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PANEL 1: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NATO AND THE CHICAGO SUMMIT:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PIFER: Okay, why don't we go ahead and get started? Good afternoon. My name is Steven Pifer. I am a senior fellow and director of the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings, and it's my pleasure to welcome you all to our discussion today on "NATO, Deterrence, Reassurance: Looking Toward the Chicago Summit," May 20, 21, but also taking a look beyond that summit.

We're doing this in cooperation with the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Royal United Service Institute, and I'd also like to thank the Ploughshares Fund for its support of this event, but also for the Arms Controls Initiative in general.

This first panel is going to take a look at what's going on between now and looking towards Chicago. And one of the questions when NATO leaders meet on May 20 and 21 will be NATO's nuclear posture. Nuclear weapons have been a part of NATO's defense planning going back to the mid-1950s, when the first American nuclear weapons would deploy to Europe. During the Cold War, at one point, there were as many as 7,000 American nuclear weapons of a variety of types deployed basically because the alliance made a decision that it was not going to try to match the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact tank for tank, artillery piece for artillery piece, but was going to deal with large Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional force advantages by deploying nuclear weapons.

Now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, those numbers have come way down. According to the Federation of American Scientists, and these are the basis for the numbers I'll use, there are now roughly about 200 American B-61 gravity bombs deployed in Europe. The Federation of American Scientists says that those weapons are currently deployed in Germany, Belgium, the

Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey, and, therefore, used by American dual-capable aircraft could also be by dual-capable aircraft of the German, Dutch, Belgian, and Italian air forces. In total numbers, it's believed that the United States maintains now roughly 500 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, 300 bore back in the United States. The numbers are a little bit less clear on the Russian side. It's estimated the Russians have anywhere from 2,000 to as many as 5,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons and whereas American nonstrategic nuclear weapons are all just B-61 gravity bombs, on the Russian side, it's a variety. It's not only air-delivered munitions, but also warheads for service and cipher missiles, naval weapons, air defense weapons, and such.

Now, two years ago, in the run up to NATO's summit in Lisbon in November 2010, the alliance set about defining its strategic concept, and this is an exercise that NATO goes through about every 8 to 10 years to take a look and say what are the threats, what are the challenges that the alliance faces and how should the alliance respond to those? And part of that question in that discussion was what should the strategic concepts say about nuclear posture issues? And I'll intrude a little bit on Malcolm's subject, but I think it's perhaps an oversimplification, but in that run up to the NATO summit, there were probably two groups of NATO allies: one group that said we no longer see a threat that requires American nuclear weapons to be deployed in Europe, to deter that threat, and a second group of allies who said no way, we still see that threat, we still want to have that nuclear presence. And on the part of that second group of countries, it's still some uncertainties about Russia and Russian intentions.

Now, there are two questions when you look at the rationale for nuclear weapons. One is the deterrence of an outside threat, but the second point, which has always been fundamental, is the question of reassurance. How do you assure all allies that, in fact, their security may be safeguarded? And you can say maybe that you don't

see a reason to have American nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, but also say but they have to be there for assurance purposes. So, you have those two sorts of considerations.

Now, the strategic concept did not come to a fundamental consensus on what to do about nuclear posture. It left a lot of those questions open and pushed it into the deterrence and defense posture, which we're going to talk about today. And a deterrence and Defense Posture Review that was tasked November of 2010, basically called for a definition of what should be the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense forces for NATO, and that work is now underway, it will be discussed when NATO administers meet on Thursday in Brussels, and then there will be a report to NATO leaders in Chicago on May 20, 21, and, presumably, some kind of a public articulation by the alliance of the results of that study.

So, what we're going to do with this first panel is look at the issues, the considerations, and the perspectives that are going into that process. We're also going to use this as the occasion to release a new Army War College book: *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO*. A little bit awkward is that we actually don't have the book here, but for those of you who came in late, you probably got a paper like this. If you came in early, you may not have gotten this sheet, but the third paragraph here will tell you where to go to sign-up to get a free copy of the book mailed to you in about two weeks' time. The publication date is now set for April 26, and, so, the Army War College, if you've log on there, fill out your information, several days later, you'll receive a copy of the book in the mail.

But we have here four, and counting myself five, authors who contributed to that book and we're going to talk about some of the basic issues it raises. I'm not going to go into long introductions or biographies because you have that information in

the program, but just to quickly walk through how we'll organize this panel.

We'll start with Malcolm Chalmers, who is research director at the Royal United Services Institute, and he's going to talk about European perspectives on issues related to nuclear weapons in Europe and the deterrence and Defense Posture Review. Our second speaker will be Tom Nichols, who's department head at the Naval War College, and he's going to describe for us Russian thinking on nuclear weapons questions. Third, we have Leo Michel, who's now a senior research fellow at the National Defense University, and he'll provide an American perspective on the question. And then, finally, Jeff McCausland, who was responsible for pulling the book together, will talk about some of the possibilities that there might be for armed control approaches to nuclear weapons in Europe in the context of looking at the possibilities that might come out of this study from NATO.

So, with that introduction, let me turn the floor over to Malcolm.

MR. CHALMERS: Steve, thank you very much, and thanks for asking me to take part in this panel. I'm down in the next panel, as well, so, I'm going to leave critical gaps in my presentation in this session so that I can fill them next time around.

Let me start by saying that although I'm tasked to provide European perspectives, of course, I won't be able to speak for Europe, and, indeed, there is no one single European perspective. One of the key aspects of this whole debate is that Europeans are not untypically, I have to say, divided on what should happen in the DDPR. The U.K., the country I come from, is one which pushed the idea of looking at what the appropriate mix of nuclear conventional and missile defense capabilities should be following on from NATO's strategic concept.

It looks from what we hear, and maybe we'll hear a bit more after the Defense and Foreign Affairs ministerial this week, but it looks from everything we hear

that insofar as there's going to be any agreement in Chicago on this issue, it's going to be one which basically stays more or less where we are in relation to the role of nuclear weapons, and, indeed, it's pretty clear in the DDPR missile defense, wasn't really an issue of contention; that already had been started, so, the main issue was actually the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional and whether or not that should change. Some countries thinking it should, some others feeling it should not. It doesn't look as if there's going to be much change in Chicago. Perhaps, in part because they're a bigger or at least more urgent fish to fry, that on Afghanistan the clock is clicking. We've got a definite deadline there in 2014. We've got to get our act together in an alliance rather quickly and urgently in that and we can't wait. But on this issue, it seems that the consensus is we can wait perhaps for the fullness of time to solve these problems.

But as we've argued in our papers, one of the problems there is that the modernization schedules for dual-capable aircraft controlled by those European countries who continue to have a nuclear role. Germany in particular, is a clock that's clicking. It's ticking at a slower rate than Afghanistan, but it is, nevertheless, ticking. And certainly the judgment that we've made in our Carnegie paper is it remains, in our view, very unlikely the Germans will at some stage in the next few years change their mind and decide that they're prepared to make their Euro fighter aircraft nuclear-capable. And if that's the case, at some stage, some unpredictable stage over the next decade or so, Germany will no longer be prepared to play that particular role in NATO's nuclear posture and that will raise a whole series of other issues.

I think it's clear looking at the contours of NATO's debate on nonstrategic nuclear weapons today that it has some resonance in past debates. This is not a new issue. U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons have been in Europe since way back in the early days of the Cold War and they've been politically contentious throughout that

period, especially with the Cruise and Pershing debate in the 1980s when German leaders pushed that deployment through against a very strong domestic opposition, because of the perception of an aggressive Soviet threat, especially in a period after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And in some respects, today's debate is a very faded version of that debate. Even more than that time, there's reluctance, I think, to talk about what the operational role of these weapons is and much talk about the political and symbolic role of these weapons. But there's also a discussion if they have no real clear operational role, how can they be a deterrent? And if they're not a deterrent, then why are we going to so much trouble to keep them there when the United States President in his early period in office made so much emphasis on nuclear disarmament?

One of the interesting, perhaps unpredicted consequences of the last couple of years in this debate is that one of the things that encouraged the German government to take a stronger stance on the need to remove these weapons from Germany was President Obama's Prague speech and the raising expectations in relation to nuclear disarmament that led to. But while there's an echo of that old 1980s debate, and I wouldn't want to overstate it, but I think there is an aspect of that. There's also a whiff of Don Rumsfeld's new Europe and old Europe paradigm, which we haven't heard so much on in those terms. It was a simplification then, of course.

Britain is hardly New Europe, but maybe it was New Europe in the Iraq War and it's a simplification now, but there is a sense that it's pitting the complacent Western European countries, like Germany and the Netherlands, against the new democracies of the Baltic countries and the Poles, who are more pro-American, more concerned with military values. But that picture is hard to square with countries like the Baltic republics spending just as little in defense as countries, which are less exposed to Russia in terms of proportions of GNP. And if you look at the Libyan operation, the

NATO European countries, which were most active in that Libyan operation, were countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway. None of those countries on the nuclear issue are at all in that more hawkish end of the spectrum.

So, Europe's a complicated place. There isn't a simple division between different groups. There is a sense in which this nuclear debate is a reflection of wider debates about the future of NATO, but I wouldn't push that too far. It's got many other dimensions, as well.

Now, what could provide a Get Out of Jail Free card for NATO in this debate sometime down the road two, three, four years' time is that the Russians start playing ball. The strategic concept makes clear that if they were prepared to get involved in some sort of reciprocation in relation to their nonstrategic weapons, then NATO would also play in that game. Russia clearly isn't in that place today, but it's clearly desirable if we could get that sort of process going, but I think we also have to ask the question: If that isn't the case, are we saying that NATO should modernize tactical nonstrategic nuclear forces in Germany, in particular, should do so if no agreement is reached? And one of the things we talk about in our Carnegie paper, and I'll talk a bit more about this perhaps in the next session, is whether there's a range of other options which help us manage those particular problems in relation the European DCA problem without necessarily involving withdrawal of all American weapons from Europe.

Most of all, though, I would make the point from a European perspective, and this is perhaps the classic Euro-America buck-passing exercise, but there is real strong sense in which these are American weapons, not European weapons; that the key decision-making country about the future of these nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe is the United States. And we've rightly had a very long period of consultation within NATO, but it's not up to the Europeans to decide what the future of these weapons

is, it's up to the alliance to decide. And that alliance is an alliance that on this question, as in many others, should be led by the United States. And, certainly, one of the things I've learned from the many events I've been to on this subject over the last couple of years is the United States itself is divided as to what the future of these weapons should be, and as long as the United States hasn't come to a clear view or perhaps it has, then we will need to continue the debate.

And let me just conclude with a point with which I conclude in my chapter in the book, and just in case you haven't yet got to page 473. (Laughter)

MR. McCAUSLAND: If you haven't, we're disappointed in you.

SPEAKER: That's right. (Laughter)

MR. McCAUSLAND: We'll rush out immediately.

MR. CHALMERS: Well, I'd recommend it to you that however this debate is concluded, or, indeed, not concluded, NATO will survive as an alliance. We've moved a long way from the Cold War via different concerns, via different risks, but I think it's still a pretty robust alliance that's never everything we want it to be. But the idea that on this issue or even on much more central issues that NATO is in an existential crisis is an argument I don't buy. So, we shouldn't be relaxed about tackling this problem, but it's not an existential problem. Thank you.

MR. CHALMERS: Malcolm, thank you.

Tom, how do the Russians look at this?

MR. NICHOLS: Well, to go from the complicated European and European-American view to what ostensibly is the simpler, straightforward, unified Russian view, no such luck.

First, any time we start talking about the Russians and nuclear weapons, there's always this problem of what the Russians say, what their negotiating position is,

what they actually believe, and what they think is necessary for purely internal reasons. That is in some ways far more complicated, I would say, than the American debate in a lot of ways. The American debate is reasonable transparent, the lines are fairly well drawn, and the advocates for the various sides are pretty clear about how they feel about it. The Russian debate on this suffers from a lot of lack of transparency partly because when you're dealing with the Russian position, you're not really dealing with the Russian government position. When you're dealing with the Russian government position, then you're dealing with the general staff and the military bureaucracy and the people who have I would argue inordinate or disproportionate amount of control over these issues who see things quite differently.

Malcolm at one point said he didn't want to push the point about the 1980s, yes, because the 1980s is too hard and I think that when it comes to talking about the United States and Europe, that's wise. However, even Russian writers when they're talking about Russia, even some of Russia's internal defense writers and critics say you look at stuff published in Russia and you close your eyes and it could be 1983. It's almost as though at least from a rhetorical standpoint, almost nothing has changed, that you hear about scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons, the chief of the Russian general staff last year said it's a lot of regional contingencies where we could have operational plants for what they still have called tactical nuclear weapons and in a way that we, the West, simply don't talk about anymore. We had a fairly clear image of what we were doing with nonstrategic nuclear weapons during the Cold War and now that has shifted, as Ambassador Pifer pointed out, this issue of deterrence versus reassurance. That's a different debate than the one the Russians are having.

For the Russians, there are a couple of central points. One is nuclear weapons still matter in a very important way, in a way that is almost totemistic for them.

The second is that nuclear weapons allow Russia, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of Russia from superpower to whatever it is we want to call it now, large regional power. Nuclear weapons are still the kind of thing that allows a country to punch above its weight in international relations. That's been an overused expression in Washington these days, but it is an accurate expression that nuclear weapons, at least through Russia's eyes, are one of the things that allows it to really press its case more strongly than it might if it were merely a regional power. And partly this is because, and they will admit this, they, including their own uniformed military folks, will say it's because of the collapse of their conventional abilities. Now, that seems like a fairly straightforward position. Well, we need these nuclear weapons to maintain our great power status, to be taken seriously in the world, because our conventional forces, we're trying to make the transition to a professional military force, to a volunteer force, to getting away from this kind of ragtag conscript army that we've been left with. But there's a really worrisome notion that underpins that, and that is that the Russians look at nuclear and conventional force, at least hypothetically, at least to take them at their own words, but they really view those forms of power as fungible. And that's a real concern to say, well, if we don't have enough conventional force, we can always kind of cover the shortfall because we have enough nuclear weapons and particularly we have enough nonstrategic nuclear weapons. And this has been kind of a mystery to me for a lot of years that I've studied them, how they actually make that equation work that we don't have enough men in uniform, but our security is nonetheless guaranteed by the fact that we've covered that shortfall by maintaining a robust nuclear capability, I haven't quite been able to unlock because, obviously, those are not the same kinds of force, they don't do the same kinds of things.

And I think a large part of the reason that they think that way is the

Russian defense establishment in particular is more than any other gripped by a kind of Cold War atavism. It is a much more high bound, much less transformed, much less forward-looking military organization than the United States or its NATO partners. Well, I mean, we could talk all day about why can't the Russian officer (inaudible). It has to do with culture, it has to do with the way they're educated, it has to do with the way they're structured and incentives for propagating existing notions. But I think one question that arises in all that is: Do they really believe that? And the answer is I don't know.

One of my favorite sayings on this is Kurt Vonnegut once wrote that we are what we pretend to be, and so, we have to be careful what we pretend to be. And I think if you pretend long enough that you are still an old cold warrior who sees the United States as a great threat and that nuclear weapons are the great equalizer, I mean, eventually, if you say it enough times, I imagine that at some innate, cognitive level, you'll start to believe it.

