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PARTICIPANTS:

Moderator:

DIANA NEGROPONTE
Nonresident Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

HERALDO MUÑOZ
UN Assistant Secretary General and Director
Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
United Nations Development Program

MARTA LAGOS
Coordinator of Globalbarometer
President of Latinobarometro

CAROL GRAHAM
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

KEVIN CASAS-ZAMORA
Senior Fellow and Interim Director, Latin America Initiative
The Brookings Institution

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PICCONE: I'm Ted Piccone. I'm a senior fellow and deputy director of the Foreign Policy program here at Brookings. Welcome to an excellent panel we have to start off your week here Monday morning. And you know the topic, "Citizen Security, Public Opinion, and Democracy in Latin America." And anyone who follows this knows that this is red hot and becoming more and more important in policy and political debates, and even economic debates throughout the region. And we're very lucky to have the panel we have here today. My job is simply to welcome you and introduce the panelists and then hand it off to our moderator who I will also introduce.

But let me start by, in particularly, welcoming Marta Lagos, executive director of Latinobarometro, who is a well-known figure throughout the Americas for her work polling on a range of issues in 18 countries, conducting thousands and thousands of interviews over many, many years and enabling those of us who follow the region and policymakers to see a range of issues comparatively and over many years to help shape our policy and political decisions. She is the founding director of Latinobarometro and has worked in this public opinion field since 1984. She's written three books about the consolidation of democracy. She's involved in a number of projects, not just in the region but also globally, on public opinion research and we're really honored to have her here flying up from Santiago.

We will then turn to Kevin Casas-Zamora, who is a senior fellow here at Brookings and interim director of our Latin America Initiative. Kevin was the minister of National Planning and Economic Policy and second vice president of Costa Rica several years ago. He is an expert in campaign finance and public security issues throughout the region. He's a prize winning author for a number of works that he's done and he lately has been doing a study on citizen security that's very relevant to our topic today. So we

look forward to his remarks as well.

We will then hear from Heraldo Muñoz, also very warm welcome who it's been quite a while since we had him here at Brookings. He's now in a new position as director of the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean and assistant secretary general of the United Nationals Development Program. So sitting in a key place where policy decisions are made up at the U.N. that are directly relevant to Latin America. Ambassador Muñoz served for many years in the Chilean government. He was a permanent representative of Chile in New York to the United Nations for seven years. You have the additional details of his bio. Notably, chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into the assassination of former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, held very senior positions in the cabinet of President Lagos, and is also a well-known author, prize-winning author, written a dozen books on issues of inter-American security, foreign relations, democracy, and human rights. He's also really made a big push to put the issue of citizen security on the agenda of UNDP and we look forward to his remarks as well.

We'll then turn to Carol Graham, who is also a senior fellow here at the Brookings Institution. She's with Foreign Policy and our Global Economy and Development program. Carol is known around the building as a pinch hitter who can do anything and everything here. She's a professor at the University of Maryland. She's a specialist lately, among many other things, on happiness economics, the economics of happiness, and has written a book called The Pursuit of Happiness: An Economy of Well-Being, that came out last year. A very highly regarded, cutting edge work in that field. And also we'll have some very useful comments on the material that's going to be presented today.

And to shepherd us through the conversation we have Diana

Negroponte, who is a nonresident senior fellow with us here at the Latin America Initiative. Diana has spent years as a scholar, a lawyer, and a diplomat I would say, well-known throughout the region for her work on education, on citizen security, particularly in Central America. She's recently published an important new book called Seeking Peace in El Salvador: The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of the Cold War. And I commend that to you. And I will hand you off to her good hands. Thank you.

MS. NEGROPONTE: Ted, thank you very much. I'm now calling on Kevin.

MR. CASAS-ZAMORA: I think Ted already -- she needs no introduction. She needs no introduction.

SPEAKER: Do you want to make your presentation?

MS. LAGOS: Hello. Good morning. Thank you very much to Brookings Institution, Kevin, for organizing this wonderful opportunity to present to you unedited data from the Latinobarometro 2011. The fact is that as we were looking at the results of the data in 2011, we thought this is much too important and too much data. In order to put it inside the report it will get lost. So we decided to do an extra report and here we are.

This data that I'm presenting today is a combination of a recollection of the data that has to do with Sodi Esualana from 1995 to 2011. So there will be data here presented from years, back years that has also not been presented before. For those who want the technical details of the data you can find it on the webpage. It's the yearly report. It's on the yearly report.

So Sodi Esualana, as we have already said in our main report, is the main problem facing the countries today, 18 countries of Latin America. Now, is it the main problem? I think this is the question we're asking ourselves today. Is it the

problem? That problem that people mention?

We can see here that obviously through the years the red line, which is unemployment -- I'm sorry that the graphs are in Spanish but you will get the picture. This is unemployment and the blue line is delinquency. The one goes up, the other one goes down. This is a sign of prosperity. Our report 2011 says watch out. Latin America is no longer what it used to be. And this is part of the important part of the analysis we have to do with crime today.

So where are we? Fifty-five percent of Latin Americans self-place themselves in the lower class. I think this is key data we cannot miss when we analyze crime or Latin American problems. Only 37 percent place themselves in the middle classes and, of course, 5 percent in the upper classes. So we have a region where at least 55 percent -- in most of the countries, well over 50 -- over 10 countries, well over 50 percent of the population places themselves on the lower classes.

Now, there is a huge gap and this comes out in every other number. Please look at this. While 58 percent of those who place themselves in the lower classes do not make ends meet means they don't have enough. This is a very rough way of putting income but it is a very precise way of putting it because it's a self-placement of income as well. So we have self-placement of social class and self-placement of income. While 40 percent of the lower classes say they have enough, on the other hand middle and higher classes, they do have enough on a majority basis. So the gap here is being in the lower class and not having enough. That's the message.

Now, that's one of the aspects we have to take into account. The second aspect we have to take into account is that we live in a violent region of the world. These are data done in 2006. We're going to repeat it now in 2012. How much violence and in what parts of society do we find violence? And we find violence towards women,

towards children, towards older people. At least 2 out of 10, almost 3 out of 10 people find violence, acts of violence within society. And these acts of violence are not even in our statistics. They are beyond statistics. And this is also an important part of the problematic. They're beyond statistics.

Not only that but in 2008 when we decided to find out about the youth we did the scale of whether, you know, youngsters will be seen as violent or not violent, and of course asked about societies, and we found out that people considered their own country, their own societies as rather violent, more towards more violent than less violent. So we live in a world where people do not come to the end of the month, they don't have enough. We have an enormous amount of violence within the homes but it is not acknowledged by the state. There is no public policy towards that. And on top of that we think our countries to be violent. This is the climate of opinion in which this main problem in Latin America takes place.

