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FAMINE IN SOMALIA: AN EXPECTED TURN FOR THE WORSE

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Good morning, everyone. My name is Beth Ferris. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement. We are glad to see so much interest in these dog days of August as we talk about the situation in Somalia. Somalia, of course, has been on the international agenda for at least 20 years with questions of conflict, drought and now famine.

We've put together, I think, a very impressive panel to talk about these issues. We'll hear from five individuals, each of whom will speak for about 10 minutes, and then we'll have some questions about the situation.

We're going to begin with Allan Jury. And you all have the bios in your packet, but Allan's with the World Food Program, has worked with them for about 10 years, and before that, worked in State Department, and he'll give us an overview of the situation inside Somalia.

He'll be followed by Mark Bartolini who is director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and USAID. Before taking on this position, he worked for many years with the International Rescue Committee and has worked on emergency operations and situations as diverse as Bosnia and Hurricane Katrina.

So, we'll first look at the situation in Somalia, and then look at some of the regional dimensions because, of course, when there's drought and famine and conflict in Somalia, countries in the region are also deeply affected.

We'll start with Vincent Cochetel, who's the UNHCR representative

here in Washington who's worked with UNHRC for some 25 plus years and, again, in many different emergency situations.

We'll then turn to Reuben Brigety from Department of State, Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration. Ruben has worked in a variety of different types of jobs: The Center of American Progress, George Mason University, a US Naval Officer, Human Rights Watch, and so we'll talk also about some of the regional dimensions of this crisis.

Finally, we'll hear from Semhar Araia, who's Oxfam International representative working on Horn of Africa issues just back from Kenya. She divides her time between Kenya and Washington working on issues of international law, gender and so on.

Thank you. You are all most welcome and we are glad you are here and look forward to hearing the insights and maybe even some answers to the situation in Somalia. Allan?

MR. JURY: Thank you very much. I want to start out with a little bit about the context of the region directly, as it relates to Somalia, then talk more specifically about the current situation in Somalia and conclude a little bit with what WFP is doing and the operational challenges that we face.

I won't go too much into the region because, as Beth has already said, that some other speakers will be picking up the regional implications a little bit more. But the overall situation is the drought conditions in the Horn of Africa, coupled with the conflict in Somalia, have affected over 13 million people in the region and WFP is targeting 11 and a half million of those, with the biggest

number of 3.7 million in Somalia, and the next biggest number of 3.5 million in Ethiopia, plus refugees, and then Kenya, Djibouti and parts of Uganda. Governments and other actors in the region are providing assistance to those not targeted by WFP.

Now, from a climatic point of view, the drought aspects, the roots of the crisis in Somalia are quite similar to the roots of the overall regional crisis, and it began after the failure of the 2010 October/December rains and related harvest. And then the 2011 rains were late and erratic, and in some areas of southern Somalia, rainfall was less than 30 percent of the 1995 to 2010 average.

So you have a situation in which rainfall well below normal, major effects in pastoral and marginal agricultural livelihood zones of Somalia, and reductions in availability of waters, death and reductions of cattle. So both immediate food and livelihood needs severely negatively impacted, particularly in pastoral zones.

But as you turn to Somalia, it's definitely the hardest hit of any of the regional countries. As many of you probably know, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia announced on July 20th that the humanitarian emergency in two areas of southern Somalia had degenerated into famine.

The areas are the Bakool livelihood zones and all areas of lower Shabelle Province which, for those of you who don’t specialize in Somalia geography, it's pretty much smack in the middle of southern Somalia.

So, the southern half of the country pretty much smack in the

middle are a couple of districts that have already sunk into famine because of drought and the conflict in displacement, and different from the other countries affected by this drought, the near total absence of humanitarian access to the most affected areas, which is in southern Somalia.

So, right now you have a humanitarian emergency across all the areas of the south. You have famine declared in two particular areas. But very honestly, the assessment is, unless there is a rapid assistance and opening up of the country, that anytime within the next one to two months virtually all of southern Somalia will have met the criteria for famine. And the famine criteria are fairly explicit. They are based on a set of indicators -- and we can go into those questions -- but, that are based on the combination of mortality, food access and specifically children, malnutrition and mortality.

And we have a situation in Somalia that's truly chilling. Erie is, in all areas, acute malnutrition exceeding 20 percent, and in these most severely effected areas, acute malnutrition exceeding 50 percent. I mean, this is the most serious crisis in terms of food insecurity that we have seen in the Horn of Africa or anywhere in the world for a long time.

It is estimated that tens of thousands of people have died in the past three months. So we have, as I said, 3.7 million people affected and 2.2 million of those, roughly, are in the southern Somalia area where access is extremely difficult. And in addition, we have refugees fleeing outside the country, which will be discussed more with other speakers.

Now, the humanitarian; turning to the last of sort of the three areas I

wanted to cover, WP operations and challenges, World Food Program; obviously the humanitarian operation crisis in the Horn is the most serious number 1 priority for our organization right now. I mean, 11 and a half million beneficiaries, an operation that has needs, total needs of over $700 million over the next six months. This is a major crisis.

Now, we already had the capacity to do a lot in those areas of Somalia where we had access. We were already assisting one and a half million people, before this famine declaration, mostly in the north and central regions of Somalia where we had good access and some capacity expanding in Mogadishu.

The challenge is, the malnutrition rates are very, very high in the south were we have little or no access, and that's where 2.2 million, as I said, need to be assisted.

What we've been trying to do in the short term is to really ramp up the food assistance, and particularly, the special nutritional products in areas that are in the south but more along the borders that have some access.

And there are two main points where we can get some access to some people affected in the south. One is the area of Mogadishu and the other is on the Ethiopian border in the Ghetto region of Somalia where we are also able to reach some people. And we have been rushing in high-energy biscuits, supplementary, plumpy, special supplementary products to try to gear up and rapidly expand operations in those areas doing hot feeding in Mogadishu to a lot of people and expanding supplementary feedings across the region.

But I think the key issue is that Somalia is probably the most dangerous country we operate in. I mean, we have not been able to operate under acceptable conditions in most of south Somalia since January of 2010.

We are exploring what options there are to open up access either directly or through partners, but it is a very challenging environment, one in which very fluid political and public statements by authorities are constantly changing, one in which we have to pursue, if you will, targets of opportunity and look at all sorts of innovative ways as to we can get there.

The challenge I think that we face is that there's no question that the risk environment to try to reach these areas is high. And we need a dialogue and an understanding with all the actors and our donors and our supporters about that risk and the right balance of those risks because it's not going to be easy to access, and the arrangements, if we get any, are likely to be ones that are not optimal in terms of where one would like to have them, and in terms of the maximum controls. And so, the question is what can we do there?

Let me conclude. We do have funding challenges, but I would say the access challenges are in many ways even bigger than the funding challenges. We estimate our operation needs, as I said, about $750 million in the region over the next six months. We had about, earlier, almost 300 million of that met.

We've got about another 200 to 250 million, 50 million that’s in the pipeline that people have indicated they were either right now contributing or bringing on. We estimate somewhere between $200 and $250 million is needed,

additionally. But, of course, much of this will depend on whether we can reach those people in southern Somalia.

But the funding is important because what we don't want is the situation where we obtain access and we can't act on that access because we lack the resources to move quickly to do so. So that's the situation as we see it and what WP is trying to do about it. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Allan. We'll now turn to Mark, but let me invite those of you standing in the back. There are seats on the front row. Please, Mark?

MR. BARTOLINI: Thank you. Good morning, everyone. So, as Allan said, right now we're looking at 3.7 million people inside Somalia who are being affected by this drought. Of these, we expected about 3.2 million are in urgent need of life-saving assistance.

