THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

PRESENT MEETS FUTURE: EVOLVING DEFENSE PARADIGMS

Washington, D.C.
Thursday, March 15, 2012

PARTICIPANTS:

Opening Remarks:

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTOPHER D. MILLER
Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs
U.S. Air Force

PANEL 1: CONSTRAINED BUDGETS AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERING PLANS:

Moderator:

PETER W. SINGER
Senior Fellow and Director, 21st Century
Defense Initiative
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

COMMANDER MIKE HANNAN (USN)
Federal Executive Fellow, Atlantic Council
"Punching Above Their Weight: How Four Small
European Navies Can Support American Strategic Rebalance"

CAPTAIN SCOTT CLENDENIN (USCG)
Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institution
"Networking Maritime Security in Central America: How to Better Link With the
Region's Maritime Security Services in Combined Operations at Sea"

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARTHUR "DWIGHT" DAVIS (USAF)
National Defense Fellow for Special Operations And Low Intensity Conflict,
Naval Postgraduate School
"The Regional SOF Headquarters: Franchising the NATO Model as a Hedge in Lean Times"

* * * * *

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SINGER: Hello. I'm Peter Singer. I direct the 21st Century Defense Initiative here at Brookings. And I'm delighted to welcome all of you to the 2012 Military and Federal Fellow Research Symposium.

Like a number of other think tanks and universities around the nation whose members will be represented at this symposium today, Brookings not only carries out its own research, but also hosts the Federal Executive Fellows Program, which is made up of officers and officials from all of the services and several government agencies. It was from this military and government fellows program that the concept of this symposium sprung several years ago.

Those of us who were involved in hosting these programs saw how the officers involved weren't just serving as a valuable bridge between their home services and the policy and academic worlds, but they were also conducting their own top-flight independent research on issues faced by the national security community. And it was because of the experience and expertise that they brought to the table that they were often focusing on important topics that were either under-researched or they were bringing new perspectives to old debates. That is, they were often bringing the best of both worlds to complex issues. And so this symposium series was created to provide a platform for that kind of research.

The theme of this year's symposium is "Present Meets Future: Evolving Defense Paradigms." And I think it shows very well the value of that kind of approach of allowing officers to conduct independent research on what they believe will be emerging topic areas of importance. Today we're going to enjoy panel discussions on the latest research in areas like international engagement strategy, China's rising global influence, terrorism, counterinsurgency, and Department of Defense reforms.

Now, what is striking is that while each one of these topics encompass core policy questions today, the fellows researching these topics decided to start on their journey almost 10 months ago. That is, those of us who work in both D.C., but also in academic can attest, it is all too rare to get the opportunity to discuss timely issues, but from the perspective of in-depth research.

It's with that in mind that I have to emphasize for all of you, but particularly for the media joining us here today, that the research and the policy recommendations and statements made by those gathered here today are not about espousing official policy. Rather, it's a research symposium intended to provide a greater awareness of the research work that these leaders are producing on cutting-edge issues; importantly, cutting-edge issues that both the research world, but also the bureaucracy is finding a challenging time dealing with today. That's what makes it such an exciting event.

And it's been an honor for those of us here at Brookings to see this program come together and we very much appreciate all of you joining us today. And with that, I'm especially honored to welcome our opening speaker, who will help us set the scene for this event.

Lieutenant General Christopher Miller's career very much exemplifies the diversity of experiences and expertise that we ask of our top officers in the U.S. military today. He entered Air Force service as a graduate of the Air Force Academy in 1980, subsequently earning a degree in international relations from Oxford. His staff assignments include two previous tours at Air Force Headquarters, International Affairs, and as a policy advisor to the U.S. ambassador to NATO.

His operational assignments include two wing commands, serving as a senior Air Force commander in Afghanistan, and command of America's only B-2 wing at Whiteman Air Force Base. He currently serves as deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and programs at Headquarters Air Force here in Washington. In his position he leads the development integration of the Air Force's long-range plans in the 5-year, $635 billion Air Force Future Years Defense Program.

General, we're delighted to welcome you here today. (Applause)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILLER: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. And thank you, Pete, for that kind introduction.

It is a real pleasure to be here and, in a way, the title of this symposium is actually sort of what my job is, bringing the present and the future together with the near-term program. That's clearly something that we're living in the present and doing it every day, trying to make the best of the resources we have to meet the jobs that we are assigned as an Air Force and as a Department of Defense. And then you don't do that without looking out ahead to the future, which is sort of the other half of the job. So it's a real pleasure to be here and kind of talk about what's in my job jar, but really to focus on warming up

the discussion for you, for the fellows who are going to present and the group of folks who are here to talk about some important issues.

There are a couple of things about DOD that I think make this a timely topic at any time, but particularly as we approach a transition point. One is, by nature, a big institution is difficult to change. And so when we're thinking about progressing into the future, little things done early can have a big effect, but they have to be done and they have to be done intentionally.

And second, DOD has another sort of a disincentive to change and that is we've been very successful for a long time. And so it's sometimes hard to break out of current-day constructs, current-day ways of thinking about the problem, and to move forward. And so if you're here as a fellow either presenting or with your fellow fellows, or if you're a young officer who's just getting ready to start down the road toward these kinds of things, I've got some good news and some bad news for you. The bad news is by virtue of being a fellow, you're a designated change agent. The worst news is sometimes being the tip of the spear means you're first contact with things that are hard to change. But the good news is it means you have an opportunity to make a difference and to help take a bite out of some problems that are central to the future prosperity and survival of our nation.

And I did not do my homework to figure out how to change slides, but I guess we got it figured out.

So my perspective this morning as I open things up is going to be from an Air Force perspective because that's the job I'm in right now, but I'll try to relate it to the larger DOD and national perspective where it's appropriate. If you kind of look at the evolution of our defense complex, and particularly the Air Force part of it, since the end of the Second World War, we've gone through some very distinct phases: end of the war, containment and collective security was clearly one of them, things that we all know well because they've been in the vernacular for a long time that was associated with the Cold War.

And this line here is an interesting sort of way of capturing the relationship between technology and capability and the resources that it takes to field that technology. Because that's the procurement for Air Force weapons systems over time, the number of platforms that we bought at particular eras as we go through this last half-century-plus.

So the end of that inflection point with the end of the Cold War, we sort of moved into an era of regional operations and stability. We as an Air Force focused on what we call global reach and global power. We saw technology bring us precision strike and integrate that into things like Desert Storm and post-Desert Storm operations. 9-11 brought us another inflection point into what we call overseas contingency operations, characterized by continuing nuclear deterrence, which has been a strategic theme throughout, but a great increase in our need to surveil the battle space to understand what it is that's happening not only in the battle space, but in the wider world; continued focus on building partnerships and outside of formal alliances, much more so than in the time previous.

And so if you look at the time period we're approaching now -- this is not a DOD term, this is my term for what we are approaching now -- we have been focused on the low end of the conflict spectrum. We have been continuing some pieces of the high end of the conflict spectrum. But we are now approaching a time where we're trying to rebalance the way we approach things. We're facing some challenges out here in terms of continuing to be able to operate in an anti-access denial environment; continue to have high-end combat forces, but without losing the low-end capabilities we have. We need to continue to have the tools that have given us success over the last couple of decades.

The importance of space and cyber is clear. We still need to be able to operate across the planet, and so right-size lift is one of the components of this. All of which, from an Air Force perspective -- and we'll come back to this -- adds up to global vigilance, reach, and power to do these sorts of things that are part of the evolving DOD strategy.

This is a very busy chart. It's not my intent to walk through every single one of these things or to try to tell you that they are in priority order or that they're even necessarily all accurate. But I think it is accurate to say that globalization is a continuing trend. It will not slow down. It brings with it a proliferation of capabilities. It brings with it the visibility or and the existence of rising extremism, at least in the near term. Cyberspace, incredibly prevalent in most of the developed world; increasingly prevalent in the developing world. It is a domain and an area that we cannot afford not to think about a lot.

If you look at the impact to demographics, increasing populations, increasing urbanization; manpower shortages that are in pockets throughout the world, but, nevertheless, significant; you look at things like supply and demand, the U.S. role as a superpower changing over time; China as a

strategic challenge and a strategic partner; Russia continuing to evolve; and I could go down the list on the left, what does that imply for us? And you can kind of see the implications on the right, all of which, from a U.S. DOD standpoint, require us to relook at some of the basic assumptions we have about how we prepare for war, how we prosecute and sustain peace, where we operate routinely, and so on.

