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PANEL 2: EUROPE'S POWER IN THE WORLD:

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## PROCEEDINGS

MS. HILL: Ladies and gentlemen, we're just getting ready here. I'm asking my fellow panelists to make sure that their Blackberries are switched off. For any of you who were at the first panel, our Greek colleague got a call immediately after he had spoken. Clearly there was a bit of concern in the Greek markets about his comments, and he had to dash off stage. So I'm wanting to ensure that we don't create any more political controversies across Europe. I think that's the last thing we need.

I'm Fiona Hill, the Director for the Center on the U.S. and Europe. I'm very delighted to see that so many people are here for our second panel of our day-long annual conference on issues related to Europe and the EU and the consequences to the United States. This panel is focusing on the issue of European power. And we have with us two speakers today who know a thing or two about this issue, and I'm sure that's why so many of you have turned out.

On my right we have probably the most famous representative of the European Green movement, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who is here as a guest of the Heinrich Böll Foundation who are our partners in crime, so to speak, for this conference today. I don't think for anybody who has been following European politics actually for several decades, although he looks as youthful as he did in those early days when he was Danny, and I used to be as a young person watching him on the barricades in so many different places. He looks pretty much the same as far as I can tell. He doesn't really need much introduction. And, of course, the German Greens have just had so much success recently in politics that whoever wrote off the Green movement early on in its incarnation is now I think having to turnaround and wonder whether the Greens are the next party of power in Europe. So there is the power dimension here.

And on my left or on your right from the audience -- we were joking about what's left and what's right these days in politics and Daniel said it dependent on where you're sitting and from whose perspective. So he's ironically on my right and on your left. We have here on my left and on your right, Bob Kagan, who doesn't also need much introduction for this audience but who is newly joined Brookings. After years we've stolen him away from Carnegie, but as everybody knows, Bob Kagan, just like Daniel Cohn-Bendit, is very much an institution in his own rights and one of our foremost commentators here in the United States on issues of U.S. foreign policy and the issues of power.

And we're having this panel against the background, of course, of President Obama's most recent trip to Europe. Today the conference of the G-8 in Deauville has just wrapped up and if the volcanic ash has continued to drift northwards and hasn't crept south, I believe the President is on his way to Poland. But then he could always take a train anywhere; it isn't too far away. But in any case, he's heading off to Poland which is soon going to be having the rotating presidency of the EU, having just finished at the G-8 conference and, of course, having had meetings in London and before that back to his ancestral home in Ireland.

So in the G-8, of course, the big four of the EU -- the U.K., France, Germany, and Italy -- were very represented and, of course, in declaring the fact that European countries are still big players in global affairs. But the question that we're here to address today is Europe, is the EU itself, particularly considered a power in its own right.

So I wanted an initial question to Daniel Cohn-Bendit about this issue of the EU. We just had the last panel on the crisis in the Eurozone, and with the Lisbon Treaty in place in the last year, there's so much expectation that the EU coming into its own rights as a major, unified, player and then the euro crisis hit. As we heard in the last panel, we may be talking about the crisis in the Eurozone for some time to come. And this has really cast into doubt in many courses the ability of the EU, if it doesn't have a strong fiscal underpinning, to be able to project itself as an effective unitary actor, especially as so much informed policy these days requires some kind of financial backing. And, of course, the big debate about now with the Middle East is will the EU be able to step up with a major assistance package.

I've just come back from a week in Turkey where I took part in a number of conferences where the EU project was pretty much flatly declared as finished. Now, obviously, this kind of plays into Turkish politics somewhat, but is it indeed finished as some of the naysayers would have us believe? Where is European integration going to go from here or is this just a difficult period?

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Well, it is a difficult period. This is true. I mean, the complicated thing in this debate is that we don't discuss in our mind historical project. We just say, oh, this year's bad so it's over. I mean, I always said, take the Europe of 50 years ago. And then you say what we have today is incredible, impossible. If 45 one would have said you will have this Europe in 50 years, nobody would say it would never get there. Then you add all the crises, the French refusing the United Army, et

cetera, so I think it's a normal crisis in building something anew. It's not the state, but it's something completely new. The European Union is something that didn't exist before nowhere. It's not the federal state. It's not the nation state. It's not putting state only together. So this has difficulties. And, of course, in crises like today with the euro, they suddenly have to defend? It's not a nation state, but they have to defend common money and it's complicated. Now they create new structure.

But look, you have a federal state in the United States, okay? Is the politics to defend the dollar much better in a federal state than the politics of the European Union defending the euro? I think it's a good argument to compare to see if it's true. I would say the euro is in difficulty because now, and you are right, everybody sees that you can't only make one country to the other; you need a real European budget. And this put the government in problems because do you continue with this budget which is part -- the national budget, give something to Europe, or you take all resources? You have completely new debate on own resource in Europe, own budget, so as a base of a possibility of politics to adjust now the different countries. And at the end, in economy and finance, this is a most difficult thing to bring together. You know, the German are not nationalists. The French are not nationalists. But the Germans want that all Europe thinks like the Germans. And the French want that all Europe think like the French. And in the economy, in finance, it's a problem because the cultures are different. And I think there we are. We are not at every country -- Germany is suddenly to think we have a responsibility if we like it or not for Greece or for Portugal. And the Greek and the Portuguese have a responsibility to say we are not acting alone. We are in a framework, so our way of doing things must completely change.

And to finish, we have also this big problem of wrong financial economic politics. Take Ireland; Ireland was really the example of the neoliberal, get low taxes for enterprise, and the world is beautiful. And it was beautiful. And suddenly you had a crash and now Ireland is where Greece is. Completely different, but you see also there suddenly the Europeans have to think do we need a conversion of taxes for enterprise? Do we need -- suddenly a conversion of things is on the agenda, but this takes time. But I would say so we have difficulties. We have difficulties of economic financial culture to bring together, but all the people who say the euro has failed are wrong. In the United States the majority didn't believe in the euro. They didn't believe at the beginning that Europe could do it. Then they say well, they will do it, but it will fail. So every year they say, you see? It failed. I mean it's a thing that

you can forget. The euro will continue. Based on this, there are difficulties and we can discuss the difficulties. But forget the idea that you will have a Franc or a D-Mark again. This is over.

MS. HILL: Well, that's very good to hear, although we will continue, of course, to keep debating this as we go on.

Bob, we've heard from Daniel that this really was an enormous historical project, and he's absolutely right. If we were all sitting here 50 years ago in the Brookings Institution, we would never have envisaged what we've seen today. And exactly this point, this is a new creation. It isn't a federal state, per se. It's certainly not a nation state by any stretch. And it's not an attempt really to become the United States in some kind of European form. But how should we look at Europe from the outside because in many respects the EU, the European Union, has been trying to exert itself as an independent power in the international context and has requested, of course, a representation for itself in key multilateral institutions. So how should we think about this issue of the EU as a power in the international context, and also how much does that really matter for the United States? Don Kohn on the last panel, for example, said we shouldn't be at all sanguine or take any joy in these crises in the Eurozone because they will have a big impact on American markets. And clearly the perceptions of EU power, with Europe being the traditional longstanding ally, individual set of allies, will have a reflection on our own abilities to conduct foreign policy.

