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SENEGAL'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A TURNING POINT FOR DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN WEST AFRICA

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. KIMENYI: Good morning. My name is Mwangi Kimenyi. I'm a senior fellow and director of the Africa Growth Initiative here at Brookings, and on behalf of the Africa Growth Initiative and the Brookings Institution I would like to welcome you to this very important event.

We do have some seats in front, so if you could -- if you don't have a seat there is availability in front. I would also like to recognize -- I know from the registration we have a number of ambassadors from various countries and at some point maybe we would like to recognize who is here so that if you have a comment we would like to note that. So, thank you very much.

The Africa Growth Initiative focuses on issues of economic growth, how can we achieve high and sustained economic growth in Africa? As we know, that's the most important way or the most assured way to raise the standard of living of the people in Africa, but we also know that to achieve economic growth, institutions are (inaudible 0:01:12.7) very important and we know that democratic elections are very important for building these institutions.

And Senegal, as we know, for a long time we have known Senegal as the best example of democratic governance and now we have (inaudible 0:01:38.5) issues and we don't know what is likely to happen in the future, and so it's an important time to discuss about the elections coming in Senegal.

Now, increasingly we have -- we are often baffled by African leaders and we keep asking questions, is someone going to run again? Is

Museveni going to run again -- or we ask the question, what's going to happen when he is out of office? What's going to happen when Mugabe is out of office? Or the President of Angola?

And the question that occurred to me -- maybe we spend a lot of time asking the wrong questions. Probably we should be asking, what will happen if this president continues ruling this country? What happens to these institutions? What happens to the country? And we deal with that.

And it reminds me of a story, by the way, a true story, of a tourist who visited Africa and saw a Maasai boy with a lot of goats, about 100 goats, and he asked the boy, how many goats would you take home if one of them went missing and what would you tell your parents? And the boy asked this person, where do you come from? And the tourist asked, why do you ask that? Because you ask very stupid questions. If one goat is missing, I'm not going home without it.

Probably we should be asking this president when we ask them whether they are going home, we probably -- they should be saying, that's a stupid question. I'm not going anywhere until probably I am done another way of exit.

So, I think we have a problem in Africa in terms of this (inaudible 0:03:29.1) our institutions, and Senegal, being a very important country in southwest Africa, we need to see what are our (inaudible) how do we understand the institutions. And today we have a very good panel and all the panelists here are very good -- well experienced on Africa and they will be introduced, but I thought that I would like to bring in someone from outside Africa to moderate and

to ask those questions that will not be stupid questions, so -- but he will be asking what's going on and we see what type of answers.

Witney Schneidman is actually someone with very good experience within Africa. He has been with the State Department as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and he had been working with businesses (inaudible 0:04:30.6) with the issues of trade and so on, but most important -- one of the most important things in his career is that he is also an associate with the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings Institution, he is subbing as our advisor on several policy issues.

So, Witney, take over.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Thank you, Mwangi. Let me extend a warm welcome to all of you and thank you for braving the rain and the cold to come out for what I think will be a most important panel.

Before we get going, let me just observe some protocols here and I think AGI is probably the only place in town where we ask you to keep your cell phone on because we want you to Tweet or you're welcome to Tweet if you would like to, and the hashtag is #AGISenegal. We've received a number of questions over the last week via Twitter that we will feed into the discussion today, but please put your phone on silence and we will try to make this as interactive as possible.

Just let me briefly introduce the panel. As Mwangi said, I think we've assembled an outstanding group to really get into the issue of Senegal, its elections, its economy, and what the next several weeks are likely to portend for that country's future.

To my left is Vera Songwe, who is currently the Country Director of Senegal, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania at the World Bank. She too is one of our own. She's a non-resident senior fellow with the African Growth Initiative here at Brookings and also a lead economist at the World Bank.

To Vera's left is Chris Fomunyoh, who is with the National Democratic Institute, where he's currently a senior associate and regional director for Central and West Africa, and Chris has vast experience in democracy elections in Africa.

And to Chris' left is Dr. Mamadou Diouf, who is the Leitner Family Professor of African Studies and the director of the Institute for African Studies at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. And Professor Diouf brings a most impressive biography and I urge you to look at some of his writings because it's hard to find anybody who's given more attention and thought to Senegal than Professor Diouf.

So, the format is, I will ask some questions for the next 30 minutes or so and then we'll turn it over to you to hear your questions. And hopefully by the end of this, we will really have had a good discussion about Senegal and where it seems to be going.

But Chris, let me quickly turn to you and ask you to set the scene for us about these elections. You know, what are the major issues at play? Is this just about President Wade or is -- or are there issues that the opposition candidates are putting forward? And place these elections in the context of the emergence of democracy in Africa as well.

MR. FOMUNYOH: Well, thank you very much, Witney, for those very kind words of introduction and Mwangi and the Africa Growth Initiative, for putting together this very important panel discussion on Senegal, which is one of the more important countries on the African continent.

This is the tenth presidential election for Senegal since independence and I would say this is the most important election that Senegal has known in its over 60 years of existence.

I would also respond to your specific question by highlighting three factors, which I think provide a proper context within which to evaluate what's currently going on in Senegal.

First of all, I would say that these elections rarely threaten to get at the exceptionalism of Senegal because, as many of you in this room know, and for those of you who have written extensively on Senegal -- on Africa and spoken on Africa, we traditionally have that one paragraph where you said all of sub-Saharan Africa was either ruled by the military or under one-party regimes, except for Senegal, Botswana, and Mauritius.

These elections are threatening to deprive us of that opportunity, because even beginning in the 1990s with the third wave of democratization, as other countries came along, Benin, Mali, Zambia, and even South Africa after the collapse of Apartheid in South Africa, we still took delight in being able to site Senegal as a country that stood out because it had never been subjected to military rule and it practiced political pluralism for many, many, many years.

I think these elections are really a blow to that level of exceptionalism.

Secondly, I would say that these elections, in a very strange way, pit Abdoulaye Diouf against Abdoulaye Diouf, in the sense that many of us in the '80s and even in the '90s revered this intellectual, this lawyer, eloquent lawyer, this visionary leader, (inaudible) leader, who talks so much about democracy, he talks so much about African renaissance. When he got into power he was one of the leaders of NAPAT and talked about governance issues with some level of commitment, and we all thought that was the beginning of a new wave of leadership on the African continent.

And here we are having to pit this visionary leader versus the President Abdoulaye Diouf --

SPEAKER: Wade.

MR. FOMUNYOH: Sorry, Abdoulaye Wade -- it's Abdou Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade -- with President Abdoulaye Wade, who now seems to have all of Senegal around his person and who is coming across as not even respecting the things that he went out and lectured Gbagbo about in Côte d'Ivoire or lectured Kaddafi about in Libya.

And the low point for me in all of this was when, last month, around January 27th, in response to an interview by a journalist about the controversy regarding the constitution, President Wade said to the journalist, "I'm also a lawyer", talking about himself, "I know this Constitution more than anyone else. Nobody can talk to me about this Constitution because I wrote it all by myself and I wrote it all alone." It's a quote in an AP story.

And I think that, for me, is very telling of the person that President Wade has become today compared to the Wade that many of us knew and

respected in the ‘80s and in the ‘90s.

