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THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA: THE PROSPECTS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION AND ARMS CONTROL

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PANEL 1: MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PIFER: Okay, good afternoon. My name is Steven Pifer. I'm a senior fellow and director of the Arms Control Initiative here at Brookings, and it's my pleasure to welcome you to today's discussion. We'll have two panels, the first which will look at missile defense and the prospects for missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia and NATO and Russia, and then the second panel which will look at how this relates to other U.S.-Russian arms control questions and the broader U.S.-Russia relationship.

In the fall of 2009, the Obama Administration made a decision to reconfigure American missile defense plans for Europe. And by putting in a new plan which had a shorter range interceptor missile and a new radar, it seemed to alleviate some of the Russian anxieties about what American missile defense might mean for Russian strategic forces.

But I think it's fair to say that Moscow is not fully persuaded. In November of last year, in Lisbon, NATO leaders met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and they agreed to explore the possibility for NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense. And there has been an active dialogue going on both between NATO and Russia, but also a very intense dialogue between the U.S. Government and the Russian government in bilateral channels. And right now the issue seems to be a disagreement between the sides with the Russians asking for a legal guarantee that Russian strategic forces would not be the target of American missile defense, and with the American administration prepared to offer a political assurance, and that seems to be a stumbling block at this point.

But the game is not over. President Obama and President Medvedev will meet next month in Hawaii on the margins of APEC. And assuming there is no

surprise in the Russian presidential election in March, President Putin may be coming to Chicago for the NATO-Russia Summit in May.

But while you have these official dialogues going on, there's also been a lot of work going on in the non-governmental or Track II world on missile defense. And I'm pleased that for this panel we have two of the key participants in those dialogues.

Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright heads a Track II dialogue with former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and the focus of that dialogue over the last two years has been nuclear arms reductions and U.S.-Russian cooperation to promote nuclear non-proliferation, but it's also had considerable discussion on missile defense and missile defense cooperation.

Secretary Albright, of course, had to deal with these issues while in the government during the Clinton Administration, and also this came up when she headed the group of NATO experts that was doing preparatory work for the strategic concept last year that was adopted by NATO.

We also have former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. He heads a Track II discussion on missile defense cooperation in the context of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, which is an American-Russian-European effort to look at how to promote cooperative security in the European area.

His opposite number is former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov. So he's been involved in these Track II discussions, but also he was very involved in missile defense as deputy national security advisor, and then national security advisor during the Bush 43 term, and also very much involved in efforts during the second term to try to find a way to promote a U.S.-Russian cooperative missile defense system. So we have a lot of expertise here, delighted to have these two guests, and Madam Secretary, why don't you begin?

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, thank you very much, and I'm delighted to be here to talk about this subject. I think that what I'd like to do is to put some of the missile questions within a much larger political context. Some of the things that Steve was saying that I've been doing I think fit into that well.

First of all, I do think there is some regret among the Russians that we hadn't gone forward with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty negotiations and a variety of issues to do with that. But I think that what really is going on is that there's kind of a chicken-and-egg issue in terms of discussing missile defense and Russian -- American-Russian-NATO relations.

The question is whether you can improve on where the relations are before you really begin to talk about how the missile defense systems themselves work or do you, in fact, use the missile defense discussions in order to improve the relationship, and I think by being able to do a real thing, whether, in fact, you do better than having theoretical discussions about what the relationship should be. Let me talk a little bit about the whole strategic concept aspect because it shows up where some of the fissures are on this particular issue. What happened, just to refresh your memory, is -- and at Strasbourg/Kehl on the 60th anniversary of NATO, there had been a decision by the heads of state to have a new strategic concept for NATO. Secretary General Rasmussen was asked to develop that strategic concept. And at the same time, they suggested that there be a group of experts that would give advice to the secretary general on which direction to go.

So each country named an expert. The United States named me. And then what happened was Secretary General Rasmussen decided to make the group of experts contain 12 countries, thereby automatically irritating 16 countries, and then he asked me to chair it. (Laughter)

So it was a very interesting discussion actually, and we covered many, many different aspects and had quite detailed seminars and consultations and public hearings and a variety of ways that we were looking at what was a changed strategic context in many different ways, where were the treats. And frankly, we were still working off of, as far as the Russians were concerned, their not so hidden anger at the expansion of NATO. And so there really were -- that was the context that operated. So first I think there was a question among the allies themselves the extent to which they wanted to go forward with any kind of missile defense, and also a problem in terms of a change of how the missile defense picture was painted from the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration, and some, well, criticism and anger by some of those who thought they were getting radars and then that didn't happen. So there were questions about that, questions generally about how NATO was going to operate in the 21st century out of area, what was the role in Afghanistan, and a variety of issues that covered the whole gamut.

The real question that we had difficulty with was how to even have any kind of discussions with the Russians about a NATO strategic concept. And so while we deliberately had consultations within the alliance itself, just when we went to Moscow, we had to call them conversations or dialogues, but certainly not consultations, because that in itself would kind of break the back of what we were trying to do, so that is the context.

The part that came out from the Russians was, even at that time, that not only were they concerned about the fact that NATO had expanded and we kept going through the same thing -- I really felt Groundhog Day because the number of times I had to explain to President Yeltsin that an expanded NATO was not against them, I had to continue then to explain it to President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin and the others, and basically they still didn't believe that. And in addition to that, they certainly

did not believe that anything to do with missile defense was against Iran, that that seemed like a completely phony issue, and it was really hard to persuade them of that fact.

Nevertheless, we began to talk about what the possibilities were. But I have to say that in some ways, as group of experts, we kind of ducked the issue generally on missile defense because we couldn't find real agreement within the alliance itself; there were differences, as I said. And in many ways my sense was, and still is, that as the alliance has grown, there really are very serious differences between some members and other members, and some of that was evident in the Libya campaign.

So generally, as far as NATO goes, I think that's something that has to be on the table. But also, there really were differences in terms of the relationships with Russia. As one might imagine, the newer members of the alliance continue to be distrustful of Russia, were very happy to have whatever they could against Russia, and, therefore, saying that whatever missile defense had to do with Iran didn't quite suit them either, so it was a difficult discussion to have.

So we kind of kicked the can down the road and said these were discussions that had to take place in Lisbon. And what has happened, in fact, is that as a result of the discussions and the summit at Lisbon, the phased approach has begun, it will continue to go through on missile defense, and I think that we will see an evolution of it and continued discussions of that.

Where we are on the Track II discussion that Steve mentioned is that it is a very compatible group, frankly, of former American political figures and some of their military figures and some scientists, and we don't seem to have that much problem in agreeing on many issues, obviously, under the leadership of Steve. And we had very interesting discussions, and we felt that there was a way that would be useful to move

beyond the New START Treaty and begin to look at a variety of ways that we could deal with sub-strategic weapons and generally try to find more things to talk about.

The problem, and I put this on the table, and Igor Ivanov is the one that has mentioned this over and over again, they don't have a bench of people to really discuss this. The people that used to be the experts on missiles and trajectories and throw weights and placement somehow are out of the business, and I think it really makes a difference. I think that is part of the issue.

And, therefore, I would say that trying to develop a set of discussions as we develop new experts is important. And I personally am in the camp of those who believe that if we go forward with more detailed discussions, it will help the whole atmosphere.

I do think we need to deal with, on the assumption the surest thing in the world is that President Putin will reappear, that -- and I do think also that the whole issue of U.S.-Russia, NATO-Russia discussions will be very much a part of the political campaign. And there is no way I think to avoid the politics of this issue. In the United States generally, I think we've already heard some of it and we have to remember it.

The other part is the money. I think as people begin to look at the defense budget, I think, again, there will be those who are eager to see changes in missile defense, as well as in looking at working on lower levels of missiles themselves as a budget savior and a saving and a good way to go about it, but I think it will have political implications.

So, for me, I think this is a crucial subject. There are a variety of ways that it can be very helpful. I think in our discussions, I happen to believe, and have for a long time, that we need to figure out a practical set of discussions with the Russians. I also believe that NATO-Russia relations are crucial in terms of not only keeping the peace in the region, but also in looking at other areas.

And, therefore, to have a very practical set of talks is useful before everybody that deals with this dies out, and there is not a whole new set of people that are able to do this. And it fits in with the budget discussions and what I think is a very important political agenda.

MR. PIFER: Great, thank you. Mr. Hadley.

MR. HADLEY: I guess I'm in the category of one of those people that's dying out. (Laughter)

MS. ALBRIGHT: The priesthood that's gone on to something.

MR. HADLEY: This is actually not the first time the United States has tried to do missile defense cooperation with first the Soviet Union and then Russia. This is the fourth effort. And it's important to keep that in mind. First was under Bush 41, as we say, '90-'91, with what was called GPALS, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, accidental launches and third country launches. And then I remember getting a call from Strobe Talbott around 1998 to come to the State Department and talk about the discussions of the Ross-Mamedov Group and actually had some unclassified briefing charts we used in those conversations and xeroxed them on the State Department briefing Xerox machine so I could give them to Strobe.

And an effort was made in the Clinton Administration to get talks with Russia on missile defense. And then the Bush 43 Administration tried yet a third time, the Obama Administration trying a fourth.

So this has been -- the thing I would leave you with, this is a serious effort by the United States over four administrations, two Republican, two Democratic, and we have not yet gotten across the goal line. And I think it's difficult and challenging and I think there are a couple reasons for it and we might just take a minute and talk about what those are.

There -- it's full of conundrums. The Russians won't engage on missile defense cooperation unless they're serious about missile defense -- unless we are serious about missile defense. So we get serious about missile defense and we design a program, and we hammer it out within the administration and we hammer it out with the Congress and we get a program and we get it funded, and we tell some people, go execute this program. And we then approach the Russians and say, hey, we're serious about ballistic missile defense, we want to do it cooperatively with you. And the Russians say, but you already have a program; we don't want to be the tail on your dog. We want to start at the beginning and have a conversation and be in on the ground floor of designing the system. So we say, fine, we're in on the ground floor, but, you know, we can't stop what we're doing.

And we get in these conversations and every time we move forward on something in our program the Russians say, see, you're not sincere; we're not really a full partner; this isn't really what we had in mind. And I think we've tripped over that problem every time we've done ballistic missile defense. And when you add in an alliance dimension in doing it NATO, it only compounds the problem.

There are a number of sort of structural problems in this area, as well. One of them is a dilemma. The Bush Administration started talking about ballistic missile defense cooperation against strategic range, long-range ballistic missiles out of Iran. That was something that threatened the United States, we were concerned about, we wanted to get cooperation against that threat. But, of course, defenses against strategic ballistic missiles are exactly what the Russians are most anxious about.

The Obama Administration has gone other way, I think wisely, and said, let's start talking about cooperation against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles; defenses of those type much less threatening to Russia because Russia really

doesn't have any of those missiles, so that's a good starting point. But that then is a dilemma for the U.S. Congress because those missiles from a place like Iran don't threaten the United States, so it looks like we're funding a system to protect Europe that has no benefit to the United States. Is Congress going to be willing to fund it?

Third, and finally, there are risks in this cooperation. There is a concern that Russia, because it's anxious about a U.S. missile defense system, if, in a cooperative framework, is given too much access to that system, they actually might be able to do things to disrupt it. And if they get to know too much about that system, given past ties between Russia and Iran, would they pass that information to the Iranians, the person against whom the system is designed to defend?

So it is a tough challenge for all kinds of reasons to get this missile defense cooperation started. It is worth the effort because if we could cooperate on ballistic missile defense, which has been a neuralgic area of disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia, if we could cooperate in this area, I think it would really be just transformative about U.S.-Russian relations and Russia-NATO relations, and that is why it's worth making the effort.

It's also worth making the effort because if we want the Europeans to participate and support this system, I think it is important that we either secure Russian cooperation or at least show that we've made a good faith effort to get Russian cooperation, and that's another reason to do it. But having said all that, it is operationally very difficult. And I think these Track II dialogues really are all trying to do the same thing: Can we come up with a concept for missile defense cooperation between the United States, NATO and Russia that, in some sense, steers that narrow passageway between conservative Russian generals on one side and conservative Senate Republicans on the other?

