THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

INTERPRETING THE ARAB SPRING

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FEATURING OLIVIER ROY AND TOM FRIEDMAN

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. INDYK: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Brookings this evening. Thank you for joining us. I'm Martin Indyk, the director of the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings, of which the Center for the U.S. and Europe is part and it is the Center for the U.S. and Europe that is hosting this and the seven previous Raymond Aron lectures launched first in 2004 when the Center for the U.S. and Europe first was established out of what was then the program on France at Brookings. From that time to this we've enjoyed a working relationship with the Policy Planning staff at the French Foreign Ministry and the support of the French Foreign Ministry for the work that we do on France. And for that we're very grateful.

Since the series was launched around the time of the centenary of Raymond Aron's birth, that would seem to us a good reason for naming the series after him. But the real reason for naming it after him was actually that he, of course, is a great scholar, was a great writer and philosopher, intellectual and pundit. And he thereby provides a very interesting and important example for this lecture series in which we bring together distinguished French and American scholars, practitioners, and experts to address the burning issues of the time that both France and the United States have an abiding interest in.

We've had a wealth of distinguished speakers since 2004, including Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Pierre Hassner, Stanley Hoffmann, Yvette Vadrene, Tony Judt -- the late Tony Judt -- Thérèse Delpech, and many others. In the last two years, the Raymond Aron lecture has focused on economic issues, and last year, those of you who were here will remember,

Francois Bourguignon and Kemal Derviş talked about the global economic crisis.

While the crisis remains very much at the heart of current problems facing the transatlantic community, nevertheless, 2011 was also the year of another profound development, potentially a tectonic shift in the world and that was, of course the Arab awakenings. And to help us interpret those Arab awakenings, we're very honored to have two distinguished and highly qualified speakers tonight. To deliver the Raymond Aron lecture, we're very pleased to welcome Professor Olivier Roy.

Back in January 2011, he was one of the first of the experts to argue for the need to get on the right side of history and support the change, the democratic change that he understood would spread across the Arab world from Tunisia. He has argued that the Arab uprisings constitute the first post-Islamist revolutions, but recent events in elections in Egypt and Tunisia appear to lead in a different direction and we'll be very interested to hear how he interprets developments -- the recent developments there.

Olivier Roy is a leading French scholar of Islam and Middle East politics. He is a senior researcher at the French National Center for Scientific Research, and a professor at the School of Higher Studies in Social Sciences. And he currently serves at the European University Institute in Florence where he directs its Mediterranean Program. A philosopher by training, Olivier became a specialist in Afghanistan, where he spent a good deal of time in the 1980s traveling, doing field research, as well as on Iran. And from there he ventured out to become a specialist of Islam and the Middle East and he is today one of the world's leading specialists in those areas. Among his many books, including

on Afghanistan and Iran in the 1980s and '90s, is *The Failure of Political Islam: Globalized Islam, and Holy Ignorance When Religion and Culture Part Ways*, which was published last year by Columbia University Press.

He has combined both expertise and academic specialization with fieldwork and his experience as consultant for the U.N. Office of Coordinator in Afghanistan, as well as heading the OSCE mission in Tajikistan, has placed him very well to be able to comment on current developments.

After Olivier Roy delivers a lecture, Tom Friedman will offer a response. Tom hardly needs an introduction to this audience but I'll give him one anyway because I suspect he, like me, would like one. He is, of course, the *New York Times* columnist, thrice a Pulitzer Prize winner. He actually holds a degree in Mediterranean studies from Brandeis University - when I first met him when he was a student there - and spent semesters abroad at the American University in Cairo. So when he was appointed correspondent in Beirut for UPI in 1978 and then became the Beirut bureau chief for the *New York Times* in 1982, it reflected a long-time interest and passion for all things Middle Eastern.

In 1984, he was transferred from Beirut to Jerusalem, where he served as the bureau chief for the *Times* in Israel. And of course, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* became the title of his famous award-winning bestseller book. He was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1993 for international reporting from Lebanon, and in 1988, free international reporting from Israel. And he won the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for commentary in the *New York Times*. And in 2005, he was elected as a member of the Pulitzer Prize Board. Does that mean you're not allowed to win the prize anymore? Far better thing that you do.

As well as *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, he's written a number of bestselling books that have become legends in their time: *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, *The World is Flat*, and most recently, with Michael Mandelbaum, *That Used to Be Us,* a terribly nostalgic book about how America fell behind in the world and what we can do to come back.

So without further ado, ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Olivier Roy to deliver the eighth Raymond Aron lecture. (Applause)

MR. ROY: Thank you very much. It's a big honor for me to be here with all of you. So, of course, the topic of today's very hot topic and there's a lot of debate about that and a lot of controversy. So I will go directly to the important facts.

First, I think that what did happen under the name of the Arab Spring is irreversible. We are now facing a new stage, a new situation. Of course, there is something (inaudible). You know? Because after what looked like a revolution, the Arab Spring, we have, in fact in power, old elites, old political elites. Now, the Islamists have been on the political scene for decades. And almost all the present leaders are, well, quite old people who have decades of political activity. So they do not represent the new generation which demonstrated in the streets almost a year ago.

So we can see that if there has been a revolution, it's not the revolutionaries who are now in power. It's, on the contrary, more conservative, even traditionalist people. Whatever their political background, the army or the Islamists, they are people, in a sense, people of the past. But can they open a new era where Islamism could be reconciled with a democracy? I think so

because the societies of the Middle East have changed. We have a deep social, cultural, and religious change. And the consequence is that the actual leaders are traditional, other people who have been elected through the first three elections in Tunisia, for instance, they are being reshaped, you know, recast by the new political scene. They didn't contribute to build this political scene at least in the beginning, you know. They joined the movement lately and sometimes in a different (inaudible) the Muslim Brothers were quite reluctant, you know, to enter into the movement at the beginning for different reasons.

But they have to adapt to this new political landscape. And they have to recast the reference to the centrality of Islam in a new context. What is the new context? They do not have the monopoly of Islam and I will go a bit more in depth about that later. They have to build a political coalition with a lot of potential candidates, you know. In Tunisia, they have chosen to build a political coalition with leftist nationalists, if I can qualify this way the new president.

