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INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND HOST COMMUNITIES: THE LIMITS OF HOSPITALITY?

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PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction:

MARY WERNTZ
Head of Regional Delegation
International Committee for the Red Cross

Moderator:

ELIZABETH FERRIS
Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

ROBERTO VIDAL
Professor of Law
Pontifica Universidad Javierana

CHALOKA BEYANI
UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs
Co-Director, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FERRIS: Hello, I'm Elizabeth Ferris, Director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement. We're delighted to welcome you to this session today on IDPs and Host Communities: The Limits of Hospitality. And we've got a terrific panel lined up, but we're going to begin with some introductory comments from our good friend, Mary Werntz, who's the Head of Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross here in Washington. Mary, welcome.

MS. WERNTZ: Good afternoon. I'd like to begin by thanking our colleagues at Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, and especially Beth Ferris, because both have been hosting this important discussion, but also their years of very positive interaction between the ICRC and Brookings. And for this, ICRC is deeply grateful.

The research that we will discuss today is rooted in the past few years of discussion between our institutions, specifically the notion that too often, especially in policy centers such as Washington, the debate on displacement centers largely on individuals, the internally displaced person, or on statistics, the quantitative number of persons displaced. As we all know, numbers do not provide the full picture. It's vitally important to look at the needs and the vulnerabilities of the entire population affected by conflict and displacement, what we call the displacement-affected communities. Today's event builds upon research that the ICRC and Brookings have collaboratively undertaken, and I'm very confident that it will contribute to the ongoing discussion on how to improve humanitarian responses to displacement crises.

In this audience we are all familiar with the magnitude of the crisis of internal displacement. Global figures for IDPs are astounding, with more than 27 million people displaced worldwide, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.

Many of us here have operational experience in responding to needs of displaced persons. My own organization, the ICRC, working with national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, assisted 4.3 million internally displaced persons in some 32 countries during 2010, all of whom had been driven from their homes by armed conflict or violence. Our figures for 2011 are coming out soon. Our work includes restoring family links of people separated by violence, providing basic assistance, including health care, emergency household items, water; rehabilitation services; and importantly, engaging with national and local authorities to ensure that they fulfill their obligations to their populations. However, the ICRC, like many organizations, still struggles with achieving the most effective response possible. This struggle is rooted in the complexity and variety of contexts in which civilians fleeing from violence are found, and in the understanding that states themselves have the responsibility to deal with protecting civilian populations and responding to the needs of the displaced. There is no standard case for internal displacement, no model for the perfect humanitarian response. That said, one lesson we have learned is that, while the public image of displacement is that of a large IDP camp such as Gereida in Darfur, many IDPs find refuge with individual families and communities. Camps are an important factor in responding to IDPs, but they are not the only or even the most important tool.

In addition, perhaps the most important lesson we have learned is that working exclusively with the displaced person, whether in a camp or in a host community, not only misses a significant part of the problem, but can actually create problems. As mentioned, families and friends, villages and towns that are facing their own daily struggles are frequently the ones that are taking in IDPs. The strains of war and armed violence extend beyond the locations where bombs drop and guns flare. Host communities feel these same strains and face similar difficulties in daily life because of

the conflict dynamics that force people to seek refuge elsewhere. Tension between displaced persons and host communities emerges when assistance is solely based on status and not on need. Effectively responding to displacement challenges, and more broadly needs arising from conflict, involves looking at the needs of the entire displacement-affected community. This is demonstrated vividly in Colombia. Over the course of the conflict in Colombia, rural communities have often fled to urban centers, many ending up in Bogotá. Most frequently these people end up in poor, underserved areas of the city with limited public services. The complex relationship between the displaced Colombians and the communities they find themselves in poses great challenges for aid agencies beyond the mere provision of assistance. Assistance needs to be developed in such a way as to not exacerbate tensions between IDPs and hosts, but rather to reduce them, and not to replace or undermine local capacities, but rather to support them.

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, is struggling with a protracted IDP conflict that has lasted for more than 20 years. As Head of Delegation for the ICRC in Baku in 2004 to 2006, I witnessed firsthand the impact of this large-scale, long-term displacement. In such a protracted situation, it is important to be flexible. Vulnerabilities and needs change, and thus the response needs to change. I would add that with such a long-term problem in an unresolved conflict situation, it is easy for the international community to ignore or grow tired of the issue.

I am very eager to hear from the researchers about their reports on the crises and from Chaloka Beyani, the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights of IDPs, who will certainly provide his important global insight and will today help us to draw comparisons between the two cases.

Finally, thanks once again to Brookings-LSE Project on Internal

Displacement. While this is a collaboration, the truth is that they and especially Bryce Campbell and, of course, the researchers Yulia Gureyeva and Roberto Vidal, did most of the work. I'm proud of the work we've done together, using ICRC's field presence and Brookings' research expertise, and hope it will help inform policy and operational responses to displacement. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Mary. We, too, value our collaboration with ICRC. It's been a good partnership, actually, to use ICRC's field presence and day-to-day operational questions with some of our academic and research expertise and something we'd like to continue in the future.

As Mary said, when we began talking about what we could do together and what were the main operational challenges facing not only ICRC but the humanitarian community generally, it was on this relationship of IDPs who don't live in camps and the communities which host them. Now the word host is a nice word. It's kind of a generous, warm word. I host a dinner party. I host overnight guests. I had the privilege in high school of spending a year in Brazil as an exchange student and lived with a host family, who made sure I didn't commit too many cultural faux pas, put up with my bumbling Portuguese, and kept me safe. It was a warm, wonderful feeling I still have many years later about my host family. But when we talk about IDPs, the word host has a little different meaning. When I host someone in my house, I decide to invite certain people to my house, to welcome them to my home. But communities and sometimes families hosting IDPs aren't in that position of extending an invitation and inviting people in. So we decided to look at what it means to be a host community or a host family.