MR. KAGAN: Yes, well --

MS. HILL: I shouldn't have tried to answer the question --

MR. KAGAN: No, no, that's fine, it's great. I'll see if I can deal with the question and the answer. First of all, let me just say I agree with Daniel about the state of the euro and the Eurozone. I think it will ultimately come out of this crisis, and I don't see it -- I've not been one of those, by the way, who's been predicting the imminent demise. I've always said that what Europe has created was a kind of a miracle and something to be grateful for. And as Americans I think we should be grateful for the European Union.

I guess the question we're addressing, though, is what is Europe's power in the world? And I would have to say, unfortunately, the fact that you spent your time discussing whether the

European Union will in fact hold together, I'm with you on that. But that's a long way from Europe will run the 21st century, which is what --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: I agree with you. I agree.

MR. KAGAN: And it's almost as if we in the United States said don't worry, the United States is going to hold together. So don't worry, we're not breaking up. That's not progress, especially not progress compared to what we were talking about maybe even 8 years ago about the European Union and its project and what would happen in terms of its influence in the world.

And I think there are two things that need to be said about the European Union because we tend to pull them together but they need to be viewed separately. The European Union is a project primarily about the past. It is primarily about preventing recurrence of the horrors of Europe in the 20th century. That is the motive force behind the creation of the European Union, and that is why in my view Europeans will not allow the European Union to fail. It is about -- the past is too horrible to return to. Everybody in Europe understands that. And, therefore, Europe, despite all the obstacles and there are obstacles, will keep plodding if not forward, but certainly to hold onto what there is.

But there's a separate question, which sometimes people elide into that, which is will Europe be a great power on the international stage? The fact that Europe will succeed in preventing a return to its past does not necessarily mean it will take on this new function effectively. And I think that's what's in real doubt, and I've always thought it was in real doubt, that the European Union would come to stand in the international system -- well at one point I think people thought it would basically learn how to run the international system, but even at this point, standing along the other great powers in the international system as a great power of equal influence. I think that's, unfortunately, what's in doubt right now. Because setting aside the crisis, and even before the crisis, I think there were real doubts about whether Europe had the capacity to play a role as a great power in the international system as it's currently configured.

And the first problem in that regard is a theoretical one. The Europeans made a bet -- now again, they did this for historical reasons. But as they were looking forward in terms of power and influence in the world, they made a bet that the world had moved into the end-of-history phase, that it was all going to be about geo-economics and not geopolitics, that it was all going to be about soft power and

not hard power. And in a world that is about soft power and not power, that's about geo-economics and globalization, not geopolitics and competition, Europe seemed to be poised to be the exemplar of success in that new international system. Unfortunately, insofar as that was a bet, it's proving to be the wrong bet. The truth is we are not at the end of history. The truth is that we have not replaced geopolitics with geo-economics. The truth is hard power still matters. The truth is we are back to global competition of a recognizable variety, constrained I would say only by nuclear weapons, not by any natural evolution of mankind, and I hope it's constrained by nuclear weapons. And in that environment Europe is now not necessarily configured to act, and it's not configured in two ways: One, it's not configured as an institution capable of enough unitary action to compete with strong unitary actors in other states. It's why Russia is able to pick the Europeans apart on energy. It's why China is able to play one European off of another. It's why the United States was able to play Europeans off against one another during the Iraq crisis. I'm not saying it's a good thing. I'm saying it's a vulnerability that Europe has.

And the other is, again, the question of hard power, which I think, unfortunately, we have not moved into a new era. It's still important. And Europe's hard power capabilities, despite the very encouraging actions of France and Britain on the Libya episode, Europeans' hard power capabilities in relative terms are declining and declining and declining. And so whether Europe is going to be able to compete as a great power -- and I don't, by the way, suggest that that's all there is. Europe has a massive economy. It will wield influence. It wields a lot of moral influence, which I think is important. But I'm not sure it's going to be able to compete effectively in an unfortunately competitive great-power world as it's currently configured.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Can I --

MS. HILL: Yes, please, and I was actually going to ask you, what about this moral level that Bob has mentioned? One thing just quickly to mention today -- I mean, most people may have read about this that we've finally, or the Serbians, have finally tracked down Mladic.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Wonderful, and this was the pressure of Europe.

MS. HILL: And mentioned, and that's what I was going to ask you.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Because this was the thing. You come in if you give us Mladic. So it's not only a moral, so it was also a real power to change a little bit. But I come back to this.

Now look, look, first we have to discuss what will be a power of tomorrow. And I agree with you, it's not only soft power. But you must agree with me that Europe can only be a power if it is both, if it is an economic power putting forward a new form of growth, putting forward ecological and social responsibility in the economy. This is one, a moral power where exactly the lesson of history is a lesson of human rights. Europe failed.

And then I come to the hard power. Europe failed at the beginning in Bosnia for the first time completely. It was because they were afraid of the real moral stand. They put moral stand aside, not to take the consequences of the moral stand. So there you are absolutely right. And there Europe started a lesson, or the European Union -- I always say the European Union, but Europe is bigger than the European Union -- that European foreign policy is not to add 26 now, 27, or 14 foreign policies, but is to find a common ground of European interests who is not the French interest, plus the English, plus the German. You saw it in Bosnia; it failed because the German went to the Croats. The English went to the Serbs. The French went to the Serbs and to Bosnia and neither or both and nobody knows whatever until -- this was the reality until it's true. A part of the European and the American is end of the game.

But there the lesson was on its way and then you have another behavior of Europe in either of some European countries. In Kosovo you must accept that this was a dramatic evolution. You have now -- I would say the problem of Europe now is, you're absolutely right, lesson of the past. But the lesson of the past is not what is now a European interpretation of behavior in now and the future of this. Not only getting together, not only making war between France and Germany. And there you see that the Europeans are not at the level of the treaties. In the treaties it's written, if you are in an international institution, U.N., the European countries that are in must coordinate their action before they act there. Did you see it in Libya in the Security Council? No. So the European today and now we are in an historically interesting phase, namely that the nation state has to understand, start to understand, that to give civil liberty to Europe is to add internationally completely differently. And this is a contradiction, and now you took the example of Libya. The intent of Libya is interesting because it was a French and an English reaction. They didn't believe. They didn't want. Sarkozy didn't want because Sarkozy had to pay very hard his hard friendship with el-Qaddafi two years before. So it was in his own interest for the next election that Sarkozy could come out of this. But in there it was not European. The problem is, and if you



take Libya and if you take Libya as an example, you'll see the French started with four planes. Wonderful. And it was important because it was a first stop in Benghazi. I don't want to play it down. But then you needed the American Tomahawks. And after a week when the Americans went back, they were needed for the second phase, also the American Tomahawks. So you had now the demonstration that the hard power of France, neither the hard power of Britain, was there. And now you have the interesting debate, and it's my position. If Europe wants to take responsibility, not as a power like the American power, not because they want to lead the world, but to play because they have to give answers of crises in the world, then the European countries much go and say we need a European army. We have more than two million European soldiers if you take the 27 together. To do what? For what? So we are now in a very interesting 20 years that the nation state will say our existence in the world is not through our capacity as French, English, Luxemburg, Andorra, I don't know what, but as a common existence. And there you will see that Europe can -- and this is the political fight -- can be in future of power, but it will be a different power with a different way of doing things than the American one.