They have to deliver the Muslim Brothers, the Islamists, they have to deliver on economics, on good governance, and on stability. They are under watch from the States, you know. There are demonstrations, the same way in Tunisia and in Cairo, but in Tunisia, other people are demonstrating daily. And among these people there are people who voted for Ennahda. It's not the opponents who are now demonstrating in Tunisia. It's precisely the people who voted for this new coalition and who want to have, you know, results. We want to have progress. The Islamists are under -- I won't say control -- but under watch of their own electorate. But also under the watch of the external world. And the key about that, it's something important, you know. It's a big difference, for

instance, with the Islamic revolution of ’79 where the revolutionaries took the power, didn’t care to build a coalition, engaged immediately in the true revolution, and tried to export the revolution into the Middle East and did confront the superpowers of the time, you know.

There is nothing like that now in the Arab Spring and now in the Islamist electoral wave. They have been elected on the domestic agenda and not on a revolutionary agenda. In fact, the electorate is quite conservative. It’s not a revolutionary electorate. There was a revolution, but as I said, a revolution without revolutionaries. The young guys who were at the front of the Arab Spring didn’t care, didn’t want, you know, to enter directly into politics. They didn’t endeavor to build political parties and to promote some sort of new program of government. They just want to stay outside the government, to watch what the government is doing, to put pressure on the government, but they don’t want to indulge into the politics. So it’s something which is rather new.

So I think that the Islamists are constrained by this new political scene, that they are becoming democrats, but they are not liberal. They are very conservative. They have a conception of society which is a majoritarian conception, you know, the idea that the measures that they should impose, could impose, you know, its views on the society even if as Father Christian in Egypt, they recognize, you know, the minority hides. But as a minority, which is something important.

But many of the liberal opponents, in Tunisia, for instance, but also some quartiles in other countries are not specifically democrats, you know. Many Tunisian secularists, for instance, are rejecting, in fact, the elections, either

claiming that there was fraud or that the people are too backward, too religious to be democratic. So we have this condition between democracy and liberalism, which is a key general feature of this movement.

Why did I say that the Arab Spring is irreversible? For me there are three main changes, in depth you know, in the Arab societies. First, there is a new generation. The demographic patterns have changed during the last 20 years. The fertility rate everywhere has dropped. Tunisia has a lower fertility rate than France, for instance, now. For the present young generation is a numerous generation of growth, but it's the last numerous generation. They marry later, they have less children, there is more gender equality among them in terms of education, in terms of age of marriage, for instance, you know. They are less connected to big families, to extended families. They have less children when they have children. They are more connected. They are more global. They often understand and speak foreign languages. They are informed. And they don't follow, you know, the traditional patriarchal society, precisely patriarchal culture, precisely because the social patriarchal structures are now down, are not working anymore. They are more educated than their parents. They're better than their parents.

So the traditional fatherly figure of the gate leader doesn't work anymore. They are not attracted by charismatic leaders. It's a generation of peace, you know, not of great leaders. And so the consequence is that -- this is the second change -- there is a collapse of the traditional -- well, traditional, it's a big word -- but of the traditional Arab political culture based on the charismatic figure or on the son, you know. Usually sons are less charismatic than their

fathers. But still, you know, the idea was that there was a legitimate, big, great leader and that the people were supposed to be united, you know, and any kind of ideology, nationalism, pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism, it doesn't matter. And that democracy was a foreign -- more than a foreign -- democracy was a Western plot to destroy the unity of the Arab people.

All that is finished now. All that is done. They believe in democracy, not in cultural terms but as something within us all. They don't care about, you know, following nontraditional patterns. They don't believe in a Western plot to undermine Arab nationalism. They don't buy the propaganda. They don't stick to traditional ideologies either to the Arabic ideologies, nationalist ideologies, or Islamic ideologies. They are far more individualistic. And hence, they call for dignity, not for honor. You know, honor is a collective reference, but for dignity, an individual right. They want good governance and citizenship.

So it's a new political culture. Of course, it's not the whole society, which has experienced, you know, these changes. These youth are in the time of crisis in a minority. And it's clear that when elections come there is some sort of a conservative backlash from the majority of the population because many people are afraid of going too far, afraid of instability, afraid, you know, of losing tourists, of seeing the economy being disturbed and possibly destroyed. But this new generation by definition, you know, will have more and more influence on society during the next decades. So they are the people of the future. And their ideas are pervading, you know, now the whole society.

Another factor which is very important, a third factor of change, is about religion. And this is, I think, the main misunderstanding about the Arab

Spring, the main misunderstanding as always. There has been a wrong premise for I would say decades about democratization of Muslim societies. The premise was that any democratization in a Muslim society should be preceded by either a wave of secularization or some sort of religious reform. Without reform or reformation of Islam, without secularism, democracy is not possible. And the consequence was very simple. Because all the indicators, you know, assured that, in fact, religion was fading -- that we all know -- but religion has been more and more visible during the last 40 years in the Middle East and more and more pervasive among the population. Then the consequence was the conditions are not met to have democratization of Muslim societies.

And this is a big mistake for different reasons. The issue is not religion, the issue is not theology. In Christianity we have the same theology for 20 centuries and a lot of political consolation of religion. There is no link between theological reform and political reform except after 200 years for political scientists. Okay, we try to find some connections between looser reformation and democratization in Europe. But, you know, Martin Luther was not a liberal and even he was not a democrat and he was not interested by democracy.

So the issue is not to have first political reform, religious reformation, you know, that we have a democratization process. The issue here is not about theology; it's about religiosity. By religiosity, I mean the way people experience the relationship to religion. The way they experience their faith. And during the last two decades, me and other, you know, researchers, we observed precisely a transformation of religiosity. By that I don't mean a liberalization but an individualization and diversification of the religious field. The stress is on an

individual belief, on individual faith. And the stress is also the possibility to choose. The born-again phenomena is also a Muslim phenomena. And when we speak about born-again, it's always about somebody who is breaking with a tradition, somebody who doesn't consider that religion is something traditional, something inherited from his or her parents. He thinks or she thinks that religion is something which precisely has to be saved from tradition, saved from culture, saved from the social inertia.

And these new religious activists tried, you know, for the best or for the worst (inaudible) issue, to rebuild first communities outside the framework of traditional kinship, traditional social bonds. So what appears as fundamentalism is -- was, in fact, some sort of transformation of religiosity, of individualization of religiosity. And this is concurrent with the quest for citizenship. This is concurrent with the idea that at the core of the society, the issue is individual freedom, even if it can be done from the fundamentalist conception of religion.