And the last thing I would say on that point is that, this is happening at a particularly bad time for West Africa because despite all of the efforts of ECOWAS, and I would say among the subregional organizations on the African continent, ECOWAS has been one of the strongest in terms of setting up standards for democratic governance and credible elections, that despite all of these efforts by ECOWAS, this is particularly a bad time for West Africa in terms of political stability and in terms of credible elections.

Senegal, itself, has got issues in the southern part of the country in the Casamance. It’s a low intensity conflict that isn’t going anywhere. On the contrary, in the last few weeks we’ve seen skirmishes that have led to the death of Senegalese soldiers.

Incidentally, when Wade campaigned for president in 2000, this was one of his campaign promises, he said he would resolve the issue in the Casamance in the first 100 days in office. That was before the 2000 elections.

So, Senegal has got the issue in the Casamance.

To the southern border you’ve got Guinea-Bissau, which is a basket case, and many people have written about Guinea-Bissau as a narco-state and it’s got it’s own issues. To the further south, southeast, it’s Guinea-Conakry, which is in the process of still grappling with its own transition from (inaudible 0:13:09.3) rule to civilian democratic rule and still has legislative elections pending.

And to the west, we have a country which up until a few months ago looked very stable, looked like a functioning democracy, and today is

engulfed in a major crisis with the Tuaregs in the north, and I'm referring to Mali.

And then to the north there is Mauritania, which is also another case.

So, in the past, Senegal has been viewed as the anchor in the sub-region and today, unfortunately, we're in a situation where the metal in the anchor is kind of melting before our own eyes.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Great, Chris. Thank you. Vera, let me ask you, you know, we're in an election cycle here in the United States and one thing that characterizes our last several election cycles has been the refrain, "it's the economy, stupid". How much are economic issues playing in this election? Are people -- you know, we see a strong youth movement, are they being driven by unemployment, or, again, is it just Wade and the concern of losing the exceptionalism that Senegal has developed?

MS. SONGWE: Thank you. Before I start I want to thank you, Witney, and thank AGI for inviting me. It's a pleasure to be here. I think like most of us on the panel, we all have a special place -- or have always had a special place in our hearts for Senegal, so what's going on here, we would have really loved to sit here and be talking about a different Senegal and not the one that we're talking about today.

But coming back to your question, I think there are three things, and you're right, it's the economy, and what we see on the streets, I think, of Senegal today is a population, as we all know, which had one of the highest literacy rates, which has a middle class that was rising.

Senegal, one of the exceptional issues about Senegal is it's not a

resource rich state. Senegal is a pretty diversified state. Senegal had been able to lift up a number of its people from poverty, but then you have -- you get to a sort of what we call an equilibrium trap. Senegal could not get out of this growth cycle, and then what you have is the 2008 crisis, the 2008 crisis comes and sort of puts a stop to what was otherwise a nice economic growing country.

Senegal was growing higher than the average African country before the 2008 crisis, about 5.5 percent. After the 2008 financial world crisis, it fell to about 3 percent, and then down to 1 percent. And those two years, I think, brought even more a lot of the desperation of the youth in Senegal.

In the last decade we went from having about 5,000 students -- sorry, 25,000 students in universities. Today, 71,000 students. So, Senegal is graduating that many students from university. Senegal is graduating an even bigger number from high schools. Students are all looking for jobs.

Now, we have two issues. The one is when you come out of the university, most of them in the literary areas did not have jobs because they haven't been working with the labor markets to meet the appropriate labor demands.

Having said this, again, like I said, Senegal is a pretty diversified economy, so they should be, by definition, ways of making sure that this newer and younger generation has access and entry into the labor market, but very strong labor market rigidities, which had not been tackled in the last decade and which existed, but Senegal continued to grow because there was an overall world economic boom and now becoming more and more evident and needing to be dealt with. For example, rigidities in hiring and firing, links between the labor

market and the education system, issues of health services and labor codes and labor laws.

So, I think the government has to deal with that to make sure that this population of 70,000, 80,000 does have a job, and I think that's what you begin to see is, you have an educated class that is asking.

So, that's one part of the economic issue. The second part of the economic issue, I think, is inclusion and I think, again, Chris mentioned it. It's one in every two Senegalese lives below the poverty line, so 50 percent today of the Senegalese live below the poverty line, and I think as one of the things that a lot of the electoral candidates are talking about is agriculture. A lot of the Senegalese, 70 percent of the Senegalese actually are involved in either agriculture or fisheries. Those are the two big agriculture staples of Senegal.

What has happened over time is the regulatory environment, again, when you have an international boom, a lot of these things can be masked because anyway there is high demand, but the minute when the world demand drops, then you have to be able to compete, you have to be able to produce, you have to be able to have the appropriate regulatory framework.

Today in Senegal the framework around fisheries is not good enough, so you have a lot of poachers, you have a lot of illegal fishing rights, so the population that made its mainstay off of fishing is not being able to do that anymore.

The second thing is agriculture. Senegal, today, still depends on rain fed agriculture for most of its agriculture, and as we know and we have seen, climate change is affecting that. So, what you need is new regulation around

irrigation policy, you need new regulation around ownership rights, especially for women, who are the ones involved in agriculture, and you don't have that.

So, again, I think Senegal did really well coming up into the 2000s on the macroeconomic front, they've been very stable, they've had good debt sustainability, good fiscal deficit, and during the crisis actually put in place good expenditure policies, huge investment policies, to manage the crisis and actually stayed up.

But I think what is happening -- as actually is happening in -- we see in some of the countries in Europe -- Greece and Portugal -- is that structural level. They have not yet made the big reforms at the structural level that need to take them to the next level.

So, I think what we see today in Senegal masked behind a lot of the political discussion is a cry out for better reforms in the economy, structural reforms, governance reforms in the regulatory system, and then more inclusion of the population so that many more people benefit from the growth that we continue to talk about because they're going to be growing at 4.5 percent, which I think in Europe or the U.S. is a number that anybody would like to have.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Yeah. Absolutely. Thank you. Thank you. Professor Diouf, let me turn to you and ask your analysis of the movement running up to these elections and whether or not ethnicity, religious factors, regional loyalties, are playing a factor in motivating some of the opposition candidates or, again, is it something different, and the role of the Islamic Brotherhood -- Muslim Brotherhood in Senegal - how are these cultural factors playing out?

MR. DIOUF: I would like first to thank the Brookings Institute for inviting me, in particular the Africa group, to this panel to discuss elections in Senegal.

I would like to begin to say first that I think one of the problems we have when we are trying to understand what is happening in Senegal is that we have been mystified by the so-called Senegalese exceptionalism, for one reason, is that we are always comparing the political situation in Senegal with the other African countries. And if you do that, you over-exaggerate the kind of democratic system, which was established in the country since independence.

But if you locate it within the Senegalese trajectory, you see much better the flaws of the system, and in particular you understand better what has happened with Wade and why his style of government, his way of dealing with the different actors of a society, is having such a negative effect. Because Wade is not an anomaly contrary to sometime what we say, he's a product of the Senegalese system, and he has to be understood within the system.

And it is precisely what is actually signaling his kind of skills, manipulating the society and making sure that he can always benefit is why he's so unstable in his political approach, is why his style of government is a kind of systematic attack on the institutions. It's why he can say, I produce, I wrote this Constitution. He did not, actually.

