

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION  
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEW MIDDLE EAST:  
SURVEYS OF ARAB AND JEWISH OPINION IN ISRAEL

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**Featured Speaker:**

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**Discussant:**

NAHUM BARNEA  
Columnist  
*Yedioth Ahronoth*

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. GALSTON: Well, if I could ask the people in the rear of the room who are filing in to take seats as quickly and quietly as possible, we can proceed.

Let me kick things off, then. I'm Bill Galston, a senior fellow in governance studies here at the Brookings institution. And on behalf of the Saban Center and governance studies and Brookings, I'd like to welcome you all to what is surely going to be a timely and fascinating panel.

The purpose of this is to release, analyze, and then discuss new survey data involving all populations on attitudes towards the new Middle East. And to conduct this conversation, we have two of the most distinguished analysts and commentators on this question that one could imagine, let alone get together in the same room.

Doing the presentation of the survey data is Shibley Telhami, a former colleague of mine at the University of Maryland, I'm proud to say. He hasn't deserted, and he is currently as we speak the Anwar Sadat for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland. And, I'm also happy to say that he's a non-resident senior fellow here at Brookings.

Nahum Barnea is, I would say -- and I hope there's no one in the room to contradict me -- the dean of Israeli political commentators, now functioning in journalism. And if you don't believe me, talk to the committee that awarded him the 2007 Israel Prize for his work in journalism. I recently saw a remarkable Israeli film called, I believe, at the University of Maryland. And, I'm also happy to say that he's a non-resident senior fellow here at Brookings.

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for his work in journalism. I recently saw a remarkable Israeli film called, I believe, *The Footnote* that talked about a very interesting backstage controversy during and after the award of the Israel Prize, and I assume that there was no such drama surrounding the award to Nahum.

Okay, here is the order of events. Shibley Telhami will present the survey, Nahum and I will then ascend the dais, and I will hurl a few well-judged questions out for discussion, and then we'll turn as quickly as possible to questions and answers from the floor, and I will play the traffic cop during those proceedings.

One last injunction, which I address first and foremost to myself and then to the rest of you. If you have cell phones or other intrusive electronic gadgets, please turn them off now.

Shibley?

MR. TELHAMI: Thank you, Bill. I appreciate that, I appreciate the generous introduction. I'm certainly very happy to have Nahum join us on this panel.

Before I start with the presentation, I want to just give you a little background about these two surveys, really, not just one. The first one is among Jewish Israelis and the second is among Arab Israelis. The reason why we did two is partly because of their history and partly because of the methodology.

Initially, those of you who know my work and have been here for previous releases at Brookings know that I do an annual Arab public opinion poll in six Arab countries that we repeat annually. We in fact released the 2011 poll last week.

And initially, because I was studying really the relationship between media opinion and identity in the Arab world over a decade trying to see how media influences identity and opinion in the Arab world, I thought of using Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel as a control group initially. That is, to compare how they're responding

to a different media environment where they also speak Hebrew and also have Israeli media. Do they respond differently? And so initially, the questions that we were asking pertained to copying some of the questions that were being asked in the Arab world.

And the methodology was similar in the sense that they were all face-to-face interviews. You can't do, I think, extensive, long interviews in the Arab sector in Israel by phone only. And particularly because we cover the villages and most of the population in the villages, and we send people out there. Among Israeli Jews, you can do that by phone and they do it very well.

And so, when we started getting the Arab Israeli data, there were obviously many questions that had to do with their relations with Jewish citizens of Israel. And so, we then started polling Israeli Jews but using the typical methodology of phone, using the Dahav Institute in Israel, which has been doing polling for many years.

So, the two are not the same. We have some overlapping questions, but not identical, and occasionally I'll be comparing it even with Arab public opinion polls just to give you a flavor where it matters, what the differences of opinion are.

So, I'm going to start. You can see that the Jewish Israeli poll was conducted among 510 Jewish Israelis. Margin of error is plus or minus 4.4. And the one among Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel, sample size of 500 and a margin of error is 4.5.

I should also say that all of these polls are academic. All of the funding is scholarly grants, both from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and University of Maryland. So there is no additional funding that goes into these which, by the way, is the same with the annual Arab public opinion polls. All academic funding.

So let me start with what we found among Jewish Israelis. Thinking about the Arab Spring, is it mostly about ordinary people seeking dignity, freedom, and a better life? Opposition parties of sects seeking power? Or, foreign powers trying to sear

trouble in the region? By the way, we asked that in the U.S. as well. My colleague, Steve Kull and I from PIPA, we did a poll among -- in the U.S. about American attitudes toward the awakening, and we had similar questionnaire, and we even asked the same questions in the Arab world. So, this is trying to figure out how the Arab Spring is being interpreted.

Well, as it turns out Israeli Jews see it roughly the same was as a lot of others see it. It's mostly about ordinary people seeking dignity, freedom, and a better life, although only 46 percent in the Arab world, a majority, see it that way. 34 percent see it about opposition parties or sects seeking power, and 12 percent see it as foreign powers trying to steer trouble in the region.

Which of the following is closer to your views about the impact of the Arab Spring on Israel? Is it mostly for the better? It makes no difference? Or, mostly for the worst? And it is interesting. I mean, that is obviously very different from the way Arabs are in a poll that I released last week; a majority of Arabs seek mostly for the better for them. And you can see here 51 of Israelis say it's mostly for the worst, and 21 percent say it makes no difference, 15 percent only say it's for the better. Remember, these are Jewish Israelis. Arab Israelis see it differently, and you'll see that. And recall: Arab Israelis constitute 20 percent of the population. So, what I'm going through now is only Jewish Israelis.

Nonetheless, this seemingly negative result seems to be almost a direct result of the lack of confidence that the Arab Spring will lead to democracy in the Arab World. In fact, when you ask them what if the Arab Spring will lead to democracy in the Arab world that it'd be better or worse for Israel, and look at that. Then they say -- 44 percent say it would be better, and only 22 percent say it's worse. So it appears to be not so much that they're not supporting democratic change in the Arab world, just a lack of

confidence that these events are going to lead to democracy in the Arab world. That, I think, is an important nuance here by asking this question.

How would you describe your views of President Barack Obama of the United States? Moving to the relations with the U.S., obviously. Now recall that when President Obama started in 2009, particularly after his Cairo speech, a lot of -- and President George W. Bush was very popular in Israel -- Obama was not particularly popular, although I think he was made out to be less popular than he actually was. But nonetheless, he certainly had the majority of Israelis having unfavorable views of him. Maybe there were, you know, some disagreements about the extent of that.

And so even now, the assumption, I think, conventional wisdom is that Israelis have an unfavorable view of President Obama. Well, here's the surprise. 54 percent of Jewish Israelis have a positive view of President Obama, and that seems to be something of a reversal from 2010 when a slight majority had an unfavorable view of President Obama, only 39 percent have a negative view of him. I'm actually curious to hear whether most of that is a function of his UN speech or something else, and I'm looking for insight from my colleague, Nahum Barnea when he joins us for trying to explain this.

