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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PICCONE: My name is Ted Piccone. I'm a senior fellow and deputy director for Foreign Policy here at the Brookings Institution. Thanks for taking time away from a beautiful spring afternoon that we haven't seen really this season. So it's quite a sacrifice to be inside and not outside right now.

Thanks for coming. I also want to make sure I say that a key component of the work on my side of this joint effort with National Endowment for Democracy has been the Managing Global Order project, which is led by Bruce Jones. And we also have with us Steve Stedman from Stanford University, who has been a critical component of the work that we do here at Brookings looking at how issues of global security and global cooperation are operating now and into the future in the 21st century. And this project, this effort, this conference is part of that project.

We're joined today by really top experts from think-tanks, academia, NGOs to cover in just a day and a half a huge and complex subject, but one in which there's really a dearth of research and understanding in Washington, and I would say in many other capitals on what role these six, and of course more can be added to the list, but today we're looking at the six emerging market democracies, what role they're

playing and will play when it comes to supporting democracy and human rights around the world.

We need a better intellectual grasp of the historical, political and economic drivers of how these governments conceive of their national interests, how they're changing, and how they are reflected in their respective foreign policies. And at this conference we are trying to fill that intellectual gap and on that basis better understand the policy implications for policymakers in the United States and other developed democracies as well as democracy and human rights analysts and advocates around the world.

The working assumption for these discussions is that democratic development is and must be controlled by domestic actors, but that external actors can and do have influence on the margins in some places more than others. The democracy and human rights agenda for the 21st century will depend on whether these governments that we're talking about in these days, and others like them, see enough value in a world composed of states with similar political systems in which human rights are respected, rule of law is consolidated and enforced, and governance is transparent and accountable. Or, will we see these states pursue a different course, one in which foreign policies are detached from

the democratic values practiced at home in favor of a realpolitik or a strict noninterventionist view of the world?

At what point in our current era of 24/7 news cycles will the media, civil society, parliamentarians, and business interests converge to influence these governments to take notice of what's happening to human rights in other countries and change their views on sovereignty. And what doctrine will it be under the right to protect or protection of civilians rubric used to authorize what we're seeing now, very muscular U.N. interventions in Libya and Cote d'Ivoire? Or, perhaps a more enlightened concept of self-interest in which states conclude that neighbors will be stable only to the extent to which they are democratic?

We're going to hear from national experts from these six countries, really bringing some on-the-ground insight from the real world from the field outside of Washington to help us consider these and many other questions.

Tomorrow afternoon at lunchtime we're also going to hear from Samantha Power from the National Security Council, who's really been, I would say, the leading official in the U.S. government thinking about some of these issues. And as well, in the last panel of top thinkers,

including Tom Carothers who's here to discuss the policy implications of these trends.

I hope that by the end of tomorrow we will have reached some preliminary conclusions about if and how these states are adjusting their foreign policies to the winds of political change that we see, for example, in the Middle East and North Africa and the implications for managing global order.

Let me turn now to Marc Plattner from the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy to say a few words, and then we'll go to our first panel.

MR. PLATTNER: It's my great pleasure on behalf of the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies to join in welcoming you to this conference. For those of you who may be unfamiliar with the International Forum, it publishes *The Journal of Democracy* and hosts the Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program as well as organizing both smaller meetings and larger conferences like this one.

The main focus of our work has been on the domestic politics of countries struggling to establish or to consolidate democracy, but we also seek to encourage the exchange of information and ideas

among the worldwide community like democracy scholars and activists. Toward this end, we act as the secretariat for the comparative democratization section of the American Political Science Association, but also as the secretariat for the Global Network of Democracy Research Institutes, which includes more than 75 think-tanks from every region of the world. And as we carry out this aspect of our work, we've increasingly become aware that the world's democratic countries can no longer simply be divided as they often were in the past into so-called advanced western democracies and new democracies, the young democracies from other regions.

Just as economists have emphasized the importance of emerging markets and students of international relations have highlighted the importance of emerging powers, we've been struck by the salience of a new group of nations that we've labeled emerging market democracies and even used the abbreviation EMDs as a shorthand. These are countries with relatively consolidated democratic institutions, growing economies, and increasing clout on the world stage. This category certainly encompasses the six countries, all members of the G-8 that we'll be focusing on in the sessions ahead: India, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia, and South Korea.

The rationale for the focus of this conference is contained in the four-page short description that was available at the registration desk and was sent to each of the panelist in advance of the conference. I won't repeat all that's said there, but the key points from our perspective is this: Many supporters of democracy in the West had hoped, some even expected, that the EMDs would become advocates for democracy internationally. Most of these countries have succeeded in breaking down their own authoritarian regimes during the past few decades, and a commitment, a strong commitment, to democracy at home, seemed to have become an essential part of their national identity.

Yet for the most part, these countries have turned out to be rather hesitant about championing human rights and democracy beyond their own borders. In some cases, they've even given explicit backing to some very unsavory authoritarian regimes, and the question we hope to address is, why is this the case?

Now, one quick and obvious response would be to say, well, that's simply the way of the world. Every country's foreign policy is shaped primarily by its concrete economic and security interests, and the U.S. and its western allies also support some very unsavory authoritarian

regimes when their national interests demand it. So to ask other countries to support democracy is at best hypocritical.

Of course, there's some truth in this response. Foreign policy is notoriously a realm in which hypocrisy flourished, but I think very few of us would want to follow this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion for that would mean simply accepting the view that nations can and should act solely on the basis of their interests, and that to criticize them on moral or humanitarian grounds is utterly unreasonable. This would be essentially to endorse the argument that Thucydides, as the Athenian envoy, made to the millions before Athens conquers their island and as Thucydides describes in a short and chilling sentence: "Kill all the grown men and enslave the women and children." An argument the envoys makes is at one point summed up as follows: "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."

Accepting this view would mean we have no grounds for criticizing powerful countries for actions they take in pursuit of their own interests. On the other hand, I doubt anyone, even the most rabid supporters of democracy, would claim that promoting universal goals of democracy and human rights should be any country's primary foreign policy goal precisely because a democratic state derives its legitimacy from the consent of its

own citizens. Its highest priority must be the security and welfare of those citizens and the preservation of its own democratic institutions.

In many cases the imperatives of security and democracy or human rights promotion will point in the same direction, but it cannot plausibly be denied that sometimes immediate and urgent security or even economic interests must trump at least short-term democracy promotion goals.

So the question becomes the one asked in the subtitle that we've given this conference. In the inevitable tradeoffs that always have to be made in determining a country's foreign policy, what role for human rights and democracy? In a democracy these tradeoffs reflect the interest and views of different parts of the population. Many of the Americans who are here today, I suspect, advocate a more prominent role for promoting human rights and democracy in U.S. foreign policy.

Now democracy advocates win some battles in Washington, and they lose many others. And we've come to recognize the complexity of the issues and the forces at work both in our own country and in other countries. In some cases and on certain issues, decision-making may be largely the preserve of a relatively insulated foreign policy elite; in other

cases or on other issues, wider public opinion may become decisive in shaping foreign policy choices.

In some instances there may be a broad national consensus on foreign policy; in other instances competing political parties may favor very different foreign policy priorities. It's difficult to generalize in these matters, and we hope our discussions here will help to illuminate the specific domestic determinances of foreign policies in each of those six countries we'll be looking at.

Now, it may be that we'll come away from this conference with some insights about how to strengthen those forces favoring a greater role for democracy and human rights. From the point of view of our international forum, we acknowledge that we'd be very pleased by such an outcome, but I'd also say that it's not our immediate or primary goal; we're here not to lecture on the virtues of human rights and democracy or to push the case for promoting them. Instead, we wish in the spirit of open-minded inquiry to learn as much as we can about how key emerging market democracies view the role of human rights and democracy in their own foreign policies.

So with that introduction we'll now move directly into our opening panel on India. I'll ask the panelists to come to the table here,

and it's my pleasure to briefly introduce the chair of this first panel, Francine Frankel, who is professor of political science and the founding director of the Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania. Francine and Pratap and Satu, please come to the front.

MS. FRANKEL: My thank you to Dr. Plattner and to Dr. Piccone for extending an invitation to me to be here with you this afternoon. I'm very pleased and feel very privileged to start this panel.