But there's another factor here which is that whether they believe it or not, it's a very important thing for them to say for internal reasons, as well. The Putin regime has staked a lot on the maintenance of Russia as a great power, of being respected, of having its views taken into account, that Putin ostensibly has been countered to the Yeltsin years when Yeltsin gave away the farm and sold Russia down the river and did whatever the West wanted it to do. And so, when they hold new exercises, for example, like they did over 10 years ago and then again a few years back with Poland where they simulate the use of nuclear weapons against Europe. Is there any Russian planner who really thinks that's going to happen and that they can really get away with that?

That's probably less of an important question then the reality that it got a lot of press within their own country to say, look, we're doing something. We are not a

prostrate defeated power; that we will carry out exercises where when the West seizes Kaliningrad for whatever utterly mysterious reason we would do that or when war breaks out in the central front and Russia has to somehow march across 52 million Ukrainians to get to it, that those nuclear weapons are there and they're usable and they have meaning. That carries a lot of impact in the public debate, whether or not their strategic planners take it seriously.

By the way, there's an economic dimension to this that really has to be considered. Every large country has a military industrial complex. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, the Russians have a particular problem, which is they're not able to move people easily from one sector of their defense production to another, and, as a result, they are almost on autopilot with programs that were put into place 7, 8, 10, 12 years ago from modernizing nuclear weapons and particularly with things like strategic delivery vehicles because they don't know what else to do with these people. They can't really fire them, there's nowhere else to put them, they have to spend those rubles somewhere. And it's good -- again, to use the kind of media term -- it's good optics to unveil the newest delivery system or warhead. And so, the Russian position is this strange amalgam of a Cold War approach to nuclear weapons, a totemistic, almost quasi-religious belief in the power of nuclear weapons, which I think is very unhealthy because that sends a message to everybody else in the world that nuclear weapons are really important and that they should have them, as well, a high bound planning and offshore promotion system that rewards this kind of propagation of I would argue untenable positions.

And finally, this whole economic aspect that I think is many times just transparent. We were talking earlier and I said there's a lot of flap in the Western press about the Russians were building a new monster missile. And the Russian explanation,

of course, it was all in response to missile defense and Obama and Poland and the collapse of negotiations. And the fact of the matter is they were replacing a missile that they had promised years ago to replace, again, for their own reasons as a matter of defense industrial complex, and they simply tacked on all of these strategic explanations that happened to be current at that moment to rationalize a decision they had far earlier and actually were replacing the missile with a missile that was smaller than the one that they were replacing. But in the Western press, it became this huge crisis in Russian-American relations because I think we sometimes don't quite understand Russia's internal reasons for doing that.

I'll just finish by saying that as a result of that, I tend to be somewhat pessimistic about further negotiations with the Russians about the reduction of nuclear weapons because I think we're not even close to proceeding from the same assumptions about what nuclear weapons and particularly about what nonstrategic nuclear weapons do. We do not share fundamental assumptions about that. We've been able to negotiate things like START, although that was far more difficult than it should have been, because we still are negotiating based on Cold War tenets like the ability to destroy hundreds of urban centers. But on other issues like nonstrategic nuclear weapons, we don't share a lot of fundamental beliefs. And I think that the answer for us, and I'll leave on there, is to say that at some point, we're going to just have to leave the Russians behind and move ahead with our own reductions, our own reforms, but in consultation with our allies because I just don't think we're going to get very far talking much further with the Russians about it.

MR. PIFER: Thanks, Tom.

Leo, how does this look in Washington?

MR. MICHEL: Thanks, Steve. I thought I would do a couple of things,

and one is to just give you a broad overview of what the U.S. Government -- and I'm not an official spokesman of the government, although I think I'm the only one of the panel with the government affiliation still.

MR. NICHOLS: I don't either.

MR. MICHEL: But I want to give you a broad overview of what has been said recently about the subject and then give you some personal ideas about the strategic context because as it was mentioned, this is one of the subjects that are being considered in run-up to the NATO summit in Chicago next month.

Actually, if you go into U.S. Government sources, there's been relatively little that's been said about the subject of nonstrategic nuclear weapons over the past few years. The last important government review on nuclear weapons was the Nuclear Posture Review that was released in April 2010, and it really only makes a passing reference to the specific contribution of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and it states that they contribute to alliance cohesion and they provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats. It really doesn't say much more.

Why would this important document be relatively silent on this issue? I think one is it's very clear that the document's priorities were elsewhere, they were on strengthening the global nonproliferation regime, where the Obama Administration has placed a lot of effort and on preventing nuclear terrorism. The document, that is the Nuclear Posture Review, explicitly states that Russia is not an enemy and states the hope, at least, it will be an increasing partner in confronting nuclear proliferation and other emerging threats.

And finally, it does pay notice to the fact that there have been over the years strengthening capabilities in the alliance writ large responses and also countered WMD capabilities and missile defense, saying that these have strengthened deterrence

and defense. Implicit but unsaid in this is that perhaps there is a reduced role not in the elimination of a role, but the reduced role for nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

With regard to systems, just wanted two facts to put out here. With regard to the United States dual-capable aircraft, right now that capability resides in the F-16. These are going to be replaced, as many of you know, by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and that the NPR does state that the Air Force is going to retain a dual-capable fighter as the Joint Strike Fighter replaces the F-16. And it does commit the United States to what is called the Life Extension Program for the B-61 bomb and this is the type of gravity bomb that exists in Europe. And those are U.S. bombs. Now, certain European countries, which at least I will not name, have the capabilities with dual-capable aircraft to carry out nuclear missions.

It's no secret that there haven't been different views in the U.S. Government over the years on the necessity of keeping these systems in Europe. Exactly what their contributions are and so forth for those who are interested, there was a good explanation, I think, of the role of these systems, but it goes back to December 2008 and the Secretary of Defense Task Force. But it was reported at the time, in fact, it was reported in that task force report where they said -- and, of course, this is in 2008 -- that there was some senior U.S. leaders in Europe who did not believe that it's necessary to keep these weapons in Europe, and some even advocating their unilateral withdrawal. It was four years ago, it was a different administration. I only point this out to indicate the questioning of the requirement in and of itself; it's not a development to the past one to two years. This is not something that you can, depending on your point of view, say that the Obama Administration is somehow responsible for. This debate has been around for some time.

Finally, with regard to the U.S. view on all of this, I would refer you -- and

this is available online, I won't read them to you, but in the spring of 2011, just about a year ago, I think it was in May, there was a NATO Foreign Minister's Meeting in Tallinn, and Secretary of State Clinton at the time put forward five points which explained the U.S. principles in which it would look at nonstrategic nuclear weapons issue. Part of it is simply repeating in essence what the NATO strategic concept says, that is as a nuclear alliance, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance and that the sharing of nuclear risks and responsibility is fundamental. I'll come back to this in just a second. And then it had one to two other points with regard to how the U.S. would view that this would be an important part of a next step of negotiation of nuclear weapons issues with Russia, and the plea that this needs to be done since the alliance works by an unwritten consensus rule of decision-making, this is a decision to be taken by consensus among the 28 allies. This is not a U.S. decision that is somehow announced to the allies or imposed upon them.

And I would like to just step away from nuclear weapons specifically for a second just to remind you that this debate on nonstrategic nuclear weapons takes place in a broader strategic concept. Despite the NATO's strategic concept of 2010, to me at least, it's not clear that all 28 allies really share the same assessment of threats and challenges to the alliance. It stills depends a little bit on where you are geographically, your history, your capabilities, and so forth. Some still look more towards their large neighbor to the east as a source of possible risks and threats in the future and others are thinking more in terms of expeditionary missions overseas.

The second point is there have been differences and we've seen this most recently, I would say, in Libya. There is a different appreciation of the willingness of different allies to accept the risks and burden of being members of the alliance. And we still see this to a certain degree in Afghanistan, on the different roles that NATO allies are

willing to accept, and, of course, we saw that only 8 of the 28 allies were prepared, had the capabilities and political will to undertake strike missions in Libya. So, there's a certain question about the sharing of burden and responsibilities.

And finally, in an era of what promises to be an extended defense austerity, it is a legitimate question in my view to say how should we spend our defense dollars or our euros? So, in the case of some countries, they can say and are saying should a certain portion of these be to maintain indefinitely a dual-capable aircraft or should we be spending those resources on other things that are still important contributions to alliance: aerial refueling, intelligence, surveillance, recognizance, and whatever.

Bringing this home now to this question of the DTPR, NATO is still working on the DTPR; it's not been finalized. In my view, hopefully, it will be so that it can be publicly released, I hope, at the summit. We'll see, but I've come up within the chapter that I've written with just five, and I'll just tell you sentences on each one. Five things to kind of keep in mind. And these go to my background also as being a very -- both at OSD before and now, I'm a very NATO-friendly person. I don't seek to hide that. But I think it's important to keep the psychology and keep the importance of the alliance in mind in all of these.

I think that allies should avoid denigrating the threat perceptions of others. Those that favor a go-slow approach in this area are not necessarily paranoid about Russia. Those who would prefer to make some movement in the area to see reductions perhaps in the near term are not necessarily anti-nuclear pacifists. But as we've seen in the wake of demanding operations, for example, in Afghanistan, again in Libya, there has been questioning of within the alliance are all allies willing to accept an equitable share of the risks and burdens of alliance membership? There are only a small

number of allies who actually base these nuclear weapons on their territory or have the DCA to go with them. So, I think if eventually reductions are to be contemplated, it should be done, in my opinion, in a way that preserves the nuclear sharing arrangements over as why the base is possible. To have only one or two allies potentially bear the brunt and say that represents the European contribution to NATO's nuclear forces in Europe, I think is unwise.

A third point. You've heard a lot of talk about smart defense, how countries should cooperate more multilaterally in preserving capabilities and maybe even making our investments smarter in future capabilities. I think, though, that while these projects are very good, they become more and more difficult the closer you come to capabilities that are at the frontline of combat.

So, I know and I have some colleagues I respect highly that have put out some ideas about maybe a multilateral type of air force that would perform this role in NATO rather than having national dual-capable aircrafts. My modest opinion, that's a bridge too far.

With regard to defense austerity, as I said, it is a legitimate question to raise: How should we spend our defense dollars or our defense euros? My only plea here is let's keep the debate honest. Let's not exaggerate the costs of keeping dual-capable aircraft or perhaps even introducing new aircraft if that's necessary. The United States is spending a lot for this. The Life Extension Program is not cost-free. People should think about our contribution, as well, to dual-capable aircraft and the security that goes with them in Europe. I think it's fair to ask Europeans here to do their fair share.

And finally, in this nuclear debate, this consensus rule that NATO has had, unwritten rule, since the beginning of the alliance has been challenged by many, I think unwisely from time to time. It's very important to keep in mind. It's not necessary

that all allies have exactly the same view of the threat, exactly the same view of the capabilities necessary or exactly the same contribution, but I think in this area as in others, it's very important to do this by consensus, not by U.S. FEA, which I don't believe will be done, and not by simply an abdication to the United States. America, it's your problem, take care of it so that Europe doesn't have to tackle some of these difficult issues.

Thank you.

MR. PIFER: Thank you.

Jeff, if these issues get into the arms control world, how might they be handled?

MR. McCAUSLAND: Thanks, Steve.

Before I start that, I'd like to make a couple of introductory comments, if I might. As one of the project directors, I would personally like to thank Steve and the Brookings Institute for hosting this here today. I would also be remiss if I didn't acknowledge the efforts in getting this thing accomplished by my colleague and editors, Tom Nichols on the panel; my good friend, Doug Stewart, from Dickinson College here in the forefront. And also I've noticed scattered throughout the audience are several others of our authors. Guy Roberts, who was our deputy secretary general at NATO; Paul Schulte here in the front from King's College London and an old friend for many years in Ministry of Defense; and Richard Wise from the Hudson Institute. And if I've overlooked one of the other authors who wondered in, my sincere apologies, but this was a wonderful team effort and very enjoyable for me working with this fantastic group of experts.

As Steve mentioned, I'd also like to remind you that the book is available. It's actually available in digital form online right now and will be available, as well, in hard

copy in a couple of weeks, and you can register for that online. I'm told having gone through this process, having a workshop in August and getting with the publisher by January and churning a book out in three months in the 21st century with iPads and others, it's still considered lightning speed.

And finally, I'll talk about these options, there's about four of them, and I'm speaking in my own personal capacity and not also as a spokesman of the U.S. Government. So, let me take that on.

First of all, I'll point out it's one of the ironies of history to me that we would have this discussion about tactical -- and you'll notice on the cover, that's in italics -- because there's some real arguments about tactical and nonstrategic if you look in the history. We, the United States, deployed these weapons back in the '60s and '70s. I think I'm the only person on the panel who could still put one together and take it apart. I did that a lot as an Army officer. Because we perceived at the time in the '60s and the '70s are severe conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. And now as Tom pointed out, this irony of history where to some degree, at least for some Russians' perspective, that, in fact, has been reversed. And with the passage and ratification of the New START agreement, United States saying I think they initially actually made it a requirement of the administration or they talked about making it a requirement to initiate negotiations on these particular nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It was pointed out to them it takes two to tango, you can't hardly make this a requirement, and said well, please try to, and part of the documentation around ratification was a sense of the Senate to move forward.

One idea to do that is, of course, a son of New START or a daughter of New START, perhaps, in which you would take the existing limits for strategic warheads. On the U.S. side, you would add in roughly the 500 nonstrategic nuclear weapons the

United States has, about half in Europe, half in the United States, and in addition, those warheads that we have in storage. On the Russian side, you would take, of course, their limits under New START for strategic weapons, add in nonstrategic nuclear force, as Steve pointed out. We're a little unsure. Somewhere between 2,000 and 5,000 warheads, and a much smaller number of warheads that they maintain in storage and you find the total number of warheads then gets roughly comparable, so, you might declare a new limit, both sides can mix and match as they choose to be appropriate now under this new overall limit, combining all nonstrategic and nuclear warheads.

This seems to me to be the way the United States government from my talks would like to proceed on these particular talks, should we move in that direction? Obviously, though, it would be much easier to describe it as I just did to accomplish that fact. I think the Russians will obviously want rough equality in the total numbers and in strategic nuclear warheads that may probably be unacceptable of the United States. The United States will want equal stockpiles and the freedom to mix back and forth and the Russians probably won't like that because they want to maintain a larger, nonstrategic number of warheads for the reasons that Tom Nichols pointed out. But definitely want to preserve a substantial number of warheads that belong to the Navy, sea launch cruise missiles and the like, and this is because of their perceived inferiority not only in conventional ground forces, but particularly as they look at the size of the United States Navy. They'll probably insist on maintaining their current position that we'll be happy to talk about that after you've removed all your nonstrategic warheads from Europe. And then, finally, because we're talking about warheads on weapons as well as warheads in storage, warheads being destroyed and nonstrategic nuclear warheads, if you think the verification provisions under New START are complicated, you ain't seen nothing yet in terms of the level of transparency you're going to need to get to to accomplish that.

The second option would be sort of the grand bargain, back to that irony of history. I was talking to my old friend Susan Cook, and Susan and I and Leo Michel may be the only three people in the room that know what the acronym MBFR stands for --

SPEAKER: Four.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Sorry, four. Five. Stand for, but believe it or not, at one point, the United States and agreed NATO policy was so-called option three which proposed back in the 1970s, during the nuclear balance force reduction talks, some tradeoff of nuclear warheads for reduction in conventional forces, and this actually stayed on the table as an agreed NATO proposal for several years, was never accepted by the Warsaw Pact. One could talk about a grand bargain. At a minimum right now, that's a major problem because as of November, of course, the United States after watching Russia suspend participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and tried to find a solution to that problem after four years, the United States announced we would suspend our participation with the Russians. So, creating that grand bargain, obviously, very difficult.

