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DAWN OF MODERN CHINA:  
THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINA'S 1911 REVOLUTION AND THE  
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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**PARTICIPANTS:**

**Introduction:**

RICHARD BUSH  
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Northeast  
Asian Policy Studies  
The Brookings Institution

**Keynote Address:**

MARY BACKUS RANKIN  
Author, *Early Chinese Revolutionaries and  
Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance*

**Opening Remarks:**

RICHARD BUSH, Moderator  
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Northeast  
Asian Policy Studies  
The Brookings Institution

AMBASSADOR JASON YUAN  
Representative  
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative  
Office in the U.S.

**PANEL 1: THE 1911 REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH:**

**Moderator:**

STEVEN PHILLIPS  
Professor of History and Director of Asian Studies  
Towson University

**Panelists:**

DAVID STRAND  
Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science  
Dickinson College

EDWARD McCORD  
Associate Professor of History and International  
Affairs  
The George Washington University

ZHENG XIAOWEI  
Assistant Professor of History  
University of California, Santa Barbara

PANEL 2: THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

**Moderator:**

NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER  
Professor of History, Edmund A. Walsh School of  
Foreign Service  
Georgetown University

**Panelists:**

THOMAS GOLD  
Professor of Sociology  
University of California, Berkeley

LIU FU-KUO  
Executive Director, MacArthur Center for  
Security Studies  
Institute of International Relations  
National Chengchi University

RICHARD BUSH  
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Northeast  
Asian Policy Studies  
The Brookings Institution

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. BUSH: Ladies and gentlemen, I think we can get started now. Thank you again for coming to this conference on the “Dawn of Modern China: The 100th Anniversary of China’s 1911 Revolution and the Significance of the Republic of China.” I’m pleased that so many people have come to listen to what I think is a really outstanding lineup of speakers.

And we begin with a keynote address by Dr. Mary Backus Rankin, who is one of the most prominent scholars on late 19th and early 20th century Chinese history. She has written a number of really great studies on that period, and she’s working on understanding the 1911 Revolution as it took place in different parts in China.

So it is my great pleasure in welcome her today. Please join me in welcoming her. (Applause)

MS. RANKIN: I might as well tell you I didn’t quite finish this paper, but I do have a pretty good idea of what I was going to be saying toward the end.

To start with, though, I’m going to start with the end of the Taiping and just do a quick run over that because it really is relevant to what came afterwards. But the end of that war gave way this period of reconstruction that involved both officials and local social leaders and for many survivors required a period of self-examination and reconstruction in a way to move beyond the trauma of the Taiping wars.

The establishment of *Shen Bao* in 1872 was a landmark in the movement away from post-Taiping personal and local concerns towards new

issues that soon arose. Local men who took responsibility for reconstruction then moved into continuing involvement in local affairs, such as permanent welfare organizations, positions in new academies that antedated the war, and *Shen Bao*, which became a national newspaper by the early 1880s, played a very important part in fostering local activities and broadening public opinion.

Among other things, it encouraged nationalism by disseminating news about major and minor foreign incursions. One of the first had been the Japanese brief expedition against Taiwan in retaliation for the deaths of some of their sailors from the Ryukyu Islands. The Chinese government thought it unnecessary to take a strong stand against claims of such an insignificant island, thus opening the way for further conflict.

The next year, *Shen Bao* presented the news of the British interpreter A.R. Margary in Yunnan. England did not take that lightly. The paper published news of all the British demands, negotiations, and naval troop movements.

The next year it informed its readers about the dispute with Russia over control of the distant Ili region, including anchoring Russian ships off Dinghai on the Zhejiang coast. This was also a minor matter, but the newspaper brought out the larger need for military preparations and coastal defense.

Already uneasy about foreign threats, coastal elites were ready to defend the country, aware of the need for better military equipment, and at least some doubted that the bureaucracy would be able to modernize effectively.

These were all minor incursions, but they were followed by the much

more serious Sino-French War from 1883 to '85 and the Sino-Japanese War, of course, during 1894 and '95.

The military aspects of the Sino-French War were less complex. French colonial expansion from Manam across the ill-defined Chinese border led to hostilities that by 1883 had become full-scale battles. The French moved then their fleet north to attack Taiwan, blockaded Zhenhai to keep Chinese ships on the Yung River rather than able to get out into the ocean before it moved south to destroy the Foochow Naval Yards.

The Chinese government was sufficiently impressed to sign a peace treaty in 1885. Within Beijing the war was complicated by furious attacks on Li Hongzhang and others by the so called Qingliu group, who blamed Li in particular for China's defeats. Along the coast, elites led militias, contributed money, and ran the French blockade.

Now, I have previously used the term "participatory self-strengthening" to distinguish views of Jujongese within the province from those of high officials within the government. These two groups might favor similar reforms but with different implications. Official self-strengthening was a forerunner of state building during the last Qing decade in which leaders did not encourage widespread social initiative. Whereas participatory self-strengthening assumed social mobilization and cautiously raised the idea of giving administrative authority to local men and greater weight to public opinion. Elite reformers hoped for a less tyrannical and corrupt government.

The public response to the Sino-Japanese War was in many

respects similar to the social response to the Sino-French. Rumors, militias, individual, and guild donations were part of the usual issues. Piracy increased as did anti-missionary sentiment. Leaders in Beijing were again blamed for defeat, but this time questions were being asked about Cixi role in governance.

The short-lived Taiwanese Republic and the men who sought to prevent Japan's appropriation of the island lacked the numbers and military equipment to prevail.

By the 1890s, there was little distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Jing Yan Xian explicitly related patriotic mobilization and suggested a further threat. Chinese land was being cut up, and the people's wealth was being used for indemnities. He wished that the people would contribute voluntary donations to aid in obtaining voluntary supplies and called together voluntary troops to raise a voluntary army. All those voluntaries were in there in *Shen Bao*. They would thereby save the country and requite the people.

Now during the short period after the end of the Sino-Japanese War and the beginning of the 100 Days, both social legion officials, including some like Jong Jejung, who were very highly placed, undertook a number of reformist activities such as starting to establish schools, some new associations, newspaper-reading societies, agriculture, and anti-foot-binding societies, chambers of commerce a little bit, cotton mills, sericulture institutes, silk (inaudible), debating societies, and more. New journals like *Shuobao*, the Chinese progress appeared, and the large park known as Jong's Garden became a popular meeting place for the new societies.

Now as you probably all know very well, during 1897 Hunan became another center of reformist activity with encourage of Governor Jinboa Jin. Yung enthusiasts like Tang Si Jong, Tan Si Tung pushed reform and the retired Jiangsu education commissioner Wang Hung Jian advocated investment in commercial projects. He also encouraged students to read *Shuobao* and more boldly suggested the establishment of the Academy of Current Affairs with Yong Xichou as dean of Chinese studies.

After this modest beginning, the educational reform soon became more radical. By the end of 1897, the School of Current Affairs was in the hands of young scholars who had been invited to Changsha and who were also involved in publishing a new Hunan journal.

By the end of the year, the writings were supporting the controversial Qonguwei and had an anti-Manchu tone. Then of course climax at that point was that in early 1898, the South China study, (Chinese term), was established along with the *Shen Bao*, which published many of the study society debates, and these include ideas of parliamentary government, people's rights, and people's parties along with other things.

Yung suggested that Hunan should prepare for independence. This seems to have meant gaining understanding of how self-government worked, not separation from the Ching. And at this point many new societies were appearing within the province that may have been indicative of intentions to create basics leading to creation of a provincial assembly. That didn't happen.

Whatever the case, Jong Chidung and more conservative gentry like

Wang Shin Tien had had enough. Jinboa Jin was replaced as governor. The South China Study Society was closed, and the Hunan journal ceased publication. The reformers responsible for the brief experiment left Hunan.

So we get then to the 100 days, which this 100 days of reform begun in mid-June after (inaudible) with the Guangxi Emperor and ended on September 21, 1898, when Zhexi with the support of Yuan Shikai and others executed a coup. Regrettably this coup had been precipitated by Jong Tsejung, who had called on Yuan Shikai and asked if he would join in removing Cixi from her continued supervision of Guangxu.

Now what Tang had in mind doing that I just hesitate to say. Not surprisingly Yuan told Cixi about Tang's plan. The emperor's political power was transferred back to her. A few changes had effectively been put into place before Cixi's coup, so very little had actually changed. However, Tang's (inaudible) move resulted in his immediate execution along with five others who some of whom had seemingly had not been involved at all.

After that extreme conservatives maneuvered to gain power within the court and ushered in about two years of extraordinary political instability. The announcement on January 24, 1900, that Prince Tuan's son Pujun was to be the heir apparent immediately aroused fears that Guangxu was about to be deposed.

The resulting protests were not limited to officials. Clear evidence that public opinion could now sometimes be expressed came from a telegram of 1,231 signatures collected by the Shanghai director Imperial Telegraph Administration, Ching Yung Chan, who was well known by elites and Jungxi and



Jujong. I really like that guy.

Somewhat astonishingly, Ching's bold move ended further open discussion of that possibility. However, high-ranking Manchus were replacing Chinese officials. Gongyi spent six months traveling around South China to demand payments from the governments, the provincial governments, and to also look for hidden enemies. Yong Xichun and Kang Youwei had long fled to Japan.

So I am going to skip over the Boxer Rebellion pretty much because I think you've all heard of that. So the next step after the Boxer Rebellion was pretty much taken care of was a revolutionary rising by Tang Sai Chung made in contact with central (inaudible).

In the last winter of 1900, he established the independent society. That summer he took another step by establishing a national assembly, Guo Wei, which held two meetings in Jong's Garden in Shanghai on July 26th and 30th. At this time, also, a lot of people were holding meetings in Jong's Garden, some of them who knew Tang Sai Chung and I think knew about his plans, but who were not particularly anxious to be a part of them.

Jong Tsetung urged Tang to flee, but he did not. The revolt was definitely not a success, and this is why Jong Tsetung had urged to Tang flee. Tang told Jong Tsetung that the revolt was an alliance of followers of Kang Youwei. Jong then took measures to crush the conspiracy, had all 20 men who had been captured executed, including Tang. Quite a number of these were students, some of who Jong Tsetung knew, but he was determined to stamp out this kind of behavior.

After that first set of executions, more rebels were caught and executed. It seems probable that the severity was because the rebels were part of a branch Guo Wei and also believed that there was an alliance between Kang Youwei's Boa Wanwei and Sun's revolutionaries, which there was not.

By 1901, the worst of the danger had past. Students were being sent to school in Japan. The Shanghai Educational Association and Patriotic School with Zi Yon Pei as principal and the Patriotic Girls School attracted numerous students who devoted a good deal of time to military drill and calisthenics. And this radical complex also acquired the newspaper *Subao* that reached students in a number of cities.

The in the spring of 1903, a rumor was circulated that Guangxi governor, Wang Jejung, had asked for French troops to suppress a persistent secret society rebellion in Guangxi in return for mining and railway systems. At the same time there was news of Russian troops in Manchuria seeking to control mining interests in Northern Manchuria. As a result, mass meetings attracting many students from Shanghai students were held in the well-known Jong's Garden.

At this point the growing radicalism of student circles caused a rift between the reformers and revolutionaries. Students began to distribute revolutionary literature along the Yangtze, and during the spring *Subao* also became increasingly radicalized to the extent of advocating killing Manchus and publishing a review of Zou Rong's famous revolutionary army.

As is well known, the result of all the turmoil at schools was that officials closed the Patriotic School in June, arrested a few of those at the school,

including Jong Ping Ling and Zou Rong. The Shanghai officials have been extremely reluctant to take action against this group, but eventually had to do so. In the end, Jong was sentenced to three years in jail and Zou to two. For, I think, unknown reasons still, Zou died before being released.

After that revolutionaries continued to come to or pass through Shanghai, but it was not really as much of a revolutionary center. It was perhaps too close to Japan where revolutionaries and other Chinese came for good military or other educations before seeking employment in the new schools and army brigades being established back home. Moreover, Shanghai was a very protean city where such organizations as new schools and chambers of commerce were beginning to play a part or would soon be beginning to. Before long it would become a center for major political movements like the 1905 protest against the American government's decision to prevent Chinese from entering the United States and the long drawn out fight over local control of construction of a railway between Shanghai and Hangzhou.

There are also many cultural, artistic, and intellectual attractions for those less interested in politics. The literary southern society was one such example. It had been established in late 1909 and continued into the Republic. Some members were still politically active, some were not, and others came and went. What did happen was that many more students now went to school in Japan, either being sent by the government or on their own, and this meant they were often in close contact with one another and thereby might encourage each other to form groups to protest specific complaints. This happened in the spring

of 1903 when students, inflamed over the problems of Russian behavior in Manchuria, undertook to form an anti-Russian volunteer corps. They bombarded Yun Shi Cai and Beijing with telegrams expressing their intentions of stopping Russian encroachment. Meanwhile, students in Tokyo were drilling their small student army, but soon the Japanese foreign office made it clear that they would not be allowed to train militarily on Japanese soil. Finally they sent two student representatives to see Nu Yon who not surprisingly said he didn't want to see them. The final result was that students' views shifted further toward anti-Manchuism. At a meeting in July they remade their association into a secret, radical organization. About half the members left. Those who remained maintained their secrecy and concentrated on overthrowing the Qing.

There was one more major disagreement between students and Japanese educational officials who drew up a list of regulations to better control their behavior. After months of discussion, agreement was reached. The issue was settled amicably, though unfortunately not before Jen Ten Kwa drowned himself after reading derogatory articles about Chinese students in the Japanese press. After the Tan Mon Hoy was established, students were given more encouragement to return to China and continue revolutionary work in schools, new armies, or various associations. More than in any other province, revolutionaries who looked to Sun Yat-sen launched a long series of uprisings beginning in 1895 and ending with the Canton revolt of April 17, 1911. Depending on how one counts, there were 12 attempts altogether. Sun Yat-sen was given credit for many, but was seldom involved in fighting, which frequently

fell to wan shing. Some of these attempts were called off at the last minute; others ended very quickly. The fighters still taking part were mostly members of secret societies, usually goo lay way, or sometimes from the aggrieved local populous. The most important efforts were in the ping yo lee uprising on the Junsei-Hunan border. That was really the closest to a good attempt.

Then there was wan shing's resultant unlikely attempt to end French incursions into China from Annon. The British led him into a longer effort to gain followers in the countryside of western gwang chi and a futile effort to win support of two army officers who never committed to the tong wong way. Finally, the much lauded new army mutiny on April 27 might have had a significant outcome, but again there was confusion over the timing that gave the government troops a chance to gain control. Seventy-two soldiers were captured and executed. The gwang doon revolutionaries were so weakened that they did not revolt again until I think the second revolution.

Gwang doon was, of course, not the only province to start building up its military, but most other provinces did so under governmental leadership. They were one part of a concerted reform movement after 1902 that arose both within the Shing government and in society to establish a hierarchy of new schools, chambers of commerce, self-government schools to prepare people for local councils to be established near the end of the decade, also agricultural societies and, of course, military schools to complete the listing.

My purpose in this paper is to look at the new schools and chambers -- well, one purpose in this paper is to look at the new schools and

chambers of commerce that were encouraged by the Shing, but were often established and controlled by the prestigious, wealthy, merchants and gentry.

There are two books that are particularly useful for this topic, one by (French) which was published at the (French) in Paris. And then (French) has a book with a title of *Associational Networks and Sociopolitical Change* -- or he may have changed that a little bit -- which is being published by Stanford University Press and will probably be out in July.

Shau Plan argues that the Jung Su education leaders headed by Jong Jen tended to accept ideas and duties, especially the rights of society to dispose of their own what he calls goods, thereby promoting reform of culture and the rights of the people. Popular opinion was radicalized. Only educational progress and local autonomy could save China. Rights of the people tended to be more identified with reform. And at the same time, Darwinist principles stressed the need for a state that could compete against other countries.

Then at this time there was beginning to be also a thought of provincial assemblies within China that would offer at this point a hope that would offer a way to communicate between the state and the people. The schools became part of a new arena of local influence. In 1905, Jong Jen created bureaus of education that in 1906 were renamed (Chinese). The press gave education a lot of coverage. Merchants financed new schools founded by gentry and then started to finance their own organizations. Lower Jung See commercial development already had done much to bring together merchant lifestyles and values. Confidence was so strong that in the general education association --

okay, that the general education association was established with Jung Jen as President in 1906, even before he requested permission from Beijing and the provincial government of Jung Sun. Many in the new educational associations claimed semi-official functions, which initiated a division of power between monarchy at the top and local social government below. Local autonomy to them meant right to protect local interests. The Jung Soo educational association had a central place in promoting reform culture and rights of the people. Directors of the association promoted the society to study constitutional government and the (Chinese).

The chambers of commerce studied by Jung Chin had a good deal in common with the Jung See educational association that began to be established a few years sooner. But they, too, had contacts and interests that went beyond commerce, and they were much involved in the protests against exclusion of Chinese from America, the Jung Soo Gi Jan railway movement, and the issues in constitutional reforms. The chambers also established a strong, three-tiered, hierarchy in which there were a few roughly equal chambers of commerce at the top followed by secondary ones in the prefectures, and a third-level one in counties or large towns. Changes of chambers of commerce also proliferated in Ju Jong, although not to the same extent as in Jung Soo.