Now, the question on what's the most important problem facing the problem today upon which Latin Americans answer crime with a 28 percent in the year 2011 -- you see it here -- can be compared with the addition of the other answers of the open-ended question to add up to economic problems with the 37 percent. So at the end of the day, Latin Americans identify as the single most important problem, crime. But when we add up the rest of the problems that Latin Americans have, they add up to being the most important ones and it's economic problems. And this is backed up by a lot of other data that we show in the report.

Now, let's go into the subject itself of (speaking in Spanish.) How do you say (speaking in Spanish) in English?

SPEAKER: Citizen security.

MS. LAGOS: Okay. Thank you. Citizen security. And this might -- and

we go into this very sort of gray area where there is no congruency whatsoever between what people say and what analysts or intellectuals or rational thinking might lead to think that should happen in the countries. The first thing we see here that is striking is that the statement to live in a country is everyday more insecure is declining. Well, this is completely incongruent with the previous data that was saying that the crime was every day more important. How can crime be every day more important and it can be every day less insecure to live in a country? We will be looking at these contradictions.

Now, a third indicator also tells us that -- less people today tell us that crime has increased in the region. So we have two indicators saying that somehow things are better somewhere. Of course, the difference between 93 percent in 2001 and 83 percent in 2011 is not that big but the trend is going down. It's not going up. So how can it be that crime is going up while the perception of the increase of crime is going down? And how can it be that crime as the most important problem is every day more important while people think less that it has increased?

And what we see here is that we find very many contradictory or we can typify different situations in which, for example, a country like Colombia that has enormous levels of crime by objective data -- numbers of homicides, violent crimes, blood crimes -- has a position rewarding the situation they have today because they have a better position today than yesterday. It's not that crime has gone away; it's that the situation is better.

So what matters when people evaluate their own position? The original position of the country in the first place. In the second place, the speed of change. And in the third place, the position of the person within that society and how that change has affected him or her. Now, if we look at Costa Rica, exactly the contrary has happened. Costa Rica is not a violent country. But crime has increased in Costa Rica in such a way

that people think that it is outrageous the increase, outrageous the speed, and therefore there is a punishment for the fact that that has increased. So this has nothing to do with the objective numbers of crime itself.

Now, let's go to the immediate area where we live. Is it secure to live in your neighborhood? And we see here that 64 percent, almost the same as 10 years ago, say that it is secure. Now, how is this? I mean, how can this be possible if crime has increased? Everybody says crime is the most important problem. How can it be secure to live in your neighborhood if it's insecure to live in the country? So we have here the phenomena that things happen always outside my own sphere. They're happening elsewhere. It doesn't happen to me; it happens to everybody else. So the country has a problem; I don't have the problem.

Now, if we compare this again we can see that we saw at the beginning that there was violence at the interior of each household and we see here that there is an enormous amount of violence within the household, within the vecinos, within the neighbors, and the famous bandias. So people are not denying that level of violence. And yet one slide away we were saying that it was secure to live in our neighborhoods. How can it be that it's secure to live in our neighborhoods when all these other violences are happening? Is it a lifestyle? Is violence embedded in our way of living in such a way that we do no longer think it's difficult or it's a problem or it's a national problem? And when we compare security in the country and in the neighborhood we can see three types of countries. Countries in which it is very secure to live in the country but very insecure -- I mean, in the neighborhood -- but very insecure in the country. So violence happens always elsewhere. Countries where there is a congruency between the level of insecurity at home and in the country -- Guatemala. We will see there that Guatemala is one of the countries that has the most failed state. And then, oops, I think you can't see

the last one -- the last one, I think, is Venezuela, where there is an acknowledgement. There is a congruency between the lack of security at home and in the country. So by no way can we use either these indicators as regional indicators, nor can we come to one conclusion on how people position themselves within their own immediate fear and this fear of the country.

Now, in the article we're going to publish soon after we take all your comments we speak about the climate of opinion. I think the climate of opinion is one of the key factors that explains the attitudes and behaviors of Latin Americans towards crime because given the lack of leadership or political leadership, the agenda -- the media has taken the agenda on crime and filled it with information without any content. And this information without content has led to the installation of this climate of opinion where you don't find one single Latin American who is able to stand up and say, "Hey, you're wrong. Crime is not the most important problem in Latin America." When you say that and people say, "Hey, how can you be so out," you know, "there's no way that crime is not the most important problem." So there's a huge spiral of silence against security. And this spiral of silence against security needs leadership, I think.

Now, let's go to the explanation or try to explain. We have this question on "have you been a victim of a crime?" where, from 2010 to 2011, there's an increase. Now, this is contradictory with all the data we just mentioned. So again, there is no congruency whatsoever. Now, are you worried that you will be a victim of a violent crime? There's also an increase, although there's a decrease in insecurity and a decrease of the perception of crime increasing. So and you see here the amount of people who have been victims of a crime with violence.

There is no congruency whatsoever between the level of violence of a crime, the amount of victims, and the perception on that violence. So that's another thing

that the data tells us. Beware of the statements you make on crime because most of the time you get it wrong. Maybe 100 percent of the time you get it wrong. But there is a profile of fear which is somewhat congruent with what it states in the literature, meaning that those who have less in society are more afraid than those who have more. And those -- the women are more afraid and the people who are more adult are more afraid. So there's some sort of a profile of those who are more afraid. Adults, poorer, and those who have less and those who feel that the country is more insecure.

So there is a revolving door here in the forming of this climate of public opinion that is set by the agenda. Many presidents in Latin America have started fighting against the media and saying, oh, the media is guilty because they were the ones who put all these things in people's heads. And it's the wrong thing to put in people's heads. So we have (speaking in Spanish) trying to close down (speaking in Spanish) and, you know, and Ecuador, as well, et cetera.

But what happens here -- I think that this is very important to acknowledge -- is that in the lack of leadership there is no way the media is not going to fill the gap. This is a gap. This is a gap that is filled in the agenda by the media because there's nobody else saying the contrary. So maybe the first thing that one has to do in crime is produce the leadership to say what it takes, what it takes to fix the problem and not go with the mainstream, which is the climate of opinion. And here again you see the difference between victim of a crime and violence -- the level of violence of that crime. There is again no correlation in any country and you can find all sorts of typical vocational situations in this contradiction, this incongruency again.