I would suggest to you whether that is done in one big bargain or parallel negotiations that are linked or parallel negotiations that are separate, it is my feeling that from the Russian side, some progress and having some conversation about conventional weapons and probably now missile defense is going to be some kind of a precondition to having any conversation to have progress on nonstrategic nuclear forces. So, they might not be the solution, but I think it sets the condition, perhaps, to find a solution.

A third option people talk about is, of course, well, why don't we just go towards confidence-building measures or some measure of cooperative security. Some people talk about well, let's just detonate the warheads. Well, frankly, I think that's

largely been done. The B-61 bomb, they're not uploaded on aircraft on a daily basis and we're pretty confident on the Russian side on a daily basis, operationally, most of them are detonated anyway. Some people have called for relocation. Let's convince the Russians just to move the darn things farther from NATO borders, particularly the Baltics and the eastern most members of the alliance would find that attractive. Quite candidly, I would say that's really not a nonstarter. Obviously, A, very expensive; B, most of these are delivered by aircraft. I don't know what a few hundred gains you, in reality; and, C, some Russian observers have said to me, well, in reality, all you really want us to do is move those beyond the Urals to complicate our situation with the Chinese and others. So, that's not necessarily the greatest idea.

So, I've argued about increased transparency. Could you consolidate these in fewer size? Could you give better notice and where they are? Could you take advantage of existing mechanisms such as Open Skies or be in a document to monitor and, therefore, provide greater reassurance on both sides. There's not a moment in time that a substantial movement of these weapons is occurring. That's possible, I guess. Some have talked about both sides making an announcement about no increase. Well, we can't negotiate reductions; we'll at least say we're not going to increase. That's also possible. We'd have to acknowledge some of these issues my colleagues have talked about, about Life Extension Programs.

Finally, one could also, I guess, talk about the idea of changing the paradigm. If we are in a formal arms control negotiation, it does speak, I would suggest, having worked on this for years, somewhat of an adversarial relationship. Close friends don't have arms control negotiations. I don't think we've negotiated with the Canadians since we demilitarized the Great Lakes sometime around the War of 1812.

As a consequence, as long as we get into a negotiation, it is adversarial,

and President Obama, I think quite rightfully, pointed out in the Nuclear Summit back in April of 2010 that these weapons may actually be a common threat, the greatest threat, may be a common one to both sides. Less worry about the use of these weapons against each other as a result of some crisis or conflict, more a concern due to their size, perhaps their age, perhaps their dispersion, they could potentially fall into the hands of some third party, and we're now talking about a major terrorist incident occurring in one capital or another. So, perhaps, some conversation extension along the lines of what we've done in defense, threat reduction, about how we secure them, how we do personnel reliability programs, what kind of technologies do we use for intrusion detection alarms might be a legitimate conversation where both sides benefit and cast the discussion more as cooperative security as opposed to formal negotiations.

Third option, of course, would be a unilateral withdrawal. The United States unilaterally announces on behalf of NATO a removal, perhaps some fig leaf that will maintain airfields or whatever to quickly reposition should that be required. Obviously, there would be an invitation to the Russians along the lines of the presidential nuclear initiatives back in the early 1990s to do the same thing, but in reality, the stockpiles are so disparate, I'm not sure that gets you a long way, and I think in the current political climate, and this is key for the moment, consensus amongst the NATO allies would be a little bit difficult. We've just been through Russian elections, we're about to finish up French presidential elections, and I've heard tale there might be an election here in the United States. So, for the rest of 2012, I think that's problematic.

Well, if those are our options, where does that leave us? Well, it leaves us, I think, with the NATO summit coming out with the GDPR, as Steve said at the onset. I think, in general, this will be a first step and not a finished product, and we'll be talking about this for a good period of time because the current political climate, and as both

sides, I think, Russia and the United States are still digesting the somewhat New START, the prospects of an agreement in the next year are pretty slim, the beginning of conversations might be more appropriate. We certainly have got to respect some of the issues that I think Leo pointed out, that the whole question of dual-capable aircraft. There will come a time when this goes away and how we husband those fewer and fewer resources.

And, finally, I think one of the themes, and I'll kind of create a circle back to where Steve started this whole conversation, it seemed to me one of the interesting things about this discussion, this book, this whole effort was that it was symptomatic. The whole question of tactical nuclear weapons and the future of NATO as a nuclear alliance. Well, very, very important, I don't mean to discount that, in many ways was a window upon broader questions that the alliance now is wrestling with in the 21st century about how it postures itself to think about itself in future of new threats, deterring those threats, while at the same time reassuring a larger and larger membership.

With that, I'll turn it over to the chair.

MR. PIFER: Great. All right, thank you.

We have about 35 minutes for questions. I'm going to take the privilege of posing the first one, and let me describe for my co-panelists up here my perception of where I think NATO's likely to come out in Chicago, and see if you agree or disagree with me. In part, for reasons that I think Malcolm discussed in some detail, there's a difference in view among the NATO allies with regards to the requirement for nuclear weapons in Europe, and it seems to me unlikely that that difference is going to be bridged over the next five weeks. So, what I'm sort of hearing is that what might come out of Chicago would be some kind of NATO discussion about transparency measures, maybe some ideas on confidence-building measures, and then language that would roughly link

the idea of numbers on the American side or reductions in American nuclear weapons in Europe to some actions by the Russians to reduce theirs. But that sort of general language not getting much more specific, and I just wonder if anyone has a different view as to what might come out of Chicago.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Well, I'd make two -- one, I generally agree with you, Steve, number one. Number two, I think the maximum oxygen in Chicago was always going to be about Afghanistan, and after what's happened with the last three or four months, it'll be even more about Afghanistan and getting all the allies to sign up to that.

To the degree there's any oxygen left over, the second, I think, in many ways big topic will be ballistic missile defense and are we able to get anything that looks like a remote acknowledgment by the Russians for cooperation? And that, too, of course, that whole question of ballistic missile defense and where that goes gets at some of these same broader terms and issues that we're talking about. How do we talk about deterring future threats while reassuring many of our NATO partners?

MR. MICHEL: I would just add that one of the elections you mentioned, actually, the first round of the French elections will be next Sunday. And it's interesting that while the two I would say lead candidates, President Sarkozy running for reelection and the Socialist candidate, Francois Hollande, while they disagree on many subjects, actually, I haven't seen at least from the speech that Hollande gave last month much daylight between the two on nuclear issues. So, French position may shift on some issues affecting NATO, perhaps on Afghanistan, possibly on missile defense, I don't know, but I think on nuclear issues, it won't. And one thing that has been kind of in the wind of the NATO debate is whether or not NATO should come up with a statement that is similar actually to what's called the negative security assurance that was in the 2010

NPR, and there are different views on this.

My personal guess is that there's not going to be a NATO-wide negative security assurance. For those who aren't familiar with the term, it basically says that a nuclear weapon state would not use nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear weapon state under certain conditions. And I don't remember the exact wording in the case of the U.S. 2010 NPR. It was that the U.S. wouldn't use nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear state that was a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with the treaty. So, there are several conditions there, but this is something that at least one country that I'm aware of in the French strategic community, they don't like this idea. I think there might be others, as well, but I don't feel it's particularly useful.

MR. NICHOLS: Again, I'll leave the Russian perspective aside. I think part of the problem is that after the incredible amount of effort it took to deal with the START Treaty, I think there's a kind of nuclear fatigue that sit in on some of these questions, and that tended to be a problem for a while, that there are these bursts of interest and what to do about nuclear weapons, is NATO going to be a nuclear alliance, and then something happens. And because there is no imminent nuclear war, that gets kind of pushed to the back burner. And I think Chicago, I agree with Jeff's characterization, but I also think that's partly the result of just a kind of exhaustion with the nuclear question because New START was just so much harder than it had to be, that everybody's kind of just throwing up their hands and saying, okay, that cake is as baked as it's going to get for now and let's just move on to the other things like Afghanistan and the looming deadlines there.

MR. CHALMERS: Yes, and I agree with what the others are saying. I think the dilemma people in NATO have is can they come up with some form of words, which sounds as if this DDPR is all not for nothing without offending anybody in the

process? (Laughter) And there are better diplomats than I am, they can achieve that objective. So, there's been all this discussion recently about transparency and confidence building and I'm sure they can come up with some form of words, which suggest that NATO is interested in such things. But I'm a little bit of a skeptic as to will it say something that's precise enough to mean that NATO will behave in a different way after Chicago from how it will before.

And in the declaratory policy a little while ago, people thought that declaratory policy might be the thing which we could do something about because I don't think it's necessarily about NATO's security assurances because NATO is not a state; it can't give those assurances. But both the U.S. and the U.K. have given new negative security assurances. They're the only two countries which assign nuclear weapons to NATO, and, therefore, some people have the bright idea that, perhaps, NATO could say something a little bit new in which suggested that the emphasis on using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states was, perhaps, less problems than it had been in the past. But as Leo said, it looks as though the French are going to block that even if nobody else does.

MR. NICHOLS: Just one note about the negative security assurance, it's not new.

MR. CHALMERS: Yes.

MR. NICHOLS: I mean, the Clinton Administration put a similar position on the table, and, actually, it goes all the way back to the Cold War, when we were kind of trying to divide the Eastern Europeans from the Soviets about who'd get nuked if things went back, but the negative security assurance, it's not a new concept and it's not a first time we've ever put it out there.

MR. MICHEL: And I think there's also one issue on declaratory policy,

and then there is some discussion going on in NATO that the United States and the Nuclear Posture Review said that the fundamental purpose nuclear weapons it to deter attack and set the goal of creating conditions in which the sole purpose of American nuclear weapons would be to deter nuclear attack on the United States, its friends, and its allies. And the question then is, well, should NATO move since the American strategic turn is the fundamental security guarantee for NATO? Should NATO move in that direction? And I think the French don't want to do it and there's simply just a different philosophy, which in the last several years the American policy has been to make a bit more precise and a bit more restricted the circumstances under which the United States would consider resorting to nuclear weapons, whereas the French philosophy is maximum ambiguity in their mind maintains the maximum deterrent value of the weapons. And it's very difficult to see how those sides are going to close on that argument, so it may not be that there's anything on that aspect of declaratory policy.

MR. PIFER: Well, let's go ahead and open it up for the questions. Please, right up here, and if you could just state your name and your affiliation, please.

MS. OSWALD: Rachel Oswald, Global Security Newswire.

Two questions. First, could somebody elaborate more on why they don't think it's going to happen or it's a good idea that the number of tactical warheads in Europe be consolidated from six bases to maybe two or three? And what about the potential for Russia and the United States agreeing to lower the alert level of their strategic nuclear weapons and possibly some tacticals, as well?

MR. PIFER: Okay.

MR. CHALMERS: Do you want me to have a go?

MR. PIFER: Go ahead.

MR. CHALMERS: Really good questions, Rachel. On the consolidation

to fewer countries, it's the countries which clearly are most reluctant to continue basing these weapons are most of all Germany, but also, I think, people assert that if Germany gave up this role, then the Netherlands and Belgium politically probably would do so, as well, which would leave only two countries, Italy and Turkey, holding those weapons. I mean, that's an option we discuss in our Carnegie paper. I think the argument against it would essentially be that Italy and Turkey will be quite reluctant to have these weapons and in a way, almost all the basing countries, all five of the countries which currently base these weapons are reluctant basers in one respect or another, and to the extent they're continuing with the role, it's because the others are doing so. They're doing it out of solidarity with the other basing country and with NATO as a whole, none of them want to unilaterally, and, therefore, once you take on brick out of the wall, then there's a concern the whole thing will fall apart.

Now, in our paper, we also say is there a distinction that could be made between those American weapons in Europe which are designed for use by European aircraft, where the modernization issues comes to the table, and those which are designed for use with American aircraft, where there's the same modernization issue? But you still have to put them somewhere, and you could put them in the United States, but that's a more radical option.

So, I think if we get to a state in this debate, which we probably will do at some stage, where it's very clear that basing in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium is no longer an option, and I don't think we're yet at that stage, but if we get to that stage and people are then faced with a choice of either only basing in Italy and Turkey or not basing in Europe at all, then I don't think only basing in Italy and Turkey will be totally off the agenda, but I think it'll be pretty difficult to sell in either of those countries. The Italians, I don't think, are that far from the North Europeans in their approach to this. This

a little bit quieter, but they're not that far in terms of their domestic politics. And the Turks, the Turk's own DCA aircraft as far as we know aren't trading actively in this role and the Americans don't have aircraft in Turkey for this role, but there are American warheads there. So, it's all pretty mixed up.

Second question, I mean, I guess the obvious way you could lower the levels further for these weapons would be to have them based in the United States, although you could have a higher level in the United States. How long does it take to get them over? But symbolically, I guess you could do that. And then the issue of strategic, there is a whole different kettle of fish, which maybe we can have in our discussion.

MR. PIFER: Okay.

MR. McCAUSLAND: And I know there are several members of the military in the audience, so, I spent a good portion of my military career stationed in Germany; I'm married to a German. I think the centrality in political terms of Germany in this cannot be discounted. If Germany decides to pull out, I think it's going to be very difficult, at least for Belgium and Holland to stay in, more problematically, as Malcolm says, perhaps for Turkey and Italy.

We have to understand how this has all evolved. Back in the day, back in the Cold War, when I was a young officer, at one point in time, we have 5,000 nuclear weapons in Germany, but Germany was West Germany and it was a frontline state. As a German military friend of mine said, we created a posture whereby if the Warsaw Pact attacked our deterrence in terms of being a German was we'll shoot ourselves, okay, because 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons going off mostly on West German soil was going to be a pretty bad day any way you cut it. Don't forget if you look back historically in the 1980s, probably the central country politically in that whole debate I would still argue was Germany. And I was in Bonn when the Bundestag voted to accept INF and there was

massive demonstrations in the streets. So, Germany remained central in that debate then, remains so now.

In many ways, this conversation began with the formation of the most current German coalition government in which one of the aspects of the -- and I love the way they speak about this in Germany. The coalition treaty between the two parties was the free democratic party insisting that a plank be introduced whereby Germany wished removal of these weapons from their territory, and that really started this whole conversation even though some of these questions over time, weapons platforms and aircraft becoming more and more obsolete were certainly in the background. And we have to keep in mind though we can talk about fewer or we could talk about more. Why not disperse this and have more countries being involved and sharing this burden more broadly?

As you go east now, Germany now finding itself where it's always wanted to be historically, and that is surrounded by allies, one might argue that you can move them east and you might find the Baltic republics or other Western European countries a lot more enthusiasm for it. Well, that might be true. At the same time, please don't forget when we formed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, we made pretty clear commitments that as we enlarge the alignment, we would make significant reallocation of either conventional forces or our nuclear forces on those new alliance members' territories. So, that historical backdrop is key in terms of how one still tries to maintain a level of nuclear burden sharing within the constraints that I think history and politics have framed the question by.

MR. NICHOLS: Can I say a word about alert levels? Because I don't think when it comes to nonstrategic nuclear weapons, that's not something we really have to deal with.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Yes.

MR. NICHOLS: In terms of they're not on airplanes that are warmed up on the runways. When it comes to strategic forces, that's a whole other kettle of fish because you don't want to lower alert levels without changing your doctrine about using nuclear weapons. The problem is right now, in my view -- and I also do not speak for the government, so it's a trifecta -- right now, we have a kind of mutual assured destruction, only smaller. Our current doctrine is like a "Mini Me" of our Cold War doctrine.