At about the same time, gentry and merchants began a series of demonstrations against the insulting American-Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904 and also about earlier agreements with America to build a railway from Canton to Hong Ko, and England to build one between Nun Jing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou.

After America pulled out of Canton, the railway was reconstructed without too much trouble. However, soon thereafter huge protests began against the Exclusion Act, particularly in Shanghai and Canton. In May 1905 the Shanghai chamber of commerce announced a boycott of American goods, although it was put off for two months to allow time for negotiation. Not surprisingly, the United States government did not back down, and boycotts began in Shanghai and Canton in late July. A large movement took place in Shanghai, after which a Chinese man named Fung Chou Way, who had been living in the Philippines, committed suicide in front of the American Consulate. The boycott was still more pronounced in Canton and some other coastal cities of gwang doon.

By the end of the year it had begun to fade, but still had much support in Canton. Moreover, there was a considerable amount of support of poorer households who were willing to avoid certain products to help in the protest. There's not much information about this because I guess they didn't write themselves up for the newspapers. But you keep stumbling upon this kind of activity from we'll say the lower classes, so it did exist. The boycott ended by November in most places, but it kept being revived in Canton until the end of 1906. The largest revival there occurred in July when the remains of the boycott martyr Fung were disinterred, carried, stopping occasionally along the way so people could tell him what a great guy he was, and arriving in Canton where it was greeted by a large crowd of over a 1,000 merchants, gentry, students, and representatives of the 72 Canton Gils.



By the end of the year, the movement was essentially over and was soon replaced by more controversy over the Canton railway. Meanwhile the question of the Ju Jong railway had come to the fore. It had been established in 1905 with Ton Chu Jen as President and began collecting money through 1906. Meanwhile the Jung Soo railway had been established in that year and was running by 1907. A compromise on the loan issue had been worked out in 1908, but the question of the British loan was never fully solved, particularly the Ju Jong company managed not to use the money that they were supposed to be receiving from the British. There was a major demonstration in Hangzhou in November 1907 and continuing protests for many months. Subscription bureaus had been established in several prefectures. Some small shares were sold on the streets, and there were large pledges that were never altogether fulfilled. These were made at a special meeting for that purpose.

Despite the difficulties, the Ju Jong company had raised 5 to 6 million yen by the end of 1906. The company pushed ahead on construction and by early 1912, it also had 10 million 600,000 yen which made it the most successful of the railways at that time. The railway construction was clearly tied up with nationalism, and railway advocates also took part in protests against expansion outside of treaty ports usually by Japanese, but also by missionaries. The injury of a Chinese boy in a fight at a Japanese shop produced demonstrations in Hangzhou in 1910. However, the railway question also became mixed up with political alienation.

There was a short lull after a nine-year schedule for establishing a constitutional government. This was broken when the main enemy of the railway, Shung Swen, was appointed a vice president of the Ministry of Communications. Ton memorialized objecting and referring to public opinion. Shung's appointment was a step toward nationalization plans that had not yet been adopted. Ton was strongly backed by the railway stockholders and managed to hold on to his position until the second petition for the National Assembly. Then he accused Shung of corruption and was dismissed by imperial edict the next day. Four days after that, Shuba printed an editorial entitled "On the Distinction between Centralizing Power and Tyranny." By then in mid-1910 there was already an almost irreconcilable gap between the throne and the elite populous.

Now there are a good number of things that I would like to talk about a bit, although I have not written anything down about them. The first is that during the 1900s, there was a steady stream of annual floods or droughts or both in many parts of China. And by many parts of China, I mean many parts of China. But one example was the Kwai River, which routinely overflowed its banks, and that, of course, turned the whole basin into a vast lake. The government did not have funds needed to provide relief and in localities such money was all too likely to be used up or stolen. In any case families had to flee their homes with few possessions and little food. They were prey for bandits. Many starved to death. Cannibalism was rampant and the misery was terrible. Eventually the water would dry up or maybe if it was a drought, they'd get some rain later, but

then you had the chance to start all over again the next year. It was an extremely unhappy situation.

Then one is struck by the number of people, students or others, who came back on their own to China, became involved in ways of passing out or around anti-Manchu literature, or other literature favoring revolution. But they were doing this on their own. They had not joined even an association, and they weren't members of the Tongmenghui, necessarily. They were just doing it.

And there's this one guy, he was an old-ish scholar who came to Shandong. He taught for a few years in schools there, old-style schools there. And then he decided he was tired of that. He was evidently very good with handwriting, so he made copies of the books for low-level students and passed them out, at the same time telling them how the Manchus were destroying China and various other little nuggets of information.

He worked in Shandong for quite a while, and then he got tired of that. So he went over to the five Northwest -- not Northwest, Northeast provinces. Not Manchuria, obviously. And the story is that he altogether went to about 3,000 schools doing the same thing and passing along the same anti-Manchu information. What a way to live.

So, then there was another man who -- he might have been Tongmenghui -- and he was definitely in favor of revolution. He wanted to make contacts, I think, with people in Hunan. But he didn't know how to do it, so he found a friend who said, well, he could introduce him to someone who could.

So they took off -- started off on totally dark streets in the middle

of the night, when this guy had no idea where he was or why. And they did this all night, and then they finally came to where they were going. Met the person that he was to be introduced to.

Well, it turned out that she was a woman -- she really ran the whole thing, rather than her husband. But he was introduced to her, and then the story kind of ended. I assumed that he made other contacts that he was hoping to get from them.

And then, of course, there was the -- after the revolution had begun, there was the problem of the Manchus in all the provincial capitals. And this was sometimes okay, but it often -- well, I mean, by okay I mean they were told, okay. You can stay and we'll work it out, sort of thing. In other cases it was quite brutal, and in -- well of course, in Nanjing it had started out in a quite friendly fashion. But then when other forces -- other revolutionary forces -- entered Nanjing, not having been told about what nice guys these Manchus were, they -- well, they slaughtered them. And that was -- and then they came back and did it again, I believe. But that did not work out well at all.

And then in Shaanxi, there were -- again, there was a Manchu garrison there. And it was -- in the course of the revolution, the people there were bombarded and so forth. You know, after that they separated good-looking women from the rest of the group. Some, I believe, were shipped off eastward for revolutionary armies that were evidently lacking women. You know, others were kept in the capitol. The rest were just told to leave.

And you know, in that part of the country -- and this was a very

late Fall -- leaving with practically no food, not probably much in the way of clothing, didn't seem like a very happy ending. So, you know, there was a great deal of this. And I got a little bit upset reading some of it. But there you go.

Then, when you -- there's the other thing that, you know, as they approached 1911 there were more -- you know, there were more armies that had at least a component of trained men and officers. And so, that was becoming better than it had been at the beginning of the century. It still was not altogether perfect, but -- and there's still the military component of the provincial capitols had a big lot of Gulahuei or other secret societies filling in the cracks. And some cases, it was mostly Gulahuei and some who had gone to military schools and had a better education.

So, it wasn't really -- the strength of the army, in many cases, was not all that great. And this is something -- I mean, it -- I guess you would also say that in most places, it was not all that great. And therefore, it was not -- there were not that many provinces that could have run over everyone else.

They were also, as they approached the end of the first decade, you had Tongmenghui revolutionaries. And then also, constitutionalists who might be high officials, they might be low officials, they might be in the schools. And they, in some cases, got along okay. And in some places they didn't. And I think that they -- it became less easy to get along as the time of the revolution approached, because you were then looking at who was going to be commanding the armies, and such things.

So, there were places where the revolutionary military and the

constitutional military were kind of trying to knock one another out. You know, just -- and that produced some difficulties. There was the example of Hunan -- which was -- which, well, invaded Gueijo and then invaded Szechwan, the southern part of Szechwan. Didn't seem to want to leave Szechwan, but finally decided that -- they didn't want to -- they weren't getting any further. And that they didn't really want to hang out there indefinitely when they were maybe, say, not wanted. And so that, again -- there was a lot of confusion. And so you sort of, after a while, began to, you know, wonder how this was seriously going to work out.

The fighting around Wuchang was easier to follow, because it was definite. You had definite people involved, you had three definite people that were -- three definite parts that were being fought over. And then again, you knew -- and you knew who won. But this was not necessarily true in some of the other places.

You know, then there is the petition movement, which was -- it was really pretty impressive. And you know, the -- I kept wondering how they got so many people on that third petition. So it would seem, you know, that they went to all the schools, chambers of commerce, and any other organizations they could find, and just said, sign here. Which they probably all did. And they may even have collected signatures on the street. You know, the railroad people did. I don't know.

But you know I used to just say, oh, that's ridiculous. The numbers involved. But I think -- I've come around to the thought that they were perhaps

more accurate than I had assumed.

So, then this -- I'm not sure who starts where after me. If -- are people going to start by talking about the --

MR. BUSH: I think we need to take a break here, so we can move to the other room.

MS. RANKIN: Yes, okay. That's fine. I mean, I can be finished at this point.

MR. BUSH: Okay, that's fine.

MS. RANKIN: But I didn't know whether someone else would start out with the (inaudible) --

MR. BUSH: No, this is great. Thank you very much for a rich and detailed description of the background of the 1911 revolution. (Applause)

MR. BUSH: The 1911 Revolution obviously brought to an end the Imperial System in China after intense political and social conflict during the late Qing Dynasty. At its best I think the Imperial System provided unity, stability and order, relative prosperity, cultural brilliance, effective governance, and international respect. And one can say that since 1911, China has been on a quest to restore all of those things and obviously some objectives compete with the other.

So far we've seen two approaches, two sort of tentative solutions to that question. One is the ROC on Taiwan. The other is the PRC on the mainland. The quest is not over but the centenary is a good time to reflect back on the revolution itself, what happened after, and what it means today.

And to help us get started on this part of the program, it's my great pleasure to invite Ambassador Jason Yuan, who is Taiwan's representative here in the United States and the defender of Taiwan's interests here to say a few words.

Ambassador Yuan.

(Applause)

MR. YUAN: Dr. Bush, excuse me, ladies and gentlemen. Before I start my remarks I just want to say I just got back from New York City late, late last night. And because -- oh, thank you -- because of my vice president, Vincent Siew had a very, very smooth transit through New York City from Panama and Paraguay, and he learned I'm privileged to be here with you, so he asked me to say hello, particularly to his best friend, Richard Bush, and his friends, old friends, back in Taiwan and here to say hello to everybody. And in the meantime, also about a week ago President Ma Ying-jeou had a very, very successful radio conference at CSIS. He also wanted me to take this opportunity to say hello to everybody who attended or who read his text during that conference.

Today I really would first like to extend my thanks to the Brookings Institution for inviting me to give these remarks at this very, very important forum. For over 90 years, Brookings has been a leading voice in the formation and refinement of an international system that is more secure, accreditable, and predictable. The people of Taiwan are grateful to your institution's contributions to the fulfillment of this vision in East Asia, which has allowed both Taiwan and



the region as a whole to prosper.

It is also a great pleasure and an honor for me to exchange views with such a distinguished panelist as we commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the Republic of China. I know some scholars today will focus on a historical review of the past 100 years, so I would like to focus on the present day and how our goals and achievements are already shaping the future.

Republic of China in the year 2011 is a land of political freedom and economic opportunities. These features did not arise without effort. It is because our values and their perseverance so we can achieve so much in so little time. But they also required another element, a spirit of openness that has helped accelerate our progress and that will be essential as we step into the future. It is that element that I would like to address today because it has not only stimulated our political and economic development, but it has also contributed to cross-strait rapprochement, strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan strategic partnership and ensuring a bright future for the Republic of China and Taiwan.

As you all know, the Republic of China is the first republic in China and the modern ROC is the first truly democratic political system in Asia, a distinction that our citizens continue to pride in. Our first direct presidential election was held in 1996, and like all young democracies, modern ROC endeavored to live up to the principles enshrined in its constitution.

Now, with our next presidential election on the horizon and the two peaceful transitions of power already behind us, the resilience of Taiwan's

democracy is assured. Our open system is fortified by transparent governance, a healthy business climate, and independent and lively media, a vocal civil society, and accountable elected officials. For these reasons Freedom House recently gave Taiwan some of its highest marks for political and civil rights.

In the arena of trade and economic competitiveness, Taiwan's progress in recent decades has been nothing short of astounding. Taiwan's per capita GDP was U.S. \$18,603 in the year 2010, a far cry from 1951 when per capital GDP was only U.S. \$154. And while much of the world continues to struggle to gain the momentum lost from the global economic crisis, Taiwan is racing ahead. Our growth rate of 10.82 percent last year outpaces mainland China and eclipses the global growth rate of 4.1 percent.

Taiwan's unemployment rate of 4.48 percent is considerably lower than that of the U.S. and Japan and has been gradually diminishing for the last 19 months. Taiwan's spirit of openness is also reflected in our willingness to lower barriers to trade. Taiwan is ranked the world's 16<sup>th</sup> largest trading nation in terms of merchandise trade by the WTO and hit a record high of \$526 billion U.S. in trade volume last year.

Entrepreneurs today are voting with their feet and in increasing numbers listing their numbers on the Taiwan Stock Exchange rather than the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. At \$400 billion U.S. Our foreign reserve is the world's fourth largest. Our currency is stable, our economy predictable, and our business transactions protected by a transparent and durable legal architecture. For these and other reasons, the year 2011, IMD economic competitiveness

scorecard ranked Taiwan's economy the number six most competitive in the world. Taiwan is indeed one of the best places in the world to do business.

These advances are due in part to the wise choices made by Taiwan's leadership which came into office three years ago today. At that time it was difficult to imagine how much progress we could make, especially in cross-trade relations. Today, tensions between the ROC and the mainland are at their lowest point in decades. Nearly three million Taiwanese and mainland Chinese travel across the strait each year. More than 5,600 mainland students studied in Taiwan universities in the year 2010, and 70,000 Taiwanese companies are investing more than \$100 billion U.S. on the mainland. That's the official record. The unofficial record is way, way beyond that number.

People from the Republic of China and the mainland are talking to one another, learning from one another, and doing business together. How is it possible to make such strides in just three short years? I will say just two words: pragmatic leadership. Exactly three years ago today, President Ma Ying-jeou put forward a vision that sought to reverse a statement and increasing dangerous status quo. President Ma embraced a viable diplomacy where the principles of dignity, autonomy, and flexibility reshaped Taiwan's foreign policy. And by implementing this approach, he significantly reduced cross-strait tensions, repaired strategic alliances, and avenged economic integration through increased trade and investment. He resumed a consistent and constructive dialogue with the mainland based on the concept of flexible diplomacy. Our Three No policy -- that is no unification, no independence, no use of force -- and

the earlier 1992 consensus of a one China respective interpretations.

By taking an economic first, political issues second approach to negotiations, both sides have now concluded six sets of talks and reached 15 agreements. That includes the historical Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, or we call it ECFA, which took effect on January 1<sup>st</sup> of this year. The ECFA will grow Taiwan's economy by 4.4 percent, but its value as a model for future trade agreements with other Asian nations is immeasurable.

As a result of our government's calm and prudent stewardship, Taiwan's trade has been transformed from a major flashpoint into a conduit for regional peace and prosperity. We welcome America's support for this undertaking and appreciate President Obama's strong endorsement of our approach, including in his discussions with Chinese President Hu Jintao earlier this year. But these efforts alone have not ensured Taiwan's continued security. Taiwan's willingness to defend our sovereignty backed by security commitments of the U.S. have and will continue to play an essential role in keeping the peace. Today the Taiwan Relations Act remains the bedrock of the U.S.-Taiwan strategic partnership and the single greatest contribution to regional stability as we face new challenges together in the 21st century. Indeed, Taiwan's work towards a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences would not have been possible and it will not be sustainable without America's enduring commitment to Taiwan's security.

Looking beyond the Taiwan Strait, our government recognizes that all countries must do their part to shoulder the burden of a hence global well-

being and that Taiwan is no exception. In the not too distant past, Taiwan was a recipient of foreign assistance. Today, as a responsible stakeholder in the international community, we extend our hand to those in need as a donor of humanitarian aid and long-term development assistance. Taiwan contributes to the global common good wherever possible, from providing solar energy technology to the Solomon Island, to establishing a medical mission in the Marshall Island, to trade (inaudible) to disseminate locally manufactured each one (inaudible) to other countries in need, to providing resources in search and rescue teams in the wake of natural disasters in Haiti, and Japan.

In response to the recent big tornadoes that caused destructive effects to many southern states in the U.S., our local offices not only helped mobilize the Taiwanese community to join relief work, our government also donated \$250,000 U.S. to those states affected most. As Taiwan extends a helping hand to those in need, the world is taking notice. Two extraordinary Taiwanese citizens were recently recognized by TIME Magazine's list of the 100 Most Influential People. The 73-year-old Dharma Master Cheng Yen, founder of the Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation was applauded for her leadership of what TIME called "a non-profit humanitarian machine." When disaster hit Japan, the Tzu Chi Foundation tapped into its global network of 10 million supporters and volunteers swiftly distributed food, medicine, warm clothing to the hardest hit regions of the country.

