

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

THE ARAB AWAKENING:  
AMERICA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. POLLACK: Well, good morning. Welcome to the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. We're delighted to have you all join us this morning for the launch of our brand-new book, *The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East*.

Before I begin by talking a little bit about the book and bringing some of my colleagues up to talk a bit about it, and then exploring the events of the day and how they relate to some of the themes of the book, I wanted to take a minute to remember a colleague of ours. As many of you are aware, Christopher Boucek, a colleague at the Carnegie Endowment, died barely two weeks ago at the age of 38. Chris was a friend and a colleague of all of ours and we wanted to take a moment to remember him.

Chris was a superb scholar. He was a wonderful colleague, he was a delightful person, and all of us miss him greatly. We mourn for him, we join our colleagues at Carnegie in wishing that he were still with us, and we hope that his soul and his family will find peace.

Now, from the profound to the utterly ridiculous. The book that many of you have in front of you is the work of 18 authors from the Brookings Institution. I will begin by saying that I think that when we first

began to think about this book, when the idea was first presented to us, none of those 18 authors thought this was a good idea. As he usually does, this was Martin Indyk's idea, and as I have come to know, understand, and respect enormously about Martin, Martin is one of these people who will put an idea on the table that everyone looks at initially and says, this is a terrible idea. And then when it happens you realize it was absolutely brilliant, and that was absolutely our experience of this book.

And one of the most amazing moments was when, after we had written and read the first draft, we all came together at a meeting and we were all sitting there and saying, you know, we actually have something here. There's something really interesting in what we've done, and maybe Martin does know something that the rest of us don't.

What we set out to do in this book was, I would say, fairly ambitious and I hope that you will agree with us that we actually have done something useful in seeking that high mark. We tried to craft a book that would be useful to a lot of different people in a moment in time when the United States is obviously struggling to come to grips with what is, arguably -- I think all of us would agree -- one of the most important events of the millennium so far, and what is likely to be the beginning of one of the defining themes of the 21st century, the Arab awakening.

Obviously what is happening in the Middle East today is

transformational, it is epochal. It could very well redefine international relations, as well as obviously what is going on in the Middle East itself for the rest of millennia and for all time in the future.

It's why we wrote the book the way that we did. We wanted to bring in as large a number of Brookings scholars as we could because we wanted to bring in that broad range of expertise so that we could come at this enormous event from a whole variety of different angles.

It's also why there are 36 chapters in this book, because we were hoping to cover a whole broad range of topics. And as I said, what was remarkable to us is, as we began to read one another's drafts, as we began to think about what we had put together, by doing it in this broad brush fashion we began to see a whole variety of different things that I don't think any of us had recognized or thought about when we started to write the book emerge from that writing and from the reading of one another's works. And that, of course, led to the addition of more chapters and more work and a whole variety of other ideas that ultimately got produced in the final version that really, we hadn't thought of when we set out to do the writing of this book.

Now, let me reassure you about at least one thing. This is not an edited volume. We hate edited volumes. Most of us have contributed to edited volumes at some point in time, some of us have

edited edited volumes at different points in time. Problem with edited -- well, there are lots of problems with edited volumes. But when we set out to write this, we wanted to do something very different that would not have the problem of edited volumes. It's why we did it the way that we did.

We sat down first, we mapped out the organization of both the book itself and of each of the chapters. We wanted a book that would present a coherent, common set of themes. We wanted chapters that would build on one another, that would speak to one another so that it didn't feel like you were reading just a bunch of disjointed essays that may be on a common topic but really had nothing to say beyond what each particular author had thought of to put in his or her own chapter.

Instead, what we were looking for was a coherent summary and encapsulation of all of the events of the past year. Now obviously, that was a tall order because the year is not yet over and the events of the Arab Spring have barely begun. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, this is certainly not the end, this is not the beginning of the end, right now we may be looking at the end of the beginning. All of us were very cognizant as we were writing this. And what we were doing was hoping to set out in one place a whole variety of things that would be useful to people, both information about why things happened, about how they happened, about what's gone on, but also a number of interpretations, bringing our long

background in the region and our work on these different subjects in to help people to understand why things happened the way that they did and when they happened when they did and what to expect in the future, and also, of course, what the United States and what the other countries of the region ought to be doing about them.

And from this perspective and from our efforts, a common set of themes emerged about what happened, about why, about what should happen. And I think we all benefited from this iterative process that made this book a very collective effort where we sat down, we talked about these themes, we met at different points in time, we read one another's work, we commented on it. When we went back to rework it, we consciously set about trying to incorporate the views of our colleagues, ideas they had had, making reference to tie the different chapters together so that it did feel like an organic whole and not, as I said, just a whole bunch of essays on one common theme.

Now, I will say that there was a tremendous amount of agreement. And again, that was one of the most remarkable things about this book. The scholars of the Brookings Institution have a wide variety of views. They are views that span the political gamut, they are views that span a whole variety of gamuts, and yet the more we worked on this book and the more that we read one another's work, the more we realized that

we were in virulent agreement with one another on the broad themes of this book. And in fact, it led to some collaborations by Brookings authors who you might not normally imagine being put together, and yet as things moved along we realized that people coming from very different places shared very similar perspectives. And again, I think that that was one of the other things that emerged from the writing of this book that we all felt made it a much more powerful volume than I think any of us had imagined when we first sat down to do it.

Of course, there were some disagreements that lingered. Brookings authors are entitled to our own opinions. We never try to enforce conformity. For that reason, we did decide to put individual names on each chapter, so that if an author felt very strongly about making a certain point which not necessarily every other author agreed with, we could allow those points to stand. And ultimately, we felt that even this was helpful to the book. And in kind of reading over the final version, we felt that having somewhat different views was actually very useful to the reader to see that there could be somewhat different perspectives on specific issues within a broader common framework, a broader agreement about what was happening and why, and what should be done about it.

As I hope you'll find, we also wanted this book to be useful

for lots of different kinds of people. That's why we've got 36 relatively short chapters, because we wanted to provide a whole variety of different things that different kinds of people might get from the book. We wanted to have chapters out there for people who are just looking for ready access to a certain subject that they always wanted to know about, or that they were wondering about. Nobody's talked about Algeria. Might Algeria be next? Well, we've got a chapter on Algeria that talks about that. If you're worried about Saudi Arabia, we've got a chapter about Saudi Arabia. If you've always wanted to understand this whole Islamist thing, we've got a chapter just on the Islamists and of course, a whole variety of the other chapters also talk about the Islamists. But again, it's something that where if you just want something quick -- I've always wanted to know about this or I really don't understand this aspect -- hopefully there is a chapter or several chapters for you in there.

But we also wanted to present a book that would give a holistic sense of what is going on with the Arab awakening, and how all of these different pieces which can be so utterly bewildering when looked at through the lens of TV or newspaper articles talking about unrest here and problems there and protests here and change or revolution in these other places, how all of it knitted together and how you could stand back and see the region as a whole, but also see it in different pieces, as small

pieces, as larger pieces, and as an overarching whole. And so, we hope that what you will find -- what we tried to create, what we believe we have done, is to craft a book about the Arab Spring, about the Arab awakening that can be enjoyed either as a feast or a la carte.

Now, within this moveable feast -- moveable in the sense of as long as you can grab this you can take it with you -- there are at least three different kinds of chapters you'll find here. They're thematic or functional chapters. The book begins with an entire section where we wanted to look at the dynamics driving the Arab awakening, issues that span the entire region, how did these things shape the Arab awakening, how did the Arab awakening affect them? So, we have a chapter on public opinion and how public opinion should have led us to understand what was happening and to understand what the people of the region want.

