within the U.N.?

MR. MORGAN: Yeah, we're very closely working with the High Commission for Human Rights. And I agree with you there's a view of human rights that tends to stay with the legal aspect and not look at how those norms which are, in fact, your existing universal framework can and should be applied in development thinking and development planning.

And this comes to David's point is that if you take a human rights-based perspective on development, you'll then have to look at the questions of how do we reach those people who are worst off or, in rights language, those rights holders who least enjoy their rights, whose rights are most violated by development failures? If we look at that toughest problem first, we have every chance of, if we solve it, then addressing all the other problems more effectively. The payoff is enormous. So it makes both practical sense as well as, from a rights perspective, a moral sense to try to do that.

We would also think that if you apply human rights principles of participation and accountability, and if you find practical ways, as I was suggesting, to hold public sector to account for the delivery of services, you will then have a development path that is more sustainable, more likely to be sustainable in any case, where governments won't just be shifting, you know, every two or three years changing priorities. We'll put some money in health. We don't see an impact, so we'll shift it to something else or put it in agriculture. But you'll have the ability of the public to exercise some kind of countervailing opinion on public expenditure in such a way that the delivery and the financing of services from domestic resources becomes more sustainable.

So what I would say in summary is that the human rights architecture of treaties and conventions, which all countries have signed up to -- I mean, the U.S. has signed up to some; even Somalia has signed up to some -- that provides you already with a universal framework and universal point of reference. And that's what the Millennium Declaration refers to. Goals then can be much more agile and tailored and, you know, limited in the sense they don't have to cover all rights, but they have to become a practical expression of rights for development. Even if you only had three or four goals, as Andrew was suggesting, they would need to be pursued in ways that do reach the poorest people, that do tackle the worst forms of poverty, that do enable people to participate through their own contributions in the realization of those goals. And that would be a rights-based approach.

MR. KHARAS: Great. Thank you. Well, you've all been very patient. The floor is open. Who would like to lead off? Dan? There's a mike coming up.

DAN: I'm now teaching climate change policy at George Washington University. Two questions that are related, I think.

The MDGs had the advantage, I think, of being relevant to a certain set of actors with a certain set of instruments. It was primarily multilateral and bilateral development agencies and the instrument was primarily development assistance. Now, if you imagine a more global and comprehensive set of goals, who are the relevant actors and what are the instruments? It seems to me it becomes immeasurably larger.

And that comes to my second question. Would it make sense if you wanted global set of agendas or goals to really focus on global public goods fairly narrowly defined and try to make that work?

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. Let's try to take a few. Please.

MR. ENGMAN: Thanks. I'm Mark Engman. I'm with U.S. Fund for



UNICEF. Hello, Richard.

So on the one hand, we have a really complex conversation about Rio+20 and sustainable development issues, climate changes, a wide range of issues. On the other hand, we have, I think, next month USAID and UNICEF coming together to essentially say in a generation we can end preventable child deaths, period. Transformational, not incremental. And I guess my question is, you know, does Rio+20 mean anything if actors are going to step up and make, you know, really concrete pledges and back it up with good research?

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. Anybody else want to come in? In front here.

MR. POST: Hi. I'm Todd Post from Bread for the World.

I think this is the a question for Colin and it's made me -- it occurred to me while Homi was asking you the question about why should China be involved, and you listed a bunch of imperatives as you called them, which I thought were, you know, very convincing. So I want to ask: what are the imperatives for the United States to buy into this and to participate?

MR. KHARAS: Good question. All right. Why don't we take that round and see if we've got time for more.

Colin, the last question was very direct to you, so why don't you start?

MR. BRADFORD: Good. Okay, I'll start with that, but I also want to direct myself to Dan's question about global and public goods.