We have with us two distinguished security analysts of Indian policy, and I am going to introduce them very briefly because you have their bios in front of you.

Pratap Mehta, on my left, is president of the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. He writes widely on Indian politics and foreign relations; he is a journalist who writes for *The Indian Express* in Delhi, and he served as member convener of the prime minister's Knowledge Commission in India.

Satu Limaye is the director of the East West Center, which I'm happy to say now has a branch in Washington, and the editor of the *Policy Studies* series. He has also written very widely and published numerous books and monographs on Asian security, and his last book, I believe, is *Japan in A Dynamic Asia.*

We will organize this panel in a following way: Pratap Mehta will give his presentation -- that should take 15 minutes -- and Satu Limaye will be the discussant. After that we will open the discussion to the members of the audience, so altogether we're aiming at about 30 minutes of Q and A.

Professor Mehta.

PROFESSOR MEHTA: Thank you. It's a great privilege being here, and sort of intimidating to speak sort of with Francine, but I do know this is more about Indian foreign policy.

So very briefly, the argument of my paper is as follows: Democracy and human rights are extremely important to India's conception of itself as national and its identity. India recognizes that in a sense being a successful democracy is perhaps one of the preconditions for its very survival; India would not be a nation if it were not a democracy. India recognizes that being a successful democracy is potentially a source of great sort of strategic asset in the international order; it does sort of flaunt its credentials as the world's largest democracy and all that comes with it. And her identity more certainly and importantly, it recognizes that the success of India as a pluralist democracy which, if it can sustain growth rates for eight to ten percent from another 10 to 12 years, will really

decisively transform the debate over democracy and development and perhaps itself be an event of world historical significance.

So, existentially, democracy is very important to India. What role will human rights and democracy promotion play in its foreign policy? At one level, a very formal level, India has tentatively moved towards -- and I should stress the words "very tentatively" -- moved towards espousing the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy aim. It has joined the community of democracies, it is giving funding to the U.N. Democracy Fund and so forth, and Indian leaders and the Indian foreign policy establishment is categorical that it puts its allegiance behind democracy as a value.

However, the promotion of democracy and human rights, as a self-conscious aim of its foreign policy, is likely to remain extremely muted for the foreseeable future, and I'll just explain briefly why I think that is the case.

India is going to be very reluctant, as it were, to engage in this sort of democracy promotion agenda or think of human rights or its ability to bring about human rights change globally for two different sets of reasons. The first sets of reasons are conceptual and the second have to do specifically with India's interest in India's predicament.

The first set of reasons is that India's foreign policy is characterized by what I call very cautious prudence, and this cautious prudence has a couple of elements: it prefers a known ideological foreign policy, which is generally a reluctance to embrace ideological principles that can produce more polarization; it wants to be a zone of great power agreement, and insofar as -- insofar as the principles of democracy promotion and human rights promotion can be an axis of actually polarization in the world order, it is going to actually shy away from them. Its approach is going to be that if the point is to bring authoritarian regimes into the world order, the last thing you need is a kind of force principles based foreign policy that actually drives them away.

Second, and I think this point is important: What is it that drives foreign policy outlooks globally? Now, one of the things we know is that foreign policy is not driven by, as it were, just the goals of foreign policy or foreign policymakers, it's driven by a very subtle set of background assumptions you make about how the world runs, a sense of your own power, a sense of how causality in the world functions. And, very frankly, India's sense of judgment about what are the causal conditions that are required to promote democracy and human rights human rights in

particular contexts are likely to be very, very different from the United States.

To put it very simplistically, as Peter Beinart has argued, the U.S. optimism to it is driven by a whole set of sort of background assumptions, you know, what he calls "hubris," but in a kind of nice way in a sort of optimistic sense that you have perfect knowledge, that you have power. And, frankly, that is I think actually a larger culture epistemological set of assumptions that one brings to follow, and India is likely to be very different, very cautious, and very prudent.

Third, and I think this is more important, which is that India does not believe -- and I think Mark Bactin right -- that we should all be criticizing -- we should be criticizing the conduct of all powers when it is morally appropriate. But India does genuinely believe that it falls on countries like India to do more for democratic promotion than human rights, themselves part of a kind of ideological ruse to actually corner these countries into doing something that they actually cannot do, and it is extremely skeptical, it is extremely skeptical that the western world is actually not only going to be consistent in its support for democracy promotion and human rights but that in crucial cases is actually going to

ditch the cause if it goes out on a limb, and I think India is using Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I'd only claim Pakistan's case, India has actually gone to great lengths to shore up the legitimacy of the civilian regime formally than the United States has, so India uses, "Look, you know, you're more likely to get ditched if you go and try and do this."

Now, the practical hesitation in doing this is the following: India still has relatively limited capacity; it has a deeply fractious internal politics which actually makes long-term decision-making and strategic commitments very difficult. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is very fond of saying, "India has elites but it has no establishment." There is nobody in Indian democracy who is secure enough about their position to be able to actually take long-term risks on any sort of grand -- grand project.

But, most importantly -- and I think this is the point I want to emphasize -- let us look at the universe of known nondemocracies that we are facing at the moment, right? China, Myanmar, Iran, you know, Saudi Arabia, whatever your sort of cases is, India is in an interesting structural relationship to all of these countries, which is that all of these countries as it were, there's a way in which India is directly vulnerable to the actions of all of these countries. It's not simply a question of the United States tasks

is intervening in Libya and not in (inaudible) not, right. I mean that's a very legitimate question you can sort of ask.

In India's case, right, anything it does vis-à-vis these countries, right, it invites direct vulnerability. China, obviously, on our borders, you know, long-standing historical dispute, and we have to live with the fact that China is our neighbor, and India has had to very delicately play this card of maintaining the cause of the Tibet, you know, without actually antagonizing China. But China will impose a direct cause to India. It's not a distant cause.

Even with a country like Myanmar, right, India's primary calculation was not just the fact that China was moving into Myanmar, but the fact is that India had insurgency in its northeast, Myanmar was a safe haven for rebels, and for the integrity of its national project it needed the cooperation of the regime in Myanmar, right.

Middle East, India, of course, has the largest sort of diaspora in the Middle East most at stake, not just energy but literally the lives of, you know, thousands of people. So those structural vulnerabilities that India has in relation to authoritarian regimes is going to make it extremely cautious in actually taking stands against us, in some case, you know, these vulnerabilities extend to our domestic politics. And I must

emphasize the word "vulnerability." It not just a question about just acting on your interest or not acting on interest, you're just directly vulnerable.

Having said this I just want enter maybe two sort of thoughts which is, one, what is India's attitude going to be to the one principle that comes in the way of promoting democracy and human rights, which is the sovereignty principle. The general consensus seems to be that India is a very strong advocate of the sovereign difference or very skeptical of things like "right to protect," and so forth. Is this going to change?

An argument that I would like to put forward is this one I think that characterization of India as a sovereign dispower is a little bit inaccurate. In the early stages of its independence, it was actually one of the most vociferous internationalist powers, and, in fact, if you read all the new histories coming out of the Declaration of Human Rights, the early years of the U.N., India actually actively opposed the sovereignist principle, partly to actively get the U.N. involved in South Africa.

Second, 1971, India's intervention, although partly motivated by national interests, frankly, remains the most successful example of the application of a right to protect doctrine before the doctrine existed, right. So it's not that India will not, as it were, bench it out. But the three conditions that made India let's say a sovereign dispower, the first was its

own internal vulnerability; India's skepticism about intervention, its, you know, hiding behind sovereignty was very frankly due to India's experience with Kashmir at the United Nations, right.

Now, insofar as internal India feels that international pressure on India is likely to reduce on things like Kashmir and its own northeast, it is more likely to be able to venture out and oppose the sovereignist principle, but that, that factor is going to deal with it.

The second factor was that India, of course, needed during the Cold War years to be the leader of the Non-Align Movement. I mean that was the kind of leverage it has, whatever G-77 Non-Align Movement, and the sovereignist principle suited India then. That is no longer the case. India is playing a very complicated balancing game, so the desire to be the leader of G-77 or some such group is not going to be a decisive, as it were, factor.