I think there's a way to do that, a set of principles to do that, and that's really what we've been trying to develop in these Track II efforts that we've all been involved in.

MR. PIFER: Great. Well, let me start by posing one question, which is -- dig down a little bit deeper -- why do you think the Russians are so reluctant? Because it does sound like in the Track II discussions that there's quite a bit of common ground, and I think talking about transparency and what joint centers might look like and things like that. But why is this reaching a bump in Moscow?

MR. HADLEY: A couple of reasons. One, the problem is, look, Russians have always been skeptical about U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts, one of the reasons being, we are technologically well ahead of them. And while we talk about a defense cooperation, in truth, while we're down the road and developing radars and surveillance acquisition and acquisition tracking radars and hit to kill interceptors and all the rest, Russians are way behind. They have some actual very useful early warning radars, some other things that could be provided, but in terms of interceptors that are good against medium-, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, they're really nowhere. So there's a real asymmetry about where we are in our efforts, and the Russians I think feel a sense of inferiority.

Secondly, you know, there are geopolitical problems associated with defense cooperation in what used to be a divided Europe that's still bedevil us. And I didn't really understand, even though I've heard the Russians say this argument over and over again, and I think I finally do, the Russians came forward with a sectoral approach, said let's divide up Europe, we'll protect some, you can protect the others.

Unfortunately, the suggestion was that their sector would include some Baltic states in Central and Eastern Europe. And the Central and Eastern Europeans

said, quite rightly, hey, we're part of NATO, we want to be defended by NATO. We used to be defended by the Soviet Union, that didn't work out for us very well. Thank you very much, we'll pass. We made that point to the Russians.

The Russian problem is, for reasons of sovereignty, they don't like the idea of a NATO system supposedly defending the Baltic states in Central and Eastern Europe, but also have a capability over the territory of the Russian Republic. That makes them nervous because it looks like we potentially might have some capability against their missiles. So there are geopolitical problems.

Third, you know, there are the technical problems. Our experts have gone to the Russians many times over and shown that given the location, the characteristics of Russian missiles, much less the number of missiles, the kinds of systems we're deploying simply as a matter of physics have very limited capability about Russian missiles. We've been over and over it. They don't believe it. And I think they -- whether it's a matter of political -- of technical understanding, and the Russians are very smart about this stuff, or politics, I don't know. I think it's largely the politics.

And my sense, and the secretary may have a different view, one of the reasons we're kind of stuck right now is because I think this issue has run afoul both about succession under the Russian system and a presidential election in our system. And the feeling is that it's just the political decision, that it will take a political decision from the top to do this. And in both political systems, it's just not the time for that political decision.

Until it is, I think the experts will continue to sort of hide behind notions about your systems could threaten ours and we need legally binding assurances. I think we're stuck there until the politics on the two sides get to the point where the two leaders are prepared to decide it's in their interest to give some top down political direction. And

so I think, in some sense, I'm sad to say, we're probably on hold until sometime after 2013. Madam Secretary, you may have a different view, you're closer to this.

MS. ALBRIGHT: No, I have to say, sadly, what you're saying is true, because we ran into this and it wasn't even the middle of the political season. And basically it is very hard to change the Russians' minds about what the United States is doing in Europe. Strobe, it's the stuff that we dealt with over and over again on the founding act and a variety of different things that we talked about over and over again. It's really very repetitive, and part of it has to do with -- I mean, this is all about trust. I mean, the number of times that -- when we were in office of even taking Primakov into the tank and various things of trying to say we could cooperate, we could do any number of things, that trust is not there, not that it was in our day, but at least there were beginnings of it, and that has disappeared for any number of different reasons.

I think also there is the continued problem of the division in the alliance. I hate to say old and new, but there really is a very different view among the Germans, for instance, about what one does about this versus the Poles and the Balts. And I think that, therefore, it's very hard to go in and present a unified picture, even from our side, because -- and that's why in some ways we did kick the can down the road. There were whole issues generally about what the value of nuclear weapons was, and then the larger discussion about the -- how to do the missile defense. And then, also, suggestions like having joint centers, not virtual, but real ones, then ran into issues of who's going to be on our territory. So that lack of trust is really there.

I do also think, and, you know, I have gone over this so many times in my mind -- and again, I look at Strobe because we did this all together -- is, you know, did we respect the Russians enough after the end of the Cold War? We spent a hell of a lot of time respecting the Russians and trying everything that we could to make them feel

good. And the bottom line is that they don't. They, you know, they are not who they were, it's not exactly all our fault. I used to say it isn't that we won the Cold War, they lost the Cold War, and the bottom line is that that still affects it, and nobody represents that more than Putin. And so I think that the people that will do well under him are those who will not buy into, you know, we have to cooperate and some of that inferiority complex that you were talking about.

I also do think that there are, and I'm not an expert on this, but there are enough technical changes in everything all the time that it is possible to get paranoid, you know, to say you aren't filling us in on everything. And some of it is because we keep moving ahead on certain areas and it's hard to keep everybody up to date on it. And so, for me, the circumstances have changed.

The other part that I think is important is to think about the politics of Russia vis-à-vis Iran. All you have to do -- or Syria, or look at what has happening in terms of the politics of Russia towards the changing Middle East is they are not going to sacrifice their potential relationships with those countries at an expense of a possible way that we will agree on this.

So it will be good to sit down and start on this, which is why I think Track II is a really important -- especially when you're not in Track I, you think about Track II. (Laughter)

But I think that you do see -- and there's a capability, I think we all feel this at this point, of a greater honesty in Track II in many ways. I know, speaking for myself, you don't have to censor, you know, you don't have to put everything through the sieve of is this really the government's position. You just say, in my personal view, and it does put some ideas on the table.

And so I do think at difficult times Track II are useful tracks, and Track IV, V and VI. I mean, there are a lot of very different parts of it.

MR. HADLEY: Let me just make a couple things. One of the problems, and we do a lot of thinking about, is it our fault, is it the Russians' fault? Unfortunately, having tried this four times with the Russians over 20+ years and having failed, a number of people have concluded that the Russians don't want ballistic missile defense cooperation. They will play the game only to delay our development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses, and that, you know, that is a reading that the facts would support.

On the other hand, there are a couple positive straws in the wind. One is there is already something called the Cooperative Airspace Initiative that Catherine Kelleher brought to our attention, which actually is a sharing of information about the airspace environment in Europe, Russia, Central/Eastern Europe, Western Europe, in centers -- one located in Warsaw, one located in Moscow -- that get fed information from sites, three in Russia, three in Europe. And our thinking has been maybe we ought to build on that existing infrastructure and existing pattern of cooperation by adding something in ballistic missile defense. So there are some pieces that we can draw.

And then thirdly, I was at Kennebunkport when then President Putin, in I think 2007, the summer of 2007, went before the cameras and repeated what he had said to President Bush privately, which is that he believed cooperation of ballistic missile defense was an area of strategic cooperation between the United States and Russia that could transform the U.S.-Russian relations. And we got similar statements out from President Yeltsin. But the problem is, somehow when that -- and the Russians always end by saying, but now it's a subject for our experts. And somehow when the process of

U.S.-Russian experts sit down, that strategic direction from the top somehow seems to melt away, and that's a problem I think we haven't really solved.

MR. PIFER: Okay. Well, let me open the floor to questions. If I could ask that you first wait for a microphone and then identify yourself with a name and affiliation. Right here.

MR. MASSA: Hello, it's an honor to meet you three. But I have a question concerning we've been talking a lot about the strategic --

MR. PIFER: Who you are. Could you say your name and where you're from?

MR. MASSA: Oh, I'm John Massa and I'm studying at American University. And my question is concerning the economics of Russia and the U.S., because I think we've been talking a lot of this through a defense lens, but maybe I was thinking that wouldn't it be strategically beneficial if we were to, you know, create more trade relations with the U.S. and Russia, maybe get them into the WTO, and then that way the Russians would maybe feel more comfortable when the U.S. puts forth a missile defense program for Europe? Thank you.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, let me just say, I happen to be a believer of bringing Russia into as many fora as possible and that we're much better off discussing things with them, and the idea that they come into the WTO I think makes a lot of sense. But again, let me just say, we are, just in the last few days, hot and heavy into the political season.

And there are those who say there is no way that Russia's coming into the WTO because, still, the human rights situation is not up to snuff. The truth is that they haul out Jackson-Vanik, which I don't think is the issue anymore in terms of the number of Soviet Jews that could get out, but it is the issue that is out there. And then, in

addition to that, there is the problem of their relations with Georgia. And the way that the WTO is set up, Georgia can, in fact, continue to object. And there are -- the Georgia issue actually became very much a political issue during the last presidential campaign. And so I think that it's not just a flat out question as to whether Russia's ready or has the various components that are necessary to be able to be part of the WTO, but the political context in which it is.

And I do think that the issue of -- and I am not here to make political speeches, but I do think that the issue of relations with Russia are going to be very much a part of this presidential campaign, and whether the reset worked or not and who is getting advantages out of it, and is the New START Treaty a good treaty, and the various questions that are out there.

And part of what is also going to happen, this is not just one hand clapping, the bottom line is that we also know some of the things that Putin's been saying. And so -- that have been fairly negative in terms of the relationships that we have, not kind of, Steve, what you said when he came out of Kennebunk.

MR. HADLEY: Right.

MS. ALBRIGHT: So the combination of those pressures, and he's going to have to -- they do have a variety of issues with their defense budgets, how much of the money really goes to defense, what their economy really is, how much they're trading with others, so long as oil prices go up, they're okay, but their economic reforms are not exactly moving very rapidly.

And so I think that it's going to be very much stuck in politics no matter what we want to do.

MR. HADLEY: But you're right, we should be building those economic relations; we have. The Clinton Administration did a lot economically with Russia. The

Bush Administration spent an enormous effort trying to get Russia in WTO. If you talk to Sue Schwab, who is our trade negotiator, spent more time on pork and chicken parts and all that stuff that you do, and the Obama Administration is doing it yet again. Why? Because, you know, Russia has a problem closing on these deals, and it's partly -- it tells you something about the Russian political system.

But I think they have a notion that somehow these doors stay open forever. And as the secretary has suggested, they don't. They've got their politics, we have our politics. So, you know, at some point, they've got to -- you know, there's some doors that are open, but, you know, they've got to find a way to step through them, and it's been a problem.

MR. PIERRE: Andrew Pierre, Global Insights. Yesterday in another setting where our presider today was present, the senior American official dealing with arms control and nuclear issues with Russia spoke about missile defense and the current state of affairs and put quite a bit of emphasis on the P5, the five program members of the Security Council which met in Paris summer and earlier in London, as a possible venue for making headway on some of the particulars of missile defense.

And I'm wondering if our two guests would comment on that venue and (inaudible) basis as being something which could move us forward, and whether, in fact, that would not also lead towards further reductions in strategic nuclear forces possibly involving other three countries. Although my own view is, we're still pretty far from that in terms of the Chinese or even the British and the French.

MR. HADLEY: I'll give a throwaway line and the secretary can give you the real answer, but if you think dealing with the Russians on ballistic missile defense is difficult, the Chinese I think would be almost impossible. But, Madam Secretary.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, I -- maybe it's because I actually spent time at the UN with the P5, is there is nothing ever that is straightforward. You are -- there are tradeoffs that happen all the time. And so you may think that you can focus on ballistic missile defense or even on any kind of missile issue, but something will get thrown in, like, you know, how are you dealing with the North Koreans or what will you do in terms of sanctions on Iran or what will you do about -- I mean, not that the P5 has to take place within the Security Council, it would obviously take place outside or in the Disarmament Commission, but the bottom line is that it is difficult because they come with their own agenda.

The argument, however, always on the other side is that if we dealt with ballistic missile defense in more than just a bilateral context, you actually might be able to get something done as one of the suggestions. But I have a feeling it's always -- it's whatever you're not doing that you think you would do better than what you are doing, mainly because you're stuck. And stuck, some of it for technical reasons and some of it because these political desiderata really do come into this. And I think this is not going to be an easy time in so many different ways to tackle problems that are this complicated. I wish it were because it's dangerous, so.

