THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

FOREIGN POLICIES OF EMERGING-MARKET DEMOCRACIES: WHAT ROLE FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS?

Washington, D.C.

Friday, April 15, 2011

PANEL 5: INDONESIA

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PICCONE: Thank you. We're going to start the next panel discussion, and we're going to hear about Indonesia. And I'm going to turn the floor over to Brian Joseph from the National Endowment for Democracy.

MR. JOSEPH: Thank you very much.

We're now turning our attention toward Indonesia. We have two eminently qualified speakers.

The first speaker is Rizal Sukma on my left. Rizal is the executive director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta and has worked extensively on the issues of Southeast Asian security, ASEAN, Indonesian defense and foreign policy, military reform, and Islam in politics. He's also a member of the Board of Governors of the Implementing Agency for the Bali Democracy Forum and was a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Columbia University. He is a member of the editorial boards for the journals *Global Change, Peace, and Security* and *Studies in Asian Security*, as well at Stanford University Press. His work has been widely published, including his book *Islam and Indonesia's Foreign Policy*.

Donald Emmerson is the director of the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. His previous affiliations include the Australian National University and Princeton University. He is author of a number of books and articles on Asian politics and development, U.S. foreign policy, and democracy in governance, including

Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam and *Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Mr. Emmerson serves on the advisory boards of several journals, including the *Contemporary Southeast Asia* and the *Journal of Democracy*.

We'll first hear from Rizal Sukma.

MR. SUKMA: Thank you, Brian.

Good morning, everyone.

First of all, let me thank the NED and also Brookings Institution for inviting me here. It's really a pleasure to be back in D.C. after a couple of years after. And being in Asia, and let me also apologize to Professor Donald Emmerson, because I wrote quite a long paper, so, you know, he basically had something to read, you know, from Stanford to D.C.

MR. EMMERSON: I didn't read the whole thing.

MR. SUKMA: Anyway, first let me provide some context for --

So I haven't even begun, but I was already sabotaged by Professor Don Emmerson. (Laughter)

Let me begin by giving you the context within which this democracy enters Indonesia's foreign policy. If my reading is correct after listening to the four presentations from yesterday and today, we already have four "no's" when it comes to whether democracy should play a role in foreign policy.

So, (inaudible) basically give you maybe. So, I'm not really sure whether I should yes or I should say no. But, you know, let me try to describe, you know, where democracy is in Indonesia's foreign policy.

So, before a democracy became part of Indonesia's foreign policy, in fact Indonesia was having serious problems with its image, and after we moved to democracy in 1998 all problems actually started to occur in Indonesia. You know, of course under authoritarian rule everything is in order, and also everything on the surface looks very harmonious, but of course there is this rotten (inaudible) in the country.

So, the transition to a democracy that Indonesia had started in 1998 was really, really a difficult one. And we had a serious problem, because suddenly Indonesia as the so-called bastion of civility in Southeast Asia suddenly is known as a problem and also the producer of security for the regions, especially when the country actually experienced a lot of (inaudible) violence, really just, you know, tensions and so on from the periods of 1998 up to 2002.

And we think that it's difficult transitions, you know. Democracy, nevertheless, began to gain grounds in which suddenly Indonesia's international identity also began to change. In the past we were known as the largest organization in the country, but suddenly, you know, we were described as the largest Muslim country on earth to become the third largest democracy.

We are not really comfortable with that kind of description, so there were actually concerted efforts within the country, especially within the foreign ministry, to redefine (inaudible) after we move to democracy. But we need to recognize also that there are two new elements of the national identity. In the past, Indonesia has been always described as a secular state, but since democratization then Islam and democracy have become two new elements of

Indonesia's domestic politics. And then of course, as the role of civil society became even more and more active, then, you know, there was the pressure on the government to reflect this new element of national identity onto a foreign policy.

So, in that context, I can say that the entry of democracy into a firm (inaudible) foreign policy by the end of 2000/2001 I think is very much a frame within the context of restoring Indonesia's image abroad. So, instead of letting the international community define Indonesia as a problem, especially for Southeast Asia, we try also to project in our emails as a new democratizing state in which of course the nature of Indonesia as the largest country with the largest Muslim population in Southeast Asia become part of that effort.

And the declarations of support for democracy agenda beyond Indonesia's borders actually spotted in October 2001. You know, when Indonesia's foreign minister declared at the U.N. General Assembly meeting that that Indonesia is a democracy and then we in turn have to reflect that in the conduct of our foreign policy.

So, how has democracy been reflected in foreign policy so far since 2001, and what is the nature of the role of democracy and human rights support in Indonesia's foreign policy?

I've mentioned already that the main objective is actually to re-define and also define a new international identity for Indonesia, so it was meant to restore Indonesia's image after a difficult transition toward democracy. But in addition to that, democracy in Indonesia's foreign policy has been reflected also

in a number of initiatives, mostly at the regional level within the confines of the comfort zones of the Southeast Asia for us but a little bit also in outside Southeast Asia, especially within Asia.

The first manifestation of democracy in Indonesia's foreign policy is -- actually it can be found in the way we look at the (inaudible) of noninterference in interstate relations. So, Indonesia was no longer as strict as it was before when it comes to the notion of noninterference, especially within the (inaudible) context.

So, we began to understand that, look, you know, in the current world there is nowhere that you can make a distinction between internal affairs and also external affairs. In fact, Indonesia's foreign ministers keep saying within the same context that human rights or not the messy problem; it's actually a problem for also other countries who had come to the violation of human rights in any members of this organization state.