Now, what are we saying? We're saying that the increase -- and this is, of course, very controversial. People don't like to hear it. We're saying there is no such thing as an increase of crime. What has been happening is that crime has been

becoming more sincere. The fear of crime has become more sincere. As you can see, 43 percent of Latin Americans were victims of crime in 2001 while only 8 percent of Latin Americas thought at the time that crime was an important problem. Now only 33 percent less than then think that -- they say they have been the victim of a crime and 28 say that they have been -- that crime is the most important problem. So the gap has closed. But beware. The gap closes in a very different way depending on the country.

So you can see a congruency or a closing of the gap between the number of victims and the importance of crime. In some countries, like Mexico, where the figures almost match for victimization and the importance of crime and you can also see the case of Venezuela where the importance of crime has gone well over the amount of people who are victims. So again, there's no way you're going to be able to say this without a specific typology for each country in the region, looking at the evolution, looking at the standing point, the speed of change, and the position of each one within society.

Here again we have -- if we compare this with objective data -- and we have a book which I failed to mention that we published with -- there it is -- with CEPAL in 2010, where we tried to get the objective data and compare it with the subjective data. And that's the book. Okay. It's called Latin America in the Mirror. CEPAL.

And here we go a little bit further and compare the (speaking in Spanish). This is homicide, homicide records with victimization. And there's no correlation again. So the country that is the most violent in the world, Honduras, by U.N. standards, has had more deaths by homicide than a civil war. And the equivalent of a civil war. Only 36 percent of the people in Honduras say they have been the victim of a crime. How do you explain that? There is no explanation. And this is not one year. I mean, if we look at all the years it doesn't match in any year. So this is not a random error. It could be a random error 17 times in a row. That would be something to prove again. And you also

have the case of El Salvador. So again, perception has nothing to do with objective data.

Now, let me say that the rate of homicide is the only indicator that can be compared. Even though it is the only indicator it's very imperfect. One of the problems we have in analyzing this is that there is no standardization of indicators. There is no development of new indicators and countries spend very little on producing indicators that might tell them what's really happening because one thing is clear. People know what's happening and they're trying to tell us but we're not understanding what's happening. I think there's a huge message there in all these incongruencies.

Then we go very quickly to the role of the state. We ask which is the public policy which has benefitted you the most. And we see here that policy against crime, only 5 percent. This is the regional average. And that's the spread which is not really very bright. And the policy against narco traffic also is almost nothing. So we have the most important problem facing the country today and no public policy. This is what the state is telling us.

Now, do people think that the state can solve the problem? Yes, sir. Indeed, they do. So the state is not doing anything for me. I'm not getting whatever it is it's doing, and basically they're not understanding the problem. But I do think they should. This is what they're telling us.

And finally, which is the most important? We'll go the crimes themselves. Forty-two percent of the people tell us that the crime is not organized crime. So we're looking at crimes in public spaces. This is also important. What crimes should we look at? Those that are not on the agenda? For example, violence towards women? They're not on the agenda. Or violence against children or violence against people in the third age. Those are not in here. All that we have here are those in the public space.

And those are the crimes that aren't being addressed by public policy, by governments, because it's good for politics. It gets you votes. I think there is a revolving negative door there that doesn't address this variety of things. For example, drug trafficking is not on the agenda. It's almost a secret subject. Nobody wants to say that drug trafficking is today one of -- the second most important problem in crime in Latin America after the non-organized public places of crime.

But look at Ecuador. Piracy. Forty-one percent of Ecuadorians are saying to us that piracy is the most important crime in Ecuador. Ever heard of it? I don't think anybody has heard of it. What is piracy? Is it all there? Or stealing cars. Thirty-four percent. It looks like it is the most important place to go and steal cars -- Ecuador. Piracy in Latin America. This is another subject that's not there. So crime is not only theft but it looks like public policy is only addressing some part of the crime.

Now, does democracy guarantee protection against crime? Not really. Seventy-percent of Latin Americans say no. Democracy doesn't guarantee protection against crime. And democracy doesn't also guarantee private property. Only one out of two Latin Americans say that democracy guarantees private property. So we have a problem that looks like a petty problem of crime, theft, but in fact what we're not addressing is the violence of our societies. We're not addressing the different types of crimes. We haven't said a word about economic crimes and that's another huge area which is also not on the agenda and not being addressed at all. It has to do with the justice system and the reform of the justice system.

But the people have the right perception and by all means one of the consequences is that they don't trust the police increasingly. The police are being distrusted. After having increased a little bit towards 2006 it is increasingly now on a lower rate than last year even with 33 percent in 2011 and, of course, if I don't trust the

police, I don't go to the police when a crime happens because I don't trust them. So the self-declaration of crime is also one of the most important problems that the states have in order to know what's going on. So we don't have enough information. We don't have good indicators. Politics respond to what it takes to have more votes but not to solve the problem. And we are not addressing the violence that our societies are having. This is something that it turns out to be, as I say, a revolving negative door because at the end of the day, you know, you reinforce this idea that, you know, it's possible to bribe a policeman. You will never go to the police because they're corrupt anyway. And the state must do something but they're not doing anything really.

And if you look at the core of the problem at the end of the day, the problem is that 55 percent of Latin Americans place themselves in the lower classes and one out of two of them don't have enough to come to the end of the month. So is crime the most important problem or is economic problems the most important problems? Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. NEGROPONTE: Marta, thank you for raising confusion. And now to make the first attack on the indiscriminate correlations, Kevin Casas-Zamora, fellow, colleague of mine.

MR. CASAS-ZAMORA: I think I'm going to add to the mayhem.

MS. LAGOS: You're going to continue the confusion?

MR. CASAS-ZAMORA: Indeed. Indeed.

MS. NEGROPONTE: We have three seats up in the front. I see four people standing at the back. Please take advantage -- actually, one, two, three, four, five, six places up here. So please come forward. I'm rather like the pastor in the church where no one wants the front pew, but try it.

MR. CASAS-ZAMORA: Thank you, Diana. And thank you, Marta, for a wonderfully provocative presentation. As usual, with Latinobarometro there's plenty of information in this report to debate and to munch on.

Well, you know, I basically agree with everything Marta says. I'm going to try to stick to four points. You know, I've got 10 minutes so I'll be very concrete. My first point is about what I think is the most important bit in this story, which is this dissidence between objective levels of violence and perceived levels of violence. And we'll pretty much come out at the same place where Marta arrived with some small variations along the way.

Is Latin America becoming increasingly violent as is routinely claimed by most people? Well, the answer is pretty complicated. When you look at the objective levels of violence and you take, for instance, the homicide rate for the region as a whole, if you do this exercise and you calculate the average homicide rate and you do it the proper way. I mean, you weigh the average by population so that Brazil doesn't count the same as, I don't know, as Uruguay. Well, what the figures way is that the homicide rate for the region as a whole has barely gone up over the past two decades. It is very high to be sure but still, I mean, the trend is not towards this explosive growth that is usually claimed. Victimization rates, which is a broader kind of measure, is pretty much the same thing. I mean, when you look at the average victimization rate over the past decade, it's pretty stable actually. Again, to be sure, it has become stable at a very high level, at a level that is twice as high as the victimization rate recorded by the international crime victim survey, which is an international survey that is run in about 30-plus industrial, and mostly industrialized countries.