I mean, I think what we're facing today is a -- I mean, it's a cliché in a way, but the domestic issues are global issues simultaneously. I mean, the energy problem is a global problem. The climate change problem, the health problem, the water problem, the sanitation problem, the poverty problem. I just don't -- I think the

imperatives that apply to China in a different sort of way apply to the United States, and we -- our job is, the job of leaders, the job of the G-20 in particular, I think, is to articulate for their publics what's the connection between the angst that people are feeling at home and the problems, the global challenges that are impinging upon from the crisis in Europe, from the financial meltdown, from the climate change issue, from the fact that poverty breeds insecurity and violence abroad, and so on. And I just I think that, you know, so far, the G-20 leaders, to my metric, even though I think the G-20 mechanism is working well as a process, have failed to articulate this in a strategic way that links the publics.

I think these Sustainable Energy For All Goals have potential to link to the private sector, to the investing community, to the financial community in a way that could be dynamic and directed towards what, in effect, are global public goods. The problem I have with the term "global public goods," as Alex Shakow here well knows because we've discussed it often, is the term. And I challenge all of us to think, and I have not come up with this myself, is there's got to be a normal English language term for what we mean by "global public goods." Because, I mean, I think we all understand it and from a professional point of view it all makes a lot of sense. But this has to be language that's public discourse language, and that's where this articulation -- I mean, as an economist I find myself in these recent years working on the G-20 that I've increasingly become concerned about political leadership and communications. And I think that's what this goal-setting thing is all about actually.

MR. KHARAS: Thanks. Anybody else? Andrew, you want to pick up on

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MR. STEER: Oh, I think Dan is really onto something here actually. I think the trick, though, would be, number one, as everyone else is saying where do the

global public goods stop?

And number two, the most important thing is we have to show how those global public goods affect people. So I do think that whether it's food, oceans, biodiversity, energy, even income growth, they're all affected by what you could call global public goods in a pretty important way. And the more we can then lock those in and motivate them by saying actually the poorest and the middle class are dramatically -- all are going to be affected by this, the better. So I sort of like that.

I also do want to go on record as saying, I mean, I totally and utterly agree with David that the number one goal has to be the eradication of absolute poverty. I mean, if we don't say that, we will have gone backwards a long way, so I want to be absolutely clear about that.

But I think, Dan, you're actually making a really interesting suggestion there, and that might take off sort of some of the more country-specific, I mean, urbanization. But even there, you know, issues of technology, for example, urban transport technology, it's really actually a global public good and it will affect the future of the planet.

It's really important to remember what this seminar's about. It's the Sustainable Development Goals. We're not actually discussing should we have more just Millennium Development Goals? The Rio+20, the theme is "The Future We Want." That's the title. So, in other words, the question is, and it's a hypothesis, is it a good thing for the citizens of the world and the leaders of the world to get together every 10 or 20 years and ask, as a collective, does it make sense for us to ask where do we want society, economy, nature, where do we want to go with it as a global civilization? If we don't think that's a good idea, we may as well take the Sustainable Development Goals off the table, I think.

And by the way, just on the point about the -- I mean, there's three things to come out of Rio. One, negotiations, and, I mean, I certainly agree with David, we're nowhere near where we should be; have very, very low expectations about negotiations. Two, initiatives and statements of intents, that's the most important thing. And three, a process to launch a set of indicators that will help us navigate in the coming years. I think those are the three things. The middle thing's the most important thing.

You know, several leaders left the original Rio. They went back to the cabinets and they said -- for example, President Sudharto may not be the best example, but he went back to his cabinet and said, you know, I never got this stuff, but, I mean, I want a sustainability plan for Indonesia. Several other heads of state did that. What will the heads of countries as they're sitting on the airplane going home, what will they be thinking? And at the moment, if they read the text, I hate to think what they'll be thinking. (Laughter)

MR. STEVEN: I think they'll be jumping out of the plane. (Laughter)

And I think that is a related danger is that I think what happens at Rio may well be driven by the need just to have something at this stage and that could be quite dangerous. Just to pick up on the three questions, I think, you know, if we separate out the poverty issues, which I think are different and, as I've said now repeatedly, in a way relatively clear, I think we then need a process of actually understanding what types of thing we're talking about under the sustainability rubric.

