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**PANEL 4: SOUTH AFRICA**

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PICCONE: Good morning, everyone. We're having a slow Friday morning start, but thank you all for coming on another beautiful spring day. We're going to proceed right away with the program as you have it in front of you. We're going to start with a discussion on South Africa, which has a lot of rich material to review. And I think our lead speaker will have some slides to walk us through, and I will turn the floor over to our moderator, Pauline Baker. Thanks.

MS. AMOSU: He was confused by our locations. Good morning, I'm not Pauline Baker. I'm Akwe Amosu. Welcome to the session this morning. Special thanks for getting out here early enough to take part. And it's a real honor for me to share the stage with these two leading thinkers on South Africa and African affairs.

Presenting for us this morning is Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairperson of the South African Institute for International Affairs in Johannesburg. He's a leading voice in South Africa, challenging failures and weaknesses in South Africa's foreign policy and on the domestic front, too; the author of *Architects of Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing*, which was a pretty important intervention in the discussion about what's going wrong in South Africa; and he's the deputy chairperson of the South African -- oh I said that -- he's deputy chairperson, South African Institute of International Affairs.

Discussing Moeletsi's paper will be Pauline Baker, president of the Fund for Peace, president emeritus of the Fund for Peace. She has taught foreign policy and diplomacy over many years at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, at Johns Hopkins and before her academic career what's

a staff director for the Senate, Foreign Relations Committee. And following the pattern yesterday, I'm not gong to read both bios in great detail. You've got them there in your notes.

We'll kick off Moeletsi for 10 to 15 minutes -- he has a PowerPoint -- and then ask Pauline to discuss aspects of his comments. And after that we should about half an hour for discussion.

Moeletsi.

MR. MBEKI: Thank you very much, Akwe.

Well, I first came across this problem, I suppose. What I was told was a problem, which is that they are these emerging democratic countries that are not promoting democracy on the world stage. There was an article in *Foreign Affairs*, the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations. There was an article by a former Mexican foreign minister who raised this issue in his article, and at the time -- it's about a year ago -- at the time I was very curious what this gentleman was on about. Actually, I concluded that the Americans had put him up to it, so I didn't think any further about what he said until I got an invitation from Brookings inviting me to prepare a paper on this subject. So, now I was even more convinced of the Americans -- they've got a trick up their sleeve.

So, that's how I came across the --

For me, a promotion of democracy by governments on the world stage -- I am totally opposed to it. And I will show you how our government operates in that field. I see democracy promotion by foreign governments as a form of proselytizing, which we in Africa have been huge, huge casualties of proselytizing by Christians and by Muslims. And it's been a cover for all sorts of

atrocities against the African populations in the process of apparently converting them to Christians and therefore to be good people or converting to Muslims and so on and so forth. So, I don't think it is the business of states to proselytize about what other states should be doing.

This is one of the reasons why you find people in Africa are quite comfortable. Even our governments are quite comfortable with China, because China does business; it does not proselytize about whether you should be a communist, a capitalist, a socialist, or whatever else. They just pay the world price for oil and pay the world price for diamonds, for gold, for whatever and go home -- or, if they want to invest they put in their money and do it.

So, I think for the African people the proselytizing has a long history and has a very disastrous history.

So, my own view is that the stage in international relations should do what states so in international relations, which is to deal with the two hard issues that states are concerned with, which are the security of their country and the security of their populations and also the economic interests that countries have between themselves. It seems to me that those are the hard aspects of international relations and of relations between states. They are softer aspects of relations between states, which I've tried to put under item 3, but some of them actually may belong to HUD -- aspects like intellectual property rights and so on. But essentially I think they are essentially the hard aspects, which are national security-related aspects and economic aspects and then the softer cultural exchanges and human rights considerations.

Democracy in my view is not a terrain for relations between states.

As long as we have sovereign state under the current state system that has been around since, I think, the 17th century, it is -- democracy is a domestic terrain. As we have argued in our paper, it is a result of a contest between social classes in a given territory for redistribution of political power and resources within that society. So, by definition ages of democracy do not operate in relations between states. They operate in a given political economy.

If you look in any country under the sun, they don't have identical social groups, and even where they similar social groups like, say, a capitalist class, a capitalist class in South Africa is not the same as one in the United States or in the United States the same as one in Japan and so on. So, there are many, many forms and manifestations that this takes.

So, in my view, democracy is not a category of international relations. Democracy is a domestic phenomenon that applies in the domestic arena. Now, we've had and especially the United States and the United Kingdom have been saying they are promoting democracy in the world. In my view this has been a cover-up for all sorts of machinations that they have been doing. The Soviet Union used to do the same thing as well, because who in the United States is going to promote democracy amongst the social groups? How can the United States Government promote contest for redistribution of political power in a particular society? It does not have a particular social group to do that.