MR. KAGAN: Look, I don't rule this out. I just think you've got to -- the track record is an unfortunate one because we've had this conversation as you said. We had this conversation at the end of the 1990s, 20 years ago. Was it 20 years ago? How many years is that? In 1999 because of Kosovo, wasn't there the great Anglo-French meeting and coming together of Blair and Chirac? What was it? St. Merlot? And that was when they decided, you know this was not acceptable. We had this European conflict. We couldn't do anything until the Americans came. The Americans did everything, unacceptable. The Europeans need to have their own force, 1999. And I'm personally -- I, not a lot of people on my side of the argument, but I felt all through the next ten years, good, do it. I don't care whether you do it part of NATO. I don't care whether you call it a European army. I don't care what you call it. Just do it. Create the independent capacity. And what's happened since then? What's happened since then is you've now repeated every single one of the problems that everybody identified in 1999: The French and the Germans can't agree, the British are this, the Americans are doing everything, and here we are starting all over again.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Bob, can I tell you something?

MR. KAGAN: It's okay.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: You're right, you're right, you're right, but now take back the debate in Europe of common money; 73 --

MR. KAGAN: Okay, wake us up when you figure this out because 50 years are going to go by --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: No, no, no -- the problem --

MR. KAGAN: 50 years will go by. I heard this, by the way, in 1999. They said wait 25 years. So I think 25 years is coming up. The world is not going to stand by while Europe gets it act together.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: But the world is not going to stand by with the wrong position of the United States who has everything, but now they see they can't do it.

MR. KAGAN: Which is why I want Europe to get its act together.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: I know you want Europe -- I just want --

MR. KAGAN: I'm begging Europe to pull itself together.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: But it's much easier to make it this year in a discussion of how to do it with the 27 European states where -- and this is the difficulty of Europe -- you are always arguing if there is a leading country in Europe who could push it, and this doesn't exist and it is against the European construction.

MR. KAGAN: Right.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: It's a construction, and it's why it will grow through crises. I'm optimistic knowing that in crises you make state forward, and I think this Libyan crisis puts Germany as a kindergarten. Yes, well, it was a reality. It was a childish foreign minister who plays now a very hard -- this in his party, but this was -- Germany decided no politics. And this was one of the problems that Europe had in this Libyan conflict. At the same time, you see the German -- and the Europeans need the Germans in the financial or economic crisis. So we are slowly building this common institution. Now I agree with you. The problem of the European army is one of the most difficult. Why? Because if you have this European army, it means it's a national sovereignty. It's completely been redefined by the Europeans. And this -- you need 500 years to create European sovereignty and now you come, Bob, and saw come on Danny, do it in ten years.

MR. KAGAN: No, I'm not.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Be strong, be strong.

MS. HILL: Well, look, I'll be the barricade here. This is a really big debate about the formation of a European army. Of course, in Germany it's also a major debate about the feature of the German forces, the defense forces. And it's probably not something that we can resolve right now, but it's certainly a big issue that I think in moving forward is going to be on the table. And as both of you said, perhaps Libya is going to be the test case, but maybe not.

But there are some other examples of Europe exerting some kind of coercive power. And we just mentioned about Mladic, and you said yourself that this is the influence of the EU. Now, the Serbian President today said, no, no, it's only by chance that we managed to capture him today. But just a few days ago, Barroso, who was on a visit to the region, actually did read them the riot act about making progress on these issues. So clearly there was some coercive element in there that was the impetus.

We've also got another test with Belarus right now. There was a piece in the *New York Times* there today, another classic line from President Lukashenko talking about the fit of the political prisoners in Belarus and saying that he may probably now consider releasing them because he needs a \$3 billion at least bailout from the West because the anticipated Russian financial assistance is not coming through. Now this will be another test here. The EU, like the United States, has put sanctions on the Belarus leadership. We've possibly got them on a whole host of different players right now, also with Assad and the Syrians. I mean, how effective are these kinds of coercive instruments do you think in the European context? It is a different perspective than Serbia while there's the carrot at the end of that of EU membership. It doesn't seem to be likely of that for Belarus. But I mean, how much can the EU play with other forms of coercive power if a military is not on the table right now?

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Well, I think with Lukashenko you talked the problem. The problem -- he needs the real European power at the moment, the economic power, and he knows that there are limits. And this limits his dictatorship. I don't say it's not a detractor, but we have a tool, much more than we had in the '80s with Poland in a certain situation, a tool to limit if he uses it really strongly. Now this is a debate in the European institution, how strong do we want to be? But I think if we are strong, we can

force Lukashenko to make a step backwards. I don't say you change because you can change only from the -- if the people restart the movement. But this is the power and the partnership politics of Europe must be based on human rights and democratic arguments. And this is a lesson what we have with Libya because you take me -- Lukashenko I say the horrible thing is of Libya is not only the military. It is one. But all our refugee politics was based on an agreement with a dictator. We push you back all our refugees. You put them in a camp, whatever you do, we don't care. We don't look. So we get rid of this and we accept your dictatorship. This was the relation between European countries and the European Union with Libya. And you can make the same argument on Tunisia, the same argument on Mubarak. Now if we get the lesson of Lukashenko that Europeans' idea of a politics-based also of argument of human rights and democracy is the tool to try not to change the world, but to press the world or to press this region.

MS. HILL: Well, what about this issue, Bob? And this is something that you've spent a lot of time thinking about here, and obviously it's something that we have difficulty in the United States as well in being consistent with them. How much prospect do you really think that the EU has for realistically pushing forward on this kind of approach that Daniel is outlining?

MR. KAGAN: Well, I think it's possible, and I think people like Daniel and the European Parliament, which I hope gets stronger actually in terms of its influence because there's a lot of concern about human rights there, more than you find in most of the national governments. I think that is an evolution that Europe can take. This is what I meant by Europe being a moral force. I don't mean that lightly. Europe does stand in a way that nobody else does. The United States is its own peculiar self, but Europe is a whole group of countries founded around a common set of values and principles and that is potentially a great force. And so I'm even willing to say, you know, Europe, okay, it's not going to be a great military power, but it can do other things.

Now the problem is there were two ways that Europe can be influential, and we've now mentioned both of them. One is having a common human rights policy. Now I think it's easier in the case of Belarus than it is in the case of say China or Russia. And what we find, of course, is -- again, and I say this as an American who's critical of our own policies toward some of these countries, so this is not a relative discussion -- but look, it's obvious that Europeans have a differentiated policy and certain

governments are perfectly delighted to take advantage of relationships to sell weapons, to do business. So you want to have a common human rights policy toward China except that you're constantly -- everybody is competing for the trade, competing against each other in fact. And so that's going to obviously be a problem in terms of that. Belarus may be slightly easier. Whether that can take place --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Because it's smaller.

