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HOW TO INTEGRATE EUROPE'S MUSLIMS

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MR. TASPINAR: (In progress) — entitled The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration. We never waste an opportunity like a book launch. We want to combine the book launch with a good discussion, and we are very honored this morning to have the Finnish Prime Minister with us, Erkki Tuomioja. I would like to thank the Finnish Embassy for its support in making his presence possible today. I would also like to thank the Genesis Group for their generous support to Brookings in the framework of this project. We will have one more speaker. Peter Mandaville is on his way. He’ll be here soon.

Today's topic, just by way of introducing, is a very important one, not only for Europe but for the United States. The question of Islam and Europe is particularly Muslim integration in the western European context is a topic that raises a lot of alarm and particularly after 9/11 as the “clash of civilizations” scenario that Huntington warned about but no one took very seriously, turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. A number of books appeared on this topic and they were more or less all very alarmist, and there were only a few that tried to bring empirical data, more sobering, less alarmist research, to the field. In many ways Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse made a strong contribution to the field with their book Integrating Islam which focused on France. Today’s book is once again in
the same spirit of trying to analyze the situation rather than create alarm
and it's a very important book which we hope will become a reference
book on this topic of how different countries in Europe approach the
question of Muslim integration.

I would like to very briefly introduce our speakers today. You
have in front of their bios so I will not take a lot of your time. I will just
highlight a couple of points. Let me start obviously with the Finnish
Foreign Minister. We are again very honored to have him here. Minister
Tuomioja is a true intellectual. In addition to being Foreign Minister he is
the author of 20 books and someone who has written extensively not only
on foreign policy but on sociology, on issues related to European
integration, and he also served as Foreign Minister from 2000 to 2007 and
he's serving in his position today since 2011. He has a blog on which he
reviews many books and he will also make a very important addition, a
very valuable addition, to this conversation today from a policy angle
coming from a country that deals with the question of Muslim integration
from a policy perspective so we're very honored to have him.

Jonathan will start his presentation and he will be focusing
on the book. As you can see on the bio, he is Associate Professor
Political Science at Boston College and also a Nonresident Senior Fellow
at The Brookings Institution. He specializes in European politics,
transatlantic relations and Islam in the West. He is the author of the book that I mentioned with Justin Vaïsse, "Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France," and the book received the American Library Association Award and a French edition of the book appeared in 2007. He has also edited volumes. One of them is the new *French Council for the Muslim Faith* and previously *Governments and Muslim Communities in the West*. His articles have been published in a number of prestigious policy journals and academic journals.

Peter Mandaville who will be joining us soon will be also speaking about this topic. He also brings a valuable policy perspective. He was on the Policy Planning staff at the State Department last year, but he is currently the Director of the Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies and an Associate Professor of Government at George Mason University.

Let me also remind you that the book that Jonathan wrote is today on sale and it's 20 percent off if you buy it today and you can easily access it outside. So, without further ado, let me invite Jonathan Laurence for his 20-minute presentation and then we’ll ask Foreign Minister Tuomioja to make his contribution, and hopefully Peter Mandaville in the meantime will join us. Please, Jonathan.
MR. LAURENCE: Thank you, Omer, and thank you all for being here. I'm very honored to have the opportunity to present my new book here. I've been affiliated with the Center on the U.S. and Europe for more than a decade now. Its various staff and fellows have all influenced my thinking on this topic so it's very appropriate for me to set the book a-sail here. The Center, however, bears no responsibility for the title of the book which is of my own doing which could seem perhaps a bit optimistic. It might seem optimistic because the first thought that comes to mind about European Muslims today would rather be the steady bit of restrictionist legislation against the expression of Islamic religious piety in the public sphere rather than any notion of liberation or emancipation. In just the last few weeks and months a new anti-burkha bill has been passed in the Dutch Cabinet, a new head scarf bill is under consideration in the French Parliament and the Supreme Court of Germany made a ruling which effectively banned Muslim prayer in public schools. Religion is not the primary factor of identity and daily life for most European Muslims and my book makes no suggestion that it should be or ought to be. I do argue, however, that the absence of equal religious recognition, that is to say, the real option to practice Islam to the same extent that other communities may exercise their religious freedom, can lead to feelings of group stigmatization and a shared sense of injustice where
previously few bonds existed. That is the path on which many European politicians find rewards but that path is on a very slippery incline.

So, if the central obstacle to Muslim integration a decade ago in Europe seemed to be the very real fear of radicalization and terrorism and the measures of counterradicalization and counterterrorism that led to real community sensitivities around this topic, it seems to me that the main hindrance today stems from a disagreement over the urgency and the necessity of limiting Islamic religious expression in the public sphere, whether it is about clothing, architecture or food. Now, a small disclaimer just for the purposes of this presentation: The terms European and Muslim are not mutually exclusive and that is in fact one of the main thrusts of the book. I do make a point of breaking down the various national cases and the countries of origin and try to show some similarities across them, but they are useful terms at least for the purposes of general discussion such as today.

In particular, two opposing sides it seems are emerging in the public debate over Muslim's basic compatibility with Western democracy, and they're expressing themselves, I believe, in two competing narratives of victimization. In the first narrative, voters are told by pretty much all political parties now that Islam was allowed to flourish unchecked in postwar Europe, that Islamic leaders were allowed to pursue
the imposition of an Islamic order, and in that view, as many a blogger has bblogged, the year is actually 1683 and the gates of Vienna are under siege, except this time the threat is much more insidious because it is an internal one that is threatening European identity and Western values from within. Therefore, the only way to halt the growth of the religion's illiberal political wing is to limit outward signs of Islamic piety. In the other narrative recounted by growing numbers of Muslim community leaders across Europe, it is European governments who are uniformly repressive and intolerant of religious diversity, so in that account the year isn't 1683, the year is 1938 all over again and the legal prohibitions against minarets, headscarves or halal slaughter as well as against the less common practices of burkhas or polygamy are for them a harbinger of something far worse to come. Last year a former French presidential adviser even started to advise his fellow Muslims to begin wearing a green star in protest.