And the problem with lowering alerts is that then there's a real temptation to start signaling by raising them again. So, if you're going to lower alerts, you're going to have to really think that through a lot more carefully. You don't want to lose your competence. You certainly don't want the Russians to get lax about their procedures. On the other hand, you don't want them kind of on the edge of a knife either. But I think if you're going to lower alerts, you have to lower them and keep them there as you move toward a kind of minimum deterrence posture. You can't have the nuclear doctrines we have now and talk about lowering alerts because then I think you could take yourself right into the situation that you were trying to avoid, but with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, I just don't think it's much of an issue for that class of weapons.

MR. MICHEL: Yes, and just as a point of a fact, I mean, I think in the case of NATO nonstrategic nuclear weapons, during the Cold War, there were actually aircraft on what was called quick reaction alert, where the aircraft actually had the weapons mounted on the aircraft and could be launched very quickly. The last thing I saw from NATO said that the alert time or the alert status for NATO dual-capable aircraft is now measured in weeks or months, which suggests there would actually have to be some retraining and some things done. So, it's already pretty low on the NATO side.

MR. PIFER: A question in the back here.

MR. POMPER: Miles Pomper from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute.

Malcolm, in particular, I sort of have been having somewhat of an off-the-wall thought about how to approach this issue having written about it for the last years and everyone kind of saying the same things after a while. And it leads off in part the debate that's now in the U.K. on what's going to happen to the U.K. nuclear force, given the possibility of Scottish independence and budgetary issues there and concerns that some people saying we shouldn't have a separate U.K. nuclear deterrent.

What do you think of the idea of moving -- since the U.K. only gave up its tactical nuclear weapons about six years ago of the U.S.-based tactical nuclear weapons in the U.K.? What about moving the weapons that are now in Northern Europe to the U.K. if the U.K. doesn't want to have its own strategic nuclear deterrent? Sort of killing two birds with one stone.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Yes, put them in Scotland.

MR. CHALMERS: Well, I haven't had that question before, you're quite right.

MR. POMPER: Speak for England, Malcolm. (Laughter)

MR. CHALMERS: I just wrote a paper on the Scottish question last week, so, that's on the top of my agenda and something people in the U.K. at least worry about. I suppose the flippant answer to your question is we'd take the American weapons if the French did, but, of course, the French, I mean, one of the ironies of this whole debate about nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe is the countries that have them don't want them, and the countries that don't have them want the ones who don't want them to keep them. Anyway, if the countries that were basing them were the ones that wanted to keep them, then there really, really wouldn't be an issue.

And the French, of course, expelled the American nuclear weapons way back in the 1960s. There's absolutely no discussion of France whatsoever about reintroducing American weapons into that country. The French are very, very keen that the Germans should keep them in their territory. So, go figure.

And on the U.K. question, I mean, no, no, that is not a tradeoff. The U.K. was involved in the Manhattan Project right from the beginning; it's been a nuclear weapon state since the 1940s. I think the political momentum in favor of continuing Britain's nuclear status in some form is a pretty strong one. I mean, there's a big debate right now about the enormous costs of replacing our current Trident boats and they may well have to amend that decision in some way or postpone it after the next election. The coalition government is divided on it. And as a number of people observed and as, indeed, people in the U.K. government will tell you, if Scotland were to expel the U.K. nuclear weapons in the event of independence after 2015, there wouldn't be anywhere obvious for them to go in the U.K. But as I argued in an article last week, I don't know whether this is a great precedent or not, but when Ireland became independent in 1921, the treaty between Dublin and London specified that the Royal Navy would be allowed to keep its treaty ports in Ireland after independence. And Éamon de Valera, the Irish leader, only insisted on them leaving in 1938 because the Irish wanted to remain neutral in the event of a war with Germany, so the person that removed its naval forces from Ireland on the brink of World War II and kept Ireland out of the war. I don't think that's quite applicable to Scotland, but in the unlikely event of a yes vote in 2014, then I suspect a foreign basing arrangement would continue for some time.

MR. PIFER: Right there.

MR. GOOZNER: Merrill Goozner with the *Fiscal Times*.

Several people have talked about all of this discussion taking place in the

context of budget austerity and every country. Could you just quantify that in some way? How much is potentially at stake in terms of savings with the shifts in policy and I think it was Tom Nichols that mentioned other priorities. What might it be shifted to or how much could be said?

MR. NICHOLS: I had mentioned other priorities with the Russians, that their defense sector is more rigid and that their economy in general is more rigid in terms of being able to shift people out of those kind of priorities. I actually -- and, again, speaking only for myself, I don't think that the issue of nuclear reductions is primarily an austerity issue. They're cheap; both nonstrategic nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons just aren't that expensive. I mean, the whole point of deploying them in the first place 50 years ago was on our side more bang for the buck and on their side, more rubble for the ruble. So, I don't see this as being driven -- and I may be wrong, I don't see Washington or Moscow being driven as an austerity issue. In Moscow, I think it's more of where do you put these specialists and what would you do if you weren't building another generation of strategic nuclear weapons, but I just don't think this is where the money is in anybody's budget in a nuclear state.

MR. MICHEL: Well, some of the officials that I've discussed this with are German, and I hate to report what they think their internal estimates are, but there are different ways in the case of Germany of approaching this problem, and one is to extend through various measures cannibalizing some systems to put them on the Tornados which are currently dual-capable, which is only a part of their total fleet. And it would cost money, but there are ways of even making a Euro fighter capable of making them into dual-capable aircraft. But that would be more expensive in the way the Euro fighter is currently designed, but not designed for that role.

There are other costs, which are associated with the physical protection

of weapons, the upgrading of vaults. Some of this is absorbed by common NATO budgets, but some actually does fall to the host country. But from what I know generally of these figures, they're not really enormous. I've heard this brought up by some Germans who are opposed to the presence of nuclear weapons there to say that no, there are enormous costs involved and it's insecure somehow, this is the target for terrorism. I think the security issue involved with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, I'm much more concerned about the security of Russian weapons than I would be of the U.S. nuclear weapons that are --

MR. PIFER: And taking them apart is pricey, too.

MR. McCAUSLAND: Yes. The only thing I would add to that is I think you can measure this in different ways. You can measure it in dollars, euros, pound, whatever, and that's one measure of costs. Again, colleagues I've talked with in Germany have talked of a number on the Tornado extension of a couple hundred million euros at a minimum. Again, that's all numbers and those kind of (inaudible) is fungible. Are you talking about extending the airplane? Again, some of the other costs that Leo had alluded to in extending or training more crews, maintaining runways, maintaining the physical plant, but a couple hundred million euros for extending the aircraft in Germany seems to be what I've heard most frequently, but there's a political cost.

At some point in time, somewhere buried in the German defense budget will be a line item for a couple hundred euros. Now, that may not be an enormous amount of money. Does that galvanize then a political price that has to be paid A or B to maintaining that or not maintaining that?

In the United States, bureaucratically, obviously, there's clear costs associated with the F-35, but I would argue it's, again, from working in the Pentagon, it's not the number, but what kind of number would you like, as a budget analyst said one

time. (Laughter) Do you want a good number or would you like a bad number? Are you talking about just strictly the cost to modify the aircraft or are you talking the entire lifecycle cost which, again, has to do with training crews, et cetera. Many people in the Air Force, frankly, are pretty split on this, about devoting even though this may only be, as Tom said, not a large portion. How much money do we devote into something that we're really having fewer and fewer clear rationales in military terms how this all sorts itself out, number one?

Number two is, at least in the United States, on the other side, one could argue the United States has global commitments, we can't forget that, that may require these weapons. At one point in time, we did, in fact, deploy similar weapon platforms to the Korean Peninsula. We have subsequently removed those, however. Okay, but at one point in time, a year or so ago, when the North Koreans decided to shell this particular island, there was some in North Korea that said, well, as one of the responses, perhaps you should redeploy weapons like this back to South Korea as a demonstrable statement of our disquiet about you guys doing that and to further reassure the South Koreans. I think it was fortunate that we didn't follow that, but that was bought up. So, there are some who argue no, no, even though there are political, bureaucratic, and financial costs associated, we need to think about this not only solely in the European contingency, perhaps other places around the globe.

MR. PIFER: Tom, let me put one more question to you. The large number of Russian weapons, where we say 2,000 to 5,000, and I wonder if you could drill down a little bit more as to why so many. And I bear in mind the conversation that I had with a retired Russian general about a year ago where I asked him, I said, look, if the Chinese Army invades you in Siberia, how many tactical weapons do you drop on them before either the Chinese Army withdraws or you escalate to strategic nuclear strikes

against China Proper? And it seems to me that that number is not going to be 1,000 or 100 or it's going to be a couple of dozen at the most, but what's your sense? Why are the Russians sort of maintaining such a large arsenal?

MR. NICHOLS: I think this goes back, again, there's a Soviet reflex in all of this that, historically, we've always characterized the Soviets as suffering from gigantomania. We have to have the most, the biggest, the joke about Gorbachev claiming the Soviet Union made the world's biggest microchips, and stuff like that. (Laughter) But for the Soviet military, there is this obsession that quantity matters. That old expression quantity has a quality all its own, and they simply accept it as a tenet of faith. But partly, I think, this plays into the fact that so much of their investment, and I'm not an economist and I don't even play one on TV, but so much of their fixed investment was in the defense sector that it had to go somewhere, and if they had a complex of remaining tactical nuclear weapons, then they're ideological predispositions, they're operational beliefs, and the way that their defense sector was structured created to just crank these things out.

Now, they weren't alone in that. I mean, let's remember that in the 1970s, the Strategic Air Command at one point identified 40,000 separate targets in the Soviet Union. Let me just say that again, 40,000 separate targets in the Soviet Union. And, in fact, when Dick Cheney got his first briefing on the U.S. war plan and all these little red dots lit up all over the Soviet map, he said who ordered this? And the head of the Air Force said you did, sir, you and your predecessors, which I thought was that could have just as easily been the head of the Soviet General Staff. So, there is the tendency to make weapons, assign targets to them.

I think with tactical weapons in particular, the Soviets were pushed to this numerical obsession because they look at a map and saw nothing but land borders all

around them, whereas for us, when NATO was thinking about the use of tactical nuclear weapons during the Cold War, you could drive that corridor of nuclear use. Well, Jeff, you were there. I mean, you could drive the whole battlefield that was going to be nuclearized in the space of a few hours, whereas for the Soviet Union, they said we're going to be going all the way from the northern peninsula all the way down to the border with Turkey all the way out to Central Asia across to the Soviet Far East, so we might as well have a lot of them. And I think it became a momentum that they simply didn't know how to get out of both for ideological predispositions and, again, because of the way their defense industry is structured. And I think now, they don't know how to get out of it.

MR. PIFER: Malcolm?

MR. CHALMERS: I agree with that. Where I think there's quite a lot of ambiguity, at least from my point of view, is whether despite all of that, the Russians are still doing what the Americans are doing, but with a time lag of gradually phasing out these weapons as they realize how useless this large number is, but also because of the cost maintaining them, the higher priority they're giving to strategic modernization, where they see more of an operational role. And we don't know how many the Russians have, but if you look at the estimates we try to have in the public sphere, then they tend to suggest the numbers in Russia are coming down and not going up. The ideas that the Russians are giving a big spending priority to their nonstrategic nuclear force, I don't think that's right. They're giving a big budgetary priority to their strategic nuclear force. So, part of the dance around transparency in relation to Russia, I think, is at what stage the Russians will feel it's in their interest to be transparent and is that when they will review they get fewer than we think they have or when they reveal they got more than we think they have? It's a delicate game around transparency. What clearly wouldn't help if they revealed a very large number bigger than we thought. I think that's probably unlikely.

And the further final point I'd make in that is that the status of these weapons really matters quite a bit. When people talk about Russia having 5,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, they're normally including quite a large number, which many people of the FAS and others say are warheads awaiting dismantlement, and the United States also has several thousand warheads awaiting dismantlement. And I think we've got to be very careful in relation to arms control to not spend the next 5 or 10 years talking about how best to have transparency in relation to weapons awaiting dismantlement because that's really not going to help stability and security between our countries. We need to focus on the weapons, which are most dangerous.

MR. NICHOLS: And one other fiscal issue, and that is well, first of all, I agree. I don't think, and I know academics aren't supposed to say this out loud, I have no basis for thinking this, but I don't think there are 5,000 operational Russian tactical nuclear weapons out there. That number just seems way too -- I've always thought it was somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 because that's the number they seem to be comfortable talking with, that that's the one where they'll kind of nod and say, yes, you're getting warmer. But from a fiscal point of view, getting rid of those weapons is actually going to be in some ways more expensive for them. I mean, U.S. DOE has already accepted, and this was reported in our press, DOE is talking about something like a 15-year backlog for dismantling our weapons, that if we want it to go any faster, just take them apart. You don't just throw them in the dumpster and call them on trash day and say I have a sofa, a table, and a couple of nuclear weapons that need to go to the dump. These things are really hard to get rid of.

And from the Russian perspective, both for the sake of money and for the sake of security, they may be saying, look, we get it that there's no reason to keep these things around, and operationally these things aren't doing us any good and we

don't really care about putting the squeeze on you Americans with them. But because of our own problems, we really need to leave them right where they are for now because that's how we know where they are and that's how we know where they're guarded because the minute we take them offline and start trying to put them in areas for disposal and storage and shed and things like that, we, the Russians, open up a whole other world of problems for ourselves both financial and security-related, and that scares me more than leaving them where they are.

MR. McCAUSLAND: I think that's exactly right, and part of it is, again, back to bureaucratic politics. If you have shrinking resources and you're prioritizing where it's spent, you can defer getting rid of an old weapon, I'll do that next year, I'll do that the year after at, I'll do that the year after that; well, I'm devoting resources at things that I find most pressing.

Number two; as long as I have this thing, there is some possibility, however remote, that I'll extract some concession from my potential adversary or protagonist in terms of getting rid of them.

And number three; I think as Malcolm pointed out, we have a real problem. If you get down into I think the problem of mixing and matching all these warheads of answering the following question: When does a device become a warhead and when does a warhead quit being a warhead? I mean, and you get down to some real very precise technical questions that just kind of makes your head hurt.

And last but not least, I think I would just say in all that, there may be another thing we need to think about. The more we talk about these particular weapons, we may be suggesting to the Russians that they are far more worrisome to us than they really are, which actually could actually complicate the process. And I come back to, fundamentally, I think our biggest concern is the nature of the security, particularly of the

Russian stockpile and the common threat that it poses both sides.

MR. PIFER: Okay, great. Well, at this point, I'm going to have to end it because we're a couple of minutes over. Let me just remind folks that if you didn't get this when you came in, there are copies outside, and the third paragraph here will tell you where you go to log on to get a free mailed copy of the hardcopy of the book *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO*.

We're going to break now for about 15 minutes. Please come back at 3:45 and we'll have our next panel, which will then take a look at nuclear weapons issues that go beyond Chicago, looking out the next 8 to 10 years and addressing some of the questions that the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review may not finalize in Chicago next month. But before you go, please join me in thanking our panelists. (Applause)

(Recess)

MS. O'DONNELL: (in progress) O'Donnell. I'm a nonresident fellow at the Center on U.S. and Europe here at Brookings, originally from the Center for European Reform in London. It is my pleasure to welcome you here for the second panel of today's event on the future of nonstrategic nuclear weapons within the NATO alliance.