MR. KAGAN: It's smaller. It's not as big a deal. And I would say, look, the great test -- forget about China, China is a long ways away. The great test for Europe is Russia. Russia is becoming a more and more authoritarian dictatorship. Every single day there are elections. This year, which one could pretend might be taken seriously, Russia has signed up to the European agreements on what elections are. Will there be concerted European pressure on Russia to live up to its own stated commitments on democracy? That'll be a very interesting question. I'm skeptical because France can't wait to sell Mistral ships, and they don't want business getting away. So that's one test.

Now, that's one issue for Europe's moral. The other was the issue of European enlargement, which was what played in Serbia. And I remember Robert Cooper wrote, I don't know, maybe a decade ago, and I thought this might be true. That Europe may not have a traditional kind of foreign policy impact on the world as a great power operating, but it could through the process of enlargement play a very powerful role, especially since where Europe could conceivably enlarge, is one of the most important strategic theaters in the world. If it's enlarging to the Ukraine, if it's enlarging to Turkey, et cetera, I thought fine. That's a role for Europe. That's an excellent role for Europe where they bring these countries into the liberal European order of peace and security and prosperity. The problem, of course, is that that has stopped.

MS. HILL: Right.

MR. KAGAN: Now you'll say -- I can hear you say it in a minute -- it's a temporary stop. In 10 years, et cetera --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: No, no, I don't --

MR. KAGAN: Look, the price paid -- and by the way, the United States is responsible partly for the direction that Turkey has gone in. Turkey is responsible for the direction that Turkey has gone in, but Europe plays a big part in the direction that Turkey has gone in by the way it treated Turkish

accession. And if it comes to Ukraine, I mean, Europe has indigestion so Europe is no longer -- that's a great power that Europe has and Serbia may be the last place it's going to get played.

MS. HILL: And, Daniel, can you pick up on this issue of Turkey as well.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Yes, yes.

MS. HILL: Of course, it's a critical issue inside of Germany.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: First we have to make one clear. Europe is not a political unity.

You have within Europe different political forces. So, for instance, the force that I am in, we fight for now I don't know how many years, for Turkey, for the entrance of Turkey, in the European Union. You can say we lost politically. Sometime, you know, you're not the majority. And you're absolutely right, one of the reasons why Turkey has finished the European project. Erdogan has another project. One of the reasons of it is how Europe -- but massively Germany and France -- handled the Turkish question. And why? Because it was an ideological internal discussion. You couldn't discuss with the French government, take Sarkozy, take Metel, the strategic importance of Turkey. I don't want to say they didn't understand; they didn't care. It was an internal politics and when migration or this type of thing is internal, you're out. You can see it here in the state.

So you're absolutely right that the force of attraction of Europe is the force of its prospective of joining the club, because joining the club is a better life. This is easy to say. Now I would say that this debate -- I have an idea how to reopen this debate and where then the national opinion will have a big, big problem to say no. And it's two minutes, but it's -- I think if you take the Middle East and if you take the debate and you see this incredible theater of the Congress with Netanyahu where it was the end of politics. He could have read the last part magazine in every two sentences. They will all get up and say yes, Chicago will win, yes, Chicago will win. Now it's Dallas, yes, it's Dallas. So this was a political level of what happened, but you have behind to say if Europe and if the states, Europe, U.N., wants to have an influence in the Middle East, you have to propose something. You can't only say -- you can't say to the Palestinians forget the return of the refugees. If you want an agreement, forget it. To Israeli, you want security? Forget it that it will be Israel. NATO, Russian, whatever, we put the soldiers there, but not Israeli soldiers in a Palestinian state. It seems obvious. So we have this proposition to say we can fix something, but what is the future of this region? And then I said to the Israelis, if you go to a

really two-state solution, the prospective of Israel will be a member of NATO. Come on, stop -- this is a prospective to Palestinian state and Israeli state, say okay. You go to really two states, your prospective join the EU. We will change a lot of things. We have to change because it must be countries in Europe we have to change this phrase to make -- I don't know why -- but if you say in Europe today, we have the possibility to give to this region an incredible future by saying, if you go to the two states, the two states will have a prospective in the European Union. It will change the lives of your children for the next 50 years. This is a prospective, and you think one German who would say no to this because of the responsibility of history? You see one Frenchman who would say no? We will do everything to do it possible if this is a possibility to make a strong peace. So I think there you have the example that Europe has an incredible potential of conflict resolution that neither have for them for this because the attraction, what it means to join the club, is something still. Of course, you could tell me both would prefer to join the United States. Okay, I agree with this argument. It's too far. It's too far.

MR. KAGAN: Okay, if you do that, you're going to have 10 million Palestinians, right?

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Yes.

MR. KAGAN: Won't everybody claim -- I just want to make sure that you understand the minute you declare Palestine one of the European Union, you're going to have the entire --

MS. HILL: It also suggests that we'll have it to solve the problem of Turkey --

MR. KAGAN: Well, you skipped right over Turkey, which I think was a population issue, right?

MR. COHN-BENDIT: No, no. The problem of Turkey is now. We must understand that Erdogan now has another agenda. He has also -- we really defended Turkey's accession and also we say a modernization of this country. That's a social democrat with a nationalistic view, didn't dare to do. Now we are in a completely complicated situation because Erdogan suddenly had a great power agenda. And he sees his political agenda is to reunify the east Mediterranean. He sees this prospective to Syria, to this, and so the debate that we need for Turkey is also in the Turkish society. If you want, I write a paper -- I wrote a paper years ago. Turkey is in between in their -- and now the problem of Europe, and there is where you're right, is Europe must start also to have a definition of their interest in the definition and Turkey is a good answer to the problem in energy, the error that we made with Poland. I mean, this

was a -- we have a lot of things to resolve in Europe. If you imagine that the former German Chancellor is on the payroll, then you're right with your Russian argument. You're completely right. And that Europe has a difficulty to make a definition of economic relations with Russia, fair enough, and it will. And the political relations, and there I agree with you. I could tell you hundreds of stories why Europe is incapable, is fascinated, by the growth of China. And, of course, they say the dissident, the poor people, and it's horrible, but it's for Sunday morning when you go into church. But the real days all the week, you always forgot with this, so the human rights power of Europe is something that we put on the center of the debate, how we really use it or not.

MS. HILL: Well, one of the questions -- this addresses the institutional capacity here because we heard on the last panel, for example, Beatrice Weder Di Mauro was calling for the need for coordination among all of the various economic, fiscal, and financial institutions that Europe has created along with the larger international institutions. And this kind of gets down to the question of keeping these on the daily agenda, this struggle that Europe is currently having, of creating the institutions for a common foreign policy. Every day we read in the press about poor Catherine Ashton -- and I'm saying poor Catherine Ashton because every day she seems to be under fire from a different quarter -- and then occasionally she gets a little bit of praise. Where all of this institutional back-and-forth has been put on at least the head of one person, but we still have this problem of where Europe hasn't quite got its act together on which institution is going to take the lead on foreign policy. In Deauville Barroso was there while Catherine Ashton I think has rushed off to Serbia to take control of Mladic. So we have this problem here. Does this institutional crisis suggest the end for common foreign policy, Bob, or do you think that we can still get out of this?