So, I can interpret it. But what he does is to revise it every time he needs it, which should indicate one thing which Senegal shares with all African countries, in particular, Francophone countries, is that the Constitution is an instrument of power. It's not an instrument to protect the right of the citizens, it's

clear, and if you compare with the American Constitution, you see it clearly.

The Senegalese new Constitution voted in 2001 was revised 15 times, the 16th -- he failed the 16th time and he tried to revise it to enable himself to put his son to replace him.

So, this is the first problem, we have to go back and separate fact and fiction. And, you know, the Senegalese free regime has been very good at selling themselves, at using the so-called exceptionalism to be able to be on, you know, center stage and get resources -- resources, which enable the system to work for so many years.

But the problem with Wade's regime, and with his party in particular, it's not an administrative party compared to the socialist party or compared to the PDCE (ph) all these parties which were created by bureaucrats who knew how the administration functioned. Wade is coming from a world much more of, you know, liberal professions and he doesn't know, basically, how a state works. That's why he's destabilizing the system and using institutional destabilization as an instrument.

And the result is the collapse of the whole system, which will hold only in reference to him. He is the only reference. For these last 12 years what we have is a president, we don't have a government. You can count the number of prime ministers, you can count the number of ministers losing their position and coming back, but you can count also, and this is where ethnicity becomes important, has an effect. If you don't have institutions, people have to hold on something and they hold on their religious leader or their ethnic leader or their regional leader or their city leader (inaudible).

So, it has had an effect, a complete disorganization of a system, but a disorganization of a system which favored the kind of strong presidentialism, a kind of individual and personal power. The result is the transformation of such an individual power into a family affair.

This is also the effect of the way in which the system is functioning. And paradoxically, one of the most important victories of the Senegalese, who had fought between 1983 to 2000, to put together a system which will allow democratic and transparent elections, and one that participated very actively in this battle. It's precisely those gains which has been completely destroyed by Wade after 2000 and the impossibility of building a solid system is today what we are paying.

And one of the most interesting aspects is in relation to Muslim clerics. During this -- the 20 years between 1980 and 2000, they were pushed in the margin of the public space and they were contained. They were enabled to give the so-called (inaudible), the proscription to vote for a specific candidate.

Wade did not only recycle them back using, you know, just finances, you know, it's what we call mercenary support, and it's why you have so many parties in Senegal, it's why you have so many associations in Senegal, because an association allows you, even if you are not a good singer, when Youssou N'Dour became a candidate, all Senegalese artists had access to a president. He needed artists against Youssou N'Dour, so he paid.

And Wade has been paying his way through and the clerics are back now redoing (inaudible 0:27:59.6) and the interesting thing is the same people who did (inaudible) for (inaudible), but it's creating a kind of explosion

within such a group and this is very dangerous for the stability of Senegal.

I was in Senegal when Wade went to visit Smarabo Ntuba (ph. 0:28:22.3). And it was fascinating for me to hear a president on TV say, I'm sorry, I was elected by my people, the Mourides. I will do more for them. You -- the other citizens, you can wait, I will deal with my people first.

You know, and this is a president who is claiming to be a lawyer and who has no sense of citizenship, no sense of equality, and this is today the problem.

Now, you know, within a social context, which is a very, very difficult social context, this is a country where 70 percent of the population is between 0 and 25. They are unemployed. The educational system is not functioning. And even the kind of gain which we have made, when I left the university in 2001, were around 25,000 students, and I was teaching 2,000 students. Now we are back to a horrible situation where it's impossible to teach.

So, the generational crisis is what is fueling the violence today. You have a kind of generational blockage and we historians have shown that probably the most powerful driver of African history is generational change, and if you have a blockage, you have a crisis, and if you have a crisis, you will have child soldiers. And this could happen to Senegal today.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Right, that's fascinating. Let me just pick up on some of your themes and ask you, Chris, you know, the man versus the institutions, I think you've raised a very important point, as we all know, democracy is more than an election. You know, elections are the result, theoretically, of institutions that work and that are responsive to changing public

opinion and currents.

Chris, talk to us about the institutions in Senegal. We saw last summer when President Wade tried to change the Constitution, as the Prof referred to, to get his son as his successor, but also to lower the percentage that he needed from 50 percent to 25 and he wasn't successful. We saw most recently, however, he was -- it seemed he was successful in keeping out, you know, candidates such as Youssou N'Dour.

In an environment where the generation may be driving the change, as Professor referred to, are the institutions in Senegal strong enough, supple enough, to really mediate that change and lead us to a new era, or do you sense that they're not and we will see the more dire outcome that the Prof alluded to?

MR. FOMUNYOH: Yeah, let me just say in agreement with Prof that in some ways Senegal is fortunate in the sense that, you know, about 96 percent of the country is Muslim, so you don't have the sectarian tensions that we see in countries such as Nigeria or Sudan before Southern Sudan became independent, and also that Senghor was a Catholic and for the Senegalese it didn't mean anything. They continued to respect him and he governed very well.

But I would also admit that in the last 12 years we've seen a weakening of Senegalese institutions, probably because of its heritage, because Dakar was the center of Francophone West Africa, that -- right, I didn't (inaudible 0:32:24.6) Senegal had (inaudible) institutions that functioned.

But in the last 12 years, we've really seen that a number of those institutions have been further weakened, for example, the judiciary. I know that

the constitutional court will still have to make pronouncements on the electoral process, so you don't want to take on them right away giving them the benefit of the doubt, but it's known that Senegalese are very critical about the credentials of people sitting on the court and that it's a common belief that the judiciary was weakened about 18 months ago when President Wade stacked the current constitutional court with people that were seen as very close to him.

There have been some criticism that in making the decision on the candidacies that were filed, that the court was not explicit in laying out the reasons why certain candidacies were rejected. My sense is that as this process continues to unfold we will continue to hear criticisms about the judiciary and the constitutional court in particular.

When we look at the legislative branch of government, it's also been weakened because traditionally, in Senegal, the leadership of the National Assembly was elected for the duration of the legislature, and when you have a speaker in parliament who is elected for a five-year term, with that leadership, they would feel emboldened or empowered to be able to do the things that we expect of legislative branches of government in functioning democracies -- exercise oversight, legislate, represent citizen interest -- but when Macky Sall was the speaker of the National Assembly and had a falling out with President Wade, then Wade got the back benches of the PDS, of his party, to revolt against Macky Sall and to amend the rules of the National Assembly, the rules of procedure, to the point where the Speaker of the National Assembly in Senegal is now elected on an annual basis, and that has weakened that institution because whoever becomes the speaker is not going to feel empowered enough

to speak on behalf of that institution and to be able to exercise the appropriate oversight.

So, I'm very concerned, as we go into the elections, with institutions that don't give confidence to the Senegalese people they could be a stronger desire to resort to other means than to seek recourse with the institutions, and when you talk about the efforts to amend the Constitution, I would say that many Senegalese would say that effort was stopped, not by the legislative branch of government, but by the streets.

We have seen in other countries, in Nigeria when Obasanjo tried to amend the constitution, we saw that in Zambia when Chiluba tried to amend the constitution, or in Malawi, that the parliaments of those countries stood up and said no to the presidents from their own political parties. But the 16 amendments that Prof referred to did pass without anybody raising a finger and if the streets of Senegal hadn't come out last summer to say no to the 16th amendment, I'm sure the Constitution would have been amended despite the presence of legislatures in that body.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Fascinating. Fascinating. Vera, let me ask you, wearing your World Bank hat, representing a donor, how the donor community might be looking at these elections and what these elections might import in terms of relations with key institutions such as yours, such as the U.S., such as the EU, such as the AU. Obviously, foreign assistance is still quite important to Senegal, foreign investment, I think, is even more important. Diaspora remittances are quite critical.