I think it's safe to say that not only are individual things on either side of this chart important, but one of the most difficult pieces of this is understanding which of those connecting lines makes a difference. And the research that you as fellows have been doing has a lot to do with what those connections are and what direction things are moving along those connections.

As a programmer I have to talk about resources for a couple of minutes. So, I think it is important for us to remember that there are macroeconomic trends that will affect our careers, your careers, probably for as long as you're wearing a uniform for the military fellows. And they're different from what we've seen in the past.

From '66 to 2016, all of this is based on OMB numbers. You can see the increase in mandatory; relatively constant, actually slightly decreasing non-defense expenditures; a decreasing percentage of federal outlays for national defense. But it's really pretty striking when you look at the percentage that we've devoted to defense as a graphic percentage: '66 at 44 percent down to a projected 15 percent in 2016. That affects the choices we can make.

And it's seen most clearly here where you can see the projection of the federal debt. And so while threat has always modulated the level of resources available to defense, there are constraints on that modulation that may change historical patterns somewhat.

And when we look at historical patterns, it's interesting to note that defense outlays are cyclical. That is no surprise, and you can see it's related to the threats. This chart includes spending on operations, so in this particular case it includes overseas contingency operation funding.

The point I would make here is that we're on a path; we were on a path, with the '12 budget to a 24 percent reduction. We are now about on this 29 percent reduction. A further reduction would still only bring us down to a historical average, above the periodic low. But why that's still a concern has to do with this chart.

And what this shows, I won't walk through it in a great deal of detail, but there are two

conclusions that are important. One is operations and maintenance. What it costs us to do business has been growing as a percentage of what we spend on defense. The second is procurement, although it has not radically decreased, it is definitely less than it has been at many periods in our history as a service, while what we've spent to sort of grow our seed corn has been relatively constant.

If you're thinking about the rise in personnel costs, this chart may surprise you a little bit because it shows military personnel spending as a percentage relatively level. However, what you have to remember is that in-strength here was about twice what it is here. And so this economic picture, this division of the pie, is likely to be a feature of any solution that we think about for any military problem for a good while to come, although, like Secretary Panetta says, fiscal security and national security do not have to be opposites of each other.

One of the things that I think regardless of your service, and this has got an Air Force symbol on it because I'm an Air Force guy, but the United States has thought globally about military presence and the use of military force to maintain peace and stability for a very long time. That isn't unlikely to change. How we do it, though, and the complexity of the environment we're operating in is, in fact, not decreasing. And if you look at the Joint Force missions that the secretary of defense just indicated in his January strategy are important to us, it's a pretty broad list of things, which I notice in your research topics you're touching on quite a few of these.

Again, I'm not going to take the time to go through in detail each of these missions because we could spend a lot of time on every single one of them. What I think is important, though, is if you look at how they relate to each other.

We are still operating over the full spectrum. We are still operating over the entire planet. But exactly how we do that within that decreasing resource pie that we talked about is really kind of the key issue of our day, I think, in some respects, and not only how we do it today, but, most importantly, how we think about doing it into the future. When I look at aviation, space and, to a lesser extent, cyber-related programs, the timeline for developing a significant capability is in the decade-plus timeframe. So things that we are thinking about now will not come to fruition until the mid-'20s most likely, which means that all of these missions and the capabilities that we need to do them, for the most part we need to envision what those capabilities are today so that we can get the appropriate start or put the appropriate

resources against the existing technologies and doctrines and capabilities.

And that kind of goes back to what I was talking about with doctrine and people. DOD is a big organization. The business of keeping expertise, developing expertise, training people to think about problems in a way that allows them to solve them, we've seen over the last 10 years the development of a counterinsurgency capability across the services that we did not have when we started in Iraq and Afghanistan. Maintaining that expertise is not going to be easy, neither is evolving it into the kinds of challenges that we'll have to apply those same people against in the future.

So this is a -- it's a pretty large set of challenges and there's not yet, because of the nature of our defense requirements, a way to say we are not going to do many of the things that are there.

So as I mentioned, from an Air Force perspective only, global vigilance, reach, and power. What does that mean?

Global vigilance over the last 10 years, you've seen the building of numerous remotely piloted aircraft platforms to provide the kinds of ISR that we need in the environment we've been flying in. That is not necessarily transferrable into the area of denial, anti-access environment.

So how do we keep that capability? How do we keep the kind of capability that's let us put precise munitions against well-identified targets and translate that into a larger conflict, higher intensity conflict spectrum? How do we in a world where the routine alliances are decreasing somewhat, how do we continue to have the through-put we need to get people to where they're going?

And for us, the Air Force has divided up our job jar into about 12 core functions. I am not going to go through how all of these play together. What I am going to say is that the network of relationships between those core functions and what you can call a system of systems in getting to mission accomplishment in any particular task is critical.

So, for example, global precision attack doesn't happen unless you have the ISR to identify the targets, the command and control to put the assets against the targets. It does not happen unless you have the reach to get the platforms to where they need to operate from. All of that basically gets to-- we as an Air Force have to maintain superiority in airspace and cyber so that we can operate. And I know as I've looked at the topics that are going to be discussed today, there are a great number of

looks at how do we become more agile? How do we, for example, keep our acquisition processes on track to stay even with this kind of a demand, to evolve the capabilities we have today against the evolving capabilities of tomorrow?

So I would say just as a way of warming up the discussion a little bit for you, some of the things that I think about as we go forward as an Air Force are on this list. We have seen a lot of evolution in our capabilities over the last 10 years to do counterinsurgency warfare, to do precise application of force, to do stability operations to provide assistance through prevention reconstruction teams, those kinds of things. What of those lessons do we need to propagate? What things do we need to put on the shelf? What things do we need to decide were not profitable for us?

We talk a lot about whole of government, about coalition operations. I would argue that those things happen because real people work with their peers in those organizations, build real relationships that allow those things to happen and allow systems that naturally will not necessarily jive to come together to accomplish common purposes. And I'll talk a little bit about that in just a minute.

We need to look at how we connect operations and domains. For example, we talk about cross-domain capability: airspace, cyber, undersea, surface of the sea. The actual application of that cross-domain capability in a high-tech, speed-of-light world is a different kind of challenge from what it was in Vietnam, what it was in World War II, where communications were done by voice and planning was done by paper.

So it is a conceptually different challenge when you look at, for example, in the F-35's case, people think of the F-35 as a low-observable platform and that as being one of its key characteristics. But I would argue that one of its other key characteristics is sensor capability and the ability to plug into a network. How do we leverage that? And not in grand strategic terms, but how do you make that operationally relevant across that joint and coalition team?

How do we decrease what we call the OODA loop, the observe, orient, decide, and act loop? And that's an acquisition thing. It's a geostrategic thing. It's a training thing. Our world is moving faster, as you all well know because you're a part of it, and the agility of our processes will directly affect our ability to succeed.

I would argue that we have rising expectations in the form of a very well-informed and

very well-aware population across the world that is connected. And so we have seen a great increase in the standards of performance for the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine in conflict, and those standards require risk management, require a great deal of training. And how they play out in the low end of the conflict spectrum versus the high end of the conflict spectrum are likely to be two different things. So, in a way, we have made it look easy for a long time, and propagating that in a world of advancing challenges is not going to be either easy or cheap.

As I mentioned, we have the challenge of resource constraints, which may or may not work into a reduced level of resources for DOD in the future. But we have to be aware of, just like that aircraft procurement line that I showed you, regardless of how capable individual platforms become in the future -- ships, aircraft-- they can't be more than one place at one time. So our abilities to engage with partners and allies, our ability to have routine presence in under downward pressure as we go forward. So what does that imply for our strategies?

And finally, the shape of the force. We design our forces over time to meet the challenges we expect them to face. Deciding what those challenges are going to look like in 15 to 20 years and having the right mix of force prepared to go and take on those challenges may or may not change the shape of the force from what we see today. And that is an issue that we're all going to have to face as we go forward.

And I think, you know, sort of my bottom line is the capability to be a force for good in the world that the U.S. armed forces have tried to be for a very long time, to be an influencer, to have capability to solve the problems that are out there, like assisting when Japan had an earthquake and a tsunami, like being able to engage in Libya, those things are not a birthright. They're earned. And they're earned in an environment where the resources are under pressure and the challenges are increasing. And so, as I mentioned, as fellows you have the privilege of taking a year to think about those things and to add a contribution to the body of knowledge.