So, but this notion that crime is growing explosively in Latin America is not as obvious as people make it out to be. Or course, if you go down to the country

level the picture is very heterogeneous and you see parts of the region and specific countries in the region where the situation -- the objective situation of violence is becoming worse. I mean, I think here of the northern part of Central America -- Venezuela, I mean, what's happening with homicide rates in Venezuela is really striking.

But in some other countries, such as Colombia or Brazil, crime rates have visibly improved over the past few years. So when it comes to the objective levels of violence it's very much a mixed bag. It's very heterogeneous. The really interesting story in my view is about the perception of crime in the region because here, you know, one may see a small difference between my take and Marta's take. When you scratch the figures you find that when it comes to the perception of crime the picture throughout the region is homogeneous, is extraordinarily bad, and is worsening. With the possible exception of Nicaragua. It's the one country where the perception of crime has not gone up in the past few years and that's an interesting story in its own right but I'm going to go into that.

And the reason I think Marta is spot on on this, there's a remarkable dissonance between levels of objective and perceived insecurity. And you have cases such as Chile and Argentina, you know, which have comparatively low objective levels of violence that have extraordinarily high levels of perception of risk and you also have countries such as Guatemala and even Honduras to my astonishment that have extraordinarily high levels of objective violence by any standard but yet have moderate to low levels of perception of crime.

And actually, I went through all these figures and I ran correlations and all sorts of things and number one, yes, I mean, the correlation between the perception of insecurity on the one hand and objective levels of violence as measured by homicide rates, victimization rates, is extraordinarily low. But, I mean, on top of that the correlation

between the perception of insecurity on the one hand and the rate of change on objective levels of violence is also low. It's also low. So neither the absolute levels of violence nor the rate of change seem to explain the extraordinarily high perception of crime that is pervasive in the region. So that's, you know, by way of a first point.

My second point, what are the causes of this outsize perception of insecurity in the region? To tell you the truth, the short answer is that we don't know. You know, and this is a rather interesting finding but, you know, as one philosopher once said, you know, truth has no obligation to be interesting. I have to think that the mass media plays a role in this. I mean, this is the extent, you know, this is the standard line when it comes to explaining this. You know, I have to think that there's a little bit -- there's a grain of truth in this and, you know, I find one bit of information particularly telling. I mean, the fact that perception of insecurity at the local level, that is your direct experience with insecurity is invariably lower than the perception that the national level suggests that there is something going on with the mass media. Yet I have to admit, and Marta was right in pointing this out, that the evidence is far from conclusive. And actually, we went through this in Costa Rica a number of years ago when we were working on a UNDP report by the way on citizen security in Costa Rica and we found a very, very limited impact of the mass media on perceptions of violence.

I have the impression that a crucial part of the answer, a crucial part of the explanation lies with the widespread perception that law enforcement institutions are not up to the task of protecting the citizens effectively. That basically when it comes to citizen security, citizens have been left to their own devices. And you only have to see levels of trust in the police in Latin America which are dismally low. The chart that was shown by Marta a few minutes ago said that about 33 percent on average of the population trusts the police. The comparable figure for the U.S. is 59 percent. So we

have a problem there and a big one.

This notion that you're not protected by law enforcement institutions feeds into the perception of risk, but it also has all sorts of very practical effects. It is not just that it fits into perception but it leads to very concrete problems. Number one, it leads to an explosive growth of private security firms throughout the region, even in countries which have very low levels of objective violence, such as Chile. Just to give you one figure, I mean, this is an inexact science, of course, but the best estimate we have of the number of private guards in Latin America is about four million. That tells you how serious this is.

The second effect of this perception that you're not being protected by the state is a reluctance to report crime. The black figure of crime in Latin America is simply enormous. And I can give you a whole array of figures. I mean, even in my own country which has -- Costa Rica, which has comparatively good law enforcement institutions -- less than one-fourth of crime is actually reported to the authorities. And the practical implication of that is that impunity is the name of the game. And impunity is the single biggest incentive for crime. And it also has the problem that it makes official figures of crime pretty useless when it comes to policymaking.

So I guess the practical implication of this is that improving ties between communities and law enforcement institutions is key on both objective and subjective grounds. Number one, because it would decrease impunity itself but it also would decrease the pervasive filling of having to deal with crime on your own, which feeds into the perception of insecurity. That's the second point.

My third point, and this is a key one and I'm very glad that Marta emphasized this because I think this is a crucial issue which is overlooked, the issue of domestic violence. One of the interesting findings of the report is that in most countries

levels of violence within families are at least as high as levels of social violence. This is normally overlooked and is laden with very important practical implications. The discussion about citizen security in Latin America and not just in Latin America has been kept apart from the discussion about domestic violence as though the two things were completely separate. And as Marta very rightly pointed out, the discussion about citizen security is this proportionate concern with the occurrence of property offenses committed by strangers in public places. That is, it is concern with offenses that tend to disproportionately affect men.

And this is a very, I mean, citizen security is normally perceived through the lens of men. And this is a very serious mistake on a number of grounds. First of all, because for 50 percent of the population, that is women, the real threat to physical and even patrimonial security comes from perpetrators from within the household and hence it's a violence that takes place in private spaces.

Second, because in many countries domestic violence is a very significant fraction of what the police do on a daily basis. And here the example of Costa Rica is wonderful. When you take the number of police interventions in Costa Rica year in and year out, you find that the single biggest proportion of police interventions in the country have to do with domestic violence problems. They are called upon to intervene because of domestic disputes. That's greater than interventions related to property offenses, to narcotics offenses, to all other ways and shapes of violence. So in very practical terms, neglecting the issue of domestic violence as though it was outside the balance of citizen security is wrong in a very literal way. I mean, it dismisses a very significant fraction of what law enforcement institutions do in our countries.

And third, and last but not least, because domestic violence is a crucial factor in the intergenerational reproduction of violent behavior. So my point is simple. I

mean, if we continue to see citizen security through the eyes of the male and continue to craft our policies accordingly, we will belittle and indeed miss a very significant portion of the violence that afflicts society. Moreover, to the extent that it is real, this violence that is routinely missed in our analysis shows up, I'm afraid, in the very high perception of risk throughout the region. So the way we define citizen security may well explain part of the dissonance between relatively stable rates of objective violence and a perception of risk that is running amuck.