The discussions over the first panel clearly seemed to indicate that there is a strong likelihood that the DDPR process will not allow NATO allies -- will not be the opportunity for NATO allies to address the difficult questions that are facing them on the future of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the alliance. They seem to be highlighted for them to try and push these difficult decisions further down the line.

And so this second panel will look at the next decade, so they'll be looking beyond Chicago, and over this time period where it will become increasingly difficult for NATO allies to be able to ignore these key questions, not least because some of the military capabilities which are required for NATO to be able to maintain its non-

strategic capability will need to be renewed. So, a lot of the drill-capable aircraft will need to be renewed. Then key decisions need to be made in that area.

So, we will, therefore, over the course of the next hour and a half, discuss what is likely to happen over this next decade and how should European countries and United States go about attempting to maintain deterrence and reassurance in an alliance where there's just so much disagreement about the merits of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

To discuss these issues we are very fortunate to have four prominent experts, which I would very much like to welcome this afternoon. From my direct right outward, we have Paul Schulte, nonresident senior associate at the Nuclear Policy Program at Carnegie; Steve Pifer, senior fellow at the Center on United States and Europe here at Brookings; Malcolm Chalmers, research director at RUSI in London; and George Perkovich, vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at Carnegie.

As was mentioned earlier on, these four experts have just recently published a report, which is looking at exactly the issue we'll be discussing now on looking beyond the Chicago Summit, discussing indeed what the future for nuclear weapons in Europe looks like. And hopefully, we'll be able to explore some of the key findings that they discuss in this report.

In terms of how we will proceed, George Perkovich will speak first and offer a few opening remarks for about seven to eight minutes, which are designed to frame the current debate. Then Malcolm Chalmers will offer some thoughts on some of the key considerations that emanated from the DDPR debate relating to the notions of deterrence but ensuring on reassurance. Steve Pifer will then lay out some of the challenges and scenarios regarding the future of dual-capable aircraft within Europe.

And Paul Schulte will then close by discussing some of the options, full-strengthening non-nuclear reassurance within the alliance if indeed NATO allies are to scale back their nuclear means. Once the first panelists has made opening remarks, we will open the debate to the floor.

And on that, George, the floor is yours.

MR. PERKOVICH: Thanks, Clara, and thank you all for joining. And those of you who -- this is going on to your third hour of NATO nuclear things; you might want to think about that. (Laughter) But it's hot out, so.

I also want to begin by saying we had a fifth colleague who was extremely important to this process, Jacqueline Tanler (phonetic 00:03:4), to whom we're grateful for her contributions.

You spent a couple of hours talking about a number of the issues and the sources of tension or the considerations that need to be resolved over the nuclear issue in the context of defense and deterrence and the DDPR, and so I'm not going to repeat those here. I just want to talk a little bit about the framework of the paper that we collaborated on, and it was actually -- it was a remarkably constructive and efficient collaboration.

But the idea of framing in terms of looking beyond Chicago was that for reasons that, again, were discussed in the earlier session about, you know, Afghanistan, budgetary crisis, all the other priorities that are affecting the leaders of the NATO government, we didn't expect that there would be a resolution of the fundamental issues that we talked about earlier and that we'll talk about a little more here.

And yet there's also a natural tendency -- the way these things work is you have a big summit. There's a lot of work in the ramp-up to that. Once the summit is done it's like giving birth to an elephant, which I can only imagine, and I would imagine

that after doing that you would want to rest for a while and think about other things than producing more elephants. And so there will be a natural tendency after Chicago for people to say, okay, we got through that, crisis averted, things papered over, what have you, let's forget about it for a while. And our view was actually that the issues that we're going to talk about, you know, having to do with replacement of the DCA, maintaining the shared responsibility for the nuclear role for NATO, very concrete issues of reassurance, all of those issues are too important, but also too difficult to effect in a short time to allow them to be put off after Chicago, which would be the natural tendency.

So, we cast this in terms of looking beyond Chicago and are having this event now and publishing the paper now in hopes that perhaps in Chicago there may be made there a commitment to keep the focus going within NATO to keep active work within the bureaucracy and within each of these states on these hard issues that need to be resolved rather than putting them off for three years or five years where the resolution probably won't be any clearer. So, that was kind of the conception of the way we did this.

And then the paper and our thinking about it concentrated on two questions, and they're in the paper, but I think they're -- they may be a little verbose, but there are some subtlety and importance in the formulation.

So, the first question that we address but we think needs to be on that agenda after Chicago and very actively worked on is that given the difficulties involved in maintaining the nuclear status quo in NATO -- and those difficulties, again as you discussed earlier, some would have to do with the infrastructure, the delivery systems, their aging, the decisions required to do that -- but also the status quo is challenged from different directions in favor of disarmament, concerns from CEE states. So, the status quo is going to be difficult to maintain.

Well, given that, what alternative forms of nuclear sharing and basing

might be available that could simultaneously meet the three key requirements: one, of wide participation in the mission; two, reassurance for those states that are seen as most vulnerable; and three, making a significant contribution to the wider disarmament effort? And those three things are difficult to reconcile, but that's one of the key questions we're trying to address.

Then the second question is what it means if any can be deployed to bolster non-nuclear reassurance of those allies that feel most exposed to external threat. Now, again, there's a lot of work been done on that. There are a lot of possible answers. But we want to go beyond that, so who's going to provide those means, and when are they going to do it? And if European nuclear and nuclear-basing members of the alliance choose not to renew their commitments to base and deliver forward-deployed weapons, in the absence of an alliance consensus on removing them -- so, in other words, a few states are making decisions in the absence of a consensus on removal -- how can NATO then demonstrate a credible conventional reassurance, again, to the most exposed members?

Others have asked those questions. I think the paper and in the presentations you hear we go into them, I think, in fairly good depth with, I think, mindful -- we try to be mindful of the legitimate differing interests of the states involved. Then we noticed one of the reasons to do this work was that, you know, there's a tendency amongst some of those whose emphasis is on let's just remove the weapons, withdraw them. There tends to then be kind of an illusion or gliding over about what they would then do to substitute for the reassurance that the more exposed members of the alliance want. So, we're trying to be more concrete about, okay, what is feasible? It's nice to say, well, we'll figure out something. But if you're feeling exposed and vulnerable, you want more than that, so we try to work on that.

We've also found that some of those more exposed states who really want to maintain the forward-deployed force aren't contributing even the 2 percent of their budgets to defense that could be useful, then, in bolstering up the non-nuclear assurances. So on the one hand, there's -- so, that's a free-riding potential problem. But then others who want to maintain the status quo don't have much to say then about contributing either to the disarmament objective or the nonproliferation obligations that some states feel. So, we've tried to take all that into account and then address each of these issues in a fair amount of detail.

Clara outlined kind of who did what, so I think kind of with that framing, I would turn it over to Malcolm, who kind of distills, you know, what we and many of you have been hearing over the last few years in terms of the debate on this set of issues. Okay?

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you. Yes. Malcolm.

MR. CHALMERS: Thank you, Clara.

As we wrote this paper, I think we became more convinced -- I certainly did -- that NATO's formulation about what the question is in terms of what the appropriate mix is between nuclear and conventional missile defense was actually quite a useful way of structuring this question. And the conclusions we came up with in our paper were about how the appropriate mix might change in relation to both nuclear and conventional.

But I wanted to start, really, with an observation about the title of the review, the deterrence and defense posture. And I think one of the challenges in relation to the nuclear component of the appropriate mix is it's quite hard to get a handle on what the defense role of those weapons is or what people think it should be. And we very deliberately asked a lot of people when we were preparing this paper what they saw the operational role of these weapons being. And we did get some answers which

suggested that there might be an operational role, and in particular I think as a form of signaling prior to moving to the use of strategic weapons is not a new rationale, but it's a residual rationale, which, for some people we talked to, still had some merit. So, it's not that there is nobody that says there's any operational role, but it's pretty clear, I think, from being involved in this issue over years and talking to many of those people much more directly involved in the operations. So, that's not the driving force for these weapons.

And it's probably not even really centrally about deterrence, although it's a deterrence and defense posture if you -- deterrence is not really the driving force of the sort of nonstrategic nuclear force we have. One of the things we argue in the paper is that even if you accept that signaling rationale, the need to signal with a small number of weapons before escalation in a situation where you think nuclear use is an option, it would need a much smaller force. I mean, Tom referred to this in the last session, relation to the Russia-China dyad. But for NATO, if there were such a rationale, you're not talking about using dozens and dozens of weapons; you're talking about much smaller numbers. So, we asked the question in our paper about that.

No, I think what we argued, really, is that the real debate about the appropriate mix isn't about deterrence and defense in a pure sense at least. It's about four more political factors, each of which points to a different conclusion, a desirable conclusion, and each of which has its own supporters in different NATO member states. And I just wanted to structure my remarks about what those four political factors are, bearing in mind, of course, that there is still a defense and deterrence core in the debate.

The first, clearly, is the nuclear disarmament point. I mean, the primary reason why this issue is high on the agenda is because of that very clear German government statement. And that German government statement was driven by a view

that NATO should be doing more on the nuclear disarmament front. And it's not about cost. We talked about cost there. If there are some costs involved, if the Germans, as we say in the paper -- if the Germans were -- if the rest of NATO -- if the United States offered to pay all the costs that Germany might incur from nuclear modernization, it probably wouldn't make very much difference to German political debate. It's more about a view that NATO should be doing as much as it can on disarmament, especially in relation to weapons which, from their point of view, have no clear value. These weapons were on the front line during the cold war. They are no longer in that position. So, that's a first and I think important political driver for this debate and of course points to a particular conclusion.

A second political driver, which I think is also important, is reassurance, vis-à-vis Russia, which is not the same as that first point. It may overlap it, but it's not the same point. If that wasn't an issue, if we didn't have a NATO-Russia founding act, then we could simply move the weapons from those countries that don't want them to those countries that do and from the front line we had in 1985 to the "front line" that we have today, whether that's on the Turkey-Iranian border or the Estonian-Russian border. And even saying that, of course, you know, makes it pretty clear that those are not front lines in the sense that the inner German border was in the 1980s. But not only do we have a clear commitment not to do that in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, but it would be highly provocative and not something anybody in the current state of NATO-Russia relations would want to contemplate -- so, reassuring Russia blocks off many of the options, and I think rightly so.

The third political factor is a need to respond to concerns about burden sharing, which are primarily American concerns, and that's the main driver for the current shape of the American nuclear presence in Europe. It's not an operational reason that

we have it based, we're told, have American nuclear weapons in Europe based in five countries rather than one or two. It's driven mainly, I think, I would argue -- I think we would argue -- by American concerns that as long as NATO is in nuclear lines, there should be a sharing of the responsibilities for that role. And there are some rather less visible support aspects to that: area refueling, suppression of enemy air defenses, et cetera, conventional elements of that nuclear role.

But the most visible -- although not always acknowledged, but is pretty visible in this debate -- the most visible aspect of that, burden sharing, is the basing of American nuclear weapons on your territory and involvement of your aircraft potentially in strike roles. So, that's the third political aspect.

Now, here we argue that there may be scope for change and alteration, which should be put into that appropriate mix discussion. And we articulate options, and I apologize in advance for this, but for smock (phonetic) sharing, other ways to think creatively about how sharing is organized or not. And are there ways in which, if it comes to it, sharing could continue without German or Belgian, perhaps Dutch, aircraft involved or not?

And this is about politics. It's about sharing the political burdens, not least, I think, about American perceptions of the desirability from an American point of view of a situation, which the number of states with a very direct, visible engagement in this mission was less. And we talk about options that may involve European pilots serving in American squadrons in Italy or serving in American squadrons back here in the U.S., and are those just going to be viewed as fig leafs here or are they going to be viewed as something more credible?

And we also argue, finally, on this particular aspect, that we don't think it's impossible for NATO where these weapons all need to be based in the United States

or to be withdrawn from Europe. We don't think it's impossible in those circumstances for NATO to agree to their return to Europe in the event of conflict. And that's something that people argue about quite a lot. And we make the case that if we are basing this structure on the assumption that NATO might be able to agree by consensus to the release of these weapons in times of war, then it's not less incredible for them in times of war to agree as a signal prior to nuclear use for some of those weapons to be returned to Europe.

Now, both are incredible, because the sort of war in which nuclear use might be contemplated is so remote in Europe anyway. But I think to dismiss the U.S. simply on the basis of that argument I don't think we felt was credible. There are other arguments clearly on that. And such a consolidation or withdrawal would have advantages in relation to the first two criteria.

And finally and fourthly, we argue that there's a political requirement to respond to the reassurance needs of the most exposed states, most of all the Baltic states and Turkey and Poland perhaps just to a lesser extent. And in our paper -- and Paul will talk more about this, so I will be very brief -- we articulate ways in which that reassurance might be strengthened in ways that are compatible with changes in nuclear posture, though, and the likely changes in nuclear posture.

And in principal, it shouldn't be so hard to enhance reassurance to those more exposed states, given the relatively limited nature of the threats that are faced. And the limited amounts, which the Baltic states -- and in particular, Spain in their own defense -- suggest that they are not overly alarmed about a traditional invasion threat of the sort that one normally associates with a possible nuclear response.

But I think it is the case that after a decade in which the United States and other NATO countries were focused in Afghanistan, and we're now talking about a

pivot to a part of the world even further away from Europe than Afghanistan to East Asia, there is a concern amongst the more exposed states in Europe and that the United States in particular -- but perhaps also some other European countries in Western Europe -- don't take Article V guarantees to those states seriously. And if new risks, new threats were developed in the future that they would be left on their own if that's the context in which there is a concern that any removal of any symbols of American presence in Europe is viewed in those states.

So, to conclude, on the basis of those four essentially political drivers of this debate, we proffered some ideas about how the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional should be changed, both in relation to nuclear and in relation to conventional in a way which we think doesn't provide a perfect solution but perhaps moves NATO forward and provides some potential for building more consensus on this issue than there is at present.

Thanks, Clara.

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you very much, Malcolm. Steve?

MR. PIFER: Thank you. I'm going to talk and focus it on the question of dual-capable aircraft from the point that right now when you're talking about NATO nonstrategic nuclear weapons we're referring to American B-61 bombs, four deployed in Europe, and the aircraft that are certified wired for delivery of them. And, again, according to the Federation of American Scientists, what we're talking about is nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and Netherlands for use by the Air Force of the United States, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Italy.

But as NATO looks through the deterrence and defense posture view, there's an elephant in the room or right outside the door, which I think in Chicago they can probably overlook for the next five years. But if you're looking down the road

10 years, there is a question: Could NATO sustain its current posture with regard to a dual-capable aircraft? And I think our analytical view is that 10 years from now NATO's posture is likely to look different than it does today, because national decisions have been taken and are being taken about replacing the current generation of aircraft with the successor aircraft, which may or may not have the capability to deliver nuclear weapons. And that, in turn, can have an impact on things such as the alliance's ability to reassure those allies that feel vulnerable.

So, let me just talk briefly about what's happening just in hardware terms. I mean, the case of the U.S. Air Force is pretty clear. The nuclear posture view specified that the United States will maintain a capability to forward deploy fighter bombers that are dual-capable, and the plan is that the F-35 will succeed the F-16 in that role.

But when you look to other NATO air forces, you get some different answers. For example, in the case of Germany, the German air force currently plans to fly the Tornado, which is dual-capable, to beyond 2020. They've not yet articulated a specific end date. But originally, you know, several years ago the original plan was to retire the Tornadoes around 2015, 2018. So, they are extending that. And they're extending that, because when the Tornado goes away, the replacement is the Eurofighter, and the Eurofighter is now not planned to be wired for nuclear weapons. And given the political sentiment in Germany, I think it's virtually impossible to see a decision by the German government to give the Eurofighter a nuclear capability.

