THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

TO STAY AND DELIVER:
GOOD PRACTICE FOR HUMANITARIANS IN COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FERRIS: Welcome to Brookings. My name is Beth Ferris. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings LSE project on Internal Displacement.

We're delighted to bring to you an outstanding panel to talk about the issues of delivering humanitarian assistance in complex environments or places where it isn't safe. As we'll hear from the various speakers, the report commissioned by the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the U.N. is called "To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments."

It's well known that humanitarian work these days is becoming more dangerous. And in fact, there's an inverse relationship. The areas where access is most difficult is often precisely those areas where humanitarian need is the greatest. And so we'll be hearing about some of the ways in which humanitarian actors have evolved methods of working in situations where it's very dangerous. You know, the increasing danger to humanitarian workers raises a whole raft of issues relating to the way in which operations are carried out. A couple of months ago here we had an event on humanitarian access and we heard from the International Rescue Committee, for example, that today more than half of their operations globally are run by remote management. In other words, in places where it's too difficult to put some of their ex-patriot staff directly.

But issues around security also raise questions about the relationship of international staff and national staff, those who are hired locally. They raise questions about humanitarian principles themselves. Are there principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality simply out of date? Or do they, in fact, help issues of humanitarian access and increase the security of humanitarian workers? Lots of issues

are raised by the questions of operating in difficult and dangerous environments and I'm glad that we've got this wonderful panel of four experts in the field. Sometimes in these programs I add up the years of experience and say, oh, we've got probably 100 years of humanitarian experience on this panel.

We're going to begin with Jan Egeland, who is well known to many of us. Jan is presently director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, formerly emergency relief coordinator through some very difficult years of 2003 to 2006 and has had a variety of other positions which you can read in your biographical statements from the Norwegian Red Cross to Amnesty International to government and so on.

Jan is going to do a PowerPoint presentation and after his presentation I'll introduce our other three speakers, Nancy Lindborg, Hansjoerg Strohmeyer from OCHA, and Joel Charny from InterAction. But we'll begin with Jan.

Jan, welcome.

MR. EGELAND: Thank you very much, Beth. Good to see you again. Good to be here. Good to see good friends and colleagues. I remember working closely with Beth on many of these issues when she was with the World Council of Churches and now you're with the Cathedral of Political Thought. So it's appropriate that you have switched to here.

Now, let me go briefly through some of the issues raised in this report which we call "To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments." And I should hasten to say that the hard work, the 250 interviews, the 1,200 national field staff survey was done by Abby Stoddard and Adele Harmer. I was the team leader and we had a perfect work split. They did all the hard work and I got a lot of the praise and honors for their work.

This presentation I wanted to concentrate on some important trends and

then end up with the recommendations in the report. Now, of course, we're now seven billion people at the planet. There is a lot of progress on many fronts but never in human history have we had such a gap between the top and the bottom. So the top billion, the bottom billion have never had a bigger gap in socioeconomic terms.

There are 35 conflicts on earth. There are 450 natural disasters per year on average. And it's going up. There is, however, perhaps most importantly, an expectation that all of these people -- and this is where people live -- it's actually a map of where people live on the planet. As you can see, nobody lives in my country, Norway. But you have increasing numbers in the south. Africa has an intensely growing population in our generation. There is a new billion people every 12-1/2 years. And it will level off at 9-1/2 billion in 2045.

Now, nothing is more related to the subject that we're discussing today than armed conflict. Armed conflict is down compared to the end of the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War years. These are figures from the Norwegian Institute for the Peace Institute of Oslo and Uppsala University. The most important thing to notice is the wars in our time, in our generation, are predominately internal. That's the red. They are civil wars. And to some extent, they have become internationalized civil wars like Afghanistan, Iraq, and the like.

Now, how are civilians faring in these wars? Well, the data is clear. I mean, wars are less deadly, each war. I mean, there have been fewer wars. I should hasten to say, of course, what happened in 2003? Well, more conflicts because terror, 9-11 and war on terror is one of the explanatory factors. And we have had an increasing trend in conflict the last few years but we're still down compared to the average of the last generation.

Conflicts are less deadly. Look at the '50s, '60s, compared to this last

decade in how many people die per war. Or look at the risk of being killed in war. For an average human being on earth it's never been lower. It's one of the least riskful things for human beings now, is war on conflict.

So how come then attacks against humanitarian workers is up? And that's the whole purpose of this study that OCHA, my old organization was kind enough to commission. Humanitarian workers have seen one of the worst decades ever, the one behind us. It's the worst decade since the Second World War. More than 100 humanitarian colleagues killed per year. And especially in places like Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Congo, Iraq, occupied Palestinian territories. One hundred eighty deadly attacks against aid workers in Afghanistan alone. Many of these attacks, you know, involved many colleagues, especially national colleagues.

Why this trend of more attacks against humanitarian workers? Well, one of them is, of course, terror. This is the image of the day I started out to become -- Beth was correct in saying these were difficult years, 2006 through 2006 when I was -- 2003 through 2006 when I was the emergency relief coordinator. And the first day on the job was the bomb in Baghdad. The 19th of August 2003. It killed our friend, one of my predecessors, Sergio Vieira de Mello and 21 colleagues in the U.N. compound in Baghdad. It was a targeted deliberate action. Al-Qaeda had probably planned for months to assemble a one-ton big bomb to blow up the whole building. In many ways it exemplified a new trend. The U.N. international organization, including humanitarians, has been targeted more than before.

Another tendency is emphasized here with Darfur. This is actually the first image of us coming for the first time in the helicopter with Kofi Annan, 2004, when we got -- June, when we got access, where we had been denied access by the Sudanese government to the people of the displaced ethnically cleansed people from the Fur tribe

in Darfur. One of the reasons we have more attacks is also the expectation again that was supposed to be everywhere for everybody. So a place like Darfur, we saw a build-up of humanitarian workers from a few dozen to several thousand in a relatively short period of time and in a chaotic conflict zone with many actors.

Now, the whole purpose then is through this report which has a lot of good recommendations and good practices to say that risk management has to improve among humanitarians as humanitarians are expected rightly to be among those who need it the most. It's called risk management and it's very difficult from the risk aversion that the U.N. has often unfortunately gone into when there has been a major attack. We saw that after the Baghdad bomb, you know, increased bunkerization of the U.N., increased withdrawal of presence. We seem to see it again in some places today like Libya, where the U.N. is not present as it should.

But it is neither the recklessness of many NGOs who would go in big heart, small brain, say we really have to be here. We really have to be for the people. And let's not really study what kind of a situation it is. What kind of a conflict it is. What kind of conflict parties. What kind of actors are here. And one ends up putting oneself and others at risk. I think Darfur in the end ended up with humanitarians being able to provide a fantastically effective humanitarian operation. The problem with Darfur is there was not commensurate political and security action and these people are still in the same miserable camps.

I mentioned actors. You know, it varies a lot who are the parties to the conflict and who are the actors. These are people we met. Hansjoerg Strohmeyer and myself and others from the U.N. on a mission where I met the leadership of the Lord's Resistance Army. And this is the Lord's Resistance Army. I mean, the Lord's Resistance Army are kids kidnapped in their huts and they end up being, you know, teenage

brainwashed terrorist soldiers. These are the kind of actors humanitarians deal with in 2011. And it takes a lot of knowledge of risk management to be able to act in these kinds of circumstances.