Allan mentioned that there are two areas that have been designated thus far a drought, lower Shabelle and the southern Bakool region. We expect that more areas will be designated fairly soon as being in famine conditions.

It's the most serious of the most severe food crisis on the planet today and the most severe famine since the early 90s in the Horn of Africa. But it's somewhat distinct from that famine, and that was the famine that we think was largely man-made. In this case, the primary factor is environmental. It is the drought itself. It is the worst drought we estimate in 60 years in the Horn of Africa and it's hit particularly hard in Somalia.

It's because of these environmental factors we've seen prices get driven up to extremely high levels in many areas of the country, but there's some good news in that, unlike in the 90s, there are functioning markets inside Somalia today. I'll go into that a bit more in a minute.

Also, we expect nearly over a billion and a half dollars of remittances from the diaspora going into Somalia and we think that's been critical in stabilizing the situation to date. Of course, there are access issues which I'll also touch upon in a minute.

The response to date, the United States has been the largest donor by far in the region, over almost $460 million in FY11 alone. And inside Somalia, about $80 million thus far has gone into Somalia on the behalf of the U.S. Government to provide humanitarian assistance.

Right now there is an approximately $2 billion appeal from the international community to respond to the crisis. About a little over half of that has been pledged. As Allan said, we think that the main problem is access, getting access to these 2.2 million people that are in desperate need. But certainly, resources are also in need and we've been working very closely with other donor governments in terms of trying to coordinate our aid as effectively as possible, but also looking at new donors to step up and assist in this situation.

Now, as I mentioned, the crisis in the 90s -- we learned a lot from that crisis, in terms of responding to a situation like this. And we know from past famines that the number one killer in this famine, the number one cause of mortality will be disease that are related to malnourishment. So, we've

developed a three-prong approach, and it's been really driven by data, in this case.

We are very fortunate to have FuseNet and FSNAU providing us really excellent data on conditions inside Somalia. We have very strong market analysis of various regions, what's available in the market, what's not, what prices are.

So based on that, our strategy is to, again, look at the health complications. We're doing community health-related programming, vaccination programming. We know that, tragically in a famine, the hardest hit are going to be children under five, so that is one of our primary focuses.

We're looking at therapeutic feeding programs. Allan mentioned Plumpy'nut. There are other substances that we use. And we're looking at, again, large scaled vaccination programs. We know that cholera could be a big issue, especially when the rains arrived. And there was rain over the weekend, so we're looking at water and sanitation and hygiene programs as being critical to reducing mortality in this crisis.

And with that market analysis, we're looking at areas where there is food. We're looking at injecting cash into the market. Again, the prices have risen so high that it's become beyond the coping mechanisms of families to afford to buy food. So we know if we can inject some cash into the market, it'll give them an opportunity to buy food. It's the quickest way for them to get food.

Fortunately, there is pre-positioned food in the region and there is also the opportunity, in terms of structures that we've put in place, to do local and

regional purchase. So we can get food in quickly, but the pipeline in terms of sustaining this many people, it could take three months or more to really fill that pipeline with food.

So the urgent needs right now we think are best met with cash injections in some areas of Somalia where there is food. Where there isn't food, of course, we're going to have to do distribution. And, again, we'll use those pre-positioned stocks and the local and regional purchase options.

Now, on access, it's an incredible difficult issue and we're urging all parties to do everything they can to provide unfettered access to the crisis. Without that, we're going to see certainly the mortality numbers just rise and rise.

2.2 million people -- if you look at neighboring countries in Ethiopia and in Kenya, the drought has not struck as hard there, but you're seeing a much different situation because, again, we have access and we've been able to do programming over years, so I can't stress enough how important that is.

Now, we are able to work with a number of partners inside, but because of the sensitivity of this situation, I'm not going to today name who those partners are, for obvious reasons. But I will say that it is obvious the international community is ceased by this crisis.

Everybody in our community is working incredibly hard on it and we're doing what we can. But without the access and further resources, we're going to have a very difficult time responding, and end with that.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. We'll turn now to look at some of the regional dynamics. We'll begin with Vincent Cochetel. You are next

here.

MR. COCHETEL: Thank you very much and thank you for having me here. The issue of Somali; leaving Somalia to seek access to asylum in neighboring counties is not a new issue for us. What is different in this situation is the scale of the displacement. But since '89 -- since 1989, Somalis have been leaving Somalia. There is nothing new there.

They're going to Djibouti, they're going to Yemen, they're going to Ethiopia, they're going to Kenya, and we are a large presence of Somali refugees in countries like Kenya and Somalia before the famine struck central and southern Somalia.

As we speak now, we are on a daily average arrival rate of about a 1,300 persons a day to Dadaab camp in Kenya and about 250 -- this morning it was 270 going to Dolo Ado in Ethiopia. That's the average arrival rate.

As you can imagine, it's pretty chaotic when you are confronted to such a large scale arrival of people. It was very chaotic in the first days, beginning of July. Now, thanks to the assistance of many NGO partners, including many U.S. NGOs there, I think the proper response in terms of medical response, food assistance, and in terms of shelter, shelter assistance.

However, we see problems with half of the arrival among children, half of the arrivals in Ethiopia are severely malnourished and we cannot save all lives. Sometimes the state of malnutrition is such that we cannot reverse the process. So we have an acute mortality rate which is much higher than in normal situations.

It takes about eight weeks, otherwise, to get people back on their feet these days in Ethiopia. And we see some tragic stories of women arriving; they've lost all their children on the way to Ethiopia.

We have been discussing with the Ethiopian authorities and the Kenyan authorities the extension of camp space. In Ethiopia it has never been a problem. We had always had a very constructive relationship with the authorities. In Kenya it has been a problem. It's not a problem caused by the famine. It was a problem for the last two years.

The U.S. administration and many other partners helped us to try to get from the Kenyan authorities an agreement on the extension of Dadaab camp. Due to local politics, it could not happen.

And thank God, very recently, I think the Kenyan authorities about two weeks ago have agreed on an extension of a camped called Ifo and another place called Combioso. We started moving people to a new facility to decongest Dadaab camp where we have more than 300,000 people. It's really crowded. That camp was never meant for such a large number of population.

Our co-panelists talked about the impact of the famine on the movement of people. And what I'd like to also, maybe enlighten in my presentation, it's not just the famine driving out the people out of Somalia.

I'll share with you just some extract of some interviews with some of the people recently in Dadaab and Ethiopia that were interviewed. One is a family of a 16-year-old girl who was assaulted on rape, gang rape, returning from a wedding ceremony.

She comes from village where another girl who was 13 years old last year was killed in public by Al-Shabaab because she was so to have a like behavior that attracted the rape. So the family of that girl that was rapped decided, "We don't stay, we just leave."

Another family was a family of a girl who was raped three weeks ago in a IDP camp called October IDP in Togdheer region. And she was trying to access water from the water tanks in the camp after she was sent by her mother to retrieve water for the family. For the same reason, the mother was worried about that girl and they decided to move on.

A few more interviews that gives you the diversity of the problems; 12-year-old girl, three weeks ago in Awdal, she was refused access to school. She was beaten up and then the mother was arrested and she's since been missing. The rest of the family decided to move.

Another girl in Galkayo town of Mudug region -- that's eastern part of Somalia -- the girl was found dead in an abandoned building after being rapped and stabbed. She went missing from her room a day earlier. The killing was allegedly politically motivated by the girl's father's suspected involvement with the government of Somalia's operation, so the whole family left.

Another testimony, 20 IDP families from Kushkin basketball stadium in Beled -- that's the Hiiraan region. All the families were evicted from the basketball stadium after they were told to pay rent by Al-Shabaab. They could not afford paying the rent. They were expelled from that stadium and they decided to move on. Sounds like Haiti.