When I was there in November, one person made the observation, he said, look, nuclear weapons are now not a controversial issue in Germany, even though there's a fairly strong anti-nuclear sentiment here, because everyone understands when the Tornadoes go away, the American nuclear weapons go away. But if there was a decision to try to give the Eurofighter a nuclear capability that would immediately make

this a very big issue. And they were very dubious that the government could sustain that position.

In the case of the Netherlands, the Dutch air force is looking at the F-35 to replace the F-16. It hasn't made a final decision yet. But there, too, I think politically there's a fairly strong anti-nuclear sentiment. And also as it becomes clear that the German air force is on track to go non-nuclear, that could have a major, if not a decisive, impact on a Dutch decision.

In the case of Belgium, the Belgium air force at this point has not yet made a decision on replacing the F-16, and there is some talk even that the Belgium air force, for financial reasons, may actually abandon the fighter-bomber role. But if they do procure a successor for the F-16 or extend the life of their F-16s, I think the judgment is that the Belgian decision on whether to maintain that nuclear role would likely be impacted by what the Germans and the Dutch do.

In the case of Italy, it leaves on track to procure F-35s to replace its dual-capable Tornadoes, and the sense is that the Italian government is probably more ready to maintain a nuclear role with a bit of nervousness in Rome if it becomes apparent that the Northern tier -- Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands -- is moving away from a nuclear role.

And finally, in the case of Turkey, it also is talking about the F-35 to replace its F-16s. But as we've noted in the first panel, the Turkish air force F-16s are believed no longer to have a nuclear role, and it's not clear whether the Turkish government envisages that role for the F-35s.

So, you're in a situation now with five countries hosting American nuclear weapons and four countries providing dual-capable aircraft. Where that does spread the burden, it does also then give political cover to those countries. And the question then

becomes if the numbers come down, if the countries hosting weapons are reduced, if the countries that are flying dual-capable aircraft are reduced, how far can that go without generating pressure on the residual countries? That might become very hard to bear.

So, in the paper we talk about five alternate postures for dual-capable aircraft. But I think three considerations apply in each case. One is because in each case you're talking about a reduced posture in terms of fewer countries hosting weapons or providing dual-capable aircraft. It could have the impact of diminishing reassurance in the sense that those countries that feel vulnerable are likely to be more assured if they see a wider number of countries hosting weapons and flying dual-capable aircraft.

A second issue is that to the extent that those numbers go down in terms of countries hosting or flying dual-capable aircraft, it could raise a question of burden sharing, and one focus would be the U.S. Congress. If too much of that nuclear burden looks to be borne by just the United States, what kind of questions does that raise within Congress?

And finally, as the numbers go down I think there's an expectation that that probably increases the chances of political pressure on those countries that are maintaining nuclear roles to follow suit and also move towards a non-nuclear position. So, those are some of the considerations.

The five alternative postures would be:

Posture number one is that some European countries, one or two, abandon the dual-capable aircraft role and the B-61 bombs leave those countries, but that other countries maintain the role as well as U.S. dual-capable aircraft.

The second posture would be Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands would abandon the dual-capable aircraft role, and the B-61s would be withdrawn from those countries, but you would still have B-61s remaining in Italy and Turkey. The U.S.

would maintain a dual-capable unit in Italy, and the Italian air force might also maintain a capability to deliver nuclear weapons -- so, again, a smaller capability than in the first alternative but still having a European engagement with regard to dual-capable aircraft.

And the third alternative, you would basically have all of the European air forces drop their dual-capable role, and so it would only be an American unit, the F--16 unit, at Aviano in Italy that would have a dual-capable mission. And you might then take that unit and multilateralize it in the sense that you could assign German, Belgian, Dutch, even Polish pilots to that American unit. And so it would have something of a NATO character. And that might be a way to sort of spread the burden a little bit. But a question that you would have to ask is would Italy or some other country be prepared to be the only country hosting that single unit and be the only country hosting American nuclear weapons?

A fourth alternative, which was talked about I think a couple of years ago, although it seems to have fallen out of the discussion, is that NATO might procure its own squadron of dual-capable aircraft much in the same way that NATO owns and operates a squadron of airborne warning and control system aircraft.

And that's an interesting option, but there are some questions. One, buying a group of aircraft will be expensive. Does NATO have the funds from that out of common funds? Second, how would you decide what other roles, because the nuclear -- well, you wouldn't want to keep aircraft just for the nuclear role? There would have to be other missions that you'd want to use these aircraft for. How would you determine that? And then, finally, again, if you have this single squadron, where do you base it and its nuclear weapons? Is there one country that's prepared to be singularized in the sense of hosting those aircraft as weapons?

And then the fifth option would be that Europeans would drop the dual-

capable aircraft role, all the B-61 weapons would be brought back to the United States, and there would be a U.S.-based dual-capable unit that, again, could be multilateral. It could have German, Polish, Dutch exchange pilots, and you could ask of the Europeans if they would maintain some capability in Europe to allow their redeployment to Europe of American dual-capable aircraft and also of B-61 weapons. So, you might ask the Germans and the Dutch to maintain the weapon storage vaults and such. So, you would have that capability. I think, as Malcolm said, you know, it wouldn't be impossible, but I think the idea in a crisis of moving weapons back to Europe, I mean, soon I think it would be a politically difficult question that would require a lot of consideration within NATO.

So, when we looked at this we said there are four or five different alternate postures for NATO dual-capable aircraft compared to the current one. But, again, I think in each case, compared to what you have now, it's likely to result in some diminished reassurance to allies. It may raise more questions about nuclear burden sharing with the alliance, particularly within the U.S. Congress. And also to the extent that the number of countries hosting weapons is decreased, it probably generates more political pressure on those countries. And that then led us to think about are there other ways that you might proceed to provide reassurance in the non-nuclear area.

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you very much. Now to Paul.

MR. SCHULTE: Well, we spelled out as clearly as we thought we could on page 9, in fact, what the operational and political functions of these weapons were, and then we -- I guess you could describe our position as collective agnosticism about whether this was a good idea, whether it's worked, whether it didn't work. We tried not to get into that. But we were skeptical about the sustainability of present arrangements.

So, we looked at reassurance if this was to change. If NATO would negotiate with itself, as it tends to do, to come up with a different, appropriate mix, how

could that be done with a harmonious outcome? What would be the way of distressing the alliance? We didn't think that this was an issue that would tear the alliance apart. It's significant, but we didn't think it was first order. But, obviously, we should be interested in maintaining maximum cohesion in the alliance.

And that got into required thinking about reassurance, which is notoriously harder and more complicated than deterrence. It's like subjectivity squared. If you don't really know what deters the other side, how do you really know what should reassure alliance members about what they think reassures -- deters a potential enemy.

So, the issues are a bit subterranean as well as subjective, because this is not something we discovered. It is very openly talked about. The alliance negotiations on this are being conducted behind closed doors, because this is sensitive, emotional stuff. Countries fear that other countries are not rational about this, not reasonable. Bombs are not bombs. They're indicators. They're Rorschach tests.

Who is entitled to say, for example, whether in our discussions we heard the Baltics are being hysterical because of the past; the Germans are being compulsively debellicized; pacifists are seeking deals with Russia; the Russians are paranoid because of their approach to nuclear weapons? Who is entitled to reach these judgments? It didn't seem it was very fruitful to go into that. So, we tried to go with understanding and not criticizing other people, other strategic cultures.

It was clear, however, that the attitude to forward-based American nuclear weapons was in some ways for some groups a kind of surrogate for attitudes to Russia, attitudes to the dependability of the U.S. alliance in general. So, bigger things were projected onto these bombs than just the bombs themselves.

The people who were most open and found it easiest to be absolutely certain and outspoken were the anti-nuclear movement and the peace movement, and

they were worried about the whole discourse of reassurance, because they could see that just as an excuse to do nothing. And that prejudiced what they saw was the glittering possibility here, which is to unfreeze political relationships between Russia and NATO by removing this weapons category.

But we tried to be as clinical as we could. We looked at the fact that this is not something in the abstract. The possibility of reassurance of exposed allies depends on general international atmospherics between NATO and its neighbors and atmospherics within NATO. How good are America's relationships with its European allies?

We looked at ways which could improve those atmospherics and revival -- a greater Russian transparency about their numbers, which we thought perhaps were not as great as had been estimated. Some relocation, though not in a way that frighten the Japanese or the Chinese. There needs to be very precise bit of Russia where you could put weapons, which didn't scare people to the East.

The revival of CFE, so the reduction of fears of surprise of conventional attack would be reassuring. And even the beginning of some process of Russian-American strategic arms control, which would necessarily have implications for tactical nuclear weapons that would be encouraging.

Iran, though, as a neighbor with whom there are atmospherics was -- something would also need to be taken into account, but there's almost nothing that could be said about this at the moment. The Turks don't want to talk about it. Nobody actually knows yet how Russia should think about Iran, what kind of Iran it would be. But that's a problem on the horizon.

The greater the alliance cohesion, the greater the alliance self-confidence, the greater the reassurance or the less need for reassurance, because

countries on the edge of the alliance like that would feel that they wouldn't be abandoned, they wouldn't be intimidated, because the alliance was together, it was effective, it was meeting all its members' needs.

But if the alliance, on the other hand, ceased to be as interested in projecting power and world order beyond its borders, like if it fell back from a unconcealable failure in Afghanistan saying, in effect, we'll never do that again, that wouldn't perhaps necessarily be bad for reassurance in this aspect for collective defense. It might lead to the greater reemphasis on collective security, which these and most members have tended to prefer.

What can we do within the alliance? This question that George mentioned: Who could do what and in what time scale and at what expense? We looked at the clarity statements, speeches, diplomatic attention. We thought that one possible slogan for this would be a bias toward but not a veto for the most exposed, a way of emphasizing that those countries would get collective attention.

And we looked at the case for additional statements, particularly by the U.S. But we found there were limits to that. There gets to be a frantic quality if, after having already signed up to Article V, you then say but yes, we really, really do mean it. That's self-defeating.

The next set of things we looked at were visible, symbolic, on the ground but somewhat symbolic capacities. That would be for double enhancing the Baltic air policing mission; building new HQs and operational centers and agencies; putting assets, visible things on the ground in the most exposed countries, which might make their people feel more confident, partly because they would feel that if they were ever attacked it would be a certainty that everyone else would join in to defend them. We were particularly intrigued by the USAF deployment of small numbers of logisticians and

support personnel for F-16s and C-130s in deployment. This might be a model for other countries to adopt.

We were agnostic, I think, about missile defense, putting those assets in. It's certainly an involving thing to do, but it also potentially raises Russian antagonism and belligerence, so maybe the impact on reassurance will be neutral or hard to calculate.

More important are military significant conventional reassurances where we're getting Norwegian defense ministers saying this year NATO's ability to defend its member states is questionable and might deteriorate further. So, there are clearly things to do: building up infrastructures for civil and military transport, air bases, sea basing, air defense radars, training, exercising, live firing, you know, really significant, believable scenarios with the NATO response force; greater contingency planning, which has been a NATO anathema in the past, we're now beginning to do contingency planning, and that could be done for different kinds of conventional and unconventional conflicts, politically sensitive but probably worth addressing; and, above all, showing that East European states could improve their capacity to receive reinforcements and other NATO members could improve their capacity to send them.

But we felt that there were limits to how far one could or should or would be likely to go in this kind of conventional enhancement, A, because NATO can't afford it and, B, because if you really started doing this seriously in a way which negated Russian conventional capabilities completely, nothing could be more calculated to drive Russia into anxiety and arms racing.

So, at the end we concluded that this would not be easy, but there was a spectrum of possible reassurance measures, and they had varying costs and they're uncertain in prospect. And it will depend fundamentally on what the conditions at the

time are when these are considered, and we can't know about that because we don't know the tempo of what may happen to the NATO nuclear assets.

But the aim, we thought, should be a determined, carefully considered mix of investments, deployments, exercises, visits, speeches, and statements to address the reasonable concerns of the most exposed allies. And in the worst case you don't do that. You just, for the -- to achieve -- for domestic reasons, some key allies go to rapid reductions, but at the same time, exposed allies, nuclear reassurance *du mondes* I suppose we could call them, demand ill-justified arduous and provocative reassurement measures, and you get a complete failure to meet minds. That's avoidable, we thought, and it needs to be avoided by thinking about these things if not now, pretty soon after the Chicago summit.

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you very much.

Well, thank you to all the panelists. We now have about an hour for Q&A.

Before turning to the floor, if I may, I will just ask two questions to the panelists to get their views.

The first one just upon the issues of what are these non-strategic nuclear weapons for? And it is basically whom should we be envisaging that they should be used against? There was quite a lot of talk on the previous panel, of course, of Russia to the extent of which first it was no longer really someone or a country against whom these weapons might be required. But I was wondering what about the other countries in the world, and we touched slightly on Iran, but indeed is Iran a country that we might want to envisage over the next decade that we would want to consider that those weapons might be useful in any way, and just to what extent do we want to be bearing in mind trends in nuclear developments and other countries within the world. In any of these countries are

non-strategic nuclear weapons relevant or not?

Then the second question is simply regarding the debate on reassurances, and you touched upon (inaudible). Of course it will be tough, because a lot of the allies who want to withdraw will scale back NATO's nuclear posture. Also, those who believe that just -- the whole argument is they think that there's no need for nuclear weapons but as a byproduct so that there's, therefore, some need for reassurances, because that implies a need to reassure that there's a challenge to reassure against. And so to what extent do we expect that it will be politically feasible to really put through certain reassurances, which could really carry weight with those that are concerned. Or seeing it another way, is there really any scope for NATO to address these matters about the future of its nuclear posture without addressing the broader debate of, well, what is trying to do in this post-Cold War world 20 years down the line?

Touching upon some of the issues that Leo Michel mentioned earlier today, about there is so much disagreement amongst the alliance about what the threats are, what it's trying to do. Is it necessary to answer that debate beforehand? And seeing that it's so incredibly difficult for me to do so, what prospects are we really seeing for the future?

So, if anyone had any views?

MR. PERKOVICH: I would take a stab on that one part, what are they for in terms of who's being deterred? I think it's both totally superfluous, but also extremely counterproductive to talk about and operationalize the idea of four deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO being used against Iran. It's superfluous because Iran doesn't have a conventional military capability to speak of. It's utterly incapable of invading or occupying anybody around it, has not done so in its history, and so the logic that we've had in NATO for all these years -- well, you need these forces as kind of an

equalizer, a rapid response to a severely degraded position in a conventional threat that doesn't -- it's basically impossible to imagine that vis-à-vis Iran. And you say, well, okay, but if Iran has nuclear weapons. Well, even there it's -- the scenarios where Iran has that capability and then mounts the kind of offense of operations for which nuclear weapons would be retaliation, again, don't know anybody who's ever come up with a scenario like that.

But they don't have nuclear weapons. And so if you were to anticipate that and speak about it too soon, you play into the worst -- you weaken your position politically to isolate Iran and everything else, because now it looks like NATO's threatening Iran with nuclear weapons. So, maybe Iran needs to get nuclear weapons. So in any case, you would have to be very delayed in that. So, I think that's just a totally dead end. And I understand why some people may argue it, but it just -- I think it doesn't withstand analysis.