Also, I wanted to mention, go briefly through for many aspects, criminal violence is up at the same time as war conflict and political terror is down. We're seeing colleagues of UNOCD, Office for Crime and Drugs. It shows it's a multi, multi, multi, multi-billion dollar industry, the trafficking of drugs, human beings, and small arms. Wars, or rather major violence, is now in many regions much more linked to organized crime than it is to political conflict.

In Latin America, it's not Marxist guerillas that are killing most people. It's drug cartels and others. And the war on drugs. That is also why as we've proven, as we've seen with documentation in the report, kidnappings very often for money, for ransom, not necessarily for political means, has been the most rapidly increasing risk for aid workers in many situations. Kidnappings, very dangerous, often takes a lot of time and one needs to have a lot of risk management methods to know how to minimize that risk.

Now, I mentioned national staff. One of the flagship findings of the study is that international aid -- well, let me explain what it is. It's a survey asking, does your organization have written security policies and procedures? And you see that in the U.N., yes, there is a lot of written procedures. Some would say perhaps too many. But it's interesting to see that the local non-NGOs who are often really on the front lines who often do work on behalf of international non-governmental organizations on behalf of the U.N., have little training, and they have little policies and procedures. And some say there may be a risk transfer from the heavy international agencies to the local groups or to contractors, truck drivers who end up taking the brunt of the risk in Somalia and other

places.

How do you rate the level of resources available for security? And you see that the more you become a small local NGO, you see that you have poor resources. If you are in an U.N. agency, you find that you seem to have adequate resources.

Okay, finally, Beth, just with this image, one of the big refugee situations over this last decade and the number that was launched yesterday of how many people flee now worldwide, 43.7 million refugees are internally displaced -- two-thirds of these being internally displaced -- need to have help. And we have just a list anyway. The six main findings and recommendations of a report that I hope we can also discuss.

Number one is we believe there is need to return to humanitarian principles as they were formulated by Henry Dunant as he shaped up the Red Cross and Geneva Conventions in the 1860s. Neutrality, impartiality, independence, and so on. That's the old purpose and the strength of humanitarian action.

Number two, acceptance is the way that humanitarians have survived in conflicts and crisis, by being accepted by everybody as being impartial, neutral, there to help the non-combatants, the civilians. Acceptance means that you have to work locally. You have to get local knowledge. You have to present yourself and you have to have -- this is my third point -- humanitarian negotiations also with all sides and parties. You have to explain why you were there, why you have a right to be there, why people have the right to receive your assistance. Vulnerable people have the right of assistance from relief agencies.

Fourth point, which is relevant for Washington, D.C. in terms of humanitarian negotiations, it was and is a major mistake that the United States, the European Union, and even the U.N. Security Council have now lists of who is the terrorist of the day where they say these cannot be touched. This one should not be in contact

with, which again means that the whole purpose of humanitarian work, which is to seek acceptance by everybody and get to the civilians, can be undermined.

Interesting in Afghanistan now that even the U.S. seems to be negotiating with the Taliban, the terrorists of the past. Important to notice that Al-Shabaab is now so untouchable that people can risk money for being active in trying to reach civilians in Southern Somalia. It has to stop. It is in contradiction to humanitarian principles.

My fifth and semi-final point. There has been a militarization and a polarization of humanitarian work in the last decade which has not been good. So two bad things have happened. Donors and others have said we really want you as humanitarians to help us to win the hearts and minds of the people in this region. We want you to be part of our strategy in Iraq or whatever, and we want you to take a lot of money for that. That is very bad for the whole humanitarian field because it's not anymore impartial, neutral, independent. And everybody may then be targeted.

Humanitarian organizations have together to stand for the principles and say the things we can do, the things we cannot do. It is very dangerous if humanitarian organizations now in Libya say yes, we want to be escorted by NATO to Misrata. And it was very good that the U.N. resisted that pressure.

Finally, I think there needs to be more advocacy from top to bottom in the U.N. system in the humanitarian agencies for these principles because if we don't, we will yield perhaps not only in presence but also in actions. And those who will solve are, number one, our field colleagues and number two, the civilian population that we're there to help.

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Jan. While we're being miked up, let me go ahead and introduce our remaining three panelists. We'll start with Nancy Lindborg, who is assistant administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID. She has many years of experience as president of Mercy Corps, chair of the Sphere Management Committee, and has worked on a variety of issues in the private sector and NGOs and now in government.

She'll be followed by Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, who is chief of the Policy Development and Studies branch of OCHA, responsible for advising the emergency relief coordinator, and indeed, the humanitarian community generally on policy issues. He, too, has a lot of experience. He has worked in various U.N. missions and countries as diverse as Lebanon, Sudan, Liberia, East Timor, and Kosovo, and now in New York.

Then we'll hear from Joel Charny, who is vice president for Humanitarian Policy and Practice Interaction. Before that he was vice president for policy for Refugees International and traveled a lot and has worked with both UNDP and 16 years with Oxfam America.

So you're all most welcome. We look forward to hearing from you and we'll begin with Nancy.

MS. LINDBORG: Thanks, Beth. It's great to be here with everybody. And thank you for that presentation. I think you've done an excellent job of laying out some of the central challenges that all of us face.

What I'd like to do is make a couple of points. Then I really look forward to the conversation because you've laid out a very rich, sort of chewy set of issues.

First of all, I really want to applaud the report and the fundamental approach that it really moves us toward, which is more about managing the risk and figuring out how you stay rather than the more bunkerized or leave early approach. I

think this is a critical approach to put out and really move the debate forward on how do you enable that? How do you enable staying to deliver?

Within the U.S. Government, there has been an increased recognition of the need to liberate ourselves from an increasingly more risk adverse position and in the quadrennial development and diplomacy review there are actually five points in there that specifically address how to move forward our risk management agenda. And this is something that Secretary Clinton is very seized with and is dedicated to trying to move forward. So I think there's strong recognition that there needs to be that ability to engage more also within the U.S. Government.

I would underscore the importance of having better risk management and security training approaches. And the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has been one of, I think, the more active donors in supporting and encouraging all the ways in which the U.N. and the NGO partners can manage their risk more effectively. Funding some of the collective security platforms. I think very importantly funding some of the data collection approaches, some of which I think you used for our report. Because without that information and the ability to do the data analysis, we just really can't advance in understanding how to manage the risk better. Getting smarter is critical, particularly in some of these complex environments.

So I think that's -- those are all ways in which we've collectively advanced. I think the remote management statistic that you cited -- what was that? Whose stat was that, 50 percent?

MS. FERRIS: That was IRC.

MS. LINDBORG: IRC 50 percent.

SPEAKER: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

MS. LINDBORG: There has been an increased understanding of how to

do that kind of remote management. I would say that the related issue that is critical to keep looking very carefully at is ensuring that there is a correlation in accountability. And all of us have that concern that we know that the aid is reaching those who are most vulnerable, and that is an important piece of putting on the table when we look at risk management and remote management approaches.