What I try to show in this book is that both of these historical analogies miss the broader trend of what is actually happening on the ground for the last decade or so. The appropriate reference is neither 1683 Vienna nor 1938 Berlin but, rather, I argue a series of very crucial national-building moments in between. There has actually been a broad trend toward greater religious freedom and so the dispute over religious
symbols in the public sphere distracts from what I think the real story is and where the real challenges lie. There has not only been greater religious freedom and institutional representation for Islam and for Muslim citizens, but there has also been with the other hand of the state a greater oversight of religious organizations, personnel and funding. To give you an example, in the last 10 years alone, a thousand new Islamic houses of worship opened and were registered in France. Hundreds of German public schools began offering Islamic religious education alongside the other communities' organized religion class. Hundreds of European-trained imams are now deployed across the continent during the month of Ramadan and other holiday periods. Beyond this very narrow issue of religious integration, there have also been hundreds of city counselors, dozens of cabinet-level ministers and high-level advisers, scores of parliamentarians, even heads of major political parties with a Muslim background. While European societies are indeed tracing the outer boundaries of what religious expression they consider to be outside or beyond the pale, there is a great deal of religious expression and religious institutionalization that is now also quite firmly within the pale.

This degree of institutional integration was almost unimaginable when I began this project in the late 1990s. Islam was still largely unknown as a domestic policy issue to European politicians and
administrators and Muslims themselves were still in the process of becoming citizens. In some cases, even nationality law had not caught up to the reality of immigration societies let alone state church law. Since that time, however, in the last 13 or 14 years, state Muslim relations have been definitively moved out of Europe's foreign ministries and into the national interior ministries. And that is a very significant and difficult step. It reflects a growing sense of ownership of the new minority both in nationality law and in terms of the exercise of religious freedom which coincides also with the gradual abandonment of the hope that these migrants would eventually return home. And even though we associate the term \textit{Gastarbeiter} with the German-speaking countries, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the notion or the desire that migrants would return home was not specific to those countries alone. Even what you would consider to be self-consciously multicultural immigration societies also provided incentives to return home to many migrant families into the second generation including providing mother tongue language instruction into the 1990s. And while that might appear to be some sort of misguided policy of multiculturalism, that was actually a policy of repatriation intended to facilitate their return home.

I think the most striking institutional response to this new Muslim citizenry has been the development of Islam councils. I speak
about the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in France, the Deutsche Islam Konferenz in Germany, the Comitato per l’Islam Italiano, the Consejo Islámico Espanol the Mosque and Imam’s National Advisory Board. In almost every country you can find a similar Islamic board with a very narrow mandate and that narrow mandate is to resolve practical issues of religious infrastructure from imams and chaplains in public institutions, to the regulation of mosques or religious education, halal food or the hajj. But I argue that these mundane activities that are undertaken by members of these Islam councils are in fact the main vehicle of Muslim emancipation. Most importantly, they're trying to depoliticize the routine issues of religious observance that have provoked such controversy and the resolution of practical issues, local problems, helps to reduce the very tensions created by Islam’s inadequate religious infrastructure in many European cities. For example, prayer-goers lying prone in the streets because of an insufficient number of prayer spaces. Or the unsanitary practice of slaughtering lambs in bath tubs because of a lack of halal abattoirs. Or anti-Semitic or other radical proselytizing in prisons because of an absence of trained chaplains or any administrative mechanism to screen and appoint them. Ultimately, routinizing Islamic practices alongside those of existing historical religious communities in European countries will allow those who do not have an active religious identity to
participate in politics and society without having the practices of others projected onto them constantly.

The main empirical material in the book comes from around two-hundred interviews that I conducted between 1998 and 2011 which was the period before, during and after the major growth in state-Islam relations. I illustrate how my respondents in government ministries struggled over the better part of a decade to domesticate state-Islam relations in the sense of freeing European Muslims from direct foreign government oversight whether from the countries of origin, which are Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan and Algeria mostly, or from the hegemons of the Islamic world who have taken it upon themselves to spread their version of Islam, such as the Saudi Muslim World League. I also show how governments have wrestled with finding the right combination of incentives and sanctions to elicit religious moderation from the nongovernmental networks, which is to say the Islamist movements connected to the Muslim Brotherhood or Jamaat-i-Islami or the Millî Görüş. My interviews with religious leaders during this same period during and after the creation of Islam councils reveals a set of critical changes in the calculations and behavior of the main players in organized religious Islamic life.
What do I mean? Well, whereas the representatives of sending country governments once demanded a monopoly of representation and insisted on the use of the mother tongue in the stationing of foreign bureaucrats in Europe, they have slowly begun to abandon those practices, have begun to use European languages in religious instruction, have begun to provide more training for imams before they depart for Europe, are employing more native-born European Muslims and are sitting at the same table as rival religious factions, again, unthinkable a decade ago. Changes are also observable in the political behavior of associations and federations linked to the more politicized networks I mentioned, including the Muslim Brotherhood, who went from having really an adversarial relationship with administrators to beginning to operate within institutional norms in a comparable fashion to other recognized religious communities. So they went from having either an ambiguous stance or silence in the face of terrorism committed in the name of Islam to the explicit denunciation of political violence, from having no relationship with Jewish communities to having semiannual meetings together. The European states themselves are also better equipped to provide the conditions for the long-term adaptation of the religion to the local context. There are more Islamic chaplains in public institutions; there are doctoral programs in Islamic theology, training programs for school
teachers, animal slaughter facilities for holidays, cemetery grounds for ritual burial and consumer protection for both halal food and the hajj.

So what's the problem? In my mind today, the real danger exists that these modest accomplishments of emancipation will be undone before Muslim incorporation has been allowed to fully take place. Those who would impose limits on Islam's presence in the public sphere have gone very quickly from banning headscarves and burqhas in the name of women's rights, to the questioning of even basic religious toleration such as the right to ritual animal slaughter or the construction of houses of worship with or without a minaret. And the pursuit of progressive social and political causes such as women's rights or animal welfare or free speech can take on discriminatory overtones if they are not pursued with similar alacrity to bring reform to non-Muslim religious groups. It's possible therefore to see how even nonobservant Muslims could perceive the sum total of public debate as something akin to religious persecution if only because they my personally experience the suspicion of having certain religious or cultural habits. This is arguably self-defeating for governments' stated goal of integration. Even if the best intentions are at work in the formulation of these measures, their net effect is often to sacrifice golden opportunities to impart republican values in a shared setting and this is especially true of the headscarf and burkha laws. For
example, girls who are forced to choose between their faith and a public education may never again have the opportunity to meet their non-Muslim peers in a neutral setting. The few women who live under the oppressive weight of burkhas will now furthermore be banished to their apartments.