Secondly, democracy has also been projected. Indonesia has new visions of the new original order within Southeast Asia. Indonesia believed that Southeast Asia evolve into democratic regions in which, you know, because if you have all these countries and adopt democracy, then the idea of constructing original community would become easier. So, I think it also reflects some kind of belief in a democratic peace theory and then also the importance of norm and values in foreign policy. And then later on I found out why. You know, some of Indonesia's high officials, especially within a foreign ministry, subscribe to the importance of (inaudible) Indonesia's foreign policy simply because many of

them actually LSE graduate, like (inaudible) and also the current foreign minister. So, they believe in both power and norms, and they have been (inaudible) much I guess. (Laughter)

And the third, Indonesia has also become the champion in trying to include the principles of democracy and also human rights. Both have values and also agenda of original cooperations.

There are three initiatives that Indonesia tried to push and still trying to push. Number one is, of course, when we proposed that ASEAN should be transformed into security community in 2003 in which we believed that democracy and respect for human rights should be the foundation of the ASEAN (inaudible) and secretive operations. That's in 2003.

2006, 2007, we also pushed the inclusion of democracy and human rights into the ASEAN charter when it was at the time drafted.

And then third, in 2009, we also insisted that the newly established ASEAN commission for human right should actually subscribe to the international standards of human rights and then should also be able to do more beyond the promotions of human rights but also to include the protections of human rights.

So, it's not an easy process. But I will come back later on this particular issue.

Fourth, the projection of democracy in Indonesian foreign policy has been, I think, quite manifested in our approach to Burma or Myanmar. I think Indonesia has been at the forefront, and I know that they put pressure on Myanmar in order to reform and also to move toward democracy through a

number of activities. I think -- I will not go into detail on these activities that Indonesia is trying to do, but one I think change in Indonesia's approach to Burma is that in the past, you know, we often use ASEAN to shield ASEAN member states from all the courtesies and from the international community when one member violates human rights. That's including Indonesia, so that's why we love ASEAN in '70s, '80s. And after we invaded East Timor, you know, ASEAN came right there and then defended Indonesia. But, no, I don't think that, you know, ASEAN has the value anymore for us, but still very much functions in the same way for Burma or the junta in Yangon.

Five -- we also are trying to place democracy as original agenda and also an agenda for strategy discourse in Asia. That is basically the main purpose of the (inaudible)-led process, the so-called Bali democracy forum that we launched in 2008. In fact, in the past -- and it would be very difficult actually to even mention the word "democracy" in the conduct of foreign relations, but by creating Bali democracy forum, which of course include non-democratic states, such as China and also Burma, then, you know, we manage to put democracy as a strategic agenda for operations in Asia as a whole.

And, finally, Indonesia's associations. You know, we have a number of international initiatives to promote democracy I think is also a part of the project, the new democratic credential of the country. You know, we're part of the UNDF -- U.N. Democracy Fund -- and also Indonesia participated in the Community of Democracies.

However, there is a gap actually between what we are doing, what

we have done and we are doing at the original level and Indonesia's attitudes -- you know, at the international or global level. At the global level, especially within the Human Rights Councils and within the U.N. in general, Indonesia has always been reluctant to support any international time or pressure on cases of human rights, including (inaudible) on Burma, on Iran, and also on North Korea. Indonesia doesn't believe in the value of shaming and naming approach at the original level. But at the original level, you know, we try to do it quietly in order to encourage some member states in order to move toward democracy.

And the whole (inaudible) records of Indonesia at the U.N. is quite poor, actually. We are -- one of these new NGOs in Geneva, I think, made this ranking, and then we are actually worse than Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

And there are also two other characteristics of Indonesia's support for democracy abroad. Number one, we have not, actually, managed to produce any tangible results, and especially within Southeast Asia. Burma today is still Burma yesterday, even though they have so-called parliament, they have so-called new president, and so on. But the key problem persists in that country.

And, secondly, our effort is still Asia focused. For example, this swift changes in the Middle East -- Indonesia has not actually expressed any interest in getting involved in their democratization process beyond expressing our readiness to share our experience -- both successes and weaknesses -- if asked. So, in fact, I think our foreign minister is still entitled exactly on this mission and trying to talk with Egyptians on how (inaudible) can be useful in their transition toward democracy.

So, by looking at those elements of Indonesia's foreign policy, I would say that this is very much an exercise at democracy projection rather than democracy promotion. But I don't think that this reflects what we yesterday discussed about the hypocrisy in foreign policy. I don't think that (inaudible) hypocrisy on this one but simply because Indonesia does have limits inherent in the country status as a developing democracy with a host of domestic problems and weaknesses and also the geopolitical reality of the regions.

So (inaudible) to the limits of this projection of democracy in Indonesia's foreign policy. Domestic support -- you know, for inclusion of democracy in Indonesia's foreign policy is really high and I think almost across the board, the NGOs, the parliaments. And especially the parliaments, because many of them are actually former NGOs. And NGO stands for "next government official." (Laughter) So when they become members of the government, they still behave also like the NGOs, especially within the foreign ministry. Many of them should really push for the support of democracy and also for the inclusion of support for human rights in Indonesia's foreign policy. So, there is no questions with regard to domestic support.

And then across the board there is no party that actually tried to sabotage or even undermine Indonesia's government effort to project democracy in the foreign policy. When they criticize Indonesia's initiative, mostly actually they tried to warn Indonesia that we still have a lot of limits in doing this. So, in fact, they tried to confuse the government that we need also to fix our own problems first before we can be effective in promoting democracy abroad.