The consequence is that the religious field became far more diversified and far more autonomous. By that I mean that traditional religious authorities everywhere lost credibility – Whether it's Al-Azhar or the mufti of the states everywhere. We saw a surge of individual religious entrepreneurs, of TV preachers, of small, local imams with a local following, you know. We saw many young inventing, you know, their own kind of religiosity as a Salafist movement which is seen as a very conservative and rightist movement, which is true you know, it's also a product of this individualization of religion of this deculturation of religion. And I insist on that, you know.

Fundamentalism is not a return to traditional religion. It could go along with a transformation of religiosity on an individual basis. And this -- it's this individualization which is common, you know, between religious transformation and a quest for democracy. But, of course, there are and there will be tensions.

And here I will stress the current home of the Islamists. The Islamists are now in the pluralist political scene and they accept this pluralism. They accept elections. They accept the precept of constitution. But they cannot give up the idea that Islam should have some centrality. You know, they cannot give up this idea. They cannot become secular. No. If they become secular, they disappear. So how, for them, how to recast the centrality of Islam into a more democratic and more open, more realistic political space.

And the debate is about that, you know. The debate is quite tense for good reasons. In Egypt, in particular, the Muslim Brothers were under pressure of the Salafists and the Salafists don't care about democracy. They don't care about elections. They don't care about constitution. They just think that, okay, we should have Sharia as the state floor and everything will be okay. The problem for the Muslim Brothers is how, you know, to oppose such a naïve and simple view without being considered as traitors, as giving up the claim for a centrality of Islam in the political sphere.

So what we see is an endeavor to recast, to reshape Islam, and I would say (inaudible) markers in the public sphere. For instance, you know, what do we do with Islam as a constitution? There is a consensus, except for the secularists, you know, the strong secularists, the radical secularists, there is a

consensus: Islam is part and parcel of the society's state of political life. So, but how to make it acceptable with – to - people who are not necessarily believers? So here's a central concept identity. If you listen to Rasheed Ghannoushi, the Islamist leader in Tunisia, he always speaks about identity. Islam is our national identity, in the same way that Catholicism is a national identity in Italy. It's a matter of identity so it's very vague, you know, very symbolic. It doesn't necessarily entail Sharia and Ghannoushi says that it doesn't entail the implementation of Sharia. It's a reference.

And this idea is shared by the recently elected president, Moncef Marzouki, who has never been an Islamist with the leftists, the nationalists, and who also for years, you know, has been supporting that idea, yes, there is an identity. I think it is interesting to see that this debate on identity is on both sides of the Mediterranean. What is the European identity? What is the role of religion in the European identity, and specifically in countries like Italy, Germany, and so on? So we have a mirror effect here.

The second way to keep some centrality, to give some centrality to Islam without creating an Islamic state is to recast the norms, the Islamic norms into universal conservative values. And it's exactly what is going on now on issues, for instance, like alcohol. Should we ban alcohol? It's the first question that French journalists used to ask Ghannoushi and the Muslim Brothers. And the answer is very interesting. It has no reference to Sharia. The reference is to public health, you know, to excess, you know, and the proposals are, well, proposals which could be very congruent, with what exists in the U.S., say for instance. You know. Banning the public drinking of alcohol in the States,

increasing the age for people to buy alcohol, for instance, increasing duties, and so and so and so, making the issue of alcohol not a Sharia issue but an issue of public order, public health, you know, and decency. The same way to (inaudible), for instance the issue of -- there's a debate now in Tunisia about single mothers, you know. And this I think is a judicial issue, which has been ignored for years by the governments because it's a shame (inaudible; audio drop) in North Africa it a big issue. So instead of saying, oh, it's a problem of sin -- this women are sinners -- no, it's a social issue that has to be dealt with by the state, and so and so and so.

The issue of -- of course, a lot of these issues consisted of women and that's a big -- by definition the big issue. Ghannoushi and his party say that they will not touch, you know, the status of the family in Tunisia. But they are pushing, you know, for concepts like decency or how to fight sexual harassment, for instance, to push for more gender separation but equality, for instance, for reparation of immoral attitudes but this would be the same for men and women. And so we have this conservative modernization of public life, which is expressed in non-Shiatic terms but in terms of universal moral values, like in Turkey. And I think that will be specifically in Turkey as a way they will go on like that. The model is, of course, a cup of tea in Turkey.

But by definition, you know, you don't manage a society just by this kind of moral norms and values. In terms of religion, they will have to deal with the *de facto* autonomization of the religious field. Already now, the dean of Al-Azhar University, Sheikh el-Tayeb, said that Al-Azhar should be separated from the state. Of course, el-Tayeb is not a secularist but what he wants is

institutional separation of religious institutions from the state, which is a step precisely towards the autonomization of the religious field from the political field. And this will be done because we have the plurality of political -- of religious sectors: the Sufi, the traditional ulema, the Salafis, the Muslim Brothers. None of them is about to have a monopoly of the religious field which was the case in Iran, for instance.

And to meet the time limit, I'll just make some final remarks. The challenge, of course, is the economy. They have been elected not to impose Sharia but to improve the ways that society is working. They have no way to size the power, because they don't have the military power, because the society is diverse, because they don't have the monopoly of religion, and because they need political alliances and because their electorate is very conservative. As I said, it's not a revolutionary electorate. So they have to deal with the economic situation. In the economy, they are reborn, most of them. Most of the Islamists are reborn. And once again, they're looking towards the AKP model in Turkey, how to combine economic liberalism with a conservative approach in terms of social values. For that they have to give -- to ensure foreign investors, tourists, the business media, that everything will be okay. That there will be no revolution. So it's in their interest to stabilize politically as a country, not in taking power but in institutionalizing the democratization process. And I think it's the issue now, the institutionalization of democracy.

There will be some remaining issues, and specifically in Egypt, the issue of the Christian minority. For the Muslim Brothers there is no problem to protect a minority. So let's think about the Christians in terms of a minority. And

the minority hides. And this fits with the Christian religious hierarchy. The Pope Shenouda, for instance, does consider that yes, we are the minority, the Copts. And that this minority is under his own guidance, you know. But the new generation on both sides, Christians and Muslims, have a different conception of religious affiliation. Some see that as something which is inherited. This is a lot more of a choice. And the big issue now in Egypt will be the debate on apostasy and conversions.