Chen Shu-chu, the other Taiwanese citizen honored by TIME Magazine is an ordinary person who works in a traditional market selling --

producing eastern Taiwan, but her heart and the generosity are truly extraordinary. Despite a modest paycheck, she managed to donate over \$320,000 U.S. to those in need while supporting three children from an orphanage. "Money serves its purpose only when it is used for those who need it," she says. In our government's renewed commitment to humanitarian response and foreign assistance, Taiwan is trying to live up to the example set by Master Cheng Yen and Ms. Chen Shu-chu.

As the Republic of China reaches its 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary, the people of Taiwan are asking how can we continue to extend our spirit of openness to new ventures and horizons. Taiwan remains committed to engagement with the world through open borders and people to people contacts. Often the best diplomacy is done by individuals, tourists, investors, entrepreneurs, friends, and families. As Taiwan and the U.S. already celebrate many years of friendship and shared values, we are hopeful that Taiwan will soon gain admission to the U.S. visa-waiver program. Where the next 100 years lead us, President Ma said it best in a speech at Harvard University last year. "Against the background of thousands of years of Chinese history, the last century was in some ways merely a comma, but from larger perspective it was nothing short of an exclamation mark. As it has been a hundred years of struggle, a hundred years of experimentation, and a hundred years of education before people learned that they, too, have the unequivocal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." President Ma's vision is for Taiwan to continue along its current path as a peacemaker, a provider of humanitarian aid, the standard barrier of Chinese

culture, and the creator of innovative technologies and new business opportunities. Under this leadership we will continue to work hard to earn the respect of the international community through pragmatic diplomacy and sound economic management.

In conclusion, at this important juncture the people of Taiwan look toward a future filled with possibility as a past that was at times marked by great uncertainty receipts from view. We will undoubtedly continue to hold dear our Chinese traditions and values and remain the protector of thousands of historical text even as we dedicate ourselves to global engagement and technological innovation. Taiwan's preservation of Chinese culture goes hand in hand with our promotion of democracy in short will continue to serve as the "beacon of democracy to Asia and the world" that President George W. Bush referred to just three years ago. And we hope, through both our examples at home and our role in the world, that we can extend the light of freedom to all corners of Asia and beyond. We look forward to the next 100 years as we work to preserve and strengthen democracy and prosperity in East Asia and the whole world.

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MR. YUAN: In celebrating a great year and a great day of the Republic of China and Taiwan, President Ma Ying-jeou also sends a congratulatory message for this very meaningful event. May I ask Dr. Bush to come to the podium?

MR. BUSH: Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador

Yuan, for those remarks. This is a congratulatory message. The letterhead is President of the Republic of China, Ma Ying-jeou, dated May 20, 2011.

“Dr. Bush, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I am pleased to learn that the conference titled Dawn of Modern China, the 100<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of China's 1911 Revolution and the Significance of the Republic of China is taking place in Washington, D.C. today. First of all, I would like to thank the Brookings Institution and Dr. Bush for providing me with this opportunity to share some thoughts with you. As the Republic of China celebrates its centennial anniversary this year, it is both timely and laudable for a renowned think tank such as the Brookings Institution to host a conference revisiting the significance of China's 1911 Revolution reviewing the achievements made by the Republic of China and shedding light on the prospects of the ROC in the coming century.

The evolution of modern China has been a journey in pursuit of wealth and power.

However, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the founding father of the Republic of China fully understood that without the pillars of democracy and liberty China would never be modernized. Wealth and power gained without the support of these pillars would be unsustainable. Therefore, he incorporated President Abraham Lincoln's idea of a government of the people, by the people, and for the people in his three principles of the people, sanmin zhuyi. This demonstrates that from its inception the ROC, the first republic in Asia, has had a deep bond with the United States based on shared values.



Following the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, two world wars, and the rising tide of communism prevented the Chinese people from realizing our founding fathers' promise of a free and democratic country. However, despite all the problems the country and the people had encountered, the ROC constitution adopted in 1947 on the basis of Sun Yat-sen's ideas has provided a comprehensive plan for political and economic development in Taiwan.

After the ROC government relocated its seat to Taiwan in 1949, it began a long journey toward democratization under a relatively stable environment, thanks in no small part to U.S. security assistance. Over time, elections expanded from counties and cities to provincial governments and finally to the national level. With its first direct presidential election in 1996 and the consolidation of democracy through peaceful transitions of power in 2000 and 2008, Taiwan became not only a full-fledged democracy, the first in 5,000 years of Chinese history, but also a beacon of democracy for Asia and the world.

Meanwhile, mainland China headed in a totally different direction. In 1979, following three decades of tragedy and failure, it commenced a single-minded pursuit of wealth and power. Thirty years later it is now painfully clear that without democracy and liberty, rising military and economic power also breeds fear and distress among the mainland's neighbors. Without comprehensive political reform, as I've urged repeatedly on the anniversaries of the event of Tiananmen Square and in my call for the release of Nobel Peace Prize winner, Liu Xiaobo, mainland China cannot sustain the wealth and power it

has amassed or win the world's respect and trust. Their leaders know this and hopefully they will act accordingly.

In the past three years, Taiwan has reduced tension in the Taiwan Strait and improved economic and social relations with mainland China. Today with 1.5 million Taiwan people living and doing business in mainland China and a roughly equivalent number of mainland tourists visiting Taiwan each year, I firmly believe that Taiwan is playing a historic role by providing mainland China via people to people exchanges with a free and democratic framework of reference.

Over the course of the past century, the Republic of China has forged a close alliance and partnership with the United States in combating the scourges of aggression, communism, and terrorism. We have also worked together to promote liberty, democracy, and free enterprise. With strong support from the United States, Taiwan has become a resilient economy, a vibrant democracy, and a generous contributor to the international community.

As the ROC enters a new century, I pledge to my fellow citizens to continue Taiwan's course on the cutting edge of technological and industrial advancement. Our culture and society will be an exemplar for the Chinese world and beyond. We will fully uphold our responsibilities to our land by respecting the environment, to our country by following the constitution and its foundation of its government, and to our people by providing necessary services and fundamental liberties. Last but not least, we will promote peace, stability, and security by exercising our right to self defense.

Together with the United States, the Republic of China has

achieved much in its first century and we will accomplish even more as we embark on our next 100 year journey. In closing, let me extend my best wishes for the great success of this event and the good health and happiness of all in attendance.” -- President Ma Ying-jou

(Applause)

MR. BUSH: With that, I propose that we get going with the first panel. And so if Steve and his colleagues would come to the podium we can get started.

MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you. I was going to -- I was going to thank Richard Bush for organizing all this but after you've received thanks from the president, somehow having me chime in just doesn't quite seem the same. But I deeply appreciate this opportunity to kind of bring history to policymakers.

I would also like to say how excited I am. I'm a bit of an academic groupie. Three wonderful panelists who I've learned from and read their materials in the past. And the way we'll organize this is each will speak for about 15 minutes. I'll offer a few comments at the end and then we will go until about five of four.

Let me start by introducing all three at once and then just let them come up one after the other and give their talks. First to speak will be David Strand, who will speak on Republican China as a republic. David Strand earned graduate degrees at Columbia University and right now he holds the position of the Charles A. Dana professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. He is author of a wonderful book, *Rickshaw Beijing: City People in Politics in the*

1920s from the University of California Press. And I'm looking forward very much to his upcoming book which is coming out in June.

MR. STRAND: That's right.

MR. PHILLIPS: I'm happy to plug this wonderful book entitled *An Unfinished Republic: Leading by Word and Deed in Modern China*.

Our second speaker will be Ed McCord from George Washington University and he'll speak on the emergence of warlordism. Professor McCord received his degree from the University of Michigan, and he's written a very well received book called *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism*. He's also done many articles that appeared in *Modern China*, *Republican China*, and *Modern Asian Studies*.

Our final speaker is Zheng Xiaowei and she'll speak on nationalism, new conceptions of China. Zheng Xiaowei is assistant professor in History and the East Asian Language and Cultural Studies program at the University of California-Santa Barbara. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California at San Diego and she had a wonderful article out a couple of years ago concerning Red Guards at Tsinghua University. And that's how I got to first know her scholarship. That's in the well-known Eshrek volume.

With that I'll ask each scholar to come up and try to limit their remarks to about 15 minutes. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MR. STRAND: I spilled water on my notes. I hope that's lucky. Okay. I have a PowerPoint here but it's not too many images. Let's see. Okay.

I thought I'd begin with three comments about the 1911 Revolution and its immediate aftermath that shows the range of opinion by 1912, 1913, about whether this revolution had been a success. Plainly it had happened, but what exactly had been the outcome?

The first comment -- I know it's hard to see; the rest of the slides are images, not text -- is by Tai Chi-tao in 1912. He was a journalist, soon to be Sun Yat-sen's personal secretary and he wrote very angrily about what Yuan Shikai in the summer of 1912 was doing in Beijing. He said, "China today, although a republic in name with legislative organs, a cabinet, and a constitution for the public instruction of the Chinese people actually in terms of how power and tactics are wielded and played out is a country where everything is concentrated in the hands of one man." -- Yuan Shikai. So very negative about the outcome.

The second is from the philosopher and teacher, Yong Chong Ji, teacher, of course, to Malzadon among many others who returned to China from study abroad in 1913. And he wrote the following year a very different account of what had happened. He said, "China has experienced tremendous change in the transformation of its political system into a republic, the profound nature of which can hardly be expressed." So very positive.

And then Liang Qichao who must be one of the great thinkers of this period in world history made another kind of comment, rather strange but I think it summed up some of his complex feelings about a revolution which he helped make. He said, "It, the 1911 Revolution, was like when you open a bottle

of cold beer, the foam quickly bubbles up to the surface and appears awfully busy but when the moment is over and the foam dissipates, it's still a cold bottle of beer." I don't know what he meant by that but it can't be positive. (Laughter)

Now, Digi Tau made his remarks in Shanghai less than six months after the end of the Qing Dynasty. As Yuan Shikai consolidated his hold on power in Beijing as provisional president, a position seated to him by Sun Yat-sen earlier in the year. This was three years before the Yuan attempted and failed to turn his dictatorship by that time into monarchy and six months before 40 million men went to the polls in China in the winter of 1912-1913 to elect a new national legislature.

Now, these voters presumably assumed a Chinese republic was here to stay. They turned out to be right and Yuan Shikai wrong when he assumed Chinese would later welcome his bid to become emperor. And yet Digi Tau was certainly correct that the national institutions of the Chinese Republic were being emptied of power and authority before the first year the Republic was over. And herein I think lies a central problem or paradox. The Chinese Republic was very quickly criticized, bemoaned, mocked, ridiculed, defied, defeated, but it wouldn't go away. It couldn't be made to go away. And why not?

Now, the record of the 1910s and 20s, too, I think, suggest that the Chinese Republic, as a set of institutions, constituted a kind of failed national government or maybe failing is the better way to characterize it. But not I think what we would call today a failed state. It wasn't Somalia, although as Mary Rankin's comment suggested there were areas of great violence and despair in

China during this period.

Now, the way the national institutions failed so publicly with so much comment I think actually helps sustain a political culture of active citizenship among widening circles of Chinese. I think my feeling about the 1911 Revolution and its aftermath therefore is closer to Yong Chong Ji but certainly admits the other critical comments being made around this time.

Now, we know that Benedict Anderson has given us a classic definition of what national consciousness is. He's characterized the modern nation as an imagined community. This is the notion that we have in our heads, a reasonably vivid and complete picture of the political society we live in, and that includes people we know and meet. And here is where the imagination goes to work. Those we never meet but we know them as compatriots. There must be sufficient overlap of these pictures we have in our head to make a common political imagination possible.

So one question is what did Chinese during this period have in their heads? And I would submit today they had Sun Yat-sen in their heads. Now, what good did that do them? That's a complicated question but something was there. And in addition to that, although I think we can document pretty well that this imagined community was emerging probably as Mary Rankin suggests, beginning in the 1880s, gathering momentum after the 1911 Revolution. There was also something like an imagined state in people's minds, and this isn't a term that I know of. Maybe I thought it up basically coming off of Benedict Anderson's ideas.

Now, what I mean by that is that the people who were conscious of themselves as Chinese and cared about China's future had a corresponding appetite for national leaders like Sun Yat-sen, Jonki Shek, Maldadung and a legion of other national and local leaders who promised what they didn't have. That is an effective government joined to a mobilized citizenry which they already had. So it's in my heart; why isn't it Beijing? It's in my mind; why don't these institutions work?

Now, I have an image here that I think suggests some of the dimensions of this consciousness. This is a cartoon from 1920 and you can see a typical protest with merchants and government people and students, and one man has a set of binoculars and he's looking at eastern Shandong province, the part of Shandong that is now controlled by Japan.

This kind of posture I think was quite important in understanding how people were thinking about not only their status as citizens but also the problem of government during this period. As a citizen, one stood within one's group among other groups in one's locale in the vastness of China, increasingly represented as a map that you would find in school rooms and textbooks and in the newspapers like this, often with a mulberry leaf by its side to suggest the shape of China and also the fact that imperialist worms were nibbling at its borders. This standing within this picture; whether we think of this as a real space outside Tiananmen or as more of a metaphoric space where people thought of themselves as having compatriots they never knew or on a map of China obliged one to look beyond one's particular position. And Mary Rankin



indicated how strong localness was in China during the run-up to the 1911 Revolution. How did that localness, that local patriotism become something larger?

And I guess what happened, and I think this for me is a useful cartoon, if we think of the binoculars in a more metaphorical sense as standing for things like newspapers or novels or photographs or eyewitness accounts that afford a simplifying patriotic perspective that can be passed from hand to hand, group to group, community to community until you begin to share that common vision. A leader like Sun Yat-sen, for example, I think was able to offer his own political thought as a way of seeing the country. Now, Sun Yat-sen has been criticized for having an over simple view of politics but in many ways compared to Liang Qichao, who had a very complex view of politics, the simplicity, I think actually worked to his advantage.

And so one way we can think about what's going on in China in this period of the 1910s in particular is not only to record the failure of the institutions but the development of other social and political technologies Chinese used to embrace the idea of the modern state before they felt its full weight. As long as the Chinese state was more rhetorical, that is of their own invention than real in administrative or social engineering terms -- not saying that people weren't being taxed or weren't being pressured by the government, but their attitude toward government would naturally be more positive than if they felt the full weight of the fiscal responsibilities that they would have as citizens.

So I think when we look at Yong Chong Ji's words, having

returned to China in 1913 after 10 years abroad, when he saw the Republic, what he saw was not a set of failed institutions but a long list of challenges that were being addressed nationally but also locally, politically but also socially. He noted the imperial exam was gone, cues were being cut, opium oppressed, foot binding was coming to an end. Of course, interesting, all of these initiatives had begun under the Qing and not under the Republic but in a way what this revolution did was to bracket a whole period of reform that people were involved in before the 1911 Revolution and afterward. So the Republic, to the extent that it succeeds, is one way of packaging many of these new ideas.

And Yuan declared there was more work to do. In his case, ending arranged marriages, the taking of concubines, for example. Republican China was a political system but also for many the embodiment of change at every level of government and society against Yuan reading admitted opposition at every level as well. So this kind of relationship -- that is if we think of the state and not of government in a kind of partnership, there are people who are thinking about the value of government and acting locally to achieve it. And this is holding the place, I think, for some more profound governmental change, whether positive or negative.

By contrast, Liang Qichao, after his return in 1912 to China and to Beijing, was disappointed in what he found. This feeling was shared by many. The revolution for him was the mere pop of a beer bottle. For others, it was more like an explosion or some kind of blast. But for many, the high hopes that either quickly evaporated -- that's Liang -- or the dust settled on dynastic debris or even

worse, on the same institutions, the same individuals in place and power before the revolution. And people like Yuan Shikai for many revolutionaries rightly or wrongly epitomized that. At the same time as Ton Show Bing reports, Liang did feel that there was something new in 1912 when he returned to China, that he could not entirely make sense of. And because he could make sense of practically anything, I think that this is significant. He wrote to his daughter that “the misery of socializing is absolutely beyond words. If one has to live such a life constantly, I wonder where the pleasures of life could be. People here in the capital welcome me as if they were crazy. Every day I have to go to some three different gatherings.” It sounds like a liberal arts college that I attend. Liang’s complaint about Chinese republicanism as it was practiced in and out of government, in effect too many meetings, echoes his contemporary British literary titan Oscar Wilde’s objection to socialism. It would take too many evenings.

Chinese republicanism, therefore, I think, from the beginning was as much a social and cultural phenomena as it was institutional in government. So if it’s failing governmentally, that’s true, but since the 1980s we’ve had this public development of questioning and writing and opening schools and visiting people and trying to share the word about whatever issue concerns you, there is this cultural and social base that sustains the idea of the republic. Ironically, the worse things get, the more adamant are people about what they actually want so that that pressure for government rather than the idea of abandoning the idea of government I think is a hallmark of this period.