Within the regions, I think the main problem that we face is actually we still lack democratic credentials. And that's, I think, a major impediment to Indonesia's attempt to actually push for democracy and also get the respect for human rights. Not to mention other problems that we are still facing at the moment -- the problem of governance, the problem of terrorism, and also the problem of corruption that all, actually, undermine Indonesia's credibility of a new democracy.

And that of course invited a lot of negative views from our neighbors. So, after we started to talk about democracy in foreign policy in 2002, I have a friend from one of the neighboring countries who came to me and asked what is Indonesia now? Are you become Americans these days or what? (Laughter) So, when we started to push other countries (inaudible) to democracy in the original cooperations, then, you know, there are a lot of sentiment within the regions. And in fact, in the fights, in order to get the ASEAN Commission for Human Rights, it was a fight of one against nine.

I will not go into the other limits except to briefly mention that of course the lack of resources needed to do more in this area I think is quite important of a factor for Indonesia to limit its activities and also its attempt within the original context. For example, the budget for the foreign ministry is only 0.5 percent of the overall national budget, which is quite small. So, I don't think that Indonesia can do more than what it has been doing over the last seven years.

The original context -- you know, I think the original complexity is

really a major impediment to Indonesia's attempt to actually push the whole region to adhere to democratic values. These are the most diverse regions in the world. You have the bloody junta in Yangon on one hand, and then you have also the Sultanate of Brunei on the other. And then here we go -- you have a messy democracy in Indonesia, even though Indonesia actually -- percent, like, actually 48 percent of Southeast Asia. But nevertheless, this is a very difficult environment within which Indonesia has had to operate. Not to mention the fact that there is also (inaudible) political rivalries among the major powers, which is quite obvious in the case of Burma. You know, the role of India, the role of China sometimes also makes it difficult for Indonesia and also ASEAN as a whole to push for greater democratization in the country.

Briefly, on the prospect. With Indonesia's foreign policy, especially in using democracy and I project that beyond these borders it will stay the same or we'll have another chance. I don't see any possibility that we will backtrack from that path even though, say, 2014, we will have, you know, say, a new government because the support is quite strong across the board among the political parties, among the CSOs, and also among the members of the parliament at the moment.

And, secondly, I do believe that this part of the problems that we've encountered so far Indonesia democracy is quite resilient. So, all these challenges that I mentioned earlier -- terrorism, corruption, and bad governance -- have not actually pushed the people to demand a more authoritarian form of government to return. So, in that context, because of all the limits, I still believe

that what we are doing at the moment can be actually enhanced if we manage to address the problem of democratic credential so democracy will become more attractive to neighbors. But at the moment, I think we still have a lot of limits in order to demonstrate that democratic credential, so our democracy projection initiative doesn't really have a strong demonstration effect to other countries in this Southeast Asia.

So, I think I'll just stop there and listen to the slaughter by Professor Don Emerson. (Laughter)

MR. JOSEPH: Thank you.

Professor Emerson.

MR. EMMERSON: Yeah. Needless to say, you already know that the speaker on this panel and I have a close and shall we say mutually recriminatory relationship which I enjoy very much. (Laughter) And I regret my inability to attack the paper, because unfortunately I agree with too much in it.

But I must say I think it can be boiled down to three words. It's a very long paper, as Rizal suggested, but I think there are really only three words that matter, and you've already heard them. That is to say projection, not promotion. That's the bottom line. And, actually, I want to incorporate in the remarks that I'm going to make.

But I'd like to begin with a quote from the session that just ended, namely, the quote from Mr. Mbeki. I wrote it down as he spoke, "State promotion of democracy is a recipe for disaster."

I find that interesting in several respects. The recent respect in

which I find it interesting is this morning's edition of *The New York Times*, which I dare say I'm not the only person in the room who has read. On the front page, here's the headline. "U.S. Groups Helped" -- past tense, right? -- "U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Opposition," and our host, the National Endowment for Democracy is prominently mentioned on the front page of the *New York Times* in this article, which focuses on Egypt. And I would only comment in the following way.

The proposition that Mr. Mbeki has given us is, if I'm not being too social scientific, testable. And the test of that proposition is in the future, not just in Tahrir Square but Egypt-wide; indeed, Maghreb-wide, Mashriq-wide, including the Middle East, right? So, one of the fascinating things about this topic is both its normative and empirical implications. It's the interface of those two zones of discourse. I'm very excited by it. But I have to say that I am not optimistic that Mr. Mbeki's proposition will be proven correct.

I'm delighted to agree with what he said, provided we replace "promotion" with "imposition," so that it would read, "State imposition of democracy is a recipe for disaster." Now, even then there are two exceptions, right? After World War II, Japan/Germany. So, there's a footnote even in that case.

But the specter of Iraq should not prevent us from doing what I want to do this morning, which is to try not to deconstruct -- that buzzword has gone out of the vocabulary -- but to replace polemical oppositions with spectra, with gradations, because, it seems to me that's the only way one can really think

dispassionately about this simultaneously normative and empirical topic.

But one of the interesting characteristics of our exercise up until this point is that in a relationship between a subject -- namely, an EMD, right, emerging market democracy? -- and an object, that is to say, the external environment, the country that needs to be nudged, if I can put it that way. We have focused on the subject, not the object. Our focus has been on the EMDs, not the fields in which they work. Now, when we get to multilateral organizations later today, we will in a sense combine the field and the focus, the subject and the object, right?