MS. SACHENKO: Thank you. Julia Sachenko, Voice of America Russian Service. I just wanted to ask our honorable speakers to comment on how the problems with missile defense reflect on the policy of reset. Yesterday it was mentioned at another conference at the Heritage Foundation that the reset is a massive failure and the prominent Russian opposition activist Garry Kasparov actually mentioned that the reset is the biggest success of KGB, which he probably meant that it was FSB, but never mind. So I just wanted to hear your opinion on that. Thank you.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, I happen to think that actually it's been quite a success. I do think the New START Treaty is a very important step forward. It set a whole set of lower limits. It was, I think, a step forward in terms of the capability to negotiate. It, I think, put forward President Obama's or is the keystone of President Obama's nuclear nonproliferation policy, the Prague Agenda in a variety of aspects. So I don't think it is -- I actually think that it was a very good step forward. We cannot afford to be in a totally negative relationship with Russia. And so the question is, you can take the -- you know, you can't do -- pull up the plant every day to see how it's growing, but you have to figure out that this is a step-by-step process and believe that we need to try to improve our relations, and the question is whether it is by doing specific things or working together in a third area.

So what were you going to do if there wasn't going to be a reset? I think, with all due respect, people say that at the end of the Bush term that relations were not very good. They began pretty well, and then I think that, for a number of different reasons, they deteriorated, and I do think that President Obama moved it forward.

It does not mean that all the problems are solved. We have seen that, and some of it has to do with internal Russian politics, I do believe that. And I think that generally the question about how the entire economic situation internationally plays on this, too.

MR. HADLEY: I think we have to remember why we needed a reset, and it was because Russia went into Georgia. And Europe and the United States decided that there was a substantial risk that if Russia succeeded in Georgia in topping a democratically elected government, it would embolden them to do something in the Crimea and Ukraine, and maybe even the Baltics. And so the United States and Europe and other countries working together, we threw our relations with Russia into the toilet to

make the point to Russia that in the 21st century you could not operate based on the rules of the 19th and 20th century. That was not on and that was not going to be Russia's place in a Europe whole, free and at peace. And it was the right thing to do, I believe.

And I think Russia was prevented from toppling the regime in Tbilisi. And I think in their calculus, in the end of the day, they didn't get much for it. They got, you know, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, which are recognized I think by three states out of 190+ countries in the world. This is not a great strategic victory, but it was an important message to send to Russia. Any president elected in November 2008 was going to have to do a restart of relations with Russia.

I think the debate is going to be in some sense framed by the speech that Speaker Boehner made yesterday, and it was interesting. At one point in the speech he says, look, I'm not saying we want confrontation with Russia. There are areas where we need to cooperate with Russia -- terrorism, proliferation, other things -- and we should, but we need also to make sure we don't abandon our principles and our values in that debate with Russia. So, you know, you should not -- he had a formula at the end that I'm going to mess up because I always mess up formulas like this, but it's basically, we should never be afraid to negotiate, but we should never negotiate out of fear.

I think the debate we're going to have on Russia is that balance between cooperation, where it's clearly in our interest to do so, and how much and how we should stand up our values and principles, particularly in a Russia that over the last 10 years has seemed to move and, indeed, has moved away from what we consider to be democratic principles. I think that's probably the debate we're going to have on Russia policy in the upcoming presidential campaign.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Could I make an additional comment? Interestingly enough, it's about to be 20 years of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. And I was involved in a whole set of attitude surveys with at the time it was called the Los Angeles Times Mirror, now the PEW Operation, in terms of looking at what Russia was going to be like as the Soviet Union broke apart. And it was very interesting to kind of -- did focus groups and things like that where people were completely disoriented, thinking -- wondering what democracy was really about or what a free market system was about. And they'd say, yes, we were for democracy and free markets, but if you talked about any of the indicators, there was no recognition of what that meant.

And I think that from the perspective of the United States, and again, we were in office, there was kind of the sense that we could develop a very different relationship with Russia. And we were asked to do something that had never been done before, which was to peacefully devolve the power of our major adversary in a way that would make it possible to cooperate more. I know because we really tried this in any number of different ways.

The problem was that that disorientation and a sense of not knowing -- I mean, just -- you understand the idea of going from a superpower to being whatever, trying to figure out your boundaries had changed, the whole -- Russia is the only country that really changed its geographical location. So the bottom line is that that really had a very deep effect. And so now we are watching, to some extent, I follow this, we just did another survey where there is disillusionment both with democracy and with market systems that really does play into where President Putin wants to go with it, and a sense that they were done wrong. And so it makes it hard to have this relationship.

What I hope is that we don't fall into an attitude where we see Russia as incompatible with us on a whole host of issues. So I think that finding cooperation where

we can and I think we are looking for various areas, and not to get back into Brezhnev nostalgia or something like that, that we have to keep moving forward. But this 20-year period is very interesting to analyze in terms of what happened or didn't happen, and it is affecting the relationship.

MR. VARGA: Thank you. My name is Gergely Varga. I'm from Hungary and a visiting fellow at Johns Hopkins Center for Transatlantic Relations. My question would be the position of the United States on missile defense was always that it's a separate issue from nuclear weapons while Russia always insists that these two issues should be dealt together. Do you see any point in the near future where the United States might rethink its position in kind of a grand bargain put on the table, not just missile defense, but tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons, strategic weapons, as well? Thanks.

MR. HADLEY: I think the secretary and I may have a different view on this. I think the view was ever since the ABM Treaty that -- and the deal that Secretary Kissinger negotiated, that they were linked. Under President George W. Bush we tried to break that linkage and said that they aren't linked anymore, that the Cold War is over, that the United States and Russia are not adversaries. We don't threaten each other with our ballistic missiles and we are not -- do not need to defend against each other's ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile defense is about third countries.

And so the President said to Putin, I've got to get out of the ABM Treaty because I've got to defend the country against third country threats. I'd like to do that cooperatively with you, so maybe let's step out of the ABM Treaty together or maybe you want me to step out unilaterally, however you want me to do it, I will do it, but I've got to defend the country against those threats.

And President Putin, in a lot of back and forth, basically said in the end of the day, you go ahead and withdraw unilaterally and there'll be some criticism, but it will not tube the relationship. And within six months after that announcement, we announced the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, which dramatically reduced the numbers of strategic ballistic missiles on both sides.

So we believe that we broke the link because we weren't adversaries, our missiles really are not directed at each other, we do not feel threatened by the other, and our need for missile defense is not against each other, it's against countries like Iran, and, therefore, we should cooperate. I hope we do not move away from that new paradigm and I hope we do not relink these issues about defenses and offenses because that's right back into the Cold War formula that we're adversaries and we need to be talking principally about how we defend ourselves against each other rather than what we should be talking about, is how we can cooperatively protect ourselves and defend ourselves against threats that threaten us both.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, I have a somewhat different view on the ABM Treaty.

MR. HADLEY: I'm not surprised. (Laughter) It comes as no surprise to me.

MR. PIFER: This is okay, we encourage different views here.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, no, but it's interesting because I think we were really moving in a direction and, you know, there were a number of things that happened when you change administrations and where I believe serious departures were made, one, the most serious I think, was probably on North Korea, if I might say so.

But I do think that one of the things that we were looking at in our Track II discussions was actually to begin to look at how to go below the limits that have been set

in New START and begin to think about ways that we could encourage, not building up to the limits, but use the -- maybe one could call it the budget pressures to actually come down and look at some other levels.

The questions that we had in our discussions, and we didn't fully agree on this, is whether either side would do it unilaterally. So we were beginning -- because I think, from my perspective, I always have trouble with unilateral disarmament of various kinds, that we would maybe look at things doing it in parallel. But I do think that there is a way to begin to look at how to get on the sub-strategic levels to try to get them down.

MR. JONES: Bill Jones from the *Executive Intelligence Review*. Ambassador Rogozin a few days ago presented a proposal calling for a more general system which would protect against missiles, as well as against possible asteroids, threats to the Earth. This apparently got the support of President Medvedev; he said this should be studied. Is that considered a serious proposal or a non-starter or would that be something to bring into the debate, and is it a counter move on the part of the Russians which could have positive results?

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, I had very interesting times with Ambassador Rogozin as we were doing the NATO Strategic Concept. I think that what it probably does is complicate everything. I mean, it has something to do generally with something that we have objected to in the past in terms of having anti-satellite treaties and a variety of things that made it all much more complicated.

I don't know. I don't know whether you say it has a hidden agenda. I just -- I have to -- I am no longer a diplomat, so I can say this, I find him a little absurd in some of the suggestions that he's made.

MR. HADLEY: He's a very interesting guy -- (Laughter) -- and he's very smart on this. And he's got this -- if you ask him, why were you given this job, he says,

because the only person to the right of me is the Kremlin Wall, and if I say missile defense cooperation is okay, it's okay. There are some advantages to that. I have not seen that proposal. He's an interesting guy. He said, look, we all know that this missile defense cooperation gets Iran -- is not really serious because if Iran really gets a missile that would threaten either you or us and have nuclear weapons on it, the Israelis are going to take it out long before we'd need ballistic missile defense.

So this is a very interesting guy, very clever guy, and I can't read between the lines on that proposal to know really what he's doing. The timing is interesting since they're about to have a new president, and, you know, I just can't quite figure out what the game is.

MR. COLLINA: Hi, Tom Collina, Arms Control Association, thank you both very much. Madam Secretary, you just mentioned a concept of parallel strategic or tactical reductions, U.S.-Russian. Can you talk more about what that might entail and how it might happen, and also, the relationship between the prospects for that and missile defense cooperation? In other words, if we don't strike some sort of a deal on missile defense cooperation, what's the effect on proposals for parallel reductions or even future negotiative reductions? Thanks.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, I'm not sure that I can fully talk about it because we just began. This is one of the -- Steve, you might want to actually comment on this, because we were beginning -- we had -- our last meeting we published a report. We talked about this as a possibility, as a way mainly because our Track II is composed of people that want to try to figure out some kind of practical steps to move forward and looking for ways when we set it to use the momentum of the New START Treaty to kind of get ourselves moving forward and to look for various areas where we could cooperate.

I think that the parallel approach for me is better than a unilateral one, because I think -- I just am opposed to unilateral, but basically some on a matter of principal and some because politically it's untenable. And so the question is if one is able to have procedures where we can verify what is going on, try to do it on parallel tracks, I think that that is a possibility. But we were just beginning to talk about it.

MR. PIFER: If I can step briefly out of the moderator's role just to elaborate and give an example. One of the examples that came out of the discussions, which was then shared with both governments, was the idea that within the New START Treaty context the United States might decide to say we're going to deploy no more than 1,300 deployed strategic warheads provided Russia does the same. And this was driven, in part, by our Russian colleagues in the discussion saying that because of budget decisions they made 8 and 10 years ago, their force is likely to go through 1,550 down to maybe as low as 1,000.

The rationale I saw for offering this is the Russians now are talking about building a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile, which is a really bad idea. It's a waste of money for them, it will make us nervous about the vulnerability of our Minutemen, and it's also not a smart force configuration if they have a lot of warheads on a small number of targets, so it's very destabilizing.

So these are the kind of ideas. And actually if you did accept that idea, you could use the New START provisions to monitor it, but if you did it in parallel, it might be a way then to sort of encourage the Russians to back away from a bad idea.

MR. HADLEY: And there's, of course, a history to this idea, because in 1990 and '91, after the Soviet Union broke up and there was the prospect of tactical nuclear weapons all over the space of what used to be the Soviet Union and now it would be actually independent republics, President George H.W. Bush proposed and got

Secretary General Gorbachev to agree to exactly this kind of thing, where President Bush announced that we were going to take all tactical nuclear weapons out of our ground forces, we were going to take them off of our surface ships, leaving them only on the submarines, we were going to consolidate our theater nuclear forces in individual locations, and we were going to rely on sort of quarterly exchanges of information to verify it, if you will. And the secretary general of the Communist Party then within a few days announced a parallel set of measures. And they were initially implemented and it had the effect of bringing under the control of Russia, the survivor of the Soviet Union, all of those tactical nuclear weapons, sort of you would sort of say mutually negotiated parallel action.