MR. KAGAN: Well, I don't think the institutional issues are so critical because that's where I agree with Daniel. I mean, yeah, over time you can have a stronger and stronger institution. And look, let's face it, everybody in Europe would admit if they are -- off the record anyway -- that they deliberately picked two people to run this institution --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Exactly, exactly, and we voted against. We voted against for both.

MR. KAGAN: -- That would not compete -- right. There were all kinds of dashing international figures that they could have put in, Joschka Fischer or anybody like that.



MR. COHN-BENDIT: Exactly, exactly, you are right.

MR. KAGAN: And the European leaders all said absolutely not, that's not what we want. So fine. I don't think that's the big question, but again, getting back to our earlier discussion, this isn't just a give us time and eventually question. There is also a theoretical question whether this can actually be done. And I would say right now, based on the track record, which is not so short anymore, the powers, the capitals do not want to give up power. And whether the day may come that they will want to, I don't dispute it. Anything can happen. The European Union's a miracle. That could be the second miracle. But right now, I would say --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: The third one.

MR. KAGAN: The third miracle.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: The euro is the second.

MR. KAGAN: The euro is the second, okay. So miracles come in threes presumably. But I would say that foreign policy is the last horizon for all the reasons you say because what does foreign policy mean? Ultimately, foreign policy means deploying your citizens and potentially getting them killed. That's what foreign policy means, and that's --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: One part of.

MR. KAGAN: No, but I'm saying at the end of the day, that's why people don't give it up lightly. The United States wouldn't join the League of Nations because they didn't want any other country ever telling them where they had to send their troops ultimately. And there are other reasons, too, and I think that's a problem for Europe. And also then there are egos involved, right? So we understand that. But I don't see any progress in that direction, and so whether you can get there or not at some point I believe it.

And the other question -- let me just raise -- ask you about Germany. Sure you can say you have a crazy foreign minister, you have politics, et cetera, et cetera, but I think that the Germans have been pretty clear about how they view these kinds of issues. Yes, there was Kosovo, and Kosovo was this great moment when everybody thought okay, here's Germany coming back in to play this kind of global role. But I think that as a result of various things, including Iraq, including other things that have happened, I think Germans don't want to play that kind of role. And I mean, here was a situation where if

you had said to me, you will have U.N. authorization, you will have EU authorization, and you will have NATO authorization, and the Germans will still refuse to play, I would have said that's impossible. I can't even imagine that.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Arab League, add Arab League.

MR. KAGAN: And Arab League, most importantly, Arab League. So that I thought -- now to me that raises a real question as to where is Germany? Where does Germany want to go? Because you know as well as I do, there is no European foreign policy without Germany.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: I agree. First, this is a real battle. Now if you take the little history - - you're right if you see Germany and when westerners say abstention, I don't know if you really wanted to vote against, but it doesn't matter. It's the same abstention, you know. Then first one of the leaders of the Greens said I agree with him. Then you had a revolt in the Parliamentary group and in two hours they changed this and condemned and said you can't because of all -- you had the Arab League, you had the United Nations, and then to German look, it's not we, we are not there, you know. So this is the debate that started. It reminded me of '93 Kosovo. In '93 it was exactly the same situation we were at the beginning exactly the same few who said you can't continue like this. But what is now interesting is that for the next year when there will be the election, I think whoever will on foreign policy on this, learn the election now everybody's clear. We must go to a European position, and Germany will have learned the lesson. You can't continue to argue only with your own history because the result of this argument is Europe. So you find a solution. You find a solution to come out of the prison of your history. What I can't understand is it's a prison. And it's for this -- I'm optimistic that we can win the battle, but I'm not -- I agree with you that it's a very difficult thing.

Now on the institution, look at the finance crisis. You have more and more creation of European regulation to control the banks. It's the European going the European way. At the beginning all the countries said no, no, no. It's a nation. We do it nationwide. The Germans were the last to refuse a European -- now they make a stab at European control and coordination, I don't know, but you see that everybody is forced in this crisis to understand that to control the economic or the financial crisis, the nation control can't work.

So I'm not -- and you talk the debate now about the defense reform. Now the Germans will have 170,000 soldiers. They have a big massive financial problem. You can't -- if you say what we need for the world -- if you want -- and if you are Defense Minister, you are obliged to see the world. And then you will see the only solution is to coordinate this in the European way, that we can take part of this, with others we take all. So I'm optimistic that the world, the reality of the world, forces also Europe to go a step forward. Now, I agree with you. My big problem is I'm not sure that the end of the tunnel will be in my lifetime. This is a little problem, you know? But I think they are all force, even -- and Germany is forced to understand that their foreign policy is not linked anymore to their history. It's impossible. You can't do a league like this. And it was really funny because you had this argument on Libya, and you had two big persons -- not big -- persons important or not an important person to argue for an intervention. The Germans argue we can't. Rommel came again. Now you have always the same history, Rommel, and then you have a very known Jewish pacifist -- no, no, no, he's not a pacifist -- in Israel -- who really didn't -- he say you can't let Benghazi take over by -- and it was me -- two Jews who said to the German now stop it with your Jewish reminders. We know, now look at the reality. And I think it's for -- so I think Germany slowly, too slow, but come out of this.

MR. KAGAN: It's not just Germany either. I mean, there really is --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: You asked me the question of Germany.

MR. KAGAN: No, no, I know, but I'm saying -- I just don't know and I don't want to, you know -- but I think -- I really do think all of Europe is living with its history. It's not just Germany. All of Europe is living with the history of the 20th century, and it may take a very long time. But, by the way, maybe --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: The states are. United States are.

MR. KAGAN: Maybe it's wonderful, maybe it's wonderful that -- well, the United States has a totally different lesson from World War II. That's the thing. This is what's different --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Yes, that's what's different between their memories.

MR. KAGAN: This is what's different between us. You know, there's this great -- do you read the transatlantic survey that the GMF sponsors? *Transatlantic Trends*. My favorite question on that survey, which nobody pays any attention to except me -- it's my question. The question -- I didn't ask it,

but I love it -- the question is would you agree with the following segment? Under certain circumstances, war is necessary to achieve justice. Would you agree with that statement? In the United States -- and this was from 2003 when the Iraq war had dipped a little bit -- but the consistent answer is 80 percent of Americans agree with that statement, 80 percent -- 50 percent agree with it strongly. In France 16 percent agree with that, 16 percent. Europe as a whole is roughly 25 percent, but only because the British are 61 percent. Continental Europe is roughly 20 percent, so it's like 23 percent. Americans, 80 percent. Europeans, 20 percent. And this isn't about do you want to bomb Iran? Do you want to bomb Korea? Do you want to bomb anybody? This is a philosophical question.