But not only what you're producing as fellows as research is important, the last thing I'd leave with you, and I believe this very firmly -- again, this is an Air Force graphic; you could have the same thing for any service of any nation -- but it boils down to the business we're in is fundamentally about people working together to do a mission. And it's not just people within the military services, which

is why the fellowship is a uniquely valuable thing because it gives you an opportunity to connect with your partners in thought; it gives you an opportunity to connect with a larger community outside the Department of Defense. We cannot be insular within any service or within the Department of Defense and do our jobs because we are fundamentally connected to the people of this nation.

And so this fellowship, I'm hoping that you've seen that as you've gone through the year, is really a tremendous opportunity for you to be that conduit and to contribute both internal to the defense debate and as a citizen and a representative. So I hope you'll continue to do that. I hope that the dialogue you have today as part of this symposium is outstanding. And when you go back to your service or to your organization, I hope that you'll take not only what you've been able to contribute as a fellow in research, but also the linkages that you will find as you go through the next 10, 15 years, or however long you stay in your organization. You'll find those connections to be incredibly important in solving the problems that we cannot envision right now.

So with that, I hope this has been a useful warm-up to you as you get ready to go, and I look forward to taking a couple questions. (Applause)

MR. SINGER: So we've got time for a couple of questions. Wait for the mike to come, stand, please identify yourself. And one last reminder: questions end with a question mark. So please raise your hand if you want to ask a question. Right there.

MR. GRINDSTAFF: General, there's talk about a new Stealth Bomber --

MR. SINGER: Can you introduce yourself?

MR. GRINDSTAFF: Oh, Hugh Grindstaff, THIS for Diplomats. There's talk about a new Stealth Bomber, the possibility?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILLER: Yes. The secretary of defense last year decided that the nation needed a new bomber and his direction was that we would press on to develop that. It's on the kind of timeline that I mentioned; it's a decade or so. And we have direction to move out with that and to do it as efficiently as we can with some particular parameters that the secretary gave us.

MR. GRINDSTAFF: Thank you.

MR. HUMPHREY: Peter Humphrey. I'm an intelligence analyst. Can you shed some light on the Global Hawk diminution? Is it that our system, satellite systems and lower elevation drones

are just so good that we no longer need Global Hawk or what's going on there?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILLER: No. We had three key factors that played into the Global Hawk decision. One was the aggregate amount of high-altitude ISR that the joint team needed to have changed from the time that the Global Hawk was initially put into production to augment and then replace the U-2. The second aspect was the U-2 has capability that is still more than adequate to do the job we need. And third, when $487 billion comes out of DOD's top line over the FYDP, we had to make some very difficult choices about things that we could and could not keep. And so, in general, if we had the capability to do the job we needed and could do that less expensively, we chose for the less expensive option.

MR. HUMPHREY: Do they get mothballed or scrapped or what happens?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILLER: That's still being decided.

MR. SINGER: Right there.

MR. COBER: Stanley Cober. Clausewitz defined war as the continuation of politics by other means. In Libya, we used military force, but did we achieve a political objective? We created a political space, but did we acquire any influence to affect the shaping of that political space? If not, are we fulfilling that definition of war?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILLER: Sir, that's a great question. What I would tell you, though, and it's not to evade the question, but from our perspective as military professionals we're the instrument, we're not the policymakers. Our job -- and really one of the things I was trying to portray is that when we're thinking about preparing a force to fight over the timetable that we have to think about, we have to be prepared not only to do those kinds of operations or to do the counterinsurgency operation or to fight a high-intensity war with a state actor, we have to be prepared to do it in combination with other things. And so I think what I would say is the instrument did what was asked of it and the political and sort of macro considerations that follow is not in my job jar.

MR. SINGER: We've got time for one last question because the next -- right here.

MR. MARQUEZ: Thank you, General. Ricardo Marquez, GAO. To dovetail with the question on Global Hawk, can you describe some of your efforts to collaborate with the Navy perhaps on decisions that you make in the Air Force with resources and programs? Global Hawk and Air Force

impacts what the Navy's going to be doing. Does the Air-Sea Battle Office set a precedent for cooperation? How deep will it go?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILLER: Yeah. That's a great question and it gets to something that I didn't have time to talk about, but there are a couple of important things. There is cooperation and collaboration on the operational level that drives a lot of things. Air-Sea Battle and the intent of the Air Force and the Navy is part of a larger joint operational access concept to do at the detail level better comparisons of capabilities so that we can synergize, that is important and that's underway and we'll have some, I think, very productive downstream implications.

In terms of making the sort of macro decisions about capabilities, there's an established process between the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and DOD's resource allocation process where we all build -- the services all build their individual programs, as you know, and before those programs get turned into the DOD program and the President's budget, there's a pretty close head-to-head comparison of what capabilities each of the services brings to the table.

And so the short answer is yes, those tradeoffs were looked at and I think that will only get better as we continue to find ways to connect earlier in the process and not so much at the macro level, although we can't stop connecting at the macro level.

MR. SINGER: So, General, we very much want to thank you both for joining us today, setting the scene for the following panels -- you couldn't have done a better job -- and, more importantly, just for your service to the nation. Please join me in a round of applause. (Applause)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MILLER: Thank you. My pleasure.

MR. SINGER: And let's have our -- to keep things rolling, let's have our next panel please come up here on stage.

So, we've met with some mission success, we are close to being on time. We'll see if the moderator of this panel can stick to that.

The topics that our panelists are presenting today are perhaps more timely than many of them anticipated when they first chose them several months ago, that is, all of them started out in the fall and then in January we get the defense strategic guidance that emphasized the need for greater engagement and partnering to help deal with both emerging strategic challenges but also budget

constraints.

And the President laid out that, one, there would be a “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region, two, that a “smart defense approach” to our NATO and European allies to “pool, share, and specialize capabilities as needed to meet 21st century challenges” and, lastly, three, “building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world is important to sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership” and so the guidance directed, “new partnerships with a growing number of nations, including those in Latin America and Africa”.

The guidance identified the challenges in the priorities. That’s not the hard part. The hard part is now the “how” and that’s where these three fellows’ work comes in.

First, we’ll hear from Commander Mike Hannan with the U.S. Navy, who’s a Federal Executive Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He’ll be speaking on evolving U.S. maritime partnerships, how we can work with NATO and other European navies to support strategic rebalance.

He’s a 1991 graduate of the Naval Academy and a graduate of the War College. He’s served in a variety of Naval intelligence assignments, participated in operations in Somalia, Support Democracy in Haiti, Desert Fox and southern watch strikes in Iraq, and most recently a senior intelligence officer aboard the Eisenhower in support of ground forces in Afghanistan.

He also served as a naval attaché in Germany.

Then we’ll hear from Captain Scott Clendenin, U.S. Coast Guard, who’s a Federal Executive Fellow with us at Brookings. He’s going to be speaking on networking maritime security in Central America, how better to link with the region’s maritime security services and combined operations at sea.

He is a 1990 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy as well as a graduate of the Joint Military Intelligence College and the Naval War College. He’s served five tours at sea on cutters commanding three of them. He spent much of his time conducting operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, extensive operational work with Latin America partner nations, and ashore he’s served in a variety of positions in Coast Guard intelligence as well as serving as the Coast Guard attaché to the Dominican Republic.

And, finally, we’ll hear from Colonel Select Arthur “Dwight” Davis, who’s National Defense

Fellow for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict in the Naval Post Graduate School. He'll be speaking about Regional SOF Headquarters, franchising the NATO model as a hedge in lean times.

He's a '91 graduate of Auburn University and a Graduate of the Air War College. He's a master navigator with close to 4,000 hours of flight time and he's served in a variety of airframes from the T-34 to the C-130 and all its variants.

He's commanded two squadrons and in these tours he's served in a variety of operations including Operation Deny Flight, Deliberate Force, Joint Venture in Bosnia, Enduring Freedom in Iraq, and it's notable to his topic that most of his aviation background has been in special operations, including most recently commanding the 551 Special Operation Squadron at Cannon Air Force Base.

Finally, he gets a special prize for being the fellow who flew the farthest to join us.

So, with that, I'll turn it over to our panel.