Last point, the political consequences of crime in Latin America, I mean, quite obviously a phenomenon of this magnitude is bound to have political consequences in the region. But I would venture here that those political consequences are less visible than we tend to think. Is it about coups? Is it about, you know, that people will be willing to put up with, you know, an authoritarian regime for the sake of solving the security problem? You know, some opinion polls suggest that that additive is out there. I have my doubts about that. I mean, I don't think that people go around thinking, oh, well, you know, I'd be willing to support the dictator of the day if he solves the security issue. I mean, that's not the way people think. That's a hypothetical question. I don't think that's the way people think about this. I see no sign that people are willing to give up on democracy in Latin America for the sake of security.

Is it about dramatic election results? Well, I don't see any sign of that either. I mean, and the case that comes to mind here is Venezuela. I mean, Venezuela has seen an enormous deterioration in crime rates over the past decade, yet for whatever reason, and we can go into that at length. I mean, Commander Chavez has not been held accountable for that in any visible way. And actually, you don't see a single case in which -- you can't find really, I mean, a single case in which an incumbent -- in which the fate of an incumbent has been sealed on the issue of citizen security. So a point by the

way that the (inaudible) in Mexico would be very well advised to bear in mind.

The two risks that I see that I do think are important are of a different nature. One is the militarization of security, which is something that we're seeing, particularly in Latin America all over the place. And by the way, the intervention of the military in law enforcement -- domestic law enforcement pursuits is something that civilian politicians are foisting upon the military. I don't think that the military are happy about this by the way. And it's happening in the dark. It's happening without a rigorous discussion as to where the limits are and should be. Beware of this because in Latin America we know where this movie ends.

And the last risk, which is arguably the most important, is about the erosion of the rule of law. You know, I've heard Carol saying something that I think is true -- that when it comes to crime, very unfortunately in a way but understandably, even people -- when people are faced with horrific levels of crime, people adapt. People adapt. They change their behavior and they embrace a more cavalier attitude towards the rule of law. So the real risk, the real political risk is the very significant proportion of the population in Latin America that are willing to tolerate abuses by law enforcement institutions in the name of security, the very significant proportion of population in Latin America that still to this day has a very positive opinion of lynching offenders. It is the hollowing out of the rule of law where the political risk derived from crime lies. And the fact that it's a risk that is less visible makes it, I'm afraid, all the more ominous. Thank you.

MS. NEGROPONTE: Kevin, thank you.

(Applause)

MS. NEGROPONTE: I do not think you reached the point of chaos. If anything, you've given us greater considerations. (Laughter)

Ambassador Muñoz, you were active. Please, move to the podium. You were active during the turmoil in Chile of the coup d'état of Salvador Allende. As a young man, age 25, you were the supervisor of the Almacenes del Pueblo. You have led an effort to call for the plebiscite to end the dictatorship in 1988. Given that violence, what's happening in the hemisphere today from your point of view at the U.N. Development Program?

MR. MUÑOZ: Thank you, Diana. And thanks to Brookings for inviting me to comment on this wonderful study. I was a Ph.D. fellow here at Brookings in 1976-77 at a very difficult moment. My office went down and looked on the Chilean Embassy, which wasn't a pretty site at that moment when Orlando Letelier had been assassinated only weeks before I came when I was coming to work with him. So this is a much more joyous occasion being at Brookings. So thank you very much for inviting me.

Well, we tend to agree with some of the comments that we have heard but I would begin by asserting that even though the situation of crime and violence in Latin America, it is definitely heterogeneous. It is at a very high level. This is the most violent region of the world and it is the most unequal region of the world and I'll try to connect it to things at some moment.

Even though Latin America and the Caribbean represent about less than 9 percent of the world's population, it concentrates 27 percent of the world's homicides. However, the variation is important. There are low crime countries, like the case of Peru, Chile, Cuba, Suriname, Argentina, very low. Below the average. The world average of homicides per 100,000 population is 6.9. All the countries that I just named are well below the average.

Latin America as a whole though is about 20. And we find countries in the middle ground, like the Dominican Republic, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Brazil that are

under 20. And countries with the highest rates -- El Salvador, 66; Jamaica, 52; Venezuela, 49; Belize, 41; and the world champion last year, Honduras, 82.

So we find that this is a very violent region. And interesting, I was looking at Marta's data and she says at a point that 3 out of the 5 most violent countries of the world measure by homicides or are in Latin America. And if we include the Caribbean, 12 out of the 20 most violent countries of the world are in Latin America and the Caribbean. Which is exactly the same rate of the most unequal countries of the world measured by the Gini coefficient. Exactly the same. Out of the 20 most unequal countries of the world, 12 are in Latin America and the Caribbean, which is the same situation in terms of violence measured by homicides. So we're talking about the most violent region and the most unequal. Perhaps we would begin making a connection between those two phenomena.

We just, at UNDP, finished a study on the Caribbean. Many studies have been made about Latin America; few about the English-speaking and the Dutch-speaking Caribbean and we did that. And we just completed the study that notes, for example, that murder rates on Trinidad and Tobago increased fivefold over a decade, peaking at 40 per 100,000 populations in 2008 and then declining slightly to 36 in 2010. Jamaica has increased homicide rates from 20 per 100,000 in 1990 to about 50 per 100,000 in 2010. And the outward trend can be observed not only in the bigger Caribbean nations but also in the smaller ones. For example, Antigua and Bermuda, St. Lucia, they have increasing rates of homicides.

What about the sense of security which is one of the most interesting points because the data of objective victimization oftentimes doesn't match the perceptions? And this is a key, I think, finding and demonstration of the study. The sense of security in the case of the Caribbean tends to follow the objective trends and

region-wide about 46 percent of respondents to a UNDP citizen security survey which interviewed about 12,000 people in the 7 countries that were surveyed felt that overall they were secure or very secure. And the sense of security was strongest in Barbados, 79 percent, which is the country with the lowest rates of homicide and violent crime. And the weakest in Trinidad and Tobago, 25 percent, which is together with Jamaica the ones with the biggest problems.

And the salience of crime varies in public opinion. Crime was mentioned as one of the three most serious problems by a low of 8.9 percent of respondents in Barbados -- in other words, there are other issues that are more important clearly in the case of Barbados -- to a high of 47.6 percent in St. Lucia. Very important signal about a small country that is concentrated on the issue of crime.