Now, this attitude toward Obama that is favorable does not seem to, you know, transfer to optimism about the Obama Administration policy in the Middle East. When you ask them whether you're hopeful, discouraged, or neither -- let me just move this. I don't know what happened here, but we have a -- (pause) --

SPEAKER: It's called slideshow, and press play.

MR. TELHAMI: Let me just check -- okay. When we ask them about -- let me just maximize this so we have -- we don't have the -- how would you describe your attitude towards the Obama Administration's policy in the Middle East? You can see that

39 percent are discouraged, 35 percent are neither discouraged nor hopeful, and 22 percent are hopeful. So it's really divided attitudes on that.

Which world leader outside your own country do you admire most? Now, I want to just say something about this question. It's a question that I ask in my polling, including in the Arab world. And it's not a popularity contest, don't get me wrong. The reason I ask that question is as an indirect measure. I have these indirect measures trying to see what is the prism through which people are evaluating the world? It's really about the mindset, you know. What is it that's most important that makes them say, in the Arab world, I like Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan best. What is going on there when they say that?

And so, I use that as a way of looking at what are the issues that are most important to them, rather than as a popularity contest among leaders. But nonetheless, it's really quite remarkable because among Israeli Jews -- and this is an open question -- we do not give them names. They name anybody they want in the world. Among Israeli Jews, it is rather ironic that the leader of Germany is the most popular leader in the world, and this is among Jewish Israelis. Among Arab Israelis, as you may have guessed, Erdogan is number one. Actually, Yassir Arafat doesn't do badly, either.

But, Merkel interestingly did well last year as well. So, this is not just a sudden something this year, it actually -- you know, roughly the same if you take the margin of error into account. Bill Clinton is obviously up there, and he always has been really since he was President and that's easy to predict, that one is easy to predict. But Merkel, I think I need some more insight from Nahum when -- on this one, because it's hard to predict.

How would you describe the current status of Arabs in Israel? Now, as

you know there's been a lot of debate going on in Israel, particularly over the last year with a lot of proposed laws pertaining to the status of Arab Palestinians, citizens of Israel, and it's interesting to see how the Israeli Jews evaluate that. As you see, we have a mirror image question among Arabs -- the same question, I mean -- among Arabs to see how they feel about it. But this is interesting to see how Israeli Jews evaluate.

Now, the options are full equality, legal equality but with institutional and societal discrimination, or it is an apartheid relationship. And I use that term -- in the Hebrew, we also use a racist system akin to apartheid. We used in the actual Hebrew in order to just convey it. And the reason we used that term is because there's a lot of debate about that, and you hear that term among Arabs, particularly you'll see that. So we added that as an option to see how Israelis feel about it.

So, here's what you get. 52 percent of Israelis think actually that there's legal equality but institutional and societal discrimination, Israeli Jews. And one-third say basically there's full equality between Jews and Arabs. And, 7 percent say it's an apartheid relationship. So, it's interesting, I have to say. This was a little bit of a surprise. I thought there actually would be more divided than this on first, on number one. And number two, that ratio actually I would have to say surprised me a little bit, and maybe it should not have.

Which of the following is more important in your view, the Jewish-ness of Israel, the democracy of Israel, or both are equally important. I mean, you know how important that debate is in Israel in terms of how you define the state, laws, and priorities, and everything else. It's a very important debate, it's been ongoing, obviously, but it has become even more intense in recent months.

And so, we wanted to see how people feel about it in terms of when you force them to say, what is your priority? What is more important to you? We wanted to



see what the outcome would be. And as you can see here, you know, half say it's equal - they're equally important. But the fascinating thing is, despite the fact that as you all see, most people have strong Jewish identity and we see that in the end, only roughly a quarter, 27 percent, who say their Jewish-ness is more important than democracy. Which is basically the same number who say democracy is more important. But, that to me is very telling, actually, about how serious that debate is within Israel. Because it's a powerful kind of graphic.

Which of the following statements is closest to your view about the prospects of lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians? We asked that, by the way, also in the Arab world. Will it happen in the next five years? It's inevitable but it will take more time? Don't believe it will ever happen.

Well, here's what you get. Half say they don't believe it will ever happen. And by the way, that's almost exactly the number we get in the Arab world. We get -- this year I believe we got something like 54 percent in the Arab world who said they don't believe it will ever happen. So, we have that roughly half of the Arabs and half of Jewish Israelis believe that will never happen. I mean, that's a very important starting point when you're talking about, you know, how people assess the prospects.

But interestingly, you have a very large number who think it's inevitable but it will take more time than five years. So essentially, Israelis are divided half and half among those who think, you know, it's inevitable and those who think it will never happen.

Which of the following statements is closer to your view? I'm prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Arabs based on the '67 borders with agreed modifications. Even if the Arab states accept and recognize Israel I still oppose withdrawing from territories occupied in the '67 war. And, neither one of these, given the

option if they don't like the full solution.

And here's what we get. We get 43 percent say I'm prepared for a solution based on the '67 borders, 31 percent say I still oppose withdrawing from the territories occupied in '67 even if Arabs are for peace, and we have 24 percent who are neither, meaning they probably in their mind have another solution, other ideas of how to resolve it, including partial withdrawal.

To me, it doesn't matter the terms. What I look for when I ask a similar question in the Arab world, I'm looking for that middle there. Who are the people who are not prepared under any circumstances? You've got about 30 percent, 31 percent. You have the same kind of trend in the Arab world. You have roughly between about a quarter to 30 percent in any given year who basically say, I am not -- even if Israel withdraws from all the territories I am not prepared to make peace with it. So, we have that quarter to one-third on each side that is simply just not prepared, at least in theory, in principle to a solution.

Which of the following is closer to your position on the demand the Palestinians accept Israel as a Jewish state? As you all know, this is part of the debate right now about the Israeli government demanding that the Palestinians accept Israel as a Jewish state before there is a final status agreement. And one is, I support it and demand it as a precondition for negotiations and/or settlement freeze. I support it but would accept it as part of a final peace agreement, meaning not as a precondition. And, I do not support this demand.

And you can see there are 17 percent who don't support this demand. But, there are 39 percent -- certainly there's no majority -- that not only agrees with it but would require this to -- of the Palestinians before a negotiation or a settlement freeze. But, you also know that nearly 80 percent -- 79 percent of Israelis, in principle, support

that demand. They don't agree on the timing, but they support that demand.

Given that 25 percent of Israelis are non-Jews, which of the following is closer to your position on defining Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people and all its citizens? Now, we formulated this language about the homeland of the Jewish people and of all its citizens as a way of seeing whether there's an openness to accommodate the full equality of citizens in the definition of the state, in addition to being the homeland of the Jewish people. And it's interesting. Both in 2010, 2011 we find 71 percent of Israelis support this formulation of adding the homeland of the Jewish people and all its citizens. This is, by the way, a formulation that my colleague Joshua Goldstein, who happens to be here as well -- and I wrote in an op-ed piece a few weeks ago in *The Washington Post* about the UN considering the issue of Palestinians. But, it is remarkable how much support there is for that.