ASEAN is both a field for democratization and conceivably an actor, which could have its effect on democratization elsewhere. The European Union has a democracy plank, right? And so you can't join unless you're a democracy, okay?

Now, what I want to do, because I am nothing but an academic, is sketch out five abstractions, which I hope will help us sort of analytically shape this elusive topic. I want to talk -- I'll just run through them, because I'm sure I'll be cut off before I get to the fifth. I want to run through them quickly.

Rationale, that is to say, the basis, the justification for democracy that we are assuming in our discussion.

The profile of the EMD. What are these assets that the EMD is supposed to bring to projection or, for that matter, promotion?

The proactivity. Here is a critical scale, right?, to get us away from imposition versus doing nothing, which is a false dichotomy.

And I want to emphasize four sort of stages, if you will, on the movement toward a more and more robust kind of activity, namely, illustration. I am a model of democracy. My name is Indonesia, right? Or my name is, I don't know, you name the EMD, right? That's sort of like the U.S. case of the city on a hill, right? The city is up there on the hill. The city is not necessarily sending missionaries down-slope, right?, to transform the lowlands into democracies. You're supposed to look up and say gee, the Americans, they've done really a good job, maybe I can do the same thing. So, it's pretty passive if you think of it.

And second is projection, which Rizal has discussed and I think is appropriate and then maybe, which also is, you know, no, no, no, no, and here we get Indonesia with a maybe. But it's not a yes, right? I think that's quite right, and it shows the value of the spectra as opposed to the sharp oppositions.

Beyond project, of course, is promotion; and beyond that is a topic that I really see no need in discussing in this context -- imposition -- unless we want to remind ourselves what a disaster Iraq turned out to be, which may be helpful as a cautionary remark but not in terms of the analysis of what EMDs can do.

The fourth abstraction is diagnosis, that is, in the field, in the object country, diagnosis is a bit clinical. I'd prefer a better term. One needs to understand, okay, what sort of nudging is possible and in what direction. It's not the case that we're dealing necessarily with Myanmars, Burmas, right? Or the forgotten authoritarian regime in Southeast Asia, often never mentioned but which is really egregious -- Laos. Nobody ever talks about Laos. I think they

have the advantage of anonymity. But some bad things go on in Laos I must say. So, the diagnosis of the field, right?

And then finally, the susceptibility, the fifth abstraction. The susceptibility of the object, right? The environment to nudging, if not transformation.

Okay, let me briefly run through these.

First of all rationale. I think it's very helpful if we begin by realizing that there are two very different rationales with a spectrum in between, between the notion of democracy as a consummatory value -- we hold these truths to be self-evident. Think about that for a moment. My God, if that isn't religious faith, what is? What it really means is we don't even have to prove it. These are self-evident truths. Democracy is the best system period.

Now, Churchill, of course, moderated that -- you know, compared -- it's the worst system, but compared to all the other systems, okay. Now, what that suggests to me is in this famous phrase, "the only game in town," right? In other words, when is democracy consolidated? It's consolidated when it's the only game in town. But we want to stop and think about that. What is the opportunity cost of playing only one game? And what is the perception of the opportunity cost of doing so? Are there not other games always, even in the United States lurking in the margins of that consolidated consummatory in and of itself, no-need-for-an-explanation version of a commitment to democracy, because the alternative, of course, is an instrumental view of democracy, which is entirely pragmatic. It's not ideological. It doesn't necessarily represent a

particular value, except the notion expressed eloquently by that famous Democrat Deng Xiaoping that I don't care if the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice -- as long as the GDP goes up; as long as welfare improves; as long public safety is there, okay? A system that doesn't deliver may be democratic, but it's nevertheless failing to do what governments should do.

Why has there been a segue and discourse in recent years in the sort of morning after the third wave into governance and away from democracy? Because, I would argue, always lurking in the margins, including -- you know, we can't even put a budget together in this country. The debt ceiling -- my God, always in the margins. Even of the established democracies is an alternative view that says if it works fine, if it doesn't let's look at something else.

That, it seems to me, is why governance, which is sort of -- "governance" is a very narrow term. You want governance? Go to Singapore. That's, I think, a discourse in Southeast Asia that we need to remind ourselves is, if you will, an alternative.

Now profile is, if you will, an alternative. Now profile -- what influence do the EMDs have? What are we really talking about here? Again, I would distinguish aspects here with, again, a spectrum between, which I don't yet have time to fill in.

Is it a question of size in Indonesia's case? Does that make a natural source of a model of influence? Does that give it the capacity to nudge? I would argue no. If anything, it could be a debilitating aspect, because the smaller countries of Southeast Asia hell at you guys. You're the big elephant,

right? You're going to throw your weight around. Why the hell should we follow you? Now, it is true that there are bandwagoners out there that want to go with the biggest and strongest. I don't want to underestimate that logic. But my guess would be one reason why India has not been as successful as one might think is not only because the will is not there inside New Delhi but also but also because it vastly outnumbers the periphery in South Asia, that even to talk about a region in South Asia on a basis of any kind of democratic equality and saying we haven't talked about democracy at the international level is really pretty notional.

I would argue that it's performance -- Indonesia's performance -- this is very much in keeping with Rizal's paper -- that is going to establish a desirable a desirable brand. That's the key element in the profile of these emerging market democracies. Not just performance of democracy itself as an institutional arrangement but economic performance, its ability to delivery the goods from that instrumental rationale that I talked about.