And the third -- and this I just remind you, historically -- that intervention was associated as much with subverting democracy as it was with promoting it during the Cold War years. I mean, remember when that came out, the experience of '70s, '80s, and it's only now that at least there is more of an assurance that intervention is not likely to promote authoritarianism. I mean so if these three conditions change, India will

certainly change its stance on sovereignty, and I there's some evidence that it is.

Last and final thought, that even though India is not going to own up to it, it is actually going to end up being implicated in democracy promotion. One, its AID program which is interesting in terms of, you know, what it's trying to do in places like Afghanistan, even the AID program to Africa will indirectly, right, help the cause of democracy promotion. Secondly, it's very concerned about democracy in its neighborhood. Where India will remain actively engaged, we can talk about details -- Bangladesh, Myanmar, even to a certain extent Sri Lanka -- and India, you know, and Pakistan, of course, (inaudible) in India's master leading the activities of the only option it has.

Third, and in a sense finally, as I said, I think the most important thing about India is that if its example is successful, not only does it change the ideological debate with the nation globally about can democracy develop and go together but potentially provide models for how to run institutions -- for example, things like how to run elections and so forth. And I think a lot of Indian engagement is more likely to be the sort of low-key-under-the-surface, you know, building the parliament, building in Afghanistan, that kind of -- that kind of thing. But I think

ultimately it is going to say that India's being is its foreign policy, you know: If it does well that will do far more for democracy promotion than anything its foreign policy can aim for.

MS. FRANKEL: Thank you very much. And Satu?

MR. LIMAYE: Well, thank you very much, Francine, thank you to the NED and to Brookings for this opportunity to participate.

I'm a bit in a quandary, one, because I cheated -- I read Pratap's paper which probably he's captured in some of his comments, but he said -- which leaves me to my second sort of problem which is -- perhaps he was even more skeptical in his verbal delivery than he was in the paper. In the paper he said that India is unlikely to sign onto democracy promotion as a big idea. And what I heard here was extremely muted and extremely skeptical.

So I was going to try to be more skeptical than him, but that's going to be hard. So let me try to be, stick to my guns and be skeptical on the basis, I think Pratap laid out this really terrifically intriguing and challenging and rich paper.

Five points as to why I remain quite skeptical like Pratap, or maybe even more so about India's role in democracy promotion:

First, the glimmer of hope he cites is really about the sovereignty principle, and you've heard his arguments that it's not connected with less pressures on India, that it's no longer leading the G-77, that the prospects for intervention and subversion of democracy is declining. Those are very interesting arguments. I don't see that happening for the following reasons:

First, I foresee very little prospect of diminishment of the kinds of conditions in India that would lead to less attention on India on human rights and democracy concerns. I don't mean here institutional democracy or elections democracy or political party change; I mean the kinds of things that the Kashmir problem, you know, just disappears and internal issues of Naxalites or Northeast insurgency, or what have you, social conditions, political conditions.

So I'm very skeptical that that's likely to happen, and, in fact, the international community that will be paying attention to those things is precisely the international community that will be asking India to do more on democracy promotion. There is an uneasy relationship between the persistence pressures, if you will, on those fronts that are likely to continue in India, and the demands that India do more on these very same issues.

And that, I think, in the domestic political context in India will not be adjudicated to the benefit of more activism. So that's point one.

The second trouble with the sovereignty principle is, I quite agree, the business about India leading the G-77 is history, fine. You know, history changes. But I would argue for precisely the reasons Pratap argues in his paper that India is more conscious of "seeking power in forums," to use his quote, the G-77 becomes more important to India, not in the term of old third-worldism or nonalignment but precisely because the diffusion of power in the global system, and the development of globalization makes a whole bunch of powers in G-77 that didn't matter at all matter more in order to achieve power in forums.

So India's foreign policy, if you see what's happened in terms of structural changes, I think you'll see India no longer espousing third-worldism but those countries that comprise these elements of the G-77 NAN, et cetera, individually and collectively, and ad hoc coalitions become quite important. In other words, it's not only ideational, it's material, material interest, and you'll see that on energy and resources and coalitions, et cetera.

So that's the sovereignty problem. This is why I see very little prospect that the diminishment of the sovereignty principle will occur in such a way as to make India more active.

The second has to do with the problem, as Pratap put it, of structural relationships with its neighbors. And here in the paper he talks about China, Russia, and Iran in a global balance. And I would suggest that really we have to think about these three powers along with the contiguous southeast -- South Asia states as essentially part of the same system. In other words, it's the near abroad by extension, and here it becomes really problematic and a delicate dance for India because the conditions in South Asia and the relationship and connection of China, Russia, and Iran to the South Asian systemic geopolitically is going to increase, not decrease, and it's going to give even less room to maneuver on democracy promotion primarily because India's interests are going to be implicated more, not less.

So that's sort of a second constraint on India promoting democracy

The third problematic is, again in the paper, he talks about the balance between ideas and material interests and those of us who work on foreign policy, this is the inevitable thing. And Pratap squares

this, I think, rather elegantly and interestingly with the notion of prudence, and he talks about cautious prudence. And I was trying to deconstruct this a little bit in some work I've been doing on India and other countries on foreign policy, and I'm not sure that the ideational and material interest model as being so bifurcated now.

In fact, if you look and map out the topography of India's globalized interests, the very way in which its interests map out in the world are ones that make ideational clarity difficult to achieve. Hmm? Because India is going to have interests in a whole bunch of countries it never had because of globalization and diffusion of power. And so that dividing line in which prudence is "ain't gonna work" and "ain't gonna work in the same way," and so you're going to see what I think is prudence will be even more reinforced because of the fusion of ideational and material interest.

Now let me turn to two items and conclude with things he did not so much mention either in the paper or in his written comments. One is the quest for strategic autonomy. India's quest for strategic autonomy and the potential that for the first time since independence it's possible in a more systemic and structural way, which makes democracy promotion even less likely because the controversy over democracy promotion and

human rights inhibits Indian freedom of action and autonomy not expands it okay? It only expands it with a small group of people; it inhibits it with a lot more or a lot more countries on a lot more issues.

And the second difficulty which he did not mention is really the relationship with the U.S. -- since we're in Washington, since I'm an American I'll sort of talk about -- the democracy promotion and human rights activism issue in India is really a flow-through from the U.S.-India relationship of the late 1990s and early 2000. Now, whatever other issues that animate it -- and they do, Pratap was quite right about the U.N. and historical issues, quite right -- I'm not suggesting it's somehow a U.S. agenda -- but it's a core element of the development of the normalization of U.S.-India relations post-Cold War, and that, too, constrains it, ironically, and here's why, I think:

One is that this is still a very provisional relationship. India is, if to use his phrase, "a prudent caution," extremely prudent and cautious about the U.S. relationship, because the U,S. relationship has great benefits, huge structural ideational material benefits but great disadvantages to India, as it rises in some areas.

And the second is the democracy promotion and human rights element within the U.S.-India bilateral relationship is likely to take

less precedence precisely as the Asia Pacific security environment evolves in a way in which democracy promotion and human rights will be less important and issues of geostrategy and changes in the balance of power.

Thank you.

MS. FRANKEL: Thank you very much, Satu.

I have also read Pratap's paper on the assumption that that's what we should be doing, and I will respond to different parts of it, I think, than have been addressed by Satu but I think flows into the general argument about democracy promotion.

Pratap talks in the beginning about the notion that India does not have any strategic thinking to speak of, and he goes back to a very well-known study by George Tanham, which is now about 20 years old, in which Tanham did an exhaustive survey of security experts in India who all came up with this conclusion that they have no strategic outlook.

Now, what I want to suggest here is there's been an enormous change, and the notion that Pratap mentioned, that there can be a kind of foreign policy that India follows which makes itself a zone of great power agreement and avoids polarization is simply no longer a viable option. Now, I know people don't say this, and Pratap is nodding

his head vigorously no, however I think that in the last at least five, six years the security situation for India has changed in a rather serious way. And Pratap talks about achieving enduring goals of India's national security, one of which, for example, is primacy in its own neighborhood. And I would say including the Indian Ocean in that.