If the ban on apostasy is put in place, then it means that religious -- that individual freedom doesn't reach the religious field. But if apostasy is just (inaudible) down and freedom of religion is defined as an individual right and not as a minority right, then we'll have, you know, the conversions between the concept of freedom in religion and the concept of freedom in democracy. So I think it will be a very important challenge for Egypt in the next months and years. This will be a test, you know, of the ability of the Islamists to manage, you know, the religious differences and a true democratic process of building citizenship instead of just belonging. Thank you very much. (Applause)

MR. INDYK: Thank you very much, Olivier.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Olivier, thank you very much. That was terrific. There's nothing I would disagree with. So let me just try to see if I can supplement with a few points.

First of all, I come to the story as a journalist, and I was in Tahrir Square for the revolution and then I came back six months later and I'm going again in a few weeks. And one day I really would love to design a journalism course just around -- it would simply be called "Covering Tahrir Square," because

I think it would pose a unique set of journalist challenges. And the first rule of this class would be that whenever you're seeing elephants fly, shut up and take notes. Okay?

That was truly my rule every day walking from my hotel to Tahrir Square. You are seeing something you have never seen before. And when you see something that is this fundamental aid disruption the overriding principle should be humility. Shut up and take notes. You didn't see it coming. What makes you know where it's going? And that's really been…I've tried to practice that principle with the whole Arab Spring. I have no idea where this is going, and the balance I found in trying to cover it is to be open to the incredible possibilities of what this represented. And at the same time, to be constructively skeptical about how it could go wrong. And to me, constructive skepticism, not cynicism, and not naiveté -- those are the two boundaries you want to avoid. To me, as a journalist, you want to be right in the middle with the attitude of constructive skepticism. So that's basically how I lean into this story. And I have no idea where it's going.

I just know one thing. People say to me what did you see in Tahrir Square? And I tell everyone I saw three things. I saw a tiger that was living in a 5-by-8 cage for 50 years get released. And there's three things I will tell you about tigers. One is what Olivier said, tiger is not going back in the cage. That is for absolute sure.

Second, and I think Olivier would agree with this -- I'm saying it differently than he did -- do not try to ride the tiger. All right. That is, tiger rides for Egypt. He does not ride for the Salafists, he will not ride for the Islamists

alone, he will not ride for the military alone, he will not ride for the liberals alone. Do not try to ride tiger for your own ends exclusive of others. And I so agree with Olivier. There's a real balance of power and diversity there that is going to have to work itself out.

And the third point about tiger is tiger only eats beef. This tiger has been fed an unremitting diet of every lie in the Arabic language for 50 years. Be very careful of trying to feed this tiger anything other than beef. Whether again you're from the army -- look what the army, the difficulty -- oh, they put it all out on Facebook. Aren't we cute? And when they started putting out non-beef on Facebook, people threw it right back in their face.

And I would keep -- the people actually learned this the hard way, we're the generals. Because their attitude was basically they were afraid of this thing from the very beginning. Their attitude was nice tiger, good tiger. Tiger want elections? Tiger get elections. Tiger want Parliament? Tiger get Parliament. Tiger just don't eat generals, so tiger at President Mubarak. So it seems to me they've been afraid of this thing from the very beginning.

Now, a couple of -- what I find so fascinating about this moment is that we are going to see Islam at the governing level confront modernity in a non-oil state. And I think that every element of that is critically important because we have seen Islam, political Islam, being basically basically propagated in the Middle East since the Mecca mosque affair and the '79 revolution in Iran. From the Sunni side in this mega-oil giant Saudi Arabia and in the Shiite side from this mega oil giant called Iran. And each one in a way had its own Islamic revolution. Saudi Arabia, which pushed out the liberals after the Mecca mosque affair, which

happened in 1979, and coincidentally, the Iranians pushing out the shah in 1979.

Now, why is that oil money so important? Because it allowed these Islamist regimes to buy off every contradiction. They had the resources to buy off every contradiction. Egypt will not have that luxury. Not only does it have 85 million people but it has no oil in the ground. There's a little gas but certainly none that will allow it to buy off these contradictions. Therefore, it will have to embrace or reject or adapt to the real world as it is. And as Islamists take the political leadership in Egypt and have to confront a world in which Egypt's biggest foreign currency earner, $39 billion last year, was foreign trade, was tourism. When they have to confront a world where Egypt is now spending -- basically bleeding a billion dollars in foreign currency every month, and they're now down to about 20 in reserves.

As they confront a world where -- I did a column about this the second time I came back to Egypt after the first Tahrir event. I was in the airport and I was in the duty-free shop looking at the Tutankhamen ashtrays and everything, and they had a stuffed camel there in the shop. It had a hump, and if you squeeze the hump it honked. And I turned it over and it said "Made in China." Now, when you are one of the world's lowest wage countries next to Europe and you are importing your honking humped camel from China, you have a fundamental problem, okay, of innovation, entrepreneurship, and education. And again, the more the Islamists are in power and do not have the ability to dip into oil reserves to deal with that, they will have to deal with the fundamental problems of integration with the global economy, education of women, okay, in a country that has about 40 to 50 percent illiteracy among women. Shame on

President Mubarak for that statistic alone. Okay. And to deal with a global economy where the biggest value at will be from knowledge supply chains.

And this is for me a very important issue because I don't look at what's going on in the Middle East just given what I write about in my interests in isolation. You have to see it in the context of where the global economy is today. And where the global economy is today is moving from what I call connected to hyper connected. And in this hyper connected world -- by the way, this is a huge challenge for America. So imagine what it's going to be for Egypt. In this hyper connected world I believe the world will be divided between what I call HIEs and LIEs. Developed and developing countries is no longer the relevant metric. The world will be divided between high imagination enabling societies and low imagination enabling societies for a very simple reason. If I have the spark of an idea, if I just have this, I can now go to Delta in Taiwan and they'll design this. Skip over to Ali Baba in Hanju, China. They'll get me a cheap China manufacturer for this. Jump over to amazon.com. They'll do my fulfillment and delivery. Craigslist will get me my accountant and freelancer.com, which just listed their five millionth freelance this week, will get me someone to design my logo.