It foundered a bit because the kind of transparency and dialogue we hoped for on military issues did not occur and we had less and less view as to exactly what Russia was doing with its tactical nuclear weapons, and so there are some lessons learned from that effort. But that's an effort which was done very much as the secretary described.

Also similarly, we proposed after the START I Agreement, I think, something very similar to what you're talking about, that the parties, even before they reduced, would agree to take offline those systems slated for reduction. So you would dramatically get off of alert and off of operational status all of the strategic nuclear weapons that you would be reducing over a 10-year period.

So there's some precedence here. I see Susan Koch is in the back. She's actually pulling together the precedence on these two things from '90-'91, and I think it'll be a useful tool for people as they look for these kinds of prop devices for doing these kinds of things.

MS. ALBRIGHT: I also think that one perhaps could make lemonade out of both our budget problems because basically they certainly do, and as you were talking about, who wants to develop a new system or a heavy system. And we clearly -- our Pentagon is looking for ways to have some serious cuts, and I think that maybe that's a way to kind of view something that's a problem for both countries.

MR. BACMOND: Hello, my name is Maximilian Bacmond. I am an international student from American University. And my question is, as you told, it's very hard to find a common position towards a missile defense system with the Russians, but if the missile defense system is not directed towards the Russians, more to Iran, for example, don't you think that it would make also sense to try to remove the problem itself together with the Russians instead of negotiating about the solution for the problem?

MS. ALBRIGHT: Yes, well, I mean --

MR. HADLEY: Been there, done that. (Laughter)

MS. ALBRIGHT: That is what they're trying to do. And I think that part of the issue continues to be the international context of how sanctions are used and how, in fact, there -- I teach at another university up the street from you or down the street from you, and I say foreign policy is just trying to get some country to do what you want.

So the bottom line is what are the tools? And so my course is called the National Security Toolbox, and we have been looking at what the tools are to try to figure out how to get that country to give up its nuclear program. And the problem is that there are not a lot of tools that work where there's a cooperative aspect on it, and who is delivering what to Iran, and what pressure there is on Iran to allow inspection. So, yes, it would be better to solve it that way, but I think we've all tried.

MR. HADLEY: One of the things I like about U.S.-Russian cooperation in missile defense against missiles from Iran is the signal it sends to Iran that there's no

point to pursue these systems because they're not going to give you any leverage on any crisis in which you might want to use them. So in an odd sort of way, cooperation in missile defense could contribute to removing the problem in the first place, which obviously would be the preferable approach.

MR. McNEAL: Good afternoon. My name is Sam McNeal. I'm a colonel in the Air Force, but speaking for myself, as the secretary would sort of say. There was a recent article in the *Wall Street Journal* which highlighted how little we really know about the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal. So I'm wondering, what do you think is the proper way that should influence these discussions with Russia? Whether we link offense or defense or not I think is -- either way you go on that question, you still -- at some point, the Chinese numbers start to matter. So do you think we're approaching that point? Does it not matter? Should we include this in the calculus somehow or not worry about it?

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, I happen to think that -- I've just been in China and had some kind of, believe it or not, political party discussions, and there were -- the truth is that their military budget is so much smaller than ours, no matter what, but we clearly are concerned about what some of their missile capabilities are across the straits to Taiwan, and so we do have to be concerned about it.

I think the problem is that our mil-mil relations with the Chinese are kind of the most tenuous at the moment, and they are the ones that -- I know that Secretary Panetta has been over there, Secretary Gates certainly went a number of times, and there's a lack of trust in that category, also, but I think it does matter. And the question then is how you broaden whatever missile and military discussions there are. But at the moment, we have a lack of very good communications on mil-mil generally.

MR. HADLEY: I don't think -- the kinds of missile defense cooperation and deployments we're thinking about in Europe I think will have very little capability against Chinese systems. Secondly, one of the ironies about as you bring down the level of U.S. and Russian systems, you know, you get down to, you know, 1,200, 1,000, below 1,000, and you start making China and at some point India and Pakistan looking like fairly robust nuclear powers. And you don't want to start incentivizing them to expand their nuclear inventories so they can come up to the reduced U.S.-Russian level and they say suddenly, we're a superpower, too.

Also, a lot of countries don't worry about the nuclear weapons of those countries because of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and that has been a good thing to discourage proliferation. If people start recalculating their considerations about their need for their own nuclear weapons under this kind of dramatically reduced strategic nuclear force levels, that's not a good thing either.

So my only point is, there are some dilemmas that start cutting in when you start talking about going to what, you know, we used to call radically low numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and they need to be thought through.

LORENZE: My name is Lorenze and I just want to say it's an honor to be here. I am also a student from American University. And my question has to do with the political structure of Russia. Do you think because Russia has a semi-authoritarian political structure, do you think that is a problem right now for cooperation between the United States, Europe and Russia, or is that -- has that just become an irrelevant issue?

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, I never think that a country that has authoritarian structure is an irrelevant issue. I think that it, in many ways -- well, let me put it in a larger context. Often it is a democratic population of a country or a country -- people within a democracy that are able to express their convictions about what should happen, whether

there should be a nuclear-free world or that relations should be different with X country. Within a democracy, you have to take that into consideration.

In an authoritarian government, the head of it can, in fact, make decisions on his own, and so I think that it is not irrelevant in the way that if President Putin wants to make clear that Russia is now again a major power, he can make it happen more easily than if there is an opposition party or a number of opposition people that are able to make statements against it, so it's not irrelevant.

And I think that that is going to be one of the things that we're going to have to figure out how to deal with, which is the consolidated power that will allow the Russians to -- Putin himself to make the decisions. He will have to obviously rely a lot on military advice on a number of issues, but clearly for an authoritarian leader it is easier to make those kinds of decisions, to say it doesn't matter what the defense budget should be or whether it's in -- he determines what the national interest is more.

MR. HADLEY: There are a lot of Russian experts here who can answer this better. I will give you my sort of practitioner's view.

Russia has a lot more personal freedom today for Russians than it had under the Soviet period. They know it, they like it. What Russia has not figured out is that the way to have an enduring democracy is to create those institutions that check and balance centralized authority: political parties, freedom of the press, independent judiciary, civil society, all those other things. There's a reason why we develop those things, Russia has not, it's a long historical explanation. But that is what Russia has not done. We urged Putin to do as his legacy for bringing Russia permanently into the West and he not only did not do it, he, in some sense, went in the other direction.

The problem for the Russians is, in my view, until those individual rights are enshrined in a system of checks and balances, they will always be at risk. Values

matter. If you look at who are the United States' closest allies, it's not by accident they are countries that share our values.

And the problem we saw, I think, over in Russia from 2000 to 2008 was our values began to depart, and that became a problem. And Condi Rice has a book out November 1, I'm sure you're all going to want to buy it, and one of the things she says in that book which is very interesting is she thinks U.S.-Russian relations went sour over the near abroad, the issue of those states that were part of the Soviet Union on the border of Russia, now independent. We tried to -- wanted to cooperate with Russia in helping those states become prosperous, democratic, independent, stable states.

We tried to convince Russia that was good; you want prosperous, democratic neighbors on your borders. Russia would have none of it. The view was that that kind of state was a threat to the Russian Federation, and that by encouraging that evolution we were, in fact, undermining the Russian state. There's a case where a clear clash in values created a clash between two countries that really soured the relationship and put a limitation on what we could do. Values matter.

And the problem will be going forward to conduct a relationship with Russia that preserves where it's in our mutual interest, but still is clear where we're standing for our values because over the longer term, it will be better for Russia, and certainly better for Europe and better for the United States, if Russia becomes a more democratic member of the international community.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, one thing to watch out for is a new suggestion that Putin has put forward, is to kind of have a union or a reunion --

MR. HADLEY: Sure.

MS. ALBRIGHT: -- of some of the countries in the near abroad and what that really does mean. There used to be a -- actually, I think Secretary Schlesinger is the

one who said this, is which is the country in the world that is completely surrounded by communist states, and it was Russia during the Soviet period. So the bottom line is they felt more comfortable being surrounded by communist states than they did by democratic free states, which we were trying to persuade them. But I do think that there is something going on which is a consolidation of authoritarian authority not only within Russian, but an attempt to restructure something that has Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, maybe at least the way I read about it.

MS. SOLZMAN: Hi, Rachel Solzman, SAIS, thank you both. You both mentioned the need for a political decision and that until that can happen on missile defense, the role Track II plays in sort of keeping it alive and keeping the negotiations going. I wondered whether you think there's some sort of next step that Track II can take such that even if you're stuck, you're not backsliding, so that when you get new efforts under new administrations or a new political context, you're not always starting from scratch. Thank you.

MR. HADLEY: I think what Track II can do is try to plow the ground before the governments get to it. Get, you know, Russians, Americans knowledgeable on these issues, sitting down and saying, you know, if the decision was made to cooperate, what would the cooperation look like, and how would you do it in a way that balances Russian concerns and American concerns and European concerns? And I think that is a productive thing for Track IIs to do, to try to elaborate principles and an actual architecture that would seem to meet the objectives and objections of both sides, so that when the governments do engage in a serious way because a political decision is made, they've got something to use and build on, and it may accelerate the process of actually reaching an agreement.

MS. ALBRIGHT: I think also, I mean, just practically speaking from having been in the government and out of the government, the bottom line is that there is a lot of work done on Track IIs which really sorts out details, et cetera. When a government wants to take up the issue, then it has some not only good spade work that has been done on it, but also -- and I think another part of Track II, especially in a democracy, is that you try to talk to other people within your country about what you're doing.

Your team is composed of people from different sectors of your own country. And you try also, in our case, often we take Track II issues to members of Congress and have discussions with them so that you are in a position, if the government then wants to take up the issue that you have developed kind of a support system within the democracy to understand what's going on. And so, I mean, I would say in some ways this is part of a Track II discussion. Brookings has carried on a Track II discussion. We are now having an audience of people that are interested in it and then are able to carry the message further. And so having discussions or taking it up to one of the -- a caucus on the Hill or meeting with a set of people, one would hope that that kind of thing were happening in Russia. It may or may not be.

Igor Ivanov, for instance, a very interesting man, my counterpart as foreign minister, is now -- he's very proud of having set up a prototype of a Council on Foreign Relations in Russia. Part of it is in order to try to develop an infrastructure to support Track II, I think would be the way to --

MR. PIFER: I mean, I think it'd be fair to say in both your cases, you're both well plugged in with people in the U.S. Government today, and out of these two dialogues, you have -- lots of those ideas are going to the governments.

MR. HADLEY: It's true. And as the secretary said, Imimo, which is a think tank in Russia that has been working with some of us on this Track II effort, has a report they are going to come out with on I think October 28th, which is an assessment of the missile defense cooperation from the Russian perspective, but I think it will also include ideas that have been hatched from a variety of Track II efforts beginning to make the case that missile defense cooperation is not some favor to the United States and Europe, but is actually in Russia's hardcore national security interest. That's the case that actually has to be made, and, of course, the case is better if it's made by Russians to Russians and Americans to Americans.

MR. PIFER: Okay, I think we have time for one last question.

MARK: Hello, my name is Mark. I'm an active duty Navy commander. Thank you so much for your service previous to our country.

Madam Secretary, you mentioned Ukraine. I just had a chance to visit the region not too long ago, and we see in the news that basically the Ukrainians reupped the Crimea contract through 2042, so certainly they plan to develop their Black Sea fleet. We continue to try and have a positive relationship with the Georgian Navy. So while that is sort of a tactical development to bring it back to the strategic point here, how much of a big deal do we make about that development? A little bit, a lot? Where do we come down with that development? Thank you.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, I think we're generally worried about what's happened in Ukraine, and certainly the reupping of the Crimean base is a huge deal in terms of a longer term commitment when people hope that that would open up a different kind of relationship.

I think that generally, and it has to do -- back on the question about what difference it makes whether you move from a democratic system to an authoritarian

system, that kind of a decision was made by a new government that is more old style than new style, and it really does show the effect of it. I do think it's worrisome.