Another family from -- several people -- several families from Durin near (inaudible) district of middle Shabelle region. Al-Shabaab demanded each family to give at least one boy to join Al-Shabaab operation or to contribute by giving two camels. The residents refused that but they were fearful of what could be the consequence in terms of retaliation and the whole village left to Kenya.

Thirty women in Afgoi District of middle Shabelle where arrested also, three weeks ago, for failing to wear the veil required by Al-Shabaab, or for wearing bras. You know, bras are prohibited for women in Al-Shabaab controlled area. Their family left a woman reportedly missing.

Another one interesting because it doesn't impact on famine also. Al-Shabaab is ordering, in some part of Somalia, a ban on the slaughtering on sale of meat. That happened in Afgoi town two weeks ago. Afgoi town is, again, in the middle Shabelle region, one of the regions affected by the famine.

The ban had an immediate effect on those families who were totally deprived of livelihoods. The cattle that have not been slaughtered had been confiscated by Al-Shabaab. The family moved.

I can go on like that with stories, but these are the stories people are telling us after they receive basic assistance. So we should not just see the displacement caused by the famine just as something that is coming out of the drought.

The drought is affecting Ethiopia. It's affecting Djibouti. It's affecting Somalia but the famine stops at the Somali border. If people are moving, it's because there are also other factors leading those people to move.

Our colleagues call (inaudible) but the access problem in Somalia (inaudible) is only a very small operation in Somalia. We're trying to reach out to 100,000 people in one of the thousands suburbs of Mogadishu (inaudible) in the lower Shabelle region.

We work again through partners. And as colleagues said, it's very difficult to work there. It's not just a question of security. And when we're talking about security, let's be clear; it's the risk of being killed. Forty-two aid workers killed between 2008 and 2009. I have not kept track of the numbers for 2010/2011, but we have had lots of abduction and we had the beheading of an aid worker during Valentine's Day this year in Somalia.

There are significant problems of access and significant problems of understanding what is humanitarian help. The main spokesman for Al-Shabaab says that humanitarian organizations are luring, are luring needy people with food in order to teach them Christianity there after failure to do so in Somalia.

So there is the perception that the ad is aimed at converting people, rather than just attending some basic consideration of humanity for these people. So, there's a lot of work to be done with Al-Shabaab and other groups there to make them understand what is humanitarian action in this context.

I'd like to finish maybe with one of the things that you may have read in the press. There are lots of talk in Kenya, in particular, about why all those people have to come to Kenya. It runs the risk of destabilizing Kenya. You know, Kenya had its own problems. Why not to have Somali fleeing? You know,

staying inside Somalia and secure some sort of IDP camps inside Somalia.

The U.N. had a meeting last Friday of the Humanitarian County Team where we rejected some of the proposals around this concept. The concept is pushed by a Somali national who was the former minister of defense, Mohamed Abdi Mohamed alias Gandhi was minister of defense in 2009, and he's pushing what he's called a Jubilant Initiative that would then (inaudible) liberating part of the south, establishing a capital, a free capital in Kismayo on making sure that then Somalis would not have to go all the way to Kenya and could be assisted inside Somalia.

I think none of us have problem about people, you know. It would be better if people could be assisted where they are rather than to take such a risk to move to Ethiopia or Somalia. But the reality is, today in Somalia, there is no one who has the capacity to protect the people.

As we see, we see people displaced from IDP camps inside Somalia because of protection problems. And we also believe that if there was an established international assistance with IDP camps that would not be secure inside the south of Kenya, this would also prevent people from seeking asylum and seeking security inside Kenya.

So there is a danger that IDP protection inside Somalia would play against the right for the people to seek asylum outside of Somalia. I'll leave it there.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Vincent. And Reuben from PRM of Department of State.

MR. BRIGETY: Beth, thank you very much. Thanks to you and the Brookings for hosting this important event. And let me also say it's a great honor for me to be on this panel with all of my friends here, of both whom I respect individually, and also who represent organizations that are doing such important work on the ground.

I'm going to do my best to keep my comments very brief, both to avoid repeating things that my colleagues have said, and also to ensure we have sufficient time for Q and A at the end.

If I may, let me just start with a brief story. I was recently in the region about two and a half weeks ago, both to Ethiopia and to Kenya, in which I visited the Dolo Ado and Dadaab refugee camps on the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders, respectively, and I also held meetings with government officials and other partners and capitals.

And when I was in Dadaab, I was in the registration center where newly arriving refugees were being registered, and whatnot. And I saw something I had never seen before, either in Dadaab, in my previous visits there, or indeed, in my visits to many other refugee camps around the world.

I saw a girl about seven years old laying in a wheelbarrow. And even in the context of a refugee situation, this was an unusual sight, so I went over and inquired why she was laying in a wheelbarrow.

Well, this girl, Somali girl, had been stricken by polio two years earlier when she was five, and her mother carried her on her back for nine days without any food or water with her other six children in tow to make her way out

of Somalia and to find refuge in Kenya.

And stories like that we could repeat all morning long as a means of trying to graphically demonstrate just how severe this crisis is. I think Allan got it right; we haven't seen a crisis this bad in a long time.

I would go so far as to say we haven't seen a humanitarian crisis this complex or this bad in a generation, both in terms of the combination of food insecurity, of lack of access, as been demonstrated, and also the massive movement of people out to seek refuge in the surrounding countries.

As Vincent noted, the outflows out of Somalia into Kenya and Ethiopia, particularly, are massive with Kenya getting about 1300 a day and Dadaab getting about 250 a day -- I'm sorry -- and Dolo getting about 250 a day and Ethiopia.

I was in Dolo in December when that camp complex had about 50,000 refugees in it. It now has over a 100,000. And at current rates, it is likely that that population is going to double again before the end of the year. But what's incredibly challenging isn't simply the rate at which people are coming; it is the God-awful abysmal health condition within which they are arriving.

I visited the camp hospital in Kobe camp, which is one of the new camp areas in Dolo, and sat next to a man who is lying next to his little girl, whom I'll call Isha, who just couldn’t get comfortable as she was laying there. She's about three. She couldn’t get comfortable, one can guess, both because she was incredibly hungry, but also you could almost guess that her tiny bones were about to pierce her skin because of just how frail and how fragile her skin was.

And her father had traveled all the way from Mogadishu with Isha and his other seven children for nine days trying to find refuge inside Ethiopia. And as you tour the camp hospital there, it's obvious how these sorts of statistics that Allan was talking about, of severe acute malnutrition being 25 percent or higher aren't just numbers.

They are very, very real human stories with people in absolutely abject conditions going to find place of refuge in a place like Dolo, which is unbelievably hot, which is unbelievably dusty with a combination of the dusk and wind feeling like a sandblast across your face, in a place where the Ethiopian government is literally trying to build the airplane as they fly it, which is to say there were two camps that were there previously, Bulkemia and Mulkadeeda which were each designed to hold 20,000 people. They'll now hold combined more than that, about 50,000.

They had just started building the third camp called Kobe, which will be filled even before they complete it. It'll be filled with the 25,000 and some odd refugees probably within the next week and a half, or so. And they are already contemplating building a fourth and a fifth camp because they know they will need them, and then looking towards a sixth and a seventh.

In Kenya, as you may know, Dadaab is the largest refugee camp in the world, a camp that was designed for 90,000 people now holds at least 400,000, both in terms of the main camps and also in the outskirts of the camps.

When I was there just a couple of weeks ago, there were some 44,000 refugees which had settled spontaneously on the outskirts of these

camps; young children sitting amidst the dust, women walking around forging for some basic firewood, none of them having access to the sorts of sustained systematic services that would be available if the sorts of camp services had been systematically provided there.

