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NATO'S NUCLEAR FUTURE:

THE ALLIANCE'S POSTURE REVIEW, NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND ARMS CONTROL

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. STENT: Okay. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Angela Stent and I'd like to welcome you to this discussion this afternoon on a very timely subject.

I think the fact that so many of you have turned out on a hot midsummer day to discuss the future of nuclear weapons -- NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe -- again, is a testimony both to our experts here and, really, to the importance of the subject. So, I do welcome you here.

Last November, NATO leaders met in Lisbon and they agreed on a new strategic concept for the Alliance. And they also agreed to begin preparing the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review -- I have to keep all the acronyms straight here -- to be completed by NATO's next summit in May 2012. The key issue for this review is what the future of nuclear weapons is in Europe, particularly U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons that are currently deployed in Europe. And, what role they would play in the future mixture of conventional nuclear and missile defense forces in Europe.

Steve Pifer has written an excellent paper, which I assume is available for everyone outside -- you hope so -- called, "NATP: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control." And he raises a very important issue, which is the fact that U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons has always been a controversial issue in Europe, and in fact in the United States. We were

just discussing this before we came in here.

In a throwback to the Cold War days, I remember doing a USIA tour, speaking tour in Western Germany in 1981. And my talk at the University of Bremen being interrupted by both faculty and students who had to debate whether they would allow a representative of American imperialism to come on their campus and talk about the deployment and pushing of weapons there. And so, it was controversial then. Of course, we're far from those dark Cold War days, but some of the issues -- the political issues involved in the deployment of, now, non-strategic nuclear weapons remain.

Steve points out that there were always two rationales, of course, for these weapons being deployed in Europe, and one of them was clearly military. And that was to deter a possible Soviet threat. But the other one was also political, and I'm actually going to read you one sentence from his excellent report. You'll get a taste of it -- where he says, NATO nuclear policy attaches primarily political value to U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe as a symbol of the U.S. security commitment to Europe. So again, that kind of political symbolism of coupling of our commitment to Europe's security.

The NATO posture review is going to begin around the same time as the U.S. government is embarking on the next phase of arms control with Russia. And again, the subject of non-strategic nuclear weapons, at least from the U.S. point of view, will be part of these future

debates. But again, as I'm sure you'll hear from the panelists, it's not completely clear how much interest Russia has in further arms control, particularly in the question of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

So, as we begin our discussion I'm just going to raise three issues. The first, of course, has to do with Secretary Gates' rather somber valedictory remarks about the future of NATO, how do we go forward to ensure greater and more equitable military burden sharing in NATO? That's a broader question. And secondly, we're going to focus, I think, on two separate but related issues in this discussion. One of them is the U.S.-European relationship within the framework of NATO's nuclear posture. And the other one is the future of U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations. Can we envisage a Europe without U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons? Twenty years after the Cold War, does Europe still need the political reassurance from the United States that these non-strategic weapons represent?

And finally, I think just a reminder that from the Russian point of view the attitude towards NATO is and remains ambivalent. One the one hand, we have the NATO Russia Council. We are talking about cooperative missile defense there. On the other hand, if you read official Russian Ministry of Defense or Foreign Affairs documents, NATO is still regarded as a primary threat to Russia's national security.

So, we have three excellent people to help us understand these issues. I'm not going to read their bios in full, you have them in your

program. Our first speaker will be Ambassador Steven Pifer, senior fellow and director of the Arms Control Initiative here at Brookings. Our second speaker will be Hans Kristensen, who is the director of the Nuclear Information Project at The Federation of American Scientists. And our third speaker will be Franklin Miller, who is a principle member of The Scowcroft Group.

And I would like, on behalf of Brookings, also to thank the Ploughshares Fund and the MacArthur Foundation for the support for the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings, and particularly also for the paper that Steve has written. So, please. Steve.

MR. PIFER: Thank you, Angela. Your comment about going to speak in Germany -- I think Frank and I were recalling about 30 years ago how we got sent out to various universities to explain American nuclear policy at the height of the nuclear freeze movement here. And I think the welcome we received was just about as warm and as friendly as the one that you did.

I want to talk about three things which come up in the paper. First, what are the issues that NATO needs to look at in the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review? Second, if you did address non-strategic nuclear weapons in the arms control context, what are the options? And then finally, some of my thoughts and recommendations.

The Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which is to be concluded by the next NATO summit in May 2012 is tasked to examine

the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense forces. So, it won't look just at nuclear weapons, but nuclear weapons, nuclear posture will be a big part of their view. And that will include the future of roughly 200 American non-strategic nuclear warheads. These are B-61 gravity bombs, reportedly in 5 NATO countries: Turkey, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. And that will be a big part of the review.

So, let me go through six or seven of the questions that I think the Alliance is going to have to look at in the course of this review. First of all, what is the nature of the threat that NATO seeks to deter? During the Cold War it was the Soviet Union, but 20 years after the end of the Cold War you have countries such as Germany and France, which increasingly see Russia as a partner. That's not a uniform view within NATO. I think in Central Europe and in the Baltic states there are still a greater worriedness about Russia, and some fear of Russian pressure and intimidation tactics.

And this gets into extended deterrence being not just about deterring Russia or someone else, but also about assuring allies. Assuring all members of the Alliance that security is important. Moreover, you have to ask, what about non-Russian threats? And people are beginning to say, well what does a nuclear Iran require in terms of a NATO deterrence and defense posture?

A second question will come up is, you know, does NATO need American nuclear weapons in Europe for its future security policy?

And as Angela mentioned, when you talk to the U.S. military and when you talk to many NATO officials, they regard these weapons in Europe as having really little added military utility. The primary value is seen as a symbolic -- a political linkage that underscores the commitment of American military forces, including strategic nuclear forces, to European security.

And right now, I would say that there's a division within NATO as to whether or not those weapons need to stay. In countries such as Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, I think there's significant sentiment for either withdrawal of the weapons or removal of them. Other countries in Central Europe -- the Baltic States, and I think France and others -- believe that in fact, some American nuclear presence should remain.

The next question would be if you look at or if you decide that there should be a continued nuclear presence, you know, what is the level? Is 200 the right number? And it was interesting, when I spoke to people back about this over the last 6 months, what I heard was, well, if you see these weapons primarily as having political value, there's nothing magic about the number of 200. That there is some room for reductions.

Another question which would be related to this is the future of dual capable aircraft. In addition to weapons intended for U.S. aircraft, there are also German, Belgian, Dutch, and Italian aircraft which can carry nuclear weapons and could carry weapons in a time of conflict. However,

the German air force -- the Tornado, which is their dual capable fighter -- will probably be retired in the next 5 to 10 years. And Germany so far has decided that its successor, the Euro Fighter, will not be wired for nuclear weapons. So that means, the German air force right now is on a track to get out of the nuclear business.

At this point, Belgium has not yet decided whether it will replace its F-16s. And I think a German decision would have a major if not decisive impact on a Dutch decision about nuclear capable aircraft and its successor. And that also might impact on decisions in Italy. So, there's a possibility here of a string of dominoes going down.

Another question is, what about risk and burden sharing? And this really has been a key tenant of NATO policy for decades. And the idea is that not only the countries that provide the nuclear weapons -- the United States -- but also Britain's strategic deterrent. The risk should be shared, and allies share this by basing American nuclear weapons on their territory or providing dual capable aircraft. And if you have a radical reduction in or elimination of those weapons, that's going to change.

And I think as Secretary Gates talked about, the concerns in America about the burden in terms of overall defense spending, I think there's a parallel question. Is, what impact does that have on how the Alliance is viewed here in Washington? If the nuclear burden is really pushed back on the United States and Britain?

Another question is, what should be the mix of conventional

nuclear and missile defense forces? With one possibility being -- and U.S. policy is to try to reduce the role of nuclear weapons -- can missile defense, can conventional forces take up a greater part of the deterrence and defense burden?

And finally, I think NATO has to ask itself the question of public sustainability. When it comes up with a nuclear policy and nuclear posture, is it going to be able to sustain that with elites in Europe and with publics in Europe at a time when they may not see a threat that justifies a continued nuclear deterrent of the level that NATO has today.