On the other hand, I desperately, because I am a child of the Cold War, I desperately do not want to see us get back into where we are, you know, against each other on every single thing and interpret everything as counter to the United States. And, therefore, my plea as we go forward with this and why I'm involved in Track II discussions is to try to figure out a way how to deconflict and not conflict in the first place, of trying to figure out that we have to have some different relationship, and the extent to which whatever we do can influence anything that is going on in Russia. But I do think that the developments in Ukraine and what's happening with Yulia Tymoshenko and just generally, it's very interesting to see the push-pull that's going on in Ukraine because, in some ways, Yanukovych is trying to point that he wants to still be a part of Europe. On the other hand, he is being pulled the other way.

What I find truly interesting in the Tymoshenko case is that what she's accused of is making a gas deal with Russia. Somehow it doesn't kind of compute for me, but it does show that there is a way that an authoritarian government can change the dimensions.

MR. PIFER: Great. Well, I'm afraid we've exceeded our time. We're going to take now a quick break and reconvene at 3:35. But please join me in thanking our panelists for a really fantastic discussion.

(Recess)

MS. STENT: Okay, ladies and gentlemen, we're going to continue our conversation now after our very interesting first panel and probably discuss some of the same issues and then move and look a little bit forward into what we can expect during the next year.

We are going to talk about -- I think, we have two presidential transitions coming up in the next year. We know who the next president of Russia will be. We don't know who the next President of the United States will be. Oh, we do? Secretary Albright says we do. I stand corrected, Madam.

MR. TALBOTT: Brookings takes no position on that, by the way, Madeleine. I rarely dissociate myself from Madeleine, but --

MS. STENT: But what we do know, irrespective of who the President of the United States will be, what we do know from past experience is that during these presidential transitions it's very difficult to sustain the momentum of these kinds of negotiations. There's often a hiatus, a hiatus of a year, maybe even more, so that one of the challenges as we look forward into the future of these different arms control negotiations, missile defense and others, that I think our panelists will talk about is, how do we sustain that momentum and make sure that we don't slide back into a previous situation? How can we insulate these very important negotiations from domestic politics, both in the United States and in Russia? And I will just say, you've already heard mention of the conference that took place at a rival think tank yesterday, the Heritage Foundation, which was really a full-scale assault on the reset policy, including the arms control component of it, so that we know during our own election campaign we will hear debate about the wisdom of the reset.

And even in Russia where domestic politics is obviously conducted differently, criticizing America can also be and is part of the domestic debate there. So, how do we sustain this? How do we go forward?

There are obviously no people who are more qualified than our two speakers to discuss this. I've been told that I cannot give you a long biographical introduction for both of you. You have their bios in front of you. And our first speaker will

be Walter Slocombe. He's the senior counsel at Caplin & Drysdale and he is the former under secretary of defense as well as many other positions he's held.

Strobe Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution, former deputy secretary of state and also many other official positions. So, why don't we start with you, Walt?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Okay. Thank you. It's an honor to be here. It's always kind of cool to be in the situation where you're the -- you've got the former secretary of state, the former deputy secretary of state, a former national security advisor, and I'm just a former under secretary. It's nice to be down in the weeds.

I also certainly do not intend to talk much about U.S.-Russia relations with Strobe Talbott on the platform with me. Strobe has an amazing background in this. But I do think it's important as we think about the arms control implications to have some general sense of what the missile defense programs are and how they may be evolving and also, looking beyond the immediate questions, where do missile defenses fit in to the longer term and much more ambitious arms control agenda, which tries at least to think seriously about the possibility of either extremely low levels or actual abolition of nuclear weapons?

Now, I think it's important to begin thinking about these issues with the realization the United States Ballistic Missile Defense Program is not a single program and in particular it is not the defense of the United States as territory, the Homeland Defense Mission, which is the biggest part of the program or arguably the most important.

The limited defense of the United States itself is, of course, a major part of the program. There are now about two dozen deployed, ground-based interceptors, mostly in Alaska, a few in California, which were brought to an operational status in the middle of the George W. Bush Administration and are still operational and will continue to

be operational. Indeed, the first generation of those missiles is being replaced by another upgraded version of that missile.

That system is designed and will work reasonably well against the North Korean threat. It's important, I think, to understand that all of these systems have limited capabilities because the easiest way to deal with a missile defense, if you have a very large force, is simply to overwhelm it. If there are 26 deployed missiles at Greely, the 27th will get through, even if they work extremely well.

It's a difficult challenge, even against the kind of threat which North Korea or Iran is likely to pose in the relevant period of time, which is, say, the next decade. But I think there's a reasonable assurance that the system can work and, in particular, that the so-called discrimination problem can be overcome, that is to find the right part of the threat cloud that shows up on the sensors to intercept. And I think the Administration's position is that this system will be able to keep up with the evolving threat, and if the right things are done, that's probably also possible.

Work will continue on it and, in particular, as the Iranian threat emerges, or I suppose one is forced to say if the Iranian threat emerges, it will be probably necessary to make some changes in the system. Indeed, one of the elements of the program for the coming year is to build an additional communications link in the eastern part of the United States, which for technical reasons is probably necessary to have an equivalent capability against Iranian ICBM as against the North Korean, at least for the eastern part of the country. And as Secretary Albright points out, it is nice to defend the blue states as well as the red states. (Laughter)

MR. TALBOTT: A bipartisan view, by the way.

MR. SLOCOMBE: Well, so, in the process of defending the blue states you defend the southeastern part of the United States too as a sort of incremental

benefit.

As some of the discussion earlier made the point, there's also a major effort to deploy defenses which will be effective for defending our friends and allies. The jargon is "regional defense." One is the European phased adaptive approach, which is based on the Aegis Standard Missile 3 system, which has kind of -- the phases are successive improvements in the missile, in the radars.

A good deal of that system is already in the process of being put in place. We routinely maintain Aegis qualified ships, missile defense qualified Aegis ships. Part of the complication is that the Aegis missile ships have lots of other things to do for the Navy besides sit around getting ready to shoot at missiles, but a certain number are equipped to do this. One is routinely maintained in the eastern Mediterranean, at least most of the time. We have a -- and that provides a considerable defense of most of NATO Europe -- not, obviously, of Turkey, which is too far forward -- most of NATO Europe against the kind of threat which the Iranians will be able, if they continue their present programs, or at least we have to assume, they'll be able to pose in the next decade or so. The phases consist of a continuing upgrading of the characteristics of the Standard Missile 3 and of its radar support.

And then there is a major part of the Ballistic Missile Defense Program, which is for the defense of deployed forces, mostly our own, in principle, other people's, and that's a wholly -- not wholly, but substantially different technical problem because it's essentially defending against a conventional threat, not a nuclear threat. Long-range ballistic missiles are an extraordinarily expensive way to deliver high explosive, but they're a perfectly feasible weapon to be used in a tactical situation.

So, a lot of the things that you read about PAC-3, THAD, things like that are essentially tactical systems. And there's a very important subset of this, which I think

has an important political implication, which is the Chinese are in the process of developing a major -- what they hope to be a major capability essentially to keep the United States Navy out of the Western Pacific if it came to a conflict. That would be a conventional conflict. The most interesting from the point of view of missile defenses is they're developing a -- not a long-range system, but a medium-range system, which will not only -- it will be a ballistic missile, so that it will have the characteristics of an extremely fast approach, a very small target, and it will also have a capacity, which is the hard part for them in designing it and developing it, to track a moving target and maneuver sufficiently in the end game to be able to, in principle at least, incapacitate if not actually sink an aircraft carrier.

And, therefore, a fairly substantial part of the conventional, the deployed forces missile defense effort is aimed at negating this Chinese capability, which has obvious political implications because it creates a tension between the United States' statements, which are true, that our other missile defense programs are not directed at Chinese nuclear capabilities, but quite obviously, since the Chinese are quite frank about saying they're developing this threat against the American -- against potential American forces in the Western Pacific, obviously this part of the tactical defense is.

Moreover, and I think this is something that undoubtedly there are plenty of people in the room who know a lot more about the technical details than I do, but people who don't focus on the technical details I think don't appreciate that the sensors, the satellites, the radars, and the communications systems, which support ballistic missile defense, are every bit a part of the system and are every bit as expensive and as technologically challenging and complicated as the interceptors themselves. And one of the things which is happening in ballistic missile defense effort is an increasing integration of different kinds of sensors for different kinds of missile defense.

The United States, for example, has already deployed the so-called TPY-2 radar -- there's one in Israel and there's one in Japan -- and those are important to the tact of the regional defense. Also that radar is extremely important for the defense -- for the tactical defense and potentially even for homeland defense, and an important part of the phased adaptive approach is to increase the degree to which a given interceptor base doesn't have to rely entirely on its own sensors, but is able to use the information which comes from a variety of other sensors.

Some of these systems are already underway. SIBRS has begun to deploy. There is a debate about the degree -- as you would expect, there's a debate about the degree to rely on satellites or rely on ground-based systems and so on, but the critical point is that the sensors not only are a fundamental part of the system, but the missile defense program is going to increasingly integrate different kinds of sensors into the support of different parts of the program.

I don't think -- and this is one point which I think is worth making a comment on, which is slightly different from what was said in the previous session, I think as people talk about the defense budget there will be talk about cutting back on missile defense. I think that's extremely unlikely to happen on any significant scale. First of all, we don't actually spend that much money on missile defense. The appropriation for missile defense is on the order of $10 billion a year, which is real money, but not compared to $600 billion a year, so that the potential for savings is limited. And I think it's also important that, I think, to some degree this issue is not as controversial, at least at a congressional level, as it used to be.

It's the Obama Administration, which has committed to a very robust missile defense program. The changes, you can argue about the -- you can certainly argue about the subtlety with which they announced the change from the third site in

Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic, but the basic commitment to homeland defense, to regional defense, to tactical defense, is a strong one. And I think that a combination of the politics and the military requirements are going to make this an area which will -- and the fact that there's not that much money there -- if you really want to save money in the defense budget, go after health costs and fighter planes, that's where the money is.

I realize there is or was an Air Force colonel here and I apologize. There are equally vulnerable -- there are equally expensive and vulnerable parts in the other services except, of course, for the United States Marine Corps, which is protected not only in the Constitution, but I believe in the Ten Commandments. (Laughter)

The implications of this for arms control are, first of all, I think you cannot look at this problem at a technical level and not realize that the problem is very hard against a limited threat. It is impossible against the Russian force. And the Russian -- it's easy to understand why the Russians are worried about where this might go in the future, not least because, as Steve Hadley said, the Russians are aware that the United States has in this area, if not in others -- and it does in others as well -- a big technological advantage, but in terms of what the United States military thinks it is feasible to do. The idea that this is going to be a threat to the Russian deterrent is very hard to take seriously. It's very hard, actually, to take seriously as to the Chinese deterrent, but it's extremely hard to take it seriously as to the Russian deterrent.

And you can understand the Russian concern, but I think that what is going to come out of these Track II discussions is that there are plenty of ways to deal with the legitimate Russian concern. And I would guess that when the agreement is reached on cooperation, it will be that the Russians have decided that they no longer are interested in this issue, not that now suddenly the scales have fallen from their eyes and

they realize that 25 or a couple of dozen interceptors are not a threat to their defense.

But I think it also means that the ABM Treaty model is not going to be a feasible one in the future. The ABM Treaty model, dependent on the proposition that you could sharply distinguish between defenses against very long-range attacks and defenses against everything else, and the effort as the systems improved for everything else, it became harder and harder to come up with workable and verifiable and technically acceptable and sensible distinctions between defense at long-range and shorter-range defenses, so that any future arms control that addresses ballistic missile defense explicitly is going to have to do it in terms of transparency and cooperation and understanding what the systems do and how they do it rather than in the sort of model of a series of technical parameters which thou shall not do more than this and thou shall be totally free to do something less than that.

I also want to end on a note about the long-term implications of missile defense for the goal of an end of reliance on nuclear weapons. At heart, the fundamental concern about the model of abolition is what if somebody cheats? What if there is some way somebody manages to keep a few, develop a few? I don't by any means mean that defenses are a perfect answer to this question, but I think the arms control community is going to have to think about the relationship between missile defenses as a backstop against cheating on very low levels or on even total abolition. And the problem, which also exists, that in some sense defenses pose a stability problem because they might serve as the backstop to defend against what you were not able to get with a preemptive strike. But I think that's one of the conceptual issues about missile defense and arms control that people who are serious about abolition have to begin to think about. Thanks.