We have a chapter on new media, on the Islamists, on the peace process, on democratization, and the lessons we've learned from democratization in other parts of the region. The economics of the region, both how that contributed to the revolts around the Arab world and what the Arab Spring itself means for the economics of the region. The militaries, which have become so important, and the role that they've played. And finally, the impact that the Arab awakening may, should, we

hope will have, on terrorism.

Another part of the books looks at country-by-country chapters. In fact, most of the chapters of the book are country by country. And of course, there are common features that span the region, that spread across the Arab awakening, have made this kind of event that seems like dominoes falling across the region because there are these common patterns and these common features among the different Arab states that have lent themselves to this kind of a progression emanating out of the initial events in Tunisia all across the rest of the Arab world.

But of course, we also wanted by putting all these chapters in one place, all these countries in one place, to allow people to look at both the individual idiosyncrasies of each country to see how the Arab Spring and understand how and why the Arab awakening played out in each of these countries in the way that it did, but also be able to compare that to how it played out in all the other countries. And so, we have relatively brief overviews of what the Arab Spring has meant in each country, why it played out the way that it did, how it happened, and of course, what ought to happen there to bring this to a successful, in some sense of the word, conclusion in each one of these countries.

I'll also point out that we broke the countries up into groups simply because we didn't want to have a long list of 20 or so country

chapters, but also because we wanted to get people to think about the region differently. Typically, when you get a book on the Middle East it has chapters on every country out there, it's typically organized geographically or maybe by political alignment, something along those lines. Instead, we decided to break the countries out in terms of how they stand in relationship to change, what needs to happen, where they're moving in the future, as a way of getting people to think differently about what it is that is going on in the Middle East today, about what the overarching and most important dynamics in the Arab world are today, which have fundamentally changed from the way that we have looked at the Arab world, at the Middle East, for the past 30, 40, 50 years when we did tend to look at them as being geographic groupings or political alignments, relationship to the United States or the Soviet Union, or some other overarching theme.

And so, we've organized them into three groups. Those who are in transition, who may even be struggling towards some kind of democratization -- we certainly hope -- countries like Egypt, Iraq, the Palestinians, Tunisia, and Libya. Another section looks at those who have so far resisted revolution, but who nonetheless are facing the pressures to change just as the countries that already have gone through these transitions, countries that are going to need to come to grips with change

in the future if they are going to continue to survive in some recognizable form, countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the other Gulf states, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco. And finally, we have a section on the states that are in civil war, Yemen and Syria. And we'll talk more about Syria in just a little bit.

But we also wanted to go beyond the countries of the Middle East, because obviously the countries of the Middle East -- or at least the countries of the Arab world -- are only part of the story here as well. There are other countries in the region which have important equities involved, and are themselves exerting important influences. And so, we have another section that just looks at Iran, at Israel, and at Turkey, with separate chapters for each one talking about how they view the developments of the Arab awakening, how the Arab awakening is affecting them, and what they ought to be thinking about in the future.

And then we've got a final section that goes even broader than that, because obviously the Middle East is a critical region for the entire world, and the entire world is watching, in some cases holding its breath to see what happens in the Arab awakening. And so, we have chapters on Europe, on Russia, on China, on the other emerging powers of global order, and on the United States. About how the Arab awakening has affected each of them, about how each of them has tried to react to

the Arab awakening, and about what to expect in the future, what they will do, what they should do.

And then the last set of chapters is a series of chapeau chapters. These are chapters that introduce each of these other sections of the book and the thing that I will say about them is, these are not summary chapters. It's not simply an, in the chapters, in this section, so-and-so argues this and so-and-so argues that. Instead, what we were looking for from these chapters was once again to draw out the larger themes. And so for each section, we have a chapeau chapter that tries to look at some of the ideas that emerge from the different individual chapters and to stitch those together into a bigger way of thinking about what's going on in the region. Whether or not we've succeeded or not, we will leave up to you to decide.

Now for the rest of the day, what we thought we would do is whet your appetite, give you a little bit of a taste of what is in this volume. We thought we would talk about four different specific aspects of what's going on, and then we'll open it up to questions. And as far as the questions are concerned, have at us. It's up to you. You want to talk about what's going on in Bahrain today, we'll talk about what's going on in Bahrain today. You want to know why Egypt got to where it is? We'll talk about how Egypt got to where it is. Somebody wants to talk about, you

know, what Bibi Netanyahu is going to be doing tomorrow? We'll take a stab at that as well, although that one you really got to be easy on us, because what goes on in that man's mind is ---- well, it is his own personal domain, we will simply say.

But we thought we would kind of sketch out at least four of the different topics that we talk about in the book as a way of giving you some sense of what the book is about, why it is relevant to what's going on, how we tried to tackle these different issues.

And I was picked to start with a topic that we all thought was extremely important. It was a chapter that we didn't think of initially. It's a chapter on enabling reform in the Middle East. We always knew that we were going to have to talk about reform, and there is a chapeau chapter for one of those sessions that talks about what reform needs to look like and what reform means and things like that. But as we were doing the writing, we all recognized that we needed to go beyond that because, of course, reform in the Middle East is absolutely critical, and it's absolutely critical in part because it's been so badly neglected for so long.

The Arab states have generally known that they faced all kinds of internal opposition, unrest, that their people were unhappy for a long time, and many of them did at various points in time announce broad programs of reform. The problem is pitifully few actually did anything with

regard to those programs of reform. And so as we sat down to write this and as we were working on it, all of us were writing these chapters where we talked about the need for reform in this country or that country. We all kept coming back to this point of, okay, we can all agree that they need to reform but how do we get them to actually do it? How do we get them to actually do it when they've successfully resisted for so long? What's to prevent a Morocco or a Jordan or an Oman, which have announced far-reaching, very fair-minded reforms, from doing exactly what they did the last time they announced a slate of far-reaching, fair-minded reforms, which is going out, making some quick cosmetic changes, and then going right back to what they were doing in the past?

Now, we're hopeful that the events of the Arab Spring itself will be enough of an incentive to hold their feet to the fire and get them to realize, you know what? We can't keep monkeying around. If we don't enact real reform, this will come up with us and we will eventually get swept from power the way that Mubarak and Ben Ali and Qaddafi did. *Inshallah*, as we say.

But we all decided that we needed to do a specific chapter on how the rest of the world could help do better at holding these countries' feet to the fire, including the ones that already seem to recognize that this is the right thing to do. And so, we have an entire

chapter on enabling reform. It's a chapter that I think many of us think is one of the most important in the book.

I'm not going to give away all of the punch lines, I'm not going to present a whole variety of spoilers. In that chapter, we present a variety of different ideas; positive conditionality, setting concrete benchmarks for what reform would mean, aid coordination. You know, one of the biggest problems we have in the region right now is, there are a bunch of people who are willing to give money to a variety of Arab countries that are moving in the right direction, but they're all moving in different directions themselves. And the conditions that they're imposing for aid in some cases are nonexistent, in other cases are competing, or are mutually contradictory. And one of the most useful things that we could do is actually play the role of coordinating this so that everyone is signing from the same sheet of music and doing the right thing has the same meaning for everyone else.