Let me talk now about arms control options, which I would group into three categories. Confidence-building measures, unilateral steps, and negotiated outcomes.

The most obvious confidence-building measure or the one that I think has already been talked about and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon spoke of about three months ago would be, greater transparency regarding numbers, types, and locations of weapons.

I think you go beyond that, I think Frank, you've argued -- and I would agree with you on this if in fact you did make that argument -- that greater transparency with regards to doctrine. Because for many people in the West, it's hard to understand why Russia maintains an inventory that's assessed at between 3,500 and 5,500 non-strategic weapons that are still designated in which sense.

A second confidence-building measure, which might be

relatively easy to do because it appears to be the practice on both sides, is deeming or separating warheads from delivery systems. And I think certainly on the American side and probably on the Russian side, most if not all non-strategic warheads are not on delivery systems. And so, one confidence-building measure might be just make that a matter of policy that you would not ever re-mate them. And then, you could also look at things like consolidating weapons at fewer storage sites, and perhaps relocating them away from the NATO-Russia borders.

Unilateral measures -- well, the most obvious one would be for the United States NATO to take a decision that unilaterally they were going to withdraw the 200 B-61 gravity bombs from Europe without seeking anything in return. Other unilateral measures might be done more in a reciprocal sense. For example, the United States and Russia might consider undertaking political commitments not to increase the number of their non-strategic nuclear weapons. The United States has no plan to -- and given the current size of the Russian arsenal, the Russians have no need to.

You could go beyond that as to take parallel steps, unilateral reductions. And there was a quite successful exchange of this back in the early 1990s, when under presidential nuclear initiatives the United States and Russia separately but in parallel eliminated thousands of nuclear weapons. And one idea that I think that had been floated at one point in the U.S. Government was the possibility of equal percentage reductions in

non-strategic weapons.

And then the last category would be negotiated outcomes. And there's several ways that you could do this. One would be to try to negotiate a discrete limit that would cover American and Russian non-strategic weapons only. But I think many analysts feel that because of the numerical disparity, the level of Russian weapons is probably anywhere from 4 to 10 times the American level, depending on whether you count, you know, all of the older weapons.

With that kind of disparity, having a discrete negotiation could be difficult. An alternative would be to have a negotiation in which you put all nuclear weapons together, and the goal was a single limit that would cover strategic, non-strategic, deployed, and non-deployed weapons on the American and Russian sides. And my sense is that within the U.S. Government, they are sort of leaning towards that idea as perhaps creating some leverage possibilities where you could trade a Russian advantage in non-strategic weapons against an American advantage in non-deployed strategic warheads.

A third idea, which has been suggested by some Russian analysts, is that they conclude that limiting and verifying limits on non-strategic warheads would be so difficult that you ought not to aim for a numerical limit, but aim for a restriction that would require that all weapons be stored at declared storage sites. And your verification regime would then not aim to count the weapons, but aim to simply confirm that the

weapons did not leave those storage areas.

And then finally, a proposal that the Russians have made -- in fact, the Russians have proposed it as a precondition to any negotiation -- is a limit that would require all nuclear weapons to be deployed on national territory. Which of course, would require withdrawal of the American weapons from Europe.

Let me now talk a little bit about, you know, recommendations or the conclusions I came to at the end of the paper. And I guess the first observation I think is, I believe that NATO currently is on a path that I call disarmament by default with regards to non-strategic nuclear weapons. And this is driven by the decisions on dual capable aircraft. It is very difficult and, frankly, it's impossible for me to see the current German government or a future German government reversing the decision and maintaining a nuclear capability for the German air force much past 2020.

I think that decision has big impacts in the Hague and in Brussels. And so, I think you see fairly quickly the three Northern tier countries basically moving away from nuclear delivery capability, which removes the rationale for nuclear weapons in those countries. And that may, then, have an impact likewise in Italy and Turkey.

Now, NATO may well be able to kick this can down the road. This is not an issue for the next five years. But it's probably an issue for the second five years of this decade. And again, my sense is, NATO is

moving towards, again, elimination of -- or at least a significant reduction of the American nuclear presence in Europe.

So, you know, what would be the recommendations flowing from that? You know, I think NATO should look at ways to use missile defense and conventional forces to take up a greater share of the deterrence and defense program. I think missile defense has some possibilities. And regardless of what one feels about the theoretical contribution of missile defense to deterrence, the deployment of American missile defense units in Poland and Romania will certainly have an effect of assuring those governments in the region as a whole.

On the conventional side, there may be some more creative options. A couple of months ago, the United States and Poland agreed that they would deploy a small American Air Force maintenance unit in Poland that would support periodic deployments of American F-16s and C-130s. You know, that might be a plan to replicate. As a way, again, to assure those countries that still feel more nervous about their possible exposure to intimidation tactics from outside.

With regards to arms control, I think the logical thing is a U.S.-Russian arms control negotiation that would include these weapons. Although as Angela said, I think engaging Russia is going to be difficult. It's very hard to see the Russians being enthusiastic about negotiating non-strategic nuclear weapons. Or at this point, negotiating any further nuclear cuts for the next couple of years.

So, it will be hard to get the Russians into that game. But I think it's important to press the Russians for greater transparency, possibly movement on other confidence building measures, but ultimately seeking to come up with a negotiation in which U.S. and Russian negotiators would work towards a single limit that would cover all nuclear weapons in an agreement that would be a follow-along to the new START treaty.

And if the terms of that agreement came out right, I would argue that NATO probably should accept what will be, I'm almost certain, a Russian demand that weapons be spaced on national territory. Now, that's going to require a very significant change in NATO deterrence and defense posture. It would mean that for the first time since the early 1950s, there would be no American nuclear weapons in Europe. Now, U.S. and British strategic forces would remain. There might be the possibility of maintaining forward deployable non-strategic American systems. But NATO would have to address key questions like, how do you assure those allies who still worry about Russian intimidation? And how do you deal with other threats, such as Iran?

And I think this would be a fairly difficult set of issues that the Alliance would have to come to grips with. But I think the Alliance needs to come to grips with those issues, and the arms control approach that I outlined, while maybe not the ideal, is still better than, I think, the current course. Which as I said, appears to be disarmament by default. Thanks.

MA. STENT: Thank you very much, Steve. Hans?

MR. KRISTENSEN: Thanks very much. And, thanks Steve and Brookings for inviting me to come and participate here.

And just to follow up on the anecdotal stories from the early years. In those days, I was on the other side of the fence. I was one of those idiots hanging from this and that and unfolding banners objecting to nuclear weapons in Europe and all these things. So it would not surprise you to learn that I, today, have the role of arguing for the potential of reducing and removing nuclear weapons from Europe.

And I think Steve has done a great paper that brings up a lot of the nuances in the issue and the debate. Also, nuances -- interesting nuances, I think, about what the different countries think. Quite often, when we hear the debate you either hear one or the other camp arguing in favor of their point of view. And I think, to his credit what he does is trying to bring up a mixture of different views that we can find in different countries.

And so of course his key point is that, as you mentioned, that NATO is on a path to disarmament by default. And it's interesting because when you say NATO and on the way to disarmament, people tend to think nuclear only -- the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. But of course, NATO includes three major nuclear powers. And even if one imagined all of the nuclear weapons in Europe disappearing, even being scrapped, anyone who would consider attacking NATO, obviously, would

have to take all of that other stuff into consideration.

And I think right now in this year, it's particularly important to remember 20 years back. Twenty years back today was when Washington was, you know, buzzing with excitement over -- well, also concern, of course -- the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Presidential nuclear initiatives. Here were bold initiatives that came out -- well, apparently out of nowhere -- and suddenly ordered the complete withdrawal of all ground-launched nuclear weapons from Europe, all naval nuclear weapons that were deployed over there. And really sweeping initiatives.

Unilateral initiatives. We didn't know if the Russians were going to follow suit, but of course they did. And they did their part of it, and we still have debate about how far they've gone, et cetera, et cetera. But that's another story. But the point being here that, those initiatives really reshaped the debate, the possibilities, and NATO's future.