Now, I think we have boundaries, planetary boundaries is what the Stockholm Institute calls it, you know, limits which we risk hitting on particular trajectories. We have global public goods and then we have a set of issues around how economies function and grow that will avoid those boundaries and continue to produce those global public goods. If we can begin to separate those three things out, then we could work out

which -- what types of instrument would be most effective for delivering those, those three things.

I mean, on the boundaries issue, I don't think we should have goals, but I think it would be enormously useful if we had some kind of body in the same way that a monetary policy committee or a central bank talks about where we're going on inflation within a national economy. And if we had a body that was saying, you know, given current sets of policies this is where we're heading to on climate, this is where we're heading to on phosphate, this is where we're heading to on oceans, that doesn't imply any action, but it becomes an incredibly -- it could become, over time, an incredibly important normative check within the international system. What we want for global public goods could look completely different from there.

Finally, just on this idea of commitments, I mean, there is an idea floating around under the unlovely title "The Compendium of Commitments," which is the idea that we should be looking for a structure that brings together these commitments that different sets of actors are prepared to make on a voluntary basis and then assesses them both in terms of whether they're being met, but what they add up to in the bigger picture. Actually not such a stupid idea if it could really be used in the same way, I guess, that the Clinton Global Initiative uses it as a sort of semi-formal way of getting people to advertise what they're doing and then holding them to it. Awful name, though.

MR. KHARAS: Richard? Okay. We've got three more and I think that will exhaust us.

MS. KUSCHMITZ: Thank you. My name's Mari Kuschmitz. I work at Jaygen. Is this on?

I've been to a number of panels where people have discussed, multilaterals and bilaterals have said the process of the MDGs is kind of like a car and we

-- these being people from the G-20, DFID, and others -- have said we would like to navigate from the back, but somebody else needs to be the driver. Is there any indication of someone -- a few countries being chosen as the driver? Thank you.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. Right next to you.

MS. HUDES: Karen Hudes, retiree from the World Bank.

I'd like to follow up on your question and that is, so far, you've been talking about the outputs of the development community. Is there any thought as to how the development community is going to work together and is going to be held accountable? For example, the Paris Declaration in 2005. Are there any economies to be derived from learning processes?

And following up on that, do you think the people, the citizens who are looking for accountability from their development institutions, do you think they have sufficient information to hold those institutions accountable?

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. And we have one last. The gentleman in the middle.

MR. PIERRE: Alexander Pierre from Asian Development Bank.

I think if we look within the specialized development community the idea of sustainability and inclusion is pretty much an accepted fact. Even regional development banks have the objective of inclusion and sustainable growth. But when you go to the population at large -- there was an OECD-organized development communicators workshop at the Inter-American Bank last Monday. And somebody quoted the facts, and I probably have my numbers wrong, but I think the order of magnitude was that, that only about a third of the people had ever heard of the Millennium Development Goals that were surveyed. Only about 10 percent could name one development goal. And of those that could name them, most of them got them

wrong in terms of where the most progress is being made.

So my question is it is very important, of course, to reach a consensus within sort of the ones that lead the process in terms of development community, but these people and the heads of state ultimately respond to their citizenship and to the demands that (inaudible) asks of them. And in this climate of austerity, economic concerns, concerns about the economic crisis, how do we go about not only convincing the heads of states, but convincing the population at large that it is important to line behind sustainability and inclusiveness and not just the growth dimension?

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. Okay. Thirty seconds each. Let's start from you, Colin, and this is your chance for a final word as well.

MR. BRADFORD: Well, I do think that there -- in the case there were 24 donors at the DAC and there were a half-dozen countries, people who drove the process, so there is a navigation team even in a larger grouping. I hadn't thought about it in this case. I haven't a clue who it's likely to be, but it's a good question.

No, the --

MR. KHARAS: Brookings, of course.

MR. BRADFORD: Pardon? Brookings.

MR. KHARAS: I said Brookings. (Laughter)

MR. BRADFORD: No, the institutions are not -- the international institutions are not accountable enough. I was at an event yesterday with -- on the G-20 with the deputy finance minister of Mexico, who's chairing the G-20 summit. They're very concerned about increasing the accountability of the G-20 summit and the institutions themselves because it's widely perceived in the major countries that legitimacy depends on transparency and accountability. How that's done, I leave to others.