One of the things that we've done within the U.S. Government is formed the Humanitarian Policy Working Group, which is USAID/DCHA, along with State Department International Organization and PRM coming together so that we have within the United States Government a collective voice on humanitarian issues so that we're able to work in a more effective way both interagency and within the U.N. system. And we have very specifically addressed some of the issues that you raised, Jan.

The Libya example was one in which we worked very closely with the U.N. We were in conversation with the E.U. and throughout the U.S. Government to support that NATO not get involved in delivery of humanitarian assistance unless and until it was such an extreme situation that there was no other way to reach people. So I actually think that we've got good movement on understanding those kinds of issues and how they work. And I think the Humanitarian Policy Working Group has been an important way forward.

Let me note a couple of challenges that I think we all face, that both relate to your five recommendations and were in the report. The first is if I look at the decade of where we've had the most risk; it really is in forming countries. According to the statistics that I've got, four countries account for 50 percent of international incidents since '97 and 60 percent of local incidents. And that's the four you might imagine -- Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq. Although I notice in your tables, Sri Lanka must be in more recent years on a relative basis. But you know, so we're really looking at four

countries and I think that as we look at this whole set of challenges that it's worth disaggregating what the particular issues are in those countries and are there specific ways that we want to manage there versus building a set of approaches and understandings across the whole globe.

Secondly, the whole issue of national staff that you quite rightly note is not a new challenge. In fact, AFTA commissioned a report in 2001 by Vic Tanon and John Fowler that really emphasized this issue as well. And we have a real-time situation in Sudan right now that I'm very worried about where there are 30 local staff, relocatable local staff who are stuck outside the UNMIS compound in Kadugli. And as some of you in the room were engaged in, there was a lot of emphasis on joint contingency planning between the U.N. and the NGOs and the run-up to the referendum which I think was a remarkably effective exercise in how we jointly as a community address security issues. Unfortunately, it fell apart somehow just recently with the attacks in Kadugli and these 30 relocatable staff are stuck there.

So I think when the dust settles on all this we need to do a really strong review collectively of what happened to those plans and how do we both on those situations as well as the increased training that you quite rightly note and investment in our local staff. This isn't a new issue and it's one that I think especially given what's going on in South Sudan right now, we really need to seize with increased concern. The criminality and then the kidnapping that results from that is a piece of that, again, where I think our local staff, in fact, aren't always safer than our international staff. And so we need to not make those assumptions as we move into remote management.

The final concept that I just want to put on the table and I know that everyone will probably bring this up as well is as we look at the whole principles of neutrality and impartiality, I mean, first of all I've always been struck that the Red

Crescent/Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct really doesn't talk about neutrality but it talks about impartiality. And I think it's worth really having a conversation about those terms and what they mean. And in the context of environments that are essentially complex development. When you have protracted situations that are well past that initial urgent lifesaving period, what do you do when delivery of acute humanitarian assistance in terms of commodities and supplies becomes no longer in the best interest of the affected population? But to move into what's best for them is essentially development, which will have people on various sides of the issue, supportive or nonsupportive.

And so it raises a whole different frame of security than I think can be encompassed in the straight-up humanitarian set of considerations. And we, I believe, and I challenge us as a humanitarian community, really need to have a deeper think about this in terms of what are the frames that will work. And I'll just put two examples on the table.

The first is in Darfur where eight years on we've had an enormous operation delivering assistance to the IDPs. When I was there in December, the camps that I visited, camp leadership said, you know, we really don't want stuff anymore. We want schools. We want livelihoods. We want assistance with our seasonal returns when we go to plant our fields. We need to be careful that we don't hold people hostage to a political agenda when they themselves may feel that they could move forward with some kind of early recovery activities. I think that's an important conversation for us to have.

And I would say the same in Afghanistan. Just as an example where a number of people have engaged in the NSP. I always forget what that stands for.

SPEAKER: National Solidarity Program.

MS. LINDBORG: National Solidarity Program. And, you know, we need to -- this is again 20 years of humanitarian assistance in a place like Afghanistan and

there's pockets where there is acute need for humanitarian assistance and there are large sections where people are trying to move on with their lives. And there's other instances where you have armed conflict. So we need to be able to disaggregate in a very complex environment and undergird it with a better understanding of what works.

One of the things that we are really taking up in the Democracy Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau in Dacha is pushing forward on having better tools for understanding effectiveness in complex environments because I think we can approach these conversations better if we have a better understanding of what works and what doesn't and be able to say when it doesn't so that you can shift modalities.

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: We turn now to Hansjoerg Strohmeyer.

MR. STROHMEYER: Thank you very much, Nancy. It almost triggered a whole new conversation. I think this last point is very important but perhaps to preface my little presentation with a quote from one of those 1,200 humanitarian local staff that was interviewed; this particular staff was inColombia.And he said you don't come in and pronounce a humanitarian space. You deliver and earn the space. It cannot be based on rhetorical principles; it has to be based on consistent delivery. And I think that's the preface for the study as a whole.

We have had a decade of humanitarian space discussions. Humanitarian space is not something that we've had miraculously at some time and now it's shrinking. Humanitarian space has never been given to us. Humanitarian space has always been earning it on a day-to-day basis through negotiating access, building trust, and ultimately delivering. Nothing builds more trust with local communities than actually

delivering things that make a difference to their lives. If you don't do this, if you're just about rhetoric, you're just much more prone to the danger of being identified as part of a political or different agenda. So that's the basic tenets. It is about delivery. It is about building trust. And therefore, it needs to be about presence. Without being present, you cannot build trust; you cannot make a difference, and deliver. And I thought that was a very impressive statement.

Now, why did we do this study? Precisely for those reasons, to actually say -- that's my little napkin note from the plane. Why did we do this study? This is not a study about the safety and security of humanitarian workers. Obviously, the figures that Jan mentioned are troubling and they affect delivery. But our study is actually about delivery. It's about effectiveness of delivery. And we argue or the study argues that we will only be effective in delivering if we can be close to the populations that matter. If we can deliver. If we can build the trust. For that you need to have access. In order to get access, you need to be accepted by those communities. In order to get accepted, you need to be able to get in touch with them, to build the trust, to take the time, and to know the key stakeholders as well as analyze your risk.

So that's the background to the study. It is ultimately exactly about the point that you mentioned. It is about effectiveness of aid delivery. If you are somewhere in the headquarters outside of a country as we've had in many places for too long a time or you are in Afghanistan in Kabul, this doesn't mean that you make any difference in Helmand Province. You need to be where it matters.

So this study actually has two main parts. It is some of those key political messages that Jan sent or referred to, but it also has a part that I would like -- we have a few copies I think outside of the study. It's chapter three of the study, which is very, very important and is already being used by practitioners. And we now have

Afghanistan plus four other countries who actually with the entire humanitarian country team looks at how to take forward the study and implement some of its findings. It is a compendium of our -- I don't want to say best practices. There are probably no best practices in this area. But there's a range of good practices. You know, where has what practice worked? We cannot leave country teams to reinventing the wheel every time. There needs to be some exchange between the people who have been working in terms of getting access and acceptance with local communities in Afghanistan, in Somalia, in Pakistan, you mentioned Iraq. There needs to be some exchange. What worked where? And where are differences in approaches?