Because republicanism spread everywhere, and not just in terms of formal governmental edicts but in hairstyles and clothing that men and women adopted, the language and terminology they use, the books and newspapers they read, and how they read them, the number and kinds of meetings they held and attended and the rituals of protest and public gatherings they adopted, republicanism was also often fluid, expressive, unpredictable, and undisciplined, the kinds of things we complain about in Washington as a sign of political decay but you never know when these kinds of activities can produce something more positive. For example, political parties, presumably among the most organized manifestations of the republican principle outside of government had a tendency as republican revolutionary and historian Li Jun Nun complained, "to float like duckweed without firm roots," (speaking in Chinese), their strength lay in their rapid firability to grow, the effervescence, not in their organizational coherence and rigor but I think Li, like Liang, saw this as simply bubbles on the surface. Why can't we have real political parties?

One sign of this is Wong Shing, who as Mary Rankin indicated is one of the heroes of the 1911 Revolution, after the revolution joined 11 political parties and he said, you know, when asked why he did that he said I basically couldn't decide on what party to call myself. So he agreeably joined when asked and without resigning his other affiliations so that this kind of pluralism or chaos, if you will, is part, I think, of the response to all of those developments that happened before 1911, now trying to find some kind of institutional context. And, you know, it is true that at the national level it's harder and harder for these

reformers to find it. But China is a big place. Lots of different levels and we see a lot happening locally, both good and bad during this period.

And then to finally return again once more to Liang Qichao, in another context he described this I think quite well, talking about the earlier period but in some ways the 1910s and the 10 years before the 1911 Revolution are very much alike, whether we call one republic and the other the end of empire, that is a body of development that probably has to be looked at as a whole. Liang Qichao ironically talking about his own ideas, he says, "New ideas swept in like a raging fire, introduced in the so-called Liang Qichao style, disorganized, unselected, incomplete, ignorant of the various schools and with an overemphasis on quantity." Still, society welcomed these ideas, just as people in an area ridden by disaster will gulp down grass roots, tree bark, frozen birds, and putrescent rats, ravenously and indiscriminately. With his high standards, I think Liang wanted quality not quantity, but what the 1911 Revolution gave China was quantity with some quality but you had to shift through all these institutions, different kinds of chambers of commerce, some of them simply a plaque that said chambers of commerce, others quite well organized.

And so the development of political parties, of chambers of commerce, of study groups, of schools, has this serial quality which is chaotic, even anarchic, but I think it is where one wants to look in addition to government failure for the history of this emergent Chinese state.

Okay. Now, in addition to these kinds of activities, let's take a look at Chinese government. This is the Senate in Nanjing early in 1912. And that's

Sun Yat-sen presiding. There are 43 senators and about half of them seem to be here. A foreign observer who went to observe the sent concluded that it was different than in Europe because if you were in Europe looking down at a group of politicians like this, most of them would have bald heads. And I did take a magnifying glass and there is some thinning of hair which you'd expect after a revolution, but basically these are young, young men. Republicanism was a young idea. I think that's also important as Mary Rankin indicated. These young people of different generations play a very important role here.

Now, one way of looking at this is failure. However, if you look at the history of the Chinese Senate during this period -- I think I'll have to end with this because we're running out of time -- we see something that actually is quite lively. In the period from about January through March, the senators in Nanjing debated and approved a new constitution through two drafts and 32 days of argument. They accepted Sun Yat-sen's resignation in favor of Yuan. They weathered the attacks of infuriated, gun-toting, window-breaking suffragists in March. They crawled amongst themselves over the location of the capital before finally decamping to Beijing in April. Speeches and debate were notable for being highly emotional. During the debate over whether the Republic's capital should be in Beijing or Nanjing, one delegate threatened to kill himself on the floor of the senate if the vote did not go his way.

Debates over other questions were civil and thoughtful, like deliberations led by Sunjow Wren and Hu Hahn Men over the relative value of centralized versus decentralized governance. One definition of a republic is

debate-based and that's what China had. And it had not because the senate was doing it and the rest of the country wasn't, but because much of the rest of the country, especially in the cities was doing it before 1911, after 1911. And after 1911, if you look at newspapers from places like Hunan, they focused on these national institutions, recorded the debates, and developed a perspective that I think does suggest a gulf of the kind that Mary Rankin indicated between local people in the center. But it was a gulf to be closed not by a return to monarchy but some kind of better republic.

So I think it's in the tension between social and cultural developments on the one hand, including a lot of people, including women, and these national political institutions that one finds the development of China during this period. Focus on either one alone I think doesn't give us a state. It gives us a government, it gives us localities, but this connection I think is a quite intriguing one.

I just have a few more slides I'll just show you. This is a cartoon about what can happen when things go bad. And this is Sun Yat-sen. I like this picture because it shows both his vulnerability and the kind of strength that he had to endure all the meetings and speeches that he went through from 19 -- end of 1911 when he returned to China. And a lot of what he did was, well, take group photos. He's there.

And then I'll end with this one. I was going to talk more about women but if you look here at a group photo you see Sun Yat-sen in the middle. This is his game face. And the challenge of being Sun Yat-sen in China probably

was even greater than being Liang Qichao but he was more his element. He loved meeting people, loved giving speeches. But look at this woman on the end. She is someone who for the whole of 1912 has battled for women's rights and lost. And she has this Mona Lisa-like look, enigmatic. And I wish I had time to talk more about what women were doing during this period but they were among the most active political people in China. They and the Manchus were the banner men who had most to lose. Women who had most to gain were among the most active politically. It's hard to register these kinds of developments unless one looks for some greater balance between the social and cultural on the one hand and the governmental on the other.

Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. MCCORD: The subject of my talk, Warlordism, is probably at odds with any kind of celebration or commemoration of the significance of the 1911 Revolution. This is not what we usually think about when we think about the 1911 Revolution. And the reason for that, of course, is that any real examination of the emergence of warlordism after the 1911 Revolution tends to place a negative light on the revolution in a sense that it exposes the failure of the revolution to achieve the kind of strong democratic state that it set out to achieve. So as this is kind of dark spot in Chinese history, many people think we should simply let it go. You know, this is something best left ignored and moved on.

But I think it's fair to ask if there is, in fact, any reason to study or



remember the warlord period beyond a kind of historian's interest in what actually happened. I teach at a school of international affairs and so I find my students are always asking me to prove why they should study history and they actually end up only thinking it's useful if it has relevance for today. So while my interest as a historian on this topic is not to see how we can use past to understand the present, I have softened up somewhat in this kind of request for my students.

So for today's event I thought maybe I could at least consider whether there is any broader value in trying to understand the rise of warlordism following the 1911 revolution, apart from any kind of purely historical interests and in doing so I'm probably going to stray a little bit from just approaching this as a historian.

As a starting point I thought it was kind of a remarkable coincidence that the anniversary of the 1911 Revolution is coinciding with this wave of democratic uprisings in the Middle East. So we have this 100 years lapse. We see a similar movement of two different areas towards democracy. Now, I hesitate to suggest that there is anything in the collapse of republican hopes in the 1911 Revolution that can directly help us understand or predict what will happen in these jasmine revolutions in the Middle East today.

So at most, I would probably agree with Mark Twain when he said history does not repeat itself; at best it rhymes. And I think that's what we can find. If we can actually find some rhymes, some rhyming going on between what happened 100 years ago in China and what we see in the Middle East today. And if nothing else, I think looking at the 1911 Revolution and what happened

after the 1911 Revolution may tell us something about the fragility of democratic transitions, the difficulties of achieving democracy.

One rhyme that I'm particularly interested in looking at these two periods is the role and the importance of the military in democratic transitions or in democratic revolutions. Many times when we look at democratic revolutions we're very much focused on intellectual transitions or looking for sources of popular dissatisfaction. While all these things are obviously very important, I think the fact remains that in many cases revolutions without military power or without military support are unlikely to succeed. So in China, the revolution actually began in most provinces with military uprisings or with at least political declarations that had military support of the new armies in the provinces. If we look at the recent events in Tunisia and Egypt, obviously they didn't start with military uprisings but it was the unwillingness of the military in those countries to suppress popular demonstrations that has been the really key factor in their success. And likewise, the willingness of militaries in say Libya and Syria to back up the regimes which are a key to their troubles.

So I think it's very important to try to understand the role and motivation of militaries amid democratic revolutions and I think this is particularly true in the case of the 1911 Revolution. Now, ironically, the reason behind the military's role in the 1911 Revolution was also the first step towards warlordism. So I think this is one of the kind of troubling aspects of the resolution itself. What this was and the reason behind the military's role was something I would call the politicization of the military that included an entire period before the 1911

Revolution. Now, the way in which the military became involved in politics has a lot to do with who was drawn into politics in this period and it was basically the result of the transformation of the military as the Qing Dynasty really sought to modernize and improve the quality of its armies. And this is one of the great ironies, of course, too, is that here is one of these efforts of the Qing Dynasty to create a new kind of military force that would strengthen the dynasty and ends up, of course, being one of the forces that brings the dynasty down. So it's one of these ironies of unintended consequences of reforms.

Anyway, besides reorganizing its armies and trying to arm them with advanced weaponry, one of the main goals of the Qing military reforms was to try at least to attract educated men into the armies as both soldiers and officers. And at the same time their ability to do this was enhanced by the rising nationalism in China to kind of change the perception of military careers among a lot of the people where it now became actually admirable to be a military officer. And so there were educated men that actually joined the military, became officers, and even became soldiers out of kind of a nationalist sense or at least to see this as a positive career alternative.

Now, the end result, as Mary Rankin has said, is not that all the armies became very cracked units with good men across the board but there was a leavening of these educated men inside the armies that became a very important part of the new armies. So the new armies attract these large numbers of educated men. These men though were also influenced by the same kind of nationalist and revolutionary ideals that were spreading through the rest of the

social elite in this period. And so as the general elite swung towards revolution, the educated men in the military also swung with them. So you have this correlation between what's going on in society in general and what's going on inside the military.

So the key point in the military's role in the revolution then was the social affinity they had for the broader elite as that broader elite moved towards revolution. Now, obviously in an area of popular democracy it's the social connections we might see between the military and the people on the street that becomes most important but the principle is the same, that there is this correlation between -- the army actually feels connected to the people or the people that matter in the case of the 1911 Revolution, which is really more of the elite.

So the politicization of the military was a precondition then for the military's role in the revolution. So the fact that the military men were engaged in this same kind of political process, political thought, political discussion that was going on among the civil elite was also crucial in leading them up to the role they were going to play. But as I say, this is also I think the first step towards warlordism because it began the process of drawing the military into politics. So you had this first step taken.

The revolution itself was the second step towards warlordism because it marked a second process which I see, which is the militarization of politics where politics becomes militarized. The involvement of the military in the revolution basically represented an effort to resolve political issues by military

means. To the extent that the new armies were involved in the revolution, it was an effort to resolve this basic sense of what should the government of China be by military means, by military effort. And this is, of course, an essential feature of warlordism down the road or militarism down the road where the military becomes involved in political resolutions.

Now, what I'm not trying to do then is suggest though that the 1911 Revolution itself was the beginning of warlordism. I'm talking about steps that are being taken towards warlordism, not that the 1911 Revolution itself made warlordism. For warlordism to happen, that political engagement or the military engagement in politics has to be somehow institutionalized and that is what is going to happen then as we move into the republic itself. And I see this somewhat happening as a result of something I would call the republican realization crisis, the crisis of the inability to realize the republic as it is envisioned by the revolutionaries. And here is where we see the real difficulty in any kind of democratic transition. The 1911 Revolution is a perfect example of this.

One of the explanations for the rise of warlordism in China that I've never really found very convincing is a suggestion that the fall of the dynasty created some kind of vacuum, the government collapsed and as a result of that vacuum, the only thing out there to move in was the military. And I think what we've already see with Mary Rankin's talk and also with David Strand's talk is there is actually a lot of stuff going on in society. It's not that society all collapses and there is no institutions, there's no discussions, there's no meetings going on. Lots going on. The central government continued to operate after the revolution.

Provincial and local administrations were maintained or quickly reconstituted by local elites. There was no political collapse of civil government.

I might also say if we look in the Middle East again and make that comparison in Egypt and Tunisia, there's no collapse of government. That's not what's happening in these cases. The government collapses. Actually, the government that's on the ground continues on. People adjust, people manipulate it, but it continues on.

The main problem as I see it for the early republic is that there was no real agreement among all the various forces that participate in the revolution over how the new government should be organized or who is supposed to lead it. In fact, the only real agreement I think really is a sense that it had to be a republic. But that's a very broad category of political interpretation. What is a republic? What does that entail? How would you write a constitution for republic? These can be very contested areas.

And they remain there for a very strong disagreement there over, number one, whether or not the new government should be some kind of a federalist system that would permit a great degree of local self-government or whether the interests of the nation would be better served by a strong central government. And number two, there's a lot of disagreement about the distribution of power within the government. Should the government be -- should the main power of the government be held by representative assemblies or should it be held by the presidency, a strong executive? So these are fundamentally constitutional issues. How do you write a constitution for a

democracy that's going to work?

Underneath all this though, of course, is the underlying issue that's driving all this and that is which constitution, which political forum is going to actually make China stronger? And which way should we lean then? Should we lean towards democracy or do we lean towards strong leadership. And this is the real question that any kind of society facing this similar situation would have to face.

All these efforts came to a head with the various efforts by President Yuan Shikai to centralize power under the presidency. So he's obviously an advocate of centralized government and a strong executive. That put him into conflict with both reformers and revolutionaries who sometimes, but not always, supported parliamentary and federal systems of government and often they only did that because they were opposed to Yuan Shikai. So personal politics also enters in.

And this conflict was also exacerbated though by the very weak commitment that Yuan Shikai himself had to the principles of democracy that he was supposed to be upholding as the president of the republic. And we ultimately see this in his effort when he tries to make himself emperor in 1915. What this makes me think about also then -- I was just reading the news article about Egypt, the interview with the spokesperson from the military consul in Egypt the other day in The Post. Taking some caution when you look at statements from that military consul about how the army is in support of democracy, this from an army that has got no experience with democracy. So

you never quite know if what they're saying and what they're representing is actually what they're going to do down the road.

Anyway, the third step to warlordism then was a crisis of political authority that resulted from the situation, from this republican realization crisis. In the absence of a real political consensus or what I would see as more importantly probably a way to achieve a political consensus, a method of achieving consensus, both sides ultimately turned to military force to try to resolve their political differences. So in essence then these civil political disputes drew the military back into politics where we already had this kind of starting point with the revolution, now they're drawn back into politics again. And this, of course, is one of the great problems facing any kind of democratic transition where you have a failure of politics and how the military might be drawn back in because of that failure of politics.

But here's where the specific nature of military forces in any one country make a strong difference in outcomes. In cases where you have a united national military, the end result can often be the establishment of military dictatorship. And this, of course, is what Yuan Shikai actually envisioned. He was going to establish a military based in a way dictatorship. Unfortunately for him, his control of the military was incomplete and that goes back a lot to the way in which the military was organized as a result of the late Qing reforms. The late Qing had failed to create a single unified national army. Instead what they ended up with is a very kind of hodge-podge of different forces in the provinces that were not really united together by any kind of bureaucratic way.



What this allowed then is for different sides in the political conflicts to approach different military forces to get their support for their position. And on the other side of that, of course, it allows individual commanders to decide which side they're going to support. So you have a condition of both sides playing into the same kind of process of looking for military support and giving military support. And of course, military commanders do this based on their own political preferences but also based on their own particular interests. The end result was a whole series of civil wars to try to resolve this crisis of authority but the fragmentation of the military itself made it very difficult for any kind of military success to actually occur. The military was so fragmented it was impossible for any one military force to actually unify the country. And so this really prevented any kind of resolution of this political crisis. So the civil wars degenerated very quickly from conflicts that were basic constitutional issues to a struggle for political power among competing individual warlords or commanders.

So it's the succession of civil wars then that becomes the fourth and final step to warlordism because what these wars did is provide a context for individual military commanders to increase their own control over civil administration and military administration in the territories under their control. The end result then was indeed to solidify and institutionalize the political fragmentation of the nation among competing warlords. And this then becomes kind of the end result of the 1911 Revolution. You started off with high hopes; you end up with military rule and political fragmentation.

Now, the emergency of warlordism in this period then I think has

had a lasting impact on China. One example is it brought the military permanently into politics and we see some of that still today in the way in which the military plays a very important role in politics in the PRC. So this is one of the legacies of warlordism. But I'd also like to say one of the legacies of warlordism is the way in which it served as a negative example. So the very existence of warlordism in the 1920s highlighted, I think, its contradiction with the goals of the revolution. So the revolution was a rejection of despotism, and yet what they end up with the warlords is kind of a new kind of military despotism, military rule. The revolution sought to create a strong, unified nation and what warlordism gives is, of course, showing the danger of political fragmentation.

So I think it was actually the presence of warlordism that acted as a constant reminder of the unachieved goals of the revolution itself. And therefore, the rise of warlordism was matched almost immediately by the rise of anti-warlord movements. And I have to say this is where my own research is kind of gone now. I'm now coming to the conclusion that probably what was more important in China in this period was not the rise of warlordism but the rise of anti-warlordism. That really is the engine if history. So again what the existence of warlordism did is highlight the absence of democracy and the absence of unity and then people tried to achieve these ends.