I have to say that, as Vincent mentioned, the problem of creating the fourth camp, the so-called Ifo extension, has been something the international community has been asking for for a very long time.

When I was in Dadaab I stayed in the came for two days. My second day, I was pleased to accompany Prime Minister Raila Odinga and toured the camp with him for about eight hours. At the end of which, he did a press conference and very boldly, in my view, announced that the folk camp would be open and they would now allow the refugees to settle there.

We take the prime minister at his word and we continued to work with the government of Kenya to ensure that services are provided and people have access to settle there.

Let me close by saying that Mark is absolutely right and Vincent is right. As Vincent mentioned, it is absolutely important, absolutely critical and, indeed, nonnegotiable that the right of access to First Asylum is considered sacrosanct in the region. That is, that people who are fleeing Somalia, fleeing famine and conflict and fears for their lives have the ability to cross the border to find protection as they need it.

It is equally true that, even as we work to ensure with governments the reason to ensure First Asylum is protected, that we absolutely have to find

ways to provide assistance inside Somalia. If we do not, we will continue to see these horrendous rates of malnutrition and, indeed, the mortality occurring even once people arrive in the camps in Ethiopia and Kenya.

When I was in Dolo, one of the UNHCR emergency workers there mentioned that the mortality rate amongst new arrivals was about seven people per 10,000 per day, when in a normal emergency, the normal rate of mortality is about two people per 10,000 per day.

Again, so we're seeing absolutely unprecedented massive humanitarian crisis there. And I can assure you, as Mark mentioned, both in terms of our financial assistance but also in terms of our advocacy and our diplomacy, the Government of the United States will continue to stand not only with governments of the region but also with the refuges to ensure that we are responding to this humanitarian crisis in a way that it merits. Thanks very much.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. We'll now turn to Semhar from Oxfam.

MS. ARAIA: Thank you very much. Thank you for having us as well with this esteemed panel. So, what we've heard so far is accounts in a region which is very complicated and in dire need. And what we have here is a sad confluence of factors, if you will, which have created more or less the perfect storm for a famine in Somalia and a drought in the region.

This perfect storm is due to natural and manmade causes. It's due to the lack or poor or failed rains in the last two years. There is entrenched poverty in Somalia but also throughout the Horn of Africa. There is ongoing

conflict and there is difficulty in accessing food largely due to food prices going up, but also food insecurity for many of the communities who rely on the land.

The people who are affected are pastoralists, agropastoralists, farmers. But in the case of the famine, we're are seeing that it's affected people who have in south central Somalia, in the middle part, who tend to rely on the land as farmers, but also, there's pastoralist communities in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia who have been unable to find water and food.

This is a region of 12 million people. In Somalia proper we're looking at 3.7 million. Oxfam primarily works on water and sanitation, but we also do food distribution and livelihood assistance for these reasons, because of the communities that are affected.

Because of these factors, because of this culmination of effects, we're seeking massive drought, we're seeing famine inside Somalia and we're seeing extreme displacement into Kenya and Ethiopia. This is an unpaired situation. While the region has had droughts on a reoccurring bases, the communities have been able to cope, and their coping mechanisms have survived.

Every two to three years we're seeing communities change the way they adapt to the environment. But also, the toll of insecurity, conflict and poverty have really resulted in why we're here today, which is really not all too often, as we said earlier, since 1992 -- the last famine was in Somalia in 1992.

In terms of operating Oxfam works in Kenya and Ethiopia -- and we work through partners inside Somalia -- keep in mind that this is, again, about

people's ability to cope. And the people of this region have been able to respond day in/day out for years through conflict and through insecurity. And it's at this time that we're seeing an inability to cope and an inability to find the basics; food stuff, shelter, water, protection, and it is the Somalis who are putting their lives on the line everyday. It's the local organizations on the ground, the partners that we try to support who are calling for this appeal.

Right now the appeal, in terms of funding, stands at about $2.5 billion as needed, and that's reflecting a doubling of needs for Somalia. Just last week it was 2 billion and it's been upped. Of that 2.5 billion, there is approximately 1.7 billion that's still missing. We're appealing to donors. We're appealing to the international community to meet those funding gaps.

But in addition to the funding, one of the greatest challenges is getting that assistance to the people that are most in need. Humanitarian assistance is a job you do as impartial and objectively as possible and you go straight to the people in need, but the challenges of accessing them are very real. And so, we have a two-pronged approach.

We work through partners inside Somalia, but we also do in displacement in the camp, so we're scaling up our service in Dolo Ado doing mostly water, latrines, boreholes. And in Dadaab -- we've been there. We have worked there for about 30 years now in Kenya and Ethiopia, respectively. We've worked in Somalia through partners for 40 years. So, our appeal today is really reflecting sort of a heightened level of alert and crisis.

In Kenya, what's fascinating and really very telling is, Dadaab is a

camp that has existed for 20 plus years. And as we mentioned, it was housing 90,000 and it's now upwards of 400,000 and it continues to grow.

We are not able to respond to the need. One of the biggest challenges is not only finding the funding and the assistance to reach them, but also responding in time. We're estimating that about 564,000, roughly, people are on the brink of death if urgent interventions aren't provided to them. And over the next two months where it's the driest part of the year, we estimate about $300 million will be needed just to hopefully save lives. The rains will come in October and that's not even sure if the rains will be an adequate enough response for the land.

What we want to make clear here is, as daunting and as dire as the situation is, there is a way and there is an ability to respond. And so, while there are severe challenges to being able to access and reach the people, there are organizations and efforts on the ground that have worked. And there is creativity and a flexibility that is required for an environment like Somalia.

This is a country that has not had a government, a centralized functioning government for 20 years, and yet there have been ways that assistance has reached the people. And so, despite that particular challenge of working and delivering aid, it has worked. And we continue to see relatively decent measures of success but it's not enough. And so, it's funding that is the first challenge, it's accessing those people, and it's also being able to respond in a way that is creative and flexible for the kind of environment we're talking about when it comes to Somalia.

We fear that in the next six months we'll see this famine continue to worsen. And the response that we're doing in Kenya and in Ethiopia for Somalia is a short-term response. It is just to save lives, and we can't even assure that those lives will be able to be rebuilt because they've spent their lives in a camp.

So what's needed in the future is international community having an agenda that also includes a long-term response. The lack of long-term economic development in this region has meant that we've seen a series of short-term humanitarian interventions and emergency responses and a failure to really establish and strengthen the infrastructure for economic development.

And in Dolo Ado and Dadaab, the overcrowding is already at its highest, and the opening of additional camps will save lives but it's not the answer. It's not the permanent answer. So Ifo 2, Ifo 3 -- these additional camps in Kenya -- the swelling that we've already seen in Dolo Ado is reflecting the growing nature of this crisis.

We just had a mission, a pre-assessment mission in Ghetto just on the border of Somalia and Ethiopia. And we're seeing about 4,600 or so households already there and in displacement camps. And these people who are arriving are coming with nothing.

They're spending days on end in search of water and food. And they've reached these camps and they're making these make-shift tents, and they find ways to survive day to day, but this isn't the way that they deserve to live. And it's this notion of being able to respond and protect and provide them with the assistance so that they can live in dignity that we hope we can appeal to.

I think I'll leave it there, but I just want to say thank you for this.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Thank you to all the panelists for this very sobering overview of the situation in Somalia. We have time now for questions and answers, but let me start and just ask Allan and Mark what's the best case scenario? If everything goes well what can we expect, and what does it mean to go well in this context?

MR. JURY: I would argue that the best case scenario is a rapid opening up of access for humanitarian services inside of southern Somalia combined with a flexible and cooperative approach from the Kenya government, and to a lesser extent, the Ethiopia government to the outflow so that we can deal with both protection and the assistance needs.