Steve Grand added a wonderful section to that chapter on using international institutions to keep these countries focused on reform, and on the experience of other international institutions in doing it elsewhere in the world. We talked about enlisting the press, and of course the need for a continuing effort with a bottom-up approach of enlisting civil society. And finally, we also talked about the kind of third rail, the aid that

dare not speak its name, which is putting the military aid on the table -- the military aid that the United States provides to all these countries.

For the last point that I wanted to make about this specific topic, and then I'm going to ask Dan Byman to come up and give you a taste for one of these chapeau chapters by talking a little bit about civil war, is this issue about aid in an era of fiscal stringency.

Gary, a few years ago, I trotted out a book where I said, look, we've got to help the Middle East reform. If these countries don't reform, they're going to face revolutions, civil wars, insurgencies, et cetera. And you asked a very important question, which was -- and this was back in 2008 - - how does the new president justify providing aid to a bunch of countries when we have to deal with our economic situation at home? It's a great question.

Unfortunately, I would say I think the U.S. got that wrong. That we did put all of our effort, all of our emphasis on doing things at home. And now, it's even worse. We're talking about cutting aid to all of these countries. My god, the aid package that we've come up with for each, what is it, \$147 million in new money? It's a billion dollars, but the vast majority of it is all reprogrammed, okay? And what I think all of us felt -- and it was something we talked about a great deal, and you will see it reflected not only in this specific chapter about enabling reform, but it

spans all of the other chapters where we talk about where aid can be helpful -- is that this is an unbelievably important moment. It is a moment that will define the 21st century.

Small amounts of aid could be very important. They send an incredibly important signal to all of these countries -- to the people of all of these countries. Imagine if you were an Egyptian who thinks that the United States gave billions to Hosni Mubarak, and now they've gone through a major revolution and they're trying to put in place a democracy. And what they hear is that now the United States is only willing to pony up \$147 million. What message does that send to the Egyptian people? Where will we be 5 or 10 years from now with Egypt?

You know, there's a common line that gets ascribed to any number of different congressmen in this town. I've heard it ascribed to Russell, to Symington, to a whole variety that a billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you're talking about real money. We have a \$12 trillion debt; \$3 billion, \$5 billion for the Middle East is chicken feed. It is not going to break the bank, nor will saving that money fix the problems with our debt and our deficit. But over the long-term, 3- or \$5 billion for the countries of the Middle East who are struggling with this epochal change could be of enormous importance to them, and more importantly to us and to how they see us.

So, let me stop there. I'm going to bring up Dan Byman, who is going to talk to you a little bit about civil wars. After that, we asked Mike Doran, who wrote the chapter on new media, to come up and talk a little bit about new media and Twitter and how important that was. And then, we're going to go to our colleague, Salman Shaikh, who is in Doha somewhere, and Salman is going to talk a little bit about Syria. And once that's all done -- there's Salman -- we're going to open the floor up to you. And as I said, you can ask us about any country under the Middle Eastern sun, and any of the themes in this book or anything that goes beyond it, and we will be delighted to take your questions.

So, Dan? Tell us a little bit about civil wars.

MR. BYMAN: I'll take Ken's injunction to tell you a little bit, quite seriously, and hopefully keep my remarks relatively brief.

As I think probably everyone in this room, as they watched what happened in Tunisia, watched what happened in Egypt, there was a tremendous sense of hope and really, inspiration. It was, to me, exceptionally moving.

But a lot of what our book is about is not only the positive, but the negative. That some things have gone wrong, and some things may go wrong. And one of the biggest dangers -- perhaps the biggest danger -- is that some of the Arab Spring may end up in civil wars

throughout the region.

We saw this, of course, in Libya. We are seeing it right now in Syria. Yemen is moving in that direction, and it would not be surprising should this dynamic spread to other countries.

If you think about the Arab Spring as somewhat in the abstract, many of the conditions that experts look for when they think about civil wars are present, to varying degrees. One of the biggest is that when the new governments come in, they're weak. Some of them come in with perhaps some degree of popular legitimacy, but perhaps only a bit. In general, the institutions that were hollowed out under the dictatorship are exceptionally weak. So, basic things like courts, the media, rule of law, these need to be built.

You have an issue with the military and security services. These are usually anti-democratic forces. They were usually supporting the old order. And so, there's a question, which is do you purge them to begin anew? But in so doing, you're further weakening the state. You're making it easier for small groups to use violence in a way that can destabilize things quite a bit.

Societies are often highly divided. Sometimes it's by sector ethnicity, sometimes it's by region or political faction. And again, the old regimes usually worsen this. Often part of government policy was to keep

people divided so they wouldn't challenge the leader. And there's a price after 10, 20, 30, 40 years of these policies when these leaders are removed.

Also, the old order fights back. Even when you have a Mubarak go, you have actors, you have -- I mentioned the military, but a wide range of people who benefit from the old system and not surprisingly, they want to hang on to what they had. In some cases, they may fear for their lives. In most cases, they fear for their livelihoods. And as a result, there are old grievances, there are new grievances, there are opportunities for new groups to act. Often weapons are widespread. And at the same time, the government is weak. So, we see the conditions that could foster civil wars are quite strong.

But also what may happen is, the Tunisian revolution, the Egyptian revolution, they occurred -- in my view, at least -- in part, due to surprise. They caught the rulers off balance, they caught everyone off balance. As the regimes have had time to dig in, you're seeing much bloodier responses. In Libya, had it not been for NATO, Qaddafi would still be there. In Syria, in Yemen, the old order is clinging to power. So, you're seeing regimes that are not surprised but are waiting for unrest, and have shown they're willing to use violence.

As civil wars develop they have some tremendously

dangerous dynamics that go with them beyond the body count. Needless to say, we should all be concerned when thousands of people die and there's no hope necessarily for their future. But what often happens is, during a war the populations become further radicalized. The reasons that wars begin are often unrelated to the course the war takes as time goes on. That as blood is shed, as -- I will say tempers, but as passions rise, understandably the stakes go up and new ideologies may come in, and you may have much stronger feelings that can pull a society apart.

Also, civil wars can lead to failed states. Some civil wars someone wins, and some civil wars no one wins. We can look at Somalia for outside the region and say it's been in a civil war for decades. But really Somalia as a state no longer exists, and that possibility is certainly present in places like Yemen.

But in a way, so what? I mean, there's a real question in many of these countries that are not traditionally seen as vital American interests that, is the American interest entirely humanitarian? And you know, Americans, I think -- at least I hope -- wish the people of Yemen and Libya well. But there's a broader question of what this means for overall policy.

But I believe that in many cases there are strong interests who care about countries that have not been traditional American

interests. One of the big ones is refugees. Understandably, people flee war in large numbers, so you have hundreds of thousands, at times millions of people who cross borders. And these refugees can be tremendously destabilizing to the new countries in which they go. They can change the politics, they can change the demographic balance, and we've seen in the Middle East in the past how the presence of refugees can create cycles of conflict and create conflict in new countries, in part because of how the refugees change politics.

Also, these weakened states can often be a base for terrorist groups. One thing that security services of the Arab world often did quite well was imprison and arrest radicals who used anti-American violence. Again, you may see security services purged, but in any event you're going to see security forces focusing on other issues other than terrorism. The greatest threat to regimes now in many countries has nothing to do with terrorism and a lot to do with opposition forces on the other side.

So, if you look at Syria, for example, the Syrian regime is tremendously concerned about democratic dissenters and less concerned, I would say, about the radicals that it had focused on in the past. And as a result, you may see freedom of operation grow.