Should or shouldn't Israel do more than it does today to promote comprehensive peace with the Arabs based on 1967 borders with agreed modification and the establishment of peaceful Palestinian state? Two-thirds basically say Israel should do more, and 31 percent say Israel shouldn't do more.

What do you believe is the likely outcome if the prospects of a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict collapse? The status quo will continue; a state of intense conflict for years to come, Palestinians will eventually surrender, a one-state solution will take place. Those are the options.

We asked the same question in the Arab world, and in the Arab world every year we find that a majority -- a very strong majority, in some years -- believe that it will lead to intense conflict for years to come. And very few people believe, you know, either there will be one state, whether the Palestinians will give up. That is the view in the Arab world of this issue.

In Israel, it is interesting because now you have really the plurality I think the status quo will continue. And I think it's a little bit of a change from 2010, even when you take the margin of error into account. Where they were divided between a state of intense conflict, versus the status quo will continue. And by the way, the status quo isn't all that bad for Israel. Some people argue it's a bit too comfortable for any incentive to move forward.

And so, it is fascinating to me to see that you have here, you know, more and more Israelis -- even when you have no two-state solution -- are less worried that you're going to have intense conflict for years to come. So, that is -- I think if there is a change here, that's where I see it.

Iran and the nuclear weapons issue. On this section, by the way, just on the Iran and nuclear issue we co-sponsored this section with the program for international policy attitudes with my colleague, Steve Kull, and those questions were pertaining specifically to the nuclear issue.

There is talk of a possible Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Do you support such an attack or oppose such an attack? It's a very straightforward question, we didn't really nuance as much.

And we have -- fewer than half say they support it, 43 percent say they support it. And that's among Jewish Israelis. If you take into account the attitudes of Arabs, which I'll show you shortly, Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel, only 4 percent support an attack and 68 percent oppose it. So, that obviously you know, means far more opposition when you consider -- take that into account 20 percent of the population far more opposition than support.

Assuming that these are the only two options, which do you think would be a better situation for Israel? Both Israel and Iran have nuclear weapons, or neither

Israel nor Iran has nuclear weapons? What do you guess?

MR. TELHAMI: Now, that's really striking, I think because I think, you know, there are a lot of -- certainly that is not the sentiment in the security community globally, not just in Israel, where there's a division about -- you know, at least a division. I mean, if not more bias to the other way about the effectiveness of deterrence and nuclear deterrence and what it might do. But it's obvious that the Israelis strongly believe -- that Israeli Jews strongly believe that neither Israel nor Iran having nuclear weapons is better than both of them having nuclear weapons, 2/3 to only 19 percent.

And I think that drives some of their attitudes on some of the next questions. How likely do you think it is that Iran will eventually develop nuclear weapons, with all the talk about war? 90 percent believe that Iran is likely to eventually develop nuclear weapons. So essentially, Israelis think they're going to end up with the option they don't like at all, which is a nuclear Iran at the same time having nuclear Israel.

And so, then we have a series of questions. I'm only going to show you the central one, but a series of questions about whether or not they are open to the idea of turning the Middle East into a nuclear weapons-free zone. And interestingly, this is really almost the identical division across the questions. That essentially, two-thirds of Israelis support the idea of turning the Middle East into a nuclear weapons-free zone. Including intrusive inspections as long as Iran will allow them and Arabs will allow them, they would be accepting of -- and they're verifiable. They would be accepting of Israel subjecting itself to them. Now, that is really quite -- I was surprised. I have to say, this surprises me as well, and I'd look forward to the conversation about that.

Now, about the identity. Now you saw that I ask a question about whether the Jewish-ness of Israel is more important than its democracy, and you saw that actually it isn't really. I mean, basically only one-quarter say it's more important.

This doesn't mean, of course, that Israelis don't have a strong Jewish identity, and this is something very interesting because we have something parallel in the questions that we ask in the Arab world, and certainly in the questions that we ask among Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel.

This question specifically says, assuming that you're all following, which one is more important to you? Jewish identity, Israeli identity, citizen of the world, my family's country of origin? And here's what we have. The Jewish-ness of Israel trumps the citizenship.

By the way, in most Arab countries -- certainly in the aggregate data that we have, the 6 countries and 5 countries that we released in 2010, 2011 -- state identity gets only about a third across the board. There are variations from country to country. Lebanon state identity is strong. But across the board, state identity is weaker, and ethnic or religious or trans-national identity is stronger.

And here, it's interesting to see that a similar trend is there in Israel, even though they don't have the same multitude of identities, anyway. You have Jewish trumping Israeli.

Now I'm going to move to the questions about Arab Palestinian of Israel. By the way, why do we have Arab/Palestinian citizen of Israel? Because many Arab citizens of Israel define themselves as Palestinian citizens of Israel, or Palestinian Israelis. Some do not, and you'll see that actually, and some of the Arab citizens, including many of the Druze, don't identify themselves as Palestinian or Palestinian Israeli and prefer to be referred to as Arab Israeli. So, we're using both of these, and you'll see that in a way showing itself up in the way that questions are set up.

There is international pressure on Iran to curtail its nuclear program. What is your opinion? Iran has a right to its nuclear program and should be pressured --

that's not there -- and should not be pressured to stop it. Iran should be pressured to stop its nuclear program.

SPEAKER: Should be Druze were in the --

MR. TELHAMI: Yes, Druze were. Druze were. We have all of the sections we want to -- villages that cover that were mixed villages, Muslim villages, majority Christians, Druze, we have everybody covered. And actually, we have the whole list if you like, too, because it's interesting. Both cities and villages.

If you look at the numbers here, the red that you see there is the five countries that we released last week. That is the aggregate data from Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates combined. Where you have 64 percent say Iran has the right to its nuclear program and should not be pressured, only a quarter say Iran should be pressured.

Now, the trend is the same among Arab Israelis, Palestinian Israelis, but less intense. More people say Iran should be pressured. Still, a small majority say Iran shouldn't be pressured. And to my mind, that is sort of a regional sense of the double standard question that you get quite often in the Arab position, not a level with Iran.

Name two countries that you think pose the biggest threat to you personally. Now, I asked that of Palestinian Israelis to compare with what we get in the Arab world, because we ask this question every year in the Arab world. And you will see from the data in the Arab world, you know, every year we get the obvious ones. First, Israel, then the United States, then Iran is a far -- you know, just a third, usually far behind.

And here's what we get here. Look at the blue is the five Arab countries. You have Israel, 71 percent, United States 59 percent, and then Iran only 18 percent in the aggregate 5 countries. And among Arab citizens of Israel, you have 43 percent see the

U.S. as a threat. 22 percent see Israel as a threat, but this is the highest we've measured on Iran, 36 percent, except in some of the Gulf countries like the UAE. So, it's -- many Arabs in Israel obviously see Iran more of a threat than they do in the Arab world if you compare that.