Some of this has been highlighted by the study. So I think in addition to those big messages around humanitarian principles and working methods, I think it is those very practical measures that have worked that actually extend some guidance or provide some guidance to country teams.

Now, I think Jan highlighted this very well in his slides, but just to summarize again. There are four key features in a way around security that we're particularly worried about, which is number one, the deliberate and targeted attacks on humanitarian operations. Deliberate and targeted attacks, be it IEDs or be it at gunpoint. Be it the explosions in Baghdad or else.

The second part is these high levels of criminality and banditry that account for a certain type of attacks on the U.N. It's looting of compounds. It's carjacking and these things. It's the indiscriminate and terrorist attacks in areas populated by civilians which obviously also extend potentially to humanitarians workers working in those environments.

And it is fourthly, active hostilities of the kind we see right now. I know we shall not get into a discussion about the term "hostility" here. But the type of hostilities

active combat, let's put it that way that we see in Libya today that we had in Lebanon in the past where it is important to still deliver humanitarian assistance, even though there is an ongoing war that may even involve airborne assets.

Now, what the study is trying to do around those four security parameters is to really bolster this approach that I think has, at least for the U.N., is too slow for some of us but is taking root, which is to move from risk aversion to risk management. It's no longer about when to leave. Lots of discussions of when is the right point to leave. We've had this now a few weeks ago again in Yemen. We had it in Cote d'Ivoire, the discussions of country teams who feel under pressure. There may have been attacks already. They may have lost even or had some impacts on national staffers. So all of this triggers this discussion about when should we go? When is the right point? Because no agency head, no emergency relief coordinator, no secretary general of an organization wants to have missed those signals that were then later on clear as suggesting you needed to pull your people out and you didn't.

But on the other hand, the study also helps with a certain demystification around perceptions that we have that very often have found the higher the political food chain you go, the more there are simplistic notions of access can be found. There cannot be access without security. We have this almost every day with every conflict where people say how come humanitarians have access? How can you go without military escorts or patrolled by forces and get access? There cannot be access without security. And I think what the study demonstrates through those practices, they're not always but there very often is a way. There is a humanitarian way of doing this. And I think Misrata, for me, without overselling the U.N. involvement, Misrata is a perfect example where a combination of the very heroic efforts of organizations like the MSF or the Red Cross or IOM have actually managed within a range of two, two and a half weeks, to evacuate

over 13,000 third country nationals. And with every rotation of shifts that went into Misrata, brought in medicines and food staffs and water and other things. All of this happening, and I spoke when I was in Benghazi to some of the crewmembers that said it's interesting to see how when we entered -- approached the harbor, the shelling would subside. We do our humanitarian business, we get the people onboard, we leave the harbor, and the shelling continues.

So there is a humanitarian way. And Nancy, what you referred to, there was enormous pressure, not necessarily by NATO but by European countries to say exactly there cannot be access without security. How can you go there? We need to put patrol ships on the side. We need to use military assets to patrol the harbor and so on. And we argued, well, one can never exclude that there may be a very extreme situation where none of the traditional approaches work and you have to resort to absolute last means. But that's a different effort. That's not humanitarian aid anymore.

We argued that the moment you do this you actually turn those very humanitarian ships into targets, in this case for the government of forces. So I think if you look at this, the principles still matter. It is possible. It is possible. Not everywhere but increasingly to delivery humanitarian assistance with the safety record if you talk to the parties involved. And that's what we did. We spoke to NATO. We spoke to the E.U. We want to Tripoli and explained to the government what we were doing. We explained to the opposition that's what you have to do.

Acceptance, therefore, is a process. That's my second point. It's a process, not an event. It's not a one-off. It's not one visit. It's very impressive if you look, for example, at some of the ICRC figures. In the course of one year -- I forgot now what year, 2009 or 2010, they calculated that they had over 500 meetings with about 10,000 actors of people over the course of one year just to explain who they are, what

they are doing, what they are going to deliver, to build the trust and the confidence and the comfort and the knowledge of local actors in terms of who they were, what they were doing, and what they were going to deliver. And I think that is what we increasingly also need to invest. We need the time to build those relationships which, also, as difficult as it may be at the height of each of these conflicts, is also a political crisis, of course, a political issue. At the height of the political pressures, to make donations and for agencies to intend agencies to absorb those donations and get going. But we cannot go in safety if we are pushed too hard too fast or if we actually volunteer to go too fast without having done that groundwork, without building that confidence, without building that trust. We will jeopardize our operations and pay for it further down.

The third part is bunkerization will not work. It is interaction humanitarian. The humanitarian mantra in a way is to be with communities, to be at the local level. You cannot expect local communities to understand that you are in Kabul -- and I was there just a few weeks ago -- in Kabul in some -- I think I had to go through three or four checkpoints with three or four different types of concrete and blast wall until I actually entered this compound where quite frankly if someone hadn't reminded me every once in a while that it was Afghanistan that we were working in, it could have been any other place. You lose complete touch with the population and the population loses touch with you.

And when we were, for example, in Massari Sharif, we were -- we just walked onto the local shrine, which is the shrine where Ali, the sort of father of the Shiites, is buried. We were told that we were the first ones in three and a half years. Well, that is the holiest of the holy for those Shiites. Well, don't you think that us taking note of this and expressing reverence to these things has an impact on local populations knowing who we are? That is who we are. That is what we need to go back to.

Bunkerization will not work.

This is not to argue, as Jan also said, that we're just going back to being cowboys. Those times have gone. We need to get better, Nancy, as you said, at our analysis. We need to do better in terms of threat and risk analysis. We need to bring in security measures and protective measures where they are necessary, but to complement those acceptance approaches rather than to put acceptance behind security and make security the number one paradigm.

My last two points, quick points, is -- and I think a certain emergency relief coordinator said that once I think in 2003, different context, and said I would engage with the devil if it meant that we could deliver humanitarian assistance to people in need. And I think this is an important point that Jan made before. We are humanitarian workers. We are not about the politics. And contacts do not have to happen always in the public. They can happen very discreetly. But we need to be able to reach out to groups like Hamas, like Hezbollah, like the Taliban, at the time when it matters if those groups command control over people in need. And it's the only way to discuss with those people to get to a place from A to B. Difficult issues and we need to do it discreetly, but I think it is necessary. As we did in many places in Africa in the 1990s and the 2000s, people we would not want to have dinner with we needed to negotiate with.

My last point is stop the scapegoating. If we want to have humanitarian coordinators that actually favor delivery, that build acceptance, that build the trust, we need to stop looking for the humanitarian coordinator or the head of the U.N. as the number one scapegoat if something happens. If they have gone through the motions that are necessary and have taken all reasonable security measures, there needs to be an alternative to looking first at whoever is the leader of an U.N. mission to be dismissed. This will only create aversion and these people will not want to lose their jobs. So they

will not take risks. No matter how many times we write this in books, it is the individual scapegoating that ultimately is one of the number one impediments to a more risk management prone organization.