So, to me that ends up being, well, it's kind of, you know -- and we talk about it a little bit in the paper. I mean, there may be a scenario in Estonia where we can imagine a quick Russian conventional operation that does -- you know, takes a little piece of Estonia to send a message or something like that, and NATO can't get there in time. I mean -- so, it's Russia, and it's a limited conventional incursion, which doesn't seem very plausible either, but that, to my mind, was the one that was the most plausible which then demanded the most reassurance, which basically is to Estonia. I mean, I was --

MR. PIFER: Yeah, if I could add to that, I would agree with what George said and, I guess, make two additional points.

One is I think in most NATO countries that now host nuclear weapons, I don't think in a place like Germany or Belgium or the Netherlands that they would see their nuclear weapons as helping to deter a nuclear Iran. Turkey might be a different

question just because of proximity, but even if you look at the last several years, the Turks have been sort of ambivalent in their views toward Iran.

The second question is if you were trying to construct a U.S. posture to deter an Iran that already had nuclear weapons. Again, I'm not sure that the Iranian calculation would be affected by that much by nuclear weapons that have been sitting in Europe for all these years, and that if you really wanted to sort of remind the Iranians that you had a nuclear capability that could be used in the deterrent role, you would probably look for areas that were closer geographically -- you know, periodic deployments of B-2 bombers to Diego Garcia, maybe even deploying nuclear-capable F-35s into the Persian Gulf from time to time. That would, I think, be a much clearer signal to the Iranians on deterrence than the weapons in Europe.

MS. O'DONNELL: So -- yes.

MR. SCHULTE: I thought -- well, one way of answering that, or maybe evading that, is to look at the wording we found that we could live with collectively. In extreme circumstances of collective self-defense, the culmination of these bombs would allow NATO to decide by consensus to cross the nuclear threshold in a manner that was not purely demonstrative now. So, the question is what would be plausible extreme circumstances of collective self-defense? It's not very likely that for the foreseeable future Iran could create those possibilities. In the longer term who knows? But I take George's point; it's unwise to talk very much about this.

With Russia you could imagine very implausibly but not impossibly such extreme circumstances. So, inescapably, although not wanting to singularize Russia, that looks as though -- and that is clearly the place where these capabilities are most discussed about.

MS. O'DONNELL: And Malcolm? You wanted to add something?

MR. CHALMERS: Yeah, very briefly. A posture of you has to be for the next 5 or 10 years, not for the next 30 or 40 years. Otherwise, that will equalize madness.

But on the second point, on reassurance, I think it's actually quite important, and certainly this is what we're saying in the paper, that the reassurance measures we are talking about in relation to the most exposed states are worthwhile in their own right. They're not there as a compensation for something happening on the nuclear side. And I think it would be very dangerous if we sent out the message to the most exposed states that we're only interested in reassuring them as long as there's a nuclear issue, because then they will feel that it's in their interest to keep the nuclear issue boiling, because it's the only way they're going to get the Americans or the Brits or the other people interested in their security, which is absolutely not the case.

What I think we are doing is we're in a situation in which these countries joined NATO a decade ago. In almost all of the period of their membership, NATO has been focusing on operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere and not on Europe, and they've been festering along, you know, and have, I think, legitimate worries about, hang on, we're members of NATO, but it doesn't really feel like it. Are there things we can do in that respect?

Now, if we succeed in bolstering reassurance in that, which we should be doing anyway, then it will make them feel rather more comfortable about a realignment of the nuclear posture in a way, which others are pushing for. But that's not the reason we're doing it.

MS. O'DONNELL: Yes, here in front. Oh, sorry, you might want to wait for the microphone. And also if you could introduce yourself please.

MS. OSWALD: Rachel Oswald of *Global Security Newswire* again.

It was mentioned in the previous panel that there's the sense within NATO that it's the United States that would be the key decision-maker on the decision to keep tactical nukes in Europe. But from what was just previously said, it sounds like it comes down to a domino effect of Germany, then Netherlands and Belgium kind of being the cause of the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons. Is there a discrepancy there? Am I misunderstanding something?

MS. O'DONNELL: Yes.

MR. CHALMERS: You know, I think the Germans -- German power in Europe is a really interesting question and has been every since Germany became a unified state, and I think when Germany -- after World War II, part of the settlement in Europe has been about German self-restraint and about Germany not wanting to use its full potential power but wanting things to be done in the multilateral context. And that's starting to change in the economic sphere very clearly. But I think in the security sphere it's still a very strong element in the security settlement.

And for Europeans, NATO is not only -- I think probably even not primarily -- about mobilization of forces for operations. It's also about denationalization of security in Europe and a way of working which makes people feel comfortable sharing security with others. And that's why the Germans having put this issue out there, made it pretty clear where they stand in the long term, have also made it clear they don't want to force the pace on this to such an extent that it makes everybody else feel uneasy not simply about the substance of the question but about Germany. They would prefer -- the Germans have made it very clear they would prefer there to be an extended NATO discussion on this, which at the end of the process means there are no nuclear weapons on German territory. They're not going to suddenly tomorrow or after the next election says they're out. Sometimes -- maybe that was the message that was sent in the

beginning, which was very unhelpful. But the fact that Germany is putting that out there and some other of the basic countries are putting it out there, but not agreeing to -- not saying they're going to force the issue, means there's a question about how this issue is going to, in the end, be resolved in the lines, which is based on consensus.

And historically what happened within NATO is while there is consensus, while everybody has to be listened to, nevertheless there's a recognition amongst most member states that power does give a disproportionate say to some countries rather than others and that if you got a situation in which the U.S., France, Germany, and the U.K. agreed on a particular way of doing things, then other states would have to feel very strongly indeed that it was in their particular national interest to go against such a consensus. And even within that group of four, I think the United States, on this issue at least, has a particular leadership role to play, because they're American weapons.

The American nuclear guarantee is what the exposed states are worried about. I mean, to the extent that Estonia or Poland wants extended nuclear deterrence, they don't want German or Belgian extended nuclear deterrence or aircraft. They want American extended nuclear deterrence.

So, Americans are damned if they do and damned if they don't. The Europeans ask for leadership, and then when they get it, they say you didn't consult us properly. Well, you know, that's life. You want to lead a global empire, you just have to get used to it and that's the way things work. (Laughter) And what NATO does, I think, is, you know, when it works well, it has the right balance between consultation and leadership.

But this is not in our lines of equals. It's lines led by the United States, and that's the way -- maybe that's a roundabout way of saying this: U.S.-Germany are in totally different positions as a result of World War II and I think would like to continue to

make decisions in that way.

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you. Steve?

MR. PIFER: Yeah, let me make two points. I mean, on NATO and consensus, I mean, it's interesting. I mean, the German government agrees, as do all allies, that they're going to solve these issues on the basis of consensus, that any decisions on nuclear posture will be the result of the work around the council. But having said that, you know, at some point the Tornadoes will stop flying and, again, my analytical judgment is that I cannot see Germany maintaining a nuclear-capable role once the Tornadoes go away. And there may be an inconsistency between consensus and where the German air force is going. That at some point down the road causes a contradiction.

The second will kind of build on Malcolm's point about the United States and consultations, and I remember well when I was still in the State Department and served U.S. consultations, often with NATO, it was the U.S. going and telling the allies this is what we want to do, and consulting meant securing their agreement to that U.S. position. I think actually in recent years the United States has become, on some issues, more prepared to consult in the traditional sense where it goes and may express a view but it really is seeking allied positions.

In the run-up to the Lisbon Summit, I spent a couple of days at NATO Headquarters and talked to, I guess, officials from maybe eight or nine different NATO missions, and it was across the spectrum, including countries that I think wanted to see change in NATO's nuclear posture and countries that did not want to see change in NATO's nuclear posture as they were finalizing the strategic concept in 2010. But what was interesting to me was what most of those countries said was, you know, the United States Government is really kind of letting us Europeans decide that. In fact, I heard from a number that they thought the U.S. Government is really not interested in

engaging this way.

Now, I heard separately from American officials no, no, we were there, we were there. But at least the impression among a number of the Europeans missions was that on this particular issue the United States was prepared to let Europe see if they could come to a consensus and then deal with that consensus. My own guess is that if the Europeans had then or in the run-up to Chicago, if European allies came to the United States and said we all agree we no longer see a need for American nuclear weapons in Europe, I think the United States Government would agree in a heartbeat to withdraw those weapons. And my own sense from talking to U.S. officials is the U.S. view of nuclear weapons in Europe is driven less by the requirement to deter somebody and more by the requirement to reassure those allies who still feel that those weapons have an important deterrent role.

MR. PERKOVICH: Steve, don't you think burden sharing is still a consideration for the Americans?

MR. PIFER: Oh, that certainly is, and --

MR. PERKOVICH: And that -- if they'd agree in a heartbeat, if the Europeans agreed, then the British (inaudible) issue wouldn't be there.

MR. PIFER: I think that would be an issue, but I think if there was a consensus view among Europeans the weapons were no longer required, it would -- it's very difficult for me to see Washington trying to persuade Europe to keep weapons if Europe says they don't want them any further. And that may well have, then, some negative blowback in terms of the congressional view on burden sharing within the nuclear role falling almost solely on the United States. But I don't see it coming in (inaudible) way.

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you. And Paul?

MR. SCHULTE: Well, everything I've picked up suggests the U.S. really is interested in letting the Europeans decide what they want, although it's not absolutely clear that the U.S. is a complete unitary actor on this. Some of you in the audience may have a better sense than I do, but I don't think it's necessarily the case at State and DOD seeing it in the same way and live-in state whether they -- and they -- the U.S. mission in NATO sees it the same way as Foggy Bottom. But I don't know.

However, we shouldn't forget there's France in this, and to the extent that Germany has gone anti-nuclear, France has become more insistently pro-nuclear behind the scenes and will play a hard, determined game with very little internal opposition to French pernicular positions.

But finally, there's a historical survey of an earlier examination of NATO Tactical Nuclear Policy Enhanced Radiation Weapons in the '70s in which the author concludes that the moral of all this is that modernization of tactical nuclear weapons is impossible without firm, determined American leadership and support.

Now, without that, and I -- you know, we are talking about continuation through modernization. It's only through modernization of aircraft, because they tiresomely wear out, that you can maintain existing positions. Without that determined American leadership, the implication of that statement, though it wasn't predictive -- it wasn't intended to be, but it might be -- is that it will not happen and that, therefore -- and this is the kind of skeptical turn we take in our report -- that the arrangements will fall away because the won't be organized and won't be sustainable.

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you.

Further questions? Yes. At the back, sir?

MR. KOVER: I'm Stanley Kover. I just wonder, what economic assumptions underlie all your projections here? Given the economic crisis, how much

money do you think the NATO countries will have to spend on defense that won't be able to do all these things?

MR. PIFER: Let me make one observation here, which is that I think -- I mean, some air NATO forces will maintain a fighter-bomber capability after the current generation of Tornadoes and F-16s are retired. You know, maybe not all the countries that fly them today, but the Germans will have the Eurofighter. It's likely, I think, that the Netherlands and Italy will have F-35s.

MR. KOVER: Can I be more specific?

MR. PIFER: Yes.

MR. KOVER: Could you just give me a number, like percent of GDP? Five years out, what do you think the percent of GDP will be?

MR. PIFER: Well, I can tell you right now, I mean, NATO has set for itself a goal that each ally spend 2 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on defense. Right now the countries that meet that goal are the United States, Britain, France, Greece, and Albania. And I would suspect that those numbers are going to go down, you know, over the next few years. The point I was making, though, on aircraft is I suspect the aircraft will be there.

The actual wiring, the things that you have to do to an airplane to make it dual capable, are a relatively small proportion of the total aircraft cost. So, the question about whether or not to have an aircraft with a dual capability I suspect is not going to be driven so much by cost concerns as it will by political decisions.

MR. PERKOVICH: Well, it also is an issue of -- I mean, it's not clear what the implication of all that is. In other words, if reassurance and actually building a conventional capability that would actually be more credible, less of a moral hazard, more usable, and everything else actually costs more than just doing nothing, you may actually

keep the nuclear forces longer, drag it out, and so on and get a lot less usable deterrent, but it's easier economically. I mean, you know, think about the financial crisis. I mean, ideally you put -- you require more reserves to be in the banks, because they're exposed and everything else, but, you know, if you're in -- if things are coming down, where do you get that, and you said, well, all right, we won't raise the reserve requirements because that's hard to do, so you just keep the exposure out there. That could be the result, too.

MR. CHALMERS: Can I --

MS. O'DONNELL: Yes, Malcolm.

MR. CHALMERS: I mean, just to give you some sense of the number, I think the German defense budget is something on the order of 35 billion euros or so. We're talking the numbers that people have out there in order to pay for a new kit for their Eurofighter, which would allow them to use nuclear weapons. You might be talking about a few hundred million euros over a number of years. And in order to maintain some Tornadoes for a bit longer, which you would not otherwise have simply for the nuclear role, again it might be something of that same order. So, even if you add those two together and make some pretty, you know, topside assumptions, you're talking about per year 100 million euros or something of that sort, which you wouldn't otherwise have to spend on the nuclear role for Germany out of a budget of 3 percent of the total German defense budget.

So, I don't think for the Europeans -- and Germany is liked to be particularly expensive, because they are talking about a unique aircraft. The other European countries are talking about F-35s or they're buying a kit off the Americans. The Germans would have to design or at least pay for their own avionics package. Even for the Germans, it's quite a small proportion of the total. It's not insignificant, because

money is tight in defense throughout Europe, but it's not overwhelming.

The bigger costs, I think, are in the United States. I mean, it's the same with missile defense, but certainly in the nuclear area, the Americans are paying -- are planning to pay quite significant bucks for a separate nuclear variant for the F-35. Not all F-35s are going to be nuclear capable, but there's going to be a batch of them that are, and that will -- you know, that will cost something.

It depends if people here will know the numbers or not, but that's something significant. The B-61 modernization will be needed for strategic bombers, as well as for the F-35. So how do you allocate the cost of that between the two, assuming -- if the United States gave up the free-fall nuclear bomb altogether, then, you know, more significant amounts will be saved, but we're getting into broader issues here. So, I think for Europeans -- I mean, unlike the U.K. and France -- the U.K. and France have their own independent nuclear forces, and we are spending very significant amounts of our defense budget on nuclear modernization, because we are building submarines, which are really expensive. But for the non-nuclear states that are really just dipping their toes in this nuclear business, the amounts of money aren't so great.

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you. And Paul.

MR. SCHULTE: Three quick points. The U.S. B-61 program is for worldwide contingencies, certainly the Pacific and, yeah, Europe, too, but who knows where else, and everything I've heard suggested that will go ahead for those worldwide factors, and it's not bound up with European decisions.

Secondly, the argument of the extra cost of rewiring Eurofighters I have observed is a tactic of desperation. When you are talking to officials or activists about the other programs, on that they start talking about money, but then when you home in, as Malcolm did, on the costs, it tends to be pretty unconvincing and you can see that they're

sort of looking for -- grasping for arguments.

The third point, I think, which engages along with your overall point, despite NATO being absolutely sure it's entering major austerity and things really are very difficult for the defense budget, it is still committing itself to various conventional defense improvement programs, that there are things being built for infrastructure. There are improvements in tanks all the spectrum of conventional military paraphernalia.

How affordable that will be will very much depend upon the success of these reforms, the smart defense reforms, which are meant to deliver efficiencies that will allow things to be affordable which otherwise wouldn't be as defense budgets are probably full. And it's too early to tell how that exercise will work out, although I come from a country, which had declared that it had created small procurement a few years ago, which has led to a complete procurement catastrophe. (Laughter) "Smart procurement" is perhaps not the smartest term to use, because it sets up a lot of skepticism.