There is talk of a possible Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Do you support such an attack or oppose it? I put this to contrast with the Jewish results that I just gave you before where, you know, Jewish Israelis were fully divided on that question, Arab Israelis are not. 68 are opposed, only 4 percent are in favor of such an attack. So, when you add them together, obviously you have more people -- more Israeli citizens opposing an attack than supporting an attack.

Which leader outside your own country do you admire most? Now again, that question we ask in the Arab world every year and it varies across the board, although this year the Prime Minister of Turkey, Erdogan, was by far the most popular in the Arab world. And I showed you the answers of Jewish Israelis. If you look here on this one, Erdogan is number one but he's tied with Yassir Arafat, he's not forgotten. And I have to figure out whether this was a timing issue when we did the polls -- by the way, these polls were done just a couple weeks ago. We just finished with them a couple weeks ago, so they're November polls. So -- and you see the actual dates we put them on the cover sheet. So, I have to see whether there was anything that bumped them up. Hatta Nazola is also popular in other Arab countries; he's still popular among many Israelis. But interestingly, Obama shows up, too, on that list. In contrast with the Arab world, you can see number one is Erdogan followed by Hatta Nazola, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad doesn't do badly, either.

Which of the following is your most important identity? Citizen of your country, religion -- it says Muslim or Jew, but of course we ask Christian and Druze of the



others as well -- Arab, citizen of the world, Palestinian? Now, notice that we give them more categories than we've given the Jewish Israelis by definition because there's more. And in the Arab world we don't add -- obviously here you have to add the Palestinian. In the Arab world, usually that term Palestinian isn't part of it. We give them the Arab, Muslim, and citizen of your country, citizen of the world, but in this case we add also the Palestinian so they're not identical questions.

I want to show you just the comparison across the board of Israeli Jews. You can see, first of all, that citizens of the countries is not a majority in any segment. In the Arab world it's only 33 percent, in Israel it's 37 percent, roughly the same, which is interesting. In the religious identity if you want to call it that -- I don't think it's always religious identity, necessarily. Ethnic identity, sometimes. You have, you know, 31 percent. Say, Muslim 26 percent. Say Arab in the five Arab countries. So, together they're 57 percent.

And interestingly, 23 percent among Arab Israelis identify themselves as Palestinian -- as Palestinian first. They all have these -- remember, they're not saying the others are not important. They will define themselves as all these things, just this is a question of forcing them to rank. That's what it is.

One other issue I want to -- just to footnote here. Obviously I'm not giving you demographic analysis here. We haven't done the full analysis, we just got this data. We've done it last year and we know some things. For example, it turned out from last year's data that the most telling demographic about how people identify themselves among the Arab citizens of Israel -- the Palestinian citizens of Israel -- is not as would have been expected, Muslim, Christian, Druze, but rather whether or not they had relatives who became refugees in 1948. That this refugee status is much more telling on almost all the attitudes projected by Arab citizens of Israel.

And by the way, they're divided almost half and half. Half of them say they have relatives who became refugees in '48, half of them say they don't have relatives who became refugees in '48. And that is really a very telling demographic.

Would you accept the transfer of some Arab Palestinian towns currently in Israel to a new Palestinian state, when established? As you know, that's a debate in Israel as well. And here's what you get. In 2011, it even -- the number of people who say "no" has increased. It was a majority in 2010 but now it's 78 percent say "no". And when you ask them, by the way, about questions -- I'm not showing this -- jobs, yes, is important. But this year the number one answer is they don't want to be split from other Israeli Palestinians. They don't want to be split from their communities. That is the -- that's their connection and identity right now.

Your opinion of possible recruitment of Israeli Arab Palestinian citizens into non-military national service program? That's another issue that is being debated. Actually, they're more divided than one can think, and this is not a difference, really, from last year. It's pretty identical when you take the margin of error into account.

I mean basically if you -- you know, if you take -- they were accepted when they get equality and establishment of Palestinian state, combine them together, it's really half and half -- they divided half and half on this issue. But certainly not now, because they all want to only when these things happen.

How do you feel about Palestinian refugees' right to return? It's not too important, important but a compromise should be found, important, and cannot be compromised in any way. Actually, here there's a little bit of a change from 2010 where you have more people say it should be compromised than happened in 2010. And I don't know why, I have to think about that a little bit and analyze it. But I could tell you, as you might expect, that people who have refugee relatives are much more hard-lined on this

question than people who don't have refugee relatives. And the same in sample this year and the sample last year. They were both the same, half and half.

How would you describe the current status of Arabs in Israel? The same one we asked of Israeli Jews. Remember, the Israeli Jewish population questions are the blue. You know, roughly the same number, 57 percent, say it's legal equality but institutional and societal discrimination. But you only have 3 percent who say it's full equality, and you have 36 percent say it's more akin to apartheid.

Looking at the international reaction to the events in the Arab world. In the past few months, which two countries do you believe played the most constructive role? In the red, you can see that these are the five countries -- aggregate data from last -- that we released last week. You can see Turkey was by far number one, followed by France, followed by the United States. Well, among Arab Palestinian Israelis, what you find is the U.S. actually gets, you know -- is the number one in terms of its role. 45 percent -- you have 32 percent say Turkey, so Turkey is still getting a good score, France still getting a good score. But surprisingly, the U.S. gets a much better rating than it does in the rest of the Arab world.

Arab Awakening, the question again. In retrospect, do you believe that the international intervention in Libya was the right thing to do or the wrong thing to do? And this one, again, we asked as you can see in the five Arab countries. And -- identical. 44 percent say it was the wrong thing to do, and 35 percent say it was the right thing to do.

When you watch events in Syria, are your sympathies more with the government or with the rebels seeking government change? And I'm giving you the contrast with the five Arab countries to see here. And what you have here is, roughly the same trend, although slightly more support for the government among Arab citizens of

Israel, 17 percent versus 9 percent. But 75 percent they take the side of the people, the rebels.

And the same question was asked about Yemen, and here it's even -- you know, it's identical to the Arab world. I mean, identical on Yemen. On Bahrain is a little more difference, actually, because in Bahrain since there's a Sunni/Shia issue as well, you find still Arabs support the rebels more than the government. I mean, that is the instinct, but there is far more support for the government there than in other places. Here among Arab Palestinian Israelis, there really is little difference between the attitudes on Bahrain and the attitudes on Yemen. It's roughly the same.

When you reflect on the Arab Spring, are you more optimistic or more pessimistic than before about the future of the Arab world? And you have very similar trend to the Arab world, actually. More optimistic about half, 55 percent. In the Arab world feeling no change 30 percent, and more pessimistic 19 percent.

As you look ahead toward the Palestinian elections -- the presidential elections in Egypt, which of the following leaders would you like the next president to look like most? And I gave them these names. These were taken from lists that we had of people that we knew they admired, so this is not an open question. This is just, you know, we gave them these choices, they chose among these people.

And you can see here Erdogan by far is number one. And by the way, in Egypt as a country, he got even more than that. So, not only the Egyptians want their president to look like Erdogan, Arabs in the Arab world want the president to look like Erdogan, and Arab citizens of Israel to look like Erdogan. But, Mandela is number two. Mandela was high also there. Obama is number three, which is interesting, in this.