The best case we're in is, given that -- I think that it will statistically, in terms of famine and food security, get worse before it gets better, even in the best case scenario because it will take a while to establish that access. But if one got access pretty soon and the funding came in behind it to fully exploit the access opportunities, I think you could start to stabilize the situation in a couple of months. Do I think that's the most likely, given the challenges of access in southern Somalia? Maybe not.

I think one point, I think -- we are talking Somalia. But I do think it's important to say that, in Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent, in Kenya and certainly Uganda where there have been programs of the type, many programs of the type that Oxfam was talking about -- long-term resiliency-building programs designed to build community resiliency -- the overall levels of affected people are far less

than one would've expected with a similar level of drought.

There have been successes, and I think this is very important to recognize, that every time there's drought in the Horn of Africa, people tend to say it's a repetition of everything that's always happened before. And I think a close look, particularly at Ethiopia, where perhaps more of that work in resiliency has been done, Kenya had some good successes -- but frankly, their political problems over the last five or six years have made that more difficult to sustain -- I think shows it isn't business as usual.

There have been some successes, not as much as we'd like and not as much in agro pastoralist, but it isn't the same pattern. And I think the situation in southern Somalia shows how more dramatic it is if you don't have the preparation and the access in advance.

There is a reason why Ethiopia is a manageable expanding crisis and Somalia is a famine. They are not accidental and they are manmade because the rainfall statistics on both sides of that border are very similar. So it is a function of what the international community's done, what the governments have done or prevented people from doing.

And no one wants to setup, you know, because the human-beings at stake are kind of control situation where you're doing nothing next to where you're doing something, but frankly, the results here shows what that difference is.

MR. BARTOLINI: I would concur with all of that and say tragically that I also agree that in the short-term, even under the best case scenario, that

the conditions will get worse in terms of mortality.

I'll also say that, understand best case scenario, particularly like Allan's point about building resiliency, that's something we're looking at doing, even as we do emergency programming in Ethiopia and Kenya, and that's something that we've been doing a development program for years and it has made a difference. And understand best case scenario, we could do that to a much more significant decree inside Somalia, which is something that's been very difficult to do.

And finally, I would say, under a best case scenario, I think what's really going to be necessary is the world to wake up to this crisis, which is one of the reasons we're all here today. And Reuben's been very eloquent inside U.S. Government, I can say on this point, but this really is one of the more serious crises of this decade, I think. And in order to get the attention it needs, the world is going to have to wake up and put pressure on our leaders to make this happen.

MS FERRIS: And perhaps, with respect to Vincent and Reuben, are the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia getting the assistance and support they need to enable the continued reception of asylum seekers or refugees?

MR. COCHETEL: Well, I think they are receiving some assistance. I think we are short of what we are appealing for but we understand there is -- I mean, there are a number of governments considering providing additional assistance to these governments.

In the long term, I'm not very optimistic personally. I haven't seen

any return to Somalia for a number of years. I mean, the last returns were some returns to Somali land from Djibouti many, many years ago. We haven't seen other voluntary assisted returns to Somalia.

So as the numbers grow in both Kenya and Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti, we see tendency in the four countries to maintain a stricter encampment policy. In other words, none of those four governments would like Somali refugees to move around in the country because of various consideration related to their national security.

You know that some of these countries always think themselves some ethnic national Somalia community. They are scared of potential infiltration by different groups. So, there are genuine considerations of national security but they are using that also to prevent solutions outside of the camp.

So what does happen when a second generation is born in the camp? You know. I mean, we hardly get anyone in primary education. I think in Ethiopia it's only 60 percent of the kids in refugee camps getting access to a primary education, so let's not talk about secondary education.

Vocational training; let's not talk about new arrivals. They don't have access to education yet. What happened with the first rated second generation in the camps? What's the future for them? So I think there is no humanitarian solution to that crisis either. That is a political solution that needs to be found inside Ethiopia and inside Somalia. That's it.

MR. BRIGETY: If I can just say briefly, what we are seeing is, particularly in Kenya, is essentially an emergency on top of a protracted crisis.

So in Kenya, as we mentioned, Dadaab has been there since at least 1991. Let me give you sort of a numerical example of what that means. There are at least 6,000 camp residents of Dadaab that are third-generation refugees. That is, they are the children of children of people who fled Somalia.

Now, what that means in terms of politics is that, inside Kenya, the notion of the refugee situation in a country that holds almost 450,000 refugees -- the vast majority are Somalis -- is incredibly sensitive politically. And this is an issue that we have been engaged with the government of Kenya for sometime, particularly in context of this latest emergency.

We are working very hard with them to ensure that they have what they need to fulfill their international obligations with regard to providing First Asylum and taking care of other steps to ensure refugee protection.

In the context of Ethiopia; Ethiopia has -- if you ask them they would tell you they have been a refugee-hosting people going back to the days of the Israelites, and as such, they will always do what they will need to do in order to support these refugees.

Let me just sort of say that we are engaging daily aggressively with all the host countries in the region to ensure they have what they need, both diplomatically and financially in order to response effectively with the crisis.

MS. FERRIS: All right. Thank you. We'll open up now for questions. We have some microphones. If you could stand and identify yourselves, and we'll start with the woman up here; one, two, three. And if it's okay, we'll take three or four questions before responding.

MS. SHERIDAN: Thank you. Mary Beth Sheridan from the *Washington Post*. Thank you very much for a really great panel. My question is for Allan, in particular. To what extent are the U.S. anti-terrorism regulations inhibiting your ability to try to work inside these famine-stricken areas of Somalia? Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: We'll give you a minute or two to think about that while we have a couple of other questions. We'll take the gentleman in the blue shirt, and then the woman in the back.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Thank you. I'm Leon Weintraub, University of Wisconsin, Washington Semester International Affairs. You all have spoken about the reality of the drought, the poverty, the famine. However, you all have directly or indirectly mentioned how it's exacerbated by the politics of the situation. Mr. Cochetel mentioned you can't solve it in a humanitarian way; you have to solve it in a political way.

It seems apparent, from what we've heard, that the Al-Shabaab is not listening and really doesn't have much interest in listing to the U.S., the European Union, UNHCR, other Aid organizations. What have we done, I'd like to ask, to reach others that may be able to influence Al-Shabaab; the governments, other real organizations, not shadow organizations or terrorist organizations, but real organizations of governments that may have influence?

If we are unable to find them since Al-Shabaab seems to, according to some of the stories we've heard, based its terror or its control on its version of Islam as far as the wearing of the veil -- as people are punished because they're

not -- what have we done to try to reach other Islam authorities to try to put some type of pressure on this organization?

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. And then I have the woman in the back. Yeah, right there.

SPEAKER: (inaudible), Voice of America. My question deals also with Al-Shabaab because what I felt like is -- all of you guys talked about access. But I think the only person who actually mentioned Al-Shabaab was Vincent. And I was just wondering. You talked about access, access. Is this or the aid workers meeting resistance from the Al-Shabaab organization or government or are there other organizations out there who are actually restricting access?

So I just want to actually hear you say that it's Al-Shabaab or somebody else, please.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Maybe we'll take one more. Maybe this gentleman over here; if you'll wait for the microphone.

SPEAKER: Actually, this will be -- it's not even a question. It's just a comment for folks in the room. I don’t know if this thing is working, but is it Mr. Bartolini who was talking about, from U.S. today, making sure the world wakes up? I just want to make sure folks know that congress is listening and there's two things happening on Thursday. There is a Senate hearing in the foreign relations committee, African subcommittee at 2:15 p.m. on Thursday, and on the House side, there is a hundred caucus briefings, unfortunately, at the same time at 2 p.m. Representative McGovern who leads a hundred caucuses (inaudible). I recommend to people to try to make (inaudible).

