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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: FIT FOR PURPOSE?

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. JONES: It's an honor to host Tony Banbury today, and to welcome all of you to join us on this very distinguished panel to discuss UN peacekeeping.

You have the bios in front of you. I'm just going to quickly introduce people. You have in particular Tony Banbury's bio in front of you. It's very misleading. It says he served in some jobs in the NSC and State Department and a couple other places. I knew Anthony Banbury 15 years ago, 10 years ago? When we were in Kosovo? I guess 13 years ago, when he was the point person who was sent out by the National Security Council as a key troubleshooter to help put in place the UN's mission to Kosovo, one of the most complex operations the UN had ever run.

That was essentially Tony's job, as a key troubleshooter for some of the most difficult hotspots the UN was dealing with either on systemic issues or in specific countries, and he performed that role for the Clinton administration after a long background in UN peacekeeping itself. He continued to perform that role for the Bush administration, working closely with Condi Rice, and was then sent to head up the World Food Program's regional program in Asia, which deals with such minor and uncomplicated issues like North Korean famine and the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami, and a couple other minor challenges like that.

In then one of those moves that gives hope to those of us who continue to have great faith in the UN, the secretary-general recruited Tony's then-boss, Susana Malcorra, to be the undersecretary for field support operations. And she, in turn, recruited Tony to come in and be nothing other than the point person for the most complicated set of issues that she's dealing with, namely a suite of reforms that Tony will talk about.

So it's a privilege to have you here, and thank you for coming to talk to

us. I think it's worth saying, by the way, before I introduce the other panelists, to briefly introduce Tony's functions. Those of you who aren't familiar with the nomenclature of the UN, field support sounds like a soft and easy and uncomplicated thing. What it actually is is the politics and the logistics and the finance and the personnel of the entire UN's field operations, which is more than 120,000 soldiers, plus 20,000-odd civilians -- and some very odd civilians, but mostly 20,000-odd civilians -- in operations after the U.S. forces' deployments overseas, by far and away the largest and most complex military and logistic operation in the world. Larger than the overseas deployments of Russia, China, France, and the UK combined. So, once again, Tony's on the hot seat in an incredibly complex operation.

And it would be hard to find somebody who knew as much about peacekeeping, both from a U.S., but also a UN, perspective. Hard, but not impossible, if you turn to Bill Durch, who anybody who knows anything about peacekeeping knows that Bill Durch knows more about peacekeeping than everybody else. And Bill Durch was, of course, also the intellectual architect of a previous round of reforms, the Brahimi reforms. And I think it's fair to say -- Tony might want to contradict this -- but I think it's fair to say that the current suite of reforms still owe an incredible intellectual debt to the Brahimi reforms that are in many ways are a continuation of that effort to adapt peacekeeping to its modern purposes, albeit in a different geopolitical context and a considerably different, larger scale than Brahimi had envisaged.

And then we'll turn to Noam Unger, who is with us here at Brookings. Noam is a fellow in the Global Economy and Development Program, where he's done extraordinarily important work on UN-U.S. civilian assistance reform and foreign assistance reform, having previously served with my good friend, Carlos Pascual, when he was the ambassador for stabilization and reconstruction in the State Department, and,

I think, is extremely well-suited to give us some context of how the United States looks at peacekeeping as part of a broader suite of tools that it has to deal with a range of civilian and crisis and peace support operations.

So with that context, Tony, over to you.

MR. BANBURY: Thank you, Bruce, very much for that kind introduction -- overly kind introduction. And ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming today. I'm very happy to be here and spend a few minutes talking about peacekeeping and whether it's fit for purpose. It's a great subject. I'll try and cover a lot in a very brief amount of time.

The short answer, I think, to the question of whether UN peacekeeping is fit for purpose is increasingly so. We're getting there. There are certainly lots of opportunities for improvement, but we're trying to take a new approach to the way we provide our support to field operations, the way we enable them. We're trying to very significantly transform the way we approach that work so that missions can carry out the very complicated, difficult mandates assigned to them by the Security Council.

But it's not just a matter of what the UN secretariat is doing. It's also the troop contributors and how they approach their work, and the member states, and, in particular, those in the Security Council that choose the mandates that determine whether UN peacekeeping is fit for purpose.

We also have to recognize, I think, very honestly that this question about what the UN does in its peacekeeping missions, how it does it, is increasingly linked to resource considerations and the financial circumstances that our member states find themselves in. And there is no longer any way we can separate the very difficult financial circumstances that many of the UN member states are in and their policies in New York and in particular their decisions on peacekeeping deployments and peacekeeping

budgets.

So I'd like to look at how we can perhaps take some fresh thinking in three different areas toward making the UN more fit for purpose and peacekeeping. And that if we can make some progress in those areas that we will increasingly achieve what I think we all want -- member states, host communities, troop contributors, those of us in the secretariat and interested outsiders -- a peacekeeping capability in the United Nations that is able to deliver these not just complex, but important mandates, particularly in the areas of protection of civilians at a cost that is affordable.

The first area I want to talk about is the link between operations and cost. And right now, the way a peacekeeping mission is developed, the way it's planned for is the decisions are made in an environment almost devoid of resource considerations. There will be an assessment team sent out to the country in question that will look at the whole range of different factors in the society, and the secretary-general will issue a report to the Security Council giving his best assessment of the situation on the ground and the role that the UN could play, the number of troops and police that might be necessary, and civilians. And then the Security Council will mull it over and pass a mandate and instruct the secretary-general, please go forward and perform such-and-such a mission in this country.

And it's only at that stage that the mission will be fully costed out. And it will then go into a budget process that's very separate from all these prior analyses and discussions and decisions. So sometimes -- and not just sometimes, quite often -- we will have a conversation in the Security Council where member states will be pushing very strongly for robust mandate on protection of civilians or some other, you know, rule of law, whatever the case may be. And then the Council will pass its mandate and we will then prepare a budget and try and get it through the budget committee.

And that same member state, or those member states who were the most vocal on robust mandate in certain areas, will then bequestioning us very hard and opposing our proposals for resources required to implement that mandate. The same member state will be sending very contradictory messages, and it just makes no sense. So we need to, I think -- the member states, the Security Council, the decision-makers need to have different courses of action put before them on how the international community might approach a certain conflict or post-conflict situation in a country, and then have a dollar figure attached. And if they want to go for the most robust mandate that's going to achieve the most good, understand what we think is necessary to achieve that. If they want to have somewhat more modest ambitions, understand what it will cost to achieve that.

And so, we don't have this disconnect between, on the one hand, saying UN, go and do this huge, difficult, complex mandate. Oh, but no, you can't have this resource to do it or that resource to do it. It's just creates this inherent dysfunctionalism inside our system.

The second area that requires some real work, I think, is how we go -- once we get the mandate, and putting aside the resource issue or the budget issue in New York, how we go about pursuing the mandate. And we tend to have a fairly consistent approach in when there's a new peacekeeping mission deployed. Again, it's based on an assessment, and normally the full range of issues are included in the assessment: all the rule of law components, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration components, the protection of civilians components, gender components, HIV components, plus of course the security side. And no one wants to say no to any of those things and so they all get put in the mandate, and then we have a unit in the peacekeeping mission responsible for that slice of the functional responsibility.