To prohibit halal slaughter succeeds mostly in depriving the local Muslim communities of an autonomous source of financing for activities, furthering the cycle of foreign sponsorship whether by foreign government or foreign NGOs. Populist gesticulation around religious headwear, street prayer or halal food cannot continue to substitute serious strategies of sociopolitical inclusion. European governments need to get back to nation building because once all of the low-hanging fruit has been picked, the last burkha ban, the last foreign extremist deported, governments will still need to forge consensus on the far more critical and elusive goal of integration outcomes that engage the full constitutional responsibilities and rights of all citizens. And if European governments don't do it, someone else will.

For example, there is a new pack of suitors on the continent. Qatar recently stepped into the French banlieues with a gift of €50 million investment and the courting of French Muslim elites. The countries of origin, especially and Turkey and Morocco, have also intensified their outreach efforts. They've built elaborate institutions and consultative mechanisms of their own to stay in touch with and to protect what they
consider to be increasingly vulnerable minorities. Even the United States has developed programs that aim to enhance the integration of European Muslims. These countries are wooing European Muslim elites into their orbits because they're often the only ones taking them seriously. If things continue like this, it would be a wasted opportunity to capitalize on the recent political sacrifices and progress made in the name of integration and a regression to a time before European governments began to take responsibility for their own citizens. Thank you.

MR. TASPINAR: Jonathan, you did not finish on a very happy note. Hopefully we'll get a brighter picture from the foreign minister.

MR. TUOMIOJA: I approach this discussion with two handicaps. The first one is that I am an essayist, which automatically makes me suspicious in countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United States. I don't usually advertise the fact because I'm not of the militant Christopher Hitchens kind of essayist and I do not take any enjoyment in engaging in endless discussions about religious beliefs and the existence of God and so on. I try to avoid them. But this means that I am severely disposed always in favor of a strictly secular society, a strictly secular state and strictly secular state-religion relations. In principle, the state shouldn't have anything to do with religious beliefs.
But even in my own country this is not the case. In Finland we have an established state church or, rather, two, the Orthodox minority church in addition to the Lutheran one. This is not really an issue or problem in Finland, but it is an issue of principle. I have myself somewhat mellowed because there are arguments which are relevant to the present discussion that maybe it is useful to have some sort of state overlooking what churches and religions do and that is why we have theological faculties in our universities because the alternative would be that if there is no education for religious leaders, then they would be purely private and then we would have also many more examples of Lutheran Christian fundamentalism, which is a very minority thing within Finland and it's not really a danger. They wouldn't be throwing bombs in any case, but they are against women's rights as priests but also in general have a very conservative disposition. Of course this is very much the argument and I have read Laurence's admirable book about how to deal with and integrate Muslims into European societies, that there is a good argument to be made for state involvement as a means of eliminating extremism and so on. So we have to make compromises.

The second handicap of course is that Finland remains one of the most culturally homogeneous countries in Europe, meaning that our Muslim population is only 1 percent of the whole population so far. It is of
course increasing, but it has not been so far in any sense an issue. Indeed, we have had actually historically and continue to have a small Muslim minority, namely, the Tatars who mostly came to Finland between 1870 and 1920, a small minority of a few thousand which has never been perceived as any kind of issue or problem, fully and totally integrated into our society. And it is only of course since the 1960s and later that the new emergence of Muslim immigrants into Finland has started to raise questions and concerns.

So far Finland remains quite on the whole outside this debate which has been going on in Europe, but we are very much aware that we cannot avoid it and we don't want to be and we shouldn't be avoiding it. We should be fully engaged in it for many reasons including the one that we have full and open borders in Europe and freedom of movement for all citizens. That will mean there will be also the same minorities that we have in other countries will correspondingly be increasing in Finland as well.

I learned a lot from Laurence's book which actually is rather encouraging even if you go through the recent history over the last 20 or 30 years of what has been done and it shows success stories but not that everything is perfect. On the contrary. Again, my principal disposition would be always to approach these questions of minorities as social
issues and that of course remains the key factor because Muslim minorities, like other immigrant minorities in Europe, are always - most of them - at the bottom of the social ladder so that building societies that are based on -- and equal wellbeing rights and opportunities for all the citizens is of course is the prerequisite for any kind of successful integration. And this is of course where the Nordic model of a welfare state I believe comes in as a good but not perfect example. It means empowering people at all levels of society. This means engaging different social groups and decision-making processes through increasing participation and grassroots democracy. That means that Muslims as well as others have to be able to participate and get their voices heard also in existing democratic institutions.

What remains the biggest challenge outside this is of course the question of cultural values and how we interpret human rights. There I am very strongly in favor and do not recognize any other kind of human rights except universal human rights and these are issues where I don't see any possibilities for compromises. Tolerance for Islam and Islamic culture or any minority or other cultures is needed, but also without prejudicing the universality of human rights and in particular women's rights and women's position. By the way, we had a very successful discussion yesterday morning at our embassy on the role of women in
Afghan, peace building and society and this is something which is very close to Finland and our policies and we try to be active on women's rights issues everywhere because we think that is a key to many other things, integration, development, human rights and democracy, you name it, and particularly also in conflict resolution and conflict prevention and so on. And here we have a link also between national, local and international conflicts. Most of the time these issues are dealt with ministers of interior or ministers of education, but also foreign ministers come into this because this has very much an international cross-border dimension as well which is well-illustrated by the so-called cartoon crisis with the Danish cartoonist which caused such an uproar in many places. I also took part in the discussion because I thought that it is important that we try to contain the damage and that we respect also the feelings of others. But actually then I had some pangs of consciousness also about this because one of the fundamental rights that we must defend is freedom of speech and if somebody wants to publish offending caricatures, they have the full right to do so. That is also a fact of life which we should defend but at the same time try to contain and damage. On the whole, I think now looking backwards after a few years, I think that that has been to some extent successful and we have also learned some lessons from this crisis. I will leave here and continue with the discussion.
MR. TASPINAR: Thank you very much for a comprehensive review. Peter?