And I make this argument in an article in the *Journal of International Affairs* which has just come out. So I won't go into the argument, but the title does tell you something about what's happening, and that's the outbreak of strategic rivalry between India and China. Now, as a result of that, my assessment certainly is that India can no longer achieve its security objectives without balancing or entering into a balancing strategy against China. And this is a major change, and it underscores the ideological differences as well between China and India. I think we need to realize that since 2008 India has directed its security establishment to plan for a two-front war: that is an attack by China and Pakistan.

So India, certainly -- and this goes to the paper -- now is developing a long-term security strategy to manage China's threat on its land borders and also in the Indian Ocean.

Second, India is actively pursuing a strategy of balancing against China, and it is doing this with Japan, with South Korea. It is also doing it with the United States, and security experts in India are quite candid in saying that it India's foreign policy. They may say it secret -- not secretly off the record, but they're more and more saying it on the record, and their policy demonstrates that this is what is happening.

So in order to secure its most pressing security interests on the border in the extended neighborhood, India is drawing much closer to Asian countryside, particular Japan, South Korea, to the United States, and who are also interested in balancing and which are democracies. And so I think the commitment to a democratic, perhaps informal coalition as part of this, as a critical part of this balancing strategy, is going to be more and more at the forefront of India's foreign policy.

So on two main points that India has no strategic thinking, and, secondly, it does not accept a balance of power strategy, I think that there is an incompleteness in the analysis that Pratap has offered, and I would like to ask him, perhaps at the beginning as we open up a discussion, why in his view of India's security thinking does he say so little about this kind of change or simply give us the impressions that there has been no change in the security thinking of India.

MR. MEHTA: You raise a very large question. Partly, you know, we could sort of have a long discussion of what is changing and what -- I agree with you. There has been profound change in the last 10 years. I would perhaps disagree with you, on characterization of what that change is.

One simple way of putting it is the following: Yes, China looms large in India's imagination as it does in almost everybody else's, United States to Asia, and there's just no, you know, because China is -- that's the big question.

Yes, India will try and take all measures possible to fix, to sort of, you know, protect itself against potential Chinese ascension. But here's the thing what has not changed: At the moment India thinks that in a sense it can leverage its position in the world to get the maximum benefits out of all powers that be. So you go closer to the U.S. partly annoys the Chinese; on the other hand they begin to do business on certain things because, you know, they have this alternative.

Reverse is also true, which is U.S. looking to build an orderly (inaudible) see India as a potential alliance. But India does not for a moment believe the proposition that if China did something, let's say small territory grab, the kind of probably the worst case scenario, but let's say

that they really -- that the United States will in that event back India, okay? India is very aware that at the drop of a hat the United States is at least as likely to ditch India. So, yes, it's playing them off each other, it's doing the balancing extracting maximum it can, but its strategy is not premised on U.S. alliance against China.

And the same is true of Asia. I mean there's just -- that, that fundamental proposition about Indian strategy has not changed, and did not change and will not change. It's you know, maybe I've kind of revealed a secret Indians should not, but, but it a question for Washington as well, which is, you know, what would Washington do? Nothing. So I don't think India's going to put all its eggs in that basket. Fundamentally, India also knows on AfPak, the other side of the equation, right, its views. Its views have -- let's put it this way -- not had as much impact on Washington as should have been for any ally, and yet India knows that the United States will have to be allied with that region at some point. It will be left picking up the pieces with Iran and so forth.

So, yes, I think India is courting all powers. It is leveraging a relationship with Japan and Australia and Singapore, but it's a one step forward, two steps back, let's see what we can get out of this issue. It's

not a fundamental change in the structure of alliances. I don't think that's going to happen.

MS. FRANKEL: Okay, we're ready to open up the session for discussion. I will only say one thing: I have never used the word "alliance" --

MR. MEHTA: Yeah, sure.

MS. FRANKEL: -- the new coalitional changes.

MR. MEHTA: Yeah. Yes, I agree.

MS. FRANKEL: Okay. Yes?

SPEAKER: Is there a microphone?

MR. DIAMOND: I am Larry Diamond, Marc's colleague at the International Forum.

I think I have a mic that may not be working, but it may not matter..

So maybe we're asking too much of India in this question here, and maybe be could ratchet it down to a much more modest question. One of you -- it might have been you, I don't remember -- mentioned India's involvement in funding international idea, India's involvement sort of in the community of democracies --

MS. FRANKEL: I may --

MR. DIAMOND: It's pretty paper-thin, so far --

MR. MEHTA: Yeah, I agree.

MR. DIAMOND: But, okay, so I mean it's -- let's jus stipulate --

MR. MEHTA: Right.

MR. DIAMOND: -- it's hard to debate it, India's not going to spend a lot of geopolitical capital to promote democracy. It's not going to rank very highly in its strategic calculations to extent it has very lofty or coherent ones. But is it possible to imagine that it might kind of move an increment forward in a lot of modest --

MR. MEHTA: Yeah.

MR. DIAMOND: -- and decentralized ways? For example, India's really seen in a lot of the developing world and established world as a kind of leader in an electoral administration and confidence. I wish we could learn some lessons from India in that regard in the United States. And so, you know, can we imagine just as kind of incremental set of initiatives that would creep a bit forward without imposing a lot of cost --

MR. MEHTA: Yeah.

MR. DIAMOND: -- that just might involve maybe a little less caution -- I won't even say less prudence but less caution and less

modesty on the international scene stage? And then the second thing is if you'd look at this is really a challenge that goes to all the country papers, if you look what kind of transformed American foreign policy toward a less cautious and more active approach on democracy and human rights and its foreign policy, a lot of it was civil-society driven.

Now, India doesn't have religious missionaries going abroad the say the United States did or Britain, but, you know, it does have a very active civil society. So could you say something at least --

MR. MEHTA: Yes. Yeah.

MR. DIAMOND: -- about how India's civil society might again push out --

MR. MEHTA: Yes.

MR. DIAMOND; -- smaller increments of initiative?

MR. MEHTA: Very brief answer to your first question. I think you're exactly right. I mean I don't mean to guide that India can't do a lot more; I mean, in fact, it's going domestic in our position, we could do a lot more.

I think the operative word was the one you used, which is it's going to be "decentralized," which is I don't think if India goes in those -- in that domain -- it is going to be true in a much greater sort of allegiance or

things like that, you know, community of democracies or U.N. democracy; it will be more bilateral, it'll be more through regional organizations, partly because I think there is still the sense that the sort of international coalitions are still perhaps tainted by association with the, you know, the U.S.

So I think there will be allotment, and India's AID program is certainly going to increase in, you know, in fairly significant ways, and a lot of it is actually going to actually building institutions, I mean it's -- but it is going to be entirely, I mean I think largely bilateral or regional, not through some sort of, you know, sort of global -- global alliance.

On civil society, I think it's an interesting question. My own take is closer to Satu's which is that part of the civil society which is likely to be vocal and active is actually going to be the more left pro-sovereignist, anti-American sort of part of civil society. I don't think you have a big domestic constituency of sort of, you know, kind of liberal internationalism, if you like. Civil society will be very active, but I think -- I think it's, if anything, going to make it harder to sort of do stuff overseas and intervene.

MR. LIMAYE: And domestically because --

MR. MEHTA: Yeah, yeah, and domestic, yeah, it is domestically --

MR. LIMAYE: Natural society will be domestically focused for ideological reasons and --

MS. FRANKEL: Now, Roger?

MR. SKADIAN: Thank you, Francine. I am Roger Skadian. I've written some on India, including, well, I'm the most quoted person in Georgetown, I suppose.

MS. FRANKEL: Yes.

MR.. SKADIAN: So coming back to that, I think George Tanham's book set the stage for Indian strategic thought, for one thing.

MR. MEHTA: Yeah.

MR. SKADIAN: It stung India into that.

The second thing that none of you have mentioned is the nuclearization of the Indian armed forced. That leads to again a definition of Indian strategic thought and Indian strategic goals and spheres of influence.

The third has been the development of democracies in the nearer aboard, Nepal for instance, Bangladesh for instance.

MR. MEHTA: Yes.

MR. SKADIAN: So I really cannot share your pessimism and skepticism, and I would like you to comment on the ruin of the nuclear weapons, for one thing. And India's economic growth for another.