And that leads to, at times, I think an overly segmented approach to our work. And it creates the -- sometimes we can do, I think, better with a more holistic and integrated approach than if we didn't have that segmented approach.

And so if we take a -- whether it's working with our UN agency partners, agency funds and programs, or working the troop contributors in a different way, I think we could approach our work in a way that allows us to pursue the mandate assigned to us, but with a little more creativity, a little more integration, a little more cooperation, and probably at a lower cost.

To give you one example, without naming any particular peacekeeping mission, we have some very important protection of civilian responsibilities. In order to be good on protection of civilians, we need good early warning systems. We need to know what's happening on the ground, but in very dispersed locations. And the topography of some of the places we work is very difficult, whether it's jungles or lack of roads or inundation during rainy season -- very hard to move around.

If we used very simple commercially-available UAV technology, for instance, we would be able to give our peacekeepers much better situational awareness, what's really happening, get early warnings on issues that may expose a certain community to violence, and allow us to deploy our peacekeepers quickly and proactively. So, that would allow us to perhaps rely on fewer infantry battalions, fewer high-cost helicopters to try and do that aerial reconnaissance. We'd have a better understanding of what was happening, be able to respond faster to threats to the civilian communities, and do it at a lower cost.

The final area I wanted to mention, and this is one where I really am -- where the Department of Field Support is working a lot, is in our kind of -- our business models for field support, how we provide the troops and the police and the civilians the

tools they need to do the job.

Peacekeeping is creeping up to be, again, about an $8 billion a year function. And I -- my colleagues and I were on the Hill earlier today talking to some senators. And you know there's an acute concern about the cost of peacekeeping. But we have a great opportunity now to transform the way we do our support to peacekeeping operations. And instead of looking at each one as an independent, standalone mission that needs to be fully capable of performing all its functions on its own, we now are looking at peacekeeping as an $8 billion global enterprise with huge opportunities for synergies by combining functions in a remote location, not in the peacekeeping mission itself.

So for instance, we have this Global Field Support Strategy approved by the General Assembly, a five-year strategy, to get to the question of is UN peacekeeping fit for purpose. The Global Field Support Strategy is all about making it fit for purpose on the business side. It's about making the headquarters' role to be focused on strategy and policy and governance and member state relations, and getting out of the kind of transactional, operational work that we do in New York so far removed from our operations.

And it's about creating regional service centers where we remove the back office -- what should be back office functions in a peacekeeping mission, like finance and budget and human resources and payroll and invoicing, things that don't need to be done on-site, taking them out of a mission, and putting them -- the regional service center we now have already established in Entebbe, Uganda, and putting the functions there.

This will allow us to deliver a better quality of service to the missions at a significantly lower cost. If I take the example of, say, a payroll unit, if we put -- take all the

payroll units out of those missions and put them in Entebbe, the concentration of excellence there will -- and a higher level person overseeing it will allow them to really specialize and get very good at what they do. So I know we will be able to do our job better, but think of the efficiencies that we'll gain.

If we -- the Entebbe regional service centers service UNAMID, UNISFA in Abyei, UNMIS in South Sudan, MONUSCO in Congo, and UNSOA in Somalia. If we take 5 payroll units, and say each one has 10 people, and we take those 10 people and put them in Entebbe, we have now 50 people there, but we don't need 50 people to do the job. We can do it with maybe 30 people, so that's a savings of 20 posts.

Additionally, the direct costs of having someone in a peacekeeping mission like UNAMID or MONUSCO compared to the direct costs of having them in Entebbe is much higher, because we need to pay hardship allowances, hazard allowances. Then there are the indirect costs of having someone in, say, Al-Fashir, where we have to pay for security, we have to pay for drinking water, we have to pay for power generation, for lights, very expensive. We have to run all these generators and all this fuel, and it costs a lot to transport diesel to Al-Fashir. So, very, very expensive, significant indirect cost to having folks there.

And then there's a very big productivity gain because people in peacekeeping missions get R&R. Every six or eight weeks depending on where they are, they get to go on R&R: five days, plus two days travel. In Entebbe, it's a family duty station, very comfortable place to live. Bring your spouse, bring your kids, send them to school, but you don't get R&R. And if, depending on the cycle, per person some -- on an annual basis they get about 60 to 70 days where they're off their job because of R&R, where if they're in Entebbe they'll be on it.

We're moving 192 posts to Entebbe, half international, more or less. That's a

savings of about 5,000 to 6,000 days of work, or about 30 posts just in this one area. So, we are very significantly changing the way we're approaching our business model to introduce just kind of commonsense, logical ways of thinking about our operations and incorporating cost considerations into them. So, we are going to -- we have already started a year and a half into the five-year strategy to deliver higher quality of service at a lower cost.

By the end of the five years, we will have -- now, though, we're really focused on laying the foundation. We plan to -- we will recommend to the General Assembly creation of two new regional service centers: one serving the Middle East missions, and West Africa. And this is for special political missions as well as peacekeeping.

If the General Assembly approves them and we establish them, all our missions will be covered except Timor and Haiti. And by the end of the five-year period, we will have totally transformed the way we provide support to our peacekeeping missions. This will allow them to focus more on the complex difficult mandates they have, and not be distracted by these back office functions they shouldn't have to worry about.

But it will also show to member states that their resources are being used for the intended purposes. They're not being frittered away, they're not being wasted. And there will be more resources available -- some might just lead to budget cuts and the resources will be, you know, reverted to member states. But in some cases we may be able to redirect resources to more mandate-focused activities and do a better job for the host communities we're trying to serve.

So to conclude: is UN peacekeeping fit for business? As I said at the beginning, increasingly so, but the more important message is that the foundations are

being laid so a year from now, three years from now, we really will have a very different system in place so that I think we'll then be able to give an unequivocal answer of yes to that question.

Thank you very much.

MR. JONES: Tony, thank you very much. Bill, you've thought about these issues both from the perspective of having to deal with the complex logistics that the United Nations is engaged in, but also at a strategic level. What is it that the UN actually does in these contexts, and what are the implications for the UN's business model?

So, give us your thoughts on any issue you want.

MR. DURCH: Okay. Thank you, Bruce. I'll probably round back later and have some thoughts about Tony's remarks. But I have a PowerPoint without a projector, so I'm going to look very intensely at you and see if I can project it that way.

What I was going to say was, first, I entitled it, "Observations on Fitness and Purpose." And to talk about purpose first, there's sort of six levels in my mind of what UN operations have done or can do. And there will be handouts in the back at the end.

At the top end is international administration, like Kosovo and Timor, where the UN is temporarily in charge of being the government. They've done it twice, they'd rather not do it again, I think. Directive state-building, which was attempted briefly in Somalia in the '90s -- I'm not sure that's been attempted again -- where the internationals have the final say, but nominally in support of a local institution that's being built.

The next down would be collaborative state-building, of which there's been quite a bit. You can look at Liberia, Haiti, Democratic Republic of Congo, other places where the UN and the government are partners in trying to build post-conflict

stability. Then there's security humanitarian relief, with or without conflict suppression. Without suppression was Bosnia from 1993 to '95, and that was sort of frustrating for all concerned.

Then creating political space for peace to be built, which is in some ways the most frequent thing that complex operations do. The drama in Cote d'Ivoire last winter and spring was an illustration of how a peacekeeping mission can sustain political space for a legitimate government in the face of opposition until the international community can rally more support for that institution. And I would say Sierra Leone in 2000 was a similar case. And then last, kind of where peacekeeping started, which was providing fair witness on the ground in interstate border monitoring kinds of functions.