Also though, and perhaps the biggest impact is that as civil wars become widespread, there are reasons that neighbors intervene. At

times they're afraid, at times they see opportunities. And as a result, what starts as a local problem becomes a regional problem, and so it sucks in neighbors and these neighbors may have strong American interests.

To conclude very briefly, what can the United States do? Of course, the United States, its NATO allies, other countries can intervene and help one side win. We saw this in Libya. To me, that's a very unusual confluence of events that led to the Libyan intervention, and I recommend you read Akram al-Turk's chapter on Libya for a great description.

But beyond that, there is a question of what U.S. forces will do -- or excuse me, what the United States can do if it's not going to intervene militarily. Because this raises a huge question, right? We saw this in Libya, we see it today, which is after victory, what is the international community's role? What is America's role?

Ken mentioned the importance of aid. That's extremely important, but in countries like Libya, the challenge is even more than just infusions of capital. There are questions of creating institutions, healing wounds, and here in the United States other scan play a role but it's extremely difficult.

However, I think the biggest issue is political. There is, I would say, no eagerness on either side of the political aisle for further

intervention in the Middle East. The United States is leaving Iraq as quickly as possible. In Afghanistan, there are plans for a draw down. There has been no appetite for serious engagement in Libya after Qaddafi's fall. And so with this political dynamic in mind the role of the United States, which has seen its stature diminish in the region, is actually going to be somewhat limited. And often, the United States is going to be left with not solving the problems, but managing the problems. So, be managing unrest. It will be trying to limit spillover, it will be trying to care for refugees.

And perhaps the biggest role the United States can play is actually trying to contain these conflicts and stop neighbors from intervening. And so again, this is, I'm going to say, a 50 percent solution. It's probably not even that. But I think U.S. policy is going to be driven in part by political dynamics that are going to limit involvement, rather than broader questions of what is the best thing the United States can do for the region.

Let me stop there.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Dan. Mike, you want to talk to us a little bit about new media?

MR. DORAN: Thanks a lot, Ken. I would like to thank all of you for coming.

This book was a great opportunity for me. When I was in government, I was involved in a lot of discussions about new media but I'd never really sat down and tried to think about it in a systematic fashion, and so this was an opportunity for me not just to think about what was going on in the Arab world, but to also familiarize myself a little bit with the debate about new media and try to figure out how the events in the Arab world fit into that larger debate. For me, it was really a great opportunity and absolutely fascinating.

The debate that was going on when this all broke, for me, can kind of be summarized between Clay Shirky, who wrote a book called, *Here Comes Everybody*, and of Evgeny Morozov who wrote a book called, *The Net Delusion*. I highly recommend both of them, by the way, if you want to get a sense of just where the polls are.

Clay Shirky is optimistic, says that the new media is a liberating tool. It shifts the power between ruler and ruled and allows people to organize from below. And Evgeny Morozov, who comes from Belarus where there is new media but no political opening, he says, don't kid yourself, the new media gives the government all kinds of opportunities to ride herd over the political process, to spy on people, and to control them, basically.

Now when this all broke in January and February of last

year, there was a tremendous amount of excitement. And some of the people who wrote about this or who spoke about this were clearly on the Clay Shirky side of the debate. The most striking one was Wael Ghonim, the Google executive in Egypt. He was talking on the day that Mubarak stepped down, he was talking to Wolf Blitzer on CNN and he said, if you want to understand this revolution you have to understand that this revolution began on Facebook. It's Facebook that created this. And if you want to liberate people just give them Facebook and that will lead to democracy.

So for me, I thought this was kind of an interesting thesis to say. Is it true -- there's sort of two parts to it. One, is it true that the new media was really a primary driver of events in the Arab world, number one? And number two, is it true that this will inevitably lead to democracy?

And I come out in a kind of -- in the mushy middle, and I'll just describe the mushy middle to you. I think when you look at this, it's very hard to say, was it a primary cause? But I think it's undeniable, for me at least. It's undeniable that the new media played a major role.

The image that -- there are two images that really strike me. One image and one statement from these events. The most striking image, for me, was a picture of Ben Ali standing in the hospital room next to Mohamed Bouazizi, the fruit vendor who in January lit himself on fire.

He was -- he struggled for his life for a short period of time before he died. He was in the hospital, he was wrapped in bandages from head to toe, just a complete mummy. And Ben Ali, under the pressure of public opinion, felt compelled to go to the hospital and show his concern for Mohamed Bouazizi, and it was the most awkward photograph. This is a man who is not used to actually having to respond to public opinion in any way, and he went there and he stood next to Bouazizi. It didn't help him, within two weeks he was gone. It's a really absolutely striking image.

The second one is a statement by Bashar al Assad, which in his *Wall Street Journal* interview of last January, where he was asked, you know, in light of what's happened in Syria, in light of what's happened in Egypt, aren't you going to have to reform? And he said, no. He said, look, if I were to do that, that would be a reaction. And if you're in the position of not taking actions but having reactions, you've lost.

Now, since then we know he's been doing nothing for the last six or eight months but reacting. But it was a beautiful statement, I thought -- beautiful is the wrong word, but the perfect statement of the Middle Eastern dictator's belief that he has no need whatsoever to respond to public opinion.

Now, I think the new media has done a lot to force a measure of accountability on Middle Eastern rulers, and it's for three

reasons. One is it's created a kind of virtual opposition culture where people in relative safety can discuss politics and discuss what it is about the existing order that disturbs them. And it's not just having this discussion, but it can also develop a kind of running critique of what's going on in the country. New symbols, new narratives, and so forth can develop in a way that was impossible before the new media.

The second thing that they can do is it allows them to organize spontaneously. There's a nice book I'd recommend, it's almost out of date now. It's from the early part of the last decade by a man named Howard Rheingold. He was the first one to really, I think, recognize the political potential of the cell phone. And he wrote a book called, *Smart Mobs*. It basically just says that this tool is going to allow people to -- leaderless organization to develop, and this is going to have a massive political impact.

And that's what we've been seeing in the Middle East is spontaneous, leaderless organization. And as Dan said, this has totally taken all of the Middle Eastern rulers by surprise. It's part of the power as well as the surprise effect.

The third thing that the new media does is it allows opposition groups to get their message out domestically, but also globally, and to get it out instantaneously and very widely.

Now, there are a few, I think, comparisons that I make in the article that help show the power of these factors, but also I think their limitations. Both of the examples I used come from Syria. I think Syria is sort of a great test case in all of this because we had their -- you know, basically a Stalinist dictatorship where there was no ability of people to organize politically on the ground.

And you can see the power in the new media if you just do -- if you compare the Hama massacre of 1982 with the events of the present. In 1982, even people who were following events -- even people in government who were following events didn't know much about the massacre when it took place. About a week afterwards, news started trickling out of Syria that something really nasty happened in Hama, but the whole thing was over before the world was really aware that it had taken place.

It's striking to think, 1982. I was an adult. I hate to think that I'm that old, actually, but I was an adult when that took place, and just think about how much the world has changed. That is absolutely impossible in our world today. If you think about the events when they broke out in Syria, the opposition broke out in Syria, within a month Human Rights Watch had a very detailed report about what was going on in Syria, had it published, right? It's a completely different world in that

regard.

Now, in addition, the opposition was able to get a continuous narrative of events out to the world and it had a real political effect. Just two quick examples. The Qataris and the Turks both started to change their attitude toward the regime. This was striking because both of these countries had worked very hard to rehabilitate the Assad regime, and they -- I think largely for reasons of public opinion, they were forced to shift and distanced themselves considerably from the regime.