Unfortunately, after 20 years later we haven't thought a great deal about what that now means. NATO hasn't spent a whole lot of time thinking about a nuclear posture. And, in fact, if you look at over the last two decades, even after the elimination of the ground-launched nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of the naval weapons were completed, NATO has repeatedly continued unilateral reductions -- quite significant reductions both in the number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe without telling anybody about it, and reductions in the number of bases

where those weapons are stored and reductions even in the number of countries that are involved in the nuclear strike mission in NATO.

And that's quite often lost in the debate, I think, that during that entire period, Russia has had its own problems. It's had a very interesting change in the nuclear doctrine and strategy and what we interpret the Russians to think about nuclear weapons and the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons. And we've certainly been able to see that. They had more tactical nuclear weapons, you know, a decade ago than they do today. But we've still gone ahead, unilaterally, and reduced as if we were quite confident.

In fact, we've argued all along that the weapons that are in Europe were not tied at all to Russia. So what we're seeing now is that we are seeing officials trying to re-link or re-establish a link in the way we articulate the arms control and the process issues that we envision over the next couple of years. We're trying to re-link and re-establish a link with Russia. That we begin to, you could call it, sort of 1980s-ing the nuclear arms control process, where we are trying to link our nuclear posture to the fact that they have a lot.

And I don't think this is quite, in a way, well thought through. Because I think it has a lot to do with people in the system that haven't through a whole lot about nuclear arms control in this category for about two decades, suddenly have to start doing it. And guess what they do? Well, they reach in to the grab bag from the 1980s and come up with

some concepts. Yeah, well, we have to link our reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons to the Russians.

But I think this is problematic for several reasons. We should certainly try to work to increase transparency and verification of them. But I also think it's important to remember a couple of things about perhaps limitations of this way of thinking. Well, first of all is that the Russian non-strategic nuclear forces are not directly linked as far as we can see, or tied to the size or presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. They seem to be more linked to Russia's own general military planning, in as far as it's conventional forces are seen as being inferior to NATO's. And also to its long border with China, and how to manage a crisis in that part.

And so, it's unclear to me why Russia necessarily would agree to cuts in non-strategic nuclear weapons in return, for us, for example removing nuclear weapons in Europe. It may be we get a surprise, but I don't think there's a very strong arms control angle there.

And the second is that making further cuts continued on Russian reductions, in essence, means handing over the initiatives to Moscow. By saying that, we're essentially saying that unless you do something, we're not going to do something. In the end, of course, the strategic concept may, if you will, adjust the posture in Europe. It's very likely that it will. But it seems to me that we sort of are handing the ball over to the Russians and saying, go figure out what you want to do.

And the third is that, here in the United States we are, in a way, moving toward a nuclear posture without non-strategic nuclear weapons. We -- the nuclear posture review retired the last naval non-strategic nuclear weapons, the Tomahawk nuclear cruise missile. And as part of the B-61 life extension program, we're now going to take the three only designated non-strategic nuclear bombs we have in the stockpile, and one of the strategic bombs -- merge these different types into one type. We'll no longer have a designated non-strategic nuclear warhead in the stockpile.

They will -- whether they are called non-strategic or whether they function as non-strategic seems to be more dependent on what kind of delivery vehicles they will be mated with in the future. It could be a B-2, then we call it strategic. It could be an F-35, then we call it non-strategic. But it seems to me that if we're in the process of constructing non-strategic arms control language and architecture, we have to think about that we're not doing that over here while at the same time we're sort of making it harder to see what is strategic and non-strategic over here.

Now, there are some officials, of course, in Europe that argue that the deployment is needed as a symbol of U.S. commitment. But I think it's important to look also at even what the strategic concept says itself. That it is the strategic weapons, not the non-strategic weapons in Europe, that provide the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. So, one should not confuse this with the mission of the non-strategic

weapons, I think. The serve other purposes.

But I also think that if the leftover of non-strategic nuclear weapons from the Cold War is the basic Article 5, then I think NATO is in greater trouble than people realize. And once you talk to officials that make these arguments, in the course of the conversation -- at least in my experience and many of the people I talk to -- it becomes clear that it's not necessarily the non-strategic nuclear weapons they're so focused on. It is the security guarantee, in whatever shape or form. They want to see tangible evidence and examples of this. It can be in the form of rotation of fighter wings, as Steve mentioned, to air bases or to ballistic missile defense arrangements on the ground. What have you. But it's -- one has to be careful not to over-emphasize, I think, on this contribution of the non-strategic weapons to that.

Now, in fact, I think we are seeing more of a process where it's -- at least to me -- seems that we're maintaining a posture of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe more for internal, psychological, and cultural issues rather than because there is an urgent need, if you will. And I think here a particular problematic example is this nuclear sharing mission that we have where a handful of non-nuclear countries are equipped and trained in peace time to deliver a U.S. nuclear weapons in wartime. And I think this continuation of this arrangement, at least to me, boggles the mind. Because I think we're in an era where the non-proliferation standards that the United States and NATO seem to promote

everywhere is precisely the opposite. Not to equip non-nuclear countries to do nuclear things. And so, I think this is out of synch with where our greater non-proliferation policy is heading.

So, I would hope that the new strategic review will try to reshape this thinking rather, sort of, than slicing a few more slices of the status quo, if you will. It's -- I think we can -- could declare that the nuclear mission in terms of the deployment in Europe has been accomplished. And then, move on. And instead, focus on the other aspects that I also heard Steve mentioning here, the other aspects that make up extended deterrence and security guarantees, if you will.

So, if you will, rather than continuing sort of what you can call the death of a thousand cuts with incremental reductions -- because it's not going to go the other way. It's going to continue to slide down and down and down. I think the strategic review should take the upper hand and grab the bull by the horns and make a decision. And say, now we have completed the phase out of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe.

MS. STENT: Thank you very much, that was a very clear statement. Frank.

MR. MILLER: Thanks very much. And thanks to Brookings for hosting all of us.

First, I'd like to open by commending Steve on an excellent, fair, and comprehensive summary of the issue. And if you haven't read

his paper, please do. It really is an excellent piece of work. He even picked up in the paper one of my not-so-crazy solutions to the issue, and we'll talk about that in a minute.

And the paper does, however, contain one assumption with which I strongly disagree. We can talk about that, again, in a moment, too.

But let's begin this afternoon by focusing on what the issue is. The issue in front of us today is not fundamentally about nuclear weapons. I'd be happy in the questions and answers to talk about nomenclature weapons types, aircraft types, whether the deployment with the non-nuclear allies is consistent with the non-proliferation treaty or not. And if you read the negotiating history, it is.

Now, the discussion that we're focusing on today is about nothing less than the future of NATO. Whether or not this, the most successful alliance in modern history and perhaps throughout all history -- whether that alliance will continue to exist and function. So, I'd begin by remembering what NATO's purpose is.

NATO was created to promote peace and stability by preventing war and aggression in the Euro-Atlantic space. And in doing so, to ensure that alliance security is indivisible. That the risks are shared equally by all the members, and that the burden to do all of this is equally shared by all.

And this concept had its origins at the Alliance's very

beginning in 1949. At a time when NATO's European members faced a military threat that was not yet faced by its North American members. Geography then was irrelevant. A threat to one member was deemed a threat to all, and would be met as such. The key pillar of the Alliance, therefore, has been and remains the Article 5 guarantee.

That this remains true, at least conceptually, was reaffirmed in late November, 2010 when the 28 Alliance heads of state and government approved a new strategic concept. Which stated, among other things, NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all of its members by political and military means. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose, and fair burden sharing.

Furthermore, of the Alliance's three essential core tasks set forth in the strategic concept, collective defense was listed first. But what we are witnessing increasingly today in many of the original members of the Alliance is the growth of a cynical and beggar-thy-neighbor approach to the collective good. A reemergence, if you will, of the self-centered nationalistic politics and policies of the Europe of the 19th and early 20th centuries which twice nearly destroyed the continent.