MR. MANDAVILLE: Thanks very much and good morning.

My apologies first to you and to my fellow panelists for my late arrival which was not a very auspicious way to start my new Brookings affiliation, so I'll try to do better going forward.

I want to make a series of three quite brief points under three headings. The first of them I would term the fiction of Europe's Muslims. Second, a set of comments around the rise of the phenomenon of the governance of Muslims as a sort of category of citizens or noncitizens in some cases, in Europe. And also a set of comments about the importance of differences between generations within Europe's Muslim community, a phenomenon that Jonathan already alluded to to some extent.

First with regard to what I'm terming the fiction of Europe's Muslims. What I'm trying to get at there is the fact that we have in the last 10 years post-9/11, and particularly in the European context post-7/7, come to use the label and the lens of religion of Islam, of Muslimness, to understand, engage and make policy toward large segments of Europe's population that don't necessarily consider Islam or their religion to be a primary component of who they are. So I want to ask some questions
about the implications of projecting religious identity onto people who may or may not consider themselves Muslim or consider that to be an important part of who they are. This I think is part of a broader shift that we have to recognize in terms of how European and the U.S. government have thought about these issues over the course of the last 10 years. I think it's fair to say that with regard to Muslim communities in Europe, there are essentially three clusters of issues at work. One is a set of issues relating to immigration and this is related to a set of debates and problems about the question of who is and who is not allowed to access the social welfare services of the state and questions about the ability of people to integrate themselves into structures of employment and social mobility. Second is a set of issues related to religion, the role of religion in public life, the role of the state in regulating the religious lives of its citizens and that's the primary location that Jonathan's very timely and important book is located. Third and more recently, a set of questions relating to security.

What's happened is that on the European side many, many years the debate around Muslims in Europe took place primarily at the intersection of the first two clusters, immigration and to a lesser extent the regulation of religious life. Over the last 10 years this securitized I mentioned has come in far more strongly and it's fair to say I think in some
ways has come to predominate the discourse on Muslims in Europe. What you increasingly had in recent years is an intertwining of these three separate clusters with in many instances given the nature of concerns about radicalization and the prevalence of extremism, the security angle tended to predominate. What's worried make in observing this shift over the course of the nearly 20 years that I've been following questions related to Islam in Europe is the way in which it has become commonplace to refer to something like the Muslims of Europe as if that's an obvious unproblematic category of people, we know who they are and they know who they are, when that is not at all the case. The example that I tend to point to here is the riots that took place primarily in the -- of Paris in late 2005 and 2006 where it was quite common for media in Europe and in the United States to kind of run the headline "France's Muslims are Rioting." To me it seemed a very strange thing to do because when you looked at the individuals involved in those events, very few of them were doing so under the guise of Muslimness. Very few of them were going out into the streets chanting and carrying placards that referred to Islam. Rather, they were registering a set of grievances related to the absence of structures of social mobility, unemployment, lack of access to jobs. Yes, they did happen to be predominantly North African immigrants who happened to be of Muslim background, but I would argue that their Muslimness was a
second- or third-order feature of what was going on here and yet they became Muslims. This tendency to reify, to focus on, to obsess in some cases with the religious identity of these individuals I think has not only policy implications but has very important analytical implications when we're trying to understand what sorts of factors and issues are actually at work around these issues.

Related to that is the emergence of what I see as the governance of Muslims as an actual sort of policy phenomenon in recent years certainly in Europe and increasingly in the United States as well. That is, the idea of Muslims as a category, an object of policymaking, and you begin to make that a particular group has become an object of policymaking when it comes to be bureaucratized, programitized, when governments start to create programs aimed at affecting those communities, when those communities become quantified, when people begin to do polling efforts that try and sort of tease them out as a discrete category that you want to count and gather information about, and it has certainly happened to Muslims over the course of the last 10 years. Again it has real policy implications. I think the British government's experience with some of its preventing violence extremism programs in recent years has been illustrative here where prior to 2005 the British government had nothing in the way of government-funded programs that target Muslim
communities. Suddenly very large in relative terms amounts of money are being thrown at these kinds of programs in the wake of the London bombings but they're all focused on the phenomenon of radicalization and efforts to prevent violent extremism. You then have a Muslim community on the receiving end of these programs that essentially says, yes, you're right. Radicalization is a problem within our communities and we need to do something about it, but it's really only one of many issues that we deal with. We living in the suburbs of Bradford in Northern England subject from a whole coterie of urban ills, gangs, drug violence, unemployment, domestic violence particularly affecting women in certain ways. So how about some money to deal with those programs as well? What you then saw was radical groups in the U.K. that would use the countering violent extremism programs of the British government as a recruiting tool of their own essentially saying you can see by these programs evidence that the British government only really regards you potentially as a terrorist; the most fruitful contribution to British society you can make is to not blow something up; they have no interest in helping you to find a way and make a life in this society. So you can see now that, I'm speaking as the radical group here now, our agenda has been right all along. There is no point in trying to integrate because they are never going to allow you to integrate. There is a very sort of savvy understanding of the sort of ambient debate
around Islam and Muslims and they are specifically deploying the policy tools that the British government is using to counter radicalization to actually bring people into these movements. Frankly, I think even our own government, even the U.S. government's, efforts in this area in the wake of President Obama's June 2009 Cairo speech, when something like an industry around Muslim engagement grew up in Washington, D.C. This was of course an effort to kind of set in a different direction of the kind of tenor and posture of the U.S. toward the Muslim world after a period of rocky relations in the wake of 9/11, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the idea that the United States does not seen Muslims around the world as a security threat or in relation to terrorism but, rather, as potentially productive partners. But there again you saw this sort of programatization, this bureaucratization of Muslims as if there is still something about them that means that they're different from other religious groups and have to be handled in a certain way. To my mind, if you're trying to normalize relations with a particular group, you don't set them apart even if you're trying to set the apart in a way that emphasizes the positive tenor of relations, you normalize relations by treating a particular group the way you treat anyone else, and I think that this actually has been a problematic aspect of the U.S. government's efforts to engage Muslims around the world.
Finally, what I would end on are two brief points. One is get back to an agenda in understanding these problems that while bearing in mind these sorts of issues that Jonathan focuses on in his book about the question of the relations between Muslim communities and the state, but to also look much more closely at how immigrants in Europe who happen to be Muslim compare to other immigrant groups. Are there differences there? The evidence that I've seen from those who have done this kind of work actually suggest that there are enormous parallels between the problems and experiences of Muslim immigrants and immigrants that come from other ethnic and faith backgrounds, and in that sense it may well be that the solution to some of these problems have much more to do with the way that other problems relating to immigrant groups are approached rather than this tendency to kind of carve out Islam and Muslims as a somehow separate issue that has to be dealt with using its own tools.