SPEAKER: And the Germans?

MR. KAGAN: The Germans are better than the French -- aren't better, excuse me -- the Germans have a higher number and I don't want to make any value judgments -- the Germans are higher than the French, interestingly, because the French pulled the trigger in Libya and Germans didn't.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: But when Sarkozy decide to go to Libya, 70 percent of the French say it's okay.

MR. KAGAN: Right, no, I know, right.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: So you have also to say this part of the story.

MR. KAGAN: I'm just saying there is something in Europe that is real, and it is -- in a way, it's a wonderful thing, okay? But it doesn't lend one to think that this is a Europe bent ultimately on mixing hard power with soft power and becoming a great power in the international system. But let me tell you something. I so hope you're right, and I wish you luck in Germany. I don't even -- I'm not even being sarcastic. I really wish you luck because you're right, that's what Germany needs to escape. And if Germany escapes it, Europe will be healthy.

MS. HILL: Well, I would like in the next 25 minutes to put the audience in the hot seat as well here. We've already had a good bit of backwards and forwards, but I'm kind of getting a bit of neck strain here. It's a bit like being in the David Cameron and President Obama ping pong match that we saw and were trying to watch.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: And they didn't play a game.

MS. HILL: No, they didn't. Well, that's the special relationship. Another obsession that we've just gone through and thank God they've moved on to France and Poland now.

So while our two speakers are getting a water break here -- oh, and I'm getting one, too, thank you very much -- let's collect some questions and comments. We've already had a few from the audience, and let's get them provoked again. This gentleman here, and then --

MR. KAGAN: We don't require a lot of provoking.

MS. HILL: No, you don't, so --

SPEAKER: My question is basically to both of them, but mainly to Daniel. Unfortunately, you seem to continue to be a dreamer in spite of the 30 years or so, which is not necessarily a bad thing, but what you said about the possible idea of expanding Europe to Israel and Palestine when you know that Europe already was against even opening up to Mediterranean union. And Germany, in particular, was against it, strongly against it, even the idea of a Mediterranean union. And you know also in the past when Morocco claimed to be the closest to Europe, Morocco was shunned by mostly all Europeans. So this is basically a project, a dreaming project, to open up Europe to other countries when, in fact, you know that the real European country, Turkey, is being rejected. The Mediterranean as a whole is being rejected. Just 20,000 Tunisians, immigrants to Europe, were rejected totally. A population of 500 million could not absorb 20,000 Tunisians. Europe is in a mess politically speaking.

MS. HILL: Okay, great question. Dieter Detka?

MR. DETKA: Thank you very much. Dieter Detka, Georgetown University. Well, first I'm glad that Daniel Cohn-Bendit defends Europe so much and remains optimistic, and I think that's great. But let's look a little bit at the reality. Europe has wonderful instruments. We have the southern neighborhood, the Mediterranean union, and we have the eastern partnership, and we mentioned Libya and we mentioned Lukashenko. And now, look at the reality and your hope and optimism I would like to share. I mean, this is not a question to provoke you in any way, but I would like to share it with you. You know, what doesn't exist on the national level first in terms of defense and capabilities, will never exist on the European level. So that's what we have to achieve. If you want to be effective in a case like Libya, you have to have capabilities. You have to build capabilities. And again, the problem is on the national level. And look at the German new defense plans, the reform plans.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: But it was a fake.

MR. DETKA: So here we go. So how do you bridge this? Europe takes on the eastern partnership and talks about human rights and democracy, and then comes Lukashenko and puts down everything that's decent and that looks like human rights. And what does Europe do? Nothing. Libya? Europe had a decision-making process on Libya. Germany pulled out of even the NATO commitment at that time. Europe, the European Council, got together and made a decision, we're going to deliver humanitarian assistance, and we will even protect it to some degree militarily. But look at the reality? How does it look? It gives Qaddafi a free pass. There's nothing that would change and transform its own plans. The European neighborhood in the south, the Mediterranean union; there was a commitment and Germany, remember, was adamant in making this a European project. Sarkozy was trying to do this more as a southern European project. And then you have this enormous failure to act when the hour of acting comes. And there is nothing more important for the hour of Europe than to stand up for its own plans in the southern neighborhood and in the eastern partnership, and it's not there, and that's --

MS. HILL: Well, we're getting a lot of differences of unified Germans here on the hope that -- and Dieter will. We'll also have a panel after this on the neighborhood policy, so I hope you'll stay and be able to put some of the questions to some of the people who will be on that panel as well. Does anybody else want to pile on at this moment? We've had a number of -- yes, the lady here in the shirt. Thank you.

SPEAKER: This is addressed to Mr. Cohn-Bendit. If you comment, please, whether or not you think the U.S. is trapped in its Cold War history and discuss EU-Russian relations. I think we tend to demonize Putin more than he deserves, and I would like to have some of your feedback.

MS. HILL: Okay, right. We've covered a lot of territory here. Daniel, and then I will give Bob a chance to weigh in.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Well, first I talked about Turkey in my -- I know that my proposition on the Middle East is unrealistic. I know this and you're right to say and I think the future of Morocco is in the union of the southern Mediterranean and not integration. I could give you a lot of argument. We had the argument on Turkey. Why Turkey is so important for Europe is because for the first 50 years we hold Turkey to say you have a perspective of Europe. It was the European Christian democrats who start with

this. It was not the leftists, it was the Christians. The prospective is -- so to be clear on this. And I think that in the time where the world are fighting terrorism, to show that fighting terrorism is not fighting Muslim, was an incredible, would have been incredible why Turkey became so important and then strategically important.

The difference was Israel and Palestine that emotionally nobody would argue against in Europe. This is because this is linked in a positive trap of history. You have negative trap and you have positive. And I can promise you, everybody will tell me it's not realistic, you can't do it, but emotionally it's very sympathetic. When you discuss Turkey, nobody said emotionally it's sympathetic. No, we don't want them and it's impossible and 18 million people and whatever you can have. So this is the difference. And, you know, dreamer, dreamer. Yes, if there would not have been dream -- it's an easy answer and I take it back again -- but without dreamer you would never have had a Europe because at the beginning it was an absolutely crazy dream.

So now all the argument now about capability. You know, when we had the financial crisis, nobody dared to think that the solution we came that the central bank will bail out, as a central bank, taking debt from the Greeks, from the -- impossible. Capability is forbidden. It's even forbidden, and they did it, they did it. They did it for millions, billions, billions. So Europe is building some capability. Now you're absolutely right on the military, but then continue your argument. You have this reform. I talked before, military reform of Germany. You have the problem of France. France is fighting now or discussing now a second atomic big navy, and they don't have the money. Nobody has the money. And, of course, now this debate on the real situation of the state, the money brings one of the solutions. I don't say it must be, it is mathematic, but one of the solutions is rethink all this defense. Look, I will tell you, 150,000, half 70,000, German soldiers. You don't need them. We need 350,000 European soldiers. If you have 350,000 -- how many you have? You have big specialists in America everywhere in the world. How many Americans you have?