It represents a craven moral failure by those who once sought collective security. And even ask the United States to put its very existence as a nation at risk to deter a Soviet attack on their countries.

Now, however, feeling safer and more secure -- and here I speak of the German government and those within the Dutch and Belgian governments and political elites who support their view, they would deny to the newer members of the Alliance the very security they once so desperately sought. And are prepared to shift to the United States the full burden of protecting them from nuclear and conventional attack and cohesion.

Steve's paper summarizes the situation well. He notes that the new members understand this, and doubt the older members' willingness to support the Article 5 commitment. And as a result, he points out, strongly desire the continued presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO Europe as a political symbol of the total commitment of the United States to their defense.

As Steve wrote, "Indeed for many of the Central European members located closer to, and still uncertain about the intentions of, Russia, NATO's nuclear umbrella made concrete by U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe was a principle reason for joining the Alliance."

Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, nations which currently host U.S. nuclear weapons and which are actively seeking their removal, have, therefore, failed the new allies, the United States, and the Alliance. By seeking to force the removal of nuclear weapons from NATO Europe, they would remove from the new members the symbolic security they once so deeply believed they themselves needed.

By shirking the responsibility for nuclear risk sharing and burden sharing, but not the need for nuclear deterrence, they are asking the American people to put the U.S. homeland at risk while they get a free ride. There can be no more cynical expression of this than the statement attributed to Foreign Minister Westerwelle of Germany last year, that NATO needed a nuclear umbrella, but that nuclear umbrella should be based in the United States.

This attitude assumes that America's willingness to defend NATO is a constant. It ignores the fact that American internationalism is an historical aberration. Isolationism rather than engagement has been the dominant theme throughout most of our history.

Try explaining to a freshman congressman in this town why the U.S. homeland should be subject to nuclear attacks to deter aggression against NATO, while NATO allies are unwilling even to share the risk and burden of basing a very small part of the deterrent on their soil. And good luck in doing so.

Equally, those Americans who sought and wooed the nations of Eastern Europe to join the Alliance now have a responsibility both political and, indeed, moral to listen to and understand and appreciate those new allies' concern about their own security. It is extraordinarily patronizing for Americans in both official and private positions to tell the new members of the Alliance that contrary to their fears, contrary to the saber-rattling threats that they have heard and the

exercises they have observed, contrary to the 2008 land grab in Georgia, and contrary to their history, they really don't need to worry about Russia after all.

And it is outlandishly arrogant and patronizing to tell the new members, most of whom as Steve's paper points out, joined the Alliance to be able to be under the nuclear umbrella, the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe wouldn't mean anything. Because we can do it all with central systems based in the United States.

And I ask you, will we ever learn? Consultation means listening to our allies, not lecturing them. If anyone in the audience is old enough to have lived through the Europe missile debate of the late 1970s and early 1980s -- and I actually see colleagues who did that with me -- they will recall that when our allies -- the original 15 at the time, I would uncharitably point out -- when those allies expressed concerns about the Soviet SS-20s, the Pentagon's first reaction was to say, don't worry, we will allocate additional Poseidon warheads to SACEUR. Well, that approach didn't work then and it's not going to work now.

So much for the problem. Let's turn to the possible solutions. I do not accept as a given Steve's assumption that we are witnessing a cascade of national decisions to end participation in the dual capable aircraft role. And, therefore, that the de facto end of U.S. nuclear weapons presence in NATO is around the corner.

He may be right, but it does not necessarily have to be that

way. The Netherlands and Italy are still committed to buy the Joint Strike Fighter, and the JSF will be nuclear capable. Belgium is undecided.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon those Alliance members who believe that the continued presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is vital to NATO's security. To make that point clearly, to Brussels, the Hague, and Rome. And to underscore that collective security means exactly that, they can and they should emphasize to those capitals that the Alliance's new strategic concept -- and I will remind you, that's November 2010 -- calls for "the broadest possible participation in the peacetime basing of nuclear forces."

With respect to Germany, it would not be technically impossible to maintain a squadron of Tornados operational for a considerable period of time. What is lacking currently is the political will and the realization that the self-centered policy now being pursued has significant implications for NATO and for Germany and for Europe's own security.

Failing a decision to keep DCA, the German government should consider detailing German pilots to other allies' DC squadrons. That, at least, would keep Germany sharing the nuclear burden to some degree.

And while thanks in part to the Three No's Policy, which NATO adopted during its first expansion in the 1980s, a policy in which I and others in this room are deeply implicated. And in part, thanks to

today's political realities, it will not be possible to establish nuclear deployments on the soil of new members.

There is no reason why their air force's pilots could also not become qualified on the JSF, and integrated into other allies' dual capable aircraft air wings. That's the not-so-crazy idea I gave Steve as he was writing this paper. In fact, that notion applies to pilots from other allied air forces.

Let me note quickly in closing what would not be credible solutions. First, the idea that the United States could withdraw its weapons now but retain the ability and even the infrastructure to redeploy them in a crisis is a political and a military non-starter. This would not reassure new members. In fact, it would deepen their doubt and distrust.

Second, closely associated with that idea is the notion of negotiating the total withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe in the context of a U.S.-Russia arms control agreement. Because the threat perceived by the new members is not confined to Russian nuclear weapons, but is also driven by Russian conventional forces, some forward deployments will be necessary to provide substance to the Article 5 guarantee. Until the new allies perceive that the Russian threat, not just Russian weapons, is gone.

Remember, as Steve wrote in his paper, "Although the steady decline of Russian conventional forces over the past 20 years means that NATO has overall advantages, Russia has local advantages in

conventional forces in the Baltic area. Many in the Baltic states and Central Europe question whether NATO conventional forces have the ability to deploy rapidly to their defense, something that NATO has not exercised since they became Alliance members. Assurance of these allies is an important objective."

Indeed so. As it was with respect to Bonn, when the group of Soviet forces Germany set menacingly on the inner-German border, it was for this reason that in February 2010, when Lord Robertson, Dr. Cory Shockey, and I advanced the notion of a U.S.-Russian arms reduction treaty for tactical nuclear weapons -- the first time this idea was put forward in modern times, I might note -- that we advocated a non-zero solution. A residual deployment of some size is needed. Risk sharing and burden sharing and all that, as true now as then.

Is NATO vital to European security? Of course it is. Do our allies recognize this and have the courage to return to collective security? Well, we'll have to wait and see, won't we.

Thank you.

MS. STENT: Thank you very much for another very clear statement. Steve, before we go to general audience questions and answers, your paper has both received praise and a little criticism. Do you have anything -- would you like to respond to either of the other speakers?

MR. PIFER: I guess let me respond to one point to each.

MS. STENT: Okay.

MR. PIFER: First of all, let me thank them again. Because a lot of the -- the paper may sometimes have an on the one hand, on the other hand quality to it. That's because these were two of the main readers. And I was trying to capture sort of the full range of issues.

I guess I would respond to Hans. I mean, on the question of how you deal with nuclear weapons, I mean, I do agree that we are moving to a situation where I think the distinction between strategic and non-strategic becomes much more difficult to explain, which I would argue, I mean, that would be a rationale for going to a negotiation where you would lump all nuclear weapons together. And you might want to have a subset that covered deployed strategic warheads. But that, you know, we're now getting to the point now where you've got to do something about non-strategic. And maybe the best way to do it is a single negotiation, which covers all weapons.

On Frank's point, I just -- Frank, I will agree and I think I put it in the paper. The idea and to just elaborate, you could withdraw the weapons back to the United States and you could put into the agreement as there is in new START, a division for temporary deployment.

I also agree with Frank that even if you persuaded allies to maintain the infrastructure that would allow you to redeploy B-61 bombs back to Europe in a crisis, the politics would be almost impossibly hard to see that happening.

Although I guess the question I would ask, though, is, I think

also given the wide range of views that you have within NATO today, you know, if we have that presence and if NATO thought for nuclear signaling purposes we wanted to do something like raise the alert level of those aircraft, that would probably be easier than moving weapons back from the United States to Europe. But I think it also might prove to be not quite as impossibly hard, but it would be, I think, pretty difficult.