So, I think for me it's undeniable that this has really changed the world, but there are also limitations and I think you can see them in Syria as well. These tools are most effective in countries where there is already a modicum of freedom and independence, where people can already organize to a certain extent and it then has a kind of exponential increase.

In a place like Syria where the government is going to clamp down on you and it is not inhibited in any way and is willing to use force, is willing also to now -- I understand the security services are making people when they come off the plane open up their computer and open up their Facebook page and give their passwords, and they're using this then to track their activities online. So now, if you want to -- if you're a Syrian and you want to use Facebook and effectively you have to set up a completely

different persona, and even that can be cracked by the government.

And then there's another comparison to be made that shows the limitations, and I think that's between Egypt and Syria. And, you know, if you ask why was all this pressure brought to bear in Egypt, new media is part of it but let's not forget as well the old media. The events in Tahrir Square were under the Klieg lights of CNN. There was 24/7 coverage by the old media, or at least by cable news if we can now call that old media. And in Syria, there was no similar way -- the opposition has not been as successful at dramatizing their struggle with the regime and putting it on the international agenda in a continuous fashion.

So just to sum up, then, I'd say absolutely this has had a massive impact. I think it's created a new world. I think there's going to be a level of accountability in Middle Eastern politics that we haven't seen before because of the new media. But there are limitations to this, and let's not also forget what Dan said, that was the element of surprise.

The dictators are going to -- they're not just going to sit around like potted plants. They are going to respond, they are going to come up with strategies for dealing with this, and like the Belarus government they're going to become much more sophisticated at manipulating public opinion and at playing an authoritarian public opinion game that they've never had to play before.

So, I think that's an open question as to where this is going to lead in the end, but it's a very dramatic story. Thank you.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Mike. Okay, let's shift things a little bit and go over to Doha, where also we have an audience in Doha. Welcome, *ahan*, to all of you.

And Salman, tell us a little bit more about what's going on in Syria these days.

MR. SHAIKH: My pleasure. It's a pleasure to join you, Ken, and colleagues, and of course the guests in both Washington and Doha. Particularly in Doha, it's the start of the weekend so it's wonderful to have so many of you here.

Let me also say a particular word for the guy who just spoke, Mike Doran, with whom I co-authored the chapter on Syria and also on Bahrain. I guess on the face of it, we're quite strange bedfellows. But Mike, it was a pleasure to share a bed with you on this.

I guess I'll go quickly through perhaps some of the more salient points (inaudible).

MR. POLLACK: The Brookings Institution takes no position on what its fellows do in their after-hours activities. I simply feel the need to say that. Please proceed, Salman.

MR. SHAIKH: More seriously --

MR. DORAN: I'm not saying anything.

MR. SHAIKH: Good. More seriously, on Syria. I think I'll quickly just map out some of the main points we made in the chapter and then perhaps talk about the current phase. Of course it started as it always did in these revolutions with people, and particularly these 15 boys in Dara. And of course, it showed the response of the regime, which frankly was the use of force, and only then catalyzed the revolution further.

What we tried to lay out, how the regime has been its own worst enemy and has made mistake after mistake, at least in the initial few months of the revolution, you had this pattern of protests, the use of force, and then funerals which were then stamped down on. And that is, of course, what led to -- we believe -- to the slow-motion erosion, and now we believe impending collapse, though it may not happen anytime soon, of the regime.

We also go into the Assad and reform dogma that many have established the debate about whether the Assad regime could reform, a debate not only in our chapter but which, of course, has been prevalent on the international scene as well. And particularly, I think, with Mike's insightful commentary on this, how the police state and the effect that's been established in Syria routinized and rationalized violence, and how the Baath party -- the sole legitimate political organization in the

country still, despite the Office of Reform -- is a primary function for preserving the ruling family's monopoly on political activity.

Then we go a little bit into the family itself, which is the center of what we call the deep state around which -- which is an LOE dominated network of security officers and also business cronies that have supported the regime.

Then moving forward, even when we were writing in the summer sketched out how the status quo was not sustainable and that there were, in effect, three scenarios regarding the regime itself. One was a regime-led transition. This was something that the United States administration, too, clung onto the idea of for quite a long time, as well as others in the international community. This, of course -- the United States policy changed in the middle of all this and we've seen a change also from Europe and now most recently, I believe, from the majority of the Arab League and an Arab consensus developing that that's not possible.

More crucially we've seen, I think, an opposition in Syria which is now -- the majority view expressed is that you can't have a regime-led transition. You need to start preparing for a post-Assad Syria.

A second scenario that we pointed to was regime disintegration, and yet as Dan pointed out what we've seen from the Assad regime is a clinging to power. And the deep state that Mike and I

talk about -- at it's core, which has LOE officers and the business league, certainly gives us the notion that we're not going to see any orderly collapse of the regime anytime soon.

The third scenario is the one that we point to in particular, is a slow-motion collapse of the regime which would produce a fair degree of instability inside the country, in fact leading to a de facto armed or militarization of the conflict, and instability and spillover across Syria's borders. I think that is a scenario in which we're entering into right now. In fact, I would say that the Syrian revolution has now entered a new phase, more militarized under ground, and its dimensions with that potential for spillover which will draw in regional and international actors.

In fact, furthermore I'd say the events of recent weeks were just in the last 15, 16 days we've had more than 300 people killed, the highest number we've seen anywhere, has finally closed the window on hopes for an orderly or negotiated transition in Syria.

There's a lot of talk, just to sort of conclude, there's a lot of talk about is Syria on a Libya track? And I thought I'd just dwell on that for a couple of minutes. On the face of it I would say, yes, though the timeframe is so much longer. What took a month, month-and-a-half in the case of Libya is taking eight, nine months. First and foremost, we now do see the makings of an international coalition, which is regional, Arab, and

Western in its nature, which will seek to pressure and isolate the regime and which will focus on the protection of civilians, in particular, in Syria, and human rights.

Secondly, I suspect that we will be back into the Security Council in the not-too-distant future, and a push for more multilateral sanctions against the regime. The U.N. Human Rights Committee Commission of Inquiry Report is also out towards the end of the month. I suspect there we will also see a recommendation to the Security Council, and perhaps for great ascension, which I guess will feed into the debates and the Security Council itself.

The third area where there are similarities is now working with the opposition. There's much been made of a divided Syrian opposition. I would say, well how could you not expect that to be so after 40-odd years of being torn apart. But certainly there's been a period of conversion, and now it seems, as I said earlier, there is now at least a convergence on a post-Assad Syria and dialogue on how to achieve that transition.

And in that respect, of course, the international community will be, I guess, working more in earnest with them in the days and weeks ahead. The one thing we haven't yet seen is a contact group on Syria, rather like we saw on Libya in the early stages, something that Mike and I

actually do put forward as a conclusion for the United States to help galvanize and support.

We also talk about encouraging defections of the military. Now that's become a key factor in what has now become the militarization of the conflict. Where Libya and Syria diverge is on the question of military intervention. I don't see that we are going to see, given -- and we've heard loud and clear statements from NATO, Secretary General, as well as from Western leaders that we're likely to see a Western military intervention here. Instead, I think there is more and more talk about establishing buffer zones on the borders of Syria, if not to protect civilians, which could also serve as a safe ground for some of those army defectors.

This is, I guess, all to play out, but certainly I think the new phase will likely be bloodier and it will tax the international community -- all of the international community, particularly also other members of the Security Council, like Russia and China in the days ahead.