We have two case studies: One in Colombia with two communities in Bogotá that Roberto Vidal from the Universidad Javierana will present. Unfortunately, our researcher from Azerbaijan became ill a couple of days ago and wasn't able to join

us, but we have a short video excerpt from him -- that's Tabib Huseynov who will present the research. And it will be kicked off by our own Chaloka Beyani, who is the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and also co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project, Brookings-LSE. He's a professor at LSE. And it's great to be on the same stage with you, Chaloka. We don't often have that opportunity. We're going to ask Chaloka to speak first; then we'll see the short video presentation, and then Roberto will close it off. So welcome, Chaloka.

MR. BEYANI: Well, thank you very much, Beth, for your kind remarks, and I'm always delighted to be here. And I think each time I appear here, it should be footnoted somewhere that it's with much pleasure to be here to speak, both in my capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, as well as for co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project. My role here is more to act as a cheerleader for the reports that will detail more of the substantive material that you want to hear about.

But looking at the whole issue of host communities in relation to non-camp IDPs, this is IDP protection in this instance at the grassroots level. We normally conceive of protection and assistance, and we see UN convoys and vehicles and everything else, ICRC. But this is protection, which for the most part is invisible to others apart from those who are actually involved in hosting IDPs, as well as those who take the time to study the issue and see the implications.

So the research is of enormous importance for a variety of reasons. It's a collaborative effort between Brookings and ICRC, which is important, and I think that ICRC has always worked with civilians. And in working with a whole range of civilians caught in conflict or other areas, basic capacity to determine needs in relation to IDPs, are civilians in local communities and elsewhere. So ICRC becomes a natural agent I think to cooperate with.

And there's also an issue that I identified as one of my priorities in terms of my mandate and which occupied my last report to the Human Rights Council in March this year, two weeks ago, basically looking at non-camp IDPs and why they are important to focus on. The main concerns, which led to the report, as well as the identification of that area as a priority, are that despite the fact that our protection in our approach to IDPs is more or less camp-settlement based, the majority of IDPs are actually outside camps and settlements. For the most part they remain invisible, and approaches are there for different -- for those of us who work in the area, we take it for granted that the definition of an IDP applies, as we know it. But out there in the field, there is real denial about whether these are IDPs or not, either for political reasons or for reasons that the conventional approaches an IDP as a person who is in a camp.

We had a discussion with the government of Sudan, for example, in the context of a mission that's being planned there. And we're talking about the situation in South Kordofan where there is conflict and fighting. And the officials at the embassy say to that,, "Most of the people there actually are not IDPs because they are settled amongst villages and you don't see them; therefore, they are not IDPs." And so I cocked my ears up and said, "I think this is why it's actually important to reinforce the point that these are IDPs. They may not be visible for a variety of reasons, but actually they need protection and assistance." That also implicates the role of host communities in terms of identifying their needs as well as protection aspects.

Other reasons are that the responses have remained essentially very ad hoc, very limited in character, and insufficient. I think the research itself does assure that, to a very large extent, and the report that I presented to the Council also indicates that particular aspect.

So there are several important steps that could be taken to address the

issue, and I think the most important probably is first of all to be able to identify and locate IDPs who live with host communities. That's a huge task, and this calls for efficient data collection methods in order to identify them. And there are specific problems as regards urban areas and urbanization because most of the IDPs who go to urban areas are caught up in the problem of urbanization. They're in slum squatter settlements or slums, but in there there's an invisible method of livelihood, of relationship, in relation to those who receive them in those places. And I think that our approach should obviously be able to sufficiently have depth in order to reach those situations and understand them appropriately.

It's also important, I think, to have responses from the host families and host communities. I think most of us who recall that, when the conflicts broke out over an electoral dispute in Kordofan last year, most of the IDPs were actually in urban areas and hosted by families and friends, rather than in camps and settlements. This trend tends to continue in some areas.

But what is the experience of the host families and communities themselves? How do they provide protection needs and assistance? How do they share resources that are common? And this is an important aspect because the relationship between IDPs and host communities is one in those areas, which is stable. We have to identify why it is stable in those areas, whereas in places where IDPs are in camps and settlements, there's always tension between IDPs and the local communities. Now whether that tension derives from the virtue of camps and settlements, and therefore the label IDP carries a stigma to which the local population reacts, is quite another matter. I think that reinforces the reason why community-based approaches that create support systems to those communities are important.

We also need to identify good practices in order to be able to see what

sort of creative solutions can be offered, exercises by both current actors and others. And this is an issue that strongly came out at the Human Rights Council, that states in supporting more research in this area and the engagement of the mandate wanted more information in terms of best practice, in terms of where this is taking place, and how host communities and community-based approaches which are grassroots would actually help protect the needs of host communities in addition to those of the ones that they host.

There will also be substantive follow-up research on this issue and in other countries, going beyond Colombia and Azerbaijan, which are the models at this point in time. But I'm personally looking at engaging the issue with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee because that's where my predecessor, Professor Walter Kaelin, left the issue with ISC. And it kind of died at ISC and ISC has a transformative agenda, which has preoccupied it. And part of the reason for presenting the reports to the Council and making recommendations to ISC was to reignite that agenda and bring it back to ISC as a framework of discussion and engagement so that the agencies that are represented at ISC at least engage with the issue.

The work of the Brookings-LSE Project, of course, will continue in terms of carrying out research beyond the reports that we're looking at today. And this event, I think, is also intended to generate more interest in that research and perhaps to share some of the preliminary findings and see what those findings actually mean for us. There's a research event being planned with ICRC in Geneva to solicit further inputs from experts. And naturally I'm interested in that because my mandate will also be holding a side event at some point to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the mandate. And it will take the theme of non-camp IDPs and take in the issues that arose out of the Human Rights Council to try and identify some of the best practices and where those best practices are and what they mean in the context of advancing the debate and

engagement with the issue.

I think it's also important to note that there are certain forms of groundwork for pushing governments and institutions around the world in confronting internal displacement. I value all the actors that are engaged with that, those who are here in this room this morning who were speaking at USAID with development and humanitarian actors. I think that the mandate does value that collaborative relationship and support. Being one of the voices that articulates the concerns of IDPs across and alongside those that actually provide support to them as host communities and who make the system of protection and assistance at that level, grassroots level, viable.