Finally, following the tradition of ending on a down note, I have to register some concern that we might be able to get the policies around the routinization of relations between Muslim religious institutions and the state in Europe just right. We may be able to make progress somewhere down the line in some of the socioeconomic concerns relating to Muslim communities. I have a fear though, however, that this issue of
Islam in Europe has transcended these three nice clusters of social welfare, immigration and security and has rather now become a foil within a much broader debate in Europe about its own identity. That Muslimness and Islam is now part of a much broader conversation about Europe's own existential angst, what Europe is, what its boundaries are, who counts as a European, and Muslims have now become a useful tool, a useful other against which some in Europe are able to advance a particular conception of what European-ness means. And when the debate transcends some of these more functional issues to that level, I have real concern about our ability any time soon to make good progress in this space. Thank you very much.

MR. TASPINAR: Thank you, Peter, for a very interesting and provocative presentation. Before opening this to the floor for Q and A, I'll use my role as the moderator and ask questions to each of the speakers and Jonathan would also like to respond to a couple points. Let me start with you, Jonathan. It seems to me one of the main points you make in the book is a case for a more multicultural Europe and this term of a multicultural Europe is a very charged term these days because multiculturalism in a number of countries that I thought were never multicultural is being declared as dead now. Germany comes to mind. France comes to mind. It's hard for me to imagine how you can include
really Muslim holidays in the official holiday calendar, for instance, without really making a case for multiculturalism. Given this backlash against multiculturalism, how do you see some of the policy recommendations you make in the book becoming feasible?

To you, Foreign Minister, again this will be a selfish question on my part because I'm originally from Turkey and to bring the question to foreign policy a little bit. Do you think Turkey's membership to the European Union has any relevance for Muslim integration issues in Europe especially in the spirit of trying to find an answer to Europe's own identity; whether a large country like Turkey becomes a member to the European Union or not, does that mean something for Algerians in France or Pakistanis in Britain? It would mean something for Turks in Germany, certainly, but for other Muslim minorities in Europe?

Peter, to you finally. Is there a real causality between lack of integration and radicalization in Europe? If there is, this problem of Muslim absence of upward mobility, if the Muslims are an underclass, given the economic crisis we're facing in Europe now, the situation is likely to get worse. It's becoming more of a structural problem to find jobs, unemployment, especially youth unemployment and Muslim youth unemployment, is turning into a nightmarish scenario in a number of
countries. Are we to expect more radicalization because of the absence of Muslim upward mobility in Europe? Jonathan?

MR. LAURENCE: Thank you very much. Thank you all for very helpful feedback. I think it was Winston Churchill who said, "When I hear the word multiculturalism I reach for my gun."

MR. TASPINAR: I think it was Merkel.

MR. LAURENCE: I don't know what multiculturalism is. If it bit me I might recognize it. But the thing is there is no recommendation for multiculturalism in the book. The book is an attempt to place the integration of Muslims in Europe within an historical context. There is no argument for special treatment. The title, "Emancipation," was not chosen by accident. It is an historical reference to the emancipation of the Jews of Europe. Now, who would want to be compared to the emancipation of the Jews in Europe? That didn't turn out so well. But there were very important institutional architectures that were put in place not only after Jewish emancipation, but after the emancipation of the working classes, after the emancipation of minority Catholics in majority Protestant countries, after the emancipation of minority Protestants in majority Catholic countries. Each of these categories were considered incapable of citizenship at different points in time, in different contexts, and the rise of the category of governance of Muslims therefore is nothing new. All of
these groups had to be governed in order to integrate them into the
nation-state, and if you follow the history of emancipation, it is of individual
rights. It is always accompanied, always, a decade or perhaps two
decades later by a reconstitution - this time with dotted lines - but a
reconstitution of the group identity because citizenship and individual
rights does mean the denial of collective identity. It does not that mean
that for majority groups and it does not mean that for minority groups, and
that is not a normative statement. That is an attempt to look at the
historical record.

So you need to bureaucratize this because the relations with
Jews, Protestants and Catholics are already bureaucratized and if you
don't make a seat at that table for Muslim representatives then you're not
treating them like everyone else. You're treating them specially in fact in a
negative fashion. So this is a case against discrimination, not for
multiculturalism because the place for political representation of Muslims
or of anybody is parliament. That's the point of the modern republic. That
is the progress of the last two centuries, not unabated progress, but that to
me is where Muslims' political desires belong. This is just about fixing the
problem of religious equality and making sure that those Muslims who do
not want to be considered Muslims don't have these outlandish issues of
extreme religious practices projected onto them, ascribed to them, in a
genuinely premodern way, in a caste-like way, in a feudal fashion, that somehow because of their last name or their ethnicity they must have certain predilections.

On the issue of universal rights and universal values and free speech, again I agree with you completely that these are not to be compromised in favor of any group’s attempt at exceptionalism. My point is that Muslim demands in Europe are generally not exceptional, so that the cartoon crisis which stands out in all of our memories as this watershed moment when everyone said, “whoa, we have these Muslim minorities and they’re restless.” In fact, if you look at the record of European Muslim groups during the cartoon crisis, what were they doing? It wasn’t like Nigeria. It wasn’t like Pakistan. It wasn’t like Libya. It wasn’t like Damascus. It was a bunch of organizations filing lawsuits in court the same way that the Episcopal Conference of Bishops files lawsuits for religious incitement when the Girbaud jeans company uses the Last Supper in an advertisement filled with half-naked models; the same lawsuit that the Jewish community of Italy files against "La Stampa" when it produces a cartoon of a tank outside Bethlehem with a baby Jesus saying, "They're coming to kill me again." These are all instances of incitement to group hatred and if the law can protect them, then by all means use the law to protect yourself. That’s what the Rushdie affair was
about as well. I don't mean to bring religious beliefs into this whatsoever. The point is that if there is a blasphemy law protecting other religious communities, whether that's right or wrong, then that blasphemy law should by extension, if we're dealing with citizens, be extended to those other groups.