At the same time, the memory of warlordism in some ways has also acted as an obstacle to the realization of the democratic goals of the revolution once unity was created by the Communist Party because the Communist Party has always been able to argue that if the party collapsed, if the

party's control collapsed, China might again collapse into warlordism.

Warlordism might return. And I think it's not only the communists that think this.

I remember years ago I went out to the Stanford Institute to try to find if I could get some money from Ramone Myers and he told me the only way I could justify a historical study of warlordism is if I could show that if the Communist Party ever collapsed, warlordism would reoccur and therefore my work would be relevant.

Anyway, I think we have to be very careful though about how we interpret the lesson of the history of warlordism. The memory of warlordism by the Chinese people certainly may create a concern of the possibility of a reoccurrence of warlordism. But history itself does not actually predict these kind of outcomes. We have contingent circumstances of the 1911 Revolution phase and the circumstances of China today. There's nothing that says the same circumstances exist that would create the same kind of outcome. So it's not at all clear that the fall of the Communist Party would result in warlordism. That would be one of many possible outcomes.

Rather than predicting outcomes then, I think the history of warlordism is at most providing us with a caution about the potential role of the military and democratic transitions. It warns us about the types of circumstances that can, in fact, lead to military rule instead of democracy. And as such, I think knowing about this history can be useful as we approach looking at democratic transitions as a contact, such as the jasmine revolutions in the Middle East.

But for China actually, I think the main meaning and legacy of

warlordism is actually the memory of warlordism itself. That's the legacy. While on one hand I think there is, it does create this kind of fear that someday warlordism might occur, that we have to prevent the kind of disorder and civil war and fragmentation that would occur and after a political crisis, say with the fall of the Communist Party. At the same time though I think what the history of warlordism actually does is remain as a negative example, a negative example that, in fact, serves to reinforce the original ideals of the revolution because it does the opposite of the revolution. So the real legacy of warlordism is that fear of warlordism reinforces the goals of democracy, national strength, and unity. And that then becomes the most important way that I think we should actually remember warlordism after the 1911 Revolution.

Thank you.

(Applause)

MS. XIAOWEI: So the title of my speech today is Nationalism: New Conception of China. So I want to know how many of you in this room know Chinese. Okay. So we know that China is also called zhongguo in Chinese. To be exact to the historical context I'm going to refer to this term zhongguo a lot. So zhongguo roughly means China. Okay.

So movement politics and nationalism are the two greatest driving forces of Chinese politics in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Nationalism energized movement politics and they together led to successes of the nationalist and communist revolution. Nationalism actually also enabled Malzadon to launch the great proletarian cultural revolution. Even today, when the reform in China has said

farewell to revolution, nationalism remains.

A recent example was in May 1999 after the U.S. planes bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in an overwhelmingly bottom-up fashion. In over 100 Chinese cities, Chinese citizens of all ages and backgrounds went on the streets to protest the bombing.

So this paper explores the origins and the development of Chinese nationalism. To be noted, Chinese nationalism and the idea of thinking China as a modern nation state will actually reason historical phenomena. It was during the late Qing period that some Chinese thinkers came up with new ways to imagine and define China and they used the term zhongguo.

So there are three parts of my talk today. The first part I want to give you an introduction about this idea, the new conceptualization of the term zhongguo. And the second part, I will explain why Chinese thinkers needed to reinvent this concept and I will elaborate the concrete sense of zhongguo. And the very last part, part three, I will explore how such an understanding continued into the early republican period and examine the ramifications of Chinese nationalism. So this is the outline of today's talk.

So part one. Zhongguo. So what is zhongguo? Anyone knows?

SPEAKER: Central kingdom.

MS. XIOWEI: Central kingdom. So this actually is a very old term. The term zhongguo appeared in 600 BCE in the classics of history in Shongshu. Okay? So at that time this word translated as the middle kingdom was referred to the Western Zhou. So Western Zhou dynasty was the center of

the civilizations at the time.

So how did the Chinese people refer to their country before the late Qing period? So normally when Chinese people referred to their country they used the dynasty's name. The imperial government referred to themselves as the Empire. For example, the Empire of the Great Sung. The Empire of the Great Qing. The Empire of the Great Ming. But still, this term zhongguo remained and existed. So as the gentlemen over there had already explained, it is translated as the middle kingdom, the center of the civilization.

So the use of this term zhongguo actually implied a claim of political legitimacy. And zhongguo was often used by states who saw themselves as the sole legitimate successor of previous Chinese dynasties. For example, in the Southern Sung Dynasty, both the Qing Dynasty and the Southern Sun state claimed themselves to be zhongguo. Okay?

So even though this term zhongguo first appeared a long time ago, in the late Qing this term zhongguo gained a new meaning. So I want to give you some examples about how late Qing people talked this term, zhongguo. The first one is (speaking in Chinese). So he had this one sentence. (Speaking in Chinese.) Okay. I'm going to translate that. So the empire of Great Qing is the zhongguo from Emperor Yao's time. Okay? (Speaking in Chinese.) So we know that Yao was considered the first legendary Chinese emperor.

So in this sentence we see this term zhongguo actually was used to refer to a real political entity. This did not happen before the Qing period. We know that before the Qing period the term existed but the term was always used

as this very vague sense, the center of the civilization, the middle kingdom, but now in the late Qing, this term is related to a real political entity.

Another example was from the late Qing intellectual Liang Zi. He actually committed suicide after the 1911 Revolution and he actually wrote a letter and told people why he committed suicide. So he said the reason that he chose to commit suicide (speaking in Chinese). So both for the sake of the Qing Empire and for the sake of zhongguo. And he continued (speaking in Chinese). So the empire of Qing is a country of a few hundred years and zhongguo is the country that existed for thousands of years.

So what is so significant about this quote? Because even though this term existed but it was never a clear, defined state? But in late Qing, this term was used to refer to a defined state and also in Liang Zi's second sentence, zhongguo, this term, was used to refer to the political entity that transcended all dynasties. Okay?

So all dynasties were only different stages of the history of zhongguo. So as we can see at this time in the late Qing period, this term zhongguo had been a very different term from the earlier period. The earlier period only refers to the center of the civilization, the middle kingdom. Now it's a real political entity. Okay?

And we have to keep in mind that before the Qing dynasty, this conceptualization of the term zhongguo did not exist. For example, a very famous Ming intellectual, Gu Wen Wu, when he talked about his country he never used this term zhongguo. Either he said it's mingwa or either he said it's

tiansha, all that's under the heaven. So this is -- this new meaning was only gained in Qing.

At the end of Qing, this term zhongguo gained greater popularity. Zhongguo as a term actually appeared more frequently than the term datshing, the Great Empire of the Qing. And many people have mentioned Liang Qichao. Liang Qichao is really the most important intellectual of the late Qing period. He actually always used this word zhongguo when he was writing his articles.

So zhongguo became something very real for the Chinese intellectuals. It was a political entity. It was something definite, something real, something that transcended all the dynasties. Okay?

So if Chinese intellectuals only formulated this new concept zhongguo at the end of Qing, then we need to understand why they formulated a new concept at that specific time. What was the major problematic they were facing and the major problem they had to deal with? Why did they need a new concept to replace the old way of understanding the word? And also to address their own country. So this is what I'm going to talk about in part two.

So let's first take a look at this map. So this is how Chinese people think about the word, the middle kingdom. So at the very heart, Jung wen, the central plain, and then somewhere here, this is Japan. And (speaking in Chinese) is over here. And there was (speaking in Chinese) the country of the dwarfs. And then there is (speaking in Chinese), the country of the giants. So you know that Chinese people at this time really thought they were the center of the universe. They didn't even care about the proper names of other nations,



other countries, so they just put out this map. This is how they imagined the world. Okay. And actually, an accurate map before that map existed, so this is a map of 1620.

So Liang Qichao wrote a paragraph describing how Chinese people understand the world and how Chinese people positioned themselves in the world. So this is a paragraph Liang Qichao wrote in 1899 explaining the world view of the Chinese people. So "from the very ancient time, zhongguo was a unified country. All those countries," -- let's go back to that -- "all countries surrounding zhongguo were barbarians. They did not have cultures, nor did they have a developed political system. Our people (speaking in Chinese) thus did not treat the barbarian countries as equal counterparts and our country (speaking in Chinese) for several thousands of years had always been in the position of standing alone. Our people thus considered our country as the entire world." And this is a good illustration of that world view.

So China means all that's under the heaven. Following this line, another thinker, Yong Du stated there was no other world beyond zhongguo. There was no other state beyond zhongguo. So as you can see, this map shows that world view.

So Chinese people did not encounter challenges from other states, and in such a situation they viewed their country as all that's under the heaven (speaking in Chinese). This idea of equating zhongguo with the world lasted till the Qing Dynasty. However, in late Qing when Chinese intellectuals opened their eyes and viewed the world, they realized that the real world and the world in their mind were two very different things. And they realized that in the

real world China was in a very dangerous position.

So after realizing this fact, Chinese intellectuals were very anxious. They were thinking how and in what direction China should develop and how China should position itself in the real world. And in fact, this is the biggest concern of Chinese intellectuals in late Qing. So the real world was actually dominated by western nation states. Okay. Especially in the 1890s, this sense of anxiety was most prevailing. Especially after Africa was carved up.

So this is a cartoon of the 1890s carving of China. So we see Queen Victoria and the Japanese samurai, France, Germany, and Russia. Okay.

And this is a picture actually drawn by a revolutionary. So Russia was represented by the bear and France was represented by the frog. So China was all carved up by the western nations. So this is how people feel this is the real world. Just think about that. Less than 100 years ago Chinese intellectuals thought they were the center of the universe; now this is the reality. So after they realized the real world, they actually developed new concepts to better position China in the real world.

So after the Chinese intellectuals opened their eyes and discovered the real world, their mindset changed and they started developing new convictions. So the old notion that China equaled the world (speaking in Chinese) was quickly debunked. Rather than believing China was the center of the universe, they realized that actually the world was made up of many powerful states and in particular, the European states and because of their very developed

sense of nationalism had viewed themselves up as powerful nation states. Moreover, these nation states were actually the masters among all states at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. They, not China, were actually the center of the current world.

So according to Liang Qichao, this kind of nationalism and such a formulation of modern nation states were exactly what China needed to learn from the European states. In 1912, Liang Qichao announced that transforming China into a complete state (speaking in Chinese) and enabling it to assert itself in the world was actually the political foundation of the Republic of China.

So in order for China to enter the world and have a position in the world, China needed to be one of those nation states. So almost all intellectuals at the end of Qing considered building up nationalism and constructing a new nation state their top priority. So in that sense, western political theory on nation states and nationalism actually became the dominant political (inaudible) and the most important and powerful theoretical inspiration of the Chinese elite in late Qing. Okay.

So Liang Qichao. A picture of Liang Qichao. So how should we understand the Chinese nationalism in late Qing? I think there are two very important characteristics. First of all, some people had argued that because China as a culture entity existed for a long time, so this transition from China as a culture entity to China as a nation was rather simple. But after I presented the transition, we actually realized that China, zhongguo, becoming a nation state was also carefully and artificially formulated. It's not a natural process. So it is

invented, just like many other nation states elsewhere.

The second characteristic is that we see that a lot of the intellectuals at this time when they try to build up Chinese nationalism they focus on building up a nation state. So Chinese nationalism had a very strong focus on the state. So this is something very important. Okay.

Part three. Okay. So how did nationalism appear in early Republican China? The commitment to build China into a complete nation state continued after the 1911 Revolution. Chinese thinkers, though having different focuses and various perspectives, were all doing what they considered the most effective ways in building up a nation state. So at the beginning of the Republic of China, Chinese intellectuals first tried to build up a modern Chinese nation state via building a constitutional order, adopting the western political model to assert China's position to achieve wealth and power. And then the rather failed attempt of building up this political model and the disappointment in early republican politics led to the new culture movement that is changing the customs and mindsets of the Chinese people to build up a strong nation.

The new culture movement imagined that China would be revived through culture reconstruction. But the new culture movement was not the most effective way in building up the nation state. Chinese intellectuals experienced various political schemes until they settled on the format of building the nation state via building the party state. So this is a very important transition here.

So I need to wrap up. I have two sentences. Okay.

So in order to build up a strong nation state, Chinese intellectuals

realized that they need a disciplined mass politics and the supervision of a highly disciplined pedagogical party. It is only after the establishment of such a party that a powerful propaganda machine was built. And after the propaganda machine was built up, Chinese nationalism in its modern sense, that is a broad, popular identification with China as a sovereignty, a community, and the political entity with limited borders finally arrived.

So at the center of this modern nationalism lay the political parties that had arisen in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. And by the 1920s, these parties had succeeded in dominating the processes through which the nation was being imagined and invented. This politicized nationalism endured and actually, this remains to the present day.

Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you. Thank you very much.

In order to allow plenty of time for questions, I'm just very briefly going to attempt to sum up all debates over 1911 and its success and failure. You know, drawing together these talks is not easy, but I'd like to offer a way to look at this in the context of the two organizations that have really set the terms of debate of 1911's success or failure. And that's the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party over the last decades. And again, this isn't about agreeing or disagreeing, but nevertheless, they've sort of set the tune we all dance to when we talk about 1911 and what does it mean in history.

And I'd like to suggest that one way to sum up all the contending

perceptions, success, failure -- because, I mean, we've had discussions of how republicanism in a sense of culture and society are in some ways a success. Warlordism, through a dialectical process, turned out to be a success even though at the time it wasn't. And then new conceptions of the Chinese nation which spread rapidly thanks to 1911. I'd like to suggest that perceptions of 1911 are governed by political agenda, topic, time, and place as a way to kind of sum all these up.

Political agenda is probably the easiest and I'll start with that, which is I would argue that for the last 100 years for the nationalists and since 1921 with the communists, we've all been debating how each party needs 1911 to kind of be in this sweet spot of successful but not too successful. It has to have disappointment and incompleteness with inspiration and hope. And as someone who looks at a lot of Taiwan, I can tell you that Taiwan in the 1950s was designed to be the fulfillment of 1911. Anyone who looks at Jung Jing Wa and his discussion of -- early discussions of democratization on Taiwan -- it wasn't about democratizing Taiwan. It was about completing the work that began in 1911. And I think it's important to recognize those contexts for it.

For the communists as well -- we won't go into all the details and bore you to death with the idea of China being half futile and half colonial and what that means. However, the half success and the weak bourgeois that gives you the 1911 Revolution and its semi-success is what justifies Communist Party policies and a united front right up through 1949. And so on political agenda, I think it's important to recognize that aspect.

The other area, topic. Let me offer a few ideas how the topic we pick kind of decides whether you think 1911 worked or was a success or not. If the topic is the removal of the Qing, I would argue that's kind of the thing that hasn't been discussed enough. If you consider China's history of monarchy, if you consider how many countries in the world after the removal of the monarchy spent decades or even hundreds of years debating whether that monarchy should return or not, what an unqualified success China is. We can talk about Republican China. 1911 to 1949 is a series of debates and often, you know, horrendous violence. People debating political movements, everything from federalism to liberal capitalist democracy to eventually Leninist party states. Isn't it remarkable how little the monarchy even comes up? And I think in that way if you choose that topic you get a success; you choose warlords, like Ed, you have to look a little harder to have success. It has to be sort of the reaction against the warlords gives you the success.

Finding this idea of time and place. Simply put, 1911 I would argue, in general, looks better the further we get from it, whether it's free and fair elections on Taiwan or an etiological process that leads us to 1949, I would say you have a completely different vision of what 1911 was and its significance than from, say, a young person living in a rural area under warlord control in the 1920s. And I think that's important to remember.

And I'll close with one interesting thing that these two civil war antagonists, the communists and the nationalists, agree more than ever on the nature of 1911. This is a trend that began in earnest with communist praise for

Jong Jingwal upon his death. Again, whatever defects he had, he was always a good Chinese patriot. Events like 1911 and the nationalists' efforts in the War of Resistance are evaluated more favorably than ever on the mainland. In some ways they sound like the nationalists of the 1950s.

I'll just close by saying we really don't have a 1911 Revolution as a single event, but to me in 1911 we have a way to understand the changing nature of politics since 1911 until today. And then with that I will open the floor to questions. We don't have much time for questions. And I ask when you ask, please identify yourself. And I think there is someone with a microphone. So can we start with --?

SPEAKER: Thank you. I'm a visiting fellow in (inaudible). My question is to Zheng Xiaowei.

Thank you very much (inaudible) about zhongguo and (inaudible). But if we discuss about nationalism, I need to know more because (inaudible). So could you tell us more about who lived in the periphery? Who lived in the marginal area? And also (inaudible) in Shanghai Revolution, that is (speaking in Chinese). So that means we need (inaudible) we need a recovery in Chinese countries. So could you tell us what is the significance for the nationalism? Who is (inaudible)? Okay. Thank you.

MS. XIAOWEI: So I will answer your first question first. So who lives in the center and who lived in the peripheral?

So when this term middle kingdom, zhongguo, was first used, it was referring to (inaudible). So in that sense there was (speaking in Chinese).



So all the barbarians lived in the peripheral and the center of the universe was the Western Zhou Dynasty. So that's how this idea of middle kingdom first came about.