So I thank you very much, and I look forward to debating the issue and seeing what comes out of here.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Chaloka. We'll turn now to the short video clip from Tabib Huseynov, and again apologies from Azerbaijani researchers. There was a health problem. Somebody had back trouble and couldn't travel at the last minute.

MR. HUSEYNOV'S VIDEO: Forced displacement has been one of the defining characteristics of Azerbaijan ever since it regained its independence some 20 years ago. Today, Azerbaijan has one of the highest rates of displaced populations in the world -- some 7 percent of its population or roughly 600,000 people are internally displaced. This is in addition to some 200,000 people entering Azerbaijan who have been displaced from Armenia as a result of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

At the same time, the fact that internal displacement in Azerbaijan has been ongoing for nearly two decades, raises questions about how the vulnerabilities and protection needs of the Azerbaijani IDPs have changed over time and how their vulnerabilities and protection needs differ from those of the local non-IDP population.

This is the central theme and the central question of the research that was conducted by my colleague, Yulia Gureyeva, and myself based on field research. We've chosen two rural and two urban areas. The urban areas are Baku, the capital city, and Ganja, the second largest city. And the two rural areas were the frontline areas of Agdam and Tartar. And basically this study is based on the field research and numerous interviews with both IDPs and the local population.

Basically, if you look at the government policy at how the government has responded over time to IDPs protection needs, we can see that government initially was largely relying on humanitarian assistance from abroad. But from early 2000, when the Azerbaijani government began to receive an increasing amount of money from its oil exports, it began to assume more active policies towards its IDP populations. Today, Azerbaijan spends, according to the World Bank, some 3 percent of its GDP annually on assistance programs for IDPs. This, according to the World Bank, is the biggest share of GDP spent annually by any nation, which has faced a displacement problem.

However, the government's policy does not differentiate between different groups within the IDP community and simply approaches the IDPs as a single group in need of special assistance. This old approach ignores the fact that, during 20 years of displacement, some IDPs have managed to rebuild their lives, have integrated into the mainstream society, and basically have improved their living standards. By comparatively examining the IDPs in host communities in rural and urban areas, our research illustrates that the vulnerabilities and protection needs of the IDPs are highly situational and case-specific. And being an IDP does not make a person automatically a vulnerable person in need of special assistance.

To substantiate this argument, we look at the IDPs in host communities comparatively from the prism of various factors, including housing conditions, livelihoods,

access to health care and education, and so on.

So I have only some 15 minutes to make a presentation of some 50-page report, so I will move quickly, skim through various chapters of the report. First the housing conditions: The housing conditions are the single most visible disadvantage of the IDP populations, vis-à-vis the local community, because an overwhelming majority of the IDPs still, even 20 years afterwards, after their displacement, live in very precarious conditions. Most of them live in public buildings. Those are the kindergartens, the schools, sanatoria, dormitories, even administrative buildings. And they live in very overcrowded conditions; two or even three families may live in one or two small-sized rooms and basically they have no physical space there. They use these rooms both as kitchens, as sleeping rooms, as guest rooms, sometimes even as bathrooms because they don't have separate bathrooms. Many people living in these public buildings don't have toilets in their rooms. And as a result, they have to use -- some 25 families have to use -- one or two toilets in their public building. As one IDP said, he said, "We live in a family prison here, and we have nowhere else to go."

But not all IDPs live in such conditions. The government has also removed some 100,000 IDPs to new IDP settlements specifically built for them. Those were the IDPs who lived in even more precarious conditions in so-called notorious tent camps, and the government abolished by 2007 the last tent camp, and removed some 100,000 people to new IDP settlements. The people living in these IDP settlements have the same housing conditions as their neighbors in the rural areas because most of the IDP settlements are in rural areas. The only problem that we have identified with this group of population was that the IDPs have been rarely consulted about their place of relocation, and governments usually put the new IDP settlements in areas close to the frontline, which increases the security risks for this population because their conflict is not

resolved.

And a very small number of IDPs, some 6,000 families according to the official statistics, live in normal houses, in normal flats and apartments, which they have seized in the early 1990s at the time of their displacement. And their housing conditions basically do not differ from the housing conditions of the host communities. The only problem that we have identified with this population group, with this IDP group, was that most of these IDPs lack security of tenure. They are not lawful owners of these apartments, and there are actually lawful owners of the apartments from among the local population. And some of them are taking their cases to the courts, all the way up to the European Court of Human Rights, which have ruled in numerous incidences in favor of the lawful owners. And as a result, the IDP families have to be displaced from these apartments as well.

When we look at the livelihoods, we see that the differences between the host communities and the IDP communities is much more than you ask because IDPs do not seem to be significantly and fundamentally different in terms of their livelihood opportunities from the other non-IDP core population. Field research shows that in rural areas, IDPs suffer nearly equally; basically host communities and IDPs suffer nearly equally from a lack of employment or underemployment, from a lack of social infrastructure, poor roads, lack of access to natural gas, and lack of access basically to social services. And we found that basically the populations, IDP and non-IDP populations, living in Baku and in other major urban areas appear to be relatively better off than their counterparts living in rural areas because in rural areas there are virtually no livelihood opportunities for these people or very few livelihood opportunities in comparison to the urban areas.

When it comes to health and education -- I have to hurry up -- when it

comes to health and education, we found that basically in terms of access to health care and education, the IDPs do not significantly differ from their host communities. And again, the main differences here are between the population living in rural areas and in urban areas. In urban areas, the populations are better off because they have better access to health care facilities, to educational opportunities. But the people living in rural areas have to pay not only for a doctor, for example, but they also have to pay for their own transportation to come to Baku from the rural area, and this also increases the financial burden on them.

In terms of education, also with the IDPs basically claim that their separate IDP school did not lag behind their local schools. The major problem that they have identified in these terms was that many IDP children cannot study at home. They cannot do their homework at home because they get constantly distracted by their family members in the small rooms that they have, because, as I mentioned, many of the IDPs who live in public buildings lack physical space, which violates their privacy and also hinders their children to educate themselves and to do their homework.