So I think that this data that we presented in our study suggests here that there are big problems that have important consequences. In fact, we suggest that crime has an impact and has economic and human development costs represented between 2.8 and 4 percent of the country's GDP in expenditures to fight crime and lost revenues, jail use, declined tourism. We find that Jamaica alone incurs about $529 million in annual economic costs and in Trinidad and Tobago the report argues that a 1 percent reduction of youth crimes would boost tourism revenues by about $35 million a year. So this has concrete costs for this subregion.

But let me focus on the study back again because I think that there are some very interesting things that are said. In our study in the Caribbean that I'm going to present to the U.S. Congress in a few minutes we say that first of all trends in violent crime can be turned around with a combination of preventive and protective policies and there are experiences in Barbados. There are experiences increasingly in Colombia and Brazil and we should take that into account. Second, that the citizens' sense of security

is greatest when the level of confidence in institutions of law enforcement is highest. And that's something that we ought to take into account. And third, that besides organized crime and drugs, domestic violence and violence against women is part of a larger societal problem that needs to be addressed a lot more. And that I think in the study, the matter shows that that is a key component.

What I found interesting in the study by Latinobarometro is first that side by side the use of subjective and objective data reveals a number of very interesting patterns. They reveal that there are country biases. They reveal that there are climates of opinion that are difficult to change even when objective data changes. The climates of opinion last a lot longer so you cannot turn around even though you have objective data that climates decline. If the climate of opinion is strong it will probably extend a lot longer than that data will reveal. And it is also important to take into account original positions, where you start from. And those are elements that I think are very interesting because the paradoxes are, for example, how do you explain that in Uruguay one of the safest places in Latin America, Uruguay and sea policymakers' efforts on the issue is almost nonexistent? Or how do you explain that Guatemala, which has an extremely high homicide rate, well above 40 per 100,000, nonetheless shows one of the safest perceptions of local community and home security? Or how do you explain that some of the highest victimization countries have some of the lowest homicide countries and vice versa? Honduras, as I said, they are the world champions in terms of homicide and they have among the lowest rates of victimization. And Peru is the country at 3 percent per 100,000 homicides, 40 percent victimization.

So where is the key? Kevin just told us maybe it is because of lack of trust in the police, in the institutions that is the key. Could be but some of the data there is rather doubtful on that explanation because when you look at trust of the police you

take a look at how important is the perception of crime in Uruguay and the lack of success or trust in the state authorities and nevertheless these countries like Uruguay and Chile that have a very high perception of the importance of crime nevertheless have the highest trust about the police. So I think we have to go a lot more into this dark nonreported crime, how crime is reported. Data about all of this is very complicated, it's not very trustworthy, and I think these polls that we're doing at least are beginning to add to some of the weakness that we have in this matter.

Two more things before I finish. Second, I think the report suggests something about typology of violence that could allow us to sort of unpack this issue of citizen security in very policy useful ways because basically what we're talking about is three sets of phenomena. First, domestic violence, domestic in the household. Second, delinquency related to burglaries and other types of aggression. And third, organized crimes, at times related to drugs, at times related to gangs. So these are three sets that I think are interesting to follow. And that you can begin then mapping out the type of policy responses that are most relevant to each of these three sets of problems rather than to lump them all together which would be a mistake. So you would have that Chile and Uruguay, the homicide rates can be mostly described by the first bundle. A lot of violence, household violence, violence against women, children, seniors. Brazil has localized pockets of the second type of violence and some incursions into the third type, while El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, and I would dare say the Caribbean in our experience and our study are mostly dealing with the third type of crime -- organized on a grand scale related to either drugs and/or gangs.

And third, I think the report also shines light on the state, on the institutions, and the expectations that citizens have in Latin America about what works, what doesn't work, and there three types of groups stand out -- the critics. Again,

Uruguay is one with the highest credibility about the state and very law abiding but the regard about the public policies against crime is almost nonexistent, two percent. The skeptics of the state, like Guatemala, where 12 percent say that citizen security is good but 27 percent believe that the state can solve the problem. And then the third category, those that applaud the policymakers, El Salvador, a very amazing case where 28 percent of the citizens say that security is good and 53 percent say that the state can solve the problem -- 53 percent -- while the country as far as we know shows among the highest rates of homicides in the world.

So there's something here very interesting and clearly the type of reporting that sometimes is done about crime and violence in Latin America needs a little bit more sophisticated analysis, more sophisticated data, and I think Latinobarometro has done a great service to us by pushing the data in deepening the analysis and we hope that UNDP where we have done a study on Central America, one on the English and Dutch-speaking Caribbean and we're beginning a Latin American broad study on crime and security that will be completed in 2013, would probably bring a bit more light into a pressing problem. Thank you.

(Applause)

MS. NEGROPONTE: Ambassador Muñoz, thank you for your presentation, which I think supports that of Marta Lagos. But in our call for greater sophistication in understanding the discordance we turn to my good colleague, Carol Graham, who has developed over the last four years an index on happiness. And does the Happiness Index provide us with some answers to why there is such discrepancy?

MS. GRAHAM: All right, Diana, I was introduced as a pinch hitter so I'll try and pinch hit and answer your question.

Well, first of all, indeed, some of the work on well-being or survey work

on well-being does help provide some answers but first I want to say Marta, just congratulations on another great report. And I've been both a user and a participant of sorts in Latinobarometro for years and it really is a public service for the region and is more broadly linked to a global effort, which Marta is very involved in in leading, to measure public opinion, well-being more generally, around the world. And indeed, these surveys, despite all these paradoxes, are being taken seriously by governments. The British government is now using well-being surveys in its own statistics by the international financial institutions and even in the U.N. as a way to develop broader indicators of well-being that can complement GNP. And so when you see these paradoxes between actual rates and reporting there's actually very rich information in the paradoxes. And so let me try and just make a couple points that speak to what a lot of -- I think what all three panelists have said and also try and answer Diana's question.

So first of all it's clear that crime and security in the region is a serious problem as Marta and others have noted but if you look at actual rates and victimization they haven't increased in recent years, at least on average, and yet concern for crime has increased. So why is that? Well, one point is, of course, it's almost a technical thing as people answer surveys. Prosperity is increased so more people, rather than saying unemployment is the most serious problem, more people are going to say crime is the more serious problem. There are only so many most serious problems they can choose. And crime is, indeed, up there as a concern.

But then a point that Kevin made, and I don't know if the media is to blame or not as Marta said, but the more focus the is on crime, whether it's in the public discourse or by the media, the more people are aware of it. And then the more people focus on it and then more people will express concern about it. So it may not be media driven; it's just part of a general trend of public awareness. And public awareness in

some places obviously lags behind actual rates. Take Honduras and Guatemala. And public awareness in other places, such as Chile or Uruguay, which have more sophisticated public discourse in media, public awareness probably leads the phenomenon rather than lags behind it. So that's an issue.