Proactivity runs, as I say, all the way from illustration through imposition. I don't really have time to go into this into great detail. I must say that even under the new order, there were -- and now especially, actually -- there were efforts that looked a little bit more like promotion than projection all done, a it were, under the radar, off the record. Generals went from Jakarta to Myanmar and made the argument look, you know, been there, done that. We were like you and look at us now and you can do that as well, except phrased, obviously, much more politely than I have phrased it -- and to no effect. So, there are other

illustrations that I don't have time to give.

Now, with regard to diagnosis, the field, the object country, first of all where is -- and I'll mix this with susceptibility because I only have a few minutes -- where is the country or the zone that is most likely to respond to the Indonesian experience?

And let me reverse Rizal's comment. It is true that Indonesia has focused more on its neighborhood?

But if the foreign minister is in Cairo today, that suggests to me that there is a possibility that even someone like Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the president of Indonesia himself, might go to North Africa and might actually make a fairly positive impression partly because his country is a long way away and therefore no sense of threat, right?

And, obviously, from the standpoint of Indonesia's brand as the largest Muslim majority democracy on earth, there is a certain attraction there -- the moderate Muslim leader, one can imagine leader. One can imagine him speaking to a Muslim audiences, you know. A version, maybe, of the Obama speech but with an added dose of authenticity, given that he's coming from within the Muslin world not from outside it.

So, I would actually argue that maybe Indonesia's future experience as particularly the Bali Democracy Form, which is, I think, the most fascinating experiment, really concrete experience, that is involved here, and I think we should perhaps a little time during the Q&A talking about the Balk Democracy forum. Maybe the point would be to reach beyond Southeast Asia

and not just consider the confines, the somewhat authoritarian confines of the association of Southeast Asian nations.

Thanks.

MR. JOSEPH: Thank you very much.

We obviously have a huge amount to consider. Just one little note. Sitting up here listening both presentations, trying to figure out what is the critical issue, and you threw something out there that has sort of embarrassed me a little bit. There's an article in the *New York Times* about the NED on the front page and I haven't even heard of it yet. (Laughter) So at lunch I'll have to go read it to see what it says. But I'm assuming that there's -- it points to a question that I was struck by in your paper and also your notes that in the case of Indonesia it sounds like from both of your perspectives there's no controversy as far as the role or the position of democracy promotion goes in the countries foreign policy. There might be limitations on what Indonesia's able to do, but there doesn't seen to be, at least from your paper and your comments, much controversy within the foreign policy community about the essential role of democracy promotion as an element of democracy -- as an element f your foreign policies.

So, I'm just curious. If each of you can comment briefly on -- am I reading this correctly that in Indonesia there's very little controversy unlike we heard in South Africa about the role of democracy motion, and foreign policy. Then we'll turn it open to questions and answers and from the floor.

You've got to use mine I think.

MR. SUKMA: Thank you. That's actually a correct reading of the

place of democracy within Indonesia's foreign policy. And as I mentioned in my presentation, there are actually no things we can -- positions, you know, to the inclusions of democracy into foreign policy. In fact, members of parliaments across the party lines and also especially the NGOs -- they put a lot of pressure on the (inaudible) government, especially the foreign ministry, to include and project democratic values into foreign policy, especially when it comes to the questions of democratization in Myanmar. So, that's I think one advantage that Indonesia has in order to incorporate the democracy agenda into a foreign policy. But, again, as you correctly pointed out, the problem is really outside the country and also with regard to the international resources or even ability, you know, to really annotate those agenda in and beyond those borders.

MR. EMMERSON: Well, I would only balance that, put it in context, right. 238 million people -- they're not all in the middle class in Jakarta, leaders of NGOs, civil society, and, frankly, most of those people are unaware and therefore really don't have an opinion on what U.S. foreign -- I'm sorry, what Indonesian foreign policy should be. And so if Indonesia did move toward a more muscular kind of promotion of democracy, I can imagine situations in which those activities would be quite unpopular.

And in particular I think one shouldn't forget that although Indonesia is a moderate Muslim-majority country, there are immoderate Muslims in Indonesia. And Hizb ut-Tahrir, for example, an extraordinary organization, is expressly committed to the notion that democracy is not just a Churchillian view; democracy is bad, because it means ruled by human beings rather than ruled by

God. And I'm not saying Hizb ut-Tahrir is particularly important numerically or politically in Indonesia, but I would caution against assuming that there is a kind of unanimous view that democracy promotion is an appropriate aspect of an Asian foreign policy.

MR. JOSEPH: Thank you.

When you ask questions, please keep them brief and to the point.

We'll start with Ted in the front.

MR. PICCONE: Ted Piccone from Brookings. I wanted to try to figure out something here that's puzzling me in your presentation, which is that Indonesia in the last 10 years has been putting forward this more robust position, particularly in Southeast Asia, but as you pointed out, at the U.N. it's a different matter and has a terrible voting record when it comes to human rights issues, because it doesn't like naming and shaming tactics. But it's still the same core principle of whether you care about what's going on in another country or you don't when it comes to (inaudible) rights. And you also mentioned that the line dividing between domestic and international is getting greyer and greyer. So, I'm trying to figure out, really, what is the hang-up in the Indonesian foreign ministry on its voting record at the U.N. if it's working from a point of view that is so favorable in this direction toward democracy and human rights in its neighborhood and beyond.

MR. SUKMA: On those cases, such as Myanmar and also Iran and North Korea, I think one argument that's always put forward by many policymakers within our foreign ministry is that if they take a hard-line stance at

the international level, that would close down whatever space that we have in order to thrive, also to induce changes within those particular countries. That has become an argument.