As part of the research, we have paid special attention to frontline communities, both IDP and non-IDP communities, which live in dangerous proximity to the line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops. And we paid special attention to those people because they are a group in need of special protection. At the time of the research when we visited these communities in October of 2011, a major concern of this population was lack of protective barriers. Basically, the government built protective barriers for them made of mud, and these mud barriers overtime withered down, exposing these people to almost daily shooting incidents. There have been numerous cases when civilians have been targeted in these areas. In 2011 in March, a nine-year-old boy was killed in one of these frontline villages, and this killing basically

created a huge -- it sent shockwaves across Azerbaijan society and prompted the government to build stone walls in the villages. I've recently been to these places, to some of these villages, and the population now feels relatively more secure because their houses are shielded from the Armenian bullets by the stone walls. However, they still had a problem. When they go to work in their fields, they are still exposed to indiscriminate shooting incidents, and they're also exposed to land mines, which are very abundant in the area.

A major problem that we have identified with these communities is that the government has adopted a very inconsistent assistance approach to these communities. It has granted to some of them an IDP status because they were displaced during the active phase of hostilities in the early 1990s, and the government did not abolish the IDP status once they had returned because they still continued to live in these conditions. But strangely enough, the government has not endowed the same status and the same corresponding benefits to other frontline communities living in similar conditions. So it was an open question, what was the criteria by which the government made a decision to grant IDP status and benefits to some communities and not to do the same to other communities.

My time is coming to an end, so I need to summarize. If you summarize the major conclusions of the paper, the first conclusion that we make and we strongly argue about this in the paper, is that the government needs to abandon its old blanket assistance approach to the IDP population, treating them as a single group. It needs to adopt a more differentiated course towards IDPs, based on their individual needs and vulnerabilities.

Second, the research shows that some IDP concerns are specific to IDPs themselves and are linked to their displacement. These are primarily housing

conditions, for example. But there are numerous other concerns such as employment opportunities, lack of access to water, lack of access to many other social services provided by the government, which are not specific to IDPs and are not specifically linked to their displacement. Therefore, there is a need for more integrated assistance, targeting both IDPs and other vulnerable, non-displaced populations, particularly in the impoverished rural areas.

Another finding we came to is that IDPs certainly do wish to return. Every single IDP that we have talked to expressed a desire to return to their native homeland once the opportunity presents itself. At the same time, however, the IDPs were very explicit in their demands that they need to have decent living conditions while they are being displaced as well. And many of them complained that the government has not done enough to address and improve their lives in their displacement. So basically, in spite of the fact that government has done really a lot to protect and to help the IDPs in recent years, it really needs to do even much more to relocate the IDPs from the public buildings, to provide them with decent housing, and most importantly to provide them with opportunities to earn their own living independently and not be dependent on the government.

Another conclusion that we made is that the government needs to pay special attention to the frontline communities regardless of the fact that they have IDP status or they don't. The government needs to elevate discrepancies in its assistance policies towards the IDPs and basically come up maybe with more coherent criteria by which it would decide on which communities it provides assistance.

The government also needs to make sure that it has emergency evacuation plans for this population living in the frontline because as I said, the conflict is not resolved. And as long as it is not resolved, there's always a risk of resumption of full-

scale hostilities. So the government needs to prepare emergency evacuation plans for the frontline communities, and it also needs to make sure that it does not settle more IDPs to the frontline areas.

That's pretty much it. I thank you for your attention, and I hope also that I will be able to join you for a videoconference.

MS. FERRIS: We tried to get the video link, but weren't successful. But my colleague, Bryce Campbell, who was in Baku last month to launch this report, is prepared to answer any questions you have about the research part of it.

We turn now to another longstanding displacement situation, that of Colombia. Roberto, tell us about host communities in Bogotá.

MR. VIDAL: Thank you, Beth. Well, good afternoon. I want to start by saying thank you to Brookings and the London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, and the International Committee for the Red Cross that invited us to see our research group in social justice to work on this global pilot project on IDP and host communities. Also I want to thank in particular Elizabeth Ferris and Bryce Campbell here at Brookings that supervised our work and have made possible for me to be here today.

While I am trying to explain the conclusions of our report that is published and is available to you, I want to make a context of the situation of host communities and IDPs in the situation of Colombia at the present.

Colombia has suffered a long-term conflict with the coexistence of diverse armed actors that include many different guerillas, paramilitary groups, private armies of drug dealers, and the state forces. From 1997 to the present, there have been between 3 and 4 million displaced persons in a protracted situation of almost 20 years so far. Some international groups have described Colombia as a case of successful transition from war to peace and development. Some models, including the past

Colombian government, declared a situation of post-conflict given some elements like the massive demobilization of an important part of paramilitary groups, the implementation of judicial processes of transitional justice, and the application of finding an extensive military strategy against the guerillas supported mainly by the American government and the Plan Colombia.

However, the perception of Colombian population by the main group of researchers and even the new government is different. President Santos, one year in power so far, affirmed the actual existence of an armed conflict in terms of international military law and the need for looking for peace negotiations with the guerilla groups. At the same time, Santos has talked of the submission of paramilitary groups to the Colombian justice. Meanwhile, he has introduced the debate of drug legalization in the international agenda. The recent news showed that the guerillas are increasing their military actions and have announced at the same time their will of starting peace negotiations with the Colombian government. The paramilitary groups that survived the demobilization processes seem to be stronger. Two months ago one of these groups called La Sudoranos had the power for ordering the cancellation of any economic activity in four main cities in the northern regions of the conflict for four days. Besides, there have emerged new paramilitary groups that have declared their opposition to the process of land restitutions to internally displaced people. Guerillas, as much as paramilitary groups, really own the economy of production and commercialization of cocaine.

Our research, as I mentioned before, was a pilot project of Brookings and ICRC in two localities of Bogotá, the capital of Colombia. And the two districts are the main places of reception of IDPs in the country, the localities of Suba and Ciudad Bolivar. We found that almost the complete population of this district has been internally displaced. The divide between IDPs and host communities is related with the timing of

displacement. Host communities were displaced between the ‘70s and ‘90s. Meanwhile, IDPs are those who were displaced after 1997 when the package of legislation concerning internal displacement was made. Solidarity, as Beth talked about, amid the pool at the time of displaced people, displaced derived by the houses for rent found by host communities. The state assistance is temporal and occasional. In the same manner, the income of IDPs is occasional. It generates conflicts around the payment of rent charges.