What's the impact on these relationships of what's happening now

in Senegal?

MS. SONGWE: Thank you. I think speaking, first, for the World Bank, of course, and then I think it will extend to the donor community, it's four things on the economic front. Again, the first is the elections are happening in a difficult economic environment, so what we want to do is make sure that we can manage the overall vulnerability of the economy and ensure that post-elections Senegal comes out still resilient, which means by definition that what we are trying to do is make sure that the coffers of the state are protected.

As we know, and it's true across the world, during elections, usually, expenditures go up a little bit more than normal. In this case it means that the financing gap for Senegal, or how much money they will need next year to continue financing their development plans, may be reduced because they've financed these elections. And what we're trying to do then is make sure that we can still get all the important programs.

For example, as we all know, in terms of investments, one of the main criteria for Senegal is energy and Senegal, in the last two years, has had extensive energy problems and we are trying to, as a donor community, collectively help to bring back some stability to energy. Just to give you an example, in Senegal it takes about 40 days to get electricity if you're a business, whereas in Ghana, it takes four days.

So, and then when you have electricity you have quite a number of shortages, and I think what the international community has been trying to do is twofold, going back to this managing vulnerability and making sure that expenditures are well managed, it's bringing the private sector to come in,

because with the private sector you get slightly better governance, but you also get additional financing because in the current environment, the second thing is looking for extra financing. Most of the donor community in international organizations like ours that provide concessional financing to countries like Senegal, do not have as much resources to provide to Senegal.

So, what we're trying to do collectively is improve the business environment so that we can at least be able to convince private sector to go in.

Senegal, in 2009, was one of the top performers in doing business, which is an index that the World Bank puts out annually on good business countries, but I think, again, and this is, I think, a question of sort of persistence in reform, Senegal -- and this is maybe similar with a Constitution you come out with a good position but then you don't stay the course -- so, while they were a good performer in 2009 and they moved up almost 12 points on the doing business index, have since gone back down and today they are number 26, to put it in the context of the Subcontinent in the doing business index where you have countries like Ghana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, and Botswana and South Africa in the top five, and so what we're trying to do is, again, work with them to make sure that they can continue to pursue this, one to bring in additional investment, and secondly, to make sure that they can keep their fiscal sustainability on track.

The third thing that we're trying to do is, again, because it's all linked to the economics of this, is in times of elections you squeeze out expenditures to the most vulnerable in the society, and as you all know, and it was discussed earlier, in the Sahara region we are now having a draught, but we

also have, externally and worldwide, rising food prices again, which means that the vulnerable are becoming even more vulnerable and are being hit from two fronts.

If you add that to the security issues in the Sahara, we really have a potential boiling problem there. So, I think a lot of the international community is also focused on this vulnerable part of the population to make sure that during this period, at least we continue to provide basic services for healthcare, to the mothers and good education to the kids.

So, that's the third thing that we are doing.

The final thing is governance, and I think in some sense it embodies everything that we are discussing here, is particularly in the run up to elections, institutions are weakened and I think there is a discussion in the international community, and we talk a lot about stress testing banks, I think that elections stress test development institutions and stress test countries, generally, across all institutions, and I think it's only until after you've had a successful election that you can actually say that a lot of your institutions, including your finances, work well.

And one of the things that we are trying to do is, for example, safeguard procurement laws in Senegal, working very quickly, and Senegal, I think, in the run up to the elections had one of the best procurement laws in the sub region and actually across the world and we were actually trying to take it over to East Asia, but in the last 18 months, and even recent, in the last three months, we have been getting amendments, like amendments to the Constitution, we've been getting amendments to the procurement law, which,

again, are re-weakening the law.

When you think that a lot of the procurement is important because that's how you're getting the energy, that's how the private sector comes into invest, that's how you buy the schoolbooks, then you realize that the whole system around that is also weakened.

So, I think we are working a lot on the governance of the state to make sure that we can at least preserve and protect some of the, what we'll call, wins or (inaudible 0:41:50.7) in French, and make sure that post the elections we have something to work with and that the new framework that whoever the government comes in place can protect, one, managing the resilience again, like I said, addressing some of the initial structural change issues, which is improving the investment climate, improving the business environment.

I think, unlike Cote D'Ivoire, you know, where if we went in quickly, which is what most of the international organizations are doing, you go in and you reform the cocoa sector, you reform the rubber sector, then, you know, the economy starts growing.

In Senegal, there's no one sector that you can go in and just cut because, like I said, it's a pretty diversified economy, so you really need to be working across the investment infrastructure, providing the hard infrastructure, and providing the environment for reform.

So, it's slightly more difficult, but I think with a little bit more initiative, they have more to win on the other side because then you open a lot more broader space in the economy.

The third one is protecting the poor and making sure that post

elections we still have, I think, a cushion of gains from what we have been doing, especially during this period of food crisis and draught in the Sahara. And finally the governance environmental. That's the fourth thing we're working on.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Prof, before we turn it open to the audience, let me ask you sort of one of the big questions. Certainly, one of the major stories coming from the continent over the last 18 months has been the Arab Spring, change in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, but Sub-Saharan Africa has been pretty immune from that so far. But where do you see Senegal in relationship to the dynamics in the Maghreb in the north? And could we see that happening -- is Senegal a candidate for experiencing the same kind of change that we've seen in Northern Africa?

MR. DIOUF: Again, I think that we have to really understand what is happening in Sub-Saharan Africa looking at the logic, which is the logic of these societies. But I would also like to say that we are reading the Arab Spring as something which is very different from what is going on in Africa. We began before the Arab Spring. We had 10 years, 20 years before them, and they have to learn from us how a system could be blocked. And the Tunisian and the Egyptians are learning that. We have learned it -- you take Ivory Coast, you take Senegal, you take Mauritania, we have gone through that and the interesting aspect today, our main challenge is, why are we failing? Because this is the end of these 20 years we called the democratic transition years and they ended up in very, very complicated and very tragic situations -- Guinea-Bissau is one place, Guinea-Conakry is another case, Liberia is a case, et cetera, et cetera.

So, the problem is precisely what to do today.

Of course, as I was saying earlier, you know, for a historian trying to understand what is happening is sometimes quite interesting. As I say, it seems that the dynamics of our societies is based on generational conflict and the possibility to move from adolescence to adulthood, and it's a male problem, it's not a female problem. And the -- it's why it becomes violent, the kind of maturity -- the maturity of an adolescent and the passage to adulthood is played in the public space.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Right, right. Let me just put a pause there, I think this is a good time. (Applause)

Let me open it to the floor here. I'd ask you to identify yourself and please keep it to a question, a short question. I think there are a number of you who want to ask things. We have an excellent panel, and why don't I start right over there with you, Julius. The microphones are coming around.

MR. AGBOR: My name is Julius Agbor. I'm an African Studies fellow at Brookings. My question relates to the intervention of Professor Mamadou. Two short questions.

