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THE FUTURE OF LIBYA:  
A VIEW FROM THE OPPOSITION

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PARTICIPANTS:

**Introduction and Moderator:**

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**Featured Speaker:**

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Interim Prime Minister  
Transitional National Council of the Libyan Republic

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## PROCEEDINGS

MR. POLLACK: Good morning and welcome to Brookings. I am Ken Pollack, the Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and I am absolutely delighted to see you all here today. First before we begin our program, let me ask everyone to please make sure that all of your cell phones, for any you who still keep beepers or any other electronic devices, iPads or what-have-you, are all silenced please.

I am delighted to have you all here today because we are welcoming a very special speaker to our Statesmen's Forum here at the Brookings Institution. I know that he doesn't need a very long introduction because of he is the reason that you are all here, but nevertheless I am delighted to welcome Dr. Mahmoud Gibril Elwarfally, the Interim Prime Minister of the Transitional National Council of Libya to the Brookings Institution today. For those of you who are not familiar with him, Dr. Gibril, the Prime Minister, holds a master's degree in political science and a doctorate in strategic planning from the University of Pittsburgh. From 2007 to 2009 he served as the Chair of the National Economic Development Board and led the National Planning Council. He also has quite a bit of private-sector experience including leading a regional Libya-based business consultancy. We will begin with some prepared remarks

from the Prime Minister, then he and I will sit and I'll ask him some of the most basic questions and then we'll have an opportunity to take some questions from the audience as well. With that bit of introduction, Mr. Prime Minister, the Brookings podium is all yours.

MR. ELWARFALLY: Thank you very much. I'm delighted to be here and honored. Thank you for hosting me this morning. If you'll allow me, I'd like to start since there is a concern of time by giving a broader context into what's happening in Libya and in the Middle East in general.

I would argue at the beginning that what's taking place is a natural product of the globalization process that started in the mid-1980s. We have witnessed some results from the financial and economic scene and now we are witnessing the new global cultural paradigm paying off some real concrete results in the Middle East. I would say that what happened in Libya cannot be separated from what's happening in Egypt, from what's happening in Tunisia, what's taking place in Yemen and what's taking place in Syria. And I would also argue that this is a reversible trend, a new global cultural paradigm based on global values, common values shared by many young people in the world, and the Middle East is no exception at all; calling for human dignity, living with dignity, democracy, more involvement in the political process, more

participatory role in every daily life affairs of any country of the Middle East. Therefore I would say that this trend will continue to make some sound effects in our daily lives in the years to come.

I started with this notice just to establish from the very beginning that there is a strategic interest for the United States and all countries of the world to pay close attention to this phenomena. This is a new trend and it's a reversible trend. Which means I would argue even the cognitive framework of analyzing and looking at foreign policy should be revisited, that cognitive framework of foreign policy which was inherited after World War II and was revised slightly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now we are facing a new phenomena where the communication process is the name of the game, where knowledge is spreading like hell, you know. It's well known that knowledge is duplicated now every 7 years, human knowledge. By 2025 it's going to be duplicated in just 76 days. So this speedy thing will reflect its results in educational systems, in communications system and the mass communication that took place, that revolution is going to affect our lives more and more either in terms of knowledge, in terms of behavior and in terms of organization of the structures that are needed to face this phenomenon.

Having set this theoretical framework, just to help me introduce the Libyan picture because when the uprising started in Libya on

the 17th of February, actually it started 2 days earlier, but the 17th of February is the actual start of the revolution. When it took place, those young kids took to the streets peacefully looking for a democratic structure, a democratic government structure, looking for a dignified life, looking for a better future because they had been living for 42 years, them and their parents, under a dictatorship, a tyrant regime, which deprived them of every opportunity to have a dignified life. There is no better education, there is no medical services, all failure after failure of all developmental projects that have been introduced during those 42 years. It's enough to say that unemployment exceeds 30 percent in a country whose population does not exceed 6.3 million people with a vast amount of wealth because of oil revenues. So there is a sense of deprivation, a sense of despair. If we couple that with this international communications revolution taking place as reflected in Facebook, the internet, Twitter and everything, so people don't have a need to get into a party or into some sort of association. Communication is taking place naturally. They don't need space and they don't need time. They can communicate anytime and they don't have any space to meet. Therefore there was some sort of bigger picture that those people who took to the streets in Tunisia and in Egypt and in Libya, they all constitute one big party and that's the part of the future. They are all looking for the same future, calling for the same

type of slogans, because they are inspired by the same cognitive mind, the same new system of values.