So your second question, I wouldn't say that (inaudible) of nationalism is the modern sense of nationalism. It is a mixture of racism and nationalism. And actually, it created big problems because after the Republic of China was declared, Mongolia declared its independence. And the reason that Mongolia declared its independence was that we had allegiance to the Qing emperor but we had no allegiance towards the Republic of China. So very quickly after that, Sun Yat-sen had a new formulation saying that the five different ethnicities should live together harmoniously (speaking in Chinese). So in that sense (speaking in Chinese) they belonged to different ethnicities but they can belong into one political entity. So that (speaking in Chinese) ethnicity is something different from nationalism.

Does that answer your question?

MR. PHILLIPS: The gentleman right beside you.

SPEAKER: As you can see, I'm from India. And so I'm wondering what happened to 2,500 years when Buddhism spread from India not only to China but all over the world. And so how could anybody in 1890 say that, well, everything around is (inaudible) when they have already been swamped by an ideology from their neighbor?

MR. PHILLIPS: Good question. Does anyone -- that's an awkward silence kind of question.

MR. MCCORD: I'll take it. I think one of the interesting things about China is we do have these conceptions such as, you know, center and periphery, and yet throughout its history China has actually been very adaptive. I think the real strength of China has not been that it has a concept of itself as a central (inaudible) that you have to preserve central things and it has to remain that way forever, but rather throughout history it has absorbed things like Buddhism and other things from the outside and incorporate it into this concept of China. And that might be part of the way in which you go from calling for a Han, you know, Han nation to ending up with a nation of five ethnicities. And so I think it's one of these contradictions in Chinese culture but I think it's there.

MR. PHILLIPS: Can we have that gentleman and then up front.

SPEAKER: Thank you. Akira Chiba from Japan. I'd like to build up what Professor Phillips mentioned in his summary -- that is the origins of 1911. And of course, we all know it's implied that it's because of the corrupt Qing Dynasty that led to the century of humiliation that triggered the revolution. But when we look at the origins of the center of humiliation, we know that it started out with the Opium War. And when we look at why the Opium War started, it's because Lin Zexu burned all the opium because the British sold China opium because China monopolized tea. I know that tea doesn't rhyme with rare earth but do we see a parallel in what the Chinese are doing? Are they trying to use their comparative advantage as a strategic leverage?

MR. PHILLIPS: Another awkward silence.

MR. MCCORD: I just think you're getting beyond what historians

like to talk about. I pushed myself as far as I could go outside of history and I would rather leave that to some political scientist out there to answer.

MR. PHILLIPS: We had one lady over here who had her hand up earlier. And then Dr. Lieberthal. Because we are running out of time. I'm sorry.

SPEAKER: Thank you. I'm (inaudible) with (inaudible) Vietnamese Americans.

My question is for Dr. Zheng Xiaowei. The presentation, the conception of nationalism that you presented, is it an official view of China today? So how did you arrive at the conception of nationalism? From what you're saying, "The new political entity of China was formed since 1911, afterwards in the 1920s in a way." So before then the (inaudible) only referred to a cultural center if I did not misunderstand you. The political entity came afterwards and the nationalism that you proposed only arrived in the 1900s. Correct? And so Sun Yat-sen at that time put the meanings into the people's rights and that is adopted from the western ideas. Before then, the people in China, in zhongguo, actually had no rights. They were considered black people. They were people who lived in black houses made of mud. They were slaved. And from what you proposed or what you explained to us, except (inaudible) in the middle, the surroundings were all barbarians and we, the Vietnamese, were considered one of the barbarians. But somehow in the south of the river, there are 100 different ethnics who live in the south. And we were all barbarians.

So then my concern to you is how official is your idea and how is that being regarded by the official Republic of China and the People's Republic of

China today? Because that political entity given by you, a professor, would make a big difference for generations to come as for how we deal with the political entities.

MR. PHILLIPS: Okay, thank you. Thank you. We need to sort of

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MS. XIAOWEI: So how official this view was. I would say that the Republic of China and People's Republic of China would never say this is the official view because we know that the CCP divided Chinese people into 56 official ethnicities, even though there are a lot of problems in the classification of people into those 56 ethnicities. The official line is all those different minorities and the (inaudible) can co-exist harmoniously. So this is not the official line. And no worry about that, please don't.

MR. PHILLIPS: Our last question. Ask, Dr. Lieberthal.

MR. LIEBERTHAL: Mine will be simpler than that question. Ken Lieberthal at Brookings.

I appreciated your focus on zhongguo. It seems to me what changed was the guo in zhongguo. Right? What guo means. But what I never quite understood is how did nationalism -- how did a key term for nationalism come to be (speaking in Chinese)? Because that's distinctly different from what you would think about. I would have thought it would become (speaking in Chinese). Right? So can you kind of play with those concepts and tell us how they relate, please?

MS. XIAOWEI: Sure. I think you raised a very good point. I just

talked to a number of Chinese intellectuals several days ago in Beijing. We now actually use the term (speaking in Chinese) to translate, yeah, nationalism. (Speaking in Chinese) refers to statism. That's a different political thought. So (speaking in Chinese) actually is not a good way to translate nationalism because China's nationalism had this very strong focus on building up the nation's state. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the intellectuals, so many of them focused on building a modern state. So (speaking in China) --

MR. LIEBERTHAL: (Inaudible) you said just now but, you know, for 100 years it's been (speaking in Chinese)? How did that term become the central term with each (inaudible) of nationalism and what does that tell us when you focused your presentation on zhongguo and how guo changed? That's my question.

MR. STRAND: Maybe I could just say one thing. I think Sun Yat-sen, because he stressed social organization and political organization, was willing to treat, I think, everyone in China regardless of nationality and part of this national project. So many people at the time actually used (speaking in Chinese) partly because, as I was trying to suggest, the idea of the state, because it wasn't necessarily as controversial as the disorders of the country, was something that you could use in a more neutral way.

And certainly for Sun Yat-sen, I think he felt that everyone should be part of that. And he was suspicious of Han Chinese and their tendency toward decentralization and localism as he was for any breakaway group. In fact, my reading of his thought is he was more concerned with the center than

with borderlands. And some of his attitudes toward foreign powers, he was more than willing to let this bitter -- that bit go, as long as he could retain the center. And so I suppose in some ways he is a traditionalist but the (speaking in Chinese) is part of the debates during this period of the '10s, '20s, '30s, and '40s. And sometimes used in a relatively clear way as nationalism. The minsu, I guess, is problematic though as you suggest.

MS. XIAOWEI: Some people actually use (speaking in Chinese) to translate nationalism. So it was contested throughout the early republican period.

MR. PHILLIPS: Go ahead. Quickly. Very briefly.

MR. LIEBERTHAL: The terms were contested, right? Which is what makes it interesting. But patriotism was (speaking in Chinese). Right? So again you have this kind of real tension between guo and minsu. Right? It didn't become (speaking in Chinese). Right? So I'm still just uneasy as to when you think of the rise of nationalism in China, it seems to me that centrality overall of (speaking in Chinese) is something that is very important to explain because it is in a sense moving into a different category the central concept of the time. Maybe I'm wrong but it's bothered me.

MS. XIAOWEI: I think the reason it bothers you is we have different understanding about this idea of nationalism. So I actually understand nationalism in a very clear defined and specific way. So I think nationalism, when I use the term, I always refer to the modern nation state. Patriotism, for example, (inaudible) sentiment against foreigners. Maybe you can say that's

patriotism but it's never nationalism. So for me, when I use the term nationalism, it always comes with the building of the modern nation state.

MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you. I'm headed off to look for (inaudible) and all of its earlier incantations to start tracking this down. You've awakened interest.

Can we have a round of applause? And we will reconvene at 4:05. Thank you.

(Recess)

MS. TUCKER: It's so nice to have power.

Anyway, we are now in the last stretch and I'm sure all of you are going to want to get into the discussion at the end because we're actually going to go far enough to do something contemporary and I wanted to start out by thanking Brookings and TECRO for this session, but particularly to thank Richard Bush for helping to remind Brookings that history matters in a town where history generally is defined as the last six months. And so I'm glad you're all here. I think we have a very interesting session ahead of us.

I am not going to introduce our three panelists in any great detail except to tell you that all three of them are very experienced in and educated in analyzing Taiwan, U.S.-Taiwan relations, China-Taiwan relations, the whole thing.

We have Richard Bush, who, of course, is here at Brookings, Liu Fu-kuo, who's come from Taiwan just for this and who is at National Chengchi University, and Tom Gold, who's flown in from Berkeley because the weather has

not been as good there as here.

Anyway, we will do the presentations in the reverse order so --  
no? Who goes first?

MR. GOLD: Well, thank you very much, Nancy. I'd also like to  
thank Richard for organizing this conference and for inviting me to participate.  
I'm very honored to have been included in the program.

The previous speakers have provided a great deal of excellent  
data and food for thought on the origin and the history of the Republic of China.  
The topic that I was assigned is reconstructing the Republic of China on Taiwan.  
I'm going to talk a little bit about the history of the ROC government, it's  
reconstruction of itself on Taiwan, and then it's reconstruction of Taiwan after  
1949, and then how the ROC has been reconstructed as a result of changes  
within Taiwan and the external environment, all of that in 15 minutes -- with  
probably not even 15 minutes.

Now, on the even of its 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary, the Republic of China  
today is not your grandfather's Republic of China or even the Republic of China  
that I first encountered on my maiden trip there to Taiwan in 1969. As is known  
to all, the Republic of China government retreated from the Chinese mainland to  
Taiwan province in 1949 for a temporary stay and it has yet to return to the  
Chinese mainland, but it has also yet to disappear although it has remade itself in  
an extraordinary way. It brought the five UN governmental structures that Sun  
Yat-sen developed to govern all of China to one small province, which had not  
even been part of the Republic of China when the Republic of China was



founded. Although only a portion of the elected and appointed officials of the ROC on the mainland came to Taiwan, it was still a very bloated structure that crossed the Taiwan Strait. It faced several daunting tasks -- and let me just tick off four of them. First of all, it had to defend itself against the communist forces, which were massing to attack. Second, it had to survive in an unfamiliar environment whose population, while predominantly Han Chinese, had undergone a process of decades of Japanization in which the Guomindang government had quickly alienated after retrocession in 1945. The Guomindang government suppressed dissent and debate and the sort of warlordism that Ed referred to earlier, as a way of trying to help itself survive in this unfamiliar environment.

This process of surviving in the unfamiliar environment involved remaking the people who had been through this process of Japanization into Chinese, culturally and as citizens of the Republic of China, a process that was known as tutelage.

When you go and you look around Taibei one of the interesting things is the (inaudible), mainland (inaudible) only remaking Taiwan politically and culturally, but also physically, for instance, renaming the street names in Taiwan to reflect the geography and the political structure and the political symbolism of the Republic of China on the mainland. The education system, the ideology, the teaching of Mandarin Chinese, were all parts of this project by which the Guomindang, coming from the outside, tried to create an environment for itself to survive on the island of Taiwan.

The third task was stabilizing the economy, and the fourth was retaining international recognition and support as the legitimate government of all of China. We know that the ROC government succeeded against all odds beyond anyone's expectations, due to a combination of dedicated and chastened leaders, capable technocrats, private entrepreneurs, a favorable global environment for export, and of course, American support through the hottest years of the Cold War. We cannot and must not overlook or whitewash the amount of violence, terror, and repression -- real and implicit -- that facilitated all of this.

The ROC disproved the saying that there are no second acts in history or that history repeats itself first as tragedy and second as farce. To its credit, the ROC turned itself around to the benefit of the people of Taiwan and beyond. This in itself is an extraordinary achievement and as Steve remarked, one of the other things that the ROC government in Taiwan did was to go a long way towards fulfilling the promise of the ROC, which we heard about in the previous panels.

My first extended stay in Taiwan from 1970 to 1972 coincided with the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the ROC in 1971. If I recall correctly, it was the last time that Chiang Kai-shek made a public appearance at the parade going by the (Chinese term) as his health was failing. In spite of the bravado of that parade, the ROC, which he embodied, was in bad health as well. It had left the UN the same month as its birthday. Earlier that year, Henry Kissinger made his secret visit to Beijing, which was followed by the Nixon trip, and Chiang Kai-shek's

reelection to the presidency the same month of February 1972.

Then you had the added perfidy of Japan's Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Beijing and subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC or Communist China. I consciously said Beijing and Communist China because in preparing for this talk I reviewed the China yearbook from 1972/73 and that's what it says. On Taiwan in those days when we referred to Beijing, we said Beiping, and I imagine that some of you remember the Jun Beiping restaurant in Taipei as well.

Now, at the same time -- I don't know if it still exists or not, but it was the best Beijing (Chinese term) in Taipei.

At the same time, 1970 to 1972 was the same time of the rise of Chiang Ching-kuo as the enforcer of the regime, so you had a lot of these negative trends at that time. At the time I left in 1972, Taiwan certainly appeared to have been -- the ROC to have been abandoned and on a downward slope.

In the late 1960s, before I had got there, some initial steps were taken to remake the ROC by adding supplemental seats to the legislative UN to represent people of Taiwan, but there was still no real sense of the ROC being dedicated to the people of Taiwan per se. Taiwanese were part of the larger mission of preparing for a counterattack to defeat the communists and to retake the mainland. For those of us who lived there at that time, I'm sure you remember the ubiquitous posters, billboards, painted rocks, walls, and mountainsides reminding people all the time of the sacred mission of mainland recovery.

Meanwhile, the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and positions below it were elected by the electorate which did have more direct relevance to the daily lives of the people of Taiwan though there was a great deal of confusing overlap and blurred distinction of jurisdiction between the national and provincial administrations.

Now, for this audience, there's no need for me and no time to rehearse the details of the subsequent decades but I want to highlight a few points to illustrate this theme of the reconstruction and remaking of the Republic of China on Taiwan. First of all, I said when I left in 1972 Chiang Ching-kuo was rising and people were very fearful that whatever progress had been made in terms of improving the quality of political life in Taiwan or the potential for that was being nipped in the bud because of the rise of the maker of the authoritarian regime. Yet when I returned in 1977 to do my dissertation research, Chiang Ching-kuo had remade himself as a man of the people. He recognized quite clearly that with the ROC's increased international isolation he needed to build internal unity and cohesion if Taiwan were to survive separately from a communist takeover. Also, older mainlanders were dying off. Their kids were going abroad to study and were not returning, or if they did return, they were not interested in careers in public service. Therefore it was necessary to bring Taiwanese, to recruit Taiwanese into the party and into the state at all levels, so a new generation of Taiwanese who were brought up under the Guomindang flag, under the ROC flag, and began to be recruited into the system.

Chiang Ching-kuo felt that he could trust them, so he started this

process of (inaudible), or indigenization or Taiwanization, recruiting them into the higher echelons of the party and the state. So, when I returned from my doctoral research in 1977 and 1978, this process was already well underway but at the same time, my timing was very good, this was the time of the rise of the Dong Wai, they were the non-party, non Guomindang opposition which signaled a threat to the mainlander and KMT monopoly of power. I was struck by the fact that Chiang Ching-kuo, and people around him, recognized that Taiwan society in the intervening years had become increasingly complex and what we would now call globalized, so it was necessary to build solidarity on a new basis, not from top down enforcement of unity and stability, but through dialogue, through elections, through loosening up, and this did not happen quickly and it did not happen smoothly. There was a big setback, especially in December of 1979, which was the culmination of another very bad year for the Republic of China, which began with the U.S. and the PRC establishing diplomatic relations. But it was quite clear, beginning in the late 1970s, of the trend of a new basis for integrating and building solidarity in Taiwan.

This process continued with the termination of marshal law in 1987 and the subsequent opening up of the press and the construction of civil society. Chiang Ching-kuo died in January of 1988 and his successor Lee Teng-hui speeded up this process of reconstruction or remaking of the Republic of China. One of the first things he did was to initiate an investigation of the February 28, 1947 incident or massacre, which had a very cathartic effect, it helped to clear the air over unspoken grievances and initiate a process of

reconciliation, which could not be done under the Chiangs. He initiated a complete reelection of the National Assembly in the legislative UN, which were also shrunk. He inaugurated pragmatic, flexible diplomacy, including dealing quasi-officially with the mainland through the establishment of the Straits Exchange Foundation. He also oversaw the 1992 consensus, which was mentioned earlier, whose existence is still a matter of debate, but if you believe that it happened, then it happened under Lee Teng-hui. And in 1996 he, himself, was elected, the first directly elected President of the Republic of China. In 1998 there was the process of suspending Taiwan province to streamlining the ROC in a shrink-to-fit process so that basically the ROC and Taiwan became one. De facto Taiwan is the ROC, ROC is Taiwan.

In 1999, he set forth his two-state (Chinese term) thesis, which also was a formal way for the president to say, there are two political entities, the Republic of China and Mainland China, PRC.

In 2000, he effectively eliminated the National Assembly except in the case of emergencies. So, one of Taiwan's trademarks has been the use of elections to remake, to repopulate, to invigorate all offices at all levels. As a result, the face of the ROC, at home and internationally, has become very different from what it was only a few years prior. It's constantly undergoing a process of rejuvenation.