So, those are kind of the six levels at which you can be fit for purpose. And each requires a little bit different quality in your organization and so forth.

The next slide would have said, fitness -- purpose versus capacity, and five bits here. Speed of deployable expertise and mission set-up. There's a lot of discussion in the business about getting there sooner is better than getting there later, because all sorts of things can decay for weeks and months after a peace accord is signed when the enforcers, the peacekeepers, the support functions that were promised don't show up. And it takes sometimes six to nine months for the UN to get a mission together and fully up and running. And the UN has been addressing this on both civilian and the policing side, and to some extent military, but it's difficult because everything of course is volunteered for these operations.

After speed, skills, having the right mix of skills in the mission for the mandate.

Third, legitimacy in the eyes of the local elites and local publics. Do they believe you have a right to be there and give them a hand?

Fourth, resources, funding, and stuff, the sorts of things that Tony was talking about. And one of the things that perhaps, Tony, you could address in the Q&A is the issue of what you can do with a mission budget and what you can't. The lack of programming ability and having to rely on development and other voluntary budgets to do a lot of things that missions are mandated to do.

And finally, outside political support. If you don't have the continuing focused support of one or more great powers, you're not going to get your mandate adopted, fulfilled, because the pressures and power of the reassertion of national sovereignty are going to continuously outweigh the assertions of international legitimacy and prerogative as time goes on. Countries are simply interested in reassuming control over their destiny.

Okay, so mission life cycles. You get a mandate and it says you go out and you suppress conflict, you do external humanitarian relief, you do whatever it was in the six-item list, right? And so, how does it end? Well, it could end in several ways. You can complete your mandate based on a measured goal, tick the box, and leave -- like holding a national election. And through the '90s, this was the measure in many places.

You can complete your mandate based on a predicted outcome. This is kind of where most missions are today. We think it's okay to let go, we can take down the scaffolding, we can back away from -- start reducing troops, and sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn't. The United States also has that issue on its plate in Iraq and Afghanistan both.

Strategic consent can be revoked. Nationalism can assert itself and they can say, thank you very much, this is our country, please go away. And the UN pretty much has to go away, although that was renegotiated in Congo last year successfully.

And finally, the strategic need goes away. And by that, I mean, for

example, a border monitoring mission, the two countries kiss and make up and everything is good, and then the UN can leave.

So then the final slide would have been, okay, what are some outcomes related to each of these -- some missions related to each of these outcomes? Measured goal attainment. The missions that use it, Nicaragua and El Salvador, successfully; Cambodia, more or less successfully in the terms for which it was created; Mozambique, Haiti, but I think it was the wrong goal; and Croatia -- Eastern Croatia in 1998.

Predicted goal attainment. Good example, Sierra Leone. The military mission left, the country sailed on, had another election in 2007, the opposition party won, the country didn't melt down, good, fine. Still impoverished, but relatively stable. Timor 2005, 2006, wrong prediction. The country destabilized, UN had to go back in, international forces had to go back in. So, that was a bad prediction.

Strategic consent revoked or return to war or you have to evacuate the mission. Fairly long list of these. Egypt/Israel 1967; Angola late '90s; Somalia as I mentioned; Bosnia in '95; Iran/Iraq in 1990; Iraq/Kuwait on the verge of the war there; Kosovo in 2008, when the Kosovar said, hey, we're independent, get over it; and Chad in 2010, which invited the UN out and it did leave.

And then strategic need goes away. I think there's only one case, there may be others, Egypt/Israel 1979 Peace Treaty. But there is still a non-UN operation there as a buffer between the two states. So, the peacekeeping didn't go away, but the original reason did, so.

MR. JONES: Great. Well, that was extremely comprehensive, as always.

One of the things that I was struck by in your discussion and that I think came out very well in the description of the purposes is quite how much of what

peacekeeping does relates not just to the narrow military functions of suppressing conflict, but to the broader civilian functions of building states.

And it's on that that I thought I'd ask Noam to come in, both on sort of how peacekeeping in a narrow sense relates to that broader set of functions, and also drawing on your experience inside the U.S. Government in dealing with U.S. civilian aid reform, and how UN peacekeeping specifically fits into a broader set of tools that the U.S. looks at in dealing with these kinds of cases.

MR. UNGER: Sure. Well, thanks, yeah.

I think, you know, coming back to this title it's a pretty good -- it's a useful frame, "Fit for Purpose." Somewhere between the overall purpose of a peaceful world and the many specific purposes and types of missions for peacekeeping operations that Bill enumerated is this other level of analysis, which is why the U.S. would be interested in supporting these operations. And it comes down to the concept, at least in my mind, of burden-sharing, which is often repeated in discussions of peace operations and individual member countries' interests.

There is a flipside, which is a cynical side, which could be blame-sharing. And that's if countries are not taking seriously the mission, but are just trying to sort of avoid a problem by seeking to employ UN auspices to deal with a conflict. But let's set that aside for a second, and actually focus on a serious treatment of stabilization and peace-building in countries.

I think it's useful to put it into context. For many people who are familiar with this, you are aware of the acceleration of the number of these types of missions and the number of people involved, and the scope of these missions over the years. The past 15 years have seen just a dramatic increase, the past 20 years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations around the world: an eight-fold

increase in peacekeepers globally just in the past decade or so, I think, if I've got the numbers right.

And this is -- and it's not just -- it's not limited to the UN. As Bill noted, there are non-UN peacekeeping efforts, certainly in the U.S. experience of the last decade, and even in the '90s with regard to use of NATO missions and mandates, and specifically colored by U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan of late in terms of an ad hoc coalition of the willing and a reliance on NATO in combination with leveraging UN assets to solve problems that are of keen interest to U.S. national security.

This entire phenomenon has changed U.S. foreign policy calculations. And in there, there's a security rationale -- especially since 9/11 -- for supporting peacekeeping around the world. The past decade so much of the language around U.S. foreign policy has been infused with this notion that we're more threatened by weak and failing states than by stable ones, which can certainly be questioned when it's expanded to the general category of fragile states. And fragile states don't necessarily equate exactly with peacekeeping operations, but there's an enormous overlap.

I think that there's another rationale, which is also just the increasing share of the world's poor are found -- those billion people are found in fragile states, and a lot of those states are where these peacekeeping operations tend to happen, need to happen. And that's a more humanitarian rationale as well.

But regardless of the rationale, there's been a lot of thinking over -- and the rest of the panel here has been actually largely involved in shaping that thinking over the past couple decades. But there's been a lot of thinking on how to actually structure bureaucracies and institutions in a better system, more systematically, to deal with these problems. That's true clearly of the UN, the way that Tony is describing the situation. And it dates back, as Bruce said, to the Brahimi efforts and reviews in the '90s that led

into the current system. It's true in the U.S. and it's true in this hybrid where the U.S. has also been looking at its own capacity to deal with, you know, instability around the world and has, at the same time, been looking at the UN and how it could reform to be more effective. And an example of that is the Gingrich-Mitchell task force of about six or seven years ago.

A lot of those reforms that were prescribed or recommended by those panels of several years ago have actually already been put into place. We're not necessarily seeing all of the results of those reforms just yet, but I think there has been a tremendous amount of progress within the UN based on all of this introspection of how to actually approach these issues more systematically.