MS. STENT: Thank you very much, Walt. Strobe?

MR. TALBOTT: I'm going to pick up on the last set of comments, in

particular, that Walt just made and tie them back to a brief dialogue between Secretary Albright and Steve Hadley in the previous conversation. But first -- and I do this because I'm provoked by Walt's modesty -- is to just say what a pleasure it is to be with these two colleagues.

Your titles were not chopped liver and you understand as much as anybody in this room, and I suspect as much as anybody in this capital, which means anybody in the world, the technology as well as the theology of the subject that we're talking about.

I'm going to quickly beat a retreat to the theology, which is where I feel more comfortable, but when I was a cub reporter working on my first book on arms control in the Carter Administration, this guy, I'm not going to say he was a source, but he was certainly a guru, and it's great to be back in harness with him on this issue.

Madeleine made a comment about the actuarial tables and the priesthood, which is also a priestesshood, and I think there is a very serious point there, which is this subject is back and it is really important that we build up the bench again and the pipeline. And I was most gratified to hear in the earlier panel that a number of questions came from people who were even younger than us and who were --

MR. SLOCOMBE: That's easy.

MR. TALBOTT: -- who are seminarians and novitiates for the priesthood and the priestesshood. And by the way, I'm also gratified that so many of you were willing to stick around for the second panel and I want to particularly acknowledge the presence of Joe Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund, who has been another guru of a number of us in the room and who has been both supporting and participating in the Track II exercise that Madeleine and Igor Ivanov and Madeleine and I -- and Imimo have been involved in, so I'm surprised you don't have something better to do this afternoon,

Joe, but it's great to have you here.

Okay, let me go to the issue at hand. That was not just an extraordinarily civil, informative, and edifying conversation that we heard earlier, it was significant, I think, that there was as much overlap in basic points of view and both Madeleine and Steve stressed, to an extent, that we tend to underestimate the degree of continuity from one administration to the next. And that is a good thing to be reminded of, particularly in these crazy times and in this crazy town, if I can put it that way.

However, there was one very strong point of disagreement that was expressed forcefully on the part of Steve, and ever so politely on the other side by Madeleine. I'm going to shock you all by taking Madeleine's side on this point, but it's a very, very serious one, and it has to do with whether it was a wise decision or not for the George W. Bush Administration to break ranks with all of its predecessors going back to the Johnson Administration on the issue of whether the concept of strategic stability, aka MAD, aka mutually assured survival *(sic)*, should be a bedrock of the U.S.-Soviet/U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.

That was a point that was key to the position that Lyndon Johnson and Bob McNamara took with Alexei Kosygin and whoever was with Alexei Kosygin at the time, it doesn't really matter, in Glassboro in 1967. And it was completely counterintuitive from the Soviet standpoint for the Americans to be arguing that it's against your interest -- you, Soviets -- to defend yourselves. But everybody in the room basically knows how that long story played out in the short form, which is that the Soviets bought it and it was written into the ABM Treaty during the Nixon Administration, and all subsequent administrations notably, including the George Herbert Walker Bush Administration made further progress in strategic arms control by preserving the principle of strategic stability, predictably, and that neither side would have the perceived ability, that is perceived by

the other side, to carry out a preemptive first strike.

Steve alluded to the Dennis Ross-Georgi Mamedov conversations at the tail end of the Bush 41 Administration and I will never forget Dennis Ross calling me when he guessed, and I didn't have any idea I'd be coming into the Clinton Administration to kind of hand off that relationship, and we stayed at it through '99.

President George W. Bush made the decision to exercise the United States' right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. And you heard Steve Hadley, as wise, as bipartisan minded a practitioner as -- and he's more than a practitioner -- an influential, defend vigorously that position and you heard Madeleine register that she has a different view, and so do I. And I want to just take a minute and elaborate on why that's the case and then tie it back to the last thing that Walt said.

Strategic deterrence, mutual deterrence, is like the tango; it takes two. It isn't enough to have one party say the Cold War is over; you're now a democratic country and a member of the international community. And we're not enemies anymore and that's why you shouldn't be worried about NATO enlargement, and that's why we no longer have to have MAD, which, of course, was a McNamara coinage, and he knew that that was a heavily ironic one, but it nonetheless carried with it some highly specific concepts which had been built into arms control before that.

The Russians don't buy it. The Russians include a lot of people, but the higher you get to the top and the more power they have, and particularly the more influence they have either in the political structure or the security and defense structures, the more they don't buy it. They worry that were we, the United States, to have the capability of carrying out a preemptive strike against them, we would either use it or use our capacity to use it, to disadvantage them, if not worse. And that means that they are going to take countermeasures. One was alluded to in the earlier conversation, which is

the new heavy ICBM that they are developing. And it is, I think, unquestionably true, and this came out repeatedly, Joe and Steve and Madeleine, as they know, in our conversations with Igor Ivanov. And while that's a Track II exercise, it's a little more Track 1.5 or at least supervised Track II on the Russian side. I can say that and I think actually Igor Ivanov would be just as glad I would say that.

So, we came away in our conversations with our Russian counterparts convinced that unless the principle of the ABM Treaty -- I'll come back to the model of it in a second -- is preserved, there will be no more reductions in strategic offensive weaponry. And by the way, the ABM Treaty, as I'm sure, again, everybody in this room knows, does not prohibit defenses. It prohibits those defenses that could be construed or perceived as being strategic defenses that would make it easier to have a preemptive strike.

Now, that brings me up to, of course, the current administration. The current administration decided, just as President Bush 43 decided, to reverse however many presidents that was before him -- six maybe, right -- President Obama decided to reverse President Bush 43 and put his administration back in line with all of those administrations since Johnson and McNamara. And he did so twice: once in signing a joint statement or a communiqué with President Medvedev, I think it was in April of 2009, when they met on the margins of the G-20 in the UK; and then again in the preamble to the New START Treaty. And I lay all of that out because that is a real debate, and it's a legitimate one. And knowing that Steve was not going to be able to participate in -- or to be here for the second panel, and we're mighty darn lucky that he was here for the first, I told him, I said, Steve, I thought it was terrific, but this is the one thing I'm going to take public exception to you on. And he said, absolutely, you should do it. It's an important argument and it will probably resonate in the 2012 election and beyond.

Now, to conclude, and this in a way -- so, that's theology, but it's rooted in technology. And Angela will be not just the moderator but a participant, but I hope at some point, Walt, you will come back to the question of how the obsolescence of the ABM Treaty as a model differs from, if, in your view, it does, from what I would strongly argue, which is that the principle of the ABM Treaty should be preserved.

MS. STENT: Thank you very much. Do you want to address that right now?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Yes. I think you can --

MR. TALBOTT: Madeleine, I'm going to disagree with you terribly on all subsequent issues that come up. (Laughter)

MR. SLOCOMBE: No, I think in fact that the principle can be preserved by the kind of measures that are being talked about in the Track II discussions, which will be a way of making clear to the Russians, if they're prepared to have something made clear to them, and that's the question, that it will make clear to the Russians that the American programs and the cooperation with our allies is not in any sense a threat to their deterrent. Because I agree that the foundation of the politics of stability is the recognition that it is very much in our interest that both sides understand that their deterrents are invulnerable or safe.

I have never been happy with the phrase that the ABM Treaty represented an acceptance of mutual assured destruction, because you can no more talk about accepting -- if you talk about accepting something it implies you have a choice not to accept it. It's like saying: I accept the law of gravity. Thanks. (Laughter)

It's a physical fact. It's as close as politics comes to a physical fact. It is a condition which a country with significant technological and financial resources can impose on other countries regardless of what they do, and I think that it should certainly

be possible -- assuming both sides want to do it, it should be possible to work out arrangements that make it work.

My point was the kind of effort to draw a sharp line between defense against intercontinental range missiles and defense against shorter-range missiles, which became very difficult even in the time when Strobe and I were in the Clinton Administration, has become increasingly difficult, so difficult as to be, for all practical purposes, impossible.

We can talk more about why, if you want to, but that's my view.

MR. TALBOTT: If I could just tag on something there. Madeleine also, I think at the very end or maybe it was at the beginning of her comments at the first panel, said something to the effect of the Russians may regret now having not accepted a deal that would have allowed modification or amendment to the ABM Treaty that Walt and I were working on at the end --

MR. SLOCOMBE: It seems to me it was a bizarre political mistake for them, because I think it would have been effectively impossible -- it should have been possible to reach an agreement, and that would have made it very much more difficult for the Bush Administration to get what Steve Hadley rightly described as effectively we reserve the right to criticize this but we will not make a big deal when you crater the ABM Treaty.

MR. TALBOTT: And just -- this is a completely analytical statement and not otherwise -- the reason that they did it, I am sure, is because Vladimir Putin, who was president of Russia at the time, decided to take a chance or a bet that there would be a new American president and not the one that he was -- well, he knew that it wasn't going to be the one he was negotiating with because that was Bill Clinton, but that there might be a change of party as well as a change of president in Washington and he would wait

and see if he could get a better deal from the next president.

MS. STENT: Let me ask you one more question before we go to the audience. You're a participant in these Track II discussions with the Russians, which, as you say, are Track, maybe, 1.5. From the Russian point of view, how serious do you think the Track I in Russia is about reaching an agreement with the U.S. on missile defense cooperation?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I think the previous -- my own sense, both from what I heard earlier in the afternoon, what I've heard from people on both sides, and what Joe, Steve, Madeleine, and I have heard from Igor Ivanov and company, is that they're not that serious for the reasons that were discussed, and the one reason they're not that serious is because they aren't sure we're in a position, we, the United States, are in a position to be serious about what they would regard as cooperative defense.

MS. STENT: So, it's still quite circular. Okay. Let me open the floor to questions, comments. In the back there, and if you could please identify yourself.

MR. MESHA: Certainly. My name is Tyler Mesha. I'm a student at American University, and first off I'd just like to thank the panel for taking the time and coming down here to meet with us today.

MR. SLOCOMBE: You all say that and it's very nice of you. I'm much more impressed that you all took the time to come to this discussion. (Laughter)

MR. MESHA: I'm very happy to have obliged you. We've heard a lot of things really interesting and insightful talk today about the -- talking about dealing with nuclear weapons and the spread of nuclear proliferation throughout the world. I wonder, though, one important aspect, to me, seems if arms control is dealing with small arms and conventional weapons, which arguably have killed more people throughout the world than nuclear weapons ever could, I wonder if -- what, if any gains, have been made by

the United States and Russia in dealing with that threat as opposed to the nuclear threat? And I wonder if you could maybe -- does that come up at all in strategic -- in talks between Russia and the United States about dealing more with the spread of small arms and conventional weapons, or is it primarily focused on nuclear weapons? Thank you.

MS. STENT: Walt?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I think you'd have to say it's much more focused on nuclear weapons. By the way, I completely agree that a great many more people have been killed by conventional weapons since 1945 than by -- well, obviously, nobody's been killed -- a few tragic errors coming out of tests, nobody's been killed by a nuclear weapon. More people were killed, as everybody in the room I assume knows, more people were killed in the fire bombings of Tokyo and other Japanese cities than were killed at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki.

The small arms problem in particular faces the real dilemma that mercifully, so far, for all practical purposes, only nation states have the resources to build nuclear weapons. They don't have to be much of a nation state. If North Korea can do it, almost anybody can. But they do have to be a nation state. Whereas my guess is there are a handful of people in this room who have the technical knowledge to make a rifle, certainly people who would have the technical knowledge to make a landmine, and that's the serious problem.

There are negotiations, as I'm sure you know there are negotiations on trying to control the trade in small arms, trying to license them. Some of them come up against difficulties in the United States as a matter of Second Amendment principle. There are huge commercial interests, which make it even more difficult, but I agree, it's a problem I don't -- well, first of all, I think there are real problems about trying to address it primarily through the kind of state arms control. If you were to do it at all you'd have to do

it through some kind of system of fairly strict controls over trade in small arms, and even that runs up against the problem of the ability to manufacture them relatively simply.