COMMANDER HANNAN: Good morning. Actually, I'll have to just start out really quickly to follow up something that Peter said earlier. My talk here will be exactly my opinions, they're not policy; I don't speak for the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

The United States plans a realignment of defense priorities following a decade of combat in the Middle East and the emergence of growing powers in the Indian Ocean and Asian regions. Based on the President's new defense strategy guidance with a shift in priorities to the Pacific and the Persian Gulf, the United States must evolve its international partnerships in order to further our national interests.

We must call on historic allies and partners, especially those in Europe, to assume more of the burden as security producers.

Former Secretary of Defense Gates made this point very clear in his farewell address to NATO last year challenging our allies to improve their own defense capabilities and those of the alliance.

With the United States forced to take on additional security responsibilities in Asia and the Middle East, Washington will look to its European allies to take a leading role in managing certain crises and contingency operations, especially in the European periphery.

The United States should strengthen bilateral efforts with specific European nations who can be leaders for security development, not only with in the alliance but also using external frameworks. But to whom should the United States look as enhanced maritime partners?

Several European navies have unique strengths, modern capabilities or historic relationships with depth beyond that of the United States Navy. The recent Libya conflict revealed the curse of both national interests and defense shortfalls within Europe, therefore to identify partners who could be valuable maritime security providers, the U.S. must identify who is both capable and willing to operate and if that country's leadership will make the required defense investments.

I argue that four small European navies, three NATO allies, and one Partnership for Peace member are prime candidates to provide unique aspects of maritime security, which support the new U.S. defense strategy, these being Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands.

These nations have signaled willingness to lean forward on security matters even through policy declaration, operational commitment, or defense investments. I'll talk about my recommendations for specific capabilities or regional relationships in which the U.S. should encourage these nations to focus defense efforts and evolve into collaborative security providers.

I've grouped Norway and Sweden together first in my discussion and secondly I'll touch on Denmark and the Netherlands, this is due to their regional or functional strengths that factor in the calculus and you'll see where they can operate as leaders in a particular field. So, first Norway and Sweden.

These two nations have extensive capabilities in mission sets where the United States Navy must expand maritime collaboration, operations in the Arctic, literal warfare confined in shallow waters, and amphibious operations for humanitarian or peacekeeping efforts.

The Arctic High North region is Norway's declared number one foreign policy priority. That nation has proactively engaged Russia as well as China on various Arctic concerns ranging from search and rescue to maritime sea claim delineation.

The United States seeks to ensure access to the growing availability of High North waterways due to climate change while maintaining national security needs. Search and rescue as well as advancing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are areas for direct military coordination with Norway and Sweden in the Arctic.

Norway especially can act as an interlocutor to help shape Russian policies in the High North due to their own extensive bilateral efforts with Moscow on this issue. Norway has also focused

investments on satellite coverage for communications and maritime domain awareness in the High North.

Data sharing with Russia and China, experienced by Norway and Sweden, already encounter piracy operations in the Middle East and the Gulf of Aden region can be a model for cooperation in the Arctic.

Both Norway and Sweden have extensive experience in NATO and EU exercise operations involving mine counter measures and in-shore warfare. These nations can be significant leading partners with fellow allies in mine clearance should a contingency arise, not only in traditional NATO areas, but also in crisis choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz.

Additionally, Norway and Sweden can host training efforts for mine hunting for militaries outside of Europe, specifically the Gulf Cooperation Council Nations or Asian partners. Both Norway and Sweden have the facilities and expert cadres to build partnership capacity in these war-fighting skills.

Over all literal warfare is a skill set well known to the Swedish and Norwegian navies. Activities that constrain in shallow waters, involving modern stealth corvettes such as the Norwegian Skjold or Swedish Visby class ships can support the U.S. Navy's own evolving literal combat ship program and provide training to NATO or nations outside of Europe.

The Baltic and North Sea regions offer unique training grounds for exercising a wide spectrum of literal operations ranging from high intensity naval combat to ISR and even maritime domain awareness.

The U.S. Navy has a gap in capabilities that may reduce its ability to establish and maintain sea control in a hostile environment in literal regions. Norway and Sweden have the knowledge and skills to operate in this environment and may help mitigate our own shortfalls.

The Swedish and Norwegian militaries also have a history of close partnerships in Asia, especially in undersea warfare. Sweden has an extensive track record of working closely with Singapore since the 1970s. These ties include the sale and production of modern submarines, associated crew training, and undersea research and development.

Norway produces military technical cooperation with Malaysia as well as seamanship training with Indonesia. These existing relationships could be expanded in collaboration with the U.S. Navy, not only to continue improvements in those existing partnerships, but also to expand to other

Southeast Asian nations, such as the Philippines or Vietnam.

Finally, with defense rebalance, the U.S. should seek leading nations to increase engagement in Africa. Norway and Sweden have long experience on the continent either as part of the United Nations or EU peacekeeping operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts.

Additionally, Norway conducts search and rescue coordination with Angola and both Norway and Sweden are involved with their own bilateral partnership programs to help develop coastal maritime capabilities for several West African nations.

Norway and Sweden have decided to expand their own amphibious forces for partnership and humanitarian missions in Africa.

The U.S. should look to engage with these two nations to help them transition to an active leadership role in the Africa Partnership Station effort and other AFRICOM engagement activities.

Finally, shifting to Denmark and the Netherlands, these two nations have highly developed naval platforms with advanced air warfare capabilities benefitting the expansion of sea-based ballistic missile defense as part of the European phased adaptive approach.

Three frigates from Denmark and four frigates from the Netherlands share the latest generation SMART-L long-range surveillance radar and the APAR phased array radar systems. Initial studies conducted with the United States concluded that with certain modifications, these radar systems could conduct ballistic missile defense tracking in intercept missions.

The Netherlands and Denmark each are pursuing investments of around 250 millions Euros for the required technology upgrades.

Enhancing the Afloat BMD network with Denmark and the Netherlands would establish a burden-sharing foothold for European missile defense. The Danes and the Dutch combined could provide seven BMD capable platforms, nearly twice the number that the U.S. Navy seeks to homeport in Rodis, Spain.

These two nations could participate early on within the EPA framework as a beta test for eventual European coverage of a NATO layered missile defense system. I would argue that the U.S. Navy should move forward to integrate these navies into the sensor-to-shooter process at the earliest

point and exercise a U.S., Dutch, and Danish command and control architecture.

Finally, employing the Danish and Dutch frigates into EPAA would be a critical enabler for the U.S. Navy freeing the Rota-based American ships for other missions or to provide BMD support in the Middle East.

Additionally, Denmark and the Netherlands could train and exercise with other navies facing a ballistic missile threat, potentially GCC nations or Asian partners. These efforts would provide additional resources for the United States as requirements for BMD continue to expand globally.

In conclusion, implementation of these recommendations would require significant diplomatic engagement by the United States clearly beyond the traditional military-to-military relationships. The U.S. government must heed the charge from Secretary Gates and challenge select nations to become active security producers.

Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands are prime candidates where the return on investment can be quite vivid. Enhanced and interoperable forward partnerships led by Europeans, expanding the freedom of maneuver for the United States Navy, and supporting our rebalanced posture across the oceans. Thank you.

CAPTAIN CLENDENIN: Good morning. My paper forwards some recommendations specifically, as Peter mentioned, in regards to maritime engagement in Central America.

Instead of looking outwards at our partners, I actually looked internally to the way we're organized as a government to conduct that engagement and I forward that we can build a more robust network between our security assistance functions and our maritime operations.

This has been a -- this fellowship has been a great experience and throughout it I've attended several events and discussions on Central America and I think everyone here is aware of the concerns about impunity and the growing violence in the region.

There are efforts underway with partner nations that I believe, in my personal opinion, deserve cautious optimism.

Right now, in a sea change that I've seen over the past 20 years, there is universal recognition in the region by our partners that there's no one nation that can solve these problems in this region alone.

Additionally, there are some regional initiatives that, in fact, the State Department and international organizations are working with Central American partners on security including, you may be aware, of SICA, which is the Central American Integration System, which is coming together with regional security strategies for all the Central American nations.

Security assistance has made clear progress throughout the decades. I have personally witnessed that and it's hard to visit any of those countries and not have people come up and talk to you about all the training they've had from the U.S. And we've also seen a lot of leadership from the region; the Colombians have stepped up, and are reaching out to their neighbors and have actually implemented a maritime law enforcement academy where they invite neighboring nations to come train with them on maritime issues.