What does happen and what I think is acceptable is that you have non-state actors like civil society who sympathize with one group or another in a given society. We had, for example, about how civil society in Turkey supported

or opposed the Turkish government's support for Al-Bashir in Sudan. We in South Africa, for example, were beneficiaries of civil society in the United States, which pressurized the Congress in particular to put sanctions against the apartheid system in South Africa. But that is not a state intervention. It was a civil society intervention that brought about -- that pressurized the state. So, my main objection is states themselves pretending that they can promote democracy in other countries. I think this is really a cover-up for other issues.

Now, if I can turn to the foreign policy specifically of the South African government today, first, in terms of the hard issues that I address, the South African government does not consider itself to be faced with threats to ease security. I was very interested yesterday in the discussion of -- especially about India and about Turkey, that they are faced with all sorts of trends. Next door to them, they have nuclear power, nuclear armed adversaries, like India has vis-à-vis Pakistan, Turkey vis-à-vis Israel or vis-à-vis Iran, which is trying to build up its own nuclear arsenals.

In South Africa we don't have that sort of environment, so our government does not consider itself to be threatened, so we don't have an environment of building up an armed response, so to speak. We have had an acquisition of weapons, but this has largely been restricted to the Navy, which I think at the instigation of the United States and NATO leaned on what government to be a first line of defense of the Cape Sea route, which is a very important choke point in terms of wells and commerce. So, South Africa has built up -- has bought submarines, corvettes, and related equipment. But I think, as I say, it was -- and a great of the training of this Navy is actually undertaken by

AFRICOM, which is the Africa Command of the United States.

On the land borders it's the same thing. South Africa, because it does not see itself as having enemies, it hardly patrols the border. I think the land (inaudible) forces of South Africa, the last pieces of equipment that it bought were 30, 40 years ago, because, again, South African states do not perceive itself to be threatened by other states, which is what I think was discussed yesterday.

Again, the control of the border. One of the South African -- South Africa has been pressurized by countries like United Kingdom to control its borders more because of the movement of al Qaeda via South Africa to the United Kingdom as I explained then.

So, in terms of the South African government, it does not see itself as threatened. Even on the economic front, it does not see the South African economy as requiring its own inputs in terms of the international relations. It sees the South African economy as essentially owned by the white population rather than by the state as such or the people of South Africa. And it sees it as owned by multinationals. So, again, there are no efforts to defend the economic assets of South African citizens from, for example, being seized in Zimbabwe, which is what has been happening over the last 10 or 11 years.

What is interesting is that the South African government in fact, precisely because it doesn't see the siege of these assets as being damaging to the national interest, has been rewarding the Zimbabwe regime. Recently the South African government gave 300 million rands to the Mugabe regime allegedly for agricultural development, which is a bit of a mystery to us. How you

achieve agricultural development under the circumstance that you have in Zimbabwe, so -- which brings us to the point which I raised initially about how states, when the claim to be promoted in democracy actually have hidden agendas.

The South African government is a classic illustration of these hidden agendas. The hidden agenda or not-so-hidden agenda of the South African government vis-à-vis Zimbabwe is that the ZANU-PF from the Mugabe regime has a common thread to its power that the South African ANC government sits with in Southern Africa, Southern Africa being a very industrialized part of sub-Saharan Africa or Africa generally where the large trade union movement.

If you look at the mineral belt in Africa, the metals and mining belts -- that's from the Democratic Republic of Congo and stretches all the way to South Africa and Namibia and Angola and so on, and because of this we have very strong trade unions in Southern Africa. And the trade unions have decided to start opposing the traditional nationalist movements by setting up political parties.

The first one to do this was in Zambia, which won an election against President Kaunda, who was the liberator or the father of Zimbabwe's (inaudible) as they like -- or Zambia as they like to be called.

The second party -- country where the trade unions formed a political party is Zimbabwe with a movement for democratic change, and this movement within six months had been an open election against ZANU-PF in February 2000. And since then, elections have been rigged in Zimbabwe, which

is why it has not been winning. But essentially, it has been winning elections since 2000.

In South Africa, the ANC sees the biggest threat to his power as coming from the trade unions again and other civil society organizations, which is why it is patronizing the ZANU-PF regime with donations like the 300 million rands that I indicated.

What is that one can say about promotion of democracy. South Africa is definitely not promoting democracy in Zimbabwe, although it says it is promoting democracy. If anything, it is patronizing the power of the ZANU-PF regime. So, can we generalize about -- in conclusion, Madam Chair, can we generalize about whether South Africa promotes or doesn't promote democracy? I think one can't generalize in that respect, which is why I was saying from my point of view I would rather states did not get involved in trying to proselytize.