MR. KAGAN: 1.2, thank you.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: 1.2.

MR. KAGAN: He's a better specialist than I am.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: 1.2, okay. I think because Europe will be a mixture of soft and hard power, you can go out with 400,000, okay, 400,000 modernized? Come on. If you have 400,000 modernized capabilities, you will be also in Georgetown very happy. Leave it there, but it's of course -- if the duty what you have to do in the world, if you reduce it always in this nature, it would mean -- can you imagine the necessity of the world of today only thought by California? No, if California has to put an army on, they would say which capability they can build. Nothing. They have no money. So, no, I mean -- I want to tell you this is a lesson of the times for the European. Now I don't think this will come. It must come. I think we have to defend this idea to fight for it, and then in 10 years I will come to Georgetown and you will tell me, Danny, half of this was you said is reality and the other half is not. Well, it's progress, you know?

MS. HILL: Bob, do you want to take on any of these issues? The lady also asked about Putin --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Oh, yes, Putin.

MR. KAGAN: Well, she asked him. She knows what I think about Putin. I don't think she wants --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Well, no, no. I mean, we don't demonize him. I think Putin is a terrible dictator. Now you can say which type of politics we do with a dictatorship like Russia. It's an open question, but come on. A man who is responsible for so much killing of journalists, of people and that, you can't say we demonized him. And all this politics was, you know, was an incredible massacre and provoked the most bloody Muslim revolt -- it was provoked by the Russians for years. And I don't want to talk with you about Khodorkovsky and the trial and what happened there. I mean, it is out of the rule of law, out of the rule of law, and then I think -- and it's very dangerous that Russia today in a very intelligent way, said look, come on. We are a democracy. And one of the men who was most responsible for this is the former German Chancellor, saying that Putin is a perfect democrat. Of course, we can go along like this. Russia is a perfect democracy. I will tell you something. In this democracy, I don't want to live. I don't say that we have to make war to beat Russia. I don't say -- we have to describe the things like they are. And, of course, you can beat Putin. Is Putin worse than Yeltsin? Yeltsin was



corrupt. Putin gave a nation sense to the Russians. Okay, but he's as corrupt, is as corrupt, and all the system is corrupt, so quite difficult.

MS. HILL: Bob, on some of the other issues that were raised, do you want to make any further comment or shall we --

MR. KAGAN: Look, I just think -- let me just say a time of economic crisis is not a time to make eternal judgments about what's possible and what's not possible. So this is the wrong time to be asking the Europeans, you know, unfortunately, now's the time to really beef up your military capacity because the problem is that the trend predates the crisis. And the general trend in European military capacity, not only in relative terms, but in absolute terms, has been downward. And there's a simple reason for it I think -- and this is the only thing I want to add, and I wanted to ask you about this so I don't want to get in the way of the audience. The average European citizen does not feel the need for a great military capacity. The average German does not feel threatened by anything that a military capacity can solve for them. They feel threatened by immigration. They feel threatened by forces of the economy. They do not feel threatened by an external threat. And I asked a very senior official, very senior official, when you go to the German people and say this is why we need a military, what do you say to them? And he actually didn't have an answer to that. And if they're saying -- but he said the one thing you can't say to them because the German people aren't ready to listen to it yet is what you said, which is that we need a tool for international policy. We need to be able to deal with the human rights problem, a responsibility to protect. He says the German people don't want to hear that. Now I don't whether that's true and you're going to change it personally. But I think also not just in Germany, but looking around Europe, there isn't a driver for military capacity at the public level which -- let me just segue then into the second question -- what is the European public mood about Europe now? Because -- and I don't want to say that, again, we're in difficult economic times, but you do have the rise of nationalist parties in almost every single European country. I don't know whether Alapat is about to win or not --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: No, no, never.

MR. KAGAN: Never, okay, fine, good -- but you have --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Like the Tea Party is never going to win in the United States?

Come on.

MR. KAGAN: We'll have to talk about that in two years. Anyway, I just wonder whether the European public is going in the same direction on Europe as you're going on Europe.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Look, you're right with the populous. You're right with the populous. You have the true Finn, the true German, the true French, the true -- but okay, it's 20 percent of the population that in a crisis -- and this was the error of all the Marxists that in the crisis the people go in the right direction. No, history shows us that the people go in the wrong direction in a crisis. So this is true. I think that where you're wrong is you can argue in Germany or in France which situation where you need military capability. And this has named Bosnia, Libya, and others you can argue there we need. And we can't say we shut our eyes and let the people rant and it doesn't matter. And there nobody in Germany will tell you that we cheat with you or that we don't need, we need only police. Then they will start to cheat with you, but not because they want to say it's not necessary. They are afraid of the consequences. So this is the difference.

MR. KAGAN: Okay.

MS. HILL: We have a sir here in the audience with the blue tie. Sorry, sir, the gentleman behind you and then you. Yes, the one with the blue tie.

SPEAKER: I'm wondering what you think will be the willingness or lack of willingness on the part of NATO to play a role in future situations given what in Germany or Libya will the alliance hold on, or will it just shrink into a shell of its former self?

MS. HILL: It's a good question. Sir, can you guys come back down?

SPEAKER: I was wondering, I have really enjoyed the back-and-forth, but the question of is the modern force taking over the military force? What is actually your agreement on that? Which one is more powerful, the modern force or the military power? We see personally that it's the modern force, which is taking over the military force. So what's the future for the same kind of policy for Europe?

MS. HILL: You were saying modern force?

SPEAKER: The moral force.

MS. HILL: Oh, the moral force.

SPEAKER: I mean, the human rights and other things demanded by the population, which was oppressed and suppressed for generations, but it took over.

MS. HILL: Yeah, these two questions pretty much related as well. I mean, one thing that I wanted to add was when the NATO question came up because I was thinking about this when the two of you were in the last exchange. It was about Afghanistan. I mean obviously Afghanistan has not been popular in any European countries, but European militaries have been very active within the NATO framework and have taken considerable losses. And although that has resulted in some blowback obviously, it hasn't necessarily led to a complete rejection of the necessity that people saw in the first place of being involved in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan has been a real test for the NATO alliance and also a big question more broadly for Europe. So, I mean, how to tie these two issues together, this emphasis on moral force. Obviously, if there's a withdrawal of or a reduction of the forces in Afghanistan, there's still going to be a large European involvement in Afghanistan in policing and some of these issues that you were pointing out that Europeans always point to. And there seem to be a very strong moral obligation for people to continue to be there. I mean, how much is NATO playing now in these debates within Europe on this very issue of which takes the precedence, the moral force, the soft power, or the things that Europe does very well against the military power?