Okay. I'm going to end with that, but I just want to make one more final point, which is I did not -- this was not the entire poll. This is issues that I wanted to

share with you today because we have a, you know, whole line of questions that we have about empathy. Under what circumstances to Arabs and Jews empathize with each other? Particularly when they witness civilian casualties. I have a study ongoing on that with fascinating results, but that will have to wait another day.

So I'll end with that, and I invite my colleagues to join me on the stage.

(Applause)

MR. GALSTON: Well, let's -- yes, the system is on, hooray.

Well, thank you very much for that lucid and concise presentation, Shibley. We have about 40 minutes left, and we'll fair-mindedly divide the 40 minutes into 2 20-minute blocks. The first 20 minutes I will perform my role as moderator and toss questions to the -- you know, to Shibley and Nahum, and the last 20 minutes are yours.

And because Shibley has had his say at some length, I think in the first instance I'm going to direct at least a few questions to Nahum and then if Shibley wants to come in in his wake, that's fine.

My first question for you is a very open-ended one. You know, from your perspective what were the most important findings of this survey? And were there any surprises?

MR. BARNEA: Thank you. Let's separate the two polls. Regarding the Arab Israeli sector or the Israeli Palestinian sector, my gut feeling is that it is another evidence that the Arab Israeli sector is not a bridge between Israel and the Arab states, it's an island. It's an island. There are a lot of -- it's not, you know, an island separated from the rest of the world. Jewish Israel is also an island, but this is something obvious.

Regarding the Israeli Arabs -- so not in the sense that in many -- in response to many questions, they have either their independent, separate opinion or they

are more influenced by the discourse in Israel than -- or in the West in general than the Arab street, as we call it. Arabs in other Arab countries.

Another comment, if I may, is that we have to take into consideration that there is in recent years what we call a tribal fire. One major source of information and opinion, which has a tremendous influence over all the Arab-speaking countries, including the Arabs who live in Israel. And I'm talking about Al Jazeera. And if you walk in the Arab sector in Israel, you see more satellite dishes than cables that link to the Israeli media. So, you have -- there is not -- it's quite interesting to see the answers which were very similar or very close to the answer in the Arab world. I wouldn't rule out the influence of Al Jazeera.

Now I come to the Israeli Jewish sector. We are still a majority, and let's celebrate it before it changes. What I see in Israel is the influence of the government and the political system on people. It's quite interesting to see in various responses -- let's take, for example, the reaction to what is called the Arab Spring.

People -- I mean, Jews in Israel. There is no doubt they loved the pictures. They loved the slogans, especially in the beginning. You know, democracy is a charged term in the Israeli vocabulary, charged positively. People talk about democracy in positive terms.

At the same time, from day one the government and the media warned that it's going to end up as a very anti-Israeli, very blunt anti-Israeli message, and people were aware of it. So, you can see it by their answers. They supported the change. In Israel, there is a bias for change.

In other democratic countries, you know, change means a kind of movement. People speak here, there is (inaudible). You know, people are happy that something is changing. This is, by the way, in my opinion the reason why so many

Israelis want some change on the Arab Israeli conflict, too. They don't want to pay the price for it, but they were willing to have some kind of change. So, there is disambivalence regarding the Arab Spring, because they understand and they say it. It's going to be negative for Israel; it poses a danger to Israel. But, they like the sheer impression on the TV screen and seeing Americans like it, Europeans like it, why shouldn't we like it? Again, you have this kind of instinct.

And by the way, I have to say that maybe it's obvious that answering to pollsters is not a Catholic confession. I mean, people are saying many times very often they want to impress the pollster or they want to say what they believe is the conventional wisdom. It doesn't translate into political behavior, necessarily. I mean, I'm not an amateur here, but I guess this is something which we should take into account.

And I would say something regarding Obama. Shibley, you I believe raised the question. I believe that people confuse when they are asked by a pollster, they confuse their basic admiration to America as a country, to American values as they see it, and to the institution of the American government with the person who symbolizes or represents this institution. So, if you ask them what they think about Obama in comparison with, I don't know, George Bush, you will get a much more negative answer than when you ask them about Obama or you have an open question. Then, he represents something which in the eyes of many Israelis is bigger than him.

MR. TELHAMI: But we asked the same question last year, so why is it so much higher this year than last year? That's the question.

MR. BARNEA: I tell you the answer. You're great, and I mean it seriously. Ambassador in Tel Aviv gave me when we met in Philadelphia this morning -- he said, because -- there is a new ambassador, an American ambassador in Tel Aviv, and he's so successful.

But seriously, I believe that last year -- maybe I'm wrong. I believe in recent years that the policy United States had to adopt regarding the Middle East had to be basically benign neglect. And what happened in the first year of the Obama Administration was that it was very active, and most of the times he was active in a way which many Israelis didn't like. Many Israelis liked it, but more Israelis didn't like it.

In the last year, which ends now, he was much less active. As a matter of fact, I can't remember any major important, controversial -- he made one statement, I believe, in the State Department on Thursday, and on Friday he ran to the APEC convention and contradicted himself. So, in a way he didn't have the same kind of impact on the Israelis and it served him good. It was a positive sign, but it's a guess. You know, you can have your own theory.

It was a long answer, I mean.

MR. GALSTON: Well, but it was such a provocative answer, Nahum, that I am going to rip up my playbook --

MR. BARNEA: Okay.

MR. GALSTON: -- which I had carefully planned out --

MR. BARNEA: Don't do it.

MR. GALSTON: -- and instead I'm going to put a follow-up question to Shibley, then a follow-up question to you. Then if time permits, we'll go back to regular order.

Shibley. Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel. Island or bridge?

MR. TELHAMI: Well, it's a really good question. I could tell you that on some things they are definitely a bridge. And on the empathy question, for example, one of the things that you see when you ask Israelis about whether they have -- when they see Palestinian civilian casualties. If you ask Israeli Jews how do they react most?



Empathy is not the first reaction. They're angry with their -- they brought it upon themselves. The exact mirror image of what you would find in the Arab world. We ask the same question. When you see Israeli civilian casualties, they're angry with the Israelis, they brought it upon themselves, even on the Arab side there's even a sense of revenge.

Among Arab Israeli Palestinian citizens it's interesting because on that issue there's a projection of empathy with both. And that, I think, has -- that's something that needs cultivation and study a little bit more. And not surprisingly, some of that projection has to do with the interaction, whether -- we have a question about whether or not they have Jewish friends, and among Jews whether they have Arab friends. We found that among Israeli Jews, I think 69 percent don't have Arab friends. Among Arab Palestinian citizens, a much larger number have friends, by virtue of how they have to live their lives in the Israeli state, where Jews are a majority. And that, whether or not they have friends, impacts on the way they view the other.