In that world, the greatest value added will be to those countries who can say imagined in America and orchestrated in America, imagined in China and orchestrated in China. Orchestrated is that you orchestrate the global supply chain that produces both the knowledge and manufacturing that goes into that product. Any country that wants to thrive in the world that does not have a natural resource that it can't fall back on will have to be part of imagining and

orchestrating and working in these global supply chains.

That's the global context within which these Islamic parties will be, I think, having to decide their economic policy, their political policy, their attitudes toward women. I think the fact that Egypt is so central to the Arab world and Arab Islam really is at the core of Islam. And Egypt will now be led by or highly influenced by Islamic parties and they have no oil, means you're going to see, in my view, a fascinating and highly unpredictable confrontation and synthesis between Islam and modernity the likes of which we have not seen anywhere before. Iran and Saudi Arabia are both side shows to this.

A couple other points I would make and then we'll just go to the dialogue. One of the things I look at is Iraq. And we do very little study of Iraq in this country because basically Iraq is such a painful experience for the United States and was so politicized that we just want to forget about it. So we just want to forget about something we spent a trillion dollars on in the last nine years, not to mention 4,800 lives, 20,000 wounded, 100,000 Iraqi casualties.

But Iraq has, I think, some very interesting lessons for us to observe. One is if you followed Iraqi politics, they had the same Salafists emergence in the Sunni community and even a Shiite variant; that is there were ultra religious forces lurking underneath the society that were a shock, I think, to a lot of the Iraqi immigrants who came back and certainly to the Americans.

The other interesting thing Iraq teaches us is look at the evolution of their politics. Islamist, religious, sectarian parties won the first election, swept them. They did not perform in government and in the next election they were swept out and replaced by both parties running on multiparty –- multi-sectarian

platforms, Alwali's party, and avowedly sort of rule of law with a sectarian underpinning to be sure of al-Malaki's party.

In other words, what Olivier said I couldn't agree with more. Arabs are no different than what we want here right now. People want good government. They want clean government. They want good, safe schools for their kids to go to, and they want the electricity to go on when they flip the switch. And whether you are a Salafist, Muslim Brotherhood, army, or a raving liberal, if you cannot deliver that in any kind of democratic context you will be voted out.

And so I think one of the things is keep an eye on Iraq. We don't want to look at it but I think it bears a lot of lessons to what's going on here.

Let me just see if there's anything else that -- Olivier referred to the competition between the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood, and I think that's -- I was talking to my friend Vernon Jordan the other day and in his inimitable way he said, Tommy, there's nothing like a church fight. And I think we're going to see eventually the mother of all church fights between the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood over who, you know, has basically the real monopoly of religion.

I think the last thing I would say, and it really is about America's role in this -- we can talk more about this in the dialogue, you know -- I think the administration has handled it really pretty well, all in all. We have embraced the change. We have embraced history. I don't think they're going to make the mistake we made with Hamas in its victory in the West Bank. And I think our job is simply to keep reiterating principles that we believe in that we think are the constituent elements of any democratic society, whether it has a large religious

party component or not. We believe in free, fair elections and rotations in power. We believe in the rule of law. We believe in anti-corruption. We believe that women should be allowed to fulfill their full potential along with every other citizen, and we believe in protecting religious diversity. I think we just have to keep repeating those principles and make it clear that our aid, our help, our friendship, will be guided by those principles, whether Salafists are ruling or Muslim Brotherhood ruling, or the Army is ruling, or anybody else. I say that partly because I don't think we have any other choice but I say that because I think ultimately, you know, that's where our biggest impact can be.

So with that we'll go to the questions. (Applause)

MR. INDYK: While we are miking up here I would just like to point out to the people who are at the back there that if you'd like to take a load off your feet there are still some seats available here. There are six at least at the front. And you have a special invitation from the chair to come and take a chair if you'd like to. And please don't feel embarrassed. We'll take a few minutes to get things organized so come take a seat. There are three seats up here and three seats over here. Right up in front.

Great. Olivier, Tom, thank you for two really excellent presentations.

Olivier, I wonder if I could get you to respond to one thing that Tom brought up, and that's about women's rights. How are the Islamists going to deal with women's rights? We see very clearly in terms of the Salafists that they're not willing to give them equal standing in their tickets and in the way that they treat them. So how is this going to play itself out in this incredible scene that

you describe?

MR. ROY: I think this is the line of divide between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. Even if the Salafists make some concessions, they are starting from such a position against participation of women in the public sphere, but they will not be able to provide anything positive. The Muslim Brotherhood, I guess through my discussion with the Imam and the way they're acting, will deflect the issues. They will not speak directly about women and such. You know, they will speak about family values, about decency, about traditions. You know. They will want a conservative agenda concerning families, which by definition, you know, we know when somebody usually stresses the importance of family it's always at the determinant of the position of women in society and it's not specific to the Islamists. You know, we have that with the Christian right, not necessarily in the U.S., but Europe is also playing on this line, you know. So I think that we have a convergence between the religious rights in the West, as well as in the East. We have this process of globalization. You know.

They will adopt some forms of conservative concessions of societies which are also playing a role in our society. So it's not Western values versus Muslim values; it's a recasting of values on both sides in terms of more or less liberal values or more or less social conservative values.

MR. INDYK: One thing that your thesis would highlight for me if I were a Saudi is that the process that both you and Tom describe as going on in Egypt should be seen as deeply threatening to them, not just because of its demographic -- democratic trend but also because of this democratization of

Islam that you described. Do you see how the Saudis are reacting to this? We saw some reports of Saudi funding of the Salafists but do you have anything more that you can tell us about the way the Saudis view this?

MR. ROY: Not on the side of Saudi politics, you know, but there are clear indications. They are supporting and sympathizing and financing the Salafi clearly. And as the Salafi now are rivals for the Muslim Brothers, so the Saudis are not playing the Islamists against secularists. They are playing the Salafi against the Islamists and conservative so-called secularists, like the army, you know, against the Muslim Brothers, too. We have a clear indication, in fact, that suddenly the Egyptian Salafis decided, you know, to establish political parties which normally is anathema for them. They always oppose *hizbiyyah*, you know, the idea to have political parties and to go for elections and so and so. And it's why the Salafis were able to consider that Saudi Arabia is a true Islamic country because they just refused to go into politics. But suddenly, in some weeks, they took the incredible decision to go for politics and there was no reaction from the *shuyukh*, the sheikh, you know, the spiritual leaders of the Salafi in Saudi Arabia. So it means that, in fact, the Saudis have given a very green, green, green light, you know, to the Salafis and to enter into politics. So here we have a clear indication that the Saudis are supporting the Salafi more against the Muslim Brothers than against the secularists.