I'll leave it at that.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: Okay. And Joe Charny of InterAction.

MR. CHARNY: Okay, thanks. Thanks, Beth. Thanks to Brookings for hosting the event and to OCHA for taking the initiative to generate this report which I think is really excellent.

I started my humanitarian career working for Oxfam America in the '80s during that spike. You had that little spike in violence during the Reagan Doctrine Wars. And among many stories, you know, so you go to Nicaragua, you go to El Salvador, you go to Mozambique, all in the midst of conflict. And so we're in Northern Nicaragua, you know, in like contra country, you know, during a very difficult time in the war. And, you know, we're, of course, in a vehicle with needless to say no communications equipment whatsoever. And we get to a Sandinista checkpoint and, you know, our intention was to continue on to monitor a project that we were supporting. And you know, we asked the young soldier at the checkpoint, of course just one compass, you know, with a gun basically. You know, is it safe up ahead? He said absolutely. It's safe. No problem whatsoever. Are you sure it's safe? Sure. So we talk a little bit. He raises the bar and we get back in the car and he says when you get back let me know if it's safe or not.

(Laughter)

MR. CHARNY: So I guess that was the reckless period. But I think the point is that it definitely wasn't risk aversion but, I mean, it definitely wasn't acceptance

either. It was kind of, you know, luck, hope, and prayer basically. You know, there was a just a basic trust that, you know, nothing would happen and what we're doing was worth the risk that we were taking and we operated on that basis. And one issue I've been really struggling with since 9-11 is whether the risks have changed or whether our approach to those risks has changed. And you know, I'd be interested in maybe if people want to comment from the audience or have any sense of, you know, are we just -- have we just become so risk averse? I mean, I think that's some of the point of the report is we just cannot be so risk adverse that we're no longer with people, we're no longer assistance, we're no longer making a difference. And, you know, if it becomes solely about our safety, we've kind of lost our way I think as a community.

Now, the approach, the report is very concrete and practical in its approach. And for those of you who haven't read it or are ready to dismiss it as, oh, it's just another report, I highly recommend that you take a look at it and perhaps more importantly, share it with your field staff. Jan and I were talking before the event. I mean, they really tried to make it very practical and I think they succeed.

Now, I'd like to raise a series of points from an NGO perspective. One, on this whole question of principles and then -- or a set of comments that relate to principles and then a set of comments that relate to capacity.

On the principle side, the report recommends highly localized, low visibility approaches to programming as a good overall strategy to ensure the safety of staff and the effectiveness of the programming. And we have to acknowledge that there is a huge amount of donor pressure, especially in the U.S. context, to brand and to demonstrate visible impact. I mean, what the U.S. is saying in Afghanistan and Pakistan is we want to get credit for what we're funding. And that's fundamentally incompatible with this highly localized low visibility program approach. And therefore, for non-

governmental organizations that choose to take U.S. Government funding, they're kind of caught between, you know, a kind of imperative to brand and, you know, be perceived as being part of a U.S. strategy and the need to be low visibility for their own safety.

Now, that then leads to the obvious point, which is broad (inaudible) of our community do take money from government donors, including from belligerents in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. And I think the obvious question is whether this can be squared with adherence to humanitarian principles. And in my opinion, it's very difficult if not impossible. And it's just vital for the non-governmental community to develop and nurture independent sources of funding so that we collectively can make our own choices about where we want to work, who we want to work with, and so on.

The other issue for our community that makes adherence to the principles difficult is that most of our important members with any interaction are multi-mandate organizations that engage in relief, recovery, and development programs, often simultaneously in the same country and even in the same locale. So, you know, again, from an NGO perspective, so when are you "humanitarian" and able to adhere to these sacred principles? And when are you, in fact, engaging in a long-term process where you can't ultimately really adhere to those principles if you want to be effective? Because we know that effective development involves working with local government, working with local actors, you know, being part of a political scene at the local level. And this is a further impediment to, you know, I mean, okay, ICRC and now MSF seems to be swinging back in that direction. You know, they're saying, well, we're, you know, these are the most important things to adhere to humanitarian principles but these are organizations that simply do not engage in recovery or development work. And the entire community cannot become ICRC. So, you know, that leaves an NGO that, you know, understands the importance of impartiality and independence in a bind as it relates to

adhering to these principles, especially in situations of conflict.

Now, then you have the whole question of integrated missions. And here, obviously, these are challenging for the U.N. as well because the whole point of an integrated mission is to support a political process, a change process that is supported by the international community. And again, that's incompatible with a purist adherence to humanitarian principles. So where does that leave an NGO in that context? Well, we try maybe to distance ourselves from the integrated mission and then frankly when things fall apart we expect the U.N. to ride to the rescue. So, as an NGO, so on the one hand you're saying no, no, no, we're not a part of the integrated mission. We're independent, you know, we're neutral, you know, don't get us all mixed up with these political actors and then the minute there's a security incident in the local town it's like help, U.N., on this, come to the rescue. And that's a basic contradiction that we need to recognize and be honest about.

Now, partially in response to all these challenges, NGOs fall into the trap of calling everything humanitarian. And this hampers the ability to be rigorous and objective in looking at program criticality. I mean, one of the good things in the report is to really challenge all actors to say, you know, what is worth taking a risk for? Is it really life saving? If it is, then maybe you're willing to take more risk. But if it's just another project, do you really want to risk the lives of your staff to carry that project forward? And you're not specific in the report about how you would do such an analysis, but I think having the kind of skills and the framework to do an analysis is essential.

And the finally on the principles question, just there was a really good example from Somalia about an attempt to develop a community agreement around certain operating principles, the red lines that would simply not be crossed. And we know how hard it is to keep our community on the same page but, you know, striving to

develop a common set of understandings that basically says, you know, we're not going to do these three things. And if we're forced to do them, you know, such as pay people at checkpoints, for example, if we're forced to do them, we are simply going to -- we are going to cease operating. And, you know, we've seen again and again, I mean, the problem with our community as NGOs is precisely its diversity and it is very easy for external actors to manipulate us. Even if aid-important organizations stand together, if three other important organizations don't, well, it call fall apart pretty quickly.

Then finally just three quick points on capacity. Since we have a donor representative on the panel, I do think donor support for common platforms, security platforms, and inclusion of local partners in security training is extremely important. We have to admit we have varying capacity to deliver security and security training within the NGO sector and that's something that InterAction is going to be working on as probably our main priority over the next year. There's a clear divide between major operational agencies among our membership and everyone else. And you know, we have many medium-sized and smaller organizations. They just don't have really extensive or strong security capacity. And lifting everyone up is something that we're making a priority.

And the finally, the obvious point of just the importance of including local staff in staff care security and other measures, and if you are funding partners, again, attempting to address that question of local NGOs having such weak, you know, security training and security policies and so on.

Now, for me it's obvious that there's still work to be done, and Cote d'Ivoire is the example that I would cite. I mean, there was almost no humanitarian presence when it was really needed and I had the misfortune of sitting in on an ISF phone call. What was the main reason? Security. So the going was getting tough and everyone was headed to Ghana or Liberia or wherever. And I don't mean the refugees; I

mean the staff of the U.N. organizations and the NGOs.