Unfortunately the regime on the other side was looking at the picture differently, still the same old story that using repressive measures counting that the complex of fear is there so it can be capitalized, just firing in the air would do the trick. To the surprise of the regime and to the ignorance of the regime also, this new generation has no fear whatsoever because the socialization process which brought about the new value system is a completely different one from the socialization process we've been exposed to as the old generation where fear as a value is the central complex we all suffer from. Therefore the regime tried to benefit from the experience of Tunisia and Egypt, not to give any concessions, not to negotiate, fire live ammunition from the very beginning and that was the biggest mistake. Because the moment they started firing live ammunition, that first group of martyrs or deaths that took place were the fuel of the real revolution. It ignited more coming to the streets, more people coming to the streets. Then different strata of the society were marching into the streets and protested against this manslaughter that started to take place.

I would argue in a quick note that the regime realized from the very first week that they do not have enough personnel to put down that uprising, and therefore they resorted to something which I call wicked,

and to be honest very brilliant. They tried to go for more killing because more killing will call for the international community to intervene, and if the international community intervenes then Gaddafi will turn the story from being Libyans against Gaddafi into Libyans led by Gaddafi against the international foreign powers. This is his card that he is playing right now by hitting the strata hardly and hitting Western -- either he calls for partition of the country or he calls for ground troops on the ground trying to call for liberation against those foreign powers.

For us on the TNC realizing this fact, we tried from the very beginning to create some sort of structure just to assure the outside world that what Gaddafi is saying about civil war, about a vacuum, about illegal immigration coming from Africa and threatening the security of Europe, about the shortage of oil, all those fears about al-Qaeda, all those fears that he is trying to project to the outside world to protect him from this popular revolution, were urged and were compelled to intervene immediately and call for the establishment of the TNC the purpose of which is to talk to the outside world with one voice that Libya is one, it was in the past one country and it's now one country and will remain so in the future. One country, one people, one history and one future with one capital which is Tripoli because he started playing the card of partition from the very beginning scaring the Libyan people on the west side of the

country that those people, the Libyans coming from the east, are going to occupy you and do this and do that.

Therefore to clarify one of the misunderstandings circulating in different circles of the media, the TNC is not a political organ. It's an administrative organ managing this situation for the Libyan people until the fall of the regime because the political question of who should rule Libya and how he or she should rule it, this is for the Libyan people to decide through a political democratic process based on constitutional grounds, based on an active civil society, based on equal rights and natural human rights for everybody.

Then some other questions started to circulate. Are we safe with this TNC? Are we safe with this group? We note some cracks and some disagreements within this body. I would like to assure everybody that the TNC first of all represents the whole Libyan territory. Just 2 days ago, the last meeting which was convened in Abu Dhabi and Doha with 27 representatives from local councils from the western part of the country and the southern part of the country, they just traveled this morning up to Benghazi to join the TNC to prove that this a national umbrella encompassing all of the Libyan territory and all of Libya's regions.

The second thing is we started expanding the Executive Body of the TNC. Now we having about 14 ministries and the Executive



Body of the TNC trying to deliver every service and every commodity that our people might need during this critical time of our history. Unfortunately we are facing a very acute financial problem because of the frozen assets that we have in different European countries and in the United States. So I would like to seize this opportunity and to call on the United States administration to help us as they helped us, President Obama particularly, in particular his call for the end of the legitimacy of the regime, that this regime lost its legitimacy and should leave. This was very inspiring to many Libyan people that they are not alone in their fight against dictatorship, so I want to thank him for that call. And I want to thank all the free world who stood by us in this fight against tyranny.