The last question was, ah, actually I take those numbers to be pretty

good, to be honest with you.

MR. KHARAS: Yeah, absolutely.

MR. BRADFORD: It doesn't sound good, but when you stop to think of it, even if people get it a little wrong, they've heard -- you know, even the de minimis thing, the 10 percent of the people surveyed have heard of it and they've got a little bit of it wrong, but you're still getting through. Because let's face it, I mean, where it really mattered was in this community of people here, people who are actively professionally involved. We need to know -- we all need to be working in some fashion.

These problems are increasingly linked together, as you yourself have pointed out. And so we need -- everybody needs to be on the same page in terms of the language and sense of strategic direction. And if there's a lot of shilly-shallying and a lot of diffuseness and everything matters equally, you're everywhere and nowhere. And people don't know how to collaborate; they don't know how to take charge of pieces of this agenda.

So I think the definition of goals, the deciding of targets, the design of indicators, the use of measurement is a huge mobilizing device that in the end drives policy, drives private sector actors, drives good-hearted people who want to live for a larger community than just themselves. And I think it's a very important process.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you, Colin. Richard?

MR. MORGAN: Yeah, just to pick up on that and absolutely agree that measurement is mobilization or can be and should be. It's done with people, not just about people.

MR. BRADFORD: Yeah.

MR. MORGAN: If people haven't heard of the MDGs as a construct, as a set of goals, I think it is still true that people are talking much more now about education



policy for their countries, getting all children in school. They're talking much more about health policy and health issues. In Southern Africa, 10, 15 years ago, people were not talking about HIV and AIDS. There was what we used to call a conspiracy of silence. That's radically transformed.

In parts of South Asia, people are talking about sanitation policy for the first time and what they want to do about sanitation in their communities instead of defecating in the bush where it's dangerous, where children can die of waterborne diseases. They're talking about managing human waste for the first time. This is not MDG rubric, but it's MDG substance.

And the same can and, I think, will be true around energy policy, sustainable energy for poor communities, that kind of thing. So it's the substance really that matters more than the labels.

And then just on the accountability issue, few countries, but some, have started using local MDG scorecards. The relevant small set of goals that are important for their districts, as in the Philippines, for their municipalities, such as in Brazil, where many municipalities and mayors are now being judged on public scorecards of progress on MDG-type indicators. That's the kind of way in which you not only make it more transparent what's happening within a governmental setting, but you can also then compare progress across districts, between municipalities, and that kind of thing. And that provides a way for public institutions to be held accountable. It doesn't address the international institutions, but it does talk about national public sector and how progress can be debated and reviewed in a truly public way.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. David?

MR. STEVEN: Yeah, I think these three questions together get to the heart of one of the issues with goals. I mean, every goal is reductionist. Every goal is a

simplification.

Now, the simpler you make the goal, the more you can make it resonate and the more likely it is that people will have heard of it and will be motivated by it. And I actually think -- did you say 25 percent of the people had heard of it? I mean, I think that's an enormous success. I mean, that's certainly more people than could name the vice president in this country. I mean, you know, to get that kind of resonance is --

SPEAKER: Sarah Palin?

MR. STEVEN: Yeah, Sarah Palin. (Laughter) To get that kind of resonance, I mean, we underestimate how much work it takes to get that kind of cut-through to a large population. It is an enormously difficult task and the danger is that we'll take new goals, make them more complex, and expect in a couple of years that they'll begin to resonate with the people.

We also have to accept that people interpret goals in very different ways. I think you said if you read Agenda 21 -- which is kind of funny because I don't think really many people do read Agenda 21 these days apart from the Tea Party here in the United States, where Agenda 21 is a very much alive document. I mean, you think I'm joking. It is a very much alive document. There are websites devoted to how Agenda 21 is part of a plot by the U.N. to take over the United States, so goals can become controversial amongst political communities in that way.