The first one has to do with in the 1960s, we experienced the poor substitution in the stabilization did not work in Africa, and the argument traditionally was that it was never really tried, the transition. You mention that in the 1990s there was a wave of democratic transitions that happened in Sub-Saharan Africa, and so Africa has actually proceeded -- not Africa in terms of springs, but there were weaknesses that it was not really a transition. It actually failed. Is Africa endemic to failed transitions?

The second question has to do with you mentioning African states,

as we all know, are mostly kleptocratic governments characterized by excessive discretionary power in the hands of the executive. And so I would wonder whether the background of the leader really matters, whether it comes from civil society, like Diouf, or is straight in the colonial schools, like Paul Biya of Cameroon. I wonder if the background really matters when you have an exceptionally discretionary kleptocratic system of governance.

Thank you.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Prof, do you want to take a quick response to that and then we'll collect some other questions?

MR. DIOUF: Very quickly, I think one of the problems we are dealing with -- and it's difference of stances. In the '60s, the idea which was shared by Africans and their supporters was that the state has to play the key economic role. One second -- the economy should be nationalized because it was the oversight of sovereignty.

Third, very strong governments were necessary for integration, and I think what you call -- yeah, democratic transition failed, but Africans paid a very heavy price fighting for the opening of their system. So, it did not work is why we have to really investigate why, because we don't really know. We say a lot of things, but we don't really know. We need to do the job in order, precisely, to come up with solutions.

You know, when you read, you know, all this literature about Africa and how to fix it, one of the most interesting aspects is one where Africans are not part of the discussion. It's always people in Washington, in particular, who are going to tell them what to do.

The second thing which is important is, everybody has a solution. But what is the problem, nobody knows. (Laughter) Because it's easy to have solutions, and the third thing is the tension between actually what international institutions and donors are saying. I'm always amazed when I read Senegal is doing well, and sometimes I'm saying it's probably because, again, people are mystified why are you using the liberal vocabulary? But one of the most austere regimes against Senegal's entrepreneurs is the liberal regime. It has been going after whoever was successful, from Sendou to Baratal, from Baratal to the head of SONATE.

So, about the background. I think the problem is simple. If Africans are not coming up with their own solution they will always have problems. We are waiting for people to fix us instead of thinking about how to fix ourselves. So, we'll not do it.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Okay, great. Thank you. Let me take a couple of questions here, I'll start over here.

MS. INMAN: Hi, my name is Kris Inman, I work with Booz Allen Hamilton. I wrote my dissertation, conducted a lot of field work in Senegal, on democratization and public opinion toward democratization, so this is a really interesting panel for me to hear and I wanted to thank you.

I have two quick questions. One is a follow-up to what you said, Prof, about the transition from adolescence to adulthood being a problem for young men. Do you think that could transition into radicalism? Because I think another part of Senegalese exceptionalism is that AQIM has not infiltrated the country, even though it's partly in the Sahel. So, that's one thing I worry about,

particularly for young Muslim men.

My question for the panel is, how do you see the elections playing out? Wade's going to run. My worry there is that, you know, I know Senegalese are ready for him to go but I'm worried because the opposition are so split. You have really good candidates with Macky Sall and Idrissa Seck and all of these people. So, what do you think is going to happen?

Thank you.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Great. Let me take this question over here. Sir?

MR. SAMBA: Thank you. Hi. My name is Mamadou Samba (phonetic) from Senegal. I share the same first name as Dr. Diouf.

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MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Makes it easy.

MR. SAMBA: Great name, by the way. (Laughter)

My question is Dr. Kimenyi recently wrote an article he titled, "Should the Right of Africa's Diaspora to Vote Come With a Responsibility to Pay Taxes?" And he said that, and I quote him, "Considering that members of the Diaspora have higher income than the median income of their home countries, giving them the right to vote without incurring tax payments is a luxury that African countries cannot afford. Rights must come with responsibilities."

My question is, yes, rights, perhaps, should come with responsibilities, but should they come at a price to pay taxes? And I think that's an important question to ask which deserves some attention. Thank you.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Great, thank you. So, Professor Zartman in the back has a question.

MR. ZARTMAN: William Zartman from SAIS. What if he wins? Can he lose? What if he loses? (Laughter)

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Hold on.

MR. ZARTMAN: Thank you very much. Professor Diouf, I asked a question and I have two observations and then a question after that.

Number one, I think if you look across African countries two things are very clear. Number one, most of these countries if not all where the borders were drawn by other people, and I haven't seen in a lot of countries where the system -- in particular, governance was a decision of people sitting down and saying, this is how we want to be governed. So, what we have, as you mentioned, is people are given a constitution to work with and then they keep tinkering with it, tinkering with it, and amending it, but if these amendments do not recognize the native or the traditional system of government that is transparent, that is stable, that we have used for I don't know how many years.

I don't know how we're going to have stable governments in this system. Everybody quotes Botswana as a success, but of course the Botswanans were lucky that the British did not destroy their native system of government, and today what you have is that you have a house of Parliament, a third house that is made up of the chiefs who control their autonomous tribal regions. The Ghanaians have also been successful in incorporating their --

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: A question?

MR. ZARTMAN: -- into governance. So the question is, how do you want to solve this problem? How do you want to ensure that you can have stable governance without bringing in these things? Thank you.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Okay, let me turn to the panel here and just add one more question from Twitter, and we might start here. The question came, besides public condemnation, are there tools that the U.S. Government can use to urge President Wade to cede power, and is there the political will for doing so?

So we've had a couple of themes come out about the issue of male radicalism leading to further integration of AQIM from the Northern ACRA. You know, what about the different candidates, do they really matter here? Will they be able to express themselves? The issue of paying taxes came up, and that's quite important. Professor Zartman, always provocative. And this last question about the integration between traditional and modern governance.

But Chris, why don't you start with the issue about the U.S. I'm not asking you to speak for the U.S., but in your experience of working on the continent, working for NDI, working with the U.S. Are they likely to, you know, use influence to urge one kind of outcome or another?

MR. FOMUNYOH: Well, you know, I'm reminded of the saying that if the only tool you have is a hammer then you tend to see every problem as a nail, because that's the only thing you have in your tool kit. But when I look at the Senegalese context today and I look at the whole range of possible stakeholders, that could engage or possible interlocutors. There are not really many left.

ECOWAS right now is going through a leadership crisis. They're trying to sort out how to get their house in order and whether the next chairman of the commission should be from Benin or Burkina Faso. I think they had some

states of ECOWAS are meeting in Cote d'Ivoire this week to try to sort that out. There isn't an individual there that President Wade will be glad to listen to and not lecture to.

The EU UR saw what happened in Addis Ababa at the last EU general assembly of heads of states. They couldn't get their act together, they went to spend the next six months trying to find a new chairman for the African Union. I doubt that the African Union is going to want to take a strong stance on Senegal and make its voice heard.

Amongst partners for Senegal, the French have a lot of influence and a lot of connections. They, too, are now very involved in their own elections coming up in April and there are a lot of pictures that have shown some of the people who could speak out in good company with Wade, and I wonder whether the French are going to pay attention and whether even if they spoke out that Wade would be willing to listen.

It's remarkable to see how the personality of Wade has evolved in the past few months, going all the way from him trying to get his son into a meeting of the G-8 and a photo opportunity so the son could have a photo opportunity with President Barack Obama, and that caused quite a stir in Senegal, to him now saying a few days ago this is a Senegalese problem, I have no lessons from Paris or from Washington.