MR. TASPINAR: Thank you, Jonathan.

MR. TUOMIOJA: Just to return to my original point, I sometimes feel that maybe there should be some legislation also to protect the feelings of nonreligious people as well.

MR. LAURENCE: Absolutely.

MR. TUOMIOJA: I fully subscribe to what you described as the bureaucratization of religious minorities in Europe, but I do still see it as a transitional arrangement, necessary but transitional. You can tell me better than I can say, but you refer to historically what has been done with Catholics, Jews and so on, I don't think that their organizations and their relations with states were to play any of the same kind of role so that that transition period has already passed with them, and that will be hopefully the case also with new minorities as well.

On the question addressed to me, we in Finland and I myself very much favor Turkish membership into the European Union. If Turkey wants to join the union, its people are ready to do so, and when they fulfill
all the criteria - that of course has to be decided on an objective basis – they are very much welcome. This is very much a strategic question. A security issue, too, yes, I think, but I do not see any negative effects. If we have a European Turkey, regardless what the religious beliefs of the Turkish people are, which fully subscribes to all of the European rules and standards, fine, that is a good thing, and I think it will have relevance also for Muslims in Europe and do away with the still lingering efforts to describe European culture in Christian terms. Historically, yes, that's true, but that is nothing which should be made into any constitutional or other kind of official statement, and I think that should be welcomed also in that respect.

Then finally, the question of the present crisis and radicalization of the social crisis. Yes, looking at the pictures of Greeks on the streets in Athens and elsewhere in Greece, obviously it will have this kind of effect, but I don't think there were many Muslims involved on the streets on Athens in this case.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Let me first clarify that when I register concern with what I'm calling the rise of the governance of Muslims, I'm not at all objecting to the kind of bureaucratization that Jonathan is speaking about. Indeed, I precisely welcome it because unlike other forms of Muslim policymaking, it is focused on precisely that which defines
Muslims as Muslims, religion, and I understand it primarily as a process of settling Muslims within a set of arrangements that bring them into alignment with the prevailing norms around the way that state and religious groups relate to each other - inevitably adjusting in some ways for the specificities of Islam. I'm wholly on board with that. What concerns me more is that form of Muslim governance which seeks to create a category of Muslim that is somehow assumed by its Muslimness to be either different from other forms of religions or to have intrinsic problems, world views or tendencies that need to be managed quite apart from the question of religion, and it's that kind of Muslim governance that I think has been problematic in recent years.

On this question regarding the lack of integration and radicalization and the causality between those two things, no, I think when you look at the record you see precisely the opposite, that those who have fallen into these movements do not tend to be those experiencing high levels of absolute poverty. Rather, these tend to be individuals who according to many conventional indicators of social integration are actually doing quite well. They have relatively high levels of education, often at least some measure of employment and engage in practices that are usually indicative of stakeholding in the society around them. Rather, what you see is more of a pattern of frustrated integration, individuals who
precisely because they are involved in those broader structures of education and social mobility have rapidly rising expectations but then reach something in their lives that brings home to them again that crystallizes in one way or another, and this is very much I think more an issue of personal biography and psychology to some extent, crystallize the idea that even though I'm doing all the right things, they still don't let me belong. Certainly in the instances when I've had to opportunity to interact with those who are part of these movements, it's those kinds of narratives that tend to prevail.

MR. TASPINAR: Frustrated achievers.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Yes.

MR. TASPINAR: We have about 20 to 25 minutes for Q and A. Please identify yourself and wait for the mike. It's on its way.

MR. KEROSANOV: My name is Dmitri Kerosanov. I am with ITAR-TASS, the Russian news wire service. I would like to ask the foreign minister and all other panelists to address the issue of activities of non-European Muslim countries directly related to the context of this discussion. From your point of view, are there overall some constructive or destructive factors, a mixed bag or none of the above?

MR. TASPINAR: We'll get two more questions and answers in groups.
MR. BURN: My name is Jim Burn. I'm a freelance journalist here in town. I'd like some advice from you experts on how to accurately describe the rage and violent feelings that some of these Muslim groups clearly have expressed including in bombing us. I am persuaded that Qutb, I'd get his first name wrong but it's something like Suleiman, the Egyptian who wrote the great tract of hatred that I understand al-Qaeda studied and memorized which was a main cause of this in our time, that it was his writings that really was kind of the scripture for a lot of this hatred. I'm not a great scholar on this and I'd be very interested in your opinions on what the right way to view that anger and that hatred is. What's the source of it? Is it the Koran? I know people who quote passages of the Koran that say it justifies this sort of stuff. I don't know. I'd be interested in your advice.

MR. TASPINAR: One more question over there, please.

MR. ABRAMSON: My name is David Abramson. I happen to work at the State Department. My question is about the recent deportation of nine Uzbeks back to Uzbekistan that the Swedish government made the decision to do. I'm wondering if you see this as an isolated case - not that it's unheard of that there have been other deportations - or how would you situate it in a larger framework of the issues that you've been talking about either in terms of the Nordic model
or European trends with regard to notions of citizenship especially given… it’s come as a surprise to a lot of people that Sweden would deport people back to a country that has a reputation for endangering the people who might be sent back?

MR. TASPINAR: All Nordic countries look alike, so you can answer for Sweden.

MR. TUOMIOJA: I hopefully don’t have to take responsibility for the Swedish government, but actually it is not only limited to Sweden. Finland too has had some individual cases of deportations, mostly illegal immigrants who have not received asylum and there are some concerns in some cases by human-rights organizations that have taken up their cases because they have been deported to countries where they may face torture or inhuman treatment. This is a general human-rights issue for us everywhere in Europe and I don’t pretend to know the details of the Swedish case or even the Finnish cases, but I know that there are cases and they should be taken seriously on their individual merits each one of them.

Regarding the other question directly to me, I think that Jonathan is better equipped to answer it because I liked your concept which was new to me of embassy Islam as a first stage because this if something of course which we didn’t experience in Finland ever, but this is
a very thoughtful and instructive description of what happened so you may perhaps better answer that. I can only answer from my point of view that as Foreign Minister I have not had any reason or any occasion where this has been become an issue in any sense from that respect, but I can understand that Finland is so far in a different position than other European countries are on this.