So, on some issues they potentially bridge. But Nahum made a very important point about the media, the Al Jazeera phenomenon. And what got me to do the Israeli Arab sector as a control variable to study in the Arab world is that I assumed from the beginning, since we're talking about Al Jazeera -- when I started doing it 10 years ago, I knew it was the information revolution, was the game changer. So we're all trying to figure out how is it changing from year to year, what is the impact on opinion, and what is the impact on identity? That is the project, that's what I've been studying for a decade.

And I thought in Israel it would be very interesting. Why? Because they speak Hebrew and they can watch Israeli TV. And not only that, but if you look at the history of Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel, there was a time early on when they listened

to nothing but Arab media in the -- up until the '67 war, when Nasser was there and they had the voice of the Arabs broadcasting and everybody was listening to the voice of the Arabs. For one thing, many Arabs didn't know Hebrew. I mean, that was the first generation, just didn't know Hebrew. And so basically they were listening to nothing but Arab.

After '67, the younger generation which spoke Hebrew and became more socialized into Israel. But more importantly, grew on discrediting of the Arab media after the '67 war, because the Arab media basically failed them. When Nasser was saying we're on the way to Tel Aviv and that didn't happen, they started watching Israeli TV and listening to Israeli radio far more, all the way until the 1990s. So, Al Jazeera comes in and they suddenly -- most Arabs say they watch Al Jazeera more. And in the current poll -- I didn't show the slide, but I believe it was something like 40-plus percent Arabs say Al Jazeera is their number one choice for news, whereas about 29 percent say the Israeli TV is number one. Israeli TV is still important for a large segment, but something else is going on here, which is happening so rapidly that is going to marginalize both Al Jazeera and Israeli TV.

MR. BARNEA: The Internet.

MR. TELHAMI: 37 percent now of Arab citizens of Israeli, 37 percent say the Internet is their first choice of news. And satellite television has dropped rapidly in five years; imagine what it's going to be like in five years. So, something else is going on here that we don't -- and we saw its impact on the Arab Awakening and the Arab Spring. We don't know how it's going to play itself out.

And I wouldn't be so quick to say it's an island. I think we're all connected in some way, in ways that matter.

MR. BARNEA: I'm talking about Manhattan, you know.

MR. GALSTON: Now, my promised follow-up question for Nahum. You had a very interesting interpretation of Shibley's findings with regard to attitudes towards the Arab Spring. You know, where you have the government pulling in one direction but the positive valence of the concept in democracy pulling in a different direction. Well, let me put some brand-new facts on the table to see how you think the Israelis will react.

It looks as though in the Egyptian elections, the Muslim brotherhood is going to win about 40 percent. No big surprise there, that's what everybody predicted. Here's the surprise. Looks as though the Salafist Coalition is going to get about 25 percent, and the liberal democrats, the people who dominated some phases of Tahrir Square are going to come in third.

Okay, so everybody thought the Brotherhood would have to make a coalition with more secular democratic forces in order to get a majority. Now they can have two-thirds of the Parliament by aligning with an even more conservative, fundamentalist group than they are. This is the result of a democratic, pretty open, fair, and well-managed election in what is probably the most modern part of Egypt. So, it's all downhill from there.

Do you think that positive attitudes towards Arab Spring as democratic will survive results of this kind in Egypt?

MR. BARNEA: No. We -- it's around two, because we had it in the elections in the Palestinian territories. It was what, 2009?

MR. TELHAMI: Before that.

MR. BARNEA: Before that, maybe '08. And everybody celebrated the democracies there. Then they eye was there, Jimmy Carter was there, everybody was happy --

MR. GALSTON: Who could ask for anything more?

MR. BARNEA: Hamas took over. Took over not only Gaza, because it took over the government.

So, it doesn't -- it will not shatter the basic belief of the Israelis in democracy. But, you have this -- you know, I guess we will continue -- most Israelis will continue -- I hope so -- will continue to support democracy as a principle. But when it comes to the relationship Israeli has with countries in the Middle East, democracy was never a priority. When it comes to Israeli government, we had always better relations with the rulers than with the Arab street.

And the rulers, by the way, never bothered to indicate to the Arab street that Israel can be something less than a demon. Our ally, Egypt, you know. I've visited Egypt many times, and you could buy the protocols of the Elders of Zion for almost free in Tahrir Square and in the best shops of al-Ahram, too. I mean, you know, this was a great bestseller in Egypt all the time.

My impression was always that in Egypt, Israelis hated more than the Palestinian territories or any other Arab country because they were free of any real contact with Israel. Sometimes you know, contact somehow makes damage and Palestinian sees the Israeli soldiers in the checkpoint, and so on. The Egyptians don't know any Israelis, but still you have the envies there, you have the hatreds there, you have the feelings that Israel doesn't belong. And I believe that with the new regime we'll face a policy which will be closer to what the Arab street will dictate.

We had the kind of -- Israel was probably the only country where many people in the political system and outside the political system pitied President Mubarak. United States was very hasty, very quick in, let's say, forgetting or forgetting any commitment toward Mubarak. In Israel, there was one politician who suggested we should smuggle him from Egypt in Israel in order to protect his life, and so on.

Why? Not because Mubarak was pro-Israel, but because there was this kind of feeling of alliance and common, let's say, agenda or something. Egypt is changing and the Israeli public opinion will not be, let's say, in shock if even the peace agreement will be altered or --

MR. TELHAMI: Repudiated. Okay, can I come in on this a little bit? Because I think what's missing here is what is animating Egyptian public opinion. In part, you're right. They don't know a lot of Israelis. I mean, they don't have a lot of information. They have -- most of what they have is negative information.

But in their view of Israel is primarily a function of the Israel-Palestine issue. And if there is confrontation through Israel and Palestinian, their relations between Israel and Egypt are not going to be good now, no question. It's not going to withstand it much. If it moves in a different direction, it'll be neutralized.

I don't think that the Egyptian attitudes are deeply held in this as if they're obsessed with confrontation with Israel. I think that issue rises in the -- for the most part - - as a function of what happens in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. If you have a peace process that's working, it will be muted. You're still going to have opposition, but it wouldn't -- politicians are not going to be drive -- let's face it. Whether it's the Muslim Brotherhood or the military authorities, or anybody who's going to rule Egypt, they know that the Egyptian Israeli Treaty is in their interest. But, there is this process that could drive them in a different direction. They don't want to go there.

I can't imagine the Muslim Brotherhood, if they in fact are going to govern and they're going to establish themselves, they're going to go toward confrontation. They may be driven there by public opinion, but that public opinion will be there only if there is intense conflict (inaudible) with the Palestinians. If there is a path to peace, I think the issue will be lowered. That's my view.

MR. BARNEA: You are very optimistic.

MR. GALSTON: Well -- is this not on now?

SPEAKER: No.

MR. GALSTON: Well, let's see what I can do without that. The answer is, not too much. Okay.

MR. TELHAMI: You can take the questions from there?

MR. GALSTON: I can, but then I won't be able to see people in the back. So, the microphone is on at the podium now? Great, sorry about that.