But I still believe that despite all of that, the U.S. has some influence with Wade because the Senegalese, I think their natural inclination has always been to have good relationships with the West. I think that it may be too late in the process to get him to redraw his candidacy. I don't think that anybody

thinks that he's not going to persist and stay on the ballot through February 25, except he was struck by some extraordinary wave of lightning or enlightenment to then create conditions that would allow for the Senegalese to step back, to have conversations amongst themselves, and to come out with a comprehensive formula that would allow him to redraw his candidacy and maybe for the election date to be shifted back so his party could have an opportunity to nominate someone. That would be the most elegant solution that one could see at this point I think the pressure is going to have to stay on through election day.

And if I could just pick up on what Chris and Professor Zartman said, both of them, I think that for once the opposition is not as fragmented as it would seem, and that what we're living through right now in Senegal could be comparable to what happened in 2000. Some people look at the electoral trends in 2000 and say, Wade won in 2000 not because the PDS, his political party, was strong but because the PS was weakened. And in 2000, you had people like Moustapha Niasse and Djibo Ka, who had been strong members of the PS whose lead came with President Diouf at the time, and endorsed Wade's candidacy as part of the Cape Verde turnout.

What we're seeing now is a lot of heavyweights from the PDS. His first three prime ministers -- Niasse, Idrissa Seck, and Macky Sall -- all have now joined the opposition camp and are running against Wade. So, I would say the PDS is weaker now than it was in 2000 and that may be a trend to track, even though Wade would say in 2007 he won in the first round but we know the circumstances under which those elections were conducted.

We also know that in 2009 during the municipal elections, the

local elections, that the opposition won big, including in the city of Dakar and a lot of the other municipalities in big cities. So, the electoral trends if you just look at it from a statistical standpoint, don't really seem to go in his favor.

Now, in terms of Professor Zartman's hypothetical, if we had a crystal ball we probably would make the calls. But you know, I think there's still a silver lining. The optimist in my -- and when you work on democratization in Africa you have to stay optimistic. (Laughter) But the optimist in me would say in all of this there could be a silver lining in this story if we all wake up on February 27 and the story coming out of Dakar is that President Wade didn't get the majority that he expected, he didn't win, or he didn't win on the first round. Then the narrative would change because then we would all be talking about how the citizens of Senegal stood their ground, came out in their numbers. Citizen participation was high, people deployed domestic observers, they monitored the process, they reported on the process, and they made it impossible for an incumbent president who had modified the constitution multiple times to be able to win an election.

So, I think we still have two weeks to track this closely, and it will be difficult to make a call until -- I was going to say until the fat lady has sung -- until the jury is in.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Yeah, great. Thank you. Vera, let me ask you not so much about the male issue -- I think that's important -- but the gender issue more broadly. You know, we've seen in a number of countries like Rwanda where there are 50 percent or more of Parliament is women, where are women in this? And to go to this question, you know, is it this notion of male radicalism that

the Prof raised. You know, is that something to be concerned with here and does that create an opening for the political environment become radicalized in Senegal?

MS. SONGWE: Thank you. I think maybe I should start by saying we need, in general, more women presidents on the continent. (Laughter) We have a few and they are Nobel laureates, so.

I don't know, the gender issue -- I think, actually, as a matter of fact we have two women running for president. So in the grand scheme of things, there are women's voices on the general podium as is evident. Their names are not mentioned during this discussion, so I don't think they are among the top category.

But, I think the gender issue is more important at the beginning of the process, and then the question then -- at least for us and institutions like mine, most of ours -- is access of women at, first of all, the primary and education school level. And there, Senegal is not doing that well, and the numbers drop off as you go towards secondary school and as you go towards high school. Senegal in terms of meeting the MDG goals on maternal mortality is doing very badly, and again -- so, you know, you have as in some parts of the Sahara issues of female genital mutilation and religious rights and requirements that cause extra problems.

So I think in the overall dialogue -- because when you talk about, say for example, I spoke about agriculture. 70 percent of agriculture is done by women. If they don't have rights to land, if they do not have access to finance, then by definition they are not let into the discussion. Then when you get

towards the Parliament -- and we know and we've seen cases and the World Bank just put out a report on the WDR on gender -- where we know that if women are not involved in the policy formulation process.

In India, for example, women had to walk and young girls had to walk two hours to get water, which was the main reason why they could not go to school. Once you began to get more Indian women in the legislature, that was the first thing they changed and the number of women, girl enrollment went up really high. When the rest of the men were making the laws, they were giving more money to the schoolteacher, who was a man, to make sure that the women come to school. So there is clearly, I think, evidence that if you have women in decision-making roles and policy-making roles the access of other women and better policy for gender improves.

So in that sense, I think that Senegal, like most of the subcontinent -- and actually everywhere, because we have debates, I think, in the EU. They've just passed a law asking for 50 percent of representation in the EU Parliament. So this is maybe one place where Africa is doing much better, because maybe we came to the discussion much later and are benefiting from the experience of other continents. In the U.S. it took decades, centuries for women to have universal suffrage. I think in countries like Senegal where now the question is not can women vote, it's can the Diaspora vote?

So I think we have to look at it in two stages. How far we've come, how quickly on the continent, and then secondly how much more there is to go because of some of the cultural and entrenched issues.

So, for Senegal in particular one of the big issues is just good

education and the quality of education. At this point, I think just providing that to the 71,000 that are at the university level or the 100,000 that are getting into primary school, it's pretty important. They are now, I think -- Senegal has this difficulty with education because you have the two systems of sort of the French education -- or should I call it the Western-style education -- and then the Muslim Arabic schooling. And in some sense, the issue is how can we streamline that so that girls have access on both sides and that the quality of education on both sides is, at the end of the day, can you get a job? So how can you do that so you can provide gender with the right jobs. So that is, I think, a global problem.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: And who are the two women running, and what are their background? Are you familiar with them?

MR. DIOUF: Yeah. One is -- her name is Diouma Dieng Diakhate. Actually, she was my classmate. (Laughter) She's only known for one thing. She's the most successful Senegalese fashion designer.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Okay.

MR. DIOUF: But she's a little bit illiterate. The second one is a professor of law.

MS. VALLI: Well, we have a singer as a man running, so if you have a singer as a man running, let me interject. (Laughter) If you have a fashion designer as a woman.

MR. DIOUF: No, you are absolutely right. But one of the interesting --

MS. VALLI: By the way.

MR. DIOUF: One of the interesting aspects is that she decided to

run probably a month ago, and actually the criticism leveled against Youssou N'Dour is illiterate.

MS. VALLI: Yes.

MR. DIOUF: Was not leveled against her, which is an interesting aspect of this whole discussion.

But I agree with you. One of the probably most important successes of President Wade was to recruit women in the political system and to recruit youth, and we have to recognize that. He did it, compared to the Socialist Party, and it has renewed the political class in Senegal.

But again, the problem is you never know what is behind what he does. Two months ago, in the context of the election he decided, you know, what he called partite. Equal representation of men and women in the Parliament. You know, just going from nowhere, without organization, without discussion with human organizations, without taking into account a lot of things people have been doing.

So, the tension is usually a tension between what he says and the way he uses it. I, again -- women have been always playing a key role in Senegalese politics. Senegalese women began actually voting before French women in the colonial context, but the problem is how women are represented in political parties, how they are represented in representative bodies, and also how they are used -- and this is the interesting aspect. I say that as a historian. Sometimes they are not agents, they are resources for politicians.