It's also important to note that people notice changes, particularly abrupt changes in things like crime rates much more than they notice the status quo that they're used to or even gradual changes. As Kevin noticed, I've both said this before and have documented it; people are remarkably good at adapting to bad equilibrium, to bad situations, particularly if they're certain. So people are better able to adapt to unpleasant certainty than they are to uncertainty. So if they're used to sort of general high levels of crime, particularly petty crime, they'll adapt. And I think that may help explain some of the large gaps between when you look at rates in a particular country and how many people are concerned about them, it depends a lot on what the norms are in the particular country or even the region of the country norms can be much more local.

So let me give you some quick examples from some work I've done. I don't want to take too much time. One is some work I did here with Soumya Chattopadhyay here at Brookings, looking at crime and corruption victimization on well-being. And as expected we find that reporting in the Latinobarometro being a victim of crime or corruption in the previous year makes you less happy, has a negative effect on your reported well-being or happiness. Not a surprise. But we also constructed, and I won't go into the technical details, but what we call an unexplained probability of being a crime variable. So it's basically trying to pick up just the random chance that you'll be a crime victim. It has nothing to do with your age or your income or where you live, just sort of around you there's more random crimes and you're more likely to be a victim with no seeming explanation.

Well, it turns out that if you're a victim of crime it has a negative effect. But if you are a crime where there's a higher sort of level of unexplained crime around you, the negative effect of victimization is less. There are several plausible explanations. One is that you've just adapted to it. You expect it. There's so much crime around you, it's not a big surprise to be a crime victim. And secondly, you feel less stigmatized. It wasn't something personal aimed at you. Everybody has their car window broken or whatever it might be.

Well, this adaptation doesn't work as well for homicide. One, because dead people aren't in our surveys; but two, that's not something that people can adapt to. Homicide, I think, is not sort of in this set of studies. And it turns out being a corruption victim works the same way.

Now, if you think Latin America is unique, it's not. We did the same sort of study with a slightly different method in Africa and we get the very same results. And the most extreme result is most recently in Afghanistan where we found that being a crime or corruption victim had no negative well-being effect at all because there's so much crime and corruption that everybody's adapted to it. Except in one place. We did some of our work in districts that had Taliban influence. These aren't violent, dominated districts but just where there was more Taliban presence and much less lower rates of crime and corruption in particular. And it turns out if you were a corruption victim in one of those places, it had very negative effects on well-being because it was no longer the norm in those districts to be a victim of corruption and then it bothered you a lot.

So a lot of suggestion that people can adapt to actually quite high rates of crime and corruption and, you know, at some level it's a good individual psychological preservation mechanism to be able to adapt to bad things around you and go on with life. But I think kind of this wonderful human capacity to adapt also leads for collective

tolerance for bad equilibrium.

Another area, just to give you an example that is not unique to crime, people -- this is about health norms and how they vary across countries and how people expect or not better or worse health conditions. So people in Guatemala are more satisfied with their health than our respondents in Chile. That makes no objective sense. Health standards in Guatemala are close to sub-Saharan African health standards and health standards in Chile are better than U.S. standards probably. But you get this flip on how satisfied people are because of what the norm is. People in Chile expect good health, and people in Guatemala consider bad health to be okay health. It's not that far off from crime. People in Kenya are more satisfied with their health care than are people in the United States.

So again, there's significant evidence that society as a whole can sort of collectively tolerate bad equilibrium. So when we think about these results and how to deal with the crime problem in Latin America and how to even interpret the data, I think it's important to think about norms of what people expect and how much people are able to adapt both in interpreting the results but also in crafting policies. The same policy message is going to play out very differently in a place with certain kinds of expectations about crime rates and how public institutions should work, such as Chile, than it will somewhere like El Salvador as Ambassador Muñoz mentioned where there seems to be high regard for public institutions that are essentially dysfunctional. So I think it helps read the data and also helps us take, I think, or be able to use more the information in these gaps between perceptions and objective indicators.

And with that I'll turn it over to Diana. I hope I helped answer your question.

MS. NEGROPONTE: I think you did. I think you went below the surface

to understanding the psychological context for this.

I want to open it up to the floor but first permit me as the moderator to ask one question of our principal presenter, Marta Lagos. Marta, you and I shared before your concern of the lack of leadership and your concern in the lack of an assumption as to how to address the problem. Can you explain a little more?

MS. LAGOS: Right away?

MS. NEGROPONTE: Yes.

MS. LAGOS: Okay. Well, before going into your question I want to comment on Carol's last words. I think, you know, it makes an enormous amount of sense what you just said because it is all about this original position that I talk about. You know, it depends where you are, who you are, and what is your relationship to the mass or the collective phenomena, the way you react to it. And this is something that we're not -- we don't have the instruments within public opinion to be able to put it in the equation. So looking at the numbers alone doesn't give us anything. We need to put these two other elements in order to be able to see which way it is going. Where was I at the beginning? What part of society am I? How far am I from my goal? What are my expectations? And then you get a more reasonable answer to the numbers. I mean, they make more sense. They don't look completely wild as when you read them just like that.

And that has to do with the leadership because I think that we don't -- we, I mean, the analysts -- don't have a hypothesis. We didn't have a hypothesis about how democracy was going to consolidate after the inauguration of democracy. And we don't have a hypothesis of how to address the problem of crime. Basically, there's a political response with public policy but there is no leadership. As I said before, I tried to explain this climate of opinion in favor of crime is so strong that I don't think that there is

one single political leader in the region that would stand up and say what has been said in this room -- that crime has not gone up and that, in fact, there is a perception that has gone up but not crime. Because that politician would lose any election. You will get crucified and you will lose an election. You need leadership in order to be able to go against the tide and break that climate of opinion because as Heraldo well said, that climate of opinion will destroy any public policy. There is no way a government can be successful in fighting crime because the climate of opinion will well live beyond the success of that policy and at the end of the day will not reward that person or that politician. And therefore, it will not be implemented.

I think there is a negative cycle here that needs the construction of leadership saying, “Hey, you guys, this is not the way we’re going to address this. We’re going to go the other way around.” But we don’t have that leadership. And this is where the media comes in because I think that the media is not responsible for having filled in the gap. There’s a vacuum there. Nobody is saying anything about crime. Everybody is reinforcing the climate of opinion. And in as much as you reinforce the climate, there comes the president who says, “Yes, crime is the most important problem and therefore we are going to fight crime and we’re going to have more policemen and more whatever.” You know, well, at the end of the day he’s shooting himself in the foot because that’s exactly what he shouldn’t be doing. He should be trying to dismantle this climate of opinion in order to address precisely the subjects that Carol was mentioning. So I think, you know, this is a very complex issue of mass leadership that we have in place with crime.