MR. MEHTA: Thank you.

SPEAKER: Jim?

MR. MEHTA: Very quickly, I mean it all going to nuclear -- the point in these things about the strategic thought, I mean in a sense, and I think -- I think I'm sort of grateful to Francine for sort of pointing, I think, the wooliness of the wax using in, actually, the paper.

It wasn't to suggest that there isn't smart thinking; it's just that there isn't a kind of large ideational framework within which that thinking happens. It's actually -- I mean I actually do think India's maneuvering quite well, but is it -- is it tied to sort of a large grand picture? It's only in that limited sense.

I agree with you about the neighborhood. I mean and I actually say that in the paper that despite India not making it a doctrine, its actual practice is going to implicate it. I mean, you know, even vis-à-vis China you could actually argue that, look, you know, it's all very well for the U.S. to say, you know, human rights in China India's directly implicated

in the human rights debate in China so long as the line level is in India. So it has an active role right there.

Nepal and Bangladesh absolutely India's role is absolutely central to strengthen borders, borders' democracies, but it's not going to come under a sort of grand ideological doctrine of democracy promotion; it will be based on a prudent assessment of what it can or cannot do. So I do actually end up in the table what you're saying, it's all going to be a goal of foreign policy, but particularly India, in India's neighborhood -- and we all certainly like to play a much more active role in Afghanistan for democracy -- it is actually going to be quite significant.

MS. FRANKEL: Yes?

MR. TWINING: Thanks, this is really excellent. My name is Dan Twining. I work at the German Marshall Fund, really appreciate the subtleties of this conversation. I wanted just to pick up two points from the speakers.

The first was where Dr. Mehta left it on this idea of Indian exceptionalism of India's kind of a shining city on a hill that could perhaps best support the cause of democracy by being India. And I'm putting words in your mouth because you see the point I'm making which is that we once had this conversation in our country. And this gets into kind of

theological debates about how we think countries behave as they ascend to world power. But the American experience is that your interests expand, you suddenly find that you do need to pursue a forward policy, and that your values, internally, are implicated in your foreign policy.

So, forgive me, that was my quote, not yours. But I wanted to also come to Satu's very interesting point about kind of the balance of ideas versus the balance of power in Asia, and this question of whether values and kind of hard material interest pull in opposite directions. And you know what I'm going to say, which is that I think you can make the opposite case, which is that they pull in the same direction. And Professor Frankel mentioned very aptly, you know, the U.S., the Japan-India deepening, India's deepening relationships with democracies not only in America but along the Asia rimland.

We've already talked about South Asia, which is that there's a scenario where India really can't rise to do what it and we would like it to do without better governance and institutions in its region. We think about the Middle East where the Muslim Brotherhood has apparently asked India for help in organizing Egyptian elections, as had the U.S. secretary of state. There's a real opportunity here, so I think part of us who are more optimistic, joining my optimistic colleague near the front, part of this

is sort of prescriptive, which is that it makes sense that actually India, strategically, would benefit from taking a stronger lead on democracy, accepting everything that you've said about the complications of the Indian system.

Thanks.

MS. FRANKEL: Do both of you want to respond to? Satu?

MR. LIMAYE: Yeah, maybe I'll start. I'll be the first victim. Yeah, thanks, Dan. I know this was really addressed to Pratap on Indian exceptionalism, but you know one thing that struck me in the discussion so far and sort of this conference is also, arose from your point, is that we're talking about the supply side of democracy promotion inactive, and we're not talking about the demand side.

And that's where the issue of Indian shining city on the hill issue arises in my conversations, particularly, as you well know, much of my time in East Asia. And everyone wants to work with India, but I don't think if democracy promotion and human rights promotion were introduced into that calculation, there would be the same enthusiasm for India's role. These are very -- I'm trying to be very gentle in how I put this -- this is not the shining city on the hill. So it's a supply -- it's a -- it's a demand question, not a supply question.

On your interesting question about geopolitics, yeah, you and I have had this discussion before and others. You know, I quite get it, the community of democracies, the president's trip in the fall, the quadripartite exercises. But let me be cautious, and Francine mentioned this, too, and I'll say India will also work with Vietnam, and India will work with China. Maybe not in the same way to do the same kinds of things, but in terms of American interest in the world, we should be very careful about assuming that ideational and material interest pull in the same direction. Primarily, as I tried to imply in the fuzzy logic that I used, that ideational material interests are becoming much more interlinked in ways that are much less clear than they were during the Cold War, okay. So you have material interests in fighting off a western view of climate change for the Doha Round of their trade talk. But you may have a very distinct interest in purchasing 126 multirole combat aircraft from that country.

And this kind of integration and ideational and material thing is going to pull in all kinds of ways, and there's a second issue: India's pursuit of strategic autonomy, as I pointed out, will seek to maximize benefits wherever they can be gained, not only because it's ideationally pure to strategic autonomy, but because the way India's mapping of its interest lies out, marginal gains for India matter everywhere because it's --

marginal and relative gains matter because its absolute interests everywhere are spread so thinly. So arms purchases from Israel and the United States and Europe, but most of all from Russia, global talks with China, but a deal with Vietnam on jungle warfare, quadripartite with Australia, Singapore, Japan, and the U.S. but a deal on something else with some -- you know.

And that's based on strategic autonomy, and it's also based on one other thing that I think, you know, we are sort of post -- so closed colonial we forget that India is still a nonwestern power rising in still an essentially western system. And it's a heavy hangover; it's not done. This story isn't done. And if you go back and read Adam Watson and these others, I think they capture it, you know, that the revolt against the West has entered a new phase, but it's still a part of a post-colonial, post-development context.

MS. FRANKEL: Pratap?

MR. MEHTA: I mean I actually agree with -- I just, I didn't mean to say India has a sense of destiny or shining city on the hill, but it's more a kind of reference to kind of the debate or democracy in geological time, so let us say India were to fail in the next 10, 15 years, right, growth will flummox to three percent, five percent, which would constitute a

failure, you know, internal strife increases, right, what would that do to the attractiveness of democracy as a global model in the developing world?

What's actually interesting -- I mean I don't want to exaggerate the significance of this -- I mean I think it's still a -- but, you know, it's interesting joint-talking to several Chinese colleagues and a few kind of deconstruct the sort of -- there was this phase last year where *The People's Daily* was going after India big time to really different Sino-India relations. What was interesting was they were actually going after the Indian model of development, you know, but had a little country can-do infrastructure, can-do, you know, grow, it can do all these things, right?

In a very subtle way, that is the issue that is in the backdrop of how people think about democracy development. Ten years ago it was much easier for China to say, "pathetic little country." You know, if you're a democracy, this is how you will end up, right? That, I think, is an important issue in sort of kind of in terms of the global cultural idea of democracy and making it. So it's only in that sense, not that India is actually a shining city on a hill, but the consequences of the failure will actually be large.

Just one little dominion that Satu kind of put to India's playing the game very well, and I just sort of add one to it which is so

India's going to do maybe arms switches from the U.S. for sure. If you look at India's infrastructure investment projections, the uncomfortable truth is a lot of it will have to come from China. I mean the U.S. ain't going to do it, right? So it's not going to put itself in this position of in a sense, you know, antagonizing China to, you know, to the point of no return.

MR. LIMAYE: And China is India's largest trade partner.

MS. FRANKEL: Yes?

MR. WEINTRAUB: Thank you, I'm Leon Weintraub, University of Wisconsin, Washington Semester in International Affairs.

I'd like to ask Dr. Mehta about what he discusses, some Indian-specific vulnerabilities. For example, you mentioned on Tibet there is China, on Myanmar there's the northeast area. I was interested, you, when you mention on the Middle East, you mention the Indian diaspora, but you didn't mention something which I thought might be critical, and that might be the issue of Kashmir. Might that be linked with any Indian increase in its profile on addressing human rights in the Middle East?

MR. MEHTA: No. I mean I actually agree with you, in relation to the Middle East, the Kashmir issue cuts both ways, right, so at the level of doctrine, to be honest that is the primary source for India's sort of allegiance to the sovereignty doctrine. I think Indian -- the history of

Indian foreign policy on that doctrine would have been very different if it had not been for the Kashmir issue.