From 2000 to 2008, President Chen Shui-bian was in an even greater hurry to reconstruct, to remake, the Republic of China. He added on -- in addition to this organizational restructuring, he added on a process of

decinesization, trying to remove many of the symbols that Taiwan -- which reminded people or tried to create the idea that Taiwan was part of China and not an entity of its own. For instance, renaming many companies that had (inaudible) in their name, of issuing Taiwan passports, of renaming the Chiang Kei-shek Memorial Hall and Chiang Kei-shek Airport, and of a process of revising textbooks to highlight Taiwan's history as opposed to mainland China's history. And he set forth his theory of (Chinese term), of one side, one state.

It's clear that Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian tapped into and pushed forward societal trends that had been bubbling, percolating beneath the surface for many years but had not been allowed to actually surface. This process, I would argue, was not initiated from the top, this was not a top down reconstruction, but it was an embodiment and a pushing forward of a lot of things, which had been beneath the surface over a long period of time.

I consulted a more recent ROC yearbook and it presents a very different picture of what Taiwan is. There is a map of China in the back cover, but in the front is a map of Taiwan and the text nearly -- it focuses almost entirely and exclusively about Taiwan, emphasizing this equation of Taiwan and the ROC, the ROC and Taiwan, that China -- that Taiwan is the ROC, the Chinese mainland is something else, it's part of the external environment that shapes what happens in Taiwan, but it is not part of the ROC. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

MR. LIU: First, I would like to express my great appreciation to the Brookings and especially to Richard, for bringing me such a long way to

come to this very important occasion, and I think I can greatly announce that I'm the member of the Republic of China in this very important meeting, so my view here is very much from Taipei's perspective.

My assigned topic for this session is very much on the self power of the Republic of China, and what I'd like to do is just cover what this image of the Republic of China or the existence of a Republic of China carries, because throughout the last few decades when I was born and I was -- I recognized myself, I'm a citizen of the ROC, but outside of the ROC or outside of Taiwan, especially, this name cannot be really (inaudible) in the international community, so I think perhaps up to this moment, what we really need to learn or to ask those questions, how exactly the Republic of China means to all of us, to the region, to the international community, and perhaps even to China. And I think lately, from my engagement with many experts in mainland China, so far there is a daunting task for mainland China to overcome, that is, what exactly the Republic of China means to all of us.

And this is the first part of my question or maybe elaboration I want to really share with all of you. The second one is what sort of power does the ROC carry today, because Taiwan has existed for such a long period of time, the kind of image probably that I can summarize to all of you today. And the final part of my presentation today is I would very much like to share how significant does the existence and leaving example of the ROC present to the world and especially to mainland China.

I come to respond to this question, and actually, there are two



tasks for me. One is to identify the existing example Taiwan carries. The second one I would also do a little bit of elaboration on how exactly currently ROC's strategy today, so perhaps to follow through Ambassador Yuan's presentation earlier, some of the point -- I'd like to use a more sort of political scientist perspective to respond to what we have today, because in the last session, most analysts cover the early time of the ROC, but I will start from World War II, perhaps a much earlier time, and link up to what we have today.

So, because I only have 15 minutes and I will cut short of the historic part because we have an outstanding historian here. Just remember during the World War II, Republic of China was a great friend of the United States and the free world, so struggling through the difficult time, Republic of China remains a close friend to the United States, to many other countries in the region, in the world, and ROC, especially, I would also like to repeat your memory, during the Cold War, Republic of China stand very, very firm on the free world side and also served as a strategic partner of the United States. I think if you remember, Taiwan is at the middle of island chains of the West Pacific, and guarding against democratic value and spirit in the West Pacific, and also ROC was a significant provider and exporter of technical and agricultural advice to many, many third world countries. Just remember before the Republic of China left the United Nations, Republic of China was one of the members of the Security Council. We contribute substantially over the years, even up to today Republic of China government remains serving as such great contributors, and I would not like to go into the detail as Ambassador Yuan already mentioned

earlier.

Quite a number of countries, especially now, are poor countries in the South Pacific and some parts of Africa, Taiwan is a great donor for their foreign aid. And of course, from my early time -- when I was a child -- as a child, a beacon of freedom and democracy in East Asia, we have learned so much already, and I could not stop thinking of one of the interesting points which I believe if we are talking about soft power of the Republic of China today. Over the last few decades, nationalist government in Taiwan under the name of the Republic of China taught our people we have to walk very hard to overcome our mainland -- recover the mainland, but later on we realized that it is almost impossible. And after the middle of 1980 and up until today, we realize, really, from soft power, from another angle, Taiwanese business people already overcome and fulfill the mission. Nowadays you go to many part of mainland China in a big city, in the countryside, you saw many, many enterprises, industry running outside of state run enterprises in China, so overall, this is a part of soft power. And I categorize this as a Republic of China as a legacy; perhaps I can say that this is an image of a great friend in the region.

So, let me quickly now turn to what substance of ROC's soft power today. I think I would start with many different perspectives. Of course, the first one, Taiwan remains a democratic country. We have democratic value, human rights, and open society. Everybody knows this, but more importantly, today I would like to introduce what we have on the economic front and also cultural front. Taiwan is not just a provider of humanitarian assistance to the

international community, but also a keeper of conventional Chinese culture. When we talk about this, Taiwan, Republic of China today, we still maintain very much a conventional or traditional Chinese culture, not just the wars you are learning, traditional characteristic; I think you would recognize that many part of the culture now spreading in Taiwan is really a traditional center.

So, on the economic front, Taiwan's economic strategy after all these years, Taiwan economic miracles, and we are now shaping up into a so-called turnkey strategy which from the exporting products, manufacturing, all together, we are now shaping into a turnkey strategy, so this is a very important part of Taiwan's soft power today. I remember just last week President Ma Ying-jeou in this videoconference with CSIS, he reemphasized that this is part of the power of the Republic of China today. And I think things that he assume -- our president, he has already encouraged the country to work more and develop more on the soft power side, and I think this is the first part. Taiwanese business people are now exporting the turnkey strategy.

The second one is Taiwan over the years developed very important small, medium enterprises, entrepreneurship, and this is very important. Just a couple years ago I visited a number of Taiwanese industry invest -- relocated in Mainland China. Just after I got to the companies, and I realized the feeling and the culture is a tremendously different, it's very similar to Taiwan's, so I realized that how Taiwanese entrepreneurship transformed the culture inside China. And the spirit of entrepreneurship as it covers a harmonious spirit, faithful spirit, environment friendly, responsible, innovative,

flexible, and accessible spirit, all integrated in one.

So, I would encourage, if you have time visiting (Chinese term) and all the high-tech industry invested by Taiwanese business people, you will see that this is a true entrepreneurship which I believe changing the culture of working ethics in China. And this is very much outside of the state run enterprises in China today.

So, if you just walk in and you will find that this is a part of the transformation Taiwan is helping with.

And of course, talking about ROC's strategy today, how we are going to move above this soft power, of course the government is now encouraging, helping more companies to get international brand names, and I think some of you already recognize that when you are using the computer, you will recognize Acer is from Taiwan.

So, this is a very important part of the government's strategy, come to the service industry, come to the high-tech sectors. Overall, the government in Taipei now is trying to increase the competitiveness and this is part of the strengthening our soft power in the government.

So, quickly, talking about the cultural sectors, and I could not really go into that much details about what exactly Taiwan has achieved. On the arts and food, fashion, tourism, and all the strategy we are now pushing through quickly. So, perhaps this is one way to look into what Taiwan, Republic of China today is carrying through.

My presentation, I originally hoped, that could conclude by

suggesting a few points or leading to the future for ROC to work through in the international community because we all know that outside of this political constraint what Taiwan can do is really work hard through soft power areas.

So, number one, I would say that ROC now will continuously put more efforts on the democratic value and spirit. All of you understand that we are now going through a very important democratization process. The second point, I do believe that ROC now, we emphasize more on the soft power (inaudible) diplomacy, and the foreign policy substance, as you can see, more and more we are putting more efforts and resources on lots of part of soft power.

Finally, ROC's soft power approach to Mainland China. There are many fronts except the economic front, we are now helping, developing through personal observation on the ECFA that we have signed last year, and I do believe that that may be a very important force to help China liberalizing their economy in the near future, but of course, more will be coming, and not just economic sectors, but also gradually moving into how China could learn the basic democratic spirit from Taiwan, and I think this is the most important part that Taiwan's people and also NGO and many institutions in Taiwan is now working very hard. Even if we are not just carrying the torch of democracy, but I think the spirit is inside our business with them. So, I personally also engage with Chinese experts and also officials, lots of debate and discussion and gradually they will learn that this is a democracy in Taiwan.

So, let me stop here. Thank you for your attention.

(Applause.)

MR. BUSH: Thank you, Fu-Kuo, thank you, Tom. I'd like to thank all the speakers and the moderators for contributing today. I'd like to thank my staff for their outstanding effort, our colleagues in the communication department and in the conference services department. They have -- from behind the scenes, have contributed to the success of today's program.

So, for the final presentation, what does it matter for cross-strait relations today that 100 years ago the imperial government of China collapsed or disappeared and the Republic of China took its place? After all, the elements of what we now call cross-strait relations didn't really exist at that time.

I would argue, however, that the creation of the Republic of China on New Years' Day 1912 matters a great deal for cross-strait relations. If I didn't believe that, I wouldn't have assigned myself this topic.

The ROC and what it means is, I think, the issue at the heart of the fundamental cross-strait dispute, and unless that's understood, most importantly, by the parties concerned, there's going to be confusion and misunderstanding.

Now, it's interesting that the People's Republic of China has taken the position that the ROC ceased to exist on October 1, 1949, the day that Mao Zedong declared the creation of the People's Republic of China, which raises the question, how can Beijing address the reality of the ROC when it denies its existence?

There's an interesting bit of history here. On the even of the founding of the People's Republic, Mao's initial intention was to continue the

name Republic of China. That, after all, is what Chiang Kai-shek did when he founded the Guomindang regime in Nanjing in 1928, but some pesky intellectuals came to him and said, oh, the communist revolution is so important that we need a new name, we can't just go back -- we can't continue the old name. And so that's the origin of the term People's Republic of China.

One very important element of the ROC is that it is a democratic system and so whatever leaders of the ROC do with respect to cross-strait policy must have public support or the policies can't be sustained and the PRC has to take that into account in fashioning its own policies, but I think we all understand that this has been part of the conversation for the last 15 years, and this afternoon I'd like to talk about three other things. The first is whether the ROC really did cease to exist in 1949, second is whether there can be only one Chinese government in the world, and the third is the issue of sovereignty. It's a bit risky, I know, talking about such arcane subjects at the end of a long afternoon, but please bear with me. The answers to my questions are a little bit interesting. I think they're really interesting, actually.

Did the ROC cease to exist? Beijing's theory about the ROC, as elucidated, for example, in its February 2000 White Paper is "When the central government of the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949, the ROC government was replaced as the government of all of China and its historical status was brought to an end.

This raises the issue, if the ROC was the government of China before October 1, 1949, as even Beijing seems to accept, what was the political

character of the CCP and its army prior to the proclamation of the PRC? Now, Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party had an ambivalent attitude towards and ambivalent relationship with the ROC government. For most of the period from the mid-1920s until 1949 the two sides were locked in an ideological and mortal combat and it's fair to say that the CCP rejected the Guomindang's legitimacy as the ruling party of China and sought to replace it.

But there were a couple of times that the CCP accepted or contemplated accepting the authority of the ROC government. The first was the Second United Front, formed to oppose Japanese aggression around 1937 and under this arrangement the CCP agreed to abandon its policy of armed revolt, abolish its Soviet government, abolish the term Red Army, and put its troops under the government command, and to accept as its own program the three principles of the people, of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which was the Guomindang's program.

The second instance was the immediate post-war era and January 1946, the People's Political Consultative Conference, where all political parties, including the communists, were represented. It passed resolutions recognizing the national leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and calling for the writing of a new constitution pending which there would be a coalition government.

In February of that year, the KMT and the CCP reached an agreement which would integrate the communist armies into the national army. Of course, these agreements quickly fell apart in a climate of deep, mutual mistrust, and -- but the working assumption was that the CCP acknowledged and



accepted, at least temporarily, the legal authority of the ROC government.

Because the two sides were unwilling to coexist and cooperate, the situation quickly degenerated into what we call the Chinese Civil War. Now, I find the term civil war to be striking for a kind of political and legal neutrality. It suggests that the combatant forces in a conflict somehow appeared out of the ether and started fighting. Now, that may be true in some cases, but what usually happens is that a rebel group takes up arms against the established government. That government may be weak, it may not command much legitimacy, but it's still the government.

I mean, if you take the American example for a second, we refer to the conflict that began 150 years ago last month as the American Civil War, that's the common term today, but it was not the name that the Lincoln Administration used, and the most common name then and for years thereafter, at least in the North was, the War of Rebellion. The South, of course, called it something different, you know, the War of Secession, the War of Southern Independence, but as far as the national government was concerned, the South was in rebellion and it was the task of the national government to suppress that rebellion.

Similarly you can make a case that what we call the Chinese Civil War is, in essence, the CCP's rebellion against the national government and it was a rebellion against a government that the communists had accepted at one time. Just because the rebels won control of the Chinese Mainland does not, in my view, negate the existence of that government. Also, if you draw the analogy

from the American Civil War to the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek is Abraham Lincoln and Mao Zedong is Jefferson Davis.

My basic point here is that, at least conceptually, maybe not in terms of political reality, but conceptually, the burden of proof should be on the CCP regime to justify its status rather than the ROC to refute allegations that it ceased to exist.

So, next topic, one China or two? PRC government has consistently held that there's one China in the world, which it represents, and it rejects the idea that there might be two Chinas. Chiang Kai-shek actually took the same position. As he colorfully put it, "There can be no compromise between the legitimate government and a rebel group." (Speaking Chinese.) Note Chiang's use here of the government rebel frame. And he, of course, asserted that the ROC was the sole legitimate government of China and the two governments, the PRC and the ROC contended for about 30 years to dominate in the international system and it's a battle that the PRC has won, by and large.

But the fact of that battle and the fact that both governments had taken a one China stance begs the question of whether that was the only option or does international law permit an alternative, less zero sum solution. Whether Beijing and Taipei would accept such a solution is another question, but the conceptual one is worth asking.

Now, it happens that the United States thought long and hard about the Republic of China in the late 1950s and early 1960s. We were committed to preserving the ROC's membership in the United Nations, but

decolonization was creating a number of new UN members and they tended to side with Beijing.

Drawing on international law, however, American diplomats came up with two theories to justify keeping the ROC in the UN. The first was the so-called “new state theory” and that basically is that the ROC is there, it exists, and the PRC is the new kid on the block, but just because you have a new kid doesn’t mean that the old kid disappears.

The second theory was the so-called “successor state theory” and that is that the country China, which in 1945 was a founding member of the United Nations, has been succeeded by two states, one large and one small, PRC, ROC, and that these both should succeed to membership in the general assembly.

Now, these theories remain just that, theories. They were tactical devices created by American diplomats to make it very difficult for the PRC to accept coming into the UN on those terms. Chiang Kai-shek rejected a two China solution until it was too late, and so it was the PRC that took the China seat in the UN in October 1971.

My only point is that the international marginalization of the ROC was only one of several possible conceptual outcomes and the sort of creativity that American diplomats demonstrated four decades ago is available for cross-strait relations should Beijing be willing to exercise it.

My third issue is sovereignty and I think that that question is -- concerns the legal and political status of Taiwan and its government authorities.

I think it's highly relevant to the broader issue of the ROC. So, is the ROC a sovereign entity in any significant way? The PRC view, as I read it, is no. The Taiwan view, of course, is assuredly yes. Sovereignty is a complicated concept. There are different dimensions to it. If you want to put yourself to sleep I have a book that I wrote that I suggest to you, but for our purposes, two are relevant, one is international legal sovereignty and that's where a government and its people may participate in the international system and we've talked about that. The other is called Westphalian sovereignty, which refers to independence vis-à-vis outside parties and non-subordination to them. The issue here is whether the governing authorities of a particular territory, however they're organized, have the absolute right to rule within their domain. Now, these authorities may choose to limit their powers in some way, delegate them to some international body, but they'd do that voluntarily.

Now, when it comes to Westphalian sovereignty, and I really think that's been the issue of rivalry between the two sides of the strait over the last three years, there are two questions: one is whether Taiwan's legally a part of China and the other is, if it is, how? And this is a sort of long and complicated issue, but I think the key point is a great majority of people on Taiwan believes that the Hong Kong formula for uniting with China, called One Country, Two Systems, is unacceptable because Hong Kong is not a sovereign entity and that the ROC is a sovereign state, and it's the existence of the ROC that makes the Hong Kong formula unacceptable.

So, to sum up, I would cite what I think are facts. Number one,

that the ROC government on Taiwan can trace a historical lineage all the way back to January 1, 1912. Second, the Republic of China was the successor state to this Qing Dynasty. Third, that it has ruled somewhere continuously ever since 1912, and to this day, and all of this gives Taiwan a standing vis-à-vis Beijing that no other relevant political entity possesses, neither Hong Kong nor Macau or any province of the PRC. That's a bit more complicated, but it's still different. That Beijing claims that it is the sole successor state to the ROC does not make it true, and after all, it has a vested interest in that claim.