MR. KAGAN: I don't feel confident about what the effect of Afghanistan has been on NATO, but partly I think it's been on the negative because I think that European publics have become very disenchanted with the involvement. The governments have held relatively firm because they're part of the alliance. I think the reason Europeans went into Afghanistan in the first place was out of -- not because they were particularly interested in Afghanistan. It was an act of solidarity. It was this kind of thing we do like, that one we didn't like, et cetera. And then they've been stuck ever since. But I would say that if anything, in Britain for instance, the taste left in their mouths of the British public is not a good one. And so -- and I personally feel that the United States made too much of the U.S.-European relationship about are you giving us troops for Afghanistan and neglected other things and focused on the things that the Europeans were least interested in doing actually. So I'm a little bit concerned about that, and I am concerned on Libya. It's such a mixed picture that I don't know how to feel about it. On the one hand, yes, you had the United States and Europe working together, but within NATO councils, it was very difficult with not only Germany, but with Turkey as well. And I don't know what -- I know they have given the issue of what is NATO with a Turkey that's going in the direction that you're talking about in? I don't

know. Maybe it will be fine or maybe it won't be fine. Turkey was enough of a problem when all they cared about was Cyprus.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: But Cyprus is a problem about the Greeks at the moment.

MR. KAGAN: I'm just saying, within the --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Don't put this on the --

MR. KAGAN: Okay, I apologize.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Okay.

MR. KAGAN: And my wife would shoot me for saying that, but --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: No, no. I'm a pacifist.

MR. KAGAN: But in any case, suffice it to say that I'm worried, I'm a little bit worried about, the future of NATO and especially as European capacity is declining. Look, British capacity is declining, and the British were such a big pillar in terms of the transatlantic military capacity.

MS. HILL: But this is why Turkey has a very important role in terms of the size of its country.

MR. KAGAN: Well, they have a lot of capability, but I don't know what they want to do with it anymore. And they were willing to use some of their force in Libya, by the way, as it turns out.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Exactly, more than the Germans.

MR. KAGAN: More than the Germans, right.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: More than the Germans, okay.

MR. KAGAN: And on the morality versus military power, I don't see what the trade-off -- there's not a trade-off. You can only make good on your morality sometimes if you have military capacity. It's fine to say -- I'm not 100 percent sure I understand what the nature of the question is -- but the moral force as we've seen throughout history does need to have some capacity to back it up. It isn't enough to feel the right things. And I think in the world today, unfortunately, military power is going to continue to be a critical element.

MS. HILL: I see a transatlantic trends question.

MR. KAGAN: Well, right -- well, that raises the question. Is morality something to be achieved by war? That's a good question. I think Americans and Europeans tend to --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: You gave the wrong answer in Iraq.

MR. KAGAN: You think I gave the wrong answer about Iraq? You could say we gave the wrong answer in Vietnam. I'm not saying that military force is always right, and I'm not saying the United States is always right.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: It's always a question.

MR. KAGAN: It's always a question, but I guess I would say the forces that agree with the things that we agree with have to have capacity.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Was NATO in Afghanistan, too? I mean, the problem with Afghanistan today is the moral base why it started after 9/11 I think was strong. Now what we learn -- and I don't want to say whose fold it is -- but we learn in Afghanistan that wanting to do the good, if you do a lot of error from the beginning, then it became a nightmare. And I think the problem of Afghanistan is not to condemn it, to say let's be clear the error. Why we did things -- the Americans thought arming the tribes -- and now we can start all the debate on Afghanistan -- I think it's -- we have really to be clear that if there was a lot of error, that at the end of the day, it's very difficult to handle. So I would say for NATO, I mean, you're right with all the capacities, but I think the answers of Europe and capacity can only be given by the idea of the European army because they have no money the British. Poor Cameron, he would like to have much more capacity. He would like to be, but he can't. And the German, it's the same. So I think this financial argument is for me a political one. Okay, let's think how to do it without coming back with a nation capability. It's -- I always come back to this, the end of the story of NATO. What I want not today, but I want to discuss is, isn't it the time to make a definition to take something like NATO and to think which is the army capability, capacity, that you end needs as you end. Because I think the world of today is a completely different world, and I think we saw of Libya and we saw everywhere that if you have a U.N. resolution, that what is the capacity and you see the problem that you end with in Nigeria. You see the problem -- I can tell you all the U.N. resolutions where the capability was none and then it was also a nightmare. So I would like once to have a discussion on the future of NATO's need and the armed forces of the united --

MR. KAGAN: That would put a great burden on Europeans if they have to create a European force and contribute to a U.N. force. You've got a real -- this is going to be a powerhouse of a Europe let me tell you.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: But I think first we have to learn to think a little bit bigger.

MR. KAGAN: What was the rapid-reaction force size supposed to be, the European rapid-reaction force? That was supposed to be 60,000 -- 30,000 deployable forces, and they haven't been able to do that.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Yes, but you're --

MS. HILL: Give him time, and I'm sure he'll --

MR. KAGAN: I'm sure we'll get to 30,000 --

MR. COHN-BENDIT: I have no problem with you because the rapid-reaction force that we talk about, when starting in Bosnia there were none. You ask the Americans, I agree with them. I don't have the problem. I say yes, this is the argument why we have to think. And I can only say if you want to touch Europe and say the German have to do their intervention force or the French will never get it. They will never get it.

MS. HILL: Well, we need to wrap up so that everyone can go out and grab some lunch before it all disappears like our coffee cake this morning. In the blink of an eye, the Brookings interns will get it before anyone gets out of here. I'm joking, of course. But I wanted to ask Bob and Daniel if you have any last thoughts on this. Let's try to leave everyone on a positive note because we would like -- as you said, it's always very difficult doing things in a crisis. And this is an unusual confluence of crises that we have now, not to mention volcanoes that keep erupting just when it's safe to fly again.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Then I can go back.

MS. HILL: Exactly. So Bob, do you have any closing thoughts before we break?

MR. KAGAN: Well, the thought is -- and this gets back to the most basic point -- is that we really do need both of us to be strong in all the various dimensions of strength together because in my view, we have an increasingly competitive world geopolitically and, unfortunately, some of those major competitors like China and Russia are profoundly not where we are in terms of human values. And they are shaping the international system because it's inevitable that great power shapes the international

system. And so this relationship is actually critical, and I'm -- we didn't even have a debate. I mean, there's almost nothing to debate except our optimism about the future. And I would love to be as optimistic as you are, but things are different than they were in 2003, the last time we debated, and I'm delighted to be on your side.

MS. HILL: Daniel?

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Well, I just want to say to Bob, look, I agree with you, your sentence what you love, that sometime in the world you need war. And I would give you to say, but before you say yes, think three times. Because if you had thought three times before Iraq, perhaps you would have said at this time, this should be wrong.

MR. KAGAN: Did you think three times before Libya?

MR. COHN-BENDIT: No.

MR. KAGAN: Okay. Good. Thank you.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: No, no, but Libya was a big difference. Libya there were fighting for their freedom and there were millions. It was a city who has freed themselves. If in Baghdad there would be a free city and then Hussein --

MR. KAGAN: Oh, why was there no free city in Baghdad? Because Saddam had killed hundreds of thousands of people over 10 years.

MR. COHN-BENDIT: Yes, but there's a difference --

MR. KAGAN: But it wasn't happening, you see?

Now we've started the Iraq debate, and we're never going to have lunch.

(Recess)