And it goes beyond even the description -- the very good description, Tony, that you described of improved logistics and these sort of regional service centers. And I think that that's an excellent example of streamlining and cost saving and efficiency that's very valuable. From the U.S. perspective, that's gold, especially in the current environment because we're so budget constrained.

So there's a lot of focus within the U.S. on efficiency, effectiveness, accountability. It applies to my own area that I look at, which is just reforming U.S. foreign assistance, and it is driven by these budget pressures. I also believe it's driven to a certain extent by the now 1,440-minute news cycle and social media and the exchange of information around the world that -- especially on the accountability side, of having to actually be more accountable globally for the actions of these large institutions operating around the world.

Within the U.S. Government, you know, in the late '90s, the U.S. did a policy review, tried to come up with a better system for its own ability to engage in essentially its own version of peacekeeping operations and stabilization operations and

reconstruction. It was buried and not well-implemented. That was the during the Clinton administration under Presidential Directive 56. It revived again in the post-9/11 world during the Bush administration, which was very clearly against nation-building when it began and became a very large supporter.

And the administration also recognized the value of UN assets around the world as it became sucked in, or intentionally engaged, in very large wars and very long wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, to rely on the UN in other parts of the world as well, and then also in Afghanistan.

But I think there's been -- it's been an evolution. And within the U.S. Government side of things, I'm trying to actually pull together the very many disparate pieces of the U.S. bureaucracy. It's hard enough within the U.S. bureaucracy; I imagine it's even harder within the UN. So, my hat is off to you, Tony.

But it's been difficult. There was an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization that was established in 2004. Wasn't really even officially recognized. It was mentioned in law a little bit earlier, but it's about three years ago this week that it was officially recognized in law and finally has some kind of budget to speak of. And it never, to this day, has fulfilled its initial mission of being able to coordinate across government because of turf battles, because of, you know, the power dynamics across agencies and departments. And I think that it's a very tough challenge within the U.S. Government. But at the same time, it's that same capacity resident somewhere, you know, within the State Department, White House, USAID on the civilian side, with a lot of input from DoD that also shapes the U.S. perspective on what the UN should be doing on this side of things.

I first actually even met Bruce years ago, sitting in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and talking about the peace-building

commission and what it should look like and what it could be at that time. So in that sense, there's been this overall trajectory and focus on this set of issues. And it's been relevant within U.S. foreign policy, and it's been relevant within reforms in the UN.

And right now we're at a political time where foreign assistance generally, and specifically U.S. efforts at the UN, are under assault by Republicans in the House. Certainly if you look at the recent passage of a bill nominally focused on transparency and UN reform, but clearly focused on actually transitioning the entire nature of engagement between the U.S. and the UN and avoiding reliance on assessed contributions to a more voluntary system.

You can tell where I am on this issue. I think this is a bad direction to go. I don't think the bill has a prayer of passing, and even if it does it's actually quite -- there's been some strong language within the administration seeking to veto these -- that effort. But it's a bad sign. It's a bad sign politically for where the U.S. is in terms of thinking about its need for UN, what the UN provides around the world, especially in the area of peace operations, but more broadly as well.

I think that we'll get past it, but it's -- I'm very concerned about that these days. So I'll stop there, and we can do more in questions.

MR. JONES: Great, thank you very much.

Tony, I want to give you a chance to respond to anything that the two panelists said, but I also want to draw you out on two specific things. One is the set of reforms that your department is also responsible for that you didn't touch on directly in your remarks around civilian capacity. Because I think both Bill and Noam raised this question of how the civilian functions of peacekeeping are performed and the link to the development side, and that whole set of issues.

The other thing I want to bring you out on is if you think about Bill's sort

of category of functions and if you go to the first set of comments that you made about linking operations and costs and putting alternative models on the table for member states to consider. I just want to draw you out a little bit on two aspects of that. Sort of on the substantive side, how much is that going to look at alternative functions that could be performed -- just seeing from alternative arrangements to perform those functions? And second, how do you manage the risk that the Council simply chooses the least cost option, even if it's really not in your mind the right option? How do you weigh the -- there's an obvious merit in giving them alternative models and costings. How do you control the risk factor that they simply choose least costly rather than most effective?

MR. BANBURY: Okay. Thanks, Bruce. I'll maybe just make one general observation about the points that Bill and Noam made, and then -- and respond to your questions.

I think what came across to me, at least, listening to the comments even more so than I feel on a daily basis is how complex peacekeeping really is. This is tough, difficult work.

Bill, it was a very interesting and, I think, quite illuminating way of looking at the six levels of purpose of the different missions. And then -- so you have to be ready to perform each of the -- we the UN have to be ready to perform each of those kinds of missions depending upon what the Security Council may decide.

And then for each one, we have to be able to have the speedy deployment, have the right skills for the people, be able to generate the legitimacy, the resources, and the skills of the people that would be right for one type of purpose will be different for another one. And so, you were actually intimidating me a little bit, Bill. Gosh, we have all that stuff to do, too.

And then --

MR. DURCH: Sorry.

MR. BANBURY: There's just a tremendous amount on our plate as we face these evolving -- whether it's expectations of member states, facing the financial pressures we're under, or getting ready for the real world missions that we're asked to embark upon.

Libya, while it's not a peacekeeping mission, it's a special political mission and it's going to be a quite sizeable one. And it's going to be asked to do some very difficult -- carry out some very difficult responsibilities in a country that isn't used to a lot of foreigners kind of running around there. And the number of people who are very knowledgeable about Libya and the political, social, economic dynamics, tribal dynamics, who know about, say, rule of law or DDR, who are willing to deploy to Libya, maybe Benghazi, you know, we don't find these people lining up outside.

So what we're trying to do even if we weren't trying to reform is very difficult. And the context that Noam pointed out and the views in just this one member state -- albeit a very important one, of course -- those political considerations greatly complicate what could be kind of a technical operational approach which in itself would be difficult enough.

So, the work we're trying to do on a day-to-day basis, plus reform at the same time, big, structural reform: changing bureaucratic cultures, transformational reform, and generating the political legitimacy for that in New York, not just for our operations, say, in Libya or South Sudan. And that was a very important point, and you're absolutely right how crucial an issue that is. It's creating that political legitimacy and maintaining it. But doing that in New York for the types of changes we're making, it's -- yes, it's rather difficult.

So to answer, Bruce, your questions, first on the civilian capacity review.

There is this very important report issued by a panel chaired by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, but with other quite capable people on it, on the civilian capacity and the aftermath of armed conflict. The secretary-general has now created a task force to look at the recommendations of this panel and how best to implement them.

The report -- there's a very good executive summary if you just want to read that. The report itself is worth it, every word. It's got some very good ideas about how we need to -- how better we could generate the civilian capacity we need in a post-conflict setting in a rapid but also sustainable way. And I think there's a lot of buy-in within the secretariat among member states for the ideas in the panel, and we are already in some modest way trying to implement them in South Sudan. The challenges are our structures, the rules and regulations of the General Assembly that very clearly describe or proscribe the approach we need to take on human resources. Those structures, rules, and regulations still need to be changed in order to catch up with this new thinking that has come out from the civilian capacity review.