But the interesting thing is that the Muslim Brothers are supported by the Qatari. And Qatar has a huge hold everywhere now from Tunisia to Libya. And not to speak of Al Jazeera of course, to Egypt. So we have an interesting, you know, competition for the control of the (inaudible) to Islam among the

Sunnis. You know, between the Qatari and the Saudi Arabian (inaudible).

MR. INDYK: Tom, do you want to come in on the Qataris? They certainly seem to be punching above their weight in this circumstance. As much as I love the coteries, they're not democrats in their instincts.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Yeah, not at all. It's fascinating what -- I don't think I'm on.

MR. INDYK: You're not on? Can we get the mike -- Tom's mike on, please?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Is it on? It doesn't feel like it.

MR. INDYK: Speak loudly.

MR. FRIEDMAN: You know, one thing I'd simply say is that, you know, I've seen this phenomena so often in the Middle East. You know, free and fair elections are really pretty rare up to now in the Middle East, and so whenever they happen everybody wants to vote. And not just the people in that country. (Laughter) So whenever there's a free election in the Arab world, trust me, everybody tries to vote.

And I actually was not aware that the countries were supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudis. And I would also -- and I'm sure there's a lot of also just free floating money going to both, you know. But I think the danger to Saudi Arabia I would argue or the challenge to Saudi Arabia -- if I were the Saudis, I'd be most worried about actually what's going on in Moscow right now. And I will tell you why. I mean, because my view, and other views said this, that the Tahrir Square was about three things. First and foremost, it was actually about dignity. I was really struck by the number of --

MR. INDYK: Test, yeah?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Somebody else's mike is on it sounds like.

MR. INDYK: Can you just bring us your mike? We'll use your mike. Let's just use the hand mike if we can.

MR. FRIEDMAN: What happened? Is it on? It's not on.

MR. INDYK: Why don't we use the hand mike? Can we use the hand mike?

MR. FRIEDMAN: So I think what Tahrir Square was about -- or let's go back to Tunisia and, you know, it was first and foremost about dignity. The number of Egyptians who said to me I was ashamed to show my Egyptian passport was to me the most striking thing. And it's because they're living in a flat world and they can see how everybody else is living and they know how far behind they are. And that's why I've always believed that there were a lot of ancillary things. These are purely secondary but I really do believe they fed into this revolution in unconscious ways. One was President Obama's trip to Cairo. Again, I'm not exaggerating this. It was not the cause but these are things that fed into it.

And I wrote this actually at the time of his visit not knowing what would happen. But I said, you know, after he went I said, you know, there was -- I bet there were more than a few young Egyptians sitting in the audience listening to President Obama and saying to themselves, wow, he's dark skinned and I'm dark skinned. His name is Barack and my name is Barack. Hey, his grandfather is a Muslim and my grandfather is a Muslim. He's President of the United States and I can't vote. And I have a feeling that that was one of the very subtle things

working in the background.

I'll tell you another subtle thing working in the background, had a huge impact on the Chinese Olympics. Now, if you're sitting in Egypt and you're thinking we and China -- we were ahead of China in 1950. We were ahead of China probably in 1960. And you watch the opening and closing ceremonies of the Chinese Olympics. Well, that's one of the things that makes you ashamed to show your Egyptian passport. Okay?

So first this was about dignity. Second, it was about justice. What was the first thing they did? They burned down the police stations, the symbols of injustice and the NDP headquarters. And had it not been ringed by layers of tanks, they would have burned down that TV tower. Man, they could not wait to get to that beacon of lies. Okay. This was secondly about justice.

And third, it was about democracy but as Olivier said I think very widely defined about controlling my life, the ability to control my life. I was so struck. Al-Aswani, the great Egyptian author said to me something that week about what was behind the revolution. He said, "We so resented the idea of Mubarak handing us over to his sons as if we were chickens that could be handed by a father to a son." And we had a story in *The New York Times* on Sunday quoting one of the leading Russian bloggers, the one who is in jail, as saying "Putin treated us like we were cattle and sheep."

I'm telling you, this -- and the third thing I would say, this democracy thing, what really struck me was that, you know, I got there shortly after the attempts to crush the rebellion by the guys on the camels and the horses and whatnot. And people forget, they lost 800 kids in that according to

Amnesty International, a lot more than we realized. And the first day there were small, wallet-sized pictures of them around the square. The next day there were bigger pictures. And by the third day they were wall-sized banner pictures of the martyrs, the *suhada*. And I just walked around there and I thought that's interesting. See, I've seen martyrs for Islam. I've seen martyrs against America. I've seen martyrs against Israel. I've never seen martyrs for democracy.

And you put those -- I want to say this one last thing, Martin. You put those three together -- dignity, justice, and that desire to control your own life. And I tell you, they beat in the heart of every Arab, including Saudis. And that's why I think they can pay, they can send money, they can -- I think this is going to be a huge problem for Saudi Arabia because those three things are not things -- are not feelings confined to Egypt.

MR. INDYK: Great. Great. So let's just pick up on your last point. They weren't burning the American flag in Tahrir Square. You said in your lecture that they're not looking for confrontation with the West. Are they looking for confrontation with Israel? How does the Palestinian factor play into their calculations? You didn't really talk about what their foreign policy might be. You seem to portray them as really focused on domestic politics. But what about that foreign fact of the West in Israel?

MR. ROY: They focus on domestic politics but they are caught by a geostrategic context. So the revolutions were successful where the geostrategic context was minimal - in Tunisia, for instance. Tunisia has no other option in terms of foreign policy. And over this course maybe, but not a real alternative. Egypt paradoxically is the same, you know. The headline is the

peace treaty. The Muslim Brothers certainly hate Israel. There is no doubt about that. But they're caught by the constraints. They know that if they go for an escalation against Israel, they are done because they will be unable to deliver the goods in Egypt. So they will do nothing. The discourse will change, certainly. A certain form of a secret collaboration will disappear but they will not fight for the Palestinians.