Now if we move a little bit further toward the military situation, I would like to clarify something. This revolution started as a peaceful revolution. It's not an armed struggle against a tyranny or against another army. Armed struggle was forced upon us because of this genocide which was taking place. This killing machine was slaughtering people day and night by the thousands. The expectation and the estimate was that over 11,000 people died during those 12 weeks of manslaughtering. We still have -- and gone, you know? Too many people are fleeing their country, you know. Going to Tunisia and to the Egyptian borders. The United Nations just yesterday -- before yesterday -- released its last report saying that

over 750,000 Libyan country fled their country. This never happened in our history before.

We, despite all this agony and this painful human tragedy, we're very much optimistic about our future. Our people in Misurata, they managed with those light machine guns against this mighty military machine to liberate their city and they are marching west toward Tripoli. Those towns in the western mountain -- all western mountain towns are liberated now, and they are hoping to break the siege of that mountain to march toward Tripoli.

Active uprisings started to appear in the capital city of Tripoli itself during the last week and the week before. So we are very much optimistic that people started to gain confidence, taking things in their hands. Military are improving and gaining ground. This is against all allegations circulating that there is a stalemate case on the ground. That's not the case at all, you know.

Two, we are much better organized today thanks to Gaddafi because he gave us enough time to mature and talk to each other, develop a common understanding, a common vision for the future, common vision for development, common vision for a roadmap, even after the fall of the regime. What should be done and concrete steps. This is due to the fact that we have enough time, despite this agony, to talk to

each other to have better time to reorganize ourselves, regroup, and divide our responsibility and try to carry it properly.

I think there is a lot at stake for the United States and the free world, you know, to come to the savior of Libya. Because Libya could serve as a model not only for other Arab revolutions such as Egypt and Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, but I think it could serve as a model for Africa.

And I am emphasizing Africa in particular because Africa will be the most expanding continent in the next 35 years. Africans will be marching toward Europe. More than 359 million Africans will be jobless by the year 2050. If we manage to create a real democratic model, real successful developmental model on Libya, this will be an oasis of peace. A real hub of development that could be followed and imitated by too many African countries. Libya can be the gate of development, bridging Africa with Europe, which will be shrinking, by the way. Europe, by 2050, will be less 72 million people.

So, I think the strategic real solution for development and peace and stability will be Libya, serving as a model for other Arab countries who are witnessing revolutions right now and solving developmental -- chronic developmental problems on the African continent.

Thank you very much for your listening and I will be ready to

take your questions. Thank you.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for that.

That was a great way to start us off, and I think that you've laid a very nice foundation.

There are a few questions I'd like to ask you that, again, I think are foremost in Americans' minds before we open it up to the audience. And I think the first one is effectively where you ended your remarks.

You talked about the military situation, you talked about the fact that most Americans have the perception that the military situation in Libya -- notwithstanding today's very important and very hopeful events -- that there is a general sense that the military situation is bogged down into a stalemate. And I think that it would be very helpful for Americans to understand how you and how the Transitional National Council are thinking about a strategy for bringing this war to a successful conclusion.

MR. ELWARFALLY: Okay, first of all, I disagree that there is a military stalemate on the ground, you know. First of all, if we look at it from -- let me use the terminology. Let us get out of the bogs, you know. We've been asked this question several times that you are not able, as a freedom fighter, to settle this conflict militarily. And I always reply by saying the regime is not able to settle it militarily, not the freedom fighters,

you know.

Because the regime, with this mighty military power -- heavy tanks, armored vehicles, ground missiles -- at the beginning even jets, you know, airplanes, again, some civilians with just, like, machine guns. Never -- there is the regime for 12 continuous weeks, they could not settle this militarily.

Not only this, the freedom fighters are marching towards Tripoli. So, as I said in different occasions, I think when there is a conflict between the right of power and the power of right, the power of right always prevails, you know. Because those people have will, have determination, and they have nothing to lose, you know. And they elected to exercise their right to die, to live, you know. They want to die to live. And there is nothing -- there is no defense against that, you know.