South Africa actually does two things. It supports anti-democracy in the case of Zimbabwe, because it does not want the trade union movement to become the base for new types of political parties. But in other countries like Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and so on, it does play quite positive roles in creating or in facilitating -- let me put it that way -- for example, negotiations between the parties in the DRC and in Burundi and in helping in the democratic process. So, I think my confusion really has taken me back to what I said at the beginning. I think the states promoting democracy, in my view, is a recipe for disaster, which is not to say civil society -- institutions, organizations, and so on -- should not support other civil society that are striving for democracy like we saw in our own country, South Africa, with the support we got from other

civil societies throughout the world to oppose the apartheid system.

Thank you.

MS. AMOSU: Thank you very much, Moeletsi.

Let me hand it straight over to Pauline to respond to.

MS. BAKER: Thank you.

This is actually a very difficult case study in many respects. First of all, South Africa compared to the other case studies in this project is the newest, you might say, of the countries that are part of the EMDs.

If you think of it, it's foreign as dating from the end of apartheid. So, in many respects, its foreign policy is even more a product of its past or its reaction to its past, and in a sense it hasn't had a chance to really get into the nitty-gritty of foreign policy balance-of-power politics and came to power -- the regime came to power -- basically on a wave of world support for a government that was expected to be a leader in the human rights and democracy promotion field.

In fact, in 1993, one year before he became president, Nelson Mandela wrote in *Foreign Affairs* magazine that, "The time has come for South Africa to take up its rightful and responsible place in the community of nations. South Africa's future foreign relations will be based on our belief that human rights should be the core concern of international relations, and we are ready to play a role in fostering peace and prosperity in the world we share."

So, the vision of Mandela was quite different than the vision that Moeletsi has described for us here. And I think the world was very hopeful that South Africa would fulfill this role.

Now, in the beginning it did start to do that, even though the world understood that the priority of the new government would be addressing domestic needs. This clearly was the uppermost concern and foreign affairs was not a high priority, particularly in respect to the fact that South Africa had no enemies, as Moeletsi said, no real, real threats from the outside. In fact, it was just the opposite.

The apartheid government's aggression in the rest of the region has left a legacy of suspicion and somewhat fear on the part of its neighbors that the new nationalist and now legitimate government was inheriting basically a substantial amount of power even though South Africa had given up its nuclear weapons before the transition. But still, it had a very professional army and security force. It had a successful reintegration of the guerilla fighters from the ANC and PNC into those security forces.

Its economy is clearly the most advanced economy in sub-Saharan Africa. So, it still had the potential to be sort of Big Brother in the region. And both the ANC and the other governments were very conscious of the fact that they wanted to rein in this image and not be seen like its predecessor government as a hegemon in the region. So, while the expectations were that South Africa could lead the continent, there were a number of internal constraints based on its history that went against that.

Nonetheless, Mandela, in his short tenure, hosted talks even at his inauguration in 1994 with the U.N. and the OAU, which was formerly the African Union, and key governments to consider an African force to help and the genocide in Rwanda, which was taking place basically at the time that the

transition was occurring in South Africa. So, you had this horrendous problem on one part of the continent and this great hope in South Africa occurring simultaneously, giving two images of Africa.

But that was overreach on Mandela's part, and it soon became clear that South Africa could not, for many reasons really, participate in such an intervention. But the fact that he hosted talks during his inauguration showed that he still was clinging to this vision that South Africa would be a leader.

Nonetheless, Mandela also played a role in providing security to stabilize Burundi. He played quiet a role, an outspoken role anyway, in criticizing Sani Abacha in Nigeria after he executed Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was an environmental activist in the Niger Delta. In fact, Mandela claimed that Sani Abacha had personally given him assurances that he would not execute Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other activists, and so he felt personally betrayed when in fact those executions had taken place. So, he spoke out as no other African leader had against the brutal regime of Sani Abacha in Nigeria.

Mandela also approved sending Dee Minors to Angola at the end of its civil war, and later on South Africa also intervened very directly in Lesotho in 1998 when there was an attempt to overthrow the democratically elected leader there. Now, this intervention in Lesotho, which is a small country totally surrounded by South Africa, could be argued was a threat to South Africa itself, because it was of the geographical location. But the intervention, which actually went quite well in terms of achieving its objectives, was highly controversial both in South Africa and in Lesotho. It created a great deal of resentment. It raised this flag again of the potential hegemonic power or use of power by South Africa

on its neighbors, and the lesson of that basically was they're not going to do it again unless there are really very extenuating circumstances.

Now, Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki, Moeletsi's brother, also played a strong role in Mobutu's transition in 1997. And South Africa provided peacekeeping troops there. It hosted peace talks and trained former rebel combatants to join the national army in the DRC. And Mbeki also made a reputation for himself by being the primary force behind the New Economic Policy for African Development, or NEPAD, which basically was a bargain that the African leaders were proposing to the West. And the bargain was that African states would adopt principles of good governance, reduce corruption, and respect human rights to effectively partner with foreign donors on aid to promote development. So, it was an attempt led, really, by South Africa to really change the image and conduct of African governments and present a new face.