In terms of your question on alternative functions, I don't expect we'll be asked to do a lot of new or different things than what we have already been asked to do. If you add up all the different things we've been asked to do by the Security Council and different peacekeeping missions, it's more than 100 types of responsibilities, mandated responsibilities. Hard to imagine what else they could ask us to do except, you know, start cleaning the kitchen sink. So it's more about finding better ways to do it, whether it's partnering with other UN agencies, building up the -- making it, say, a mission objective, and this links to the Civilian Capacity Review. To build up national capacity in some of these areas -- say, protection -- from the beginning, not just as part of an exit strategy toward the end of the mission, but when we go in at the start-up start thinking about how to transition out. What do we need to do to build the local capacity, put in place

structures, processes, training programs, infrastructure that would allow the peacekeeping mission to leave at an earlier stage?

And then on the question of how to manage the risk that the Security Council would just choose the lowest-cost option if they were presented with options that had price tags attached to them. Under the current system in the UN, I don't think that would happen because the Security Council has a different set of responsibilities and a very different way of looking at its work than the budget committee of the United Nations, the Fifth Committee.

The Fifth Committee is all about dollars and cents. But the Security Council really is about peace and security, and they're -- the budget decision -- the Fifth Committee is a General Assembly committee and there is a different responsibility for the General Assembly, and it takes its prerogatives in this area very seriously compared to the Security Council. So the Security Council has to be very careful in getting involved in budgetary matters. And I certainly don't mean to suggest it should get involved in budgetary processes or matters, but it should understand that is its decision going to mean $1.5 billion? $1 billion? $500 million? There's got to be some sense of resources attached to it.

But when it comes down to it, I think the Security Council is really about peace and security. And the members -- in particular the permanent five members, but really all of them -- take that responsibility very seriously. And I don't believe there's a big risk that the Security Council will go for the lowest-cost option.

Right now, because there's no cost associated to it, it de facto goes to the highest cost option each time. And we have to move a little bit away from that. I don't think we'll end up at the other extreme.

MR. JONES: Great. Well, listen, there's an awful lot of experience and

curiosity on the floor and in the room, so let's turn to the room and take questions. I'm going to work from the back and move to the front, just to be contrarian. Or actually, we'll start in the middle.

MS. HOWARD: Thanks. Can you hear me? My voice doesn't travel. Thanks. I'm Lise Howard. I teach at Georgetown and I am at the U.S. Institute of Peace this year.

I have two questions, and one is factual and one is about -- has to do more with fit for purpose. But first I should just say thank you so much for an interesting and informative overview of what's going on these days in peacekeeping.

So the factual question. The U.S. has just deployed peacekeepers under UN auspices to Liberia as peace observers. And we also have a new mission going after Joseph Kony, and I don't know how that's related to the UN. But what I'm wondering is, I've been working on issues of peacekeeping for years. And generally the rule of thumb is that the U.S. -- actually as one of the chapters in Bill Durch's first book on peacekeeping has this lovely quote from General Colin Powell, who basically said, you know, after Somalia, over my dead body will American soldiers be sent to fight under the UN flag. This is just not going to happen; it's something we're not going to do. And yet it seems to me like there's been something of a change recently. So the first question is just a factual change. Is the U.S. really sending -- I mean, I know that we're sending our folks under the UN flag, but how widespread is it? Where are they? What's going on?

The second question has to do with the fit for purpose question, and is more conceptual. So, as Bill actually quite eloquently described, there have been a number of really extremely successful multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The UN is really very good at this thing, at multidimensional peacekeeping. The UN historically has not been so great at peace enforcement.

In contrast, we have single states -- I'm thinking of the United Kingdom and Sierra Leone -- coalitions of the willing, the INTERFET coalition in East Timor, NATO. We have single states, regional organizations, coalitions of the willing that are very quite good at peace enforcement. And yet, the UN keeps getting peace enforcement mandates. Every single multidimensional peacekeeping operation is authorized as a peace enforcement operation. So my question is, why? Why do we have this massive shift in mandate?

MR. JONES: A couple of easy questions. Let's take a couple of questions and then we'll allow the panelists to come back on any ones they want. So I'm going to violate my rule of working back to front and we'll come up to the front here.

MR. WATERS: Thank you. I'm Maury Waters. I've been looking at writing about the UN for some years.

One of the questions I'm dealing with and interested in getting your reaction to is the whole question of resources available to make a mission successful. And of course when we're dealing with resources we're dealing not only with the financial part of it, but with the political elite support as well as public support.

And I'm wondering if you can identify to what extent you think missions have either failed or have been greatly reduced and returned to their objectives by virtue of a lack of that financial support? And to what extent is the U.S. itself one of the culprits in terms of providing for that lack or making a lack possible?

MR. JONES: All right, let's take one more and then we'll come back to the panel if there's one more at this stage. Otherwise we'll -- going, going, gone.

Okay, so let's go in reverse order: Noam, Bill, Tony.

MR. UNGER: Okay. My sense is that the U.S. in recent years has walked back -- in answer to the last question, and I'll also touch on yours -- the U.S. has

sort of bounced around in terms of its commitment to actually fully paying the UN in terms of its -- what it owes the UN on time and in full. And when the U.S. -- my impression is when the U.S. actually is fully engaged, it has a better seat at the table and a better reception in terms of driving reforms.

The U.S. pays, I believe it's 27-something percent in terms of its assessment, and it comes out to about $2 billion annually in terms of its share of international peacekeeping costs through the UN. It also then spends another I think it's roughly $300 million in recent years on peacekeeping-related efforts as well. And that has to do with training peacekeepers -- very much a lot of that has to do with training peacekeepers around the world to engage in international peacekeeping operations.

So I think the bottom line is I think it's very important for the U.S. to actually be responsible in meeting its commitments and its assessed contributions. In terms of the overall amount, whether the $8 billion global figure and the $2 billion assessed amount for the U.S. is the right amount given the challenge, I think that's another question and perhaps Bill and Tony will be able to answer that a little bit better than I can. But I do think that, you know, at the end of the day it's very important for us to actually be responsible and pay our dues. And we have been of late, and we should continue to do so.

On the question of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, this Chapter 6, Chapter 7 question, I don't know the answer as to why specifically there has been a change, but the change has coincided certainly with just an increasing number of missions globally, an increasing reliance on U.S. peacekeeping. It's over that same period of time when the international community has relied more heavily on the UN that you've also seen a greater incidence of peace enforcement mandates for these missions.

I agree with you that there is a distinction in terms of the effectiveness of

different forces with regard to peacekeeping versus peace enforcement. But perhaps the others will have something to say on that, too.

And in terms of the -- I would say that with regard to U.S. contributions on the troop contributing side of things, that the U.S. is contributing in a small way to UN efforts under a UN banner wouldn't be actually new. It would actually be a reversion to a state that existed a few decades ago when the U.S. was a bigger contributor to peacekeeping operations under the UN, and moved away from that in years. So I just -- I think that your factual question is warranted, but I just want to connect it historically.

You know, the biggest contributors are, I believe -- I might get it in the wrong order, but it's Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and then maybe others like Ghana and Nepal. And it's not the developed countries that are generally contributing, and that's an interesting phenomenon as well.

MR. JONES: Bill.