The problem is different in Bahrain and Syria and even in Yemen because there, any movement of contestation is automatically interpreted in terms of a change in the geo-strategic balance, you know. We know that if there is a democratic -- the success of a democratic movement in Syria, the whole balance of power in the Middle East will change and it will be a tremendous change. So in this context there is less room for I would say generating democratic movement because whatever they do, it will be interpreted. Whatever anybody does, it will be interpreted in terms of geostrategy now. And it's a big problem for Iran, for instance. Iran, since the revolution, the Iranian revolution several years ago, has always played the Arab states against the Arab regimes and against the West. The problem now for Iran, if the Arab street is successful in Syria, then Iran will lose its highway to the Mediterranean, its highway to Hezbollah.

Now, since it will be a huge strategic defeat for Iran, but on the other hand if Iran is endorsing, you know, the (inaudible) of the democratic movement in Syria, Iran would not be able now to call the Arab states to rise up against which regimes, you know, to protect Iran. So in the context of a threat of a bombing of Iran, it's very, very important. So Iran is also the loser in these

circumstances.

MR. INDYK: And what about the United States? Do you agree with Tom that we've handed it the right way?

MR. ROY: Yeah, you know, in fact there are two obstacles to democracy: oil and foreign military. So in Iraq I'm not very helpful. They have no more foreign military but they still have oil, you know. And Saudi Arabia has both. But in Tunisia, it's good. No oil, no foreign militaries, so I'm optimistic. (Laughter)

MR. INDYK: In Libya they have oil.

MR. ROY: In Libya they have oil and some foreign military intervention. So, you know, on my scale, you know, Libya, I'm not so optimistic.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I would say one thing about the Israel point, and I agree with what Olivier said, that it obviously has not been a central thing. But I think the really important point is if there were, God forbid, you know, a third sort of huge conflagration between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, here are no firewalls anymore. Mubarak was a huge firewall. Assad was a huge firewall. The King of Jordan is a huge firewall. And they absorbed the whole War of Hezbollah. They closed down the embassy. They pulled the ambassador back. They absorbed the Gaza War. They are not there and therefore, the fire I think would spread just incredibly fast. And that's why Israel and the Palestinians must not play with matches.

MR. INDYK: Do you agree with that?

MR. ROY: Everything in theory, yes; in practice, no. I think, in fact, that there is a process of political maturation among the people. When you

vote, you know, you are more aware or at least a part of the electorate is more aware of the political implications. My view is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is less and less central to the geostrategy of the Middle East. And the democratization process will make these conflicts more and more less central. But the growing conflict is Shiite-Sunnis. It's Saudi Arabia versus Iran. And the democratization process is accentuating, you know, the Shiite-Sunnis conflict because precisely it's giving more power to the Sunnis and Syria and it could give more power to the Shiites in Bahrain.

MR. INDYK: And in Iraq, power to both.

MR. ROY: In Iraq, you have Shiite power now in Iraq. It's done.

MR. INDYK: Let's go to the audience for some questions. I would ask you please to wait for the microphone, identify yourself, and please ask a question.

Let's go to the back first. Down there, the lady at the back.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER SHONER: Good evening. My name is Lieutenant Commander Zoe Shoner with the U.S. Navy. I have two questions for you.

First, you had made mention of obviously as a recap, social change -- major social change going on, economic trade changes, political changes. This introduces a whole host of security challenges and fundamental shifts in the traditional balances that have occurred in the Middle East and the Greater Islamic region worldwide. My question, number one, is how do you see the security environment in that region changing?

Number two, they're not looking for confrontation with the West

yet. I heard that reference made earlier. Will there be a point where the West risks becoming vulnerable to the gaze again? In other words, what do we need to do to prevent being front and center to the confrontation?

MR. INDYK: Do you want to -- go ahead, Olivier.

MR. ROY: Secure environment. Well, it depends on what you call secure environment. You know. If you mean there is conflict, yes, there will be conflicts. But it will not be directly against the West. It will be more between proxies of Saudi Arabia and Iran, for instance. In terms of terrorism and things like that, I think that will have decays. You know, it's already on the way. Al-Qaeda was out of the picture from the beginning, you know, and al-Qaeda is only on the margins. The more you have a process of democratization, the less you have danger of marginal individual radicalization.

And about the West, I think that the West should not interfere. The West should be open, you know, have a relationship on a bilateral dimension, but the West should avoid this kind of global and useless statement about Islam and democracy, about radicalization, about terrorism, and so and so. Just let's be more pragmatic and open to the precise context of every conflict.

MR. FRIEDMAN: You know, I would just say that I think the biggest security issue -- and it's not just for the West. It's mostly for Arabs and Muslims -- there's a line that was used in Russia in the 1990s after the Russian Revolution which was pointed out to me the other day that it's a lot easier to take an aquarium with fish and turn it into fish soup than it is to turn fish soup into an aquarium with fish.

And so what you're seeing now across the Arab world is

aquariums with fish being turned into fish soup. Turning that fish soup back into a stable aquarium where all the fish can coexist, you know, in a nice, you know, kind of structure, is going to be, I believe, a challenge that will be with us for many, many years. First of all, it's their security challenge and it's their security opportunity, but you know, my motto is stability has left the building in the Arab world. We are now going to deal with two kinds of instability.

One, under a microscope, the wave will look like that but it will have a positive slope, hopefully, leading toward a kind of Indonesia-South Africa transition to democracy. And another option is a way that looks like that will have a negative slope leading toward a Pakistan, or God forbid, Somali alternative. And it will be different in every country. They'll all be different given their culture and history and whatnot.

But I think that's going to be the real challenge, is going to be state building, institution building that can deliver for their people in a world of democratized expectations and aspirations, starting already in a hole because you have a huge cohort of people in these countries who I call the educated unemployed who also aren't that educated. Not to their fault.

I'm a big believer brains are distributed equally, but the educational institutions in these countries have not prepared these young people to compete at a critical mass level that they need to be. And so there's got to be a real upgrading of the educational systems as well. And this is going to be a huge, I think, leadership challenge. And as I say, it's going to be done in countries with no oil and with maybe less and less foreign aid given what's going on with the European Union and the United States.

MR. INDYK: Yes. Halfway down there.