And so I think a lot of these questions, it's just -- it's hard just because you have -- with 28 members, such a wide variety of views about nuclear weapons and how to use them in political terms as well as military terms.

MS. STENT: Thank you. Okay, well, we have now time for questions, comments from the audience. Do we have roving mics here? Yeah, okay, fine.

I'll start right in the back, then. You had your hand up right in the back?

MR. PRICE: Thank you. Hi, I'm Jeff Price, and I wonder if the speakers could say a little bit more about Russian posture and doctrine, particularly relating to countries East of the Urals, and in particular China, and what role that plays in Russia's position.

MR. MILLER: I mean, I could start. I'd characterize Russian posture, size of the arsenal in the past is obscene. And I shall continue to do so.

In the 21st century, any notion that any country needs 2,500

or more tactical nuclear weapons is beyond any comprehension. Even if Russian military planners worry about a land war with China, how many of these things did they think they could use in battle before there would be a massive strategic exchange between Beijing and Moscow? Ten, 15? Not 2,500. So I find the Russian posture opaque, deliberately, and utterly inexplicable. And I would hope that the arms control community in this town continues to focus on that and to shame the Russians at every opportunity to get them to be both more transparent and to talk about reductions.

MS. STENT: Yes, Hans.

MR. KRISTENSEN: If I can add to that, I think that it's important to see or to understand the Russian posture of its non-strategic nuclear weapons as in a transition, which I think it's quite unforgotten when people say how many tactical nuclear weapons do the Russians have today? And then we forget here that we're coming down from enormous levels during the Cold War. They're still in the process of dismantling large numbers every year, both strategic and non-strategic, of course.

But we're now in a situation where regardless if you -- in a way, you can say regardless of what Russia says is the role of its non-strategic nuclear weapons, and it's not very precise about that in the latest military doctrine at all. If at all.

What's important here is that even if we get no arms control

agreement -- and they're not putting resources into their non-strategic nuclear weapons to any extent that can offset the drawdown. And so even if we don't have an arms control agreement now, within the next 10 years the Russian arsenal will decrease significantly. Most of these weapons are old weapons that are weapons from the -- they're like 30, 40, 50 years old. The delivery system is no better.

Of course, there are elements, there are pockets where the Russian military will probably think there are important missions for these. But it's not across the broad scale. So, I think it's important to look at the pieces of the Russian non-strategic nuclear arsenal that are relevant for NATO security, if you will. And that has nothing to do with the air defense system or the ballistic missile defense system, nor does it have much to do with most of the non-strategic nuclear weapons, even though, of course, there are overlaps.

We're not seeing Russia spending a whole lot of resources on replacing these systems. They're not building attack submarines or long-range bombers or medium-range bombers, or what have you, to replace this stuff compared to how much they are drawing down.

So, the point here just is that we're going to see a significantly different Russian posture and tactical nuclear weapons in a decade or so. And we have to take that into consideration when we think about what it is that we're worried about in the Russian posture. Not just sort of fall back on what we know they used to have.

MR. MILLER: No, if I could, because this is a terribly important point. And with respect, I deeply disagree with Hans.

First of all, they are building new weapons. I mean, the Russians recycle their nuclear weapons every 10 years. These are -- these weapons are operational. Second of all, they are deploying new weapon systems. The short-range missile, the SS-26 Iskander is a new weapon system and it's been moved into the Kaliningrad area as a means of intimidation.

Two years ago, the deputy head of the Russian navy announced they were deploying a new high-speed nuclear tip cruise missile to sink carriers aboard the soon-to-be-deployed nuclear attack submarine, *Severodvinsk*. Certainly going down from 2,500 to 1,000 is a significant reduction, but if you're in NATO that's not a whole big deal.

And if you're in NATO, which you've seen over the past five years is that these weapons do in fact have a use. They are used to intimidate the allies. There's nuclear saber rattling occurring a lot of the time. The exercise which targeted Poland with nuclear weapons -- the comments that if Ukraine or Poland hosted BMD sites, they would become nuclear targets for the Russian nuclear force.

All of these things are things which the Russian forces do which are beyond the pale for what we consider to be the 21st century. And I think it's terribly important that we keep that fact in mind.

MS. STENT: Steve?

MR. PIFER: I would just add -- I mean, I think this is a case where the opaque nature of Russian doctrine works against them. I mean, if Hans is correct and in fact the plans are to bring these things down, the Russians are -- they could talk about that. They could explain, you know, what's the purpose of the weapons? The national security strategy that came out a year and a half ago is not very clear. We knew that there was a classified annex, but no one knows what's in that. So it doesn't give clarity to what Russian thinking is behind this, and that raises questions.

And likewise, if there is a plan to bring the numbers down, you know, some transparency with regard to that might go a ways to reassuring NATO countries and offsetting some of the concerns that have been raised by Russian nuclear threats over the last several years.

MS. STENT: Thank you. Yeah, over here?

MR. KIMBALL: Thanks everyone for your presentations. I'm Daryl Kimball from the Arms Control Association.

There's one essential question that none of you really addressed directly or specifically that I wanted to ask each of you to address, which is that, I mean, given the concerns about Russia's doctrine, given the fact that they do have this larger number of tactical options, given that we are in an age of nuclear terrorism, not so much mutual assured destruction anymore, it seems to me the question that NATO needs to grapple with is -- and this is in the DDPR guidance -- is

what is the appropriate mix of nuclear missile defense and conventional, okay?

And, Frank, rather than accusing the Germans of cynicism -- I think what they are pushing is the question, what is the appropriate role? And some of the other European allies. And I think we have a responsibility to address that question directly rather than to suggest that they've got other motives, okay?

So, let's address that question. And I think, you know, the -- in the Tallinn principles that Secretary Clinton outlined at the NATO Ministers Meeting, there was this concept of reciprocation that was embedded in there, that we will seek reductions in all types of warheads while seeking Russian reciprocity.

What specifically would each of you suggest that could be done in the next two to three years in that regard? And, second, what would the DDPR need to make that possible? In other words, if the DDPR locks in nuclear weapons in Europe -- U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe as part of NATO doctrine for the next 10 years, that might lock out certain scenarios -- certain arms control scenarios, or it might be written and decided in a slightly different way. It opens up certain scenarios that could lead to reductions of Russia's forces and transparency, et cetera.

So, I'm interested in specific suggestions about how to solve this core problem which I think is a shared concern of all the allies, no matter where they stand on the assurance question, et cetera.

MS. STENT: Steve, you want to start off?

MR. PIFER: Okay. Well, let me start off -- I think Frank made this point. I'm not sure that the concerns of the Baltic states essentially is just about nuclear weapons, per se. It's a broader concern. And frankly, it's a lack of confidence that if -- and I don't think they see the possibility of a military conflict with Russia as a high possibility. But for them, it's not a zero possibility. Whereas I think further to the West, you have kind of to say it's a zero possibility.

So, the question is, could you find other ways to assure them? As I said, I think missile defense has an impact. It has an impact not mainly because of the missiles, but because you will have the American forces manning those missiles. Relatively small units, but there will still be Americans on the ground in Poland or Romania. I think that's one way where missile defense can take up part of the deterrence and defense burden.

If you had a different budget situation, there would be lots of conventional force possibilities. But I think pretty much every European NATO member, as well as the United States, is going to be under pressure in terms of cutting defense dollars. So, some of the things that might be doable, you know -- more rapidly deployable conventional forces that get more quickly to the Baltic states, for example -- are probably not going to be able to be done unless NATO gets very, very smart about how it pools and makes the most economical use of its defense money.

Because I think there's a lot of possibilities there, if the Alliance was smarter, how they use dollars to get some actual capability.

The idea that I mentioned, this U.S.-Polish agreement where you have a small unit based on a Central European country and you have periodic deployment -- I mean, I think that's a way to do some reassurance.

And then finally, I think -- and maybe down to leadership context. I mean, it seems to me that assurance is not just based upon capability. It's basically how -- on leaders in one part of the Alliance having confidence that the other leaders care about their security, are prepared to address that. And an example I guess I would go back to is, I think the first year, 2009, of the Obama Administration, there was a certain amount of uncertainty in Central Europe about where Washington was with regard to the security concerns. That I would argue was amplified by a missile defense decision, which I think basically made sense but was rolled out in a very bad way.