SOUTHCOM AOR, as Peter alluded to, is an economy of Force Theater with limited U.S. assets and there's a lot of mission. I think everyone here is aware that the large trafficking and maritime threat issues we have in the region, these organizations are networked, they're agile, they're able to turn their tactics on a dime based on any indication that the international law enforcement community is on to them, and they're using tactics anywhere from high-speed boats that do 40 knots at night across fishing banks to very highly concealed compartments on freighters and fishing vessels, and now as you've seen in the news, they even have fully submersible submarines that smuggle multi-ton loads of cocaine up the isthmus.

They don't just keep their cargo to drugs, they also have movement of money, trafficking in persons, whatever it takes to make a buck for them.

Now, I'm going to describe both maritime operations and security assistance in a very brief form for those of you who may not be fully aware the way we're organized there. All maritime operations are conducted through a center called the Joint Interagency Task Force South. It is a subordinate command of SOUTHCOM. It is a DoD command. Because it's DoD it focuses on detection and monitoring and then hands off the law enforcement case to other partner agencies.

It is the gold standard in joint interagency activity. It is studied -- they have thousands of visits of academics and government agencies to come down and see how they work because it has such a reputation for multiple law enforcement agencies, DoD, intelligence assets to all come together and

focus on the regional maritime threats in the area.

I don't want to detail -- belabor it anymore, but there is an excellent NDU article if you are interested in this called "Joint Interagency Task Force South: The Best Known and Least Understood Interagency Success".

So, then we turn to -- well, let me just describe one thing. I wanted to put in a quick sea story. Just last week, Northland detected, as was reported by our count out to Congress -- detected a smuggling vessel down in the Caribbean under -- they were under JIATF South Tack On and the smuggling vessel was moving very fast. We launched a helicopter, we intercepted, they did not stop with warning shots, and a rifleman delivered precision fire into the engines and stopped the boat.

The Northland's boarding team recovered 1,600 kilos of pure, uncut cocaine at a street value of $42 million. That happens on a routine basis under the Tack On of JIATF South.

My report then describes security assistance functions, and I'm going to -- this is a highly complex system but I'll summarize it to say that Congress appropriates the money and then there's two conduits for that money, it either goes to the Pentagon or to the State Department. They manage the funding for all the security assistance.

Security assistants are things like education, training, when we give them equipment, when we sell military equipment to them, they're managed by either the Pentagon or the State Department, and then they go down to work with the co-COM, which would be SOUTHCOM, or the country teams. And actually the country teams do the focus of the planning and the resource allocation for that engagement.

Now, the system, like I said, is bureaucratic and it is cumbersome, and that came out in the interviews. In a May, 2011 report, Congressional Research Service indicated that their members were concerned with fragmented management, unclear reporting chains, and duplicative and overlapping agendas.

I don't think some of the people I interviewed would disagree with that, but I will say, based on interviewing all of those people, we have very passionate folks that really enjoy their mission in those programs and by and large they cooperate very well within the security assistance organizations to deliver seamless assistance to the foreign policy -- to our foreign partners. And I really was inspired by

the way they work through what is a very large system to deliver that assistance.

So, what I described is an excellent and successful foreign engagement program that is very well networked. I described an operation -- Joint Interagency Operations regime that is very well networked. What came out in my interviews, however, is the two are not interlinked in any robust fashion. And so, consequently, I recommend in my paper that these two need to be linked to better drive security assistance towards operational objectives and for both programs to inform each other.

This is my personal opinion; it's not based on interviews. When I spoke with the JIATF staff and other folks, they were very quick to point out that SOUTHCOM, our boss, does security assistance, we do operations. They were very good at staying on point throughout that. My personal opinion is: why do we do business that way? Why are the two not linked? And can they feed each other in a network?

So, I turned to look to see what network would work. How could we network these to better work together? And I looked at a variety of models, but I came across some discussion that we've had along with some of my colleagues about Afghanistan and out of curiosity, out of personal interest, I began to read about efforts in Afghanistan. And I came across an article by General McChrystal in *Foreign Policy,* "It Takes a Network", and then began to learn how he organized in JSOC and then ISAF over in Afghanistan.

Probably a lot of you have heard this story. To summarize it, he flew back from Mosul to Headquarters. He looked -- there was an hour -- he essentially drew an hourglass for his staff and he says, I've been thinking about this as our problem. We have Special Operations Forces on the ground in Mosul who know, they have the ground truth of what's going on. We have Headquarters very well informed from D.C. and know what's going on in the country. But we have an hourglass form. We need to figure out how to network those two so both groups of information are shared.

He then turned to his ISAF and it was a similar problem set for him. He had multiple agencies. He had intelligence, Special Operations Forces, security assistance, USAID, and he realized, as he says in his article, he needed to pool those efforts together and he had to create a network.

Now, the leadership required for this type of network is not the same as a lot of leaders would lead, it's not a directive military form of leadership, it's a lot of consensus and team-building and

moving a large group towards objectives.

JIATF South does that every day and what I'm merely suggesting is that now they pull security assistance representatives forward into the fold so that there's communication, clearly, between security assistance and operations.

I think security assistance could benefit from seeing the daily battle rhythm and the discussions that take place with operations and it would be good for JIATF to have a very clear daily dialogue with security assistance organizations.

So, at the end of my report, I collected, through all the interviews, a lot of things that were suggestions that people had thought about in various parts of the various staffs that were good ideas that were essentially put in what we call the "too hard locker" just because it was very difficult to link those two organizations. I present those in my paper.

And then in the form of vignettes at the end of my paper I run through both operational and security assistance activities and explain how the merger, better communication between those two organizations, would enrich the efforts we're making with our foreign partners.

Now, as Peter mentioned, this is -- as I said, it is an economy of force theater and the number of USS that's available to JIATF South in the out years, right now, does not look good. In fact, our Commandant just testified to Congress that despite the best efforts of our crews right now, much of our cutters -- we call our ships cutters -- are in excess of 40 years old and we're only achieving 70 percent of our programmed hours and 50 percent of the time they're sailing with casualties, mechanical casualties.

Additionally, in the Naval ships, such as the Perry class frigates, which are critical to JIATF South mission and our hemispheric security, are leaving the service.

So, we have an excellent maritime ops and security assistance organizations that I believe would be enriched by better networking, especially in this time of constrained resources, and it's my firm belief that there would be many benefits if we do look at networking the two organizations.

So, I look forward to any questions. Thanks.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVIS: Again, Peter, thank you, and, yes, I did travel from California. I'm not used to wearing a tie, and it is very, very early for us from NPS.

So, with that, I'll go right into it. You heard General Miller talk about a lot of things, the big one being the budget, and that's kind of where my journey started, and then I started looking out for, how can we increase our burden sharing? And we've used that term, we've heard that term, and if you go back and look at NATO for the past 60 years, you're going to see burden sharing as a theme that runs through it, but it's never had teeth.

Former Joint Chief Admiral Michael Mullen said in 2010 that the single biggest threat to our national security is our debt, and you know the numbers, $500 million, and if sequestration happens it could go for another $500. That's doable, but we've got to find new and better ways to do it, and as stated before, I'm a special operator by trade. For us, you know, we don't have the highest tech toys. It looks like it, but the aircraft that I flew was made in 1969, the same year I was, and it's pretty darn good. Spectre gunship does it every night and they've managed to make it work with technology that the computers on the aircraft are an average of 20, 25 years old, and it works.

NATO is kind of going along that, but we know what our defense policy has been and we know where it's going.

The current QDR emphasize a wide range of strategies and capabilities adopted by today's adversaries. Okay, we're currently looking at revising that QDR, but I don't see that being much of a change, but we're no longer shaping our strategies to revolve around high concentration of boots on the ground, we're no longer sizing forces to conduct large and protracted stability operations, we're not going to do that anymore.

The distributed nature of these threats require the ability to surveil, strike, punish from afar, insert small network ground forces, according to Paul Davis and Peter Wilson out of the Joint Forces Quarterly article that recently was released.

So, essentially, it's a call to develop innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, sharing and pooling resources. So, let's look at the European model, and talking to some of my NATO brethren over there, you know, he talks about doing business in NATO kind of like the bar scene out of the *Star Wars* movie, you know, ugly but effective at times, but inherently misconstrued on most cases of being a collective. So, NATO has become more of an organizer of collectives vice being a true collective, and I've got a feeling that that's going to be changing very, very

soon.