Thank you.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Salman. Okay, so hopefully we have whet your appetite. We've given you a taste of what's in the book, told you a little bit about some of the chapeau chapters, about one of the functional chapters, about one of the country chapters.

We have with us today here at this table and in Doha 11 of

the 18 authors, and together we wrote 26 of the 36 chapters. And we are delighted to take your questions. I think what we'll do is, perhaps, we'll take a few here, we'll take a few in Doha, and then we'll give different folks on the panel an opportunity to answer them. And I'm going to, with all due respect to my colleagues and myself who spoke, I'm going to give pride of place to those who haven't had a chance to speak, if only to let you all hear different voices for a change.

So, Said why don't you start us off?

MR. ARIKAT: My name is Said Arikat from *Al Quds* daily newspaper. You know, the last time the Arabs had an awakening, they ended up with fragmentation, colonialism, refugees, and so on. So, one must look at what the possibilities are for this new awakening.

And second, Salman's last point. What is the possibility for a military coup in Syria? Is that window still open? Thank you.

MR. POLLACK: Let's take a few more here. Gary?

MR. MITCHELL: Ken, thanks. I'm Gary Mitchell and I write the *Mitchell Report*. And I was -- I want to come back to your opening remarks in which you talked about this process that you all went through. And one of the questions that came to mind for me at the time was, I gather when we read this book we'll get a sense of how you all sort of came together to articulate points of view in the three sort of areas that

you talked about.

Is it possible that you could share with us whether it's on the thematic component or other components where this group of people was most at odds -- the issues or the ideas on which there was the greatest amount of differences of opinion?

MR. POLLACK: Great question. Salman, you want to -- Ibrahim? You want to give us two questions from Doha, and then we'll turn to the panel for some answers?

MR. SHAIKH: Yes, please. Sir.

SPEAKER: Hi, (inaudible). My question is, maybe in the second edition of the book -- I was looking for a chapter on the response of the dictators collectively, if you like, cooperating to ensure the failure of Arab Spring.

For example, the role of Saudi Arabia not only in Bahrain and Yemen and, you know, the rest of the Gulf, but also for example, Egypt, where it's alleged they were pouring money, for example, to get certain select groups to create trouble or for example -- et cetera.

So, it would be nice to see how the counterattack -- you know, to address that issue and actually have a chapter on that so that we can understand this issue and see if there can be a regional response to the regional counterattack. Thank you.

MR. POLLACK: Great. Should we take another one from Doha? Okay, why don't we take another one from here? Why don't we go all the way into the back?

MR. AFTANDILIAN: Yes, my name is Greg Aftandilian, independent consultant. My question deals with U.S. policy and U.S. assistance for groups like civil society in the Middle East. This is a big problem, particularly in a country like Egypt where U.S. funding for NGOs and civil society groups has now become a hot-button political issue. How does the U.S. maneuver to assist the development of democracy when there's these counterattacks?

Thank you.

MR. POLLACK: Great questions, Greg. Okay, these are some terrific questions. Shibley, would you like to start us off with the Arab awakening and then we'll kind of move around the panel to deal with some of these other great questions.

MR. TELHAMI: Yes, that's really a great question, Said. And I think, it gets at the title of the book that we haven't talked about, why did we choose Arab awakening? Because we all, I think, agree it is primarily a great Arab public awakening.

There have been, as you mentioned, other Arab awakenings before, so this is not the only one. In fact, originally we were going with

the theme, "The Great Arab Awakening," because nothing on this scale. But there is something really different about this one, and we have to understand it. I mean, if I had to come up with a word, I would say public empowerment and the empowerment of the individual. Because I think if you look at the dynamics of what have enabled this, what makes this different, it's not that Arabs now suddenly are aware of the world. They have been aware for a couple of decades, actually, because of the information revolution that started before. Governments lost monopoly over information a long time ago.

What happened here is that particularly with the addition of this new element, not just the satellite television and the availability of information but the interactive part of it, the Internet and the social media -- which expanded, by the way, on a scale that is faster than you can imagine. Five years ago when I was conducting my polls about the use of the Internet, I didn't have enough users to be able to do statistical analysis in the Arab world. In this year, we have the public opinion poll we're releasing on Monday here in this room at 2 o'clock, the annual Arab Public Opinion Poll. There is a question about the Internet. More than a third of the Arabs say that they've gotten the use of the Internet only in the past three years, so this is expanding on a scale that is rapid.

What I believe this has done, it has done two things. One,

it's given instruments and mobilization in ways we have not seen before. I mean, if you look at what made this revolution particularly unique is that in the past we knew the Arabs were angry. There was not a surprise about that. I've been documenting this for a decade, you know, and the question was why haven't Arabs revolted already? Not the question in 2010, 2009.

But the answer was always, look, you need political organizations, social organizations, charismatic leadership. And in this particular case, no question that you had mobilization that didn't require it because of these new instruments that have become available to the public. And with that, I think there's an individual empowerment, not just collective empowerment, on a scale we haven't seen before.

So I think that while the ending is unknown and is going to vary from place to place, that the actual empowerment is not going to go away. In ways that -- no matter what happens, even given what Michael said about the ability of governments and rulers to exploit globalization and information revolutions for their end. Inevitably, that's going to happen, but there is a new element in the mixture. It doesn't determine the outcome, but it makes it go in a particularly different direction from before.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Shibley. Salman, you want to say a few words about the possibility of military coup in Syria? Mike, if

you also wanted to chime in, you're welcome.

MR. SHAIKH: Well, it's an interesting one.

I'm not sure whether that would occur, but certainly even speaking to some members of the opposition there is a thought that somehow if they could get particularly some of the core LOE officer corps to turn against the family, that may be -- and then engage in a discussion on orderly transition to democratic future for Syria, and that would be one of the preferred scenarios. Whether or not that is possible, I think perhaps it needs to be tested out. Maybe there needs to be some quiet ability to reach out, whether it's Arab governments or others, to particular key figures in that respect.

Mike may have something.

MR. DORAN: Just one little point, really more of a question than a statement. Something that I've been wondering about, and I don't have a good answer to it is, how are the Iranians going to respond to what's going on? They've already shifted their policy somewhat. They don't want to be seen publicly to be completely on the side of the Assad regime when it's carrying out rapacious attacks against its own population.

On the other hand, they have tremendous strategic assets in their relationship with Assad, and they're going to be sitting in Tehran thinking about how do we hold onto what we have there, and, in particular,

our channel to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

And it seems to me that one of the options they will be debating, if they're not debating it already is, can they orchestrate a coup d'etat to push the Assad regime aside to create a new order that will look after their strategic assets? Now, I would love to be a fly on the wall to hear that discussion. They may conclude that they can't do it, that it's impossible. But I think it's just important for us to remember that they're there on the other side trying to figure out how to manipulate these events to their advantage. Exactly what's going to happen, I don't know.

MR. POLLACK: Gary, all of you probably not will be surprised to hear that the area where we did have these differences among us was on the peace process. And what I'll say is, we were all in agreement that the peace process was a critical aspect of the Arab awakening, that the Arab awakening was going to have an impact on the peace process itself. I actually think that there was quite a bit of agreement about many of those features. But there were some specific disagreements, in particular about how much in the recommendation section of different chapters the peace process ought to figure in there.