So, the question is, in 2010 and 2011, I think, the Administration did try to work it out. You had visits to the area by both the Vice President and the President, to try to rebuild some of that. And I think we've repaired a lot of that concern that was in 2009. What could other NATO leaders begin to do that, in a way, that begin to make those -- a leader context and instill the confidence that, yes, their security matters in other NATO capitals even if NATO may not have the funds to provide all

of the capabilities it might like?

But I think they've got to think through these ideas, because I still -- and this is where I think Frank and I probably disagree on this -- I think NATO is headed on a non-nuclear course now.

MS. STENT: Hans.

MR. KRISTENSEN: Well, I'll just say that I think many of the specifics, of course, I think are right on. I think the question is how it's going to be done. But I want to point to kind of think about some of the language, for example, that's in the QDR and the missile defense review from last year.

Both of these documents talk about sort of a new regional deterrence concept. And God knows what has been implemented of it, but components involve some of the things that Steve mentioned. And I imagine there would be other elements to it. But it specifically says that as a result of that, you could see a reduction of the regional role of nuclear weapons.

And so, there is that thinking in the strategic planning, it seems to me. The mentioning of the basis, for example, I think the smart thing about that is that it doesn't require, you know, the establishment of an expensive infrastructure at forward-based facilities, et cetera, as much it involves, if you will, a smart use of rotational units instead.

But of course, I mean, even if Russia removed all of its tactical nuclear weapons tomorrow, you know, I mean -- would we get

another -- would the Baltic states say something different about their security concerns? I don't think they would. You know, I think it's kind of like a -- it's Alice in Wonderland to some extent for me, because it's not about the nukes nor is the reassurance whether they feel so or not about it. So what are they going to get from our attack nukes for their protection? So I think it serves NATO to try to spend as much of its effort on trying to plan to reestablish, if you will, the sense of security guarantees among those countries based on a non-nuclear means. I just think that's the way forward.

MS. STENT: Frank?

MR. MILLER: I think first point -- and of course NATO should do the DDPR to come up with the appropriate mix. But the first point to take as a matter of fact and historical fact is that conventional weapons alone are insufficient. Nuclear weapons change the face of warfare by making aggression unacceptable.

NATO's nuclear weapons, the tactical weapons, are weapons of war prevention. And that is their function. History is littered with monuments to the failure of conventional deterrents. The Poles are very happy to remind us of that fact whenever this subject comes up.

Now, does that mean that the current force -- the NATO force, 200-odd, whatever the number is, needs to stay at that number? The answer is no, of course not. And in the paper that Lord Robertson and Cory Shockey and I wrote, we talked about equal percentage

reductions.

They key has to be that enough weapons have to remain that the basing countries or most of the basing countries stay in the game so that the weapons continue to stay forward unless we want to change the paradigm and say we want to put nuclear weapons on the soil of new members because they are the ones who believe they are necessary. And weapons need to be there until all members of the Alliance believe they don't need to be there.

When all members of the Alliance believe they don't need to be there for security, fine. Take them home. They're not there to serve U.S. foreign policy interests, let's be clear about that.

And last, let's talk about Germany and let's talk about cynicism. The concordat between the FTP and the CDU was late 2009. It predates the DDPR by a year and some. The Germans then called for the removal of all U.S. tactical weapons from Germany, and they have actively worked the other basing countries to get them to fall into line.

So if you get a reduction in an arms control context, and then the Germans succeed in pulling the rug out from everybody else's basing, then you are to de facto zero. And that is my point at the beginning of the conversation.

The Germans have lost the concept of collective security. Everybody was there for Germany at the height of the Cold War. Germany is not there for the new allies, even when the new allies express

concerns about their own security. And I find that immoral.

MS. STENT: Hans, do you have a small comment to add?

MR. KRISTENSEN: Well, you know, I think it's important to put the Russian threat in perspective. Because one interesting thing that came out from the WikiLeaks was a notorious memo from a meeting that was held in NATO in, I think it was October 2009, in which NATO briefed the member states on the Russian exercised that had been held that fall. And one of the interesting observations, of course, in that was that the exercise appeared to simulate the use of short-range ballistic missiles.

One of the issues, has Russia eliminated all of its non-strategic ground-launched weapons? Well, apparently not. Nonetheless, the more important conclusion from that, I think, was that it concluded that the exercise showed that Russia was simply unable militarily to conduct a large military campaign, certainly two simultaneous campaigns and, therefore, relied on the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. It spoke, I think very importantly here, about a decline in the basic ability of Russia to protect military force.

Now, that may be the case. But of course, therefore, countries can still have concerns and feel uneasy about it. But I think it's a concern about other things. And I just -- I urge NATO's strategic review here to be realistic about what that reality is and not try to sort of fall into boxes about how we used to think about this in the past and give them security assurances that are about real-world operations rather than

clinging to some leftover from a nuclear posturing or that were deployed during the Cold War and very different circumstances.

MS. STENT: Yes. Over here?

SPEAKER: I'd like to ask two Eurocentric questions. First, to paraphrase the National Rifle Association, if we take nuclear weapons out of Europe, only the Europeans will have nuclear weapons. What would be the knock-on effect of a U.S. withdrawal on French and UK weapons? I see that last week for the 14th of July, there was a large mock-up of one of the new French submarines in front of the opera in France. They're rather proud of their posture. The UK a little less so, perhaps.

And secondly, I know that at least -- the two largest advocates that I know of zero nuclear weapons -- one who is in front of us today -- are European intervention, Hans Kristensen, and your alumnus, Ivo Daalder. Going back to what Mr. Miller said, is there some sort of cultural thing going on here where the U.S.'s willingness to come to the aid of Europe several times somehow condemns people who have European origins to think that that might happen in the future?

Thank you.

MR. STENT: Frank, do you want to start off with that?

MR. MILLER: I don't. I don't want to get into any ad hominem questions. I think it is -- I raised the question in my remarks, and I will raise it again.

People in this room grew up in an internationalist America. That's not the historical norm. When you look at the freshman people in Congress today and you explain to them why we're spending billions of dollars to defend allies, it's not an easy sell. But when you add to that why are we spending billions of dollars to defend allies to put the United States at risk to nuclear attack when allies are unwilling to carry even a bit of the burden, it's going to become a harder and a harder sell. So I think it is important to ask whether the United States will always be there for Europe if Europe tends to turn its back.

I think in answer to your second question that withdrawing U.S. nuclear forces from NATO Europe, the tactical forces, will have virtually no effect on British or French forces, because they are self-sufficient. They're not the ones who are relying on those forces for deterrents. It's the small new members of the Alliance who are relying on it.

Neither, however, is possible for British or French forces to provide that kind of effective deterrent. French forces are independent, they're not tasked to secure. They won't be tasked to secure. The French don't include other allies in consultations on the use of their nuclear weapons. They never have, it's inconsistent with French doctrine. It's possible, but not certain. In fact, it's almost impossible.

And the British forces is a Trident-based force. It's a small force. And again, it does not sit on European soil. It's foolish to believe

that by changing the situation on the ground nothing has happened. Something has happened. There has been a change. The allies know there has been a change. You can explain it away, but they're not going to believe that there's been no change in their own security environment.

MS. STENT: Steve?

MR. PIFER: On France, yeah. I don't think an American decision or a NATO decision to withdraw American nuclear weapons from Europe would impact the French commitment to having an independent deterrent. Although I do think part of the reason why the French would not like to see a change in policy is, a certain nervousness that if American nuclear weapons come out, does that then put their deterrent into more of a spotlight?

On the British side, no I think also the British are committed to maintaining an independent deterrent. Although I think there is a question that they're now beginning to grapple with is, you know, can they do that with replacement to Trident simply because of cost issues? And they'll have to think that one out, but I'm not sure an American decision how that would impact that, you know, British discussion.