I know when I was in Iraq -- I always like to say Iraq -- well, oddly enough, one of the things that the Coalition Provisional Authority tried to do was to institute gun control. And so our proposal, after -- we were not as stupid as everybody says we were -- after consulting with some Iraqis, we said that the rule for gun control would be you could only have one AK-47 in each household. (Laughter)

And as an advocate of gun control I've always liked the line that Saddam Hussein's Iraq, where everybody had AK-47s, the population said, that doesn't work because we've got to have two: one to keep at home and the other to take in the car, because much of the problem is getting hijacked and robbed in the car. It was a country which was awash in small arms and I always liked to say that it was the decisive refutation of the NRA argument that no country with widespread private ownership of firearms was ever a dictatorship. (Laughter)

MS. STENT: Thank you.

MR. TALBOTT: I guess I would -- Walt has certainly answered the issue with regard to small arms, but I would just pivot from your question also to the issue of how effective the process of nuclear arms control has been with regard to nuclear arms. Not much. And, in fact, there's been real backsliding, and I think that's important to keep in mind, including in the broad context of missile defense.

By far the best way to defend ourselves against attack from other countries with ballistic missiles is to reduce the number of ballistic missiles in the world and to reduce the number of countries that have them. That's called nonproliferation and it is intimately linked to the subject of arms control that is front and center here, and even to strategic defense. And as you all know, the original premise of the Nonproliferation

Treaty was that there was going to be only five nuclear weapon states, and that was the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and Great Britain. And there are, of course, now nine -- Israel, indisputably presumed to be a nuclear weapon state, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. And by the way, Pakistan is about to -- or already has, very close to -- exceed the United Kingdom in the number of nuclear weapon states it has. And, Joe, if I'm not mistaken, if it stays on its current trajectory it will pass France in due course.

And one of the concerns about the stalemating of -- well, let me back up. President Obama hoped, as did many, including a number of prominent Republicans that the ratification of the New START Treaty would set the scene for the ratification, whatever it is, 12 years later after the Senate refused to ratify it, of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. The chances of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty being ratified before the end of the first Obama term, which may be the only Obama term, are pretty close to zero if not less, and it will be a very tough go even if he is reelected, given what is likely to be further change in the party control of the Congress and the Senate.

And without any movement on CTBT by the United States, and without any movement on strategic defenses, it's very hard to see how even bilateral arms control between the United States and the Russian Federation is going to proceed, and that is only going to exacerbate an atmosphere internationally that is going to be conducive to other countries either increasing their arsenals, and there was appropriate stress on the importance of China in that regard, but other countries coming online as well.

MS. STENT: Thank you. Questions? This gentleman.

MR. FLETCHER: Hi. I'm Kenny Fletcher with Exchange Monitor Publications. I was hoping you could comment a little bit about proposed cuts to the

weapons modernization program in Congress and the idea that that could hold back reductions of our nuclear arsenal.

MS. STENT: Who would like to start with that?

MR. SLOCOMBE: You mean the argument that if we don't maintain conventional superiority we'll have to rely more on nuclear weapons?

MR. FLETCHER: Right, that if we don't modernize we can't make reductions.

MR. SLOCOMBE: The United States spends on defense -- the United States certainly spends on procurement for military purposes more than the rest of the world combined. You can argue about whether the defense budget is bigger than the rest of the world combined. And, I mean, I am proud to have served in the Department of Defense. The American military are dedicated and committed. Our technological advantages are a critical national asset.

The idea that we cannot, after having doubled the defense budget in real terms in the last decade, cannot make modest reductions without having fundamental compromise of national security simply doesn't seem to me to stand up to analysis.

So, it's not that we're not going to modernize. It is at what pace are we going to modernize? It's not that we're not going to buy F-22s or F-35s. It's how many we're going to buy and at what pace.

I think there is room -- there's not room. You can't cut the defense budget in half safely, but you can certainly make the kind of cuts which are being talked about without damaging national security. There is lots of talk about Track II; you could probably fill this room with the publications of organizations which have come up with a lot of different ideas about how to make modest cuts.

I think some of the cuts are really going to have to be made in some of

the things which are most difficult to touch politically. Some programs, which are not justified, which are continued for political reasons or continued for jobs reasons, and the Defense Department is a perfectly good way to pump money into the economy if that's what you want to do. The health care issue is a real one. Some of the benefits arrangements are real. There's still a lot of infrastructure which is probably greater than necessary. But I think it's -- you can't simply say that because we're talking about cutting the defense budget we're going to have to forego modernization.

MS. STENT: Strobe?

MR. TALBOTT: Nothing.

MS. STENT: Joe Cirincione, did you want to add something to that?

MR. CIRINCIONE: I'm Tweeting all this.

MS. STENT: Oh, you're Tweeting? Okay, all right. In the back there.

MR. LEVINE: Edward Levine, happily retired. I understand from the first panel and this one that we are learning much about the different levels at which arms control discussions occur and how they can mesh with each other. What I'm having a harder time doing is understanding whether any of our presenters believe the current U.S. policy on missile defense is doing anything wrong, my own sense being, all right, if we manage to find an area where we and the Russians can agree, so much the better. If we cannot find an area, because the Russians just don't feel like agreeing, we will yet have shown our willingness to negotiate and we will have shown to the Europeans that we are not engaging in unilateral activities. And meanwhile, we proceed with a modest missile defense program geared primarily to do the things that are readily done and that are readily needed against emerging threats from Iran and North Korea.

So, if there is a problem with that, I wonder if you would elucidate what the problem is.

MS. STENT: Strobe?

MR. TALBOTT: Ed, first of all, it's great to see you here and great to see you again. Ed is more than a priest, up in the sort of cardinal range, and working in the all-important Legislative Branch, which is, of course, pertinent to any sensible answer to your question.

My own view is that the current administration, by coming back into sync with all of its predecessors except the immediate previous one, has adopted a pretty sensible approach on missile defense, and I didn't hear great disagreement between Madeleine and Steve with regard to the good sense behind President Obama's adjustment of our plans and program to defend our allies. The problem is that we have not -- and it has had the beneficial effect, I think, of having all the allies on board and reassuring them, well, maybe not all of them. I think there may be one, the Czech Republic, that still has some pretty profound doubts because they feel that they may have been exposed by the decision to drop that aspect of the Bush plan.

But, in general, we have the allies on board, but we don't have the Russians on board. So, we haven't been able to convert wise policy into successful diplomacy, and that is, at least in part, for the reasons that I alluded to earlier, which is the President's arms control policy has been stymied by the overall political deadlock that we're experiencing in this town right now.

MR. SLOCOMBE: You also began by saying is there anything wrong with the things we do on missile defense. There are a lot of serious technical questions. Bizarrely enough, the House Armed Services Committee wants to kill -- it's not bizarre that you'd want to kill -- I have to be careful -- it's PTSS, which is Persistent, something or other, Space Surveillance. It's a very expensive, very complicated satellite system. There are a lot of things like that to argue about, about whether you think they're the right

way to do it, but I think the basic course certainly makes sense. And, I mean, maybe going into a presidential election it's too optimistic.

I wish we could get missile defense policy in the United States so it would be like buying F-22s or F-35s. You would argue about whether you would need them, how many you need, which airplane -- what mix of airplanes you need, and not argue about it as a matter of theology in which one party insists that missile defense is the answer to everything and the other party insists that it's the answer to nothing.

Fortunately, we're getting past that, I think.

MS. STENT: Question, over there?

SPEAKER: Thanks for your comments. It's really good to hear from you. I'm a student at SAIS in the Russia-Eurasia department. My question to both of you is about something that I would like to coin as the Track Zero, the institutional framework that these talks occur in. Really the only institution left over from the Cold War era is NATO and I think that Russia sees this as implicitly a threat. The response of NATO after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, by backing off of membership plans for Georgia and Ukraine effectively supports that conclusion.

So, is there a different institution or a different institutional framework that would be a better place for discussions? Could it be the EU? We heard about values during the last panel. Could it be the OSE? And if so, what is that?

MR. TALBOTT: Just to make sure I understand your question, are you calling into doubt either the efficacy or the wisdom of trying to pursue a NATO-Russia track with regard to cooperative missile defense? Is that --?

SPEAKER: I think there's an overwhelming opinion in the EU among colleagues there that the substance of NATO is kind of being lost to the ether and NATO will come into any bipartisan talk here in the U.S. and it will come into any bilateral treaty

with Russia. When we're talking about missile defense, we're not just talking about the U.S. and Russia; we're also talking about NATO. And so is that forum essentially relegating these discussions to failure before they even start? Is a different forum going to give us a better starting point?

MR. TALBOTT: I think the key forum is the bilateral relationship, the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship, but the United States has, in my view, properly insisted on keeping NATO involved because of our obligations to NATO and because of our larger strategy and policy of trying to persuade the Russians that NATO is not an anti-Russian alliance, and that it has already demonstrated, in multiple ways which are not persuasive to many Russians, I acknowledge, that it is making a transition to a post-Cold War world.

I'm not sure what you mean by evaporating into the ether, but let me just say a word about Georgia and Ukraine. They are rather different cases. Ukraine -- neither has been excluded from eligibility, ultimate or even in the middle term, from a NATO membership and Russia has not been excluded in the long-term from what would be, of course, a rather radically transformed NATO and a rather radically transformed Europe and a considerably evolved Russia. But all doors are open there.

But with regard to Ukraine, public opinion in Ukraine has turned against NATO membership, so the issue really doesn't arise right now. NATO has never been in the position of trying to persuade a democratic country, and it is an alliance of democracies, to come in if the people don't want to.

And as regards Georgia, that's a more complicated case, because it was a core principle of NATO enlargement when President Clinton committed himself to it and, of course, Madeleine was very much involved in both the formulation and the execution of that policy. It was a core principle that the addition of a new member would

have to enhance the security of all members in the entire alliance as well as protecting or enhancing the security of the new member, and that is almost impossible to reconcile with the new facts on the ground that have been created in Georgia, as was discussed in the earlier panel where you now have a pseudo independent state recognized only by Russia, Nicaragua, and --

MS. STENT: Nauru.

MR. TALBOTT: Thank you, Nauru, but what is in, in effect, annexed and occupied territory. So, that creates a stumbling block for NATO's being able to seriously consider Georgia at this time for membership, which indeed is part of the motive why the Russians went in.

MS. STENT: Walt?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I don't have anything. That -- I agree with all that.

MS. STENT: And, by the way, the current Ukrainian government has said it's not interested in NATO membership.

MR. TALBOTT: But it's also public --

MS. STENT: It's public, but Yanukovych himself has said that at the moment -- I believe that's true, Mr. Ambassador? Right?

MR. TALBOTT: And Mr. Yushchenko hasn't been heard from on this subject recently.

MS. STENT: She has not been heard from on this subject recently. Okay, yes, over here please.

MS. VANDERPOT: Good afternoon. My name is Diane Vanderpot. I'm from OSD Policy and I too would like to thank you all for having these discussions today because they've been quite informative, but I also have an ulterior motive. As anybody who has worked in the Pentagon knows, a few hours away from that building is always

welcome, so thank you very much. (Laughter)

MR. TALBOTT: Although the country's a little bit less safe with you not in your office.

MS. VANDERPOT: I'll be back.

MR. SLOCOMBE: Especially since you're from Policy.

MS. VANDERPOT: My question is, we've had a lot of discussions, you've discussed the trust issue and potential ulterior motives that the Russians are very concerned about in these missile defense negotiations. During the first session Mr. Hadley had mentioned that he saw the conservative Russian generals as being a huge cog in the problem. So, my question is, do you see a divide within some of the Russian administration between the MFA and the MOD? And if so, if it's more on the MOD side, as these old generals start to retire, will there be an opportunity for more balanced negotiations or will Putin simply put the lid on everything?

MR. TALBOTT: Could I take a crack at that but with a condition attached? The condition is that obviously Walt will offer his views, but I'm only going to speak to it on the condition that Angela give us her views, because she really, as they say in Russia, knows this kitchen.