MR. DURCH: In terms of U.S. participation, as Noam said, in the '90s we did a couple of things. Probably after Colin Powell left the Joint Staff so he didn't have to do himself in, sent a battalion to the -- up in Macedonia under the Balkans operation from '93 to '99. And we sent a brigade to Haiti in '95. It stayed over from the U.S. intervention there the previous year under a U.S. force commander. So we kind of kept close control of it, but there were over 3,000 I think, 2,500 U.S. troops.

In terms of Chapter 7, I think it's kind of a widespread misconception that a Chapter 7 authorization is equivalent to a war-fighting mandate, and it's not. I think it is true to say that UN troops in the '90s or through the last decade went from about 10 percent of them to about 90 percent of them under Chapter 7 mandates, largely because they were being sent into very dangerous environments where they needed more flexibility to use force if they needed to. And this would include -- well, I was going to say

virtually any mission has a right to defend its mandate. And the difference with a Chapter 7 is that I think there seem to be greater flexibility to act proactively, not wait to be shot at first.

And Mike J. Jenks is in the audience and knows more about this than I do, but, for example, the actions taken against the gangs in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, together with the Haitian police in the mid-2000s, or actions against the rape gangs in Eastern Congo. This isn't an army-to-army combat, it's army-to-thug or a foreign police unit-to-thug and crime-fighting on a fairly large scale.

So I think that's where Chapter 7 comes in. It's a political signal and it's flexibility for the mission, and it's also a signal for troop contributors that they should be prepared to expect some risk if they deploy into this mission.

I don't think I know of a mission that has failed as a result of a lack of cash. They may have faded, but I'm not sure that I could say completely that they failed because of a lack of money. There are a lot of missions that are short. I mean, they ask for 100 people and they get 70 or they can afford 70. But it would be hard to answer that question definitively, I think.

MR. JONES: Tony.

MR. BANBURY: I think Noam and Bill have broadly answered the questions. Maybe just a couple additional comments.

I very much agree that there's an important distinction to be made between a UN peacekeeping operation with a Chapter 7 enforcement mandate and a war-fighting operation. And certainly UN peacekeepers should not be asked to go and fight wars. Not trained for it, equipped for it, they shouldn't be mandated for it, and the results won't be very good, I don't think, if peacekeepers are sent to fight a war. It's a very, very, very different operation than a peacekeeping mission with an enforcement

mandate.

The Chapter 7 mandates, though, are often important. As Bill said, it's because the missions are getting sent to some very unstable, insecure places with some bad actors there, and they have to be capable of, of course, always defending themselves but also defending the mandate, and it's sometimes a protection of civilians.

And in the Eastern Congo now, the UN is acting in a fairly robust manner, together in cooperation with a host government to protect civilians using the Chapter 7 mandate. And I think that that's very consistent with member state expectations, and a good role for the UN peacekeepers.

On the question of U.S. resources, whether it's troops or money or political support, one -- just to clarify in case there's any question, the deployment of these 100 U.S. military personnel that was announced just the other day to go after Mr. Kony and the LRA, that is not linked to UN peacekeeping operations in the region. And certainly those are not UN peacekeepers.

But more broadly on the question of support to peacekeeping, there are a number of different ways that a member state can support UN peacekeeping. Some deploy troops or deploy military helicopters. But there's the political support that was mentioned that is so crucial, including in working on the ground after a mission is deployed and trying to create the political space or build state capacity or resolve local disputes. The role of powerful member state in supporting the day-to-day operations of a mission can be crucial. And whether it's a U.S. ambassador or an ambassador from another country working closely with the special representative, the secretary-general, they can form or they can work in close collaboration to pursue the common objectives enshrined in the Security Council mandate.

There's also this week here in Washington the annual conference of

something called the Global Peace Operations Initiative run out of the State Department with a lot of involvement of the Defense Department. And this is a very serious, credible, effective U.S. effort to support the capacity of other countries to deploy peacekeepers. And the U.S. has been extremely helpful to UN peacekeeping by working with other troop contributors, training them, equipping them, getting them prepared to deploy a capable force to a UN peacekeeping operation. And so we as the folks involved with UN peacekeeping benefit greatly from that U.S. support, even though it's not U.S. military personnel under blue berets.

And then finally, an observation on resources. One of the strengths of UN peacekeeping, but also in certain respect our liability, is right now whatever resource we require that gets approved by the budget committee -- and most of what we ask for -- I mean, there's a little tinkering on the edges, but most of what's asked for based on the Security Council mandate is approved. And once it's approved, it's a legal obligation of member states to pay those dues. So we will get those resources by and large. Sometimes the payments are delayed, but basically we'll get the resources -- the financial resources.

But because of the issues I was talking about before, this has led to a growth in the size of missions and the kinds of things that are asked for based on the mandates. And Bruce referred to it in his introductory remarks. For six years I worked for the UN World Food Program, which is 100 percent voluntarily funded, and it's just a very different way of working. And if we're going to have assessed contributions, which I think are absolutely necessary for UN peacekeeping, I don't see any other way of it working. But there's a responsibility on the UN to ensure we only ask for what we need, and then whatever we get, that we use as intended; that we are responsible stewards of the resources entrusted to us by the member states. And I think we're doing pretty good at

that now, but we've undertaken an effort to make sure that every member state will -- or to do our best that every member state will have full confidence that any dollar, yen, or euro they send to us will be used as it's intended.

MR. JONES: Or RMB, I assume.

MR. BANBURY: Or RMB.

MR. JONES: Two cents on my side and I'll go back to the floor. On Lise's question about U.S. Special Forces in Uganda, I thought it was an extremely interesting decision by the President to send forces after Kony's guys. I mean, these are some of the worst guys on Earth, right? I mean, the Lord's Resistance Army are some of the worst guys on Earth. And I think it's also reflective of a tendency, which we've seen building across successive administrations, to really take seriously the concept of protection of civilians, and that that's gone from kind of just a slogan and occasional votes in support of mandates to something the U.S. is actually serious about. And we saw that to a substantial degree in the Bush administration and we've seen that in the Obama administration.

And I think this is becoming, in a sense, a bipartisan plank of American policy that the American power will be available to deter some of the worst excesses against civilians. I think it's part of a broader shift back towards sort of democracy promotion and human rights in U.S. foreign policy.

Now the Kony operation is, in a sense, way out there in terms of the creativity of what they're going to have to do. But the Libya operation, I think, is in the same domain and the same spirit. And in a way, one of the things that's worth probing with the administration is why they didn't look to the UN to create an authorizing environment for their forces.

Now, these are U.S. special forces, they're not going to be doing the

things that UN peacekeepers normally do. Nevertheless, UN does have a substantial political and peacekeeping presence in the region, and it seems to me that it might have been to create an authorizing environment through the Council to do what they wanted to do. And so I think that's a question worth exploring further.

Let's go back to the floor, I saw several hands. So in the middle, and then we'll come closer to the front.

MR. TIPSON: Thanks. Fred Tipson, also at the U.S. Institute of Peace, but spent four years at UNDP.

Two areas on this fit for purpose issue that I'd like to hear more about: one is intelligence, and whether we've made any progress in helping these heroic political military efforts at the UN with an easier access to sophisticated intelligence, and the other is economic reconstruction. Not just stabilization and not development as usual, but a serious comprehensive effort to try to get people employed quickly enough to stabilize the economy and get sustainability.

MR. JONES: Thanks. I saw other hands earlier. The gentleman in the back?