So for me, even more -- in a way, even more than Libya because in some ways it wasn't as challenging as Libya -- there was almost no humanitarian presence in those initial weeks. And again, it was our office was looted so we're booking out of here. So there's still a challenge related to, you know, providing sufficient security so that agencies are comfortable with staying and delivering.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Joel.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: Thanks, Joel, for raising some of the issues which we hope will come out in the discussion. And later some of the panelists may wish to comment on those. I know, for example, that it's often said that the biggest obstacle to humanitarian access is sometimes U.N. security restrictions.

We have time for questions and answers. We have mikes that will be going around. And if it's okay with the panel, we'll take three or four and then you'll get your chance to respond.

SPEAKER: Sure.

MS. FERRIS: Questions. Yes, Dawn. If you could identify yourself with the mike.

MS. CALABIA: Dawn Calabia, Refugees International. Excellent panel. I want to thank you for making these presentations and for the report.

I'd like to point out that sometimes there's a discrepancy between what the United States, particularly the Congress, thinks is humanitarian aid versus what's needed on the ground. And I would point to the International Committee of the Red Cross which had a presentation here a few months ago and basically said sometimes the question is people need water. Most approaches are to deliver the water; our approach

is if we can is to build a water system. And I think that's one of the things we might need to be looking at, donors' understanding of what kind of humanitarian assistance. Obviously, it has to be possible to do it but I think the ICRC's efforts to look at the systems that are needed and not just the stuff is something that we have to pay more attention to.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Other questions? I guess we'll take one right in front here.

DR. BROOKS: Thanks. I enjoyed the panel. Dr. Brooks with ISOA, International Stability Operations Association. And we represent many of the contractors who are in the field with the NGOs as well.

One thing I constantly hear from the companies is that the NGOs are a real mixed bag and some of them are very professional and doing amazing work and some just don't belong there. Specifically, most recently I should say, I heard from South Sudan where there are many, many NGOs that are religiously focused or whatever but the people that they're putting in the field just have no business being there. And if the balloon goes up, you know, they're just going to be, I think, problematic for everyone else. I wonder if you can comment on that. Do these NGOs actually get donor funding to do this sort of thing? Is there any sort of guidelines on what sort of training they should have before they go in the field?

MS. FERRIS: Well, that's a hot potato that we'll let the panelists think about for a minute. We'll take this question right here. Right here.

MS. SEGERO: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Rosemary Segero. I'm the president of Hope for Tomorrow. We focus on empowerment of women and children. Recently we had a very big conference of aid to international forum at the convention center.

My question is -- thank you for your wonderful presentation. Looking at local communities in Sudan, like let's say Sudan or other countries, I think I comment on capacity building because we have local people who don't understand English or anything. If the international organizations can work with the local organizations to facilitate the humanitarian, I think it could be a better way -- like we are a small organization who are interested in humanitarian. We helped Haiti in times of humanitarian. And how can we work with these countries in terms of capacity building with local NGOs in countries like Africa (inaudible) Kenya though? Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. We'll give the panelists a chance to respond to any or all of these you'd like to pick up. Yeah.

MR. EGELAND: Perhaps first on the issue of the mixed bag and so on. Yes, humanitarian action has never been so vast. There's never been so many organizations involved. There's never been so many results either. I mean, we also need to, in a way, take some credit for the fact that mortality is down dramatically in conflicts today. I showed one of the statistics but also natural disasters. So we're actually doing much more in much more places than ever before and that's partly because I would estimate that in my time, since I was the director for Foreign Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross in 1989, maybe there were 50 organizations that we said could go anywhere in the world and do anything. Now, at least 500. If you talk about doing development there were maybe a couple of hundred at the time. Now there must be 2,000. I mean, it's been growing exponentially.

And the point as you very correctly mention is that, you know, there are certain red lines. If one organization or two very visibly do crazy things, you know, in Somalia, Afghanistan, whatever, it falls back on everybody because these armed groups do not answer a group coming and say, no, but we are a new abbreviation. We're very

different from them. They see westerners coming, doing stuff that seems to be, you know, aligned with the government they fight or whatever. So that is why I think the main point here, and it goes to several of the other points also made, mentioned. Is in a way a return to the principles that were born on the battlefield and that we lost a little bit out in part during this war on terror period, for example where both groups and governments said, you know, isn't it actually a good idea that we really try to isolate those extremist groups or extremist governments and use all the tools we have in the box? It looks like a great thing. And you find out that suddenly humanitarian negotiations are not possible and you lose access to potentially millions of people or you put dozens of organizations at risk in Southern Somalia today, for example. It is common sense that you have to speak.

It's not my coin that you have to help the victims at the depths of hell; you have to speak to the devil. That was the mantra in the Red Cross when I joined in the '80s. Not because you like the devil. You really do not like the devil but it's the way to reach the people who are trapped in that terrible situation. You have to speak to all sides to explain that you're there to help civilians. And it's good for them to have civilians because then there's not epidemic outbreak. I mean, it's common sense very often in all of this.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Other comments from the panel?

MR. CHARNY: Well, I mean, on the NGO amateur hour thing, look, I mean, interaction has standards. We have 195 members. Those members self certify against those standards. But there's absolutely nothing that interaction or any other NGO forum can do if the host government allows an irresponsible/wacky/you know, doesn't know what they're doing organization to show up and do things. And you know, I, the way -- so the way I view this question is that we do the best that we can within our

community to build professionalism. And I think the professionalism of the NGO community is vastly improved over what it was 30 years ago. But at the same time, it is ultimately up to the host government in the event that organizations are again unprofessional or irresponsible to set up a regulatory framework that might control access.

And I think there's a tension. Our community is very uncomfortable with government control over the NGO sector for obvious reasons. But I think when you do get the outliers, it's clearly in our interest to have some kind of gonvemrent regulatory structure that could sanction or discipline or expel an organization that's acting against the interests of local people.

Now, on the local capacity issue, I mean, unfortunately, it's almost a cliché. I mean, if you looked on the websites of 100 organizations, probably 94 of them would say that they build local capacity and, you know, it's up to a local organization like yours or networks that you're in touch with to try and identify organizations that are really genuine about that, reach out to them, and try and set up some kind of meaningful partnership. I think what the report gets into, which is important, is that external actors not use local actors to take all the risk. Right? I mean, it has to be mutual so that from a security standpoint, in other words, if an international organization is going to ask you or some other organization to go into a dangerous part of, you know, Sudan or Somalia or even Kenya in the midst of the civil conflict, that has to be done with full knowledge of the risks that are being taken and support for you in taking those risks.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. Nancy?

MS. LINDBORG: You know, USAID, AFTA has for over a decade now put emphasis and investment into improving security risk management at a couple different levels. At the U.N. level by engaging with the UNDSS in a variety of studies and

data collection systems at the regional level by supporting interactions, security advisory group, and an analog in Europe, by supporting collective security platforms at the country level in a variety of countries. That it's really up to organizations to opt into. And I would argue that it's in everybody's interest for everybody to participate. So, you know, partners who are on the ground who see others who aren't, as Jan said, if two do the wrong thing it has bearing on everybody. So I think there is a collective responsibility to participate in that.