So, there had been thrusts forward to promote democracy in Africa, although on an ad hoc basis. With not much planning and strategic vision, it's more on an ad hoc basis I would say.

Now, in many instances, though, South Africa's been criticized for not supporting democratic regimes. And basically there are drivers or four factors that I believe are responsible for this.

The first is the loyalty and payback that South Africa believes it owes to those countries that supported it during the struggle to end apartheid. And this is the reason why -- and even Mandela spoke out in defense of this decision -- why it has supported Suharto's Indonesia, Libya, and Cuba, all of which were on the forefront of supporting the ANC struggle.

Secondly, South Africa makes decisions based on its economic interests. You might say economic -- political interests if you want to include Moeletsi's interpretation of the role of trade unions. So, this explains, for example, Pretoria's decision to sell arms to Rwanda. South Africa has a thriving arms industry. It is using that both for its foreign policy and for its economic development. And it also influences its role in the mining belt in Southern Africa, particularly, again, in the DRC where Mbeki was criticized for all of the good that was being done for being too soft on Mobutu and also Mobutu's successor, Kabila.

Now, the third factor that is driving, I think, South Africa foreign policy is the desire to be a major player encountering the West. Again and again, South Africa has spoken -- in world institutions, in world fora -- about redistributing power in the world order, particularly in the U.N. and so forth, and South Africa does aspire to be the African nation who wants in on the Security Council if it was restructured.

And Mbeki became active in the diplomatic negotiations surrounding Côte d'Ivoire with the Gbagbo crisis and again was criticized for being too close to Gbagbo, and the driving force there was the quest to supplant French interest in Africa with African interests and not let former colonial powers play a strong role in the continent.

And, finally -- and this is where if there is any strategic threat in South Africa's foreign policy it comes into play -- is that South Africa sees itself as the spokesman or spokesperson for the global South. It is constantly raising the interest in international fora, not only just to supplant or reduce the interest of

the West in Africa but in the world as a whole, to align itself with the EMDs, if you will, and press for a greater role.

So, these are the four driving forces. I think that they are really more than -- in my view more than just a class of interest in terms of domestic social forces in South Africa. In fact, there was a time in the controversy over South Africa's policy toward Zimbabwe where the trade unions refused to unload arms that were being sent by China to Mugabe through South African ports. They refused to unload them. And South Africa civil society basically rose up against South Africa's policy in Zimbabwe and said that they would not allow arms to be sent to Zimbabwe through South Africa despite the fact that this was approved by the South African government.

So, if there is a social clash of social forces that lead to promotion of democracy, it comes more from civil society in South Africa than it comes from the government itself.

Now, finally, South Africa is described by many people -- and I think Moeletsi also in his paper goes to describe the resentment in South Africa against the United States for constructive engagement and what preceded constructive engagement, which was basically working with the South African government, the apartheid government, to stop communism in Africa. We basically opposed apartheid but continued to work with South Africa on global and strategic interests. And constructive engagement was particularly controversial, because just as the drive for democracy in South Africa itself was growing during the Reagan years here, we actually did back the South African government and called it a modernizing autocracy whose reforms were genuine,

which of course was behind the eight ball in terms of what was going on in South Africa itself.

Now, that resentment against the U.S. policy, though, is not sufficiently balanced by the fact that U.S. civil society and a good deal of the political sentiment in this country also was the driving force against constructive engagement and in support of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. In fact, the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was the strongest sanctions that any country had taken against the apartheid government, and it was taken -- the law was passed over the veto of Ronald Reagan, dealing him a very serious foreign policy blow.

So, this country was divided over that, and in many respects the African-American community took a leading role in this country also in support of the anti-apartheid movement. So, there's kind of schizophrenic relationship with the United States with some factors being in alliance with ANC objectives and a history of the United States acting in other ways.

The bottom line now in terms of looking to the future, because you can see that it's a mixed bag in terms of the history of past 17 years -- what is it going to look like in the future? I think that Moeletsi is right in saying that it's going to be a very pragmatic foreign policy, not an ideological one. I don't share the view that it should not have democracy promotion as part of its foreign policy. I think there are some in the government and certainly in civil society in South Africa that do believe that South Africa should stand for these principles. But because of being burned by interventions in Lesotho and elsewhere, and because of the domestic needs are still a priority in South Africa, they're going to

be very choosey in terms of where they go. And I think they're going to follow a kind of do-no-harm principle. So, any intervention has risks and downturns, and I think they're gong to weigh the possible harmful effects of being an advocate for democracy and human rights in international affairs against the potential benefits.