The second one, I think -- unlike, you know, what we are doing in Southeast Asia, there is no pressure whatsoever on the foreign ministry when it comes to how it exercises its votes at the U.N. The NGOs basically don't pay attention to those issues. So, they only pay attention to what Indonesia's government is doing within the neighborhood. So, that I think is even a more important factor from back of the first one, you know, because sometimes, actually, if you look at -- you know, it says vote in on Burma. It changed according to the specifics of (inaudible) within the original context. Because, if you need that kind of pressure and then I would vote for yes or even abstain, but at the same time, you know, we try to use that position at the U.N. in order to put pressure at the original level on Myanmar.

I think the one that we saw very clearly demonstrates that when our foreign minister told the Burmese foreign minister that from now on if you face criticism at the international level, you're on your own. You know, don't try to come back to us. But if you won't ask to help you, then start reforming. So, it's become also a tool in order to achieve the original objective in that context.

So, I think -- I don't know anyone (inaudible) who studied U.N., for example. And then now more and more should they be (inaudible) pay attention to the G20. So, you know, U.N. is not an attractive field of study. So, I don't think that people, especially the youth, know what our diplomat is doing at the

Human Rights Council or even at the General Assembly or even at the Security Council level. So, they want the NGO if the region is small. And I think as democracy becomes more and more and more mature, my worry is that NGO will even focus more on national issues -- you know, on issues that directly have an impact on national political states. And if that had been of course a foreign policy, we'd been even freer to do whatever it wants without any pressure from the NGOs.

MR. JOSEPH: Kelly over here.

MS. CURRIE: Hi, Kelley Currie from the Project 2049 Institute, and thank you both for, as always, very insightful and interesting presentations.

I wanted to go back to something that Professor Emmerson raised about the Bali Democracy Forum and put it in a context. I heard a couple of mentions of China. In my research in this area, one of the areas that interested me is what seems to be merging as a rather passive but still there ideational competition -- "competition" is not even the right word, but counter-example -- between Indonesia and China in the region as models for emerging economies and how to move forward for the other countries that either haven't made a democratic transition or still economically really at the bottom of the region. So, I'd like to put the Bali Democracy Forum and this issue of China as the kind of other ideational model in a region together and ask both of you to speak to that issue of how China relates to the Bali Democracy Forum and how Indonesia's efforts put the Bali Democracy Forum out there. Does it have any relationship to Indonesia's view of China in the region and how it's shaping norms and

everything.

MR. SUKMA: Obviously, Bali Democracy Forum actually doesn't try to democratize China, so that's not the purpose. But I think the purpose is quite modest. Yes, actually, the main priority is Southeast Asia, because we tried to promote this idea within Southeast Asia in 2001. Even before that we tried to promote that idea within the Middle East, but there was of course no response from the Middle East at the time. And then we moved to ASEAN. Of course, even no response. So then we created a much larger grouping, which includes a lot of countries beyond democracy. So, in that context, the modest objectives are actually really to have conversations on democracy at the original level as a gaffer, if you like, for a number of substantive activities in between these high-level meetings of high-level governments in every December.

So, even though of course this is still at the infant stage, but this moving. Originally we tried to organize a number of activities that exposed, you know, those who are afraid of democracy or who are skeptical of democracy to issues (inaudible) of democracy at the general level. For example, we organized a number of workshops on how-to-organize election on what is the role of media; what is the role of political parties, role of parliaments? And everybody can basically attend. So, the exposure, you know, I understand from (inaudible) that it is difficult to argue that the lack of democracy in Indonesia is simply because they don't know democracy and that we really have tried to provide a venue where people can learn about democracy. So, it's actually -- that is not the only purpose. But because this is very much an intergovernmental process -- so, but

in that context we hope the BDF itself, the Bali Democracy Forum, is not going to be the premier forum you know where in democracy can greet the support. But I think we need to look at what the BDF is doing in between in order to promote this idea.

I'll give you a very concrete example. Without the BDF, it would be difficult to get people from Burma to participate in this kind of (inaudible) discussion of democracy, because they need exit permit in order to go abroad. Let her load to, say, attend conference and walks. But as a member of the asset and also as a participant at Bali Democracy Forum and of course they should send because we can invoke the ASEAN charter and that says that says, look, you know -- so we need to start also discussing the value of democracy and how we can strengthen democrat institution in all Southeast Asia, which includes the notions of governance and so on.

MR. EMMERSON: Yeah, Kelley, that's a brilliant question. It combines two absolutely critical issues: China and the BDF. It's going to be difficult for me to restrain myself on this one. Since I've been very agreeable with regard to Rizal, let me be disagreeable. Rizal have been on panels together before, and I remember and Rizal will remember a remark I made in Jakarta when we were on a panel together in which I said well, let's test -- again the social scientist, right? -- let's find out if the BDF really worked or not, right? Let's work out some evaluation system. We're in the third year. We have another meeting coming up in December. This is an annual event. You know, a record is being established, right? So, by what criteria would then determine the success

or failure of the BDF in terms of, let's say, projection versus promotion, you know? I mean, it is a fascinating strategy, and it's explicitly a non-American strategy.

The point is you welcome the bad guys. The bad guys sit at the table. Rather than assuming that poisons any possible result, which I think might be the temptation for an American mind. On the contrary, you open it up. You refuse to appear threatening to the Burmese or the Laotians or whoever. Well, there's got to be some way of testing that strategy, and I remember vividly your response. You said oh, Don, you're so traditional. Metrics. That's what Americans always want. Metrics, right? (Laughter) You said to me I'm a constructivist. Remember that? Yeah.