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you. Further questions?

Well, if I may, I have a question to the two U.S. panelists, which is just I was wondering if maybe you could sketch out what you see potentially, what impacts might in a next Obama administration have for the atmospherics of the broad debate seen in Europe regarding -- on how Europe should go about addressing non-strategic nuclear weapons. So, be it either because of the way the Obama administration might look upon the issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but also the broader issue of nuclear disarmament and a relationship with Russia. And in the same way, if you could sketch out what impact a Romney administration might have.

MR. PIFER: Let me start. I think the Obama administration -- they've already put out the outline. When he signed the New START Treaty back in 2010,

President Obama said there should be a further round of negotiations on further reductions with Russia. And he said you should bring into that not just deployed strategic warheads, which were limited by New START, but also non-deployed or reserved strategic warheads and also nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

And the U.S. Government is now thinking through how it might approach this next negotiation. But, you know, my sense is that there's at least a lean within the U.S. Government toward the idea that the next U.S. Russia round, if the Russians consent to a round and if President Obama is reelected, that next round should focus on a limitation that would capture all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, perhaps the sub-ceiling on the deployed strategic warheads that would be analogous to the 1,550 limited under New START. So, I think there is that readiness to move forward. A big part of the question will be how willing the Russians are to negotiate.

MR. PERKOVICH: I think in a Romney administration -- and again, a lot of it would depend on appointment -- I think you get back to something that looks more like the period between 2001 and 2009. You would have a much more mobilized -- and remember Romney, for example, you know, wrote opposing the New START Treaty ratification. Doesn't know anything about these issues, but somebody wrote that for him, and actually that was a remarkable piece in and of itself, because it had so many, like, actual factual flaws and everything else. But it gave a sense of where things were.

So, you would mobilize the disarmament communities in Europe in a way that they've been disarmed by Obama, because they thought, okay, you know, they were produced by Bush in a sense. Obama came in and he said, okay, we've got a guy who gets it, so now people are disappointed, and so. But if Romney comes in and does what has been in the campaign discourse and what others in the party have done, you're going to mobilize those people in a way that creates stronger pressure to pull them out.

The position on missile defense is fundamentalist in an evangelical way, which is going to then further alienate Russians and others. So, you get a much more intense -- where these capabilities -- this issue becomes more salient but in no good way, all in negative ways. The nonproliferation kind of global apparatus again gets remobilized in a way that makes it, you know, fairly critical.

Turkey, which has been actually very cooperative and kind of hanging back on these issues, depending on what that administration would do -- and, again, I mean, you have Senator Kyl who basically, you know, was blocking the, you know, deployment or the move to put radar -- missile defense radars we wanted in Turkey. He was blocking it because they were making nice to Israel. And so, you know, you look at some of the rhetoric from some of the people advising Romney about Turkey, which is it's gone over to the axis of -- you know, it's going to be a lot of fun. (Laughter) I mean, so, no.

So, all of a sudden somebody gets elected and he goes okay, now what's the world look like and what do I want? I mean, they may take a different view. But what the indications are and what people around town who, you know, who advise these guys, what they say on this stuff is it's going to be back to an environment that was much more like 2004, 2005, I'd say.

MR. PIFER: Let me agree with everything that George has said but then try to put a little bit more optimistic spin on it, and that is I think George is right, but I think what a Romney administration, if elected, might find is that there would be alliance management reasons to do things on nonstrategic nuclear weapons and missile defense that they might not otherwise do.

And my precedent for with this would be go look at Ronald Reagan when he came to office in 1981. You know, the Reagan administration, you know, had a list of

things to do in terms of nuclear weapons. It was revive the B-1 bomber. It was accelerate, develop, and deployment of the MX Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Arms control was not high on that list, yet seven months into the administration, a negotiations team led by Paul Nitze is in Europe negotiating on intermediate-range nuclear forces. And that was because they perceived correctly that without that negotiating effort, the deployment track -- and this was the two-track decision in 1979 to deploy American missiles in Europe were also negotiating on their, perhaps, reduction and elimination.

You couldn't do the deployment track if you didn't have the limitation effort. And so you might have a similar dynamic here, as I think that some of those NATO countries that would like to see the American weapons go away are being -- are talking about it more in a consensus view within NATO, because they see an administration that is committed to a negotiation. If they did not see that administration on the American side prepared to do that negotiation, would there be more of a tendency to consider unilateral steps? I don't know, but I think that would be one potential, so.

MR. PERKOVICH: Likewise on missile defense. I mean, again, I think there is support in NATO for American missile defense deployments going forward with a big hope that it can be done in a cooperative way with Russia. And the administration gets credit for trying to seek that cooperative way and with the failure to define a cooperative arrangement now is seen as largely due to the Russian position. But, again, what happens for European support for missile defense deployments if an American administration is perceived to be not committed to try and define a cooperative arrangement? Again, I don't know, but there may well be some alliance pressures and some alliance management requirements that would lead the Romney administration to take a different position on these issues they might otherwise be disposed to do. That's trying to be hopeful.

MS. O'DONNELL: Yes. And so I have -- oh, now we have several fingers. So, we've got two in the back and one in the front.

Yes, will come forward.

MAJOR McSNISHUS. Major Adam McSnishus (phonetic), U.S. Army. I have a question about some of the maybe subordinate elements within DOD in your research. Does UCOM, Strategic Command, or the Air Force have any stake in these weapons at all? Are they lobbying to keep them or do they just see the as a nuisance generally that they have to put up with?

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you. And actually I'll take two of the questions as well at the same time.

MR. EMORY: On a much different level -- my name is Tom Emory -- assuming that Iran does achieve nuclear weapons, what relevance if any do any of you see European nuclear weapons having in what I understand is the administration's Plan B, and that is to contain an Iranian nuclear power?

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you. And then here at the front as well, please.

MR. GOFFUS: Tom Goffus from the National Security staff. It's related to that question actually.

Our post-Chicago, post-elephant birth that is going to happen, hopefully, leaves us with a scenario I think that you've assumed is pretty much current conditions moving forward. Maybe a better economy, maybe less. I've heard that a little bit here, that relatively insensitive to the economy excursions.

And then perhaps the French and the Germans go to their respective corners, perhaps even deeper on their positions, all of which would indicate -- which makes it more difficult to change the posture in Europe rather than less.

My question is in addition to the Iranian nuclear scenario, are there other excursions that you looked at that could change the dynamics of the alliance enough to make a big change in the posture? A resurgent Russia, certainly the Baltic nations are afraid of what's going to happen with Putin and what's going on in Kaliningrad, things like that. Or, on the other hand, a positive scenario where we do find ways of cooperating on missile defense. And then maybe one more just as an idea would be something that happens with Syria, either positive or negative, in the near future.

MS. O'DONNELL: Yes. Well, maybe we should hear from Malcolm and coming in towards Paul.

MR. CHALMERS: Okay. Gosh, I don't know if I'm qualified to answer the question of the U.S. Air Force. I'll leave that to my colleagues to answer.

Iran, you know, I think if Iran acquires nuclear weapons and becomes a fully-fledged nuclear weapon state with tested weapons, a lot is going to change. And this is not going to be very high on the list of responses. We are -- we would see, I think, much more investment in missile defense capability amongst Iran's neighbors but also, if they continue to develop longer-range ballistic missiles, much more focus on Iran in core NATO European countries like France and the U.K., so that would be a big part of the response.

I mean, I think it would have the political effect of perhaps making the timetable for withdrawing these American weapons in Europe rather more elongated and not because I think people would think about them having a particular operational role in relation to Iran, because as George said before, I don't think that would be the case. But there would be a general sense that this is a setback for disarmament, which would make it more difficult. Unless you have a scenario -- and this a big if -- a lot would depend on how Russia played.

If we get into a situation where for years the Russians have been telling us that we are overstating the Iranian threat and Iran is much further behind in this and not only in relation to weapons but also in relation to missiles. So if, in your scenario, which I don't necessarily think is the most likely one, but if your scenario roars and a powerfully radiant nuclear program was clearly underway, then how would the Russians react to that? And I think it's entirely possible that Russians would say hang on. They hoodwink us as well. And if one impact of the rise of Iran in that scenario was NATO and Russia getting closer, then we'd have arrows pointing in two different directions in relation to NATO's European and nuclear posture.

So, a lot depends on Russia. If you get into a scenario in which Russia got into bed with Iran, then we are really in a quite serious position. But I don't think that's -- I think it's hard to read Russia going that direction. Russia continues to be critical in all this.

In relation to other possible scenarios, it's clearly possible that Russia, for its own domestics reasons or even because something goes wrong which they weren't planning for, you do get some sort of limited conflict between Russia and neighbors, or indeed you get a crisis in Belarus.

I mean, some of the biggest problems aren't in NATO members. In the Baltic States there are issues about Russian minorities, which they may not be handling in a perfect way, but I think that the trajectory is very much in the right direction. But what happens if there's a collapse in Belarus and you start getting responsibility-to-protect issues being raised in Western countries in relation to Belarus or indeed Ukraine? That's a scenario I would worry about, Belarus. This is something that Europeans and countries like Poland care about, and they're not going to want to stand back.

But Russia is not going to want us getting involved. The one thing the

Russians have been paranoid about in the last 10 years is color revolutions. Well, who knows where a next color revolution is going to be? We settled in predicting the Arab world. There may be color revolutions in countries, which Russia worries about much worse. So, that's something I'd worry about more than nuclear issues. And I think a few more years down the road there are issues of if Iran gets nuclear weapons whether there's going to be a cascade in relation to Saudi Arabia.

Personally, I don't think that's very likely, but it certainly can't be ruled out, and there's a Saudi-Pakistan I mentioned to talk about. But I think as George said earlier, the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by countries with very severe conventional weaknesses, like Iran or indeed Pakistan, going bad or other examples we could think of, still leaves NATO with enormous conventional options for dealing with those problems. And it's hard to see how a sophisticated ladder of escalation, in nuclear terms, is necessary or indeed at all usable in those scenarios. Basically, these weapons, insofar as they have any operational role, its in relation to a country with very substantial, conventional capabilities, and there today and the foreseeable future, I think we're only talking about Russia and China.

MR. PIFER: I can take on the question of UCOM and U.S. Air Force Europe. There have been reports going back to the mid-1990s that the U.S. Air Force and Europe would like to see the weapons withdrawn. I've had a couple of conversations in the last couple of years with fairly senior American military officers who, when you ask them do you see a military necessity for American nuclear weapons in Europe, believe that they can defend NATO territory with conventional forces, that nuclear weapons are not required.

I guess it was about two years ago when then vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright, was asked is there any role for nuclear weapons in

Europe that cannot be performed by either American conventional forces with long-range strike capabilities or U.S. strategic forces? And his very short but clear answer was "No." So, I think from the military's perspective they don't see a military requirement.

Now, they will acknowledge there may be separate political reasons that get into questions like reassurance. But they don't see the military requirements -- and I think there's a second consideration here from their perspective, which is if you're in the Air Force -- U.S. Air Force Europe -- and you're maintaining nuclear weapons, first of all, that's not a mission you're likely to do. And so you're really trying to prepare for other missions that are far more likely. However, nuclear weapons are the one mission that you do not want to screw up on.

And you need only to ask the commander of the B-52 unit that was up at Minot and then work up the chain, including the secretary of the Air Force, what happens when you fly six nuclear weapons, unannounced, from Minot down to Barksdale, Louisiana, and for 30 hours nobody knows that they're there. This can be a career killer. And so I think for a lot of military units -- and I think the same thing applied to the U.S. Navy back in the 1990s -- the U.S. Navy was delighted when the George H.W. Bush administration in 1991 said we're going to withdraw all nuclear weapons from the Navy except for those weapons on ballistic missile submarines. And these guys said that is great. That gives us more room to carry harpoon missiles, you know, conventional Tomahawks, and we get rid of this huge set of requirements that we have to maintain having responsibility for nuclear weapons. And that -- well, it just takes up a huge amount of time. They're glad to see those requirements go away and the weapons, too.

MS. O'DONNELL: George, do you have any --

MR. PERKOVICH: Just -- only one. I mean, like I said earlier, I mean, I don't think there's -- it's almost impossible to conceive of any, like, operational reason

why NATO nuclear weapons would be necessary or useful to contain Iran, even if it had nuclear weapons and so on.

But in terms of that and then your question, I mean, people in this town -- well, they weigh -- the circumstances in which Iran will get nuclear weapons is kind of like what's happening now and they just keep going. Well, more likely circumstances -- somebody bombs them in what is seen as an illegal aggression, you know, around the world and including Iran, and Iran then announces it's withdrawing from the NPT and explains to the U.N. Security Council here's why we're withdrawing from the NPT. We were just attacked illegally by a country that has nuclear weapons outside the NPT. We're in the NPT. If that's the way the system's going to work, we're out. We're giving you our notice. And now you're in a different world where the legitimacy of nuclear weapons starts getting called into question and U.S. policy and as a guarantor with Israel and all of that, the politics in Germany -- that's doesn't affect any operationally, but the political environment in that situation gets really interesting.

MR. SCHULTE: Yeah. Not in a good way. (Laughter)

MR. PERKOVICH: Well, I think it's amusing. (Laughter) I mean, you know, I look at it and I kind of go, you know, interesting job.

MR. SCHULTE: We know what you mean by "interesting job."

MR. PERKOVICH: U.N. sanctions on Israel, I mean, that's an interesting debate. You know, so, that's interesting.

MR. SCHULTE: No, I was referring to the Iranian --

MR. PERKOVICH: No, I know, yeah.

MR. SCHULTE: Yeah.

MS. O'DONNELL: Yes, and --

MR. SCHULTE: On the Iranian thing, I mean, like a grievance, it would

be interesting scenario. But if -- interesting for this question, because it would make the whole European debate about what to do about these quite left-right divided I think.

In one sense it makes the vision of the world going to down to zero pretty unlikely. On the other hand, whose fault was that? Was that -- and so this could be a more nontoxic issue in national security policy.

On USAF, I've got -- maybe an issue of what USAF thinks about these weapons. There may be an issue of levels here. I've met colonels who fly fighter bombers who insist, actually there is a damned good reason for keeping them. But when I asked them what that was, they say they can't tell me. (Laughter) So, we tried to construct what that was on page 9.

You're quite right at a sort of general level. I think that's everything -- that fits everything I've read. But I also hear it reported that in this kind of discussion the other state has an attitude, which is we don't care what you -- these are not your weapons; they're presidential weapons, so shut up. (Laughter) At what level would the issue be divided? I don't know.

And on Russia, I mean, yeah, I guess as a general truth here that any sharpening of antagonism, wherever it comes -- Belarus or Syria -- is going to block progress on a consensual agreement about the future of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. And conversely, any major rapprochement won't make it easier.

MR. PIFER: Yeah.

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you very much.

Well, thank you. The Carnegie report, which was also by the panelists, stresses that over the next few years, although of course a lot of discussions on the future of NATO's nonstrategic nuclear weapons will take place within the alliance, it will be key for there to be many public debates as well parallel to this to ensure that the

debates within NATO don't stagnate and then at the end burst out into the open into public disputes, which will then lead to quite suboptimal outcomes. So, hopefully, today has been an important contribution to this debate, and we will be having many more of them.

And all that is left for me then to do is to thank you very much to joined us this afternoon, and to ask you also to thank our panelists for their thoughts.

(Applause)

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