So I am optimistic that there is no stalemate. People are marching, gaining more confidence. They are getting better experienced. They are gaining more ground, more organization. I think that few coming weeks will witness more grounds, you know, to be gained by the freedom fighters, you know.

Regarding the strategy of solving this issue, I would say that Gaddafi has two tools right now: the power to kill and the power to bribe. I think paralyzing his power to kill is a must, you know, for any political

solution to be reasonably have a chance of being a base for negotiation, you know. Without having that in the near future, I would say any political solution on the table will not be looked at by the regime, you know.

Talking about cease fire without being part of a continuous political process, leading to the departure of Gaddafi and his regime actually is a partition of the country, which we refuse, we reject, you know. As we said, the main purpose of establishing the TNC was to insist on the Libyan unity in terms of territory, people, geography. Libya is one and will remain one.

Therefore, I would say now there are four types of pressure. Positive pressures. There are better protection of civilians, better application of 1973 resolution. Their military strikes are hitting command and control, this is number one. Number two, freedom fighters are gaining more ground and better confidence in themselves. Three, the ICC indictment and warrant -- arrest warrant -- is about to be out and this is a real political pressure, the early indicators of a real uprising taking place in Tripoli itself.

All those four elements, I would say, are pushing toward more squeezing and strangling of the regime. So I would say either an internal crackdown will take place or a total collapse of the regime will materialize in the next few weeks, hopefully.

MR. POLLACK: Mr. Prime Minister, I'd like to pick up on the point that you mentioned in those remarks where you said that -- and you talk of a cease-fire political solution. Is there a political solution to the current -- to the fighting itself? Could you imagine a cease-fire that you would trust given Gaddafi's history? And what would that look like? Take us through what a successful political resolution of this conflict, rather than a military resolution, the conquest of Tripoli by the freedom fighters.

What would a political solution look like? What would you need to make that work?

MR. ELWARFALLY: Well, there are some political initiatives on the table right now, you know. There is the African Union, what they call, Initiative, which is, I would say, not a comprehensive political initiative because actually its main emphasis is the immediate cease-fire without talking about what's next, the cease-fire. And as I said, you know, for such initiative to be a viable base for negotiation it should include some elements securing that initiative meet the legitimate rights of the Libyan people, which was highly -- clearly emphasized in the 1973 resolution of the Security Council.

There is also a Turkish initiative which was out lately. And I think it's more comprehensive, and I would say it could serve as a viable overall frame for negotiation. Too many things can be clarified during the

negotiation process. That initiative clearly indicated the departure of Gaddafi and his regime, which is the strategic objective of this revolution, that we want to get rid of this tyrannical dictatorship. We want to establish our democratic rule in the country.

So I would say that the Turkish initiative is more comprehensive because it started listing about 10 points and it contained some points which are, I think, taking care of both phases: the phase of the cease fire and what implications follow that, and then the phase of establishing a political process leading to the Gaddafi departure and his family.

We in the Council lately are preoccupied of developing our own political initiative, which is capitalizing on all initiatives on the table, you know. Trying to take 1973 resolution as the overall frame, based on which we can develop something compatible with that resolution and, at the same time, compatible with the aspirations of our people, you know.

MR. POLLACK: We heard the news just before we came out that you're going to be meeting with President Obama. And while I wish that our session was going to follow that meeting so that I could ask you what you did say to him, I'm going to have to content myself by asking you instead what will you say to the President? In particular, what are you going to tell him about the role that the United States can play? What



would you like to see the United States doing?

MR. ELWARFALLY: Well, if I meet President Obama, first of all, I would really thank him, you know, for the role the United States has played so far. And I would strongly urge him to play a more active role because there is a lot at stake, strategically, for the United States if that role is not played properly, you know. There is a lot to be lost, you know.

MR. POLLACK: Okay. With that cryptic answer, I guess I'll have to content myself. Why don't we shift over a little bit more to the political side?

I think one of the great questions that a lot of Americans have for you is, how do you plan -- let's say that we can bring the war to a successful close. The regime is gone, and now the Libyan people are fully in control of their country. How are you thinking about -- what's the strategy for building a new Libyan political system, a new Libyan economy, a new Libya. Because as, of course, as we've seen with our own painful experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the reconstruction is the hardest part of any fight. And if you don't get started with a strategy and a plan for doing that right from the get-go, coming up with one once you've won the victory is often too late.