Okay, as promised we now turn to the third segment, which is your segment, and a plea. Number one, you'll stand as you ask your question. Number two, identify yourself. Number three, ask a question. Number four, in deference to what I think will be a sea of questions, make it as concise as possible.

And I think there will be a roving microphone -- I now see that there will be a roving microphone.

MS. BABBITT: My name is Hattie Babbitt, and I wanted to pick up on Bill's question before and posit a happier, long-term result of perhaps the Arab Spring and the Egyptian election.

If it is true that the conservatives will win rounds one, two, and three and coalesce around a conservative Islamic agenda -- I was in Qalqilyah observing the election at the time when Hamas was elected. Qalqilyah had a Hamas mayor. It's a very conservative part surrounded by very large settlements, it's not a very happy place. We were told consistently ahead of the election that Hamas would lose, and we were not -- it didn't seem credible to us under the circumstances that the Hamas mayor had been such a bad mayor, had performed so poorly that he would lose the election and that Hamas would lose in that region.

My question to follow up on Bill's is, that's another scenario when if there's an incapacity to deliver and how would that play out?

MR. TELHAMI: Well, it's obviously very hard to know, you know, how these things play themselves out, even -- I mean, if you have full belief in an election and it's a truly free election, I think the scenario that you paint is right. And we've seen it, in fact, happen that way before.

I mean, even in Arab communities in Israel, as Nahum would remember - - Umm al-Fahm, which is one of the largest Arab towns in Israel where the Muslim Brotherhood is very strong and they've had a member of the Muslim Brotherhood as a mayor there that -- they were in the 1970s and really up until the early '80s, they had a communist mayor at the time when they were -- the communist party was politically mobilizing and they were getting goodies from the Soviet Union. And overnight, almost, the communists were dumped because the Islamists were providing better services and the communists were no longer providing better services. In a very conservative town where people are very religious, even while you had a communist party.

So this model, you know, could work. A lot of people, obviously, worry that if you don't have a very established democratic process, that those who come to power will then not go back to the democratic model. I think you have to try it. Personally, I'm one of those people who, as Nahum said, are more optimistic about the process.

We don't know the results of the Egyptian elections, by the way. We know the Muslim Brotherhood has done well and the Salafis have done well. We don't know exactly how well. I think the latest I heard, it wasn't going to release until tomorrow.

I was expecting the Salafis to do between 15 and 20 percent, actually based on my visit in Egypt last month. And the very strong Alexandria -- I was out in

Alexandria, I had a sense that they were going to do well in Alexandria. But if they in fact end up with 25 percent, that is almost a shocker.

Now, we don't even know. I mean, in theory they were against women voting. And so, I don't even know whether the women voted, I have to figure out how many of them allowed the women to even vote. And if that's true, then that's even a larger percent of the population.

So, it's -- we don't know the turnout either. I mean, I know people that talk 70, 80 percent recall that after the constitutional vote back in March, the early report was huge turnout ended up being only 41 percent when all was said and done. This appears to be a larger turnout, to be sure, and it's over a couple of days. But, we still don't have numbers. We just have to wait and see what the numbers are.

No doubt, though, Muslim Brotherhood will dominate the next government. I mean, that is a foregone conclusion.

MR. BARNEA: In the polls, Erdogan, the Prime Minister of Turkey, came out as the most popular. Now when most people in the West think about Erdogan, they think about his statements and how let's say blunt he is and how aggressive he is, and think about him as an extremist. But I guess part of this popularity comes from the fact that Turkey is the most successful Muslim country in the world, under a Muslim government. They are less corrupt than the previous government, dominated by the military. They are much more effective, and the growth is 9 percent per year.

And you know, Israel is now in a kind of competition -- a very complicated one -- with Turkey. One of my friends who served in a previous government went to Turkey to see some friends and they said they understand you are going to ally with Greece and with Romania, maybe, in order to circle us, Turkey, with enemies. You know, the list of the countries which would volunteer to help us fight Israel is much longer, they said, in



Turkey.

So, Turkey is a power. Erdogan has made a lot of mistakes in his relations, not only with Israel, with Arab countries. But he's still very, very strong, popular, and a leader and he has a very, very strong country which backs him.

MR. GALSTON: Experience has now taught me to move to the back of the room, and I'll keep on alternating. Yes, there's a woman in the very rear.

MR. BARNEA: I had to say it, you know.

MR. TELHAMI: The Egyptians last week, they say they want Egypt to --

MS. WEISS: Donna Weiss from the Channel 2 News in Israel. And I wanted to pick up on Nahum Barnea's remarks saying Shibley was optimistic. And I wanted to ask you, Mr. Telhami, we often tend to think that if Israel would, you know, go ahead there would be a peace movement. But when you look at Abu Mazen and the Palestinians today, concerning the polls that you just saw there isn't an incentive, I think - or do you think there isn't an incentive these days to go for an agreement in Israel because it's not about doing peace with leaders anymore, it's to do with the people. And the people are not in the mood to go and make concessions with Israel.

So now, Abu Mazen is in here -- doesn't have Mubarak to be on his back and just say, sign, the way he did with Arafat there on the stage in Cairo. We have -- the Palestinians have lost someone who will back their concessions. So, how do you see that regarding the public opinions in the Arab countries?

MR. BARNEA: Shibley, I'm sure, is more of an expert on the history of the Palestinian people. But the role of Egypt in the history of Fatah and Hamas' will is very, very important. I believe that if there is a chance for a united government in the Palestinian territories -- and I don't see -- it's a very slim chance. But if there is a chance, it's because both players, Hamas and Fatah, are courting the new regime in Egypt to get

inspiration, confidence, security from the Egyptians. This is the legacy, this is the tradition.

So, regarding the role of Egypt in the future, I'm not sure, by the way, it contradicts the interests of Israel. That Egypt will play a role in the Palestinian political system, and in the policies of whoever governs the Palestinian. This is regarding the Palestinians.

Now I didn't hear every word you said, but if you refer to my pessimism, in comparison with Shibley, first of all, I am wrong, he is right. Take it as a working assumption. I mean, you know, pessimistic people are always -- should be wrong.

But, if I judge even by the polls in the Jewish sector in Israel, you can see that Netanyahu's policies reflect, by and large, the views of at least half of the Israelis, maybe most of the Israelis. He found the right way -- and by the way, he's not a visionary. He follows the polls more than the polls follow him. He really -- he is, let's say, a religious believer in public polls.

So, what he saw -- and again, I quote him. I mean, he said it many times. What he saw after the Second Intifada and the failure of Fatah in the Palestinian election, what he saw in the Israeli public opinion was a basic very, very skeptical attitude toward any chance that a peace agreement will be signed in the foreseeable future. He saw it in the polls.

It doesn't mean, necessarily, that people are against a peace agreement, and it was also shown in the polls. But, it means that this is their basic assumption -- not their moral view but their political feeling that they don't see it coming. They see the gap between Israel and Palestinian is too big, too deep. And also, they enjoy the fact that it seems -- it means that 2004, 2005 you didn't -- day-to-day threat of terror went down to really a very marginal threat to day-to-day life in Israel. The Israelis were very fast to

enjoy the status quo.