So, I think South Africa now has sort of guarded itself from taking those what it would call dangerous escapades or adventures abroad by saying that it will not intervene in other conflicts unless there is regional approval and acceptance by major belligerence, conditions that are very difficult to achieve in acts of conflict. So, it will not take a leading stand, for example, in Myanmar, because you don't have the regional support for that. It will not take a forthright stand in Iran for similar reasons, although the relationship with Iran is a very ironic one, because traditionally under apartheid Iran was very close to South Africa under the shah. After the shah fell, relations got a little bit more difficult, and now South Africa has growing economic interests in Iran, filling the space that has been left by the withdrawal of the West. So, these economic interests again will be shaping South Africa's position on Iran.

So, in the future, these four driving forces plus a very extreme, I think, high level of caution will restrain South Africa from taking a forward position, but I think this will be controversial in some areas as the Chinese example -- arms example -- showed where I think civil society might well oppose that. And it might be the trade unions that lead that opposition.

MS. AMOSU: Thank you very much.

I'm going to seize the chair's prerogative to ask a question to kick us off.

I want to ask Moeletsi to comment on a point that I think Pauline made well, but this is a very new state, and to some extent the elite in government is still in formation, and I think that, to some extent, explains the somewhat patchy performance that Pauline was just talking about that you've seen Mandela right at the beginning saying that this is going to be a democratic and human rights informed policy. He was speaking for a voice in the liberation movement that had taken the view that that's the role that the state would play.

But at the same time, as you've seen this period -- and you can use that certainly to explain what they did on DRC and some of the other progressive interventions that they've made -- but at the same time, you have seen the elite beginning to come in to its own in this period, and I think you could argue that it doesn't necessarily represent in its own interest, its own nature, a particularly democratic impulse. It has this constitution. It has this bill of rights. It has this sort of highly democratic structure that it inherited from the transition process. But if you actually look at that elite, it ran a very commandist, very authoritarian party and liberation movement.

Many would argue they had to do it that way. But nonetheless that's the political tradition it comes from. It comes from this very anti-imperialist, anti-colonial place where, as Pauline was referring to, the U.S. and other Western democracies took, you know, positions that it was very hostile to and it got its help from states on the other side in the cold war.

There's a great deal of ambivalence towards minorities in that elite, and you can say okay, we can understand that; we know why that is to some extent -- but nonetheless it is a hallmark of an effective democracy that it seeks

to protect its minorities, and that ambivalence, I think, says a lot about its impulses.

A strong racial feeling -- you and I have talked before about those little straws in the wind, the times when President Mbeki was going traveling in Africa and prioritized back capital over white capital even though white capital had the resources to really make a big splash, in investment terms, on the rest of the continent. That was not, if you like, a neutral, pragmatic response to opportunity; it was an ideological choice.

And then, you know, finally a point again, you were yourself very clear on the levels of corruption. The level of rent seeking that is now going on in South Africa says a lot about the way that that elite wants to run its affairs. So, I would argue that you can't expect that elite to go out and propagate and propagandize or even build the kind of Brazilian or European Union's approach to foreign policy. It just -- it isn't in its DNA, as it's presently constituted, to do that. That, I think, suggests that it could so in the future. As Pauline says, you could see new government, new forces that are contending in South Africa coming to the fore being able to assert themselves and reshape that policy, and you could see a (inaudible) that starts to want to operate in a much more Mercosur style. So, contrary to what position I think you were putting, which is that the states left the South to pursue a pragmatic and ideologically neutral position, which will just, you know, go where South Africans' interests are irrelevant where the ideology sits in that.//

I would say that what we're saying is a function of who is running the South African state right now and that as these years go forward -- and

we've, after all, not even had 20 years yet -- we may see some very big changes in the way that the policy evolved. So, that's really what I wanted to get your reaction to. Thank you.

MR. MBEKI: Well, Akwe, it's very difficult for me to -- because you are touching on so many different issues here.

Yes, I agree that the new -- the elite that's in power in South Africa is a new elite and there's a great deal of uncertainty about what its primary objectives are, what it is trying to achieve. Is it trying to become an owner of productive assets, and how does it become an owner of productive assets. That alone is a very, very big story for them to have to try and address. And the South African economy has a huge presence of foreign multinationals. What should be the relationship and the foreign multinationals. For example, the South African government has a policy called Black Economic Empowerment whereby 26 percent of the shareholding of corporations have to be owned by blacks, and now for some companies -- for example, the United States (inaudible) industry, the United States information technology companies -- they have refused to go along with that policy and so the government has been compelled to backtrack and to come up with face-saving formulae but accommodate what the American companies want, because the American companies have said these are wholly owned subsidy areas in South Africa by companies like Microsoft and the shareholding is held in the United States and they are not prepared to seek shareholding in subsidiaries and so on.