So at that level, that level of principle, you're exactly right: Kashmir is still even, if you don't say it, even if you say things are improving, it is still the big source of worry.

On the Middle East it actually cuts both ways because I think now there is much more of a sentiment in India, and certainly, you know, even in justifying things like extension, the U.N. Security Council that's supposed to, you know, wanting to oppose. In India there's a perception that most of the regimes in the Middle East have not on the Kashmir issue been India's ally, right, and there is a very strong part of Indian foreign policy establishment saying, look, what did they all do for us on the Kashmir issue such that, you know, so it cuts both ways.

I mean I think the hard-headed realists are actually beginning to say that in terms of specific orientation towards powers in the Middle East, you know, we should just actually say it: Look, you know, what did you do for us on Kashmir? You know, why should we work for you?

But I do know vulnerability is a different -- it's not just the energy, it is just the fact that, you know, you have tens of thousands of

Indian workers, and even the domestic repercussions of putting them at risk are just enormous in very many important electoral states. So it's going to be played very, very cautiously.

MS. FRANKEL: Yes?

MS. BAKER: Pauline Baker, the Fund for Peace. I wonder if India's foreign policy more far afield where there aren't vulnerabilities might offer opportunity such as Africa. There China's role is increasing exponentially, if you will, but India had long roots in a big diaspora population in Africa which is struggling with democracy. Could this be an opportunity for growing influence in a democracy and human rights role as opposed to the near abroad?

MR. MEHTA: A further question is actually an interesting one because I think that you are going to see a sort of big Indian engagement with Africa. It's already growing. Once India has -- I mean, you know, I think -- I think you can play the kind of Chinese influence in Africa story two ways, and at one level it looks big; on the other hand you could argue that it's probably going to generate the seeds of its own backlash, as it were, and there will only be need to be signs of that.

So India's engagement is going to be private sector led and decentralized, and that is enormous. And if you just look at the plans of

Indian business, I mean India is going to invest very heavily in Africa. There is absolutely no doubt about it.

You're also right that the institutional links with several African countries -- and it is a complicated, I mean, you know, including South Africa -- I mean which in some sense is at one level the most, most kind of developed -- are extremely crucial and growing to, you know, are growing -- I mean just examples like I think India is probably -- India is doing a project of broadbanding all of Ethiopia. Now, you might add that's a very good democracy-promotion thing, although it's not, you know, it's a very small niche, but it's, you know, it's an incredible sort of -- so Africa is definitely going to be the frontier of engagement.

But I think what makes India work there -- and I underscore the points to make -- is that precisely because it is not done with any sense of ideological value, right. I mean the minute India did that more assertively to reduce its own potential for maneuvering into these, these niches where euro power people can come much more comfortably to.

MR. LIMAYE: Yeah, in fact, if I could just add that if you look at the I-tech, if you deconstruct I-tech and trade growth rates for India's portfolio share across regions, Africa becomes very important. And,

strategically, East Africa become important as India thinks more and more seriously about the Indian Ocean, which it's beginning to do.

But precisely because of those interests, doing it with the label of democracy promotion rather than just building broadband or building infrastructure, or working on institutions, or building businesses isn't going to work. And I would just highlight that in the joint communiqué between the president and prime minister recently, Africa specifically cited, but without the democracy component, as an area for the U.S. and India to work together.

MS. FRANKEL: Yes, sir?

MR. SMITH: I am Bruce Smith, Brookings. I have discussed often with some of the colleagues in China, what is it that holds China together? It's always puzzled me, you know, Marxism is dead, not much Confucianism. The sort of answer I get is, well, it's growth itself. Materialism, growth, and nationalism. I'm a little puzzled, so I have one big question, and then another little smaller one.

What is it exactly that holds India together? Is it the same thing? Is it growth? You know, this is going to be world transformative, well, how?

Is it nationalism? That might not be such wonderful development if China and India are both nationalists, but I wonder just expand a little bit on that.

And then, secondly, I find it a trifle odd that we're trying to approach the Indians, why aren't you more promoting democracy? That wouldn't be my priority. Just for some -- a kind of a different U.S. angle, why is it that you guys haven't been happy with this nuclear deal? The Bush administration went down the line, took a lot of heat, including from a lot of our colleagues here at Brookings, to come out with a pretty good deal for India. We'd like to sell you some more defense weapons. I would have -- is it still that there's a sort of narrowism lingering around here? Is it still the non-aligned -- I mean we weren't the colonial powers; we were against the colonials, weren't we? (Laughter) I mean we used to be.

So why is it that you're so unhappy at us giving you this unbelievably good deal of the nuclear arrangement within --

MR. MEHTA: Because we're exactly like the U.S.: We want to drive the hardest bargain possible.

Your larger question, what will be -- have a look, nationalism is important for every country that's, that's remotely held together. And when this idea that the nationalism is lead to China and India and not to

the United States is -- I mean I'm not sure that that assumption is quite right.

A proper answer to your question would probably require days of, if we could figure it out. I think the cop-out answer is, you know, the old answer that used to be given about why people do philosophy, so that they can keep figuring out, you know, what philosophy's about. And so India otherwise is a framework to keep asking the question: What is India about?

MS. FRANKEL: Could I say that Satu and I both came to the same answer to your answer: What holds India together is democracy. And I don't think we want to expand on that because it would take too long.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible)

MS. FRANKEL: Yes, right.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible).

MS. FRANKEL: That's right, but that would be our answer to that.

And I think as far as the nuclear deal is concerned, when President Bush left office, there was an expectation that the United States would go ahead with the next stages of the nuclear deal, remove from

these restricted lists, transfer of for dual-use tech -- lots of things which India wanted.

President Obama shifted and he decided to give engagement with China priority, and that reinforced again the notion among a number of India's elites that the United States was not reliable. And so it's not that people are unhappy with the nuclear deal; they just can't put their trust in the United States.

Yes?

MS. KADEVEY: Hello. My name is Asha Kadevey. You see there is as growing emergence of Indian-Americans in U.S. politics and media. Do you see the Indian diaspora in America playing a bigger role in strengthening U.S.-India relations?

MR. MEHTA: U.S.-India relations? I mean obviously, the diaspora has been very critical to that relationship, but in relation to, I think, the theme of the conference, I think you raise an interesting question which is not in terms of specifically U.S.-India relations, but it is actually worth thinking about this question which is, to what extent does the presence of the Indian diaspora, including in places like in the Middle East, in the long term create some of the cultural and institutional foundations for more complex commercial democracies to actually

flourish? I mean, that's human capital itself, again not self-consciously part of the democracy promotion agenda is actually going to be extraordinarily critical to maintaining the sort of infrastructure, you know, that complex democracies will require. So, kind of, you know, to send people out, the ideas will travel.

MS. FRANKEL: Satu:

MR. LIMAYE: Just to make one addition on this, I think the diaspora question is very interesting not only in the U.S. but also through Southeast Asia and the Middle East. And it has economic implications and foreign policy ones.

Like so much with India cuts in a lot of ways, I mean if you really deconstruct the Indian diaspora here, for example, there is a lot of discussion about what it's done, for example, to the Indian debate within India regarding funding for particular groups and particular parts of the domestic Indian environment, too, and not all of it from many perspectives positive.

So there are all kinds of implications that are in some ways are maybe perceived by some as antidemocratic, given what kinds of moneys are flowing into which parties, and that kind of thing. So I think it's a complicated question, but I think the Indian diaspora, if some of the work

we've done on remittances from this diaspora -- we can't get exact numbers because I think the Reserve Bank of India is fairly careful on giving us numbers -- but one of the things to note is that 50 percent we think, roughly, of the remittances that India gets from abroad come from U.S., Canada, and Australia. But the numbers of diaspora are most prevalent in Persian Gulf and the UAE, which happens to be uniformly together as a composite, the largest Indian trading partner, and the least area where India has to maneuver on democracy promotion and activism.

MS. FRANKEL: I am very sorry to have to say that we have come to the end of this wonderful conversation. And I want to thank our speakers, Pratap Mehta and Satu Limaye, and all of the participants today who have asked questions for making it such a fascinating discussion.