And what I thought I would do is, just because it is such a -- well, it should be such a hot topic but it's dead as a doornail in Washington at the moment -- that I thought I would allow one of the co-authors of our

chapter on the peace process and the author on the chapter on the Palestinians, Khaled Elgindy, to say a few words about the peace process and its relationship to the Arab Spring. And then, maybe turn to Mike who has a somewhat, I think, different perspective on certain aspects.

So, Khaled?

MR. ELGINDY: Thanks, Ken. Of course, it is no surprise that out of all the issues where there would be disagreement, I think it's a safe bet that there be a high degree of disagreement on the peace process. Not only where do we go from here, but what is the status of the peace process?

I think Salman and I, in our chapter, I think we make a fairly clear -- and I think it's become even more clear -- that the peace process is, for all intents and purposes -- or at least as we knew it -- no longer exists, which is both good and bad, I think. I think it's an opportunity to reinvent or recreate or rethink a process that has not changed, which is quite remarkable given the dramatic changes happening in the region.

And I think this is the one thing that in writing this chapter and in thinking about this issue, has struck me the most. Here you have a peace process; the tools, the approach, the dynamic, the formulas that are used are identical to the ones that have been used a decade ago. And in the meantime, the earth has shifted under the feet of this process, and it

seems logical that something would have to give. We're using old, expired tools to address a problem that is being recreated. The conflict has changed in the past 10 years and has been dramatically affected by the events in the region. There's no surprise, and I think it continues to be very fluid.

MR. POLLACK: Mike, you want to?

MR. DORAN: I had a slightly different perspective, and based on four points which I'll just quickly hit.

One, I thought that the world is changing so quickly in the Middle East, and all of the major actors who play a role in the peace process are shaken, confused, so I thought the possibility of any of them taking significant risks in such an uncertain environment was small -- was nonexistent, really. So I thought it shouldn't be pushed.

And then in general, though, I have a slightly different perspective than a lot of my colleagues do. I always see from an American strategic point of view the conflicts among the Arabs and among the Middle Easterners in general for power and authority in the region as the strategic core from Washington's point of view. And I thought that the Arab Spring actually is kind of -- from my perspective, has shown that to be the case. I thought that's where we ought to be putting our emphasis.

So it's not that I don't think the peace process is important,

but I don't think it's the strategically central issue. And for me, the absolutely strategically central issue is the place of Iran, the question that - in the regional balance of power. So, I think issue that the Obama Administration ought to be waking up every morning and asking itself is, how is each one of these arenas -- how is it impacting the balance of power between the United States and Iran? And I think that that aspect is what we ought to be focusing on regionally, but also I think it has a tremendous amount of importance for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We'll have a much better chance of having a successful peace process if we can weaken Iran.

And then the fourth point is that in general, even before this, I feel that the chance of peace is pretty slim but we have to be involved, so we ought to be thinking about sort of long-term policies that could change the structure on the ground so that when an opportune political moment comes, we'll be able to seize on it. But it's very hard to get policymakers to think of kind of the five-year plan.

That's what I think we should be talking about.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Mike. For Belal in Doha, your question is a great one and I promise you that it was a very important theme in the book. Bruce Riedel's chapter on Saudi Arabia, the first sentence of the second paragraph is, since then, the kingdom has

become the de facto leader of the counterrevolution in the Arab world.

And in the chapters where we talk about reform and how to enable it and on Saudi Arabia and on the changing geopolitics, in every one of those chapters we dealt with this specific issue.

But I thought I would bring in Suzanne Maloney to talk a little bit more about this, who not only wrote our chapter on Iran, she also authored the chapter that deals with Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman.

MS. MALONEY: Thanks, Ken. And I'll just say a word about the issue of Saudi Arabia, the issue of the Gulf, but also chime in on the question of Iran, which Mike has now tempted me with on multiple occasions. (Laughter)

You know, I think it's evident to everyone that there has been a sort of new Cold War set off between Iran and Saudi Arabia, in part as a result of the events of the past year across the region, in large part because of the way that the Saudis have identified this process of change that's unfolding as a threat to their own interests, and in the way that it has further distorted and further, I think, deteriorated the relationship that has always existed between Washington and Riyadh. The very close cooperation remains, but there is a sense of, I think, betrayal on the part of the Saudis that has motivated their actions that appears to be driving a sense of independence and autonomy. And I think what we're going to

see is increasing frictions between both U.S. interests, but also some of Saudi's neighbors' interest in the way that the Saudis conduct their policies.

I will say just a word about the smaller Gulf states, because I think they're important and they do tend to be overlooked. It's hard in the arc of everything that's happening across the Middle East, you know, dramatic events, whether it's Tahrir Square or Syria this week. You know, there's a lot else happening. There's politics happening everywhere and there's change happening everywhere, and we've seen in the four Gulf states that I had the opportunity to take a look at for this book a variety of different responses, to some extent, reinforcing some of the traditional tendencies of different countries, but also bringing new fissures to light as well.

So, we have in Qatar a process of top-down -- aggressive top-down reform, which has been, if anything, reinforced by events of the past year, but perhaps more important, this kind of opportunistic aggressive, assertive diplomatic stature that the Qataris have assumed. We have in Kuwait a reinforcement of the kind of traditional and unfortunate process of dysfunctional government. Democracy, in part, but very dysfunctional. We have in Oman really a very low-level, but important, set of protests that have occurred, and ongoing violence that

has occurred that should not be ignored in the wake of everything else that's happening. And we have in the United Arab Emirates an even closer identification with Saudi policy, a conservative and a very defensive reaction to the very modest amount of protest and unrest that they've seen in their own country.

What happens in all of these countries will be very important for a variety of different reasons: in the way that it shapes Saudi policy, and the way that it shapes the overall regional balance of power, and of course in the way that it shapes energy and the future of energy production and transportation.

Let me just say one quick word about Iran, because I would come at it in a very different place than what Mike just described. I think one of the great tragedies of U.S. policy over the course of the past decade in particular has been an almost obsessive focus on Iran as the source of all evil and the root of all problems. And this identification of U.S. interest in very much a zero sum way, with respect to Iran, to the extent that the Iranians are popular, however we might measure that. We must be, therefore, less popular.

I don't think this is, in fact, accurate and I think if anything that sort of a view only aggrandizes the Iranians and only plays into their own narrative. In fact, I think our interests can be advanced irrespective of

where and how the Iranians might see some benefit from the fallout of the Arab Spring. And I think we ought to be focusing on enhancing the process of change and ensuring a successful transition in countries like Tunisia and Egypt, as well as helping our other allies across the region make those transitions, and that in and of itself is going to weaken Iran much more thoroughly than anything else the Iranians can do.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Suzanne. And then for Greg's great question on civil society --

SPEAKER: Ken?

MR. POLLACK: I'd like to turn to Ibrahim Sharqieh in Doha, to Steve Grand here. Both of them have had a lot to do with this question about civil society. And then I'd also like to bring in Ruth Santini, who wrote our chapter on Europe, because obviously Europe can play a very important potential role, in particular, in this kind of bottom-up process.

So, Ibrahim? We'll start with you.

MR. SHARQIEH: Thank you, Ken. Actually, I would like to add to what Suzanne explained about the dictator's response, which is a very important question, I believe. Which is something that we ought to notice while there was a constant demand across the region by the people calling for freedom and democracy and change of their status quo, there has been a variation within the dictator's response to this, where in one of

the pieces I wrote, you know, how dictators are inspiring dictators. We are drawing lessons and trying different approaches that haven't been tried in other countries, while trying to sort out the Arab Spring of their own countries.