So, yes, they had lots of dynamics, but one of the things that interested me, and Pauline mentioned Mandela's role, was about the role of Lula

in foreign policy, in Brazilian foreign policy. This was mentioned yesterday in terms of Iran. What interested me was that it seemed very much to be a Lula initiative. It wasn't a Brazilian government initiative. It wasn't even his party's initiative. It was his initiative. The question of Mandela and this human rights agenda was also, to a significant extent, Mandela's own in initiative, which was not reflected in the party. In fact, the party was very reluctant to go along with that initiative.

So, where you have new elites with these larger-than-life characters like Lula, like Mandela, you do have sort of personalized foreign policy to some extent, which you can then say that it is a country foreign policy. It actually -- I mean, one of the strong examples in the case of when Mandela was in China and Taiwan. Mandela had decided that he would continue to recognize Taiwan, which was a partner with the apartheid regime, in sanctions busting. But the whole country and the party itself wanted the recognition of normal diplomatic relations between South Africa to be with Beijing, not with Taiwan. Eventually Mandela was pressurized to change his mind on those issues.

So, I would agree that the issue of ambivalence is actually central to understanding South Africa's foreign policy at this moment and, hence, the unpredictability in a way, whereby, you know, in the morning, for example, we have a joke in South Africa now. We voted for the no-fly zone in Libya I think on a Wednesday. On a Saturday the president was addressing a meeting at a football stadium and he denounced the no-fly zone. (Laughter) So I think the ambivalence captured very well the current foreign policy.

MS. AMOSU: Thank you very much.

So, let's go to the room. Mr. Diamond.

MR. DIAMOND: Okay, Mr. Mbeki, your paper was a little bit more positive about democracy promotion than your talk, and I'm wondering if we could just kind of disarticulate democracy promotion in a way that might identify some of the common ground that appears in your paper. So, let's accept that South Africa has the perspective on kind of very rhetorical and assertive democracy promotion that would really pressure authoritarian regimes in ways that would disrupt longstanding relationships, violate, you know, principles of "noninterference," and so on, and let's lay that aside.

And let me ask you about three other dimensions. First of all, I'd like to highlight -- you spoke about it, so I'm sure you agree with it, that there's a lot that can be done. Maybe it's the most important stuff that can be done by established democracies like South Africa, to just help appear emerging democracies to improve their electoral institutions, their judicial institutions, and so on and so forth. And the examples that you mention in your paper are actually hopeful in that regard and I think deserve to be highlighted.

Secondly, you seemed in your paper and a bit in your talk to be more or less supportive of collective efforts when you can get some degree of consensus within the African Union to encourage or reinforce or defend democracy, and the African Union does provide for the suspension, if I'm remembering correctly, under the new charter of a member's government when a legitimately elected government is overthrown, say, in a military cue. So, presumably you would support that.

And then, third, you know, it hasn't been mentioned, but I'm just

wondering what the South African view is on the general principle of responsibility to protect.

MR. MBEKI: I think the -- maybe I put the issue a bit too stark in the presentation. As a member of the African Union -- the African Union and I think South Africa played an important role in insisting that military regimes, coups d'état, those kinds of regimes are not acceptable and should be debarred from membership of the African Union. And that principle, I think, is acceptable, because it's not a proactive principle; it's actually a reactive principle.

(inaudible) I noticed yesterday has a similar principle which -- where I have a difficulty with is an individual state. The African Union is a multilateral organization. So, I have no difficulty with a multilateral organization taking positions that protect the welfare of citizens like we are seeing in Libya like should have happened in the case of Rwanda and so on. So, where I'm having a problem is where individual states take it upon themselves to then say we will decide what democracy should look like in another country. That is really the point that I was making.

But things like helping the independent electoral commissions and so on and so forth, I think that, in my view, these are all in order. But these are now at the request of the other countries, they are not at the country choosing to go and promote democracy in the other countries.

I mean, my example of what I am sure -- I am sure Iran would have been different if the United Kingdom and the United States hadn't done what they did in the 1950s to a democratic regime in Iran. We wouldn't be sitting with a feared autocracy in Iran that we're sitting with today and all the horrors that have

taken place in that country.

MS. AMOSU: Okay, thank you.

We have a question there, and we'll have one down the back there.

Ted, can we run over for 10 minutes? Do you think?

TED: Yes.

MS. AMOSU: Okay.

Yes, please go ahead. You need a microphone.