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. There's several questions for you and questions about Al-Shabaab.

MR. JURY: Well let me start with the one on the challenging question on U.S. restrictions. First, let me make clear that WP's essential exile from most of southern Somalia occurred in January in 2010 at conditions set by Al-Shabaab and Al-Shabaab affiliates. I did not come as a result of any restrictions by the U.S. Government. We had to pull out because of conditions that simply made it intolerable for us to carry on operations.

We have been involved in regular dialogue with the U.S. Government, and we have worked out arrangements that have allowed us to receive U.S. assistance and carryout assistance programs in those areas of Somalia where we have access to.

And these U.S. has contributed additional money to WFP, about $60 million in the last two to three months for Somalia operations. They have shown a willingness to be more flexible in expanding the geographical areas where we can use that assistance if we get access.

I'm not going to be drawn into a broad discussion of what the U.S. law should be or exactly what it should be, but I can say that we feel that our biggest challenge is getting the access to Al-Shabaab areas, not restrictions imposed by donors at this time.

Several people ask, you know, why don’t we name Al-Shabaab. And, certainly, one of the things is it is a challenging environment. It is southern Somalia. It is people who, for the most part, are perceived as being in line with

Al-Shabaab, but Al-Shabaab is not a unified force.

And it is also true that, as several people have said -- and we're trying not to be unnecessarily evasive, but you need innovative, appropriate opportunities, creative ways to deal with local authorities. And some of those creative and initiatives in some of those capacity for local dialogue is not necessarily well-served by naming a lot of names and screaming from the top of the podium in the press, in the media, it can be counterproductive.

We have seen that, where there were statements that people would be let in. People said very publicly they were going to go in, and there were statements from centralized authorities that were contradictory.

It is a complex web. The vision of Al-Shabaab and the south of Somalia, as one unified completely homogeneous structure, is an oversimplification of the complexities that exist there. And I think all of us who are trying to meet this terrible humanitarian tragedy are trying to see what -- in private diplomacy and dialogue, one can find opportunities to see where things are possible, where they are possible.

And it is, as Mark has already said, means that sometimes I think in public forum -- we'll be very frank -- we are not going to be as explicit as one might ask because we think that developing those opportunities is critically important, and there is a role for a more private localized dialogue there that we need to be careful in our messaging we don't undermine the opportunities to carry out that dialogue.

So, it is a conscious decision that I didn't use the word Al-Shabaab.

And they are the principle area in southern Somalia; I'm not going to deny that. But it is a more complex terrain there than simply a kind of environment of Al-Shabaab and everybody else. That somewhat oversimplifies the dynamic in south Somalia as we see it today.

MS. FERRIS: Other comments on Al-Shabaab?

MR. BARTOLINI: I would concur.

MS. FERRIS: You concurred before. Okay, other questions. We'll start here. If you'd stand up and identify yourself, please?

MR. CHEN: Chia Chen. The U.N. World Food Program withdrew from southern Somalia in 2010. If those programs did not resume, where those people get food from? And since it was here mentioned several times, I would like to ask Ms. Araia, what's the current status of the 2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia Peace Agreement? Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Okay, a couple of other questions here?

MR. COPAC: Hello. Chris Copac, International Medical Board. Is this on?

MS. FERRIS: I think so.

MR. COPAC: I just wanted to come back to this gentleman's question here. There is a lot of talk about dialogue right now and how it can increase in opening humanitarian space, so we share the same situation as WFP as being one of the band agencies. So even everything else combined, our area of operation has extremely limited our ability to access these areas. And there's a huge amount of pressure right now coming down to be able to expand our

ability to operate.

So, if there is a lot of pressure to try to create some dialogue to open up humanitarian space in one way or another. How much have these traditional golf donors been engaged given -- because they might have a better opportunity to negotiate these issues than we would.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. And right behind you?

MS. MAFUKA: Rumbee Mafuka, University of Miami. And my question is concerning the poll factor. If access remains limited and aid continues to be concentrated at the camps in Dadaab and Dolo, what are you concerns about the poll factors and Somalis continuing to flow into these camps creating even larger humanitarian crisis? Is there something in the works to accommodate the camps and provide better security, as Kenyan internal security is very concerned about that?

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. I'll take one more right here, right here in front.

MR. KEMOTHY: Thank you very much. My name is Moi Kemothy and I have one question. You talked about access, and you mentioned how the world needs to take notice. How can people like me, just individuals or small organizations make a difference in this region right now?

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Thank you. We've got a variety of questions there. Would you like to start?

MS. ARAIA: Yeah. Let me start with your question. In terms of how people can help; I mean, it's really an overwhelming need right now. And

the biggest response is funding and donations because there are scores of organizations on the ground, local, regional and international who are very familiar with this region. And what they need is capacity and resources.

So, I know, probably the first instinct is to want to go yourself or volunteer in some country over there to help with the response, but at this stage, the emergency is so real that groups want to respond and they just need the support. And so, an average American, it means donations, and it also means alerting your congressional representative to the issue.

Oxfam; we're a humanitarian organization, so we can't speak to politics and political issues. But what we would say is, we believe that what's happening in Somalia deserves to be the views of the Somalis, and what they think needs to happen should be prioritized. And a long-term solution to Somalia and to the region is needed on all fronts.

In terms of response, we would appeal that all parties to the conflict -- and I say all -- have a responsibility to allow for humanitarian access, and that includes armed groups, and that includes representatives. It includes communities, it includes international community.

It is a responsibility that we all bear. Oxfam doesn't have political views, what my answer to you about the Eritrea-Ethiopia Peace Process is not an Oxfam position. It's a process that I was a part of years back.

What I can say is the two countries signed a peace agreement. A border decision was handed down in 2002 and it is not fully implemented. And so, the two countries are at a stalemate. But this is reflective also of the nature

of crisis in this region. They are natural and they are man-made.

And the implications of having a stalemate and the implications of having a drought, the implications of having a famine in Somalia require a very complex integrated short-term and long-term response by all of us.

MS. FERRIS: Okay.

MR. BRIGETY: If I may address the question on dialogue posed by the two gentlemen and the question about the poll factor posed by the young lady; obviously, we've all addressed the question of access, and it's all so obvious that we collectively need to find innovative ways of engaging with all the actors on the ground to ensure access is provided.

Noting Allan's very important point about the delicacy of those sorts of outreaches; let me just say that we are approaching all of these options aggressively. We are very much aware of the need of engaging in dialogue. I can assure you that we are working these issues in a manner that the gravity of the situation merits.

On the question of a poll factor -- let me say that, I think that what's -- the question of a poll factor that is if you create all these -- create this massive infrastructure for assistance, that people in Somalia will want to leave their home to go live in the refugee paradise or Dadaab or, sort of, Dolo is a concern that many people have voiced. But I don't think that we're -- what we're not seeing is a poll factor. What we're seeing is a push factor.

So, as opposed to, say a year ago, where many of the people that we're leaving coming into Dadaab where people, and even by Somali standard,

had at least some means, some means to sort of pay for their transportation, so they actually got into the border by bus or by car or whatever -- you now have people that had very little to start with and have zero, nothing; pastoralists whose livestock have all died, farmers who can't farm because the drought -- the soil is all dried up and is dried up for some time.

So these are literally the poorest of the poor in an already poor situation who, as we mentioned, are walking for days, sometimes weeks at a time just to make it to the border. And by the way, once you leave Somalia and get to the border at Kenya, you have another 80 kilometers to walk before you get to the actual camp.