We know that NATO has been increasingly involved in out of area operations defined as beyond the European borders. Libya is the latest example. And we're looking at an alliance that is now more capable of being a producer of defense rather than a consumer of it, and so a relook is underway.

Secretary Gates, once again mentioned before, when he was leaving as the Secretary of Defense and he gave his last address to NATO, I won't say chastised, but he did very poignantly mention that during the Cold War we underwrote 50 percent of the Defense budget for the NATO countries essentially by being part of the alliance. Today we're up to 75 percent. I don't think that we'll be able to sustain that, and he pretty much came right out and said that.

So, in Chicago this summer for the summit, I would say, again, this Transatlantic bargain, this bargain that has been in place for 60 years, is going to undergo a redux, some change is going to happen, and the Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, his Smart Defense Initiative is exactly where that's going to start. And while there's been that Smart Defense, that burden sharing, that collective defense strategy out there for years, I think teeth are going to grow this time because ultimately none of the NATO partners have -- well, with the exception of a few -- have made the 2 percent GDP defense push and a lot of them are not going to with the austerity measures that are in place.

So, there's got to be a way that we can make this work because, again, they understand, it's stated out in the Lisbon Summit in the New Strategic Initiative that to secure their defense they have to go out of area to stop the threat before it reaches their shores.

A good example of this is the recently flagged NATO Special Operations Headquarters. As early as 1995, NATO realized that, while they had many nations that were capable of soft -- or doing soft like missions or had a capable special operations force, they did not routinely work together, had disparate C-2 and little coordinated and interoperable action.

In 2006 at the Riga Summit, essentially the nations adopted what is called the NATO Soft Transformation Initiative to come up with a way to create an entity that can take this special operations-like capability from amongst the different nations and bring it together to be able to provide command and control, training, standardization, and inoperability.

The U.S. stepped in and said that they would be the framework nation. What does that

mean? We underwrite it. We pay approximately, right now, 87 percent of the operating costs and provide a majority of the manpower to this headquarters. It's 150 personnel strong. In 2010 it was actually reflagged from the NATO Soft Coordination Center to the NATO Special Operations Headquarters, put under Lieutenant General Kisner who was the former SOCE commander, he did it as a duel hat role, not as a completely separate command structure, and it's growing.

Their mission set that NATO special operations kind of glom onto is direct action, military assistance, that's a bit one, and humanitarian assistance missions. They have a core build and deployable C-2 architecture as well as a premier training and standardization function and just of note, before they came to existence, there was no interoperability regulation, what they call STANAGS that defined what Special Operations Forces in Europe do.

Those now exist. There are about nine to twelve, depending on how you count them up, penultimate on how we do things in a special operations community amongst the different nations, understanding that a lot of them have caveats to do what and not to do what type of mission.

So, back to the bar scene. How do we fix that? And that's what they're going to discuss in Chicago this summer, but special operations command is going forward and trying to, again, provide them with assets. This is an organization that has no organic assets and, again, 150 personnel. We're about to change that by looking at providing them with some aviation capability to build an air warfare center, to give them that primary enabler for Special Operations Forces which is (inaudible) and possibly fixed wing assets to provide an initial training capability to, again, build their capacity to defend themselves with the U.S. as a supporting rather than supported role.

So, where can we take this? Kind of started digging around and figuring out, okay, this is a good idea. There's some things that may or may not work and it's been highly criticized at times. Some of the nations haven't really provided what they've said they were going to do, but I believe that if we provide it they will come.

But I started looking at the Pacific, and that was back in November is, you know, we could take this and we could put it somewhere else as a bolster to our normal theater special operations command, that interagency, that international body that can take a look at what other SOF exist in the region, pull them together, standardize, interoperability, that being the key.

But there is no NATO in Asia. And I started digging into ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum. That's the closest thing we can come up with and we've all heard of the ASEAN way of doing business that emphasizes the culture of non-interference, equality, and sovereignty, consensus building, and quiet negotiation, which if you take a look at NATO and United Nations, that is completely opposite of the Western way of doing business, but it works.

And so I started digging into it and saying, okay, the ASEAN Regional Forum, that gives that civilian type of control over any type of military entity, however, they haven't stated it as such, but I believe that going forward, unlike NATO, which was formed based on the Soviet threat, there is no definable existential threat to Asia right now. Some people want to talk about China, but I don't believe that they should be looking at that, they should be looking at the threats of WMD proliferation, food security, piracy, and essentially securing the global commons for commerce, because that is the true engine of our commerce today.

That's a nebulous threat when you take a look at transnational terrorists and crime, and why should special operations be involved. They're uniquely suited to these tasks of providing, you know, that forward presence, that 911 force, that ability to buy space and time for decision makers to decide if we need to bring that over the horizon, boots on the ground presence, or can they handle it, more appropriately doing it through special -- by, with, and through Special Operations Forces already existing in the theater.

And if they're not there, we build them. And I provide a good example, and take a look at JSOTF Philippines. Back in 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines, we established a forward presence in the southern Philippine area going after the Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the MILF. That's an economy of force effort that exists today and they've done -- the Armed Forces Philippines, under the tutelage of U.S. Special Operations and some conventional assets, have done a good job of cleaning out their area. Not unlike, kind of, the ISAF construct we see in Afghanistan, we're providing trainers and then allowing them to go forward to contact with the enemy in its economy of force effort. Less than 500 people and $50 million a year.

Think about how little that would have cost and how less that manpower would have been if we would have been able to bring a construct that involved Australia, New Zealand, Singapore,

Malaysia, any of the other nations already there in theater, but to do that, we'd have to provide that C-2, that command and control architecture, that interoperability.

Right now it's being run by the Theater Special Operations Command. If you're not familiar with those, those are the organizations that present Special Operations Forces to the combatant commander. Well, right now SOCOM is doing a relook of how those TSOCs work and they've mostly been doing the -- we call it the indirect role, providing that presence to do the partner nation capacity building and other types of missions in the area, not necessarily direct action.

That TSOC role will always be there as a requirement, that direct action line, but with a regional special operations headquarters in the Pacific, or in the Caribbean and South America, Africa, you now have the ability for the U.S. to take that supporting role to provide the interoperability, to provide the command -- you know, initially the assets and the training, and if we need to go it alone, we've got the TSOC, we've got the COCOM, we can go forward with the boots on the ground, but if we want to operate as truly part of a coalition, special operations buy you that space and that time.

They're already there, that's your persistent presence. Today we've got operators in 100 countries that have been doing this. Special operations forces are regionally oriented; they're usually more mature as far as in service, they've got the language skills.

So, they are the force that should provide that forward, permanent presence, whether rotational or forward-based, to buy us that space in time to continue engagement to show that the U.S. is still part of the regional security construct, especially in these lean times. And I look forward to your questions.

MR. SINGER: Thank you. Three great presentations. I'll kick us off with a question for each of you and then open it up to the audience here and I'll lay them all three out so you have time to think, at least the latter two will have time to think.

Scott, you lay out a great program. Can you go into specifics of how this lack of coordination right now might be expressing itself to the detriment of current operations? Maybe crystallize the impact that it's having and then in turn how you see, if we get better coordination following this network model, how that kind of example would be solved.

Mike, you lay out a plan that I think makes a great deal of sense from the U.S.

perspective and we would gain a great deal from it, and this actually, in part, applies to Dwight's presentation as well, you know, you site Gate's speech, which was applauded here in the U.S. but it landed very differently in Europe, it landed with a -- I don't know whether the phrase is thud or dud.

And so what is your sense of the European buy in to your plan? Why would they want to join on in their own time of budget austerity? What would they get out of it, in particular if it comes with added costs?

And then, in part, Dwight, that question could be asked to you, but I think it can be asked in a different way, which is, the difference of the NATO model is, while we may be cantankerous about who's, you know, sharing what burden, there's not the kind of, fortunately enough, internal regional tensions in Europe now that you might have in these other areas, specifically in Southeast Asia, that is, we've solved the border disputes in Europe versus the kind of cooperation -- and so, you know, the militaries within NATO, it's not just that we can share communications and information in a way that certainly isn't possible with other allies, but between those allies, they're not sharing information, but more importantly, they might not even trust each other.

You know, I'm thinking of, yes, the U.S. is cooperating with Philippines but there's a number of disputes that it touches upon in South China Sea with a number of other neighbors there. So, how do you work around those kinds of tensions within that structure?