SPEAKER: Thanks. I wanted to ask about South Africa on the Security Council. You mention that its position on Burma was controversial on its previous term on the Security Council, and the fact that its position was partially based on the need for consistency both on what it means to be a threat to international peace and security and on the need to have a consistent view as to where these issues ought to be dealt with within the international system, I guess assuming that the Human Rights Council was the better place to do it. But, in fact, at the time South Africa's policy was pushing back both at the Human Rights Council and at the Security Council, somewhat inconsistent with that view. We've obviously now seen a very substantial evolution within this term of the Security Council with, as you mentioned, the Libya resolution. But then also a real change in how the high commissioner for human rights, obviously a South African national, is being received by the Security Council. South Africa's ambassador at the time of a DRC briefing by the previous high commissioner was the first ambassador to stand up and push back and say why are you briefing here, you should be at the Human Rights Council, a view that fortunately wasn't echoed by any other member of the Security Council.

This week, Navi Pillay briefed the Security Council on Côte d'Ivoire with no such backlash. Is it the case that South Africa will now, do you believe, take a different view to having these issues abreast at the Security Council, and what will be the follow-up from the Libya votes? Can we expect South Africa to support more active engagement in other areas by the Security Council recognizing that there obviously a threat to international peace and security in such a situation?

MR. MBEKI: Well, South Africa's position in the Security Council, I think, is a big surprise to everybody, including us, the South Africans. First, we -- public opinion Africa was deeply shocked by our government's vote over the issue of famine, because we had all expected that this is a foregone conclusion. We are supporting the opposition in Burma. Whether the forum is the right forum or the wrong forum, it was important to send a message to the military regime that suppression of the democratic forces in Burma was not acceptable. So, there was a kind of formalism in a way that the government at the time -- and I agree completely with what Pauline said about -- and what Akwe has also said -- that you do have a very -- in a way, a very immature elite that is very new on the scene. And it is unpredictable.

On Libya, we didn't expect South Africa to vote for a no-fly zone for the simple reason that, according to the South African own intelligence service, they had said that President Jacob Zuma received support from Muammar Qaddafi when he was competing for the position of leader of the ANC. So, the expectation was that they -- South Africa was either going to vote against or abstain from the no-fly zone. But we were surprised when South Africa then

voted for the no-fly zone. But I supposed President Zuma found a solution by denouncing it in the stadium. (Laughter) So, it kind of met both sides. So, in terms of what our government does at the Security Council, the perception in South Africa, certainly in the research community, is that it's very much a hit-and-miss kind of a situation. It's quite unpredictable.

The difference, though -- there is a difference between the Thabo Mbeki administration and the Zuma administration. The Thabo Mbeki administration was much more antagonistic toward the Western countries. Zuma is much less -- so, I think those are the sort of parameters that are playing themselves out.

But at the end of the day, I think South Africa will still have quite a distance to go where you have a more balanced democracy. We still allow any one-party system effectively in South Africa. So, in terms of the debate, the debates are much -- are not as rich as they could be where you have a genuine multiparty democracy, so there is still a lot of room for the maturing of democracy in South Africa, which will then reflect in a more predictable foreign policy posture.

I don't know if I'm answering you.

MS. BAKER: Just a short comment on the change. I think when Zuma joined Sarkozy at the U.N. to call for greater sanctions against Gbagbo, that was a real turning point, because this anti-French -- particularly anti-French -- belief of Mbeki was clearly reversed, and it showed a more assertive role by South Africa and West Africa. And it's another example of the unpredictability of South Africa's foreign policy, and I don't think there's as much as a reflexive anti-

Western view right now. I think -- again, it's going to be very ad hoc. And it does open up opportunities where you can establish that it's in South Africa's interest to take leadership roles I think to work with South Africa in this administration as opposed to the previous one.

MS. AMOSU: Thank you.

We have probably got time for one more little round of questions, so why don't we just take two or three or now and then call it a day. There's a gentleman there. There was a lady over there.

SPEAKER: Thank you. I'd like to ask a question of Mr. Mbeki.

I didn't have the benefit of reading your paper, but obviously you -- in your remarks you made a strong differentiation between action by government and action by other civil societies. And I recall the role, for example, of the Reverend Leon Sullivan in South Africa with the Sullivan Principles which were very instrumental in effecting the work of foreign investors in South Africa. But these days a lot of the work of civil society is often funded by their host governments, either by contracts with USAID, which enables them to do their work, or with the National Endowment for Democracy. So, in effect, though, the civil societies are the end of the spear, if you will, doing the actual work on the ground. In fact, it's the funding of other governments that enables them to do their work. Do you have a problem with that?

MS. AMOSU: Thank you.

And the lady over there.

MS. GUMMEL: Hello, Deandra Gummel from the Carnegie Endowment. Continuing on the idea of the change in policy with increasing

criticism by President Zuma -- or, I guess, criticism for the first time of Mugabe's government and the Southern African Development Community coming out and also criticizing Mugabe's government. Do you see a shift in policy there?

Thank you.

MS. AMOSU: One more? Yes, sir.