So, we completely recognize the burden that this places on Kenya and Ethiopia. We are grateful for their shouldering the burden. We stand with them as partners to help them do so. But the notion that the provision of humanitarian assistance will create a poll factor that will make people want to go live in a refugee came for 20 years or more is something that I think is a notion that we all need to dis-abuse ourselves of. The real issue is the conditions inside Somalia that are pushing people out.

MR. COCHETEL: I mean, I could have used another 20 or 30 testimonies from that paper I had in front of me. I mean, I'd like you to leave this room really thinking that people are not just moving on because of the famine.

If people make the choice of walking nine days instead of walking two days and get access to some temporary protection and under their community know they prefer to walk all the way to Kenya or Ethiopia because

they want safety. It's not they just want food; they want safety. And I think it's important to insist on that. There are lots of push factors in Somalia, in different parts of Somalia.

There was a question also about mobilizing support from other countries that may have some inference on some of the actors that the U.N. or other donors cannot reach out inside Somalia. I mean, historically, Agate was engaged, followed by Djibouti followed by Qatar and by Saudi Arabia. I think there still are conversations between the Saudis and people inside Somalia. Whether those discussions cover also what is humanitarian assistance, opening space for the humanitarian actors, I have no idea, but certainly some of the solutions in terms of access are through those discussions.

I mean, we should not forget that Somalia export a lot of meat. I mean, they export charcoal also a lot; wood to Saudi Arabia a lot, and directly through Yemen. And if some countries have influence on Somalia today, these are those countries that need to be part of the dialogue.

Yemen is not able to play this role these days. Saudi Arabia have other concerns at their border, but certainly, it is important to keep those other countries engaged in the dialogue because they may help in the long-run.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Allan?

MR. JURY: Yeah, very quickly. Just on the WP point; I thought I'd tried to clarify that, but we are not completely out of southern Somalia. We are out of most of southern Somalia in the direct control of Al-Shabaab and affiliated organizations.

We are able to operate feeding programs in Mogadishu in the area of Ghetto along the Ethiopia border and in all of north central Somalia areas. So, there are ways to get food in and to get supplies in for the, mainly for the internally displaced or the people who are actually living in those areas.

We also have some access through Partners where WP cannot directly get to in areas immediately adjacent to Mogadishu and the GADU areas. So we are not completely out of southern Somalia but we're out of a lot of it, and -- which brings into question of the poll factor.

There are twice as many internally displaced persons inside Somalia as these numbers you've heard about in terms of Dadaab and Dolo Ado. So a lot of people are moving inside Somalia and it's not all just flowing to the borders. But there are areas where both political conditions and food conditions are very severe and people are not being allowed to help them were they are.

So they're flowing to a number of place in and around Mogadishu, around Ghetto and in external situations, so it's not just a refugee flow. There's a lot of displacement.

And, you know, these challenge of the poll factor is always challenging. And I've spent 25 years in the year of the -- you know, in refugee and humanitarian work. And while it's a challenge -- you know. I've -- I've heard it every time that there's genocide or crisis. You know, "Why do we have Thai refugee camps when the Khmer Rouge are killing millions of people? Isn't that a poll factor." "Why do we have refugee camps when the Rwanda genocide?"

It'd be ideal if we didn't have the genocide. I'll be honest; I'm a little

bit less worried about the poll factor than the thousands of people that would die. But I do think there are -- we are trying to do other alternatives, and that's why access becomes so important.

And, in response to the question about working with others who might have influence; again, similar to what Reuben said, I can't be very specific, but WP in a couple of circumstances, particularly, in the areas around Mogadishu and the Afgoi corridor, is working with Islamic groups and others who may be able to have some dialogue and some openness to access, so it is being explored, all possible vehicles.

And I think another thing that -- there is an enormous amount of coordination primarily in Nairobi where most of the -- it is used as the hub base for most organizations working in southern Somalia because of access issues. There's a lot of discussions with the humanitarian coordinator Mark Bowden, the major governments, the NGOs.

There is an enormous amount of dialogue to see whatever there might be an opportunity whether at a more global negotiation or at a local negotiation to examine the aspects of assess through many, many different channels. So I think it's -- it will be pursed at all levels in great detail, and in, I think, an impressive array of coordination.

I think the coordination on this -- I mean, the joint analysis through the food security nutrition analysis unit, which is a combination of governments and U.N. agencies and NGOs -- I think the coordination on this one may be in the face of an overwhelming enemy and famine, has been pretty extraordinary.

The analysis is basically a unified analysis that represents all the communities. I mean, there isn't a WP analysis, NFAO analysis and a FuseNet analysis. I mean this -- the basic analysis and data coming out of the SFANU really represents the prospective of virtually every single humanitarian actor, government, NGO and U.N. agencies. And we've spent lots of years building that; that's another thing. You know.

I mean, it's been three years of work on what they call the integrated phase classification system and all sorts of other acronyms that you don't need to remember, but you can learn on the web. But three years ago, this kind of system, including the systematic definition of what is famine, what's food security wouldn't have been there.

Three hard years, nobody noticed it but people who -- you know, people like Mark and people in the FuseNet and people in the NGOs you see at this panel and U.N. agencies have been working on it and you really see the value of it right now, in terms of the data and analysis of the problem. It's far different and far more coordinated than you would've seen three or five years ago.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, thanks. Mark?

MR. BARTOLINI: I would just add that, it certainly is true that there are people who are fleeing for a variety of reasons, and security one of the main ones. And they have a legal right in trying the international law for the right to First Asylum, so that's something that needs to be respected.

Having said that, there are people that are leaving primarily

because of the food situation and that's something, as I mentioned earlier, we're trying very hard to address because we know when people are displaced they're particularly vulnerable to disease and other problems.

And you've heard Reuben's really moving description of what it looks like when people are arriving in these camps. So we're doing the best that we can to make sure that those people who want to stay, who are able to stay are able to stay with the resources that we have.

MS. FERRIS: I think we have time for maybe three more questions and then -- I'll stick here with the middle row; one, two, three, maybe four if you're short.

MS. DIVENS: Hi. My name is Laura Divens. I work with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in their Office of Global Affairs, and mine is sort of a two-pronged question.

But first of all, I was wondering -- I've heard a lot of reports, you know, of a lot of people settling on the outskirts of the refugee camps in Dadaab, and that it's a rather informal settlement and that not all of those refugees are being registered, and what is being done to ensure that services are reaching them?

And in addition, when -- if and when, hopefully, if a well is actually opened, what is going to be done also to ensure that efforts in services are scaled up and coordinated in a way to address the massive influx of population there that will likely occur?

MS. FERRIS: Thank you.

MS. DIVENS: Thanks.

MS. O'HARA: Hi. My name is Megan O'Hara and I'm with the ONE Campaign, and I was wondering if you could talk about the implications of Ramadan now starting in Somalia and the region.

MR. LAWARE: Thank you. My name is Fostain Laware with Bread for the World, and I really appreciate, Mark, your comment on the fact that this crisis is different from what we've had in the past. It's largely environmental factors pushing or making the crisis really worse.

And Vincent, when you said that we had a meeting with the U.N. officials and the government of Kenya officials, did you or did we think of any other strategies that the U.N. or international community's thinking in terms of highlighting more the challenges of climate change in these regions, specifically on climate change? Thanks.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. And one more right here in front.

MR. WILLBY: Hi. My name is Willby. My question is -- you've spoken about short-term assistance as far as humanitarian assistance, but what has been done in, like, long-term assistance as far as for the refugee camps like in Ethiopia and Kenya as far as -- you've mentioned that it's just been around for a while, as far as the refugee camps. And what has been done as far as integrating the people that have actually stayed in these camps for a long period of time within the communities?