Now, again their experience shows that whenever you have a change to the status quo, even a positive change like the resumption of talks, there are always groups of extremists who become active in order to destroy this positive change. So, I can understand why a guy like Netanyahu feels like when he more or less endorses the status quo, he has the backing of most Israelis.

I'm not sure I answered your question, but here's what I could hear from here. I'm sorry.

MR. TELHAMI: Just on the one point that Nahum made about the role of Egypt in the Palestinian arena is very accurate, I think. I think, you know, if you look even at the prospects of a deal between Hamas and Fatah for the past few years, really since the split -- and certainly in recent months -- they both are essentially appealing to Egypt and responding to Egypt more than any other player. Qatar tried, Saudi Arabia tried, but no one had that kind of relationship.

Hamas obviously has been empowered by what happened in Egypt, and now they think they're going to have a more sympathetic ear because frankly, the public in Egypt is more sympathetic with them than they are with Fatah. Although they're sympathetic, according to our polling there.

So in some ways Mahmoud Abbas also felt he had to move quickly to make the deal, because it was essentially a deal made through the military intelligence establishment that was there through the Mubarak era making a deal. It modified a little bit, but the terms were still within that.

I'm not sure what will happen as we move forward, once you have a new government establish it as popular legitimacy. How much the military institution is going to be able to play the role it has been playing, I'm not sure.

MR. GALSTON: Next question, please. We've run out of questions?

Oh, I'm sorry. There's a question right there.

Is there a microphone?

MS. GLUCK: Thank you. Roberta Gluck. I'm interested in your polling on Jewish Israeli citizens, particularly in the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And it seems to me that about a third of the Jewish citizens polled pretty consistently took a negative, pessimistic attitude towards relations.

Did you do any correlations -- I assume you did correlations with demographics. And I'm interested in knowing how strongly is the correlation based upon religious beliefs? Did you find a very strong correlation amongst those who are Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox versus those who identify as secular or reform or conservative?

MR. TELHAMI: Let me just say on this -- for this year, we still haven't performed that analysis. This data came such last minute that even just to get it out here to you -- and I have some of the assistants who worked hard on it. Mike Lipson and Evan Lewis who helped me to put this together so quickly.

Well, I have done -- I have gone through the cross-steps to see correlations and I have some ideas, but in the past we have looked at it and yes, it does matter. And part of it is, you know, Nahum made a point earlier which I think is right. Which is that public opinion doesn't translate into action, into political action. It doesn't, of course it doesn't. We know that. But, we do know that people who feel more deeply about an issue, rank an issue higher in the priorities, they are more likely to act on it. And so we in many of the polling we do, we actually ask for ranking of the issues in priorities, and we try to measure that.

What I didn't show even unfavorable -- we have favorable, very unfavorable, somewhat unfavorable, very favorable, somewhat favorable. The bad news

for Obama, if you want to see bad news about the favorable/unfavorable rating, is that when you look at -- you know, yes. Overall, 54 percent have favorable view, 39 percent have an unfavorable view. But when you look at most of his favorable is somewhat favorable, lukewarm. Very few very favorable.

Among the unfavorable, the 39, most of them as very unfavorable.

MR. GALSTON: Exactly the same is true in the United States, by the way.

MR. TELHAMI: And as you know, that obviously is a more telling number if you're trying to interpret how they're likely to behave and not just the way they feel. And I think that question, you know, is important that you just raised. That you have to figure out who are the constituencies that matter. That's the kind of analysis we are doing, and we will publish that.

MR. GALSTON: We are very close to the end of our allotted time, and so let me take the prerogative of the chair -- even though I am standing -- to share an observation and a final question with the panel and with all of you.

First, my observation. From my personal standpoint, which I don't expect anybody else in the room to endorse, the single most discouraging finding in this survey was the statistically-significant rise in the percentage of Israelis who think that if negotiations collapse or cease, that the status quo will continue indefinitely. And an even larger fall in the percentage of Israelis who believe that the collapse of negotiations would renew a period of "intense conflict".

So, it appears to me that in a classic effort to reduce cognitive dissonance, the Israeli citizenry having now concluded, sadly, that the prospects for peace are not bring is now constructing for itself a bright picture of the future without peace. All I can say is, we shall see. I hope they're right, I fear they're wrong.

And now, that was the most discouraging set of findings that I found. Here's the single most surprising -- and here I appeal first to Nahum and then to Shibley, and then it will be farewell for this panel.

Most important identity among Jewish Israelis. Jewish, 53. Israeli, 37. Now if somebody had told me that those were the results from greater Jerusalem, I would have believed it. But Israel as a whole? I'm flabbergasted. Should I be flabbergasted, Nahum?

MR. BARNEA: No, sorry. (Laughter)

Look, about 40 years ago when I served as a disguised policeman on Mount Scopus, which was a demilitarized zone inside the Kingdom of Jordan, the kids of the neighboring village, Isoeah, used to run after us when we patrolled the village and shouted, "Yahoudi". Now, I consider myself an Israeli, first and foremost. But they talked about Yahoudi because they identify the term "Yahoudi" with the term Israeli. This is the words they grew up in.

The single foremost Jews -- the conflict doesn't allow, I believe, Jews and Arabs in Israel alike to identify themselves with the state as number one priority. In a way, it's not so bad, also, because we are not America. We are a nation of states with 20 percent of the people who don't belong to the majority, and should be -- and this is one of the problems -- one of the challenges we have. But it is still -- it was built as a national state. It started as an idea, and developed into a national state.

Now, maybe in the -- you know, somewhere in the future we have a young president by the name of Shimon Peres. So, his basic assignment in Israel is to deliver the future. So he says, in the future there will be not states at all. Everybody will be happy with no states at all. I don't see it yet, I'm younger.

But as long as we have the Middle East as we know it, yes. Jews will be -- or, for

Israelis or for the people of Israel, being a Jew will be the -- for the Jews will be the number one identity card more than this. I hear, you know, from time to time Arabs talking about Israel and they say, I'm Israel. I'm Israel is a term that refers to Jews. I'm Israel is a historical term. This is -- the people of Israel are not the people of the state of Israel, but they, again, mix it because this is kind -- we are very original, I agree, and very complicated.

But, look. With all the problems we have, starting from Iran going to the Arab-Israeli conflict and ending in the rift between Orthodox and non-Orthodox in Israel -- with all the problems we have, the identity problem is not, in my opinion, the number -- or, doesn't belong to the first five problems on our list. Maybe in the 22nd century you will see one people, not Jewish, not Arab, Israelites. I don't know what. You would like your brother to become non-Arab Israeli? No, you don't.

So I mean, this is a contradiction we live with, and I believe we can live on like this as long as I live.

MR. GALSTON: Well, the late conservative thinker Irving Kristol once distinguished between a problem and a condition. A problem is something you can solve, a condition is something you have to live with. And I guess in your part of the world, it's more conditions than problems.

Please join me in thanking this splendid panel. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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