MR. TASPİNAR: Peter?

MR. MANDAVİLLİ: On the question of the impact of non-European Muslim countries and Europe, I think Jonathan very nicely in the book lays out this embassy Islam phenomenon and explains where it has historically been found useful by host states to welcome that kind of influence particularly where it's an influence that seeks to enforce and regulate the religious lives of Muslims in ways that correspond to a kind of largely secular apolitical understanding of Islam. Another angle to look at though is not just the question of the role of the states themselves, but the role of various transnational Islamic movements that certainly have a presence in Europe. All the Middle Eastern groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, South Asian groups such as Jamaat-i-Islami, large pietistic groups such as the Jiamata Tabli, all have a presence in Europe and the sort of morphology, the shape that the movement takes, its agenda, transforms and changes somewhat once these groups are in Europe, and
you of course have to take into consideration the influence of international organizations that are largely under the thumb of certain states like the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth largely driven if you will out of Saudi Arabia that have had certain kinds of impacts. If you're interested in this, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life published a study about 2 years ago looking at the role of transnational movements on European Muslim communities that goes into this in some detail.

With regard to the question about how do we understand this rage? What are the sources of it? And the role of some of the iconic figures of contemporary jihadist thought such as Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian that you refer to. Yes, these figures and their ideas are deployed by the leaders and the malignant entrepreneurs, if you will, who recruit young European Muslims into these groups, but I don't think you can draw a direct line of causality between their ideas and what happens. There are hundreds of thousands, millions, of young Arab men who have read the ideas of Sayyid Qutb and an infinitesimally small fringe of them has actually engaged in radical activity so that it's clearly not the ideas that cause people to engage in these activities. Rather, what I've observed is more a process whereby the ringleaders of these groups in particular European contexts, knowing very full well the certain kinds of biographies
and personality types that they're dealing with among these young men with kind of divided identities, never feeling fully British, never feeling fully Pakistani, caught somewhere in between, kind of play on those circumstances bringing in Islamic justifications where convenient to crystallize a sense of rage and a desire to do something that's already present in the individual even before they hit the ideology itself and I think it's that process that we need to unpack and better understand.

MR. TUOMIOJA: Let me also comment on this because I think the issue of hate speech is a very serious one in Europe today and irrespective of what kind of hate speech, Muslim or whatever. We have the worst example in the Nordic countries of Breivik, who felt himself 100-percent Norwegian and his tracts, and they are to be found on the net and there are similar tracts around this undergrowth of the internet everywhere, is very, very worrying and that is where we should have zero tolerance to this kind of hate speech, be it nationalistic or religious or whatever background.

MR. LAURENCE: I would only add to these very perceptive remarks, first of all, Peter is being modest about this, but he has written an excellent book on global political Islam which I would recommend to you in addition to the Pew report that he drafted largely which is I think required reading if you want to understand the various transnational movements on
the continent. With respect to the role of non-European countries in Europe, it was the vacuum of legislation, the vacuum of administrative oversight, that allowed what were essentially Turko/Turkish and North African conflicts to be exported into an immigrant origin context in large part because of the democratic freedoms that European countries afford in terms of freedom of association and freedom of expression so that if you want to know where political Islam comes from in Europe, it doesn't come from the labor migrants. Millions of labor migrants when to Europe, hundreds of thousands and some millions went to Europe for work, some others fled political persecution and wound up in Europe as refugees, but a very, very small number of political activists, maybe in the low thousands, were effectively exiled or self-exiled from Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and they were able to essentially fly under the radar of European states and it was the embassies that European states relied upon to police these communities for them and as you might imagine, the result was not a freedom fest. This is part of the urgency for why European governments needed to take matters into their own hands and stop outsourcing the oversight of these populations.

In terms of the broader historical view, I don't take a civilizational approach to this. I don't go back 1,300 years to understand contemporary conflict. I think the 20th century is more than enough
because of the pattern of decolonization in North Africa and elsewhere in the Muslim world and the way in which regimes emerged or were supported that were not 100-percent liberal when it came to religious expression, and they had perhaps very good reasons for doing so, but the side effect of that was to essentially push that conflict off of their territory into Western countries which happened to be in need of labor at that time and the labor happened to come from those parts of the developing world that were Islamicized a thousand years ago so that I don't take a religious perspective on this but, rather, a political-historical one.

MR. TASPINAR: We have 10 more minutes and we'll take three more questions.

MS. CHOI: (Inaudible) Partners. Minister, you mentioned Finland has only 1 percent of the population is Muslim. My understanding is that Finland has one of the most liberal immigration policies although only 4 percent of the population is composed of immigrants. Jonathan's research indicated that France has had limited success integrating Muslims, A, via education, B, professionals, C military. I was wondering if you would offer your view as to how the Finnish integrate Muslims. You mentioned already the Tatars have been successfully integrated fully. However, my impression from newly arrived Muslim immigrants from Somalia is not the same trend. Second, last year in your parliamentary
elections, one of the key issues was the immigrant issue. My impression was each party has a different policy toward the immigrant issue and I would be interested in your views. Thank you.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible), Woodrow Wilson [Center]. I think there was a general agreement from the panel that their individual rights should be accompanied by group rights and there seemed to me a disagreement on exactly what category to use to recognize these group rights. As far as I understand from the minister's remarks, he's maybe not quite comfortable with the Muslim category to be treated as a basis for group rights. Could you share your views on that? Why wouldn't Muslims as a group category not be let's say justifiable when we compare let's say to the Jewish case or as you pointed out the churches even in Finland that are recognized by the state? And could this discomfort, if you will, say anything what it means to be European? And that could be maybe a broader question for the other panelists. Thank you.

MR. TASPINAR: Two questions in the back.

SPEAKER: Cathy Cosman, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. I had a question or perhaps an observation about why it's possible that the integration of Muslims today is received in a more alarming fashion aside from the security concerns, and that is the demographic crisis in Italy, Spain, Germany and for that matter
Russia, which have among the lowest population rates in the world, and hence I fear that adds additional spice shall we say to the situation. Thanks.

MR. TASPINAR: We need more Muslims.