The state delivers funds for little businesses for IDPs that compete with host communities for the use of public space in urban marginalized areas. The context of the preservation of goods and services in marginalized neighborhoods at the city’s edge accept pressure on both communities. They suffer the environment of insecurity, ruled by city gangs, bandits, paramilitaries, and guerillas, but compete for scarce resources from the state and the local governments. The surveys have shown that IDPs do not want to return to the countryside even if the security conditions and circumstances have changed. There are many reasons we have that decision. One important motivation is that the conflict destroyed territorialities. It seems to be that it implies the suppression of social and political organizations, local cultures, economic and social networks. As time goes by, IDPs create new territorialities in urban context that offer them better conditions than the ones they left in the countryside. In Colombia the social services, security, and communications, are absent in the regions and particularly in rural environments with few exceptions.

The intervention of authorities has the potential of changing relations of IDP and host communities. The divide between them for access to social and state services generates hostility and conflict in the long term. The services and support to both communities of low-income people contributes to assistance.

The institution and measures for IDPs in Colombia have achieved so far important outcomes in terms of attention and protection of rights of the persons already displaced. However, the system has arrived at a deadlock in terms of prevention of new displacement and permanent solutions. The last year, 2011, there was an important growth of internal displacement. The measures talk about 250,000 new displaced persons in the last year. On the other side, the executives were not able to demonstrate the fulfillment of IDPs' rights that allow them to declare the end of displacement. We can't prevent and we can't end displacement. In the sight of production of new displacement, it has emerged the close relationship between displacement and development.

The appropriation of territories by armed actors has not only political but economical roles. The transformation of territories from peace and traditional economies to industries and mining articulated to the expanded demands of free trade agreements. The new development goals demand the protection of property and the clearance of the land from traditional communities. At the present, the companies and investors control the territories, protected and encouraged by the development plan of the state. Development projects work as a cause of displacement and as an obstacle to their return on displaced people.

Finally, the last context of the Colombian policy on displacement and victims: By the last year, the Colombian state enacted the Act on Protection of Victims and Land Restitution. That is an ambitious project that gathered the extent of Colombian experiences of the system of attention to internal displacement. The system of transitional justice that was enacted six years ago and older experiences of land reform altogether on one project, one single act. The Victims Act looks for many different goals. To extend the IDPs rights to a wider concept of armed conflict victims, to extend the

programs from reparations, compensation, or restitution of lost property, to transform the strategies of true telling historical memory, and no repetition in permanent official institutions. The outcomes of the Victims Act related with IDP are not clear yet. The Act looks for the extent that the rights of IDP to a wider group of victims. From an IDP perspective, it seems that the Victims Act reduced the scope of protection that was achieved by the law in the last 20 years.

The cities and the municipal governments will be the main scenario of implementation of the new policies on victims allowed restitution. The municipal authorities will be responsible for the implementation of the Act. The measures will have an important impact in the local policies, the city government, and governability. Many urban authorities understand the Victims Act and particularly the process of land restitution as a chance for getting rid of IDPs who aren't in use return. The mayors of the main cities have refused to offer social services to IDPs, claiming the scarcity of resources or the risk of a permanent alteration of the electoral balances.

From other perspectives, armed actors established the control of local governments as a strategic goal of armed actions. Four decades of armed conflict have consolidated the control of local and regional governments by armed actors, drug dealers, or alliances between them and traditional elites. They control the political authorities and exert strong pressure on armed forces and the judiciary. This situation has been demonstrated in the criminal procedures against the mobilized paramilitary leaders.

In many cases, IDPs observed that the same persons that displaced them are the present public authorities, democratically elected, or they are public servants or part of police forces. The permanence of perpetrators in the political scene discourages many IDPs from political participation or even the possibility of return and

reparations.

This is the scenario of implementation of the Victims and Land Restitution Act. It has emerged as an obstacle to IDP policy in the past and victims' policies in the future. The implementation of the Victim Act needs to be nationally in use by the executive branch and imposed by the judiciary as it happens with the Displacement Act and the rulings of the constitutional court in the recent past. But it's not enough. It seems to need regional and local processes of political negotiation that creates an equitable environment for the application of the law. The end of displacement will take place through the fulfillment of basic rights of IDPs and the cities. Conversely, the lack of attention and the omission of local governments on IDPs will make the situation worse and endless. The commitment of local governments and newer societies is a fundamental condition of the end of displacement. The future of public policies for IDPs will be urban, even restitution and reparations. These policies will need to be connected to government that will integrate displaced of the past and the displaced of the present and the future. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, thank you very much, Roberto. Thanks to all three, to Chaloka, Tabib, and Roberto. We now have about half an hour for questions, comments. I'd also encourage you to share some other experiences of host communities. Is this a useful term? Host communities? Or should we be talking about displacement-affected communities? The floor is open. Yes, we'll go one, two -- we have microphones, and if you can just identify yourself, and if you can stand up, that way everybody can see you.

SPEAKER: Hi. I was interested in the way that you pointed out the importance of municipalities and local authorities in taking the land and Victims Law seriously and taking IDP rights seriously. And I'm wondering if you can share ways that

the NGO community, the global NGO community, the U.S. government, and other donor countries, can help to incentivize these local and municipal authorities to see IDPs as a boon to their economies, as something that brings more resources and more attention to underdeveloped communities. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: We'll take two or three questions, if that's all right. Patricia?

SPEAKER: Thank you, all, and I also thank Shanna for asking the question she just asked since mine is a real follow up to it or a similar question.

Roberto, your study was on Bogotá, on the environment around Bogotá, but your talk is about all of Colombian municipalities. So I'm going to take advantage of that fact and ask a similar question to the one just asked.