MR. SUKMA: You still keep the e-mail.

MR. EMMERSON: No, no, it was a conversation just we're having now. And I remain non-constructivist. I think that's a critical question, and I, frankly, am worried about the BDF in several respects. Above all, institutionally. The choice of Bali, you know, is a sort of wonderfully kind of generous choice from those who want to go to Bali as opposed to Indonesia -- (Laughter) -- as a tourist destination, so what is this, intellectual tourism? But it's actually not dealing from Indonesia's strength, from its brand as a majority Muslim country. It's not. It's not. If anything, it makes it a little bit less attractive, right, because here you have people potentially from Muslim countries, if you enlarge it, right -- from the Middle East, right? -- who are surrounded by polytheists, right? Hindus, who are praying to all kinds of different gods right outside the air-conditioned

hotel room. This is potentially a problem, but that's decision's been made, okay, so.

But the IPD, the Institute for Peace and Democracy -- and notice that "peace" comes before "democracy," right? So the idea security first, instrumental, right? The ghost of instrumentalism is embedded in the name of the institute at Udayana University that is mandated to implement the Bali Democracy Forum. Now, in fact, the IPD is run by a wonderful guy with a -- actually Michael Bueller's in the room from Northern Illinois University. That's where Catoots' PhD is from. He's a terrific guy. But, frankly, compared to the monolithic bureaucracy is the foreign ministry in Jakarta, he has no clout whatsoever.

And so really -- I mean, forgive me for saying this. This is perhaps a little bit blunt, and I hope that this -- maybe shouldn't be on the record -- but I think that's the fact of the matter. I mean the future of the BDF is being decided within the foreign ministry in Jakarta rather than in conjunction with elements of Civil Society, including intellectuals such as Catoot who have a very good idea about what might be done if they could just be given a little more strength. And I think, frankly, there's a real case here for technical assistance in keeping with the headline in today's *New York Times* from institutions such as NED that try to -- or, for that matter, Stanford University. Larry Diamond is no longer in the room, but CDDRL would be excellently positioned to try to strengthen the institutional basis for this Bali Democracy Forum.

And finally, with regard to China. Extremely good question

because I think there is an assumption post-Cold War that, you know, bipolar. What could be more ancient and inappropriate than that adjective? It's multipolar, right? The decline of the U.S. and so forth. But if in fact China-American competition in Southeast Asia or for that matter around the Pacific becomes more and more intense, then what you're saying is absolutely relevant.

I can't resist mentioning that on the 5th of September last year in Bogor, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced a Jakarta consensus. It had eight pillars. The first pillar was democracy. Now, I mention this not because this is something everybody should know but because the Jakarta consensus disappeared into oblivion seconds after it was enunciated in Bogor last September. And if you talk about a Beijing consensus, I had breakfast this morning with a sinologist. I asked again, because I'm just intrigued by this, the question, "What about the Beijing Consensus?" There seems to be unanimity among people who watch China. This is absurd. There is no such thing, not to mention that the Washington consensus is now sort of archival in character. What that means is there is no clash of models. So, when we talk about soft power, it's hard to say that there's a sort of Chinese alternative or an Indonesian alternative. Rather, it seems to me, the Chinese model derives whatever appeal it has from its being anti-Western. It's a residual category that is filled with all kinds of contradictions and complexities by what's actually going on inside China: you know, authoritarian, capitalism, whatever you want to call it. But I would continue to watch that because performance -- getting back to the instrumental view -- to the extent that China continues to perform impressively, eventually the

Chinese are going to say well, you know, we know what we're against but what are we for? And soft power will possibly be somewhere on the agenda. And we may then have a debate that pseudo intellectuals like myself can engage in between two different kinds of models. But we're not there yet.

MR. SUKMA: Response --

MR. JOSEPH: Yeah.

MR. SUKMA: On the IPD, initially we wanted to have Institute for Democracy and Peace. But, you know, this IDP, and then we worried that, you know, people would confuse it with --

MR. EMMERSON: Displaced persons.

MR. SUKMA: Displaced persons.

MR. EMMERSON: Ah, okay.

MR. SUKMA: So, it doesn't have any of this intellectual underpinning to it.

MR. EMMERSON: Thank you. If it makes you feel any better, the NED is big part of something called the WMD, so.

MR. JOSEPH: I think there was a -- somebody had a question in back. He must have stepped away.

Up here please?

MS. HILL: I'm Helena Hill. I worked for two years in Indonesia both in the 1950s and the 1990s. And the Chinese -- the indigenous Chinese population in Indonesia has been deprived of full citizenship rights and their periodic pogroms against them. I'm wondering whether the rise of China now

and the influence of China ay change the attitude of the Indonesians toward the Chinese in your midst.

MR. SUKMA: Obviously, you've been away from Indonesia for quite some time. (Laughter) Well, you know, since 1989, there have been a lot of changes in Indonesia on this issue. We even amended the constitutions. Our constitution says that only (inaudible) can be president. That article is gone. It says only Indonesian citizen can be a president of the Republic of Indonesia. And then all the regulation that you mention? It's all gone. Even in (inaudible) 1998. And then, you know, all these restrictions that (inaudible) Chinese can only -- could only go into business except -- cannot go to other areas except business is also gone. Many of them have become MPs and become part of the political elite as well. So, it has nothing to do with the wrath of China, basically -- you know, simply because there was the demand of the democratization process itself, you know, within Indonesia. So, I don't really see that there was pressure from China for (inaudible) to change Indonesia's treatment of the Indonesian Chinese and it very simply reflects the democratic changes that have taken place in the country since 1988. So, we solved this problem by I would say 2003, the last amendment process to the constitution, which basically removed that rather discriminatory articles in our constitutions.