As we've seen, at least conceptually, regime change need not produce a single successor state, you could have two, and as we have seen, the historical lineage that the PRC can claim is to be an armed party that rebelled against the ROC. My basic point is that if we think more creatively about the history of the ROC and what it means, it opens up new possibilities for resolving the fundamental cross-strait issue in the future and unless the PRC is willing to address and accommodate the reality of the ROC in such creative ways, it's never going to achieve its political objectives. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

MS. TUCKER: I'm going to be relatively brief, but I do feel compelled to bring the United States back in to our discussions. I am, after all, an American diplomatic historian as well as a specialist on China and Taiwan, and the United States has been very absent, not completely, but pretty absent, today, and it's really important, I think, because Sun Yat-sen was in the United States in 1911 when the revolution happened, and Americans, making an

obvious, and I would say superficial, connection, called him the father of his country and the George Washington of China.

But Sun was, as we know, rapidly pushed aside by Yuan Shikai who would go on to try to make himself emperor and Americans found this whole struggle in China largely opaque. They thought of China as far away, exotic, and largely irrelevant to what they felt they needed to know about the world. And then Woodrow Wilson became President and decided that he did understand what was happening in China and that the United States had to weigh in on the side of morality rather than money or power as his predecessors Roosevelt and Taft had done. And therefore Wilson went on to recognize the Republic of China, even though China was on the verge of civil war, and the fact that the operational head of the Guomindang had been assassinated by the new president. He also pulled the United States out of a banking consortium which he said was necessary so as not to exploit China, but as a result, he forced the new government to borrow money from Japan with, as we know, not terribly good results.

Now, the specific story here might be unfamiliar, but the larger elements, I think, have a very contemporary ring. Repeatedly, in its history, Washington's approach to the Republic of China was ill advised and uninformed. Americans conflated U.S. interests with those of the Republic of China, convinced themselves of shared ideals and goals, and thereby encouraged the ROC officials to assume U.S. support, and this confusion led to disappointment during the Second World War, during the Chinese Civil War, and during the Cold

War.

The real nature of the ROC was, in fact, less important than the image it constructed and the picture that the United States wanted to see. The soft power that Dr. Liu just talked about proved very powerful, crucial, in fact, to the survival of the ROC, and I would say today, ironically, the ROC is a bastion of democracy, which it certainly wasn't under Chiang Kai-shek, and a preserver of Chinese culture.

Dr. Liu contends that Taiwan businessmen living in the PRC have already, in essence, recovered the mainland for the ROC given their influence across Chinese society and China's economy, but for the time being, there continues to be a practical divide here despite Taiwan's influence inside the PRC and the constructive talks between Beijing and Taipei. Accordingly, as far as the U.S. is concerned, let's be honest, we deal with two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan, in a very practical and pragmatic sense, as we have since 1949.

The story that Tom Gold talked about of the ROC's development on the island of Taiwan actually involved a large measure of American economic, cultural, military, and political assistance, and this paralleled the acknowledgment of and the acceptance by the United States that the People's Republic of China could not be overthrown and would endure. So, here we have two Chinas, two entities that the U.S. government has to deal with.

Now, it's worth noting, as Richard Bush has observed, that Beijing often refers to the American Civil War to justify its actions and that this analogy is largely unpersuasive. I think for Americans, more relevant may be the fact that

having fought the British and long been hostile to them in the wake of the Revolutionary War, and despite the growth of American nationalism and American power, two English speaking entities have survived and prospered, cooperating, but not reunifying. And so today the United States has not abandoned the Republic of China, although currently, as has happened before, there are prominent Americans who are urging Washington to do so.

Dr. Bush argues that cross-strait stalemate reflects the muddled successor state conundrum that he believes must give way to some form of shared sovereignty. Beijing, he thinks, has to understand that the existence of the Republic of China makes a wholly PRC formula for resolution unworkable.

As we embark on the post 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary era, peace remains the central U.S. goal, but that depends, I would contend to you, on creativity that allows the ROC and the PRC to work together, whether as part of a single China, or as two separate, mutually respectful sovereign states.

The floor is now open to questions. The young man over there? And please identify yourself and make these questions or very short statements, please.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible), PhD candidate in Chinese history at Johns Hopkins University. I have a question -- it came from Dr. Liu's presentation but I think it might have relevance to maybe everything. Speaking of soft power, this is something that I've -- and I hope this doesn't -- or at least the beginning of my question doesn't come off as being superficial, but I've always thought about this interesting tension between -- when I think about soft



power, of Taiwan, of the ROC over on the Mainland, I think about the various TV programs and popular music and, Professor Gold has written about popular music, that refer not to just the republican era but the team Princess Pearl, (Chinese term), the most popular talk show that's watched by young people from the Mainland produced in Taiwan is called -- I mean, it's a play on names of their host but it's called (Chinese term), it refers to the most (inaudible) Emperor of the team, and in Mary Rankin's keynote address she actually brought up the very interesting episode that happened in 1895, the Taiwan Republic, which was another very, very short instance of some elite reformers from the Mainland in collaboration with some elite performers from Taiwan --

MS. TUCKER: Could you make it a question?

SPEAKER: My question is -- is Taiwan the fulfillment of just the ROC or is it the fulfillment of this imagined state, going back to Professor Strand's presentation, that really came from the late Qing and we should not take 1911 -- we should take 1911 seriously but maybe it should also help us think about other sorts of political culture, social culture that led up to this, and that is also played out. I mean, preserving --

MS. TUCKER: Okay. Thank you.

MR. LIU: Thank you. This is obviously complicated question, I cannot really respond in such a short period of time, but I think you pointed out quite rightly. Taiwan is now influencing Mainland China in all ways, not just the way I mentioned, but I think you probably also recognize if you travel lately, especially after what we call (Chinese term) revolution. I would presume --

actually, last month I was traveling in Beijing and Shanghai, I noticed that Taiwan's TV program cannot be shown lately and many important newspapers from Taiwan, their websites have been blocked, cannot be seen, but I think if the case you mentioned, Taiwanese TV performers or movie performers make the contract with Chinese producers, then they would be okay, but I agree that even the New Year's Eve programs run by CCTV, Taiwanese TV performers are now occupying a very important part of that program and also attract lots of attention in Mainland China.

So, I do believe that in the years to come Taiwan will have more influence over this soft power. Thank you.

SPEAKER: Thank you, Linda (inaudible), Chairman of Asian Corporate Governance Association, Beijing, Hong Kong. I have a question for Professor Liu. You mention about Taiwan's soft power, it seems to be in some ways quite effective in influencing the way either the business is done, the culture of the business people, and so on. Now, since Ma Ying-jeou's election, Beijing has been pushing soft power as well, you mention (inaudible) and the (Chinese term) expanding the facilities and so on. From your viewpoint, does it have any effect, and if so, what kind of effect Beijing's soft power has had since the election of President Ma Ying-jeou?

MR. LIU: This is a very difficult task for me, but I should think that currently we are opening up (inaudible) with each other, more and more influence, not just one way influence, but also mutual influence. Just last week I know that the new round of tourism, the flight negotiation, we are preparing to

open up to 500 flights in a week, so that will be beginning some time from this summer. And in that kind of situation I would say that you are quite right to say that not just Taiwanese influencing China, but also Mainland China is now trying to influence Taiwanese.

Currently, I think most of you probably already observe the awkward situation after Ma Ying-jeou took over the presidency in 2008. More and more communication across the Taiwan Strait, but the public survey in Taiwan shows that Taiwanese people, more than half don't like to have a closer relationship with China, and so far political scientists in Taiwan cannot really figure out the reason because after 2008 we have more Chinese tourism -- tourists are coming to Taiwan, and perhaps a good and bad image left in Taiwan, that may be -- my observation is that is early part of communication, closer communication begin to society. It happens, but as long as we can continue this current course, people would know each other more and then we would tolerate - - we would understand and then gradually move into much better stage.

But talking about political angles, how exactly Beijing would be influence all these actions; I have some reservation on that. From my understand, Beijing is a very cautious and very careful about sending any message to Taiwan because the experience they learn in the past, it would be much better for them just to keep quiet, not to do anything, otherwise probably they cannot have Ma Ying-jeou. Instead they would help DPP to win the next election. Thank you.

MS. TUCKER: Yes?

SPEAKER: Hi. Thank you. (Inaudible) with *Legal Daily* of China. First, I should say, sorry for we Chinese create the problem for the American people, but my question, as we know, the clear and consistent policy of U.S. government that there's only one China, so I just wonder, how do you elaborate this policy? What do you mean by saying "one China"? Thank you.

MR. BUSH: We could have a whole program on this but in my personal opinion I think it means mainly that there's not two Chinas and, you know, we made that decision some time ago, and furthermore, the Chinese government that represents the Chinese state in the international system is the Peoples Republic of China. We are much more ambiguous when it comes to applying a one China principle to cross-strait relations and to the issue of unification and there our focus is very much on process, how unification might take place, how the fundamental issue is resolved, and not on the substance. We don't endorse anybody's point of view on that and what we don't want to see is sort of unilaterally change in the status quo.

MR. TAYLOR: Hi. I'm Jay Taylor, an independent writer. I think Richard Bush would make a very good international lawyer. He has some very good arguments, but I'm afraid Peking -- (inaudible) Beijing -- Peking, I'm afraid, can come up with equally persuasive legal and historical arguments. The Civil War, for example -- I mean, the Confederacy -- they had some very good arguments, legal arguments, historical arguments, for their right to separate. After all, the Constitution didn't forbid that and the Declaration of Independence that when a state or a body finds themselves at odds with a ruling group they can

secede. They made these arguments. They persuaded many European countries that this was persuasive. Britain was on the brink of recognizing the Confederacy and it was the Emancipation Proclamation that prevented that.

Anyway, I think the end -- these legal arguments are really not going to have any role except in perhaps justifying whatever position we take and they will justify whatever position Beijing takes if it comes to a conflict over these questions.

What really will determine whether the legacy and the realization of the revolution of 1911 in Taiwan, whether that continues for the long-term, and if it does, it will have a profound effect, I think, on developments in China as suggested here -- that will be decided, I think, by relations between the United States and China, by the power of China and the United States and how these are reflected and come out of internal politics in both countries.

I'm sorry. Would you comment on that?

MR. BUSH: I don't disagree at all. I did want to make the point that these arguments that we hear with great intensity which leave us with the impression that that's the only answer to the question, it's not necessarily true, if one wants to be creative about it. I do detect, I think, Jay, from your accent that maybe you're from the South.

SPEAKER: Gerrit van der Wees, editor of *Taiwan Communiqué*. I have a question for Richard. Richard, you asked about the relevance of the ROC for today and the old civil war was, of course, one where the communist party and the PRC does represent the one China, about Taiwan and its future, I

think on Taiwan we still see some folks hanging on to the old one China heritage but opinion polls on the island show that large majorities see themselves as Taiwanese and really want to be accepted internationally as Taiwan. The other day I was a guest at the Voice of America and there were questions from China and one caller from China said, well, we should drop the ROC and replace it by the People's Republic of Taiwan, and I thought that was an interesting thought, and he said, well, in that way it will not be gobbled up by China -- my free translation of what he said. The basic question is how does Taiwan have a better chance internationally if it does present itself as Taiwan or if it does represent itself under the old ROC myth?

MR. BUSH: I think that that's a sort of issue that's being battled out. We had the strategy of the DPP government, which had certain results. We have the strategy of the Ma administration, which has had modest results. And I'd refer you to a program you'll probably hear that we had a month or so ago about international space for a mixed picture on that.

I don't sort of dispute your reporting about the polls. I think you report them accurately. The problem with at least some polls on Taiwan is that the questions are not exactly designed to reveal the complexity and -- of Taiwan peoples thinking and, you know, it may be that if we had more sophisticated polls it would confirm your impression, but I think that it is at least possible that -- just - - even though most Taiwan people love Taiwan, and that's what they identify with, that that doesn't rule out a variety of sort of different types of coexistence with the mainland, and that's an important task for the Taiwan political system to

sort of better clarify what those possibilities are.

Fu-Kuo, did you want -- you don't have to if you don't want to.

MR. LIU: Okay, just very quick. Thank you. I think I would agree with Richard. This effort we have been doing since the time I became a graduate student and almost in my generation and my parent's generation, we have fought for this effort. But unfortunately my very humble or perhaps brief impression that if Taiwan is going to do something in the international community, we have to settle the relationship with Beijing first. Good or bad, this is the way that we need to really cope with, so I personally very much -- feeling convinced that we need to do more with Beijing rather than just spreading lots of energies outside of the region. That may be the core for Taiwan to really work hard through. Thank you.

SPEAKER: Hi, I'm Darvey Lee from Georgetown University and also an intern at the Mansfield Foundation currently and I have another question for Dr. Bush, if he doesn't mind.

Given the current rise of China and, of course, the PRC, do you think it is really a viable thing in the future for Taiwan and China to coexist? And if so, how would the international community and Taiwan work to keep the status quo as it is?

MR. BUSH: I think there are a couple of variables here; one is the degree of strategic patience on Beijing's part. We know what its goals are and we can see its strategy at work and the -- but I think that it would take some time for that strategy to play out. I think it takes more creative thinking about -- on Beijing's part on how to resolve the fundamental dispute. Until that happens, the

coexistence and maintaining the status quo is probably the better option. The bad outcome would be, you know, if either side or particularly Beijing got impatient and decided to push circumstances before they're ready to be pushed.

What was the other thing I was going to say? Oh, I do also think that it's important for Taiwan to do some homework. There are a number of things that Taiwan has to do to maintain its position in the status quo. I think it needs to ensure that it has a truly world class competitive economy, it does need to strengthen itself militarily, improve its relations with the United States, it has to have a better understanding of what it means to say that the Republic of China is an independent sovereign state, and what that means for cross-strait relations. If it doesn't strengthen itself that way, sort of reconstruct itself for this new era, I think it may be that the growing power, a symmetry between the two sides of the strait, will lead to a loss of confidence.

MS. TUCKER: I would only add that a couple years ago we were very worried because China had deadlines on how quickly unification had to happen and that Taiwan had to act. More recently the position has been, we want to prevent independence and we understand that unification is far in the future. I think China believes time is on its side and, I guess, in the interim, as Dr. Bush says, Taiwan has a lot that it can do to help its own situation.

SPEAKER: Thank you, (inaudible) with *Voice of Vietnamese Americans*. To follow the trend of thought, Dr. Bush had proposed that we can have two sovereign entities -- Taiwan has proven that you are very responsible players in the region and recently I attended the speech by President Ma, and



this morning the ambassador was here and then Dr. Liu. You all have proven that Taiwan has played its part as the responsible partner in the region, in the Pacific, and in the future the U.S. and the international community are looking for what to -- the other partner in the transpacific partnership. So, would that be possible that we propose for Taiwan to have its own seat in the UN? And also in ASEAN -- in the group of people, the countries that could have some vote or say so in maintaining the peace, prosperity and security of the Pacific Ocean?

And I also have a side question for Dr. Liu. With the soft power and your intention to be the center of traditional Chinese culture, what would you do with China -- Chinese plan for -- with the Confucius Institute?

MR. BUSH: The brief answer to your question is that, you know, the state of play since October 1971, if not before, has been that the PRC's goal has been to drive Taiwan from the international system. Now, you know, if one thinks creatively there are ways for Taiwan to come back into the international system and play a constructive role, but it really requires more flexibility on Beijing's part to allow that to happen.

Other major countries would not stand in the way, international law wouldn't stand in the way, it's really up to Beijing and I think what Beijing does on this is very important in terms of its image within Taiwan itself.

MR. LIU: Thank you. This is the task President Ma Ying-jeou is now working very hard, but I can report to you that two years back our president, President Ma, already proposed that starting from the writing characters, Chinese men and people are using simplified characters. We are using traditional ones.

So, for the younger generation in Mainland China, they cannot recognize ancient literatures because they were all written in traditional form. President Ma already proposed that we should greatly combine such writing, maybe aiding more traditional writing into the simplified characters, and I personally feel fortunate, Beijing government already agreed and then gradually a group of experts are now working together.

So, talking about Confucius Institute, I do not believe that our Taiwan Academy is looking into competing with this institute because talking about Chinese culture, we are really doing the same job -- doing the same thing. But perhaps just looking from business or commercial point of view, maybe both of the institutes in the global community are competing for some business opportunity but I personally do not agree that this one is from our government. Really targeting culture can be teaching with Mainland Chinese because if you look around -- looking into the substance, the materials that we are supplying, we are carrying almost the same things with Mainland China and currently our government is trying to develop a more culture relationship with Mainland China. So, even if currently there is no direct communication on this cultural cooperation, but it has been put on the agenda. If not this year, perhaps next year, there would be a cultural cooperation agreement, should be considered, should be signed. Maybe next round of the (Chinese term) talks. So, that may be the direction I can offer to you. Thank you.

MS. TUCKER: I wan to congratulate everybody in the audience for making it to 5:30 and I wish you would join me in thanking the panel for great

presentations.

(Applause)

\* \* \* \* \*

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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