I've read and there's a huge difference in impact between a city as vast as Bogotá even if the IDPs don't live in Bogotá itself, but in the metropolitan area, and very, very small municipalities that may have been conflict-affected and have been impacted with IDPs that could even outnumber their local population. So taking your point that many of the municipal actors are hostile to the IDPs, want the IDPs out, are themselves perhaps in the pockets of the drug agents, and so on, could one also take the other side of that and say well, a better investment in these smaller communities, in these impacted communities, in the services that they could offer, would in fact help integrate the IDPs and would make the overall situation better, excluding giving money to drug dealers and such.

MS. FERRIS: I think one more here.

SPEAKER: Thank you. My name is Daisy Francis, and I'm with Catholic Relief Services. I wondered if I could get the two of you to reflect -- although I'm sorry we can't get our colleague from Azerbaijan because I think it's relevant -- on the issue

around resolving the problem, which is trying to find the money for it to be honest. And so part of our challenge right now in terms of how siloed we are, and so IDP is a particular silo of money. Refugee is another silo of money. Then you have development money. And I present this simply because this is an issue that I raise in another parallel context which is refugee context, but protracted refugee context which offers perhaps a model that can be replicated in IDP settings, which is at a certain point they stop being refugees. In the same way as Shanna said, at a certain point, IDPs stop being IDPs. And I really welcome the notion of not looking at them as a consolidated, solid, entity. And I think host communities are also not a solid, monolithic entity. But can we have a new conversation and do you have some reflection on what we could do in terms of expanding the development budget, the development mandate?

UNACR is talking to UNDP to say protracted refugees are there. They've been there for 25 years. They've stopped being refugees. Let's really look at them, integrating them into a development plan. I accept development encroachment as a concern, but I'm just wondering in terms of positive and pro-poor, antipoverty strategies can we look at, breaking the silos, and find a way to integrate responding to IDPs as part of broader, national, antipoverty reduction plans.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Why don't we start with Roberto, some of the comments about municipalities, and then turn to Chaloka for some of the broader issues around humanitarian development silos, if that's okay.

MR. VIDAL: Well, thank you, Beth. I want to say two things today -- very interesting questions, thank you very much. First of all, the evaluation, the assessment, of the policy for IDPs the last years has shown in Colombia that the weak part of the policy is the connection between the national realm and the local realm. And for some of the reasons that I exposed before, there is an opposition of many and especially in the

little towns that were mentioned and even in the huge cities. And there is a sort of opposition from the local governments to the national policies on displacement. And this is a huge obstacle to the application of the war policy. That's the reason why I put the emphasis in this spot.

Now, what can we do about it? We are thinking now, our research group -- I only mention that in the last part of my presentation is that we need to make contexts of analysis and intervention. And maybe we have coincidence with the perspective of the last part of Plan Colombia that these two have regions of consolidation to make strong interventions in the social and political and economic realms. I agree with that, and the intervention of NGOs and international cooperation I think should point to that kind of support.

Finally I want to connect that could the proposal that you do that is the need of connecting the policies, aid policies for IDPs, to development because the isolation of the two perspectives is making damage to the IDPs because we have strong policies of how restitution and reparations on one side. And on the other side they are promoting policies of development that reduce displacement and exclude the victims of return or to stay in the territories. We need to acclimate these two policies because at the present are contradictory.

MS. WERNTZ: If I could just say a word or two about municipal levels as well. A few years ago we held a meeting in Colombia with mayors and municipal authorities precisely because the national government has pretty good policies. But when you talk to municipal governors or governors or mayors, they would often say well, "According to the law we're supposed to provide education to all these children, but where do we find the money for an additional 100 or 1,000 kids? Government has given us the responsibility, the mandate, without the funds." It was really an eye-opening

meeting to hear the mayors from 20 or so communities in Colombia, most of who were very negative towards IDPs because they saw it as competition. Do we help kids with disabilities or IDP children? So that's led us really to think further about the role of municipalities. We'll be doing some further research looking not only at capital cities, but also at some of the smaller ones as Patricia mentioned.

MS. FERRIS: Are there larger issues, Chaloka?

MR. BEYANI: Okay, thank you very much. I think that the questions have been touched on already, but first of all -- and the question of local and municipal authorities, I think what Beth would say -- but I think one of the ways of dealing with this is to make sure that central governments actually have contingency funds in their budgets for dealing with issues of displacement and in relation to local municipal authorities. That often is not dealt with. I think this idea of having local governments, municipal authorities with regular budgets dealing with education, sanitation, or whatever, does not foresee contingencies. But one model that's important, which hasn't managed and the current constitution that we're able to work on, first of all assigns specific responsibilities to devote units of government to deal with refugees, IDPs, in the context of natural disasters. There is then a contingency fund on the part of national government, which has to revolve around to deal with emergencies, and this must be set aside as part of the budgetary allocation. This is in the context of preparedness, that if states actually take out measures of mitigation, preparedness, and warning in advance of crises happening, then that contingency fund I think is very important in order to bear in mind and which partly resolves the problem.

But also in some respects local government and municipal authorities are seen as distinct from national government. I mean, they operate autonomously, and I think that relationship needs to be more defined in most respects. These are the

preliminary comments on that.

On the broader issues of funding, protracted models of refugees and IDPs, and development actors, I think there are some real issues there to be heard. First of all, from the point of protractedness, I think that there are real differences as regards refugees and IDPs in protracted situations more because in the context of refugee protractedness suggests that return or repatriation is not immediate and, therefore, refugees will wait until conditions of normality have been restored in their country of origin.

The other solutions could be, of course, naturalization, but we see that many countries are not willing to do that, or resettlement elsewhere for reasons of safety and otherwise. But if you take the model of refugees, it might only apply insofar as return is important and the conditions, which obstruct return. In the context of IDPs in protracted situations, I think that in Azerbaijan the regional cause of displacement continues to be a factor, very much so. That touches on issues where territorial control and political authority over disputed territory, for example, continues to be an obstacle. So you have Nagorno-Karabakh, you have South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and others in that line, Kosovo to some extent. So you have territorial issues that were being talked about in the context of Colombia where the groups control territory and territorialism then becomes an obstacle and protractedness and it continues.

So beyond that, you also have to consider that there are other doable solutions available to IDPs that may not be available to refugees, local integration being one of those. This is where the role of the host communities actually becomes a very important aspect as a frontline of protection and assistance.