SPEAKER: Thank you. My name is (inaudible). I'm with the East-West Center.

Rizal, you mentioned about Indonesia's voting record at the United Nations, which do not consistently reflect the promotion or projection of

democracy. When you say that, what came to mind is the nation voting record of the Human Rights Council on the issue of the defamation of religion. Understand that this year for the first time that the solution has been dropped. But Indonesia had voted all along with Pakistan and the OIC in supporting the resolution (inaudible), and this is hardly -- I guess this is not quite a projection of Indonesia's human rights or democracy. I was just wondering if you are aware of the internal debate with the Indonesian Ministry of Affairs or parliament about why is Indonesia supporting this resolution.

SPEAKER: I don't know. Sorry. See, and there's nobody study U.N.

MR. JOSEPH: In the back here.

MR. CHATTERJEE: Samar Chatterjee from SAFE Foundation. Now, the democracy when it is an international context should be defined as a country that is peace loving and does not engage in invasion and things like that. Now, given that, what is Indonesian government and your organization, the Bali movement, doing to put pressure on the United States to change its behavior within the country starting with 9-11 and the Patriot Act and so on that has gone on.

MR. JOSEPH: Thank you.

MR. SUKMA: Well, Indonesia’s position on this one is quite clear. We have repeatedly said that democracy cannot be imposed from outside. What we can do is actually support, you know, once the democratization process has already started. So, in that context, I think Indonesia and the U.S. is actually on

the same page. You know, that's basically the most effective way in order to strengthen the process that already started because of the demand from within.

When it comes to the elements of democracy, the peace loving, I'm glad to report to you that Indonesia actually, since we have become a democracy, we managed to resolved a number of international conflicts through the peaceful sentiments of our dispute. The case of Aceh was actually really an example on how we moved from the use of military force to deal with the insurgency in that province into the political settlement. And today the peace process is still holding very well. And then also we resolved all these (inaudible) violence within the country, you know, through dialog and also other peaceful means. So, I think we still, even today, believe that you can't basically enforce democracy from outside. But democracy that has already started cannot also flourish unless it gets support from the external actors. That's always our experience.

MR. JOSEPH: Unfortunately, we're actually out of time for this panel.

Do you want to add --

MR. EMMERSON: Well, yeah, I don't know. Actually, what I was going to do was ask a question to Titinon, who may have had his hand up earlier, I'm not sure.

And when we're talking about Myanmar as the sort of, in my terms, the most important object here, the typical object given the egregious violation of human rights in Myanmar, I think we neglect to realize that Southeast Asia is full

of regimes that are strewn along a spectrum from sort of democracy through quasi, semi. There are lots of prefixes that are used to indicate some deficiency in the kind of democracy that's operating.

Now, Titinon Ponsadira, my colleague from Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, happens to be in the room. And Thailand, surely, is at the moment the most dramatic and upsetting case of some, what, democracy wrong or what. And I would ask you, if I may violate the rule that the professor never singles out someone in the audience, I would as you to be quite candid. Does Indonesia have anything to teach you given the turmoil that's going on in your country?

MR. JOSEPH: Don?

MR. EMMERSON: No pressure.

SPEAKER: Please violate the rule, Don. That is a good question. I had some comments and a couple of questions. I'll reduce them. I'll be concise.

First, I think that there has been democracy promotion from outside, right? A lot of politics and that's why we're here. But there has been also democracy impositioned from inside, from within. So, I want to ask Rizal, you know, Indonesia has all the right makings, the rightful file now, and whether there is a democratic drift -- has it plateaued? I mean, on the outside I mean with do you know and international community, the G20, you know, the various platforms?

Indonesia is progressing being assertive and so on. But inside

now, is it drifting a bit. You know, there's some regression, and what circumstances, what conditions would lead to regression? Have we reached the point of no return for Indonesia?

And for Indonesia, I also want to raise this point and a question. The miracle of the Indonesian transformation, is the NGOs that Rizal discussed. The democratic culture and values that were cultivated and implemented and nurtured during the Suhoto years -- NGOs and civil society in Indonesia is very liberal and democratic.

Now, civil society in Thailand has been more anti-democratic than one might think. And this comes back to Don's question to me. Yes, we do have a lot of reconsideration to do in Thailand. I think it is not going the wrong way, but it's been contested to the democratic path in Thailand. And I was talking to Dino last night. He had a very thoughtful response. Twelve years ago Thailand was of -- moxie in Thailand was going up, and Indonesia was very murky, perhaps going down -- and did notice that perhaps one day we will all go up,. and this is something Thailand has to think very deeply about. It's contested, and what has not happened is during this year civil society -- the alternative shadow superstructure -- has not been put in place and nurtured, and so now you have a status quo entrenched, existing superstructure. That is fighting back or resisting, you know, changes, demands, expectations from all sorts of people. That's why we have this violence in Thailand. So, yes, we do have (inaudible) from Indonesia, and I think that the period in 1998 and 1999 in Indonesia we will see some of that in Thailand very soon.

Thank you.

MR. JOSEPH: Thank you. Well, please join me in thanking our two excellent speakers.

MR. PICCONE: We're going to stay here and we're going to stay in the Asia region and we're going to move to the Republic of Korea. So, if we could just have a quick switch of panelists and we'll get right back to business. Thank you for your patience.

(Recess)

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