And then in our proposals we have a required part of describing your security approach and management techniques, so I think -- I actually think AFTA is a model for donor engagement on these security issues, both in terms of support, you know, the push-pull required and putting a lot of investment into. And I believe as a result and because of other initiatives, the professionalism of a core cadre of NGOs has increased incredibly and in partnership with the U.N. system as we've all gone through these tricky situations.

I wanted also to address Dawn's question on the systems versus stuff. And I think this goes -- I don't think this is a restraint on what the funding will do so much as the critical issue that I raised and that Joel also raised in terms of when is it acute humanitarian endangered lives situation and when are you moving into a situation where it's in nobody's interest to keep delivering and you want to move into enabling some sort of early recovery, even if it's a halfway station between a refugee camp and their points of origin. And so I think this is where a lot of complexity comes in because you are -- it's in the interests of the people we serve to move as quickly out of the delivery phase. And so when do you and how do you bound that in an acute lifesaving time period? It's not a constraint on the funding. We're able to move into that early recovery when the situation warrants.

I would also offer for consideration for those of you who are multi-mandate, the OECD-DAC guidance on state building, I think begins to offer a way forward on the impartiality issue because it really puts a couple of principles out there that says, you know, when states are being built they are locally owned, they are legitimate, they are contextual. So it's not about what we, the donors, want but it's about what is in the interest of that country and those communities. And I think we need to take a hard look at how we pull these two together. Once you are out of an acute lifesaving, people are dying, armed conflict phase, which is actually a relatively short period in most of these situations, and then you enter the protracted phase. And that's a different set of challenges. And I think we need to look hard at the principles and how they relate to those gray periods.

MS. FERRIS: And in fact, some two-thirds of the world's refugees and internally displaced persons are living in protracted situations of more than five years and yet it's primarily humanitarian actors that are engaged with them.

Yes, Hansjoerg. And then we'll have another round.

MR. STROHMEYER: Yeah, just a few points. I mean, I think someone raised whether the security, in fact, was the main impediment to access. The short answer is sometimes I belong to the more impatient crowd. Yes, that's exactly how we fell. However, as we are also trying to demonstrate in the report, security is a necessary part of risk management. So it's not to say move the security guys out of the picture and let us do what we used to do in the past, it is to bring them in in the right manner. And I think that's where we do have a lot of discussions and we still have some way to go but where we do have -- we have made progress. But I think the point that Joel raised in this point is we are sometimes our own worst enemies. Cote d'Ivoire is an example. It was not, and definitely not only, the security people who said you all have to get out. There

are consultations. And so if you have one country teams key partners -- they may be U.N., they may be NGO -- who say in the individual capacity they opt to say, well, for the next two weeks it may be safer to go to the neighboring countries. What are we going to do? No one at headquarters can override the assessment that those operational people take on the ground. You cannot stay but you have to stay because we, in New York, think the situation is much safer than you in Abidjan think right now.

There is a problem. There is a problem that we have to go along with this. We have to put the right stuff. Nancy, I think you said it. In terms of training, we have to put the right stuff in there that is security aware, that is to a certain level security resistant, it has been through tough situations and know how to deal with that pressure that comes with it. We're not always doing the right thing there by our own people by putting people into -- we've just seen this a few weeks ago in Tripoli. We have put people into Tripoli in the beginning that were not the right people and were not stress-resistant enough. In order to manage this risk you need to have the right people. So I'm just saying it's not only the security people that we like to beat up on, there's also something that we need to learn.

The second point goes to that of NGO diversity. Without going into the point of professionalization and so on, just to say 1,500 NGOs estimated at the height of the Haiti crisis, no one can cope with this. There cannot be any reasonable coordination but what can you do about it? I mean, if you look at it's not only the donors, the governments. You have the differences. Governments -- some governments fund key NGOs; other governments have let 1,000 flowers bloom approaches to this because they bank on diversity. And both approaches are sometimes useful. So the point is that we need to find some kind of a coordination system that marries those two things, not to think that we would possibly be able to squeeze all 1,500 but after into a coordination

system but to definitely make sure that those key partners -- be the U.N., be the NGOs -- who amount for, I don't know, 90, 95 percent of the operational capacity are actually coordinated.

And then to look at what diversity and what interesting contacts and access opportunities do some of the smaller provide. That also needs to be factored in. And I thought -- I just met two days ago with an NGO consortium on Haiti. They do very, very interesting work. And I said how many NGOs do you coordinate? They said 15, the bigger ones. Fifteen out of, today, probably still 500, 700. I think that would be a plea to the donors, Nancy, if I could pass that back. We need to just recognize the fact that NGO coordination is a key ingredient of effective coordination today. And we need to have these outfits that we have in Haiti and a few places much more predictably. We need to know the moment we roll out a response, we roll out coordination, we know -- we need to know who are the predictable, pre-funded NGO coordination people who actually know how the system works overall and what their place and their contribution is. I think otherwise we cannot make any progress in marrying capacity with diversity.

And the last point is perhaps on this ongoing and probably never-ending debate on humanitarian versus development. I mean, I think we just have to recognize why in some places it is a progression basically from humanitarian, a graduation I would almost say, from humanitarian to development. In many other places it is just that both exist in peril. And I think Jan said something in his earlier presentation that I think is worth picking up on. You spoke about a right to assistance. This has been much, much argued but I think we are on our way to a completely different system where in the past 30, 40 years ago humanitarian action was very much sort of -- there was a shock or an event and individual agencies would go. Whoever got some funding or had some added value or some proximity to the place, they would go. Today, it is because of information

technology, we know, I have a cell phone where within six or seven minutes I get information about just any natural disaster, anything that happens in the world, GDAXI, whoever wants to sign up on this. So you know what happens. You cannot afford to look the other way. We cannot afford to not know about places anymore.

When Jan started in 2003, we had a longer discussion about forgotten crises. There are no more forgotten crises today. There are only more better known and higher pitched crises but there are no more forgotten crises. And all of this will change the volume. From 2003 until 2010, the volume of multilateral funding that has been funneled through the consolidated appeals process has quadrupled from $2.7 to $2.9 billion to over $10 billion at the end of 2010. Quadrupled. That's just the multilateral funding. This shows you that because of the amount of disasters and other things that we see, climate change and others of these global challenges as we call them, the demographic developments, the impacts of financial and energy shortages on chronically vulnerable people, there will be many more caseloads. And so I think the point there is that we're moving, graduating towards a system that actually needs to be much more fit for purpose anywhere in the world within 12 hours, 24 hours notice. And that requires that many, many more actors need to be involved. That goes to your point that we need to take capacity building at the local level -- not only at the national level -- at the local and at the regional levels much more seriously and invest in those measures because the U.N. will not have the capacity. And I think Pakistan was the perfect example. Twenty million IDPs at the height of the crisis. That is five times more than we are dealing with in Darfur right now. You cannot externally accommodate the needs of 20 million people unless you're much more serious about building the capacity of those countries that we know will be hit by disasters or natural disasters of some kind year in, year out.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. I think we have time for a couple more. We'll take these two in front.

MR. WORTHINGTON: Thank you. Sam Worthington from InterAction. A great panel.