Thank you very much. (Applause)

MR. ABENTE: Good afternoon. I am Diego Abente, the deputy director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy.

Our panel, our second panel is about Brazil. We are going to have a speaker and a commentator. The speaker to my left is Ambassador Roberto Abdenur. He is a retired career diplomat. He served as a Brazilian ambassador to the United States and previously he was posted as ambassador in Ecuador, in China, in Austria, and in

Germany. He was also deputy foreign minister and he now works as a consultant on international economical -- economic and political issues for corporations.

Our commentator is Carlos Pereira. He is a visiting fellow in the Latin American Initiative here at Brookings Institution. He is also an assistant professor of comparative politics at Michigan State University and a professor of political economy at Getulio Vargas Foundation in Brazil. His research focuses on political economy and public policy and comparative perspective and he has published widely in a number of reference journals in the states, as well as in Latin America.

I am not going to go into too many details about the panelists because you have their bios and we have little time, so without further adieu I will ask Ambassador Abdenur to start with his presentation. He will have 15 minutes, Ambassador.

MR. ABDENUR: Yes.

MR. ABENTE: And Carlos, 10. And then we hopefully have about 30 minutes, 35 minutes for Q&As.

MR. ABDENUR: I want to start out by giving the audience a reassurance. I think I am the only diplomat, former diplomat to address you.

There is a saying that goes around according to which diplomats are honest people paid by their governments to tell lies on its

behalf. (Laughter) Now, for starters, I was never an honest person. (Laughter) Now, what matters is that I am retired now so nobody pays me to tell lies about Brazil, which means what I'm going to say is my true opinion. And I do this at the risk of displeasing three or four of my younger colleagues, some of them former collaborators of mine but who are still in the active service. But they don't lie that much because they are not yet ambassadors. When they become ambassador -- well, I lost a few seconds.

Allow me to tell you, of course, the issue of the role of democracy and human rights in Brazil's foreign policy cannot be tackled without reference to the domestic scene for the simple reason that Brazil went through two decades of military rule between early '64 and early '85. Now, interestingly, there were moments in the past four decades in which there was a measure of interaction between the democracy issue as it played itself out in the international scenarios and the internal situation. However dictatorial at times, the Brazilian military regime, unlike other military regimes in South America, never lost sight of the formal institutions of democracy as at least a reference for the future. The Brazilian military regime was much more engaged in the idea of development, *desenvolvi mentis mo* as we call it, than other similar regimes in the region. And *desenvolvi mentis mo* meant the regime could not simply degenerate into a personalistical heliotype dictatorship as had

happened in so many parts of the region before. One has also to bear in mind that the strong anti-communist bias underlying the regime meant *a contrario sensu*, a certain measure of attachment, however reluctantly and begrudgingly, to the western model of democracy.

Political life as such was therefore never totally interrupted. The arbitrary interventions and the political scene never sought to develop a doctrine for a definitive everlasting authoritarian regime. Anti-communist ideology meant the need between inverted commerce to intervene forcefully in political life but it did not necessarily bring with it a rejection of democracy.

At an early stage of the regime, a handful of so-called institutional acts suddenly eliminated all political parties then in existence, but something interesting, awkward, took place. The regime created one party to act as a mainstay of its interests, but on the other hand notably it created another party to be the voice for the opposition. So curiously, the regime felt it needed an opposition however constrained if it were to gain a basic modicum of legitimacy in the eyes of the population and also in the eyes of foreign opinion.

So I am going to tell you of something very interesting, an anecdote. In the last stages of the military regime when redemocratization was well on its way, foreign policy was used not just to give the government more credibility abroad; it also served the purpose of fostering

democracy internally. This latter remark deserves a recollection as it constitutes a rather unusual episode of a government resorting to foreign policy to buttress an internal political process.

The last military government under Figueiredo from March '79 to March '85 was committed to completing the process of redemocratization. The foreign minister during that period Saraiva Guerreiro, who passed away three months ago unfortunately and with whom I had the privilege of working for no less than nine years, suggested that in order to signal out to the outside world and to public opinion at home, the firmness of that commitment to redemocratization, the first country to be visited by the new president should not be Argentina, the one country with which Brazil in the region had the closest relationship but which was then under a brutal military dictatorship, but rather Venezuela. You see how the world turns around. (Laughter) Which was back then the only beacon of democracy and stability in South America.

Now, the word democracy has long had another rather peculiar meaning in Brazil's foreign policy. Earlier, as a developing country and now more recently as an emerging power, Brazil is not comfortable with international, economic, and political order. Hence, the demand for more democracy between inverted commerce and international relations, meaning greater multilateralism and more power-sharing in the major formal and informal international organizations. At

the current stage to be sure, Brazil continues to use that discourse but now under the umbrella of the newly established G-20 instead of the G-27 of which earlier speakers spoke, in addition to its continuing efforts at reform of the Bretton Woods and United Nations' organization. So Brazil insists on stressing the relationships between human rights, development, democracy, and peace at large.

With the return to democracy in '85 and the 1988 constitution, the defense of democracy and human rights was enshrined as a guiding principle of foreign policy. The Brazilian constitution states among the guiding principles for the nation "the dignity of the human person and political pluralism." It also proclaims that international relations, meaning foreign policy, shall be governed, among other things, by the prevalence of human rights. Since then, Brazil's foreign policy has been highly proactive in the defense and promotion of human rights in international fora, such as the U.N. General Assembly, Mercosur and the new Human Rights Council. But with some twists that deserve further comments, as will be mentioned further down this text, the growing weight of democracy and human rights in Brazil's foreign policy after redemocratization turned out to be an important underlying factor in a major diplomatic breakthrough in South America. The founding of Mercosur, the regional integration process, was only possible after Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay achieved full democratic statement --

status. The attachment to democracy and human rights is an essential indispensible tenet of the grouping. The partners from Mercosur acted together to introduce a formal democratic clause, sorry, clause in the statutes of Mercosur.

In 1998, a protocol declared that in case of disruption of the democratic order in a member state it could be suspended from participation in the various integration mechanisms or even be totally deprived of its rights. A few years ago during a serious political crisis in Paraguay, the other member states' threat to apply the democratic laws contributed decisively to avoid a coup in Paraguay. Brazil also helped negotiate the 2001 Organization of American States Democratic Charter, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, particularly comprehensive documents containing numerous principles, norms, and commitments about democracy. The charter goes well beyond the idea that democracy depends or consists exclusively of holding elections. It portrays representative democracy as encompassing essential elements, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, periodic free and fair elections, political pluralism, and the separation of powers and independence of government branches. But it goes even farther. It defines the parameters of a mechanism for collective action in the case of a sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic process.

More recently, the Inter-American Commission on

International Law or perhaps more correctly the International Law Commission came up with a most interesting set of proposals to perfect the charter by adding to it clauses that would prevent the undoing of representative democracy through the use of democratic means, such as elections, referendums, and other measures aimed actually at curtailing democratic rights in representative democracy. And the OAS Secretary General on his part has also suggested several measures to that purpose in a clear reference to the situation that exists these days in the so-called Bolivarian governments of Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. Those ideas are still under discussion.

Now, on the other hand, rather grudgingly, Brazil established a dialogue with the Community of Democracies, established initially in the year 2000 by a few countries led by Poland and the United States. Brazil still looks somewhat askance at the Community which it considers to be a small club strongly influenced by U.S. entities and which it feels might sometimes act especially at the U.N. in ways that Brazil does not deem appropriate.

Now, under the Fernando Henrique Cardoza government from January ’95 to December 2002, Brazil went so far as to place itself in 1998 under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights Court. It extended a permanent invitation to rapporteurs of the U.N. Human Rights system and has already welcomed about a dozen visits by those

rapporteurs. This was a significant gesture as Brazil both gave a constructive example and put aside its own former attachment to a rigid absolute interpretation of an adherence to the principles of sovereignty and noninterference. And actually, a few years ago for the first time Brazil was formally condemned under the American Convention on Human Rights to pay compensation for the violation of the rights of one of its citizens and other similar instances occurred later on.