And you've mentioned that Kenya -- there is some kind of internal stability problem but, in Ethiopia, as far as -- can you mention or highlight some

of the work that has been done, and I'm sure there has been? So, thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Great, thanks. A variety of questions here, some about the refugee camps. Who would like to begin?

MR. BARTOLINI: Maybe I'll start, and Vincent, in particular, if you wanted to talk about the issue -- with regard to the spontaneous settlements around Dadaab, there are a couple of different issues. As I mentioned, there are probably about 44,000 people or so -- probably growing now -- that are on the outskirts.

There has clearly been a challenge in terms of getting assistance to them, and also registering them. The registration challenge -- there are a lot of very, kind of, technical issues associated with it. One is, is actually getting people from the extension to the main registration place, which is in the main Ifo camp.

Part of it is, many NGOs that would be doing services have been reluctant to extend services out to the outskirts, given that the government of Kenya, up until recently, has not permitted the opening of the Ifo extension.

UNHCR just the last couple of days has actually started to move people into the extension. We anticipate that we will be able to see services accompany those people being moved in relatively short-order. We continue to work with their government of Kenya to ensure that's done in a very systematic way. And then other issue, frankly, is just a throughput, just a shear numbers.

For example; early this year, you were talking about 1500 people a week coming into Dadaab. Now it's about 1500 a day, right? So that just adds to

the capacity issues.

Now, having said that, we are confident that once we get additional support from donors to respond to the appeals that Allan and Vincent had mentioned, that it will actually be comparatively easy to scale up the response in Dadaab because there's actually been an infrastructure that has existed there for 20 years, as opposed to say -- in Dolo and Ethiopia, as I mentioned, they are literally sort of building the infrastructure as it is required. So it's a different challenge. The challenge in Ethiopia, frankly, is more logistical than the challenge than Kenya. Frankly, it's more political but we are working both of those issues accordingly.

On the issue of Ramadan. Al-Shabaab, for the last two years, has initiated major counteroffensives in south central Somalia on the eve of or during Ramadan. We don't know if they will do that this year.

Obviously, should that historical practice continue in the context of this current emergency, one can imagine that people that were already food insecure and moving for food issues will have an even greater concern with regard to conflict and may even create a greater push factor, so this is something that we'll be watching very closely.

On the question of assistance to local populations; in the refugee realm, we always try to work to achieve durable solutions for refugees, and the three basic durable solutions are that people can either go back home, they can be resettled to a third country or they can be locally integrated and essentially give some sort of legal citizenship status or other legal status in the country

where they've sought refuge.

Part of the issue in Kenya is that none of those three options are available. Somalia has been in a state of disarray for 20 years. You cannot resettle your way out of a problem with the 400,000 refugees. There's about 15 million refugees in the world. Of those 15 million, only about a 100,000 will be resettled in any given year. Of those 100,000, 75,000 come to the United States.

So you can't literally take enough people out of those camps in order to decongest the pressure, although we are working with other resettlement countries, as a sign of solidarity to Kenyans to be able to do so.

That leads you to the third question of local integration and some sort of local status inside Kenya. As I had mentioned before, that is an incredibly sensitive and fraught issue inside Kenya. For a variety of reasons, there are some who believe that if you actually allow these people to have legal status, then it will fundamentally throw off the political electoral calculus inside Kenya, so then you're left with a situation which people are in refugee camps for 20 years.

So this is an issue that we are working with UNHCR and others to try to figure out a way beyond the sort of traditional three durable solutions, how you address this issue to affect the sum 840,000 Somalia refugees that are in the Horn region proper. We know it's a problem and it's something that we're trying to address.

MR. BRIGETY: I would just add one more thing, and that's that you can't forget about the host populations that live around the camps and in the region because they're suffering quite a bit, as well. And we know from

experience that if their needs aren't met, then you're going to have another whole host of problems to deal with, and that's something that we are very actively trying to address.

MS. ARAIA: And also, in the Oxfam we work in Ifo 2 and Ifo 3 in Dadaab. And in Ifo 3, which just opened, we still aren't clear on the infrastructure and how it has met up to standards required for humanitarian response. So we're working to put in latrines and water taps and boreholes. But, I mean, already there is about 3,000 tents in Ifo2, which just opened a few days. We've heard from the field last week. But what's unclear is how families are being relocated from Ifo 3 to Ifo 2, which has been ready, and where the standards are for Ifo 3 in terms of shelter and sanitation and water.

In terms of the response, I just want to circle back to an earlier point about -- you know, the response has been -- we've know about the drought for months, thanks to early-warning systems, thanks to the ability to flag and see the drought coming on. But in 2011 we saw, after the rains in the earliest part of this year, that this drought was going to be different. And what Oxfam is appealing is for donors to respond even more so than they have before.

So the United States should be commended really for, you know, giving early warning systems priority and the drought response a priority. But when you look at the figures, the U.S. assistance to Somalia and to this region has simply plummeted since 2008 due to other concerns, such as diversion of food and other policies.

So what we want is to see a scaling up of our funding from the

United States and other donors. We are appealing to Arab and African and non-traditional donors as well as the western donors. But in particular, we also want to ensure that it goes beyond the drought and that it addresses long-term response so that we can move away from this need for more and more camps and provide mechanisms for communities to be resilient and be able to cope better than they have before.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Anybody want to tackle the question of climate change or long-term assistance?

MR. JURY: Well, it definitely needs to call attention to it. And I think, as we've seen in previous droughts, what we really need to see after the end of this thing, or as we move in emergency phases, the increase in focus on long-term resiliency. I mean, I've been through three of these and there's never enough, in my view, done to address the long-term needs of resiliency in agro-pastoralist communities, which are the first hit.

They live in the most marginal lands; the **13:52:33 Kenya, the southern Somalia, parts of southern Somalia, parts of eastern Ethiopia. I think there has been some progress done with communities that are more fixed agricultural communities through a number of projects. We do food for war, productive safety nets in Ethiopia, a number of NGO projects, but the agro pastoralist community -- I've seen proposals identified. I've never seen the funding or the attention stay with them once this is over, and they are always the first hit. It's just always the top of the list.

And, you know, the conference in Nairobi, that the U.N. agencies

tried to pull together at the end of the last -- I think it was -- that would've been the last thing, about 2008. And the governments were interested and the donors were kind of moving on. There are things done but there needs to be more done.

We know where the most hard-hit communities are and we can never stop the effect of drought. There will be an increase of people who need emergency assistance, but as I think, some of Ethiopia, as I said earlier, has shown if we focus on it, we can mitigate. We can mitigate and adapt. And I do think the climate issues do need to be called attention to, and I think there is a broad need to really prioritize this region in terms of mitigation and adaptation to climate change, but to climatic shocks away.

I mean, we like to say -- I don't know how much of a drought can be attributed to climate change other than normal weather patters, but the mitigation and adaptations are the same. Whether it's climate change or whether it's cyclical drought, you still need to do the same thing on the ground. I mean, I'll let others with more of the science debate the science, but the response is the same.

The only other point I make -- it didn't actually get alluded to earlier -- I should've made is a warning note. There is one great silence in this drought; we don't have the information and we don't have a (inaudible). We don't know what's going there. The government's kept people out. It is climatically, in terms of not quite as close to the center of the drought affected zones -- it's a little father north -- but it is a big question mark in this.

And I think -- I mean WP has been out of there because of a

number of issues with the government for a number of years, and so many NGOs. And I think it's a big silent potential. And hopefully, it's not as bad as some of the other areas, but Eritrea is probably the biggest unknown question mark that stands out there that could be -- maybe won't be -- but could be a significant problem in the next six months.

MS. FERRIS: Well, thanks to all of the panelists and thanks to all of you for coming.

(Applause)

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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