MR. ELWARFALLY: I think you are absolutely right. That's why in the Council, you know -- now for probably three weeks -- have

established probably three teams, multidisciplinary teams, you know. One team is concerned with the reconstruction of Libya after the fall of the regime such as what happened in Kuwait, for instance. The second team is concerned with the social reconciliation process, the South African model. And the third team is concerned with the capacity building. Because if we want to initiate or establish a governance structure after the fall of the regime, then having the right institution and the right skills, the right qualified human resources, is a must, you know, to start delivering the necessary services and outcome needed by the Libyan people, you know.

Therefore, I would say that we came up with what we call a roadmap. It's a transitional roadmap.

full of the regime and immediately that he (inaudible) should call for the convening of what we call the National Congress. National Congress compose of members of all regions of Libya, all cities and towns. Take into consideration the relative demographic weight of each town and city. The function of that National congress is to select the committee which should draft the constitution. That constitution should be laid out for a referendum supervised by observers from the United Nations.

Having that constitution approved, then the election for the first Libyan Parliament after the victory of the revolution will be in place. Two

months after we finish the parliamentary elections, presidential elections should be there. During this period, there should be an interim government. That interim government is a mixture of members of TNC, some elements, democratic members, democrats from the old regime, especially financial (inaudible) economic, because these are vital functions that we need. We know who's who and where are the background of everything, the history of everything. There should be two or three elements from security, two or three elements for military officers, one judge from the Supreme Court, and a group from civil society and social leaders.

The name of the game here is two things. One inclusion, we have to include everybody just to establish legitimacy of that interim government. Two, which is more important, to prevent any chance for chaos and disorder to take place, such as what happened in Iraq. Hopefully, this theoretical map can be materialized after the form of the regime.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. I have to just say that just listening to you sketch it out, you're clearly well ahead of the United States as we were engaging in our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. So, by that light alone, you've already bested us.

Why don't we open it up to the audience and take some questions there? Why don't we start right here?

MR ARIKAT: Mr. Prime Minister, on March 11, Mr. Aujali and

Mr. Shamam met with the Treasury Department and the Department of State to talk about the release of the funds and to talk about recognition. Here we are, two minutes later, and there's been no release of funds and no recognition.

How long will the regime last after these two things?

MR. ELWARFALLY: Thank you of raising this question.

Honestly, this is a big hurdle that we're facing in the TNC right now. And yesterday and today we'd be meeting members of the Congress, trying to urge them to help us in this regard. We are facing the real crisis; we are running almost out of money. We have different demands and expectations of our own either in the eastern part of the counter or in the decision cities which are surrounded by Gaddafi. Or those Libyan people in the Exodus, the Tunisian borders, I think their number exceeded now 40,000 people. So, we have a real human tragedy in the making right now, but it's overshadowed, unfortunately, by those military activities. But the real tragedy is underneath. There is a real human tragedy.

We tried several proposals here. 1973 revolution inflicted or imposed some restrictions on those assets by being frozen for the Libyan Government. We are not recognized by the United States. So, they cannot release the money because we are not replacement officially yet for the old regime. Ironically enough, the United States is declaring that the regime lost

its legitimacy. So, it's not recognizing the other regime by the very fact of this official statement. There is the TNC, what we are trying to say, we need a political recognition by, thus, recognizing this council as the sole legitimate representative interlocker of the Libyan people. We are not talking about a new state and presence and it needs recognition. Even this is not successful, this political recognition. It worked out with Qatar, worked out with Italy, with France, with some African countries such as Gambia, Malawi, the MALDEF. It worked out, and there are some other countries which about to recognize the council in the near few days, by the way. So, we have a legal problem here.