Yes, I think there are institutional and bureaucratic differences that are more than just nuance, but less than schisms, if I can put it that way, but I'd like to tie your question, or an attempt to answer it, at least partially back to the previous discussion on Prime Minister soon to be again President Putin, and the difference between him and President soon to be Prime Minister Medvedev.

Broadly speaking, I think, that the significance of the decision that was announced how many weeks ago? September --

MS. STENT: September 24th.

MR. TALBOTT: On September 24th -- see, I told you, listen to her more closely than me -- has been exaggerated. Putin has been number one throughout. Nothing's important in any field that the president of Russia has done during the Medvedev presidency was done over the objections of Prime Minister Putin. So, it is not, in that sense, a huge deal what is happening and what will happen.

However, I do think that President Putin represents a background and, therefore, a foreground, if I can put it that way, an approach to the future based on his past. We all are who we are, but we are also who we have been, and he is an alumnus of the KGB. Many of his -- a number of his formative years were spent in the GDR, a country that no longer exists. And I think that the preoccupation, which I find to be backward-looking or certainly shortsighted, with the presumed, alleged, and largely phantom threat from the West, is more deeply engrained in President Putin than it is in -- in Prime Minister Putin than it is in President Medvedev, and that could make for at least nuances of difference as in Russian foreign policy depending on what happens to American policy in coming years.

MS. STENT: Walt?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I'm interested in hearing your thoughts.

MS. STENT: Well, thank you. I'll just give you my two cents' or kopeks' worth. I mean, first of all, you know, the Ministry of Defense in Russia like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs isn't a monolithic organization just as our own, you know, obviously, the Department of Defense, Department of State are, but it's the same in Russia, so they're different groups. It's true, obviously, that there is a group of the older and more powerful colonels that may have a view of this, but there are others, you know, who don't share those views. It's very hard because one doesn't read publically about this very much, but one knows from discussions that, you know, there are debates going on there but the

question is: who prevails? That's one point.

And the second thing about Mr. Putin announcing that he's going to be president, I mean, Strobe's quite right that you have to assume that any decision that was taken in the U.S.-Russian relationship under Medvedev, including New START and everything else, was taken with Putin's blessing. It wouldn't have occurred had that not been the case, and that, therefore, in that sense, you might expect continuity.

But, you know, we also know -- our evidence from the last eight years of Mr. Putin's presidency and then three and a half years of being prime minister, is that his world view and his view of the United States, it's -- you know, he obviously has had relationships with U.S. presidents, more particularly President George W. Bush where there was cooperation. I mean, there was, you know, a reset after September 11th and then, you know, that eventually deteriorated over a number of issues, including the questions of missile defense.

Now, there are some people out there in our community of kind of Russia watchers who say, well, maybe there will be Putin 2.0, right? He comes back as president and there's going to be a new -- he could surprise us, he could be new. Obviously, one would assume that on the basis of what we've seen so far one would have to be a little bit skeptical about this but it's always possible. And I think probably the general view has been, and again, I'm not involved in any of these Track II negotiations, that one of the major reasons for Russia engaging with the United States and talks about missile defense cooperation, is to understand what the U.S. program is, to understand how it's evolving. And we heard in the previous panel that sometimes it evolves so fast one doesn't hear all the elements of it, and Walt talked about that, too, whether it's actually possible to come to an agreement with them is another issue. But as long as we're engaged in negotiations with them, at least, you know, we keep the process going.

So, I would assume that the process will keep going, but I'm not sure about, you know, coming to an agreement.

In the back there.

MR. NIKURADZE: Thank you. My name is David Nikuradze. I represent Georgian television station Rustavi 2 in Washington, D.C. The United States Government urged Moscow many times to fulfill its commitment on ceasefire with Georgia, but we still see that Russia is not going to restore its troops to prewar positions. Do you believe that this regional issue could be an obstacle for a reset policy for proper relations between the United States and Russian Federation? Thank you.

MR. TALBOTT: Yes. It will be a continuing obstacle for exactly the reasons that you mentioned. And I thought Steve Hadley was, as on other issues, forceful and correct, and in particular when he was by, I would say, deftly fending off some of the criticism of the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration, I think, did not overreact to the -- let's call things by their own names, as they say in Russian -- the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008. That was absolutely a proper reaction, and just to put it, since we all have American domestic politics in mind looking forward, let's look backward. Senator Obama, as he then was Candidate Obama, was, I would say -- what's the word? -- back-footed a bit, on it, did not immediately take a strong position.

If I'm not mistaken he was in Hawaii at the time and paid a price, not a lasting price and not a big price, but it was noted that he wasn't sure quite what the reaction should be to the fact that, once again, Russian combat boots were clomping around in a neighboring country, which is what it all came down to. And they are still there, still clomping around, and that will be an obstacle, and not just in U.S.-Russian relations, but in Russia's relations with all of its neighbors and particularly with Europe.

MS. STENT: Yes. Over there.

MS. GRAY: Thank you. My name is Angel Gray. I'm studying foreign policy at American University. It's been mentioned that there's like a heavy suspicion between -- of U.S. intentions concerning policy. So, my question -- from the Russian perspective -- so my question is, do you see Russia capitalizing on its weapons relationship with China in order to sort of balance its relationship with the U.S.?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Yes. I think the Russians -- first of all, China is a major export market for Russian arm sales. They don't sell -- even the Russians are not prepared to sell the very best stuff to the Chinese, but they'll sell almost anything else. And I think also -- and I'd be interested in Strobe and Angela's view -- I think the Russians made a quite deliberate decision to try to, at a minimum, to balance their relations with China to eliminate the Sino-Soviet split, to relegate that to history along with the rest of the Cold War, particularly in Central Asia. And I think the arms relationship is an aspect of that.

I also think in the long-term -- by the way, I hesitate to criticize this, but the -- I thought that what Secretary Schlesinger said, and I actually thought it was Secretary Brown, Harold Brown, for whom I worked, was that fortunately it is the Soviet Union and not the United States that is surrounded by hostile communist countries.

MS. STENT: Actually, I think it was the Soviet Union is the only country in the world that's entirely surrounded by hostile communist countries.

MR. SLOCOMBE: Anyway --

MR. TALBOTT: We got that straight. (Laughter)

MR. SLOCOMBE: I think in the long run there is a potential for considerable tension between a rising, increasingly assertive, heavily populated, resource poor China and Russia, which is what Russia is.

MS. STENT: I would just say, I mean, Putin's first trip after he

announced that he was going to be president again -- run for president again was to China to make a point to the West. But I think if you look at the trajectory of it, obviously the relationship is much better today than it was in the days when they were shooting each other in 1969 or when they had a very hostile relationship, but it really is, as one of my colleagues has described it, an axis of convenience.

I spent some time in China this summer talking to the Chinese about the relationship with Russia and it's clear that, you know, Russia's a useful energy market, although they still haven't signed a pipeline deal -- gas pipeline deal. They've been negotiating for years because the Chinese don't want to pay what the Russians are asking. And they do buy Russian arms; although they're actually buying fewer than they did before and they've reverse engineered some of those already and are producing them themselves.

But the interesting thing about the Chinese is they say, you know, Russia supports us in all issues that are really important to us like Taiwan, Tibet, a multipolar world, issues where they have differences with the United States. But when you talk to them about Russia's economy or its domestic system, I would say they're pretty skeptical, to put it mildly. So, I think they view this in a very, very pragmatic way.

And from the Russian point of view, I think there's a realization that, yes, China is a good arms market, maybe not as good as it was; and yes, the Chinese would like to buy their energy, but, as Walt said, there are huge problems. The Russian Far East is depopulated. The most dynamic parts of the economy in the Russian Far East are run by Chinese migrants, you know, who live there and then go back to China. So, there's a deep, fundamental concern about the longer-term viability of a country, Russia, whose population is shrinking, and China, whose population is expanding.

MR. SLOCOMBE: I'm struck by the analogy -- a similar question was

asked -- a friend of mine asked a similar question about the Turkish relationship with Russia and was told the Turkish relationship with Russia is strictly emotional. (Laughter)

MS. STENT: Very good. Strobe?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Well, I think there's a bigger strategic element with China.

MR. TALBOTT: Exactly. It's a lot more than that with China and Walt absolutely nailed it: resource rich, people poor. I don't know what else to say about Siberia, the maritime Russian Far East, cheek by jowl with the most populous country on the planet for another couple of decades until India overtakes it, and a country that is resource poor. That is, you know, all of us are students in one way or another of both classical and perspective geopolitics, which is also geo-economics, that is a formula for trouble, which is neither to hope for nor to predict that there will be another Sino-Soviet split or that there will be gunfire on the little islands -- Damansky Island, or whatever it's called in Chinese, and the Amur and Usuri and stuff like that, or that there will be another Russian contemplation of a preemptive nuclear strike against Lapnor. But trouble, big time, and certainly a very strong incentive for no Russian leader who is thinking at all strategically to, for example, provide MIRV technology, which is an issue that has arisen at least in the public press and, therefore, I assume has arisen to the Chinese.

MS. STENT: Yes.

MR. THIELMANN: Greg Thielmann, Arms Control Association. I wanted to ask for a clarification for a point that I think Walt Slocombe was making about evolving technology making it even harder to differentiate strategic missile defense from theater missile defense, in light of the fact that the two governments demonstrated they can, in fact, agree to differentiating the two in the 1997 protocol to the ABM Treaty, because it does seem to me that the problem is not technological. The Russians are giving all kinds

of signals that Phase 1 and 2 are okay, Phase 3 and 4 are not, in the phase adaptive approach. The problem is theological, that there's a large and powerful portion of the U.S. Congress that is diametrically opposed to any kind of constraints on national territorial missile defense and that the George W. Bush Administration bought on to that theology and, in fact, took actions to conflate theater and national missile defense by, in fact, even eliminating program distinctions and even the word so that the problem is not a technological one, it's a theological one.

MR. SLOCOMBE: Well, I understand that argument but, for example, the difference between Phase 2 and Phase 3 has partly to do with the diameter of the propulsion unit. You know, that's not just a theoretical -- there are important technical reasons why, if you want to continue to maintain the capacity of the system to provide regional defense, you need to make those kinds of improvements. And the current version of Phase 4 is, in fact, to upgrade to this Block 2B version of the missile so that it would be able to make a contribution to both homeland defense and to expand in defense.

I'm actually -- the rational part of the Russian objection, it has always seemed to me, is -- and most serious Russians will say, you know, we're not arguing about 26 or 30 ground-based interceptors, we're arguing about the fact that you're building this big infrastructure, particularly the sensors, you're building the technology. You know, the Ted Postons of the world say discrimination can't work. We worry it might work, even against us. And if you're going to get a technical constraint, it's going to have to be a constraint which says, we need to be able to -- and that you could -- I'm not saying you couldn't have technical agreements. It's that I don't think they can be based on the distinction between there is one part of the world which is strictly regulated, intercontinental defense, and another part which is not regulated hardly at all, indeed not

least from the Russian point of view, because what the Russians say, which is not totally crazy, is something which is forward deployed may have some -- even though it's not -- the relevant issue is the distance between the launch point of the interceptor and the intercept point, not the distance between the launch point of the target -- the attacking missile and what its target is.

I just don't see that the kind of effort, which the '97 protocol exemplified, but which was a can of worms, put real constraints on the American programs for nonstrategic defense. I just don't see that as being something that is -- you know, if you can come up with the scheme that doesn't unreasonably constrain what we need to do against other countries, that's fine, but I just am very doubtful it will be possible. And I focus particularly on the increasing integration of the system so that one approach to long-term homeland defense is the first shop comes out of an Aegis shop supported by a TPY-2 radar, and anything subsequent comes out of Greely or wherever you put them comes out them, supported by XMN. I mean, and that's not going to be an easy problem to solve because the Russians are going to be worried about the Aegis and we're going to be worried about missing the first shot.

MS. STENT: Strobe?

MR. TALBOTT: No theology on top of that theology.

MS. STENT: Okay. We've had a great discussion. You started with the theological metaphors. I think we've heard two high priests of missile defense, arms control, and everything else.

MR. SLOCOMBE: Go and sin no more.

MS. STENT: Please join me in thanking both of our speakers.

(Applause)

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