You know, what happened in 2000, why the Socialist Party lost at that point was the violence during the election.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Yeah, which is --

MR. DIOUF: And women who used to be voters were forced in some cases to stay home, and this is what we are experiencing again today. I'm just saying what is happening.

The presence of young males in the public space, in meetings, is why Wade was enabled to have his meeting in Rufisque yesterday.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Right.

MR. DIOUF: Because they exercised violence and they force women to withdraw, which is very bad, but it's really part of a system.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Prof, let me ask you -- I just want to pick up on Professor Zartman's question and ask you to give us sort of, looking forward, your crystal ball. You know, if Wade wins or if he loses, can you?

MR. DIOUF: Yeah, beside what I was going to talk about. One, it's too late to speak out. The international community had many opportunities these last two years to speak out and try to fix it. Even the Senegalese themselves has organized what they called the Assises (phonetic), and Wade was invited to participate saying this constitution is not working. We are in a deadlock, can we all sit and try to find solution? It's too late.

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Third, I think the U.S., the French, they have such a formalistic approach of what is happening that they are not able to understand what is really at stake. What is really at stake is not only Wade, it's the whole Senegalese political class. They are too old, okay? All of them, from the opposition to -- and again, I'm going back to my obsession with generations. You know, this is the oldest political class of West Africa and I can tell you why. What made

Senegalese successful created such a tragedy. In the other countries you had civil war, military coups, et cetera. So, it changed.

In Senegal, it's the same. People who were 18, student leaders in the '60s are now there. And why is it so important? You can denounce the same lack of democracy in the opposition than with Wade's party. You have the same people who are leading this party for 20 years. So, this is also a problem.

So it's the system which is now the problem, and what is interesting is youth movements are exactly addressing all those problems and fictions, in particular by saying they are much more individualistic. You have a cultural shift which is not translated politically, and this is what is creating problems.

So, the solution is simple. I'm not sure that the elections will take place, one. So, what people have to do today -- if Wade is going to win, he says that he's sure he will have -- and I'm giving you the number -- 53 percent, he will win. It is already cooked, it's obvious. (Laughter)

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Inside track.

MR. DIOUF: No, this is the first. The second thing, everybody knows that if Wade wins, the first thing he will do is try to put his son. The Senegalese don't want that. This is -- you have all the ingredients for a crisis. Today the only solution is to postpone the elections and make sure that he is not running and organize elections in June.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Okay, let me take some -- we've got a couple more questions. Over there, yes. I see you, just hold on a second. I see you, hold on a second. Behind you, go ahead.

SPEAKER: Hi, my name is Ann. I'm a student at SAIS across the street.

About this youth movement, I have a question. I was in Senegal in June right before the protests about the constitutional amendment went on and all of my friends who are not highly political but, I think, are a pretty good representation of what the average youth is in Senegal were so excited. They were like, this is it, we're going to go out on the streets, we're going to show Wade he can't do this, we're proud Senegalese men, a lot, and we're going to show him he can't do this with us, and they were incredibly proud because they did. I think what happened on the streets was critical in why he withdrew.

But then, I was there again in January and there are still a lot of critical youth but a lot of my friends had also completely changed their view. They're like, all right, he made a mistake but he apologized, he still loves you, he's still guiding our country, and I would rather trust him than any of these opposition candidates.

So I would be interested in your point of view, in first of all what Wade is doing so right and the opposition is doing so wrong that they can't keep youth excited for only six months about a change that they might be able to achieve. And also, if you think there's a role for youth after the election, no matter who wins, or if it's more something that's easy to mobilize in case you need people on the streets but then you kind of forget about it again because you're not that important in the political system.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Okay, Steve? Right here.

MR. LANDE: Thank you. Steve Lande, Manchester Trade. A

light comment and then a serious comment.

The one thing I've never understood with my USAID friends is why they don't set up a secession fund. It would save a lot of money. (Laughter) President goes through what he's supposed to go through, accepts his term limits, leaves, goes out and gets a job at AGCI, gets a job at Georgetown funded by USAID. Such a simple solution. (Laughter) May not develop the systems people talk about --

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Professor is right, everybody does have a solution, don't they? (Laughter)

MR. LANDE: Now my more serious comment is that I heard a comment about ECOWAS, and the one thing I do not understand -- I'm really looking a lot at the World Bank as far as I can see. There's no way that whatever the "donor," which may not always be the best word because Africa pays a big price for the donors, so it's more of a partnership. But anyway, the donor community.

You can't work in every single country, so you have ECOWAS which really got a good start, has a common currency, has a lot of things in place and so on. I should say, the UMOA has the common external tariff. But in any case, this really has moved well and it exists, so whether it's UMOA or whether it's ECOWAS, can't we work more through these institutions in terms of democracy-building -- relying on African peer pressure which has some very notable success recently and so on -- to push our way.

Not one comment was made, other than the quick comment on ECOWAS which was appreciated, on a role of the regional groups to play, and

yet I don't see how we can do it on an individual country basis. Thank you.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Great. Thanks, Steve. Osita, did you have a question?

MR. OBU: Thank you very much. First of all, let me appreciate the professor for throwing into light --

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Please introduce yourself.

MR. OBU: Oh, I'm Osita Ogbu with the African Growth Initiative at Brookings. There's a lot of myths about what happens in Africa, and I think the professor himself has tried to put a light to it. There is myth about what's happening in Botswana, there's myths about militias, there is myth about Senegal, and unless you really, really understand these countries you're going to have a narrative that feeds your own ideology or what you think. So, I think it's important that he has already told us what has happened in Senegal, because it's strange.

Senegal is a country in Africa that we respect for its deep civil society. It's a society that we thought something like this could never happen but it has happened, and when people talk about whether Wade would run or not, I asked a question which has not been asked. Yes, he amended the constitution, but was the interpretation right by the constitutional court? I think that question needs to be asked.

Second is, the youth -- just like the young lady mentioned -- cannot see the opposition or have not seen as alternative because there is all of them running on the same stock, as the professor has said. So really, A, B, or C, you are likely to have the same outcome. So, this leads me to a discussion

about the system and the costs that are involved -- the entry costs into politics so that the younger generation do not have as much access to political power as those who are older, because of the resource costs.

Thank you.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Great, thanks. Well, I think we're almost out of time, so let me give some final comments and maybe you can respond to the questions about the role of the youth and regional integration and regional organizations and other issues in another minute or two that we have left.

Why don't I start with you, Prof?

MR. DIOUF: I think about the role of the youth. What we are getting is what -- actually, what I see, what I have always expected. They are mobilized, they are reacting. But one of the most simple facts of registering, in many cases, they are not doing it, and you have ups and downs.

I was in Dakar June 23. I was there for one week, and I have seen what has happened, which was completely not prepared. The day before, the opposition was organizing a press conference and it was disbanded by the youth. They came in -- I was there -- and they told all of them, enough, you stop talking, you get out. Tomorrow we are going to demonstrate, you better come.

But the youth is always missing one thing. The leaders of political parties are accountable to their party and they have their own strategy, which is not necessarily the same strategy and demand than the youth. And their parties will never expose their leadership knowing that Wade's police will charge them, which has already happened many times.