We tried another proposal by trying to convince them, and there is something now when Senator Kerry yesterday declared that he's trying to develop legislation to release some of that money. I heard that it's around \$180 million or something, though, as you all know, that our frozen assets exceed \$54 billion. Our estimate of our immediate needs during the next six months exceeds 3.6 billion dinars, which equals \$3 billion. So, we are trying to convince them okay, keep those assets and use them as a collateral against which we can have some clear decline just to try to meet the demands of our people. Even this, so far, is not working, but, hopefully, the Appropriation Committee is trying to develop another approach of solving this problem.

I think the time is the crux of the matter because having solved this problem in a matter of four or five weeks might be too late. That's why our finance minister said yesterday that we need this money yesterday, not today, because there's a sense of urgency, real urgency, because of this human tragedy in the making right now.

MR. ABUZAAKOUK: Aly Abuzaakouk from Libya Human and Political Development Forum.

First of all, welcome, Dr. Mahmoud, to our capital here, and congratulations. Britain already recognized and then asked to (inaudible) for the Libyan Council there.

My question is that we have all the NATO countries hitting Gaddafi almost daily, what is the strategy to get those countries to recognize the National Council?

MR. ELWARFALLY: My understanding, or at least this is what I gathered from meeting his different political leaders and officials from different countries we meet, there is an understanding of recognition as a legal requirement only. Trying to convince them of what I call the political recognition, it seems to some of them is not convincing enough. Either they recognize you as a state better than me, for a state, it has three requirements: trajectory, government, and people.

For the eastern part, we have people and we have trajectory.

If we declare a government, then we are a state, but if we do that, then we are a separatist movement. Gaddafi would say well, this is what I've been telling you, that the people on the east, they want to separate themselves, they want to partition the country. That's why we call this executive bill, it's not a government because of that political concern. Nevertheless, it put us in a squeeze from the outside world, that I need the three elements, so recognize. I mean, this is a tricky situation. Damned if you do, damned if you don't. If we need the recognition, we have to go for a government. If we go for a government, then we are separatists.

Trying to help them use their TNC as interlocker for the time being, a representative of the voice of the Libyan people. If you are convinced of the legitimacy of this revolution, of the legitimate demands of those people, then some political steps have to be taken. Unfortunately, so far, some governments (inaudible) and they came (inaudible) recognize the council. Some will do in the near future, and others, they still see that this is a legal restriction that they cannot overcome.

SPEAKER: Yes, my question is about the roadmap. If I understand it well, it's asking for election for the freed areas now. I think my question is why and does cities like Misurata and Az Zintan considered freed areas and why?

MR. ELWARFALLY: Considered to be what?

SPEAKER: No, I mean if the roadmap, according to my understanding, asking for election in freed areas now. So --

MR. ELWARFALLY: No, no, that's not true. We do not call for elections. We call for elections only after the fall of the regime, after the constitution is drafted and it's approved by the Libyan people, and then we call for the first parliamentary elections. But this is after the whole Libya is liberated. So, all cities and towns of Libya can take part in that electoral process.

SPEAKER: Thank you.

MR. POLLACK: Three rows back, there's a gentleman who's been rather eagerly -- thank you.

SPEAKER: Thank you very much.

My question is: Dr. Gibril, are you satisfied and happy as far as NATO is doing its mission? Are they succeeding in their mission as far as bringing the Gaddafi regime down? And, also, another, how much support do you have from the people of Libya today?

MR. ELWARFALLY: Well, first of all, regarding NATO operations of Libya, we are talking about the protection of the Libyan civilians, and the resolution even states clearly that whatever measures need, it should be taken to accomplish that objective, of protection of the Libyan civilians. I think NATO strikes lately are more effective. They are



more responsive, more quick, and I think talking to NATO (inaudible) several times during the early days when there were some complaints about NATO's responsiveness or quick responsiveness to the atrocities and the genocide taking place against the Libyan people.

We discovered that the decision-making process had a lot to do with the quickness of the response of NATO members. I gathered that there's about 28 members, so, it's a committee making a decision, and a committee of 28 members is completely different than to making a decision of a coalition where it's led by one country. So, the time span is completely different, but I would say NATO now is more active in carrying out the responsibilities of 1973 resolution.