But also you speak of the right of those communities obviously to receive others and absorb them. Here I think, from your comments, two parallel issues emerge.

One is dealing with this in the context of antipoverty strategies that apply across the board, which is fine from my point of view as long as those strategies relate to the receiving or host communities as well. If they don't, then there will be specific problems that will arise out of that.

The second is that even with that approach, we have to bear in mind that IDPs are a special category of individuals who have been forced or obliged to leave their places of habitual residence. So they are in poverty stricken conditions as a result of displacement, whereas in normal situations affecting the populations, those populations have resilience and adaptation in relation to the environment. The IDPs have to live in a new environment altogether. I've heard this from development actors mainly who say, "But look, why should we favor IDPs ahead of other similar situated populations?" And I think therein lies the answer in the approach, that inasmuch as we take a development approach, we have to be aware that we're dealing with a special category of individuals that has been disadvantaged for whole multiple reasons.

Now where do the development actors come in place? Again, if you draw the parallels in relation to refugees as you indicated, refugees have UNHCR. It's an agency with a mandatory relation to them. They have a standing. They can engage UNDP and other actors in making sure that return reconstruction is actually doable to facilitate the normality of conditions of livelihood of refugees. Now, IDPs don't have that single actor. There is Mymondo, OCHA. You have UNHCR. You have IOM. Now you have the designation of humanitarian coordinators at country level who very often come from a development background such as UNDP. Now they see things through construction and development. They very often don't see things from the point of view of humanitarianism, and I think this is where the change between humanitarians and development actors has developed over a period of time, that the methods of

engagement are different.

So, yes, UNDP, for example, is quite willing and engaging to address issues of reconstruction and development in relation to IDPs, but there has to be that trigger to instigate and to make them engage and, in fact, to lobby them to engage along with other actors on the ground. I think that that situation in and for IDPs is one that's likely different.

To give you a concrete example, when I was in Burundi at some point, UNHCR and the other humanitarians were saying, "Look, the IDP issue in terms of doable solutions is important to address because the solutions that were being addressed by the government discriminated between categories of IDPs in areas where IDPs were being returned as a result of this." The humanitarians told us it's a real problem in terms of achieving a doable solution.

For UNDP that was not an issue. This is a forgotten issue. We don't want to redirect the IDP issue. All we need to do is reconstruct houses in places where IDPs are being returned to, but in fact, you're promoting ethnic segregation in doing so. So unless you address the humanitarian aspect into which the development aspect feeds into, that both actors must be engaged from the very beginning and to share the parameters and modalities of engagement even in the context of antipoverty strategies.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. We have time for another round. Let's see, we'll take you in the white.

SPEAKER: Hi, my name is Catherine Gleason, and I'm a fellow at the National Law Center for Homelessness and Poverty. So my interest is in how to bring some of these lessons back domestically to the United States and specifically in terms of -- obviously this is different, not a conflict situation -- but specifically in terms of people who are forced from their homes in the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina. I guess my

question is sort of how can the lessons of these places that have had protracted situations of internal displacement be used in terms of framing the Gulf Coast evacuees as internally displaced people? And what lessons can they learn about how to frame their own involvement in development and in resettlement and things like that?

MS. FERRIS: Great. Thank you very much. There was another hand?

SPEAKER: Hi. Sarah Wilson. I'm a recent graduate in development. My experience with IDPs is mostly in Iraqi Kurdistan, which is complicated because you've got the different languages and different ethnic groups as well. But in thinking about this debate between humanitarian approaches and development approaches, from my experience one of the problems is that they're often forcibly separated by the way policies and funding is set up. And the policy at this end will provide funding to aid organizations to only support local NGOs who will fund IDP projects. But IDPs that I've spent time with are reluctant to return because of a lack of development. They want to stay in the towns where the schools are. So I'm interested in that wider issue and also whether on the ground from your experience, which is obviously much more considerable than my own, how host communities feel about the fact that we're categorizing IDPs as a separate group. And whether they in your research have expressed a difference between IDPs and other types of migrants, whether it's rural-to-urban migration or economic migrants because those are people living with the host communities as well, and it is that differentiation that is existing in the people that you're speaking to.

MS. FERRIS: Great. Thank you. Other questions? Okay, Patricia, you get the last one.

SPEAKER: Patricia Fagan, Georgetown. I didn't mean to monopolize the session, but as long as there are no other hands, I will. Yes, I want again -- I think the questions have really framed the issue very well, and I want to address myself to

Chaloka's remarks primarily.

An IDP is who? This is a very -- it isn't only the end of displacement; it is really defining who is an IDP at a particular point in time. I wrote a paper not too long ago contrasting Liberia and Colombia, Colombia being a country that defines IDPs down to the last little codicil of the court decisions so that everyone has to be quite clear what are the conditions that IDPs have and they're still IDPs until that last condition is met. Liberia on the other hand -- who in Liberia -- is somebody asking how many IDPs were in Liberia, and I said well, either everybody or nobody or something like that because an IDP is a person who was forcibly displaced because of conflict and went to Monrovia. An IDP is a former combatant who ran out of benefits and couldn't go back to the community of origin and became an IDP. IDPs are the thousands, hundreds of thousands, of returned refugees who didn't stay in their place of origin for the very reason that Sarah just gave, that they couldn't survive there and so they went to Monrovia. So who are the IDPs? The IDPs are basically almost the entire population since the population has grown three times what is was before the conflict.

Now development, the government's idea of development is to develop Monrovia, to make Monrovia a better place to live, a cleaner place to live, and so on. But that means evicting IDPs from places that they have no right to be. Therefore, I think we have a challenge in working with municipal authorities for a much greater, more comprehensive, development strategy -- working with municipal authorities and the UNDP and other development actors on this sense. I'm sorry, this is more a comment than a question, but I welcome further comments on it.

MS. FERRIS: Chaloka, you want to go first and then Roberto?