So you have this tension between, you know, these leaders being

accused of being cowards and, you know, them trying to work their differences and trying to make sure that they are going to win. It's why you have this kind of fragmentation, and the fragmentation is not bad because I think in Africa one thing we need, really, to learn is to respect pluralism and difference. I think this is more important than democracy, you know, because it will help people be tolerant and be able to talk, exchange, and decide on common. To have open societies.

The problem we have today is that we have these very closed and authoritarian societies. We are always accusing our leaders and leadership but society also has to be dealt with, and this is what Senegal, I think, is teaching. This kind of very, very complicated tension.

Today, I think that what we have been experiencing shows clearly that this country is really very close to the social explosion. And, you know, whatever are around and have been around. You know, Guinea is not very far, Casamance is part of Senegal, but you have the crisis also in Mauritania, et cetera, et cetera. So, what does it mean? It means that at the point, if Senegalese are not able to deal with their problem -- and today, the problem we like or not is an officially 85-year-old man who is just competing with Senghor. He wants to be president at least for 19 years, close to what Senghor has been president. He wants to be more important than Senghor, et cetera, et cetera. You know, he's kind of a messiah mentality, you know, and this is the problem. The problem is, what do you do?

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Right. Chris?

MR. FOMUNYOH: Yeah, let me pick up on something Vera said

right at the beginning of our conversation, about how elections test systems. And responding to the question about youth violence around elections, I think that's one indication of the lack of confidence that the young people have in governing institutions, whether it's in Senegal or in other countries. Because they can't seek redress, because they can't find political space within the framework of institutions that exist, there is this temptation to then act out their frustrations.

We had a situation in Ghana in 2008, where we had a very close election, and at one point in that process the ruling party Ghana felt aggrieved because the Election Commission had decided to postpone their announcement of the formal results until this village up in the northern part of Ghana voted. The ruling party went to court, because in Ghana people believed that they could seek redress from the judiciary, their confidence in their courts. They went to court, they lost the case, the Election Commission was allowed to maintain the timeline, and nobody took to the streets and nobody was killed in the process.

So, I think whenever we see the youth coming out to manifest their disapproval of the system it's the symptom of larger issues that our countries ought to be dealing with and, you know, should try to deal with if we really think or hope to consolidate democratic governance in our respective countries.

On Steve's point, I would say that first of all on the light note, I think -- let me start with the more serious note on ECOWAS. I think it's a great regional body. ECOWAS, as I said in my remarks, is trying very hard to have some standards. Notably, a few months ago there was a presidential election in the Gambia and the Gambia is a member state of ECOWAS, but ECOWAS made a public decision not to send observers to the Gambia because they said

the environment didn't allow for credible elections.

Unfortunately, the African Union which traditionally ought to defer to the regional bodies sent a delegation to the Gambia that was chaired by the election commissioner, the chairman of the Election Commission from Cameroon who had just run a poor election in his own country. (Laughter) And he went to the Gambia and on behalf of the African Union said that the Gambian elections went very well. At a time when the regional body was tying to hold the line on some standards.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Interesting.

MR. FOMUNYOH: So, I think that anything that can be done to strengthen some of the regional organizations, especially ECOWAS, would be a worthwhile investment.

On the lighter note, we were joking before coming into the panel about how maybe Mo Ibrahim needs to increase the incentive with its price. You know, talking about secession, maybe he needs to increase the envelope. But invariably, something needs to be done to remind African heads of state that it's life after the state house. That you can become a world citizen, you can become acknowledged and accomplished and recognized around the world if you govern well and you provide an opportunity for citizens of your country to renew the political leadership of the country.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: Thank you. Vera, let me give you the last word here and ask you just to make a brief summary of what you've heard.

MS. SONGWE: Thank you very much. I think maybe just to answer because it was a pretty specific question, also. There are maintenances,

and should the Diaspora pay taxes? I think in some sense the Diaspora is already contributing a lot on the social side and in Senegal and in many other countries by remitting the resources that go for education and health, because the state cannot provide it.

In many of our countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, tax collection is a big issue and I think that in asking that question we could be slightly a little bit ahead of the curve because first we need to reform the tax incentives in most countries, and then bring on the Diaspora. Because if the problem is if you ask the Diaspora to pay taxes but we cannot control it, then it will go into a leaking hole.

So, I think first of all -- and a lot of countries are doing better, including Senegal by the way, in improving the revenue administration -- and I think Senegal is about to review its whole tax incentives law. And I think in that context, one can then look at should they pay taxes and then should they have -- what do you do with remittances? So I think that was a very specific question.

Now, I think we've sort of heard a lot about Senegal and almost left here depressed because we've all sort of have a positive feel for Senegal and this is depressing, but Senegal has had nine elections. Ghana has had seven, and I think one of the reasons why Senegal has not had a *coup d'etat* -- so, there is a history around Senegal, which endears it to us, I think. There is a history of debate, there's a history of openness to it, and precisely the reason I think we're talking about it today with interest is because we are afraid that that history is going to change.

Again, going back to this question about what can the international

community do -- and Chris alluded to it earlier -- is we've done well so far, at least we can almost congratulate ourselves, coming out of the crisis as international partners, that Sub-Saharan Africa did well. We are one of the first continents that came out of the crisis growing again with Latin America. So almost sort of -- the macroeconomic conditions have been attained in most of these countries. So, the fight of the '80s on the macroeconomic front is relatively won.

Now, the second fight is the fight on the institutions. One of those fights on the institutions is the fight about voice and access to development, and that goes through elections, that goes through electoral process. In many of these countries that we're talking about we have election committees, we have constitutional courts. Those institutions have been set. Those institutions have been tested, and they're all failing. So, just like we all failed in the '80s with our deficits and our debt and sort of went into debt forgiveness, I think there is a little bit an analogy we could look at where Africa is today.

Then the question becomes should we be talking about this two weeks to the election, or should we be talking about it two years to the election? If we all know that seven years from today Cameroon is going to have an election and five years from today, do we have an electoral process in place that works? Do we have the electoral machines in place that work? Are they just distributing the electoral ballots two days to time, so we know it's going to be 53 percent?

My sense is, I think that progress in testing those institutions would be when we could actually say two years before we have electoral ballots, we have both that are working, the electoral commission. Because complaining

today about the head of the constitutional court or the electoral commission is too late. We should have complained about it two years ago. We should have complained about it, institutions like ours, like the one I represent, at least cannot work directly with the politics but we are working very hard, I think, with civil society and with the youth to empower them, to give them the information, to give them the best practice of how that can work.

And we don't need to go very far to see how it works. You just gave the case of Ghana. Ghana has run and run good elections. Ghana has run close elections without riots, so we know that we can do it. The question is, how do we work now to put in place those institutions that we now know work? There's no African exceptionalism to, I think, elections and to voice. So, I'm worried about, you know, let's go back to our old institutions and look at how we work now.

What we need is a transparent process whereby everybody has access to decision-making at that level, and setting up those institutions I think is the lesson that we take from here. We need to do it earlier, we need to do it way back when, we need to do it at the beginning of the constitutional process. I think one of the questions we should be asking is how many constitutions are changed two or three years to elections, because my sense is when the constitution is successfully changed the election is won.

MR. SCHNEIDMAN: And on that note let me thank all of you for coming, and I think we've had a great discussion. So thank you, Chris and Prof. That was great. (Applause)

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