MR. CASAS-ZAMORA: Can I ask you something? For me it starts with acknowledging that it’s a supremely complicated issue and that there are no quick fixes.

MS. LAGOS: Exactly.

MR. CASAS-ZAMORA: And, you know, the flavor of the month is about pedaling quick fixes.

MS. LAGOS: Yeah.

MR. CASAS-ZAMORA: And, you know, this calls for a patient struggle on the part of society. I mean, it's not something that was generated overnight and it's not something that will be solved overnight. And just saying so will make an enormous difference in the climate.

MS. LAGOS: But I also think that the other problem is that governments try to think that they will be able to solve something within a government period. And I think if you look at unemployment, for example, and what has happened in the last 15 years, you will see that it takes more than one government to do stuff. And therefore, alone by saying in my government this will happen, that's wrong because then you create expectations that are not possible to meet.

MS. NEGROPONTE: Bringing it back to the crime issue, what role can UNDP play in changing the tone for political leaders?

MR. MUÑOZ: Well, I think UNDP and research agencies as well, but we have a broader responsibility because we talk to governments. Our partners are governments. It is to provide evidence-based analysis. Evidence-based so that the temptation of an issue such as crime and violence which is extremely politicized will not lead to leaders lagging in leadership and simply saying mano luda, you know, the iron fist. Build more jails, lower the age of penile responsibility. In one country of Latin America the age of penile responsibility has been lowered to 12 years old. What's next?

And we know that doesn't work. So I think our responsibility would be to provide evidence that the issue is a lot more complicated like we have revealed now. Second, that we have to say the truth about the data that we know. Third, that there are

experiences about reversing situations of crime but that involves working with local communities. That involves working with the police, reforming it with judiciary, the penile system. Tackling programs for the youth, which is absolutely fundamental. And at the same time a combination of prevention and control. Nobody wants to wait until inequality has been solved. You know, people want answers when a son or daughter has been raped or kidnapped. They want answers now so that a combination of those two elements I think is fundamental. And that has to be on the basis of evidence. And I think UNDP can do that.

And we are beginning to talk to governments about that. We have 10 programs right now working with governments of the region. We're helping them to shape their security policies. We're helping in the reform of local government policies towards crime. Local governments towards crime and violence and working with them on a larger level on reforming the police of the judicial system, et cetera. So that I think would be the role that we can play and that we hope to play further by providing evidence with these reports and the one that we are doing, as I said, for the whole region for 2013.

MS. NEGROPONTE: Thank you, Ambassador Muñoz.

We have very few minutes but I know there are many questions. I'd like to take the first three questions please and ask the panel to respond. I have a question here in the front, one right at the back, and a third one right at the back in the orange shirt. Yes. Can you give us please your name and your affiliation?

MR. GONZALEZ: Yes. I'm Pablo Gonzalez from --

MS. NEGROPONTE: A bit louder.

MR. GONZALEZ: Hello? It's on? Okay. My name is Pablo Gonzalez from the IDP. This is a quick question for Marta.

Do you think that security has specific concerns for the middle class as

opposed to (inaudible) employment for the very poor? And if it is so, then we could expect that the concern for security will increase as the middle class increases?

MS. NEGROPONTE: Pablo, thank you. The lady right at the back.

MS. ARNSON: Hi. Cindy Arnson from the Woodrow Wilson Center. Thanks to all the panelists for some really --

MS. NEGROPONTE: Cindy, the mikes are dreadful so you've got to yell.

MS. ARNSON: Is that on? Can you hear me? Cindy Arnson from the Woodrow Wilson Center. Thank you to all the panelists.

As much as I appreciate the focus on domestic violence, I'm struck by the sort of contradiction in what a number of you have said which is that it's underreported. And so my question really is how you're able to affirm that this is, you know, a big problem in the region. What is the evidence basis for making that claim, as much as I would share your sense that you're right, that this is a huge problem that we need to pay greater attention to?

MS. NEGROPONTE: The third question is the gentleman just in front of you.

MR. CALISTE: Thank you very much. Good morning and thank you very much for your presentation. My name is Paul Caliste and I'm a student in the Latin American Studies program at Georgetown University. I'm a graduate student. And I just had two quick comments and I promise I'll be brief. Honestly.

The first one is that I saw one of the questions that was posed in the Latinobarometro survey was about states' capacity to solve the problem of insecurity. And I think the corollary question which is on the same theme and one that perhaps could more decisively spur leaders in Latin America to action is to what extent does a person believe that solving the problem of insecurity is a priority for the current government?

And the second quick point is that since there are questions regarding the police in Latin America, one also has to ask questions about the level of public trust or confidence in the judiciary because as I'm sure Kevin Casas can speak to in the Costa Rican case is disappointing if a policeman captures a criminal today and then tomorrow they're (inaudible).

MS. NEGROPONTE: Paul, thank you.

May I ask Marta to answer Pablo's question. Perhaps you would answer -- Kevin, perhaps you would answer the question about domestic violence and then we will leave it open for Paul's question.

MS. LAGOS: I think that the question of security is a societal question. The way the climate of opinion has taken over doesn't leave anybody aside. It's not a question of the middle classes or the lower classes; it's a question of every society, everybody in the society. That's one of the key problems is if it was a question of only one segment of society it would be much easier to address.

MS. NEGROPONTE: Kevin, would you address the question on domestic violence?

MR. CASAS-ZAMORA: Yes, as best I can.

What are the bases of that assertion, Cindy? Well, I mean, one obvious basis is that when you take all the available surveys about domestic violence in Latin America, rates vary immensely. And that points to the fact that people are very reluctant to talk about this. So the empirical basis of whatever public policy does with domestic violence is flimsy in the best of cases. But beyond that, perhaps my point was that, you know, regardless of what the empirical basis of, you know, those assertions are is the fact that from the discursive point of view the discussion about citizen security has been separate from the discussion about domestic violence. And citizen security is routinely

seen through the eyes and gives priority to those offenses that tend to affect disproportionately men. And that, you know, law enforcement institutions tend to take a hands-off attitude towards domestic violence. Someone else will deal with that.

Instead of making or bringing the issue of domestic very much and putting it at the core of citizen security discussions, that's my preoccupation. I mean, it is an empirical preoccupation but most of all it's a discursive preoccupation which leads to policy consequences of a very visible kind.

MS. NEGROPONTE: Thank you. Paul, will you come up afterwards and we'll discuss your question but time is our enemy. It is 11:35 and I would like to ask you all to thank this remarkable panel for the quality of their discussion and for Marta, for your study.

(Applause)

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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