MR. CHATTERJEE: My name is Samar Chatterjee from SAFE Foundation. Mr. Mbeki, I think you made an interesting point that and criticism also by Pauline saying that South African governments were different and vacillates. That is true about most countries, and I'm glad South Africa's now joined the BRICS so that you can join -- you've become BRICS in our bureau. Throw some bricks at the, you know, genocidal policies of United States and NATO when they promote democracy through bombing, strafing, murdering, and genocide, which has become a standard practice starting from Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya and maybe it will go on. So, given that American policy is also ridiculous at times, you cannot promote democracy through genocide, through bombing, strafing, murdering from remote areas where you don't even know who your enemies are, you're killing people. And so -- even Pakistan being such a close ally of United States and now taking objection to all these stones being thrown at them, if somebody in the United States were throwing stones at the White House, we wouldn't probably love it, too. So, given that situation --

MS. AMOSU: Sorry, I'm gong to cut you off because we've only four minutes left. So, I think we've got the basic point.

MR. CHATTERJEE: It's a bad situation.

MS. AMOSU: Moeletsi can respond.

MR. CHATTERJEE: I think congratulate South Africa what it's doing.

MS. AMOSU: Thank you. Go ahead.

MR. MBEKI: Well, on the issue of strategies of the war in Afghanistan, which really I think the gentleman -- the last speaker was referring to, I have no military expertise to judge whether one tactic is good or bad. I think this is a matter for the United States and Pakistan to -- and Afghanistan I guess -- to deal with those issues. But these are not issues of democracy. These are issues of war between states. But I think here we are dealing with issues of democracy and promotion between different countries rather than issues of warfare between states.

And I was interested in the question about the civil society being funded by government. I was once told by a prominent Ugandan social scientist that there is a new animal that has been invented in Uganda which he said is called a GONGO. So, I said okay, what does this animal do? He said a GONGO is a government-organized -- nongovernmental organization. So, I -- but the relationship, really, between enlarged democratic countries and more mature democracies like the U.K., the United States, France, and so on, the relationship between the states, the private sector, the nonprofit sector is actually a great deal more complex than whether you're government or not government, because the nonprofit sector in these countries, I think, has a lot of power and a lot of influence and can therefore compel governments to allocate some of the taxpayers' money, which is, after all, their own money to be used for causes that they consider important. So, I think the distinction between government and non-

government, private sector, and so on is becoming more blurred as the states' power weakens and the non-state actors' powers rise. So, it's complicated.

So, one principle -- I wouldn't say I won't work with an American NGO because it receives money from AID, because in fact it's a reflection of the democratization process in the United States, a positive reflection I think.

I didn't quite understand which shift you were looking at.

SPEAKER: (inaudible) more pro-Zimbabwe or more willing to criticize Zimbabwe and so Zuma now.

MS. AMOSU: Okay. Well, SADC is a very -- also an equally unpredictable player when it comes to Zimbabwe. SADC has a whole lot of electoral rules of what a free and fair democratic election should be like. But it doesn't -- in the case of Zimbabwe, they find an excuse not to revoke those rules. SADC had a tribunal, an arbitration tribunal whereby certain types of economic cross-border grievances could be taken to and farmers -- South African farmers and Zimbabwean farmers -- their grievances to this SADC tribunal, and Mugabe just said they have no jurisdiction.

So, there's a great -- the reality about Southern vis-à-vis Zimbabwe is you have a major division. You have essential three factions. You have the pro-Mugabe faction, which I think includes Swaziland, includes South Africa, includes Angola; it includes the Democratic Republic of the Congo. You have what I would call an anti-Mugabe faction, which is a strongly pro-democracy faction, which is led by Botswana. I think it has the support of Lesotho, although more muted. And then you have the fancy tales, which are, you know, Tanzania -- a group led by Tanzania and Mozambique and so on. So, the huge divisions --

there are those three divisions -- and so SADC -- it depends who's meeting in the particular instance that you had. You had stronger -- there were only three countries that were meeting, and Zambia, which is much more anti-Mugabe than South Africa, was the one that was actually articulating. It wasn't essentially a -- it was -- there's a tri-party structure, which is the committee -- the organ on politics and security, which has three members. And it was those three members who were meeting in Zambia with what was a very strong voice -- rather than. Well, it was presented by our mediators if it was South African, so it was actually Zambia, but to a strong position.

But once you go to the whole meeting of SADC, you'll see that message will be a lot more toned down than it was in that tea party organization.

MS. AMOSU: Thank you very much to both our speakers. We're out of time, but I think -- I hope it's been a conversation. Certainly I found it extremely stimulating.

Thank you both very much. (Applause)

MR. PICCONE: We're going to go ahead and have a short coffee break. If we could convene back here in about 10 minutes. Thanks.

(Recess)

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