SPEAKER: Hi, I'm Omar Daair from the British Embassy.

I was just wondering whether you could say something about UNAMID and whether the difficulties with that have sort of killed off the idea of doing more things as a joint mission. And then secondly, more generally, if we look at the African Union mission in Somalia, AMISOM, which people seem less keen to see roll over into UN mission and UNISFA, which is a UN mission but effectively Ethiopian, whether there is a changing nature of peacekeeping in Africa or whether the sort of model we've seen of peacekeeping operations so far will remain the same?

MR. JONES: Thanks. One more before we go back? Please.

SPEAKER: Walter (inaudible), student from Germany. I was just -- it's more conceptually a question that is basically asking for some details, which I like.

So this term "peacekeeping" and on the other side maybe "peace promoting," like peace promoting would rather carry connotations of, I don't know, looking for possibilities, providing opportunities to trigger ideas of -- within society and within the limits of fear that might be in fragile states, of moving forward on the one hand, and promoting opportunities that might not be taken, but that might just be put, and, on the other hand, the term "peacekeeping," which carries more connotations of institution control, rather conservative approach, maybe.

So probably between persons there might be different relations to other people, but also between institutions. And I mean, the UN seems to be an institution that kind of like a lens integrates perspective in a way that the outcome is not as certain. That some states, like maybe the U.S., would want to join fully in some part.

So, I don't know. Just some -- I don't know, insights on these differences of perspective.

MR. JONES: So the shocking accusation that maybe the UN is a little conservative at times in its approach. Let's do this in order, so Tony, Bill, Noam.

MR. BANBURY: Sure. With respect to the first question on intelligence, I'm sure you meant to use the term "information," which is the term we prefer to use in the United Nations. We don't do intelligence gathering.

But of course for peacekeepers to be effective they need good situational awareness. They need to know what's happening down the road, over the hill, through the forest, where the bad guys are, what the vulnerabilities of the villages are, what the intentions of hostile forces are. They need to -- the more they can understand those things, the better they will be at their job.

So we try and develop that understanding through all kinds of very legitimate, normal ways: political affairs officers, civil affairs officers out talking to mayors and village chiefs and taxi drivers or, you know, woman heads of household, or whatever. But the UN military side also has their ways of working, and they try and generate information as well. Battalions -- even an infantry battalion, they try to develop situational awareness.

I referred earlier to the possibility of using UAVs, and I wouldn't call it intelligence, but I think this could be a very valuable tool to a force commander in SRSG. If used in the appropriate way, with full transparency to the host government and host authority, this wouldn't be anything secret or, you know, under wraps.

So it's a critical area. We try and have the best picture we can. We welcome information from wherever we get it.

In terms of economic reconstruction, it's very important for the international community, not just a peacekeeping mission, to understand what's really happening in a country. And it makes no sense to try and look at the humanitarian situation over here and another group of actors looking at the development situation, another looking at the political, another looking at the security, and they all with their own mandates going off in different direction. Because in the real world, in those countries, the economic situation, the social situation, the political, the security, they're all interconnected and it's the same actors, and they're all influencing each other.

So starting with the understanding of what's happening, and then in terms of how we as the UN pursue our mandate, we need an integrated approach. And now we really have implemented that concept in a very real way in UN peacekeeping through our integrated missions. Most missions now -- certainly the complex missions and the complex environments, the new ones, are integrated missions where the head of

the mission is in charge of the whole UN country team: the agencies, funds, and programs as well as the peacekeeping operation. And normally, her deputy or his deputy -- one of the deputies -- is the UN resident coordinator that looks after the UN country team, and the other deputy is more looking after the peacekeeping mission.

So the questions of economic reconstructions, job creation, absolutely critical. And this is something that has to be done at the very beginning stages of the mission. We have to start delivering value -- delivering on the expectations of the host community from the beginning, which is really one of our biggest challenges because the expectations are invariably unrealistic. That's an important part of it.

With respect to the questions on UNAMID, UNISFA, AMISOM, new models of peacekeeping in Africa, I think the United Nations needs to be able to tailor our responses to both the needs of conflict or post-conflict situation on the ground, and to the interests and intentions of our member states. We need to be a flexible tool that meets the needs of the host population in a manner that member states will support and, hence, vote for and pay for. And that means being flexible. It means being creative, it means not having cookie-cutter approaches.

In our system that's hard because we have fairly rigid processes and structures and sometimes conservative thinking. But we're trying to change that so we can really tailor our -- not take these cookie-cutter approaches and just say, this is what we did in this country, move it over here and just same report, cross out a few names, same approach. That tendency will inevitably lead to a misapplication of tools and resources to challenges.

And in the case of UNISFA, on the border between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan in Abyei, you know that was a creative approach that took into account both the realities of the situation on the ground and the realities in the Security Council.

Ideal? No. Best available option? Best one I can think of, at least. And whether we work more or less with the African Union in places like Darfur, I think we'll, yes, certainly be influenced and informed by our experiences in Darfur, some of which have not been easy. Any time you have a big operation with two different masters with separate political and economic interests, inevitably there are going to be some differences of opinion. But we've learned a lot. We have a strong partnership with the African Union, and I would not be surprised if we see that model again if that's what the circumstances on the ground would benefit from. In Libya now, though, that's not what we're doing. It's a UN mission; it's not a joint mission, despite some early talk suggesting a different approach.

Finally, just a quick word on peace promoting versus peacekeeping. Peacekeeping really is a mandated activity of the United Nations, mandated by the Security Council. Peace promoting could come in many different forms, but broadly falling under, I would say, the good offices of the secretary-general. And he -- in this case it's a "he" -- would be able to pursue that in a number of different ways, and he does. I would say him and his office plus the Department of Political Affairs, and in some respects UNDP, even, are trying to promote peace in a number of different ways in different areas. But that really is a different activity than the mandated activities of peacekeeping by the Security Council.

Thank you.

MR. JONES: Bill.

MR. DURCH: On intelligence and headquarters, it's pretty much what headquarters receives from the missions and what it reads on the wires. There's no formal strategic intelligence function, and there should be but member states are nervous about the UN knowing too much too soon.

In operations, though, in recent years there have been these joint -- help me out, Mike.

SPEAKER: Mission analysis.

MR. DURCH: Thank you. Joint mission analysis, the JMAC --

SPEAKER: JMAC --

MR. DURCH: -- and the joint operation centers, that fuse civilian and military and police intelligence that UN military observers may gather or the civil affairs officers may gather out in the hustings as they try to promote some of the peace building that second question -- third question was raising.

On the UAV question, I also favor the UN having more overhead capacity. The one mission I'm aware of that tried to do commercial UAV contracting started out with a $4 million bid and it wound itself up to $60 million and they quit, because that was like 10 percent of the mission budget for 2 or 3 birds. So they could probably do better than that somewhere else.

On economic reconstruction, I was part of a study a few years ago that looked at the economic footprint of UN missions, and a fairly small percentage of the budget lands in the host country aside -- and most of that is staff per diem. A little bit is mission procurement. There could be more. And this outfit called the Peace Dividend Trust runs things they call the Peace Dividend Marketplace in Afghanistan, Haiti, Timor, I think Liberia asked them to come in, where they survey and catalogue local business and put that up online, and make that available to the international community and push that to the international community to contract with, procure from local business. And in Afghanistan in particular it's been quite successful, on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of cash into the local economy.