MR. GRINDSTAFF: Hugh Grindstaff. But for the last 15 to 20 years, all I've heard about the Middle East is revolutions, revolutions because of jobs. With the population I think about 60 percent being under the age of 25, how do you get the jobs? Otherwise, you're going to have Arab Spring but it's going to be the opposite way. It's going to be the inequality that existed before Segunda exists because what corporations are going to go in there?

Shibley Telhami, when he was here, he gave the report on what leaders are admired most. Obama finished after Hugo Chavez. So there's this thing we think about that Americans are admired but it's kind of different on the streets sometimes.

MR. INDYK: Yeah. How do they get the jobs?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Oh, I think this is -- again, this is a huge challenge, and it's why I emphasize when I look at this phenomena, the global context. If you think of the last really period of plasticity in the Arab world, the '50s and early '60s when you had coup after coup after coup, you know, this was an age of protected economies. It was a world of walls. It was a superpower divided world where each one could fund the other and prop up states basically. And expectations were low. You didn't know what was going on basically anywhere else.

Now, this second wave of, you know, in our lifetimes of -- that was followed by a period of rigidity, of solid states basically funded by -- security states funded by oil and by the Cold War. And now that's been broken down. But unlike the chains that -- it's broken down as if there had been a war. We're

seeing the kind of breakdown of states that normally follows a World War I or World War II or the end of the Cold War as we saw in Eastern Europe. This breakdown is driven by one thing in my view -- the merger of globalization and the IT revolution. That's the whirlwind here. All right? Because it's created this huge democratization of information, of tools, of aspiration, of commerce, et cetera.

And so this jobs question is going to be a huge problem for us, for America, for Europe, for France, because the stress that it puts on individuals to compete globally. And so it's going to be quadrupled, you know, in a country that hasn't really had to face that kind of competition. And I think it's going to be the real elephant in the room basically.

MR. INDYK: Olivier.

MR. ROY: Yeah, I think there are some potentialities. For instance, precisely because of this new generation. As I said, they are more educated, more open, more global, they travel. And if they have more opportunities in terms of opening both the political market and the economic market, there is a potentiality coming back of second generation immigrants. We have this phenomena from Morroco and from France. You have second generation, third generation Moroccans who go back, but they are engineers or they are businessmen and they go back to Morocco.

The recent Tunisian elections, at the consulate in San Francisco, we have the same in Tunisia now. But the Tunisians in San Francisco, they are in Silicon Valley. They are not cleaners or home cleaners, workers like that. They are intellectual and they voted for Ennahda too, you know. So they might

have something in mind by doing that.

I think that this wave of democratization can go on with a wave of creation of small business, for instance, you know, in the area. One of the big problems in Tunisia was kleptocracy, you know, the fact that it was totally -- you couldn't open a successful business without being robbed by the family in the weeks following your first economic successes. So it's not enough but it's part of the picture, too.

MR. INDYK: Last question I'm afraid. Down here.

MS. OSWALD: Hi. Rachel Oswald.

You both mentioned that you're generally supportive about administration's policy toward the Arab awakenings. But what about the cards it does have on the table? What about the billions of dollars in aid it provides to SCAF annually? And, you know, the stationing of the fleet in Bahrain? If SCAF refuses, you know, to give power to, you know, elected parliament and involves itself in the constitution, and if the Bahrain monarchy does not in its prosecution of protestors, you know, and discrimination, what do you think the Obama administration should do on those two issues?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Yeah, I would just say I don't know enough about the options on the Bahrain situation but I'd say as far as the SCAF is concerned, I think they've done a pretty good job of leaning into them, you know, basically, to keep this process going forward. And if it were to come to an abrupt halt, it would fall out of the hands of the administration into Congress, which appropriates the foreign aid. And that could lead to very unfortunate, because there you're going to get a lot of politics mixed up in it.

You know, I felt from the beginning that one of the things that we should do is do something radically different. And that is we give the Egyptian Army I think it's about $1.3 billion a year. And one of the things I would love to see the administration do, and it could really play to Obama's, you know, sort of identity is -- I would simply say we're going to take 100 billion of that.

MR. INDYK: Hundred million.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Hundred million, sorry. Hundred million. Because Egypt has no predators today. Its only predicators are poverty and ignorance. And you don't need more F-16s. So we're going to take 100 million of that and we're going to build 50 science and technology high schools from Aswan to Alexandria in collaboration with you, at your instruction, where you want them to go. We will fund them. And this is in honor of the revolution. That's our way of honoring it.

I think we need to do something that's actually in tune with the real aspirations of young Egyptians, which I don't think is for another set of F-16s, but it's to be given the tools and opportunity to compete, connect, and collaborate with everyone else in the world. So that would be my piece of advice.

MR. INDYK: Olivier, let me just finish by asking you about the SCAF because you focused on the Islamists. And you basically have a fairly rosy picture of how things are going to evolve there in a positive way in terms of democracy. But the SCAF is not democratic.

MR. ROY: No.

MR. INDYK: The pressures on it are somewhat different.

MR. FRIEDMAN: And their war with the Muslim Brotherhood

goes a long way.

MR. INDYK: So how does the SCAF play in this game?

MR. ROY: I think the SCAF played very clumsily during the events and the disconnect of the Army, disconnect itself during the last events. Now, Egypt needs a strong Army, preparations (inaudible), you know, I think a strong national Army. So the problem is now for the Army to go the same way as the Turkish army, you know, keeping -- you know, going back to the barracks, but, of course, staying as a strong national Army. If the SCAF is not encouraged by strong electors to go against the Muslim Brothers, I think they will have no choice than to play along the rules. And the Muslim Brothers and the Army, as you know, they're good old enemies, they know each other perfectly. They know how not to go too far. They know they have channels of communication, you know. So I think if there is no foreign pressure they will find a way. But the Army I think is a loser until now because they played badly.

And for Bahrain, it's a long story because here we are back to the big confrontation, you know, between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And here the Americans cannot be here at all. So here we have -- it's one of the case where geostrategy is more important than democratization.

MR. INDYK: Olivier, Tom, I think that Raymond Aron, if he were able to listen to you, would be very happy to have this lecture series named after him. You've done him proud and you've done Brookings proud by a really excellent lecture and conversation. And we're very grateful to both of you. Thank you very much. (Applause)

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