The last observation was in -- I just note because I heard it from several British diplomats over the last year. Is when they say -- when they talk about the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, more clearly than I've heard from virtually anyone else they're the ones saying this posture view needs to take a broad look. That, you know, NATO's future

deterrent posture and its defense posture cannot rest as heavily on nuclear weapons. It's got to look at the broad mix of adding conventional and missile defense into the mix.

MS. STENT: Hans?

Mr. KRISTENSEN: Well, sort of rewriting the NRA slogan, I'd say. The equivalent would be something like, nukes don't kill, people kill. Something like that. (Laughter)

But I think if you look at France, France is an interesting case. Because yes, I agree, I don't think it's going to influence them directly, or Britain, for that matter. But I think France has been an interesting case in this round, after the Lisbon meeting, what have you. Somewhat -- very firmly put its foot down to broadening the arms control process to involving them. You know, and sort of trying to -- they're trying to keep themselves isolated for now, based on the assumption they've done enough this round, they don't want to be involved. I hear rumors that they may be reconsidering at some point in the future, the future of their land-based component of their nuclear posture. But that's only from internal rumors.

But more interestingly I think one of the results I learned when I was recently in Europe from the Lisbon agreement and the French position was an agreement that the strategic NATO Deterrence and Defense -- Defense and Deterrence Posture Review would not consider the contribution of strategic forces to the Alliance. I'm not clear if that's

entirely correct, but I heard it from a very high-level source. And if that is the case, I must admit that I think it's a very artificial construct. Because how can you ignore the contribution of the overwhelming nuclear forces of an alliance -- of the member states in an alliance?

It seems to me, creating an overemphasis on just the tactical nuclear weapons that are in Europe. And any adversary, of course, would have to come to some form of perception about what the Alliance would do. Not based on a little fringe of the arsenal that's over here, but of course of the entire capabilities of the countries that are in the Alliance. And so, I think to me that makes the process very artificial. And I'm frankly a little worried about it that we're going to come over in a posture that's going to put too much emphasis on the non-strategic nuclear force in Europe.

MS. STENT: Okay, we'll take your question here.

SPEAKER: Yes, thank you. I wonder if I can have several questions?

MS. STENT: Not too many questions.

SPEAKER: Not too many, oh. I can give a whole talk, of course, but I will not now.

The first question concerns credibility on strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. I'm quite old-fashioned, given -- I can say, conservative. Yes. And I'm used to thinking out -- nuclear weapons can prevent war if they have a credible mission. Yes.

And I do have like a problem with the credibility of the B-61s in Europe right now, because they were intended to be used against the territory of Poland to bomb soviet troops there. So, what's the message now that we send to Russia? Assuming that the plans to invade Poland.

How that if, like, you invade Baltic states then use nuclear weapons against Poland? Well, that's a message. So, yes, I'd like to really hear sort of some discussion about the credibility of these weapons.

Can they be assembled or anything if they cannot be used? Yes, and the military here -- JCS, for example -- do say it. How do they don't need them? So, that's a big question in my mind.

And second question --

MS. STENT: I think maybe can we stop on that? Because there's a lot of other people -- all right.

SPEAKER: It's a very short one -- yes. And that's specifically to Frank Miller. Quite frankly, listening to him I do not understand what we do here. Yes, and who says about the policy, like, of the United States? Is it the U.S. Government or the governments of new members? Because what he really suggests is that we must listen to them and do whatever they say.

I'm sorry about that, but that's my understanding.

MS. STENT: Okay, all right. Frank, can we start with you?

MR. MILLER: Sure, okay. First. What is their mission? Do they have a mission, are they credible? If the question is, do the current

generation of F-16s and Tornadoes with adequate suppression and support packages, could those aircraft reach their targets, the answer is yes, I'm absolutely convinced that they could. Of course they're going to refuel. Of course they're going to refuel. Look at what NATO aircraft are doing to hit Libya today. They are refueling. You know, this is a no-brainer. We know how to refuel, we've been doing it for 60 years, okay? The Air Force is good.

Second, you know, can the military mission be accomplished by U.S. strategic forces? Yes. If you want to use large yield, the weapons will get there. These are smaller yield weapons, they may be more credible in fringe scenarios. But can they be accomplished by strategic forces as is quoted in Steve's paper? Of course they can. No-brainer number two.

But that's not their mission. Their mission is political. Their mission is reassurance. Their mission is war prevention. Read the paper. Allies say we need these weapons to reassure us that NATO will protect us. And I didn't say we need it to be dictated by the allies. But I said we need it to consider what allies say.

John Woodward and I worked for a long time on GLCMs and Pershing IIs. The United States did not say, we want to put GLCMs and Pershing IIs in Europe. The allies came to us and said, the SS-20 has created a deterrent gap. And so the Alliance went through one of its most neuralgic crises in its history because allies believed something was

necessary to close a gap in deterrence.

Right now, I won't do the math. A substantial number of allies believe that the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons is important to their security. We can convince them that they're wrong. We can take the weapons out and see if NATO survives. We can see if they want to build their own nuclear weapons. You know, there are lots of options. But you can't have an alliance which is based on collective security and ignore the views of the members of that collective.

SPEAKER: And (inaudible).

MS. STENT: All right. Do you want to add anything, Hans?

MR. KRISTENSEN: Well, I mean, it's this fog about what the allies think. And who talks to them and who in the allied countries are we talking to. And you know, who do they represent and how much insight do they have? Or -- one person goes to talk to them and they get one answer. Another person goes to talk to them and they get another answer. And then six months later, they go back to talk to the same person, they have another view.

And so, I mean, there are a lot of nuances and perspectives in this. And I think so, it may be that under the circumstances that we are -- you know, that they are involved in with the strategic review right now that they would prefer for now that the weapons are -- some weapons or some capabilities are retained in NATO.

But of course, that doesn't exclude that there is a process

going on here. And that, you know, we're moving on from Lisbon, we're moving on from the strategic concept. We're thinking about these things in new ways, or trying to think about things in new ways, trying to increase the non-nuclear components of the security guarantee, if you will, et cetera, et cetera.

So I think, you know, there is also a recent report that has been put out by a European group that a couple of researchers asked -- also took the trouble of traveling around to European capitals and talk to the people who are involved in the nuclear mission. And they came out with a report that showed a very different picture, that most countries were interested in the removal of the nuclear weapons if it could be accomplished with a consensus decision.

And it comes back to this issue, that we have this monster of 28 countries that relies on a consensus decision. And how on earth are you going to accomplish that on an issue like this? It takes a couple of countries to block that decision.

So I think it's just important to recognize and acknowledge that there are nuances even within -- important nuances within the individual capitals and what they believe about this issue.

MS. STENT: Steve?

MR. PIFER: Yeah, I would -- on credibility, I would draw a distinction between the credibility of the deterrent in Russian eyes and the credibility of the assurance to NATO allies. As regards to how Russia

looks at this as a deterrent, I'm not sure American nuclear weapons in Europe buy us that much. I think the Russians calculate that there is some level of military action against Europe that would trigger an American nuclear response.

I'm not sure that they see that as measurably increased if there happened to be 61 bombs in Europe as opposed to, you know, strategic forces. I think the credibility question more asked -- and I think we've all kind of touched on this -- is about the assurance. I mean, having an American nuclear presence in Europe is seen as assuring to those allies who still worry about Russian intimidation.

And the question that I think NATO has to look at now is, given that I think it's going to be very difficult if not impossible to sustain that nuclear presence, can NATO look at other things? Missile defense, conventional forces, rotational deployments that can provide assurance that will fill in for what the nuclear presence now does?

I guess another point I'd note is, if you look at the East Asia case, since 1991 the nuclear umbrella to East Asia has been extended by U.S.-based strategic forces. And the possibility for deployment, for example, places like Guam -- either nuclear-capable bombers or nuclear-capable tactical air. That model is -- it's hard to apply that to Europe. And I think, you know, some say, well, you could apply that to Europe. And maybe in the end I think, you know, we can do that. But you have to -- and there's just a different history there. And that because nuclear

weapons have been so much a part of the NATO legacy over 60 years, that going to an East Asian model while not impossible, requires that you do a lot of work.