On peace -- oh, the hybrids. With deference to Bruce, he's done a lot of

work on UN hybrid missions. UNAMID is kind of a close-embrace hybrid, whereas the forces are intermixed and the command and control is intermixed, which the UN doesn't like so much. AMISOM is kind of an arm's-length hybrid. Here, take the money and we don't really want to know what you do with it so much. And it's protection money to protect the UN from going into Somalia. And UNIFSA is a nominal mission, but it's doing -- or capable of doing things as a single national unit that a complex operation wouldn't necessarily be able to do if it's pushed. And I think that was kind of the idea of having who's there, there.

And in terms of peace promoting, that does tend to be the job of the civilian components of a UN conflict operation. The secretariat prefers the term "peace consolidation." The idea of, you know, bringing it all together so it's in a whole and that means -- it implies we can leave and go do someplace else and that's its high-level task.

And it's trying to differentiate the early tasks that the peacekeepers do from the longer-term development tasks. And there's a fuzzy boundary, and it's not clear that early tasks are also short-term tasks. As the World Development Report suggested, building capacity in fragile states takes decades. And what was it about Lake Woebegone and the years could not improve? (Laughter) So, yeah.

MR. JONES: Noam?

MR. UNGER: Great. On the -- let me start on the question of information sharing, I mean, I think a lot has already been said. But the only thing I would add is that there's another element in addition to the operational, on the ground sense of information sharing, and that's the information that member states can share with the UN agencies generally and UN Central or DPKO or field support.

And I had experience with this when I was in government as a humanitarian affairs analyst in the case of Darfur. And so in that case, I was very involved in a process that

involved many people in the U.S. Government on declassifying information that need not be classified, and sharing that information -- in this case, some of it was imagery -- related to destroyed and damaged villages throughout Darfur. And that information was then relayed by officials in the U.S. Government to officials in the UN, and to other member states in the Security Council, trying to make a case.

It's a touchy issue, especially since that happened after the, you know, infamous use of intelligence by Secretary of State Colin Powell with regard to Iraq at the Security Council. And I think this is a touchy issue.

My concern is that the U.S. Government had been moving in a good direction in terms of limiting classification of information and promoting sharing of information with partner organizations even outside of the government, up until Wikileaks. And that in reaction to the Wikileaks phenomenon, we're going back to the days of incredibly constrained over-classification of information, and that is not limited to the U.S. Government. I think that applies to every government and international organization that's been exposed to the phenomenon. And so that's a concern that I have about information sharing that affects peacekeeping operations and a lot of other things.

On the language issue, this is -- it's a pet peeve of mine as well. There's always these questions -- I probably even, over the course of today's discussion, have used stabilization, reconstruction, peace building -- Bill mentioned peace consolidation. Peacekeeping, which is -- you know, Tony's right, it has a legal sense in terms of the UN construct. But, you know, these terms are often used in connection to each other, sometimes they're even used interchangeably.

One thing that I failed to mention earlier is that in this sort of global movement to catch up with the importance and centrality of what's happening in fragile states, if you look at the whole aid effectiveness discussion globally, the Paris Declaration

in 2005 really did very little to focus on the question of fragile states or what's specific about engaging and assisting fragile states.

I think in the Busan High Level Forum that's going to happen at the end of November, you'll see much more that's been building on this international dialogue that's called the International Dialogue on Peace-Building and State-Building in terms of the language. It brings together a lot of the sort of proactive, conflict prevention, development umbrella with the more technical, often security-oriented peacekeeping, even peace enforcement, stabilization agenda.

And so I think it's interesting to think about the terminology. And yes, there are different connotations depending on which words you use. And I like the way you framed it in terms of opportunity.

And last, since I think I'm getting close to my time, I'll just do one comment and that will be my wrap-up, which is that I just want to -- I really want to commend Tony because it seems to me that all that is happening within field support -- which is, you know, new in and of itself -- is a sign to me of finally taking seriously that the UN does a lot of things operationally around the world, most notably in terms of today's discussion. And that it's going to keep doing these things, and that it needs to take it seriously and do it better, and actually consolidating services and providing platforms allows for a unity of effort and efficiencies, as you noted, that is not possible if you just pretend as if every single one is an ad hoc, standalone, never done this before operation. And I think that, you know, that recognition has been there for years, but what you're working on is actually translating that recognition into a reality. And I think it's excellent.

And I think related to Fred's comment on economic reconstruction, I think this kind of -- it's not sexy, but this kind of logistical base for multiple operations in a region and for, you know, political missions as well as peacekeeping operations provides

a sense of continuity that could provide a platform that bridges the administration or support for security through policing or troops to an economic reconstruction platform that is also done, quite ably, by different parts of the UN as well, so.

MR. JONES: Three quick comments from me: one cynical, one optimistic, and one concluding.

The cynical comment is about Somalia. There's a reference to Somalia operations -- and I have to say, despite what I said in a positive tone about protection of civilians in other contexts, including with Kony and Liberia and Libya, et cetera, I worry what we're doing in Somalia is something rather different. Understandable, given how difficult the case is and given the dangers, but we're essentially back to a kind of containment model in Somalia.

We've got the largest deployment of U.S. Special Forces outside of Iraq and Afghanistan in southern Somalia killing Al-Shabaab. We've got the UN basically controlling the port, and occasionally Ethiopians or Kenyans going to kill some other Al-Shabaab. There's no serious process to restore the politics or any kind of sort of positive horizon in Somalia. We're really just in a "contain this from coming to hit us" mode in Somalia. And I worry that that model -- I mean, okay, of course that model exists, but I worry about it if it becomes an attractive alternative to a slightly more constructive engagement to try to solve these problems, recognizing that Somalia is about as difficult a problem as it is to deal with.

On the more optimistic side of things, the point that you made about taking things seriously I want to connect to economic reconstruction. Because I think actually now we're also starting to see the Bank -- the World Bank, which is a much larger player than some of the UN agencies, starting to take this agenda seriously as well. For a long time, economic reconstruction in post-conflict states was a kind of,

comma, oh, yeah, and we also do this issue for the World Bank. And I think they're increasingly recognizing -- it's a point that Noam made -- most poor people live in places affected by conflict. And so if you think about yourself as a development agency, you better think pretty hard about what you're doing in places affected by conflict.

The big money is still going to flow to India or China or whatever for now. But where the people are most affected is in the same places that peacekeeping operates. And so I think you've seen now a new seriousness on the Bank's side to start having a serious interaction with the UN about how to do differently the business of economic reconstruction and peacekeeping and context. And that's, I think, a very important shift.

Then, just to conclude, Noam's point about being encouraged by the work that Tony's doing in taking these issues seriously. When I was in Kofi Annan's office working on UN reform, and I was -- one of the things we were trying to get member states to do was to sign off on a series of management reforms. And I used to use the line -- I used to say, look, the UN was set up to manage intergovernmental conferences in New York, and now we're managing 100,000 peacekeepers in the field with the same managerial system, the same budget system. I then discovered they were absolutely, horribly bad at managing intergovernmental conferences in New York, so I stopped using that line.

But nevertheless, I agree with Noam that it's extremely encouraging to see the work, Tony, that you and Susana and others are doing. And we appreciate you coming and taking some time today to inform us about it. So thank you very much. And thank you to the panelists as well. (Applause)

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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