And the final question about accountability, you know, we are moving into a very, very different world in terms of information and evidence. I mean, I spent a lot of last year in Pakistan. Pakistan, we now have the names and addresses of every poor person in the country to an accuracy of maybe +/- 3 or 4 percent. That is a radically different place to be in, both in terms of delivery and then the accountability for that delivery, and that's now. We're talking about goals going up to 2030, so we need to think

about accountability seriously, but also in completely new ways given the information that is going to be available.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. Andrew?

MR. STEER: Well, just on that last point, I really agree.

MR. STEVEN: About me being a Communist, you mean? (Laughter)

MR. STEER: About the data. I do think that with social media -- I also thought your numbers were high, by the way. That's really encouraging. It reminds me of --

SPEAKER: High for the United States.

MR. STEER: When I was at DFID we did a survey of the international opinion makers. DFID was everywhere, you know. Then we asked the citizens of the United Kingdom and they'd never heard of it. (Laughter) Literally never heard of it. That's why we changed the name to UK Aid, by the way.

I do think with social media things actually could be quite different. I mean, you think that literally in real time now you'll be able to get data on all kinds of things; forests, you know, you could get a real buzz around that. What matters actually is that, for example, in parliaments and in the political debate, you get some of these indicators to have a back-and-forth sort of thing. And I think that could be -- that's what you really do need. And I could envisage that happening.

Who should be in charge of leading? Well, obviously every country has to implement is the country that needs to be the leader, but -- the driver, but I think what you mean is the process. I mean, obviously Colombia and Guatemala have been sort of pushing. It'd be great if Brazil would really sort of try and make this the signature delivery; I think they may. And then whoever the two developing country or middle-income country and low-income country, and we've got some indication of who that might

be to head that, if those two people could really seize that and lead, I think it would be excellent.

In terms of accountability, I mean, I don't think we're going to get something that's sort of legally binding in any sense whatsoever. I do think the kind of pledge or review kind of thing, what you called the compendium, David, I think there, I mean, citizens and parliaments and international meetings can then at least record. Look at the data, for example, in the Cost of Doing Business Survey. Essentially that ranks countries. Hugely controversial. I mean, massively in the public news if you go to the countries that I've lived in, and you have, too, Assandro. So you want sort of something like that that creates a buzz and creates a change in behavior and policy.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. Well, I want to close, but just in closing leave you with two words of caution.

The first is there's been a lot of talk about data. I don't think anybody has mentioned how appalling the state of our data really is. And so, you know, we talk about eliminating or eradicating poverty, I don't think we know global poverty to a factor of 2. The household surveys are really imperfect and almost no new resources are being put into improving those.

FAO just withdrew their measures for hunger. Some of the numbers that Richard was quoting about stunting in India, oh, I really wonder about the quality of that data. So there are a lot of things that we're trying to do and that we're basing policy on which are actually being based on very poor quality data. The other -- and I hope that part of this process will be to really give a big new impetus to data improvement in a way that, unfortunately, I don't think the MDGs actually serve to do.

The other caution is it is tempting and very easy to leap to saying we can now eradicate poverty. In fact, you know, I'm also guilty of that. But I think we also have

to recognize that poverty today and certainly poverty in 10 years' time overwhelmingly will be in fragile and conflict-affected states. Our track record of reducing poverty in fragile and conflict-affected states over the last 20 years is exactly zero. There are the same number of people today living in poverty in those countries as there were 20 years ago. All of the improvement in poverty in the world has come in non-fragile and conflict-affected states.

So if we're now going to say in the next 25 years we're suddenly going to be able to reach these at least 500 million or so people, we should better have some really good ideas, new ideas about how we're going to do this. Because the World Development Report on fragile states, which was a wonderful document, basically said don't even think about doing this in a span of 20 years. This is not a generational issue. This is a multigenerational issue.

And so I do worry that the temptation to have an early, easily communicated, really ambitious goal will also imply that we'll have a goal which is simply completely unattainable because nobody's thought about what would it actually take to get this done.

Thank you all very much and thank you to the panel for a wonderful conversation.

(Applause)

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