CAPTAIN CLENDENIN: Well, thank you, Peter. I've been thinking about how to respond. I obviously don't -- I want to be careful not to embarrass particular programs, but there are efficiencies within the system that folks are aware of. But I'll describe from personal experience some of the things I've seen where I think we could get some efficiency.

I made a port call early on in my last ship in a partner nation and saw the Secretary of the Navy. We had some plan engagement. And as I sat down he said, Scott, I think it's terrific that you arrived just when we have a coast guard law enforcement training team on the other side of the base here. I had no idea. It just wasn't linked.

We also, late at night, will often be pursuing suspects. Our area of operations is shared with territorial seas, so we'll be pursuing a go fast -- a suspect vessel, very high rate of speed, towards that country and we needed to begin to talk with them and then understand how they were going to react.

Of course, there's always use of force concerns, blue on blue concerns, and during my tour I realized that we had standard protocol but we weren't training to it. We had it and both sides needed better training and coordination on that.

And out of initiative I reached out to JIATF South, to someone who had also had embassy experience. We coordinated an ad hoc operation and I learned about the bureaucracy, because it took a long time to get the Leahy Act requirements and everything done, but we eventually set up operations, very short duration, we call them Pass X's because it's where forces just happen to be passing, where we would work with foreign forces and it took very little time out of operations and we would actually conduct an exercise. We also brought Special Operations Forces that did training with units in conjunction with that, so we actually had security assistance people conducting the training with the foreign force.

And we actually netted some narcotic seizures because of that because we had more conductive communications.

These efforts are moving forward, but, again, they're ad hoc, and I'm just proposing that we formalize more regular communications between the operators and security assistance because our strategy is to engage with partners and I believe that should be a part of what we do with our ships.

COMMANDER HANNAN: Peter, that was a great question. Yeah, exactly, you know, kind of the reception over in Europe from a lot of news outlets was that it did kind of ring pretty sour, but I think in my research and looking at European countries and who would be those entities that might actually take a lead, and that's why I kind of focused on, you know, the three Nordic countries and then the Netherlands. I think they did it. I think in looking at, especially the Nordics, they're already looking at -- they're already conducting either investments or engagements in Africa. The Norwegians are moving, you know, way out front within the Arctic Council on High North Policy.

So, I think we can -- if the United States can articulate and maybe a little bit of arm twisting because it's going to have to be a political decision in the end.

But I think that these candidates would be able to take a lead in security development and I think that's something where the United States can go to these countries and say, look, you're already engaged in these regions or you're already taking on these functions, let's help you to transition

to that kind of leadership role, you know, whether it's their own bilateral building partnership capacity aspects or if it's within NATO in some sort of NATO framework.

So, security development is one aspect. Another one is defense industry. I mean, there's the capabilities -- if they're talking about enhancing their own defense angles or exporting some of those capabilities to other countries, you know, it's a business aspect as well, I think, and if you're looking at jobs, lean times, that might be an avenue that they may want to approach as well.

And then if you look at those four countries that I discussed, the only one that's stuck in the Euro mess right now is the Netherlands; the Nordics are good and in discussions, statements from the Norwegian Defense Minister recently, they're pretty -- they're being pretty aggressive with what they're looking at as far as future defense investments.

So, I think those are kind of the talking points the U.S. government could use and keying on where those countries are already engaged and then helping them to kind of take that lead position. But it's going to be a whole government approach. We're going to have to -- and I kind of touched on that. It can't just be the normal mill-to-mill kind of thing. You know, we talk to our counterparts in uniform and, you know, and they want to do stuff, but it's getting their parliaments, it's getting the civilian politicians to understand that this is in their interest, and that's where I think it can be kind of an open the aperture and make it a wider scope where the U.S. can touch to these countries and push them forward.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVIS: Yes, Peter, the Gates speech, when I read it, it was kind of eye opening that he would actually come right out and say what we've been feeling for a long time. If you're on your way out you can go ahead and drop those -- you know, you can pull the pin on that hand grenade and toss it out, but it was right on the mark.

As far as NATO itself, you know, when you talk about out of area operations, my focus was not so much on the NATO response force, it was really looking internally at special operations. Of the 28 countries, you can -- depending on how you look at their internal security forces and special operations, 26 of them have what they call a special operations force. But most of it is designed to be internal, it's counterterrorism and we understand that the borders are secured, but they're very fluid, so a lot of things can move around Europe without really much impediment with the whole EU construct.

So, NATO, in itself, is looking at the U.S. reducing our force presence, they're going to be

more and more, you know, the quote I like is we're no longer going to be the quartermaster of joint action. We're going to have to, you know, pull back, but in the area of Special Operations Forces, I look at, well, they're used to doing this type of thing, so if you're taking a look at -- like, I keep mentioning that bar scene, it's not so much the case with special operations. By nature, we're trained that way and we've worked with NATO partners. You know, as recently as last year when I was out at Cannon Air Force Base, and in fact, he's actually a student at Naval Post Graduate School now, I worked with a -- Norwegian SOF Forces had come out and we were doing exercises with them out on the Melrose Range, and I've worked with them every year for the past three years.

So, we're used to that type of relationship.

Going back to, okay, so why are we doing this? With SOF, it was, you know, you go back to -- I think the earliest real example is the Olympics in Athens. Counterterrorism is a big deal and we know we have the Olympics coming up in England, but before we started looking deeply into a smart defense initiative with SOF, specifically, you had different counterterrorism forces, special operations, running around trying to protect everybody at the Olympics, but they weren't talking to each other. They were not even talking to the command posts that they had set up there in Athens. They were going back to their regional governments.

And maybe that information would flow, and maybe it wouldn't. A lot of it is intelligence driven. So, to get around this, we do have -- it's called BISES, they've developed an internal network amongst the nations that are part of the NATO SOF Coordination Center and even beyond, where they can share this intelligence. It even reaches down into ISAF in Afghanistan.

So, there is that culture now coming forward of greater intelligence sharing, greater interoperability training, and then you've got to ask, well, the borders are secure. They -- NATO made the decision to go into Libya because they saw it as a possible -- you know, you had a humanitarian, mostly, driven factor there in my mind. But with the colonial ties that a lot of the countries in Europe have, they still have interests in, let's say, the Pansa Hel, Northern Africa. They went into Sudan in 2005 to 2007.

A lot of it is, you know, before deploying your forces to avoid that threat coming forward. We have piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden protecting, you know, financial interests moving through the Suez. We've got, you know, operations on the Horn of Africa, again, looking for those transnational

terrorists that can move across borders. Once you hit -- once they hit Europe, they can almost move with impunity because of the nature of the European Union in that border.

MR. SINGER: Let me crystallize it, though. The question is not how do you get Norwegian and American SOF to work together, or to get Norwegian and British SOF to work together, because there's a shared vision of threat, there's 40 years of working together, there's an ability to share communication and the like. What I'm referring to is the challenge as you franchise it, that you will move into regions where the local SOF will be from states that actually have tensions between them.

So, if we're thinking about franchising this in Southeast Asia, well, we've got border disputes, unclear border disputes, from pretty much everyone who touches the South China Sea. So, the ability of, yes, the U.S. can work well with, say, Philippine or Indonesia, but there may be other, you know, once you drop Australia into the bucket or the tensions between Vietnam or the like, that's what I'm getting at, is the idea of, yes, NATO -- it's not always perfect, but NATO has figured out how to work together.

But how do you take it when it's from states with very, very different interests, particularly when you've got a number of these that might involve internal security challenges, that is, I imagine Philippines not so psyched by having, you know, seven different SOF states operating inside its borders or maybe we, you know, use the example of Indonesia or the like?

Or Latin America would be another great example. We've got states there with Bolivia, Venezuela, that certainly are not getting along well.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVIS: Right, Peter. You know, when I started, again, looking at this, that was one of the things that kind of was rattling around and with some of the critiques I got from the folks that I had, you know, batted this around with at Naval postgraduate school, and really the only answer I can provide is the U.S. has become an excellent bridging function with a lot of these nations.