Regarding the popularity, I would rather talk about the popularity of TNC and not myself. TNC represents for the time being the national consensus of the Libyan people, and, as I said, this is an administrative body which was selected through a consultation process. But when the political question of who should rule Libya, that's a political question which should be settled through electoral process.

MR. POLLACK: All right, let's keep moving back a little bit.

SPEAKER: Yes, Dr. Gibril, you have mentioned that your force are marching towards Tripoli. Do you have any timeline that you see that you take over that city?

And the other question is: Are you seeking some arm assistance from the United States of America? And if you could explain to us what kind of Arab countries providing to you in terms of arm assistance?

MR. ELWARFALLY: Well, when I said that the freedom fighters of Misurata are marching to the west, we don't have a timeline or don't have a timetable because actually those freedom fighters are defending themselves. They're not an army that has plans, you know, to do something, you know. They are hit and they are trying to fix themselves, you know.

When I said they are marching west, they are trying to join hands with their brothers in the next town, which is Zliten, in an alliance to protect themselves against this tyrant's regime, which is slaughtering them day and night. So, it's a process of self-defense.

I always try to remind myself and others that this is a peaceful revolution. It's not an armed struggle, and I always remind the distinguished members of the media that please don't forget that this whole uprising started as a peaceful, legitimate process of the Libyan people trying to look for a better future. It was crushed inhumanely, and they are forced, you know, to resort to whatever they can get to defend themselves, you know.

So, I would rather not get indulgent in talking about military

plans, because this is not a military struggle. The nature of this is a peaceful revolution, you know. But it was squeezed into that tunnel, you know.

You just notice, you know, when Gaddafi started bombarding Ajdabiya, for instance, during the last week, the whole thing stopped. This is an armed struggle. We wouldn't have a cease fire, a temporary cease fire. It was a natural instant cease fire taking place without any initiative, without any negotiation simply because Gaddafi stopped bombarding Ajdabiya. And everything stopped. People are defending themselves. They are returning fire. They are not initiating it, you know.

What's the other question please?

SPEAKER: Are you going to seek some Arab (inaudible) sent here from the rest of America and what kind of help you are receiving from the other countries. There's talk about trainers --

MR. ELWARFALLY: We really appreciate the assistance of our brothers, you know, something with the JCC, then the Arab League, who called for the protection of the Libyan civilians in the first place and who called for the no-fly zone, you know.

We are seeking every type of assistance from our Arab brothers, you know. Qatar played a very decisive role in assisting us. The United Arab Emirates did the same thing. Kuwait pledged some financial

assistance and some other economic assistance and sharing their experience after the aftermath of Kuwaiti invasion. Jordan is pledging all types of support; Morocco, the same thing. So, I cannot distinguish between one Arab country and the other. All of them are recognizing the plight and the agony and the human tragedy that the Libyan people are going through. So, I would like to seize this opportunity to thank them for this brotherly stand.

MR. POLLACK: Let's take one more quick question, and we'll take it right here in front. Gary. And then I'm going to have to ask everyone to please remain seated after the event, because diplomat security needs to move the prime minister out.

MR. MITCHELL: Thank you.

Prime minister, I'm Garrett Mitchell, and I write *The Mitchell Report*, and I want to ask if you could put a little bit more flesh on the notion of the vision that you've talked about at several points in your remarks.

I'm interested to know whether this group that met in Doha and that is assembling into these groups is focusing on specific tactical and executional challenges for the country, whether you have, over and above that enormously important work that you've started with, a picture in your head collectively about what Libya in the year 2025 -- what does it

look like? What's happening in Libya? And, importantly, because you said at the outset that this was a bunch of -- I think you said young people who were really leading this revolution -- are they part of this process and are they part of this vision?

MR. ELWARFALLY: Okay, this is a very strategic question, you know. During 2007 and 2008, a group of Libyan professors from the University of Garyounis and other Libyan universities and Libyan practitioners took part in an exercise to develop what you call Vision 2025 for Libya. It was based on the following factors.