Just a quick observation on Haiti. It was interesting that a coordination committee is about 50 NGOs involved in it. The one that sort of sticks out is that you do have the 15 largest -- the last time I looked it was 93 percent of the resources. So you look at this enormous concentration and then a very long tail. But my question really is about -- because you've done a very good job of looking at sort of the humanitarian community but in many conflict environments we have multiple communities sort of living side by side. You have the humanitarian community with its rules, its norms. You have the stabilization community, which is living by different rules, different norms. You have the development community, oftentimes living by its norms, its rules, Paris Declaration, so forth. You have what I would call sort of the international volunteer do-good community that shows up to do things. And then to complicate things you then throw in the human rights community, looking at issues of justice and so forth.

Having gone to many conferences in each of these communities, each one seeing themselves as sort of the center of the universe, the challenge in many complex environments is how do we relate to each other and which community dominates? Sometimes it's the stabilization community; sometimes it's the humanitarian community. Where I'm coming from I'm more interested in the space that we're talking about on this panel. But I would be curious to get your impressions of how do we deal with this reality of multiple communities in humanitarian crises?

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. And we have one more.

MS. WEISS: Good morning. My name is Cornelia Weiss. I'm a member

of the U.S. Military. And I saw here regarding gender that your questionnaire indicates that there is little to no effect. And then I looked at question number one of your survey and there was a comment area. And I would be very curious to see what the comments were that you received. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Great. Thank you very much. We have some short responses. I know that we do need to leave.

MS. LINDBORG: In case I need to head out, I want to make two comments. One is not a question that just got asked but I just want to not lose, Jan, something that you noted that we have to put a big flag on and that is the criminality aspect as a rising part of insecurity and the whole kind of business mode of kidnapping. And you may want to comment more on that in terms of what you learned because I think that's very important.

Sam, on your comments, there's a reason that the Bureau at USAID is called Democracy Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, and it's very much, I think, because of the need that while we, as a country and as a gonvemrent, we very much have a commitment to humanitarian values and that's something that the American people resonate with probably more strongly than anything else. And we affirm and continue that commitment. And we also affirm the need to look at all the ways in which you can protect and enable the kind of development that brings, you know, dignity and long-term prosperity to people and address shocks both before they happen and then to more quickly recover from them, whether it's violence or conflict or disaster. And so I think the more we find that common set of frames, that common frame that allows a vocabulary and a set of approaches to move forward more in consonance. And we talk about democracy, human rights, and governance, and we're standing up a new center. We're in the process of that at AID specifically because I think it's imperative to draw the

communities together. They don't unfold in separate lanes on the ground with the communities and so we need to take our cues from that.

And that's why I keep bringing up the need, I believe, to separate out what is that acute delivery phase and what are the principles associated with acute delivery in high conflict? Because Misrata is different than Darfur eight years later. And we need to disaggregate the environments in which we're working and therefore, I think the frames follow and the vocabulary follows.

MS. FERRIS: Does anybody want to respond to the question on gender? Yes.

MR. EGELAND: Yeah. Well, on gender I think it would be good if you actually contacted and I think probably the e-mail is even here. Abby Stoddard and Adele Harmer, my two female companions who actually did the hard work going through all of these things, and I'm sure there are many good points in the comments site. We were perhaps actually surprised that it was not more of a gender perspective of the risks of humanitarian workers because there is a tremendous gender perspective from the beneficiary side. I mean, what's happening to women in war and conflict and chaos is just unspeakable and needs much more, much more attention in my view.

Nancy, as you're leaving, I actually agree with you on the point that perhaps governments should perhaps push more actually for humanitarian organizations, relief organizations, one of these four or five different actors in times of war and chaos and disaster, to try to go from the emergency relief phase just handing out stuff that people do not, you know, perish in situations and move to recovery and rehabilitation, etc.

What I think is the lesson here, however, and I -- there is no time for you to answer but you perhaps didn't answer the area where we feel that governments should

not push aid groups and that is be part of our political agenda here. Be part of our way of stabilizing this thing because we have a political vision here and you would be great allies of ours. And don't speak to those because those are on the terrorism list in these few years. And don't do this, don't do that. So in a way, yes, you can push in the area where you say you can push. There are other areas where I think it was wrong really to try to politicize, in my view, humanitarian assistance.

And if you look at the four categories, the humanitarians are in the particular situation that when it's really chaos and fighting and crossfire and so on, the humanitarians are the ones who are supposed to go and deliver to those who are trapped in the conflict and to survive you need to be respected by all of the various sites and you need to be respectful of them. And we then have a problem which we have perhaps not touched enough upon in this panel. For many reasons, humanitarian is very western still. Look at the 10 big donors, including my microscopic western countries is one of the five biggest donors on earth. Where are non-western donors at the same time, because we are also -- it has become a pattern that it is Geneva-based, you know, Brussels-based, Washington-based organizations that are doing all of this work. So the rest of the world is doing development work, reconstruction work, construction work, but they're not in this area. And that is part of the problem also, that we're being peppered really by threats in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and so on. They see us as part of a western agenda. And I think we have to grapple with that better in the future.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. Quick final comment, Joel?

MR. CHARNY: No, I'm going to pass.

MS. FERRIS: Hansjoerg?

MR. STROHMEYER: Just on the gender thing. I mean, the study does look at this and we're going to publish actually the 1,200 national staff that we interviewed

as a separate survey. So what the survey found is that gender, according to the researchers, had little to no effect on national personnel security risks. A minority of those interviewed reported that female staff felt exposed to greater risk due to cultural norms. So that's what we said there but we can, as Jan said, continue to discuss this. The second discussion is, of course, a much longer one on stabilization and everything else.

Just the one comment that I would like to make, it is not necessary juxtaposition but it's one of priority and supremacy. I think humanitarian agencies, WFP was created to provide food to people. That's their primary mandate, HCR to provide tents to displaced populations and so on. If stabilization, if there can be a contribution that can be made to stabilization, for example, Afghanistan, that is good. That is desired. But it is not the primary purpose of these organizations of MSF, of the ICRC, of those organizations to do stabilization in the country. And I think that's why we need to look at those different communities. I think the trick there is not to all make them one and whole of government approach as necessary. It is a question of very nimbly coordinating these things on the ground.

And just my last comment on this is what it shows is when we went to Afghanistan just a few weeks ago and said what is the humanitarian story, very few people could tell you what the humanitarian profile actually was. You had to dig deeper. People had lost the sense of what are humanitarian needs. They all talk about security and access or whatever. That's not humanitarian need. But when you drill a little deeper it is still about those displaced populations. It is still about food insecurity and the fallout from natural disasters that particularly humanitarian communities, agencies need to address.

And interestingly enough, it is over those last 1-1/2 years that MSF and

NRC -- I don't have the figures but they attested to this -- have made progress on access in the southern and southwestern districts of Afghanistan because they went back to establishing a clearer humanitarian profile, delivering against those humanitarian needs, and identifying what they stand for including those principles. That is not against the overall context of recovery development but that's someone else's job and I think that's what we found in Afghanistan.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. Thanks to all the panelists and all of you.

(Applause)

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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