And I was -- going back to one of the comments from one of the NATO member state diplomats that I talked to back in November at NATO Headquarters. And he made the observation, he said, look, you know, if there weren't American nuclear weapons in Europe, we wouldn't choose to put them there. But, you know, since they're here, you know, pulling them out is more difficult. So, but I think the credibility question, it's really maybe 10 percent about Russia and it's 90 percent about assuring allies. And then the question that NATO, I think, needs to look at in the context of this Deterrence and Defense Posture Review is, are there other ways to satisfy that assurance requirement.

MS. STENT: We'll go back there. Yeah.

MR. KUCERA: Josh Kucera, I'm a freelance journalist here. I'd like to ask about specific Turkey-related issues in the DDPR. It would seem that they have some unique positions there, political elite. Their military elite, and the population might have all very different ideas about, you know, their relationship with the United States and hosting nuclear weapons.

How do you see the Turkish position in the DDPR? And the, you know, Washington's and other allies' positions vis-à-vis the nuclear weapons in Turkey?

MS. STENT: Steve?

MR. PIFER: I think there's a mixture of views in Turkey. Turkey is not one that I think is pushing for withdrawal of nuclear weapons. But I think Ankara gets nervous if it sees a course where it may be the only state or one of only two states prepared to host American nuclear weapons.

I think an additional factor in the case of Turkey, of course, is Iran. But there again, I think there's kind of this ambivalence. I mean, if NATO is looking to have a deterrent that is not only about Russia but other possible threats, and the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would be one of them, that nuclear presence in Turkey may have value.

On the other hand, if you look over the last year, the Turks have a fairly interesting relationship with Iran. I mean, they were, by all reports, the ones who insisted that when NATO talked about missile defense it never would say that missile defense is aimed at Iran. So, I think there's a mixture of views in Turkey that are hard to predict how they play out if you see the Northern tier countries beginning to move toward a non-nuclear stance.

With regards to the specific question of Iran is to add two other points. I am not sure that the need to deter a nuclear Iran if that's where Iran is going to end up four or five years down the road, changes the calculation in a lot of other capitals in Europe about the need for an American nuclear presence, bearing in mind that last year or over the last

several years, the United States had to do a certain amount of persuasion with allies to adopt the idea of territorial missile defense in light of an Iranian threat.

And I would think also that if you're looking at ways of having to contain or deter a nuclear run at some future point, I'm not sure B-61 bombs in Europe is the way to do it. I'd look more at things like periodic B-2 deployments, Diego Garcia, and maybe deployments of nuclear-capable American aircraft from the Gulf from time to time.

MS. STENT: Hans?

MR. KRISTENSEN: Well, I just want to -- I mean, those are all great points. I just want to, you know, remark that the Turkish case in terms of the deployment is a unique case in NATO. In the sense that it's the only base where you have nuclear weapons, where you also have a squadron to deliver the weapons, aircraft to deliver the weapons. And there's obviously a whole history going back into the '90s about that, but Turkey has always blocked that and rejected such a deployment.

So, there's a unique perspective of course in Turkey on many aspects of this. So, I don't know, I don't have anything to add to what Steve said. But I want to point out that there is a particular posture in the Turkish case.

MS. STENT: Frank?

MR. MILLER: I think three things, quickly. One, Turkish government has not taken a position on the continued presence of nuclear

weapons, nor have they called for the removal of those nuclear weapons.

Two, clearly any sort of cascade would raise Turkish fears of isolation and raise the question about unhinging the entire posture of forward presence.

And three, the Turks worry from time to time about their allies' failure to remember collective defense. And don't forget that these same allies have effectively blocked their entry into the EU for decades.

MS. STENT: Okay, last question. We'll take here.

SPEAKER: It's terrible this is the last question, I don't know. To be left to the last question. But putting aside the Turkish question, which is an interesting thing in Turkey and Iran and that equation. The question and comment I wanted to make was to return back to Russia.

And it seems to me that Russia becomes in this issue the critical variable almost. The assumption seems to be in all of your discussions, basically, that the reason that we worry about nuclear weapons in Europe and that we debate them in one way or another still, as in the Cold War, focuses on Russia. That seems to be the constant.

And in thinking about broad strategic things, even though we are in the midst of undertaking a defense policy review, that can't be divorced from a larger political strategic review. And what we want to do with Russia and where we think that relationship is going, and what we can do about it, if anything.

I say this with no illusions about Russia, and certainly

without any Pollyanna-ish expectations. But I do think our policies, both the United States and NATO, will have an effect on Russia's disposition and development in the years ahead. It's just a near-term example. Efforts, for example, to involve them in cooperation and for example, missile defense, should have some impact, some bearing on their view of NATO, their view of the West, and where they see themselves in this whole strategic equation. But it can extend much further than that, and it seems to me we need to think about an evolution in Russian attitudes and Russian disposition that in and of itself will have a major impact on the new NATO states. Not to say the old NATO states. And we have to think consciously about the kind of policy objectives and strategy we draw toward Russia to help solve some of this problem. And that will play back on the nuclear weapons issue.

MS. STENT: Thank you. Let me start off with you? Closing comments, thoughts?

MR. KRISTENSEN: Again, I think I'd just bring it back to one of the themes I've been trying to push. Which is that I hope that the strategic review will examine the many nuances of NATO's posture and it's relations with its neighbors.

Based on the variables we have today, on the scenarios we have today, what we can anticipate to the extent possible are credible scenarios for the future. Rather than leaning back on what we used to have, and just because it's difficult to deal with it, we shouldn't deal with it.

That's just a plea to be forward leaning rather than too much rooted in the past.

MS. STENT: Frank?

MR. MILLER: A couple things. John, I think you're right. I mean, what NATO does will have an impact on Russia. I think today, NATO's efforts to lead by example have produced less-than-expected results. But third, there is also a sense, I think, that Russia has failed to lived up to the expectations of the 21st century. That an irresponsible Russian policy of nuclear saber rattling has produced the very fears that in turn are now reflected in the new members and we're calling for continued presence, at some level, of U.S. nuclear weapons. And if the Russians stop the intimidation, that would improve the situation.

I think as a closing point, I would say -- I would start by saying thank God NATO is not the Warsaw Pact. We do not tell our allies what to do and what to think. If our allies have security concerns, we need to take those into account. We don't have to always agree with them; we can argue with them, we can discuss with them. There are people who have spent careers doing so, including myself. However, you have to take them into account.

The second key point is that NATO is an alliance of all for one and one for all. If NATO nations begin to shirk the role of collective responsibility, then the Alliance is ultimately doomed. The nuclear weapons issue is a small piece of that and a large piece of that at the

same time.

And let me repeat again, we don't maintain our nuclear weapons in Europe to further U.S. foreign policy goals, other than the cohesion of the NATO Alliance. If our allies didn't want those weapons there, they wouldn't be there. And if at some point they don't want those weapons there, they won't be there. But that's not the case at the current time.

MS. STENT: Steve, you have the very last word.

Mr. PIFER: Three points. The first one in response to your comment, John. Yeah, I think Russia is a critical variable. If Russia were a more comfortable neighbor, I don't think this would be a very big debate in NATO about nuclear weapons. But there are still some who are not comfortable with Russia, in part because things that Russia has said and done over the last several years.

The second point is, though, I do think that this disarmament by default is a real thing happening. NATO has to think in a creative way about how to manage this. And how to maintain a plausible and assuring deterrent and defense posture, even if it goes to the point where there are no American nuclear weapons in Europe. I think that's going to take a lot of work. I think it's possible but it's going to take some creativity and some flexibility and a lot of thinking.

The third point is, I think NATO has to be extremely careful about how it handles this. Because this is an issue where if NATO somehow finds itself in a position where the nuclear issue becomes the be

all and the end all of the Alliance when you have such a wide variety of viewpoints, NATO, you know, can well do itself significant damage that would not be in either our interest or in the interest of our NATO allies.

MS. STENT: Please join me in thanking our panelists for a very stimulating discussion. (Applause)

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