You mentioned, we work well with -- our Special Operations Forces work well with a lot of these countries. They may not play well together, but if you come in from the light of, if we're going to franchise this and truly make it work, we have to be all in. And in the latest dialogues, you know, with the East Asian Summit that happened back in November that President Obama attended or, you know, this past fall, and then going forward with a lot of the dialogue, again, that ASEAN way, I'm not suggesting

that that's a NATO or that it's going to function anything like NATO. But I am suggesting that with those small, discreet, Special Operations Forces, if you take it in terms of using the U.S. as, again, the quartermaster and the trainer and you work through that third party construct. You know, we've been running this hub-and-spoke system out there forever with a lot of bilateral and some multilateral with, you know, pretty much everybody that's in that region and that's part of ASEAN. But, you know, I started to map out how all that works and it was just this convoluted chart that I could barely comprehend myself much less any of my readers.

But I said, you know, we could make it work and we could make it work in South America. Again, you work the bilateral piece to eventually get to the multilateral piece. It's a long process. It's not something that -- it's not a fast-food restaurant that I can throw up tomorrow, but I think that I could build something that can capitalize on those habitual relationships we have with member nations to eventually work the piece. Because what we offer is -- and that's what NATO SOF headquarters is working toward -- is they each get a benefit because those forces will come home and propagate from within so they can assure their own security in addition to, over time, a habitual relationship with other nations they might not normally work with, to work toward that collective defense. And I'm not saying we're building a security community in Asia with just some special operators, but we're getting, I think, the toehold. Does that kind of make sense?

MR. SINGER: Gotcha. Let's open it up to the floor. Again, please raise your hand, identify yourself.

MR. LLOYD: Good morning. I'm Mr. Lloyd from Baltimore. My question is about Southeast Asia. Many of you have touched so much about Southeast Asia. Now, with this fluid relationship and boundary between the Philippines and Malaysia, especially in the south, and there is so much piracy going on, human smuggling, trafficking of arms and high powered weapons. And with the presence of the U.S. forces, especially there in the Southern Philippines, and with the growing sort of disturbances of the Muslim insurgent movement, you have made mention of the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf, and with the presence of the U.S. forces there right now, in the part of the U.S. Navy and the Air Force, do you have any plans to increase forces in the Southern Philippines? And, if so, when and how great the forces would be? Thank you.

LIEUTENANT COLONOL DAVIS: Okay, I know of no plans and, again, I've been living in the academic environment for a year, so I'm giving you everything that I've read, okay. I know of no plans to increase nor would I see any plan why they would. And this is, again, my opinion, it's not that of the Department of Defense. This is just somebody who's spent a lot of time reading books and current events.

I can't see a reason why we would want to increase our footprint. Again, there are problems, and I recently read that while the Armed Forces Philippines did just recently take out a pretty high-powered individual in Abu Sayyaf, the overall operation was completely conducted by them. The U.S. still provides some intelligence-sharing operational capabilities in terms of, you know, from teaching guys how to do battlefield medicine to sniper training, but we're not part of any of their operations. It's not our charter. We're there as a training organization. There's no need for us to increase it because our number of trainers is about right sized. That's been about the number for the past five, six years.

So, my reason for bringing that in as a case was simply because that is a good example of a low footprint, low signature effort and, again, we're not -- we are supporting, not the supported force in the area.

Does that kind of answer your question?

SPEAKER: That's good.

MS. O'DONNELL: Thank you. Clara O'Donnell, visiting fellow at Brookings. I had a question for Mike Hannan, and it was, is there a particular reason why you didn't choose to explore options for enhancing cooperation with Britain and France in light of their quite large maritime forces? And I was wondering, are there any areas where you think it could be worth exploring the U.S. strengthening its ties with those two countries?

COMMANDER HANNAN: Sure, yeah. I did -- I started looking at that but then I kind of focused on really what are kind of the I guess you could classify it as lower end capabilities. I think if you're talking about Britain and France, you're definitely looking in -- approaching more the higher end, the higher end warfare, something that's going to involve a lot more research and development, something that approaches kind of what we see with air-sea battle and obviously precision strike, those kind of operations.

I think something, especially in either defense realignment or just if you're looking at fiscal priorities, you know, what's going to make it above and below the cut line. And I think that, in my opinion, the U.S. Navy needs to focus on, obviously, we'll continue the relationships that we have with some of our significant partners and allies such as Britain and France. But, okay, what are some capabilities at that lower end of the spectrum that we may have to kind of franchise out or look to other players to kind of take that leading role?

And that, kind of, was the focus of my research, whether you're talking about regions like the High North or Africa, or even increasing some functional capabilities, whether it's amphibious operations or humanitarian assistance, you know, disaster response kind of things. So, that's where I kind of -- that's how I scoped my research. And looking at it is, you know, the U.S. Navy is going to continue on that high end of the spectrum, obviously with allies like Britain and France. So, okay, of areas that we most likely would probably have to look at for divestiture, who would be, you know, nations that could step up and kind of take the lead on that and that are already either willing or they're already kind of along those lines in taking those approaches currently?

MR. SINGER: Right here in the middle. Yeah, could we get him the mic? Yeah, go ahead and yell it out.

SPEAKER: This question's for Mike. I'm Mike (inaudible). I'm an Army fellow at the Army (inaudible) Policy Institute. And some of the selections that you made were for the European navies to actually monitor the North Seas, Indonesia, Angola, are kind of interesting selections.

So, with those selections, did you -- how much was actually thought of? Because there are actually oil, rare earth minerals and all kinds of interesting stuff that are there. Did that actually play out in some of those selections? Because that is a national security issue, not only in this country, but it would be a national security issue for those countries as well, as they need access to oil and (inaudible 1:00:13) minerals.

CAPTAIN CLENDENIN: Yeah, I think you kind of answered it right there. I mean, those are bilateral activities that those countries are already doing, you know, that's just what I've kind of looked at either individually or if you look at especially the Nordic countries that are part of NORDEFCO, the Nordic Defense Cooperative. So, that's areas where they're already engaged.

Sure, I'm pretty confident that they're looking at their own interest, whether it's something from resources or, you know, maintaining the global commons. I mean, especially where they're looking at building up, you know, easy enforcement or some sort of Coast Guard-like capabilities in those West Africa countries exactly.

And I think that's kind of the crux. These countries are looking at that and they're saying, hey, this is in our interest. I mean, it mirrors a lot of what the U.S. Navy is trying to do for how we maintain and try to guaranty the safety of the global commons, so that's definitely an avenue of approach that -- where we need, as the U.S., need to then lean into those countries and say, hey, you're already working on these activities, let's assist you and then you can kind of transition into that leadership role.

MR. SINGER: Let's do one last question before break. Back there.

MR. WINTERS: Steve Winters, local researcher. I'd like to ask Lieutenant Colonel Davis how the current rethink of the COIN strategy, especially as it was promoted by David Kilcullen in Afghanistan, has impacted on the future planned use of special operations forces.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVIS: Well, David Kilcullen came out and spoke at Naval postgraduate school last fall and I was fortunate enough to have kind of skimmed through the book and then listened to him speak and, yes, the COIN strategy. And, frankly, I'll be honest with you, I'm in the Defense Analysis Department, Irregular Warfare, Unconventional Warfare Information Operations, that's what we do. And some of the great thinkers are part of that.

But this whole counterinsurgency strategy thing, we're kind of going away from that. There's a shift toward more of, you know, irregular war -- well, what is regular war? As of today, I mean, what is regular war and then what is unconventional?

So, there's a blurring of lines there and I believe that if you take a look at what's going on in the QDR right now, what the strategists are really thinking of, is we're going away from, okay, how did the insurgency begin? And there's some excellent work out there by Dr. Gordon McCormick that talks about countering this, but it's from a model that I don't believe exists now because of the transnational nature of the threat. And the fact that we're shifting away from intervention in weak and failing states, in my opinion, that will be a shift away. So, a counterinsurgency strategy won't necessarily be kind of an encompassing piece of work.

I believe we're now past that. Again, my opinion, but I think you're going to see that's where more of our doctrine and our thought process is going. Anybody else got something on that?

MR. SINGER: Well, again, thank you to our three panelists. I think you can see it's three very interesting and fruitful lines of research and we're all -- I think you've given us just enough to make us want to actually read, not skim, as a friend of Dave Kilcullen's, I'm glad he got a book sale from you, but kind of disappointed that you didn't read it.

No, so hopefully we'll all promise to actually read your papers because it's some real interesting research. So, please join me in a round of applause. (Applause)

We've got time for a break. We're going to start up the next panel at 11:25, so please join us in here then. Sorry, 10:25.

(Applause)

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2012