So while we see leaders escaping in Tunisia, a defeat in Egypt, and we see a whole different approach in Yemen, where we see a president that has been using a whole different approach of maneuvering and draining the resources of the protestors and trying to exhaust them in the process and (inaudible) we see a military confrontation in Syria and other countries, in particular Morocco and Jordan, trying to advance the response to them. And so it's very interesting how the regimes' level of variation and response, you know, to the Arab Spring in their own countries. So, that is -- I think we should continue to see this as continuing on the same level, where if an approach is not working, then we probably are seeing other approaches are being tried.

On the civil society question, which is a very important question at this time, this is in particular a question to the U.S. policy and how responding to this and how working with the civil society organization -- unfortunately, that has been, to a large extent, ignored at this particular point. Probably the way I see this is as part of the larger failure of the U.S. policy to respond effectively to the Arab Spring and to be responsive

enough that civil society organizations are, unfortunately, not supported to the level they should be supported. However, they are taking the most active role in the entire region.

So in Yemen, for example, we are seeing civil society organizations taking the lead on a peaceful protest that started over 10 months ago in a country that has over 60 million machine guns, while for 25 million people -- while the credit of this commitment, incredible commitment to peaceful change, has been attributed largely to the role of the civil society and their public awareness and their being with the people in the streets, and in the Tahrir Square praising and promoting the commitment to peaceful change. So, they are taking a real leadership role, and for the first time -- not a surprise -- where the first Arab woman to be the Nobel Peace Prize winner is to be a civil society leader in Yemen.

So, this is the civil society organizations are taking really incredible roles in this, in advancing and promoting the change and the peaceful change in the Arab region while probably not receiving enough attention from others.

Thank you.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Ibrahim. Steve?

MR. GRAND: Just to build on what Ibrahim said. We talk in the book about a variety of ways in which the United States could help

these processes. We talk about military-to-military assistance, we talk about economic assistance, and the importance of democracy delivering the economic goods. I would argue that citizens are probably willing to be patient as these processes play out, but not too patient. They expect not just democracy, but they're also looking for better economic conditions. We also talk about the importance of institution-building and getting institutions right and setting up checks on executive power and that, too, is critically important.

The third piece in the assistance realm is this aspect of public empowerment that Shibley talked about. What's really different about this Arab awakening is that the Arab publics have found their voice and are making their voice in political life, and that's really what's important and distinct about recent developments. And we should find ways to support those, and I think this is an area -- the first three types of assistance that I talked about we've done before and we've done a lot, and we're fairly good at, in the area of supporting civil society, civic empowerment, supporting -- giving people new perspectives by getting them in and out of the region.

These are areas where I think a lot more creativity could be brought to the table, and there really should be effort to innovate and find new ways to push this process of social and cultural change that we've seen in

the region over the last, really, three to four decades as people have had the opportunity to travel, people have had the opportunity to study abroad, people have had the opportunity to participate in satellite television, in the new media. We have a chance to sort of build upon those processes.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Steve. And Ruth? Do the Europeans know something that we don't know?

MS. SANTINI: I wish. Thanks, Ken.

Just a couple of quick quotes on Europe. As you might imagine, Europe was very much taken aback when the uprisings erupted and happened in the region. And Europe has got a series of legal frameworks for its relations with the Middle East and North Africa, partly overlapping and partly complementary.

The Barcelona Process, which is called the Euro-Mediterranean Process, and then the European Neighborhood Policy and then the Union for the Mediterranean -- but out of these different legal and policy frameworks, there has always been a sort of lack of strategic horizon for Europe's relations with the region. And the Arab uprisings have actually shown the extent to which Europe has been struggling to formulate a new approach to deal with the region.

So, of course, there have been new strategies and communications from the European Commission coming up, in terms of

devising new areas of cooperation where the EU might have a bigger impact. Of course, everyone thinks about what Catherine Ashton has formulated as the 3-M, so, increased market openings, increased mobility, increased -- sorry, this is market, mobility, and money -- and increased money. So of course, money is a huge problem. Europe has now committed 4 billion euros for the period between 2011 and 2013 to Tunisia, overall, and this is considered a big amount given especially European financial constraints at the moment.

Of course, the big part of this money comes as loans, and especially through Europe's role in facilitating the role of European and international financial institutions like the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Construction and Development. It's also a lot of reprogrammed money, as Ken was right in pointing out, in the case of the U.S.

Tunisia is a big sort of showcase for Europe. So, if the U.S. are looking at Egypt and for them the key to success in the region in terms of successful transitions is Egypt, Europe has been quite clear in placing a huge weight on how the transition in Tunisia is going. Europe was present in Tunisia with a strong electoral observatory mission, which went well, and it was considered a success in Brussels. It is being increasingly involved in supporting civil society in Tunisia, especially with the European

instrument for democracy and human rights with new funded projects.

On the political level, I think Europe is now confronting a series of challenges. I mean, the 3-M I talked to you about, in terms of market openings, Europe has this huge problem with its Mediterranean members -- Italy, Spain, France, Portugal, and Greece -- who are not willing to open their agricultural markets to imports from North Africa specifically, and the reform of the common agricultural policy in Europe will only happen in three years' time. So, we are not going to see any change in that respect before the cap is going to be reformed in 2014.

In terms of money I don't think we are going to see any kind of improvement, of course, especially given the current financial challenges. And as far as mobility is concerned, mobility policies in Europe are not a domain of the U.S. So, I remember state as having its own migratory policies and agreements on a bilateral basis with the third state.

What the EU is trying now is to push member states to grant bona fide sort of mobility opportunities, not just to businessmen and students and researchers from the Middle East and North Africa, but to any person who might be traveling to Europe for bona fide reasons. But of course, unofficially we know a lot of member states refrain from accepting that kind of framework, so I don't think we are going to see any change in

that respect.

And the last point I want to make is about political vision. I mean, in Europe it's striking how no one talks about how the region is shaping up in terms of new balances of power, politically, at the domestic level. And there hasn't been a debate on how Europe will engage with the Islamist forces in the region. There hasn't been, and this is a domain, of course, of member states, but whereas we have seen much more open debate and discussions in the U.S. policy community and policymaking community, this hasn't been the case in Europe. And we know that some member states are refraining from having that kind of debate, and this is not getting to the top of the EU agenda, which implies that then the EU doesn't have a say and is not talking to Islamists. If not on purely an unofficial in the region, which then of course further diminishes its weight and role and capability to influence developments on the ground.

Last point I want to make is about transatlantic coordination between EU and U.S. in terms of democracy promotion in the region now. The EU appointed a new special representative for the Southern Mediterranean, Bernardino Leon. And of course, the U.S. State Department has got now an Office for Transitions, headed by Bill Taylor.

When I met with Bernardino Leon last week, of course one of the questions was, so what kind of coordination are you envisaging with

your counterpart in the U.S. administration? And the reply was, we will be traveling together to the region. So, again, I don't think we are going to see a stronger coordination in terms of policies, but maybe more coordinated messages from the U.S. and the EU, and an attempt by both sides to bring in regional actors behind important policy decisions in the region.

Thanks.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Ruth. Well, we've kept you longer than we intended, and my apologies to those of you who still have questions, but the one thing that I can say with great confidence is that whatever questions you do have, you will find the answers somewhere in this book. (Laughter)

I hope that you find it useful, I hope that you find it interesting, I hope that you find it thought-provoking, and that it helps you to understand this seminal event in ways that you didn't before you cracked the spine of the *Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East*.

Thank you all very much for coming. (Applause)

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