First, reading of the global scene today, you know, where things are moving globally -- where we see demography, capital, and human resources population. Those are the three factors that will shape the 21st century, the interaction between those three factors, where Libya can be positioned within its regional context and global context in terms of competitiveness. We have depleted commodity. We depend on it because it's (inaudible) to the economy. We have only oil, and the oil reserve is, you know, whatever their duration is going to be, 25, 30, 35 years. So, it's a commodity that is going to deplete one day or the other. So, we have to think of an alternative economy. But it's not a haphazard selection. It has to be based on this positioning of Libya, which identity of an economy that can help us compete regionally and internationally so we

can get the hard currency so we can feed our people find housing for them, provide them education, health, blah, blah, blah.

And we managed during that exercise to pin down that Libya can go with a service economy based on knowledge you know, where a human development be the crux of the matter. Education, a new type of education, a new paradigm of education is emerging. We moved it from access to knowledge to the management of knowledge, and therefore the whole curricular, the class, administration -- everything should be revised, you know.

That exercise came out in a document that exceeds 2100 pages, you know, because we went through all sectors of the economy. In each sector there is a roadmap that should take us to that scene of Libya -- democratic Libya -- where the private sector plays a very active role, where there is a quality between different segments of members of society, where is no gender ethnicity in religion. All these are take into consideration -- independent judiciary authority who are talking about accountability, talking about transparency, you know, all the elements that make for rational governance, a good governance.

Reaching that stage, you know, and Libya, in my opinion, is a must, because Libya is facing four types of challenges right now -- a demographic challenge because the Libyan population is shrinking. Our

growth rate dropped from 4.8 to 1.5 just three months ago. That's very scary, because Libya among 28 countries plus 5 by the United Nations facing this population decreased. This is, in time, where the rest of Africa is expanding exponentially, you know. Egypt, by 2025, will be 117 million people to our east. Algeria and Morocco combined by 2025 will be 92 million people, while Libya in 2025, will be 8.1, you know. The Sudan on our south will be 73 million people. Africa as a continent will be 1 billion to 158 million people, you know, so it's a must. It is inescapable that there is going to be an African march coming from the south going to Europe, you know, looking for a better life.

That's where we tried to develop that Libya could be the link, you know, to develop this developmental model, not serving only the Libyan people through finding an alternative economy, but also serving the continent by making this transformation in the process of the skills of Africans to serve the needs of the European economy and within also the type of skills that are needed. Europe by 2025 will be needing 110 million extra skilled laborers just to sustain the current level of productivity. So, the equation is there. It's ready, you know. All it needs is the real (inaudible). We sustain the course and we can make it. This is the first type of a challenge.

The second type is the depletion of oil resources, and the

third type of challenge is the scarcity of water resources. Libya and the Emirates are the worst in the world in terms of the share of each individual for water resources. And the fourth type of challenge is the diminishing sense of the state in the minds of people. People don't respect the state anymore because of the state of chaos that's taking place and lack of institutions, lack of rule of law during the last 42 years, you know. That's why corruption was widespread in the country. You can do whatever you can do, you know. Nobody will tell you the state of law sometimes is applied in a selective manner if you are not cooperative enough to be involved in some corrupt practices, you know. Other than that, we have a state of a jungle, you know, where, like, what (inaudible) said, the state of nature where all against all, you know. This is what's been taking place at least in the last 10 years in the country.

Therefore, those four challenges -- if we do not attend to them immediately, I think Libya will be in a very, very serious position, you know, as it might be characterized as a failure state. With this uprising coming into existence, there could be a solution, because this is a new generation with the Libyans of the Diaspora and some of the qualified Libyans inside. We have the qualified Libyan resources to do it. We have the financial resources. We don't need some assistance, financial, from anybody. All we need is the real political will to do it and the right vision to



accomplish it.

MR. POLLACK: Mr. Prime Minister, you've been incredibly generous with your time, and we can only wish that your vision of Libya is one that is fulfilled and perhaps even before 2025.

Again, I need to ask everyone to stay in their seats while we move the prime minister out, but please, from your seats, join me in thanking the prime minister, Mahmoud Elwarfally. (Applause)

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## CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

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