MR. BEYANI: Yes, well let me start from where Patricia actually ended in the context of the status situation in Liberia or Monrovia and development actors and

who is an IDP. I think from all those descriptions that you meant, only one I'd probably exclude and that is the demobilized combatant. I know that they present a variety of issues and problems, not just in the context of Monrovia, but also in the context of even Nepal and other areas. I think it testifies to the absence of a proper demobilization strategy in relation to individuals who are combatants. Because of that, they've become part of the population that is kind of dislocated.

But I would start from the lens of the definition in the first instance. Is this a person who has been forced or obliged to leave their place of habitual residence as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of generalized violence, violations of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law, or environment, or causes manmade or human? I think that those others that you describe, perhaps returning refugees, might fit within that lens. The others who have been displaced because there are issues to do with urbanization and the role of municipal authorities, they, too, now need to be looked at more closely in the context of the relationship between climate change, maybe development or the absence of it, but more as measures of adaptation. It is those flows that get caught up with urbanization, squatter settlements, and where the reaction by local municipal authorities, to simply say it's not just Monrovia. It's Zimbabwe and others; you're unwanted here so we'll evict you. But the point is that there is a failure to actually identify who is an IDP and who is not an IDP here and, therefore, everyone gets caught up. But if you had systems of identification, data collection, as we stated monitoring the movement of populations, then you might at least be able to say well, what was the pattern of movement for this particular category of individuals when they came to the urban area, no matter how scattered they might be? And what kinds of interventions are required here? So development actors, including local municipal authorities, have to be informed by the fact that if they're dealing with IDPs, then there are specific methods of

engagement in relation to them and in relation to the application of doable solutions. So if someone comes within the definition that I described and no doable solutions have been applicable to them, from my point of view they continue to be an IDP. But it is that definition that distinguishes the application in relation to IDPs and other similarly situated categories.

Which then takes me to the other question about okay, fine, these are IDPs but you also have migrants. I think that is related to Patricia's issue as well. I think lopsidedness in terms of development, the idea of creating metro poles, urban areas, in the context of climate change, shrinking resources, environmental issues, clearly means that populations will be on the move to try and go to areas where they think that they can best have services that they would like to have. So in there you have a whole host of individuals -- migrant workers perhaps, rural-urban migrants, and others. So I think a development policy has to take into account that all these categories are obviously involved and should not be neglected and should not in any sense simply be victims of evictions without having to plan in relation to them. Because if they are evicted as such, whether they have come as migrants or whether they were IDPs, it means that they actually get caught up in a pattern of secondary displacement by virtue of eviction. So that doesn't resolve the problem. So development actors then have to engage with the fact that if these persons are to be evicted from here, first of all there has to be consultation but especially in relation to where. There should be a planned location perhaps in development terms, which is consistent with the views and desires of these individuals. So there I think you have the techniques for IDP protection and the techniques in relation to development and reconstruction that might actually merge for the benefit of both categories of individuals who are involved. But we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that a migrant obviously moves because they're looking for a better

opportunity. A migrant who is a victim of a slow onset disaster might move because they're being compelled. The conditions have become inhospitable. But an IDP faces this aspect of being uprooted or in relation to uprootedness, there might be adaptation also involved. And I think that is the situation that brings about their vulnerability. If you didn't have that situation, perhaps they'd remain where they are. They may be poverty stricken as I said earlier on, but they'd have resilience and coping strategies in the environment in which they are. But that factor of compelled movement and uprootedness does something to their livelihood, which is the attraction from both humanitarianism as well as the aspect of development.

I agree entirely with your opening remarks about funding, which is targeted for development NGOs or humanitarian NGOs and other actors and policies. And I think clearly that is the cause of the problem to a very large extent. So we'll be looking at perhaps at funding policies and perhaps also appealing to the funders that this dichotomy is creating real problems and fragmentation on the ground in terms of being an obstacle to a comprehensive approach to problems of displacement as between humanitarian and development approaches.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you, Chaloka. Roberto.

MR. VIDAL: Thank you, Chaloka, for your brilliant explanation of the issue. I only want to say two little things. The first one is that the perception that we have, that the separation between economic migrants and IDPs is becoming more and more obscure at the present, particularly for the economic motivation in the perspective of Colombia, the economic motivation of conflicts, of armed conflicts, and the use of force by the state in the process of modernization or mobilization like we are facing. In the other perspective, it's true that those affected by economic deprivation are exposed more to forced migration. And in many aspects the situation of economic deprivation, of

economic necessities, are more and more connected with forced migration.

The second point is that -- I was thinking in the question of the lessons for the local situation and the forced migration by environmental problems like Katrina or something like that. In the debates that we have in Colombia about this law of restitution and compensation, we are talking more about the transformative restitution and transformative compensation. It means that the compensation doesn't have only the goal of returning the people to their state before the displacement or the economic conditions that they had before the displacement, but different. The intervention should have the goal to transform the conditions that made it possible and to have new conditions of life, not of the past because the conditions of the past put the people again in a situation of vulnerability. That's one of the concerns now.

MS. FERRIS: Great, thank you. Just to add a word on the United States, the question about people displaced by the oil spill. Under the guiding principles, those who are displaced by natural or manmade disasters is how it's phrased, are IDPs. I mean we made that argument unsuccessfully during Hurricane Katrina, that those who were displaced weren't refugees, they weren't evacuees, they were IDPs and as such subject and able to avail themselves of relevant international law. Unfortunately, the U.S. government chose to call them evacuees, as did the Japanese government, incidentally, after the recent hurricane -- I mean tsunami and earthquake.

I was also struck, though, in the discussion about host communities. But this is also an issue for people displaced by natural disasters, whether it's communities or families. My sister lives in Galveston, Texas, which is subject to periodic hurricanes. And over Christmas, she said to me, "I'm so glad that Cousin Kim has moved to Austin because now I'll have a place to go without having a hotel bill if we're evacuated." People think in those terms in the Gulf Coast, of who do I have where, what kind of host

family can I avail myself of when there is a natural disaster? So these issues of host communities and host families and IDPs aren't just an issue for people displaced by conflict in the global scene, but also here at home which is a lesson, which we all perhaps should take a bit more seriously.

But thank you all very much for coming, and we'll look forward to continuing the discussion. Thanks to our panelists.

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