SPEAKER: I am (Inaudible) thank you for the organization of this great meeting. My first question is to Peter. When you were talking you told Muslims are a tool for the policies. They are very essential tools for policies. I wonder, if you're relating that Muslims are a mere tool for the policies or the policies of the Muslims are the goal of these policies. I wondered about this. My second question is for Mr. Laurence. I wonder if these policies emancipates the Muslims in Europe or are these policies form a kind of alienation of the society, alienation of Muslims from the society. Thank you.

MR. TASPINAR: Maybe let's start with you, Jonathan, and go in the regular order to wrap up, please.

MR. LAURENCE: It's certainly possible that the effect of policymaking targeted toward specific groups can have an initial alienating effect in that they do recognize difference and separateness where people might just want to blend in. I guess the point of the book and the point of the research is to show that the goal should actually be to get beyond religious identity as a primary factor because that's not generally how
people lead their lives, and that this is only possible by first passing through what the Minister referred to as a transitory phase. My dream, which is perhaps a sad one, is that these Islam councils that I've wasted my youth studying will pass into oblivion just as the labor councils of the interwar period and the Jewish consistories of the 19th century, et cetera, who has heard of those things now? The point is that you don't need to hear about those things now, thank God as it were.

The demographic crisis is real and the response to it, and this predates any security concerns, has been to be very suspicious of immigration from Muslim countries not necessarily because of the religious aspect, but because of the problem of political development and modernization in a lot of these sending countries that can make these populations more difficult to integrate for other reasons than their faith so that Spain and Italy already in 2000 started looking to the Philippines and to Latin America for domestic labor and they were only partly successful because as Secretary Napolitano has put it, you build me a 50-foot wall and I'll show you a 51-foot ladder. There is a certain economic pull, there was a certain economic pull, from Europe and so long as you have really different unemployment rates in North Africa and Western Europe which for now are still different, you will have people trying to get in and you will
have also employers taking advantage of the rents available from lower wages.

MR. TUOMIOJA: There are actually more than 1 percent immigrants in Finland but most of them are non-Muslim. Most of them are Russian speakers from Russia and the Baltic countries and that is our most significant minority. Actually at the time that the Tatars came to Finland there were absolutely no policies of integration. They just fitted in. It was not always perhaps an easy process, but there was something that the authorities or the body politic never occupied itself with until 1922 when we passed our legislation on freedom of religion and they received registered status as a religion, but otherwise there were no policies. But when we are dealing with much more larger numbers of people, obviously this quantity changes into quality and it means that this is much more of a challenge and that is something that we have to still address and learn from from the experiences of other European countries who have had these issues on the forefront for much longer than we have. Hopefully what we can do is learn from other people’s mistakes and avoid them and try to use best practices.

Regarding the Finnish elections, contrary to how it may seem looking from the outside, immigration actually played a very small role in the elections because we don't really have an immigration problem
at present. Yes, you may have it on the margins, but it's not relevant and it was not decisive for the elections and the success of the True Finns Party, European issues and anti-Europeanism, euro-criticism, played a much bigger role, but the decisive thing was a social issue, a reaction against growing social inequalities in Finland and all the parties seemed to be responsible for this development. But this said, this party too has an organized minority of a very I would say even vicious strand of extreme nationalism and racism. It's not dominant and it's not representative of the party as a whole, but it is a potential issue and which the party leadership has yet to deal with. I don't think by the way that establishing full legislation new positions for new religions is an answer, I would rather disestablish the old churches as well, but treat them as NGOs, representative NGOs, and that particularly a Nordic approach. We have a very strong tradition of popular movements, civil society, who are engaged in all aspects of society, economic, social and even also in foreign policy for example. We engage our NGO community all the time in our international negotiation processes. We have a continuous dialogue and we include civil society representatives in all of our delegations to international conferences and so on and I think this is the way that we should deal also with different religious organizations and affiliations.
MR. MANDAVILLE: Just to clarify my comments about the use of Muslims as a tool, I was not indicating that in my view the policies of European governments treated Muslims as a tool. They treated Muslims as an object. Muslims had become the object of certain kinds of policy programs and where those programs were outside the remit of the making of arrangements to regulate certain aspects of religious life which I have no problem with. Where they treated Muslims as a sort of category that set Muslims apart from other kinds of citizens, that's where I had a problem with them. Where Muslims I think have become a tool is in the narratives of certain kinds of usually right-leaning European politicians who want to use them as a way to advance certain kinds of claims about the limits of Europe, who can and can't be a European, and that's where I’ve had problems with it.

On the issue of demography, I think Jonathan's analysis is absolutely right not to continue to be a shill for Pew, but there is also another wonderful Pew study that came out in his final installment last year that was a demographic analysis of Muslims around the world. It was interesting not just because it gave estimates for current Muslim populations of virtually every country in the world, but also contained estimates for the year 2020 and 2030. What it showed was that these alarmist scenarios that predict a sort of Eurabia situation whereby Muslims
in certain European countries could begin to approach a majority by the latter part of this century simply don’t hold true; that, yes, you certainly do see marked growth but that it will actually begin to slow quite considerably in the coming two decades. The U.S., incidentally, is the European country where they estimate there will be the most rapid growth in Muslim populations. And on this question of kind of multiculturalism group right claims, the hard definition of multiculturalism is one that involves differential citizen rights for different groups, the idea that I can claim that as a Muslim I should have rights separate from other religious groups. That I have a problem with and I'm much more comfortable with a term that I've heard recently, omniculturalism, rather than multiculturalism, omniculturalism I think being the name of what the minister has precisely focused on, the idea that universal human rights become the basis for our reframing these issues. But where it is a case such as was in Britain a few years ago where there was this debate about sharia law and Britain recognizing sharia law, that was a situation where Muslim groups were asking to have the personal status code of Islam be regarded in the same way as the personal status code of Jewish communities in the U.K. For some years now under the Arbitration Act, Jewish groups have been able to have personal status issues settled according to Jewish law and those cases would have status and enforceability within the British Civil Code,
that was simply Muslim communities asking for the same right and that I have no problem with.

MR. TASPINAR: I think we've had a brilliant discussion. Let me remind you that Jonathan's book is available for sale and it's 20 percent off today. Thank you all for coming to Brookings on this beautiful Friday. Please join me in thanking our panelists.

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