Now, more recently under the Lula government, two terms from January 2002 to December 2010, Brazil was deeply engaged in the creation of the U.N. Council on Human Rights. But Brazil was also keen to extend influence over the definition of the guidelines for special rapporteurs. And one issue in which Brazil took the initiative was the creation of the mechanism for Universal Periodic Review. In keeping with the traditional line of action of Brazilian diplomacy, the government has been striving to develop the concept of human rights so it will also cover economic, social, and cultural rights. Hence, the claim to a sort of right to development both domestically and what concerns international relations.

More recently, interestingly following the 2008 economic crisis, Brazil and the BRICs and some African countries were behind a special session of the Human Rights Council to discuss the impact of the crisis on the human rights situation, especially in poorer countries. This position clashes at times with the views of many western countries,

including the U.S., which prefer the concept of human rights to be circumscribed to civil and political aspects. Now, Brazil's posture at multilateral fora has been one of mediation between various trends in an effort to reduce what it considers to be sometimes undue politicization or selectivity of the human rights issue.

In 2008, the Lula government, working hand-in-hand with President Chavez's Venezuela, led the establishment of UNASUR, the Union of South American Nations, a comprehensive, ambitious new organization aimed at fostering the broadest and deepest possible integrity in the region. The constitutive treaty of UNASUR is, however, sparing in the references to democracy and human rights because there was the influence by Venezuela. These are mentioned only in passing.

Later in 2010, following the serious crisis in Ecuador, an additional protocol on commitment to democracy was adopted but the operative paragraphs provided for a mechanism for the application of sanctions in cases of a breach or threat of breach against the democratic order. The purpose of the protocol is laudable. Although it does not mention the word, its fundamental aim is to prevent coups but it stands to reason that an important motivation has to do with the fear of suffering coups by some of the Bolivarian regimes.

So in those years, in the past two governments there was a sort of double-edged attitude towards democracy and human rights.

Internally, human rights were the object of a comprehensive set of policies and initiatives, including the creation of ministries dedicated to various aspects of the problem, a special ministry for human rights and others dedicated to related issues, such as women's rights, racial equality, social development, all of them at cabinet level. With regard to democracy, Brazilian -- internally Brazilian institutions continue to progress despite the poor ratings of politicians as such. Above all, there has been over the past two decades a remarkable new dynamic within civil society at large. I dare say Brazilian society these days certainly ranks high among countries with an especially lively social political life.

Yet, in keeping with the ideas prevalent in the more left-oriented segments of his party, the Workers' Party, President Lula and important political players aligned with him did at times invade against the press while at the same time preaching the need and making concrete proposals to set up mechanisms for the so-called social control of the media of cultural life and even of foreign policy. The intended social control would, in fact, be made by certain trade unions and social movements co-opted or controlled by the Workers' Party or the government. So these moves were flatly and emphatically rejected by society at large, the press, and important sectors of the political establishment. The rejection of these initiatives did not, however, prevent President Lula from engaging in an extremely active foreign policy geared

in not unimportant and infrequent moments of fraternizing with some authoritarian governments.

In order to speed up my speech I should say that under President Dilma, who was inaugurated just a few months ago, the stance -- Brazil's stance on human rights has changed enormously and I would say myself to the better.

I want to draw your attention -- please look at the internet. I won't quote now because of the lack of time but it is impressive to see how many emphatic references to democracy and human rights are contained in the Dilma Rousseff-Obama Joint Communiqué of a huge, long, very dense, extraordinary document that it is worth analyzing. It's impressive to see how many times Brazil and the U.S. express adherence and the willingness to work together in defense of those rights.

Allow me just to say my opinion is only too natural. There is a certain tension in Brazil between the commitment to democracy and human rights and real political interests. It's true that the Lula government went perhaps too far, in my opinion, in actively supporting the Bolivarian regimes, but Brazil did not in any way lose interest in the general defense of democracy internationally. I should say it is clear to this day that the Brazilian government harbors misgivings about situations that seem to unduly represent a lack of respect for the principles of sovereignty and noninterference.

There is an ambivalence that is in a way natural in Brazil's postures as we saw also in the case of India. And I noticed something interesting. Brazil issued several -- several communiqués about the situation now in North Africa and the Middle East, but in none of those communiqués there is an explicit reference to democracy as being the object of the revolutions taking place there. The language is very subtle, highly nuanced speak at most of the need for progress in a context of democratic improvement or democratic environment. There is a certain shyness with regard to the outright use of the word democracy.

And just to finalize, one of the reasons for Brazil's real political caution on human rights and democracy has to do with the fact that Brazil is the third country in the world with the biggest number of neighbors. We share 10,000 miles of borders with 10 countries and have close relations with two with which we do not share borders, Chile and Ecuador. We live in peace with those countries for over 130 years and we have defined our borders through peaceful means over 100 years ago.

So this makes a lot of difference between Brazil and India. India is sometimes cautioned about democracy because of its difficult relations with the near abroad with its neighborhood. Brazil is careful because we want to preserve this good atmosphere because there is a huge asymmetry between Brazil and its neighbors in favor of Brazil and because we are engaged in a process of integration. So that is the reason

why Brazil is very careful about there is a gap so to put it between Brazil's rather active or relatively active defense of democracy in international fora and the more cautious approach towards its neighborhood. Thank you.

MR. ABENTE: Thank you very much, Ambassador. And now Carlos.

MR. PEREIRA: First of all, I'd like to thank Ted Piccone for inviting me to discuss this paper. It's a pleasure and an honor to read and have an opportunity to discuss your paper, Ambassador, which by the way develops a very interesting and comprehensive historical digression of democracy and human rights in Brazil from the authoritarian regime to the current administration.

At the beginning it is important to highlight that the Ambassador's paper makes a very close connection of the concepts of democracy and human rights qualifying the former by closely associating or conditioning democracy to human rights. This is a historical and perhaps endless debate in the literature about democracy in which scholars have on the one hand emphasized a minimalist view of democracy taking into account a more procedural or electoral dimension of democracy mostly, and on the other hand emphasize -- others emphasize more substantive and liberal aspects of the concept like human rights.

At the beginning I would like to suggest, and the

Ambassador to critically assess, this debate in a new version of the paper which I believe will highlight this debate even further. Second, the paper tries to make a distinction between Brazilian authoritarian governments from Latin America authoritarian counterparts when for instance points out that unlike other military regimes in South America Brazilian dictators never lost sight with formal institutions of democracy. The regime, as the Ambassador said, felt it needed an opposition. That is with the exception of 1969, Brazilian congress worked relatively normal. Elections were held for mayors and legislative buddies. That is, political life was therefore never totally interrupted. This is a very good point.

The degree of violence and/or human rights violations indeed vary dramatically among Latin American countries, especially when one takes into account the period that the authoritarian regime was implemented. There is plenty of evidence, for instance, that dictatorships implemented in Latin America in the '70s, like in Chile or Argentina were bloodier and more repressive than in the '60s and like in Argentina again and in Brazil. So the paper tentatively suggests that it might be related to the purpose of the military regime in place in Brazil by arguing that the military regime was much more engaged with the idea of developmentalism, and then other regimes in the region which had a more oligarchical populous or personalistic profile. I would like once again to strongly encourage the ambassador to develop further research in order to

test or demonstrate this potential hypothesis which could be formed as follows if you allow me.

So in the ‘60s, the main concern of the military regime was to enhance a safe environment for economic development of the national industry. As such bureaucratic regimes obtaining the support of large sects of the population, including middle class bureaucrats, industrialists, nationalists, etcetera, with the idea of (inaudible) institutionalization. (Inaudible) this dominant coalition of this regime include high level of technocrats working in close association with foreign capital. The emergence of totalitarian regime in the major Latin American countries since the ‘60s is largely due to the difficulties of the dipping of these institutionalization processes. Foreign policy was therefore used to provide credibility abroad in order to attract and foster foreign investment.

In the 1970s, however, military regimes were no longer concerned with depersonalization but rather with trade liberalization. As a consequence, the degree of opposition was much higher not only from the left wing parties and labor movements as in the case of Brazil but also from the opposition coming from the national industrial sector and middle classes. This sector had much to lose with the first international competition without trading barriers and other protective ISI mechanisms. Therefore, the degree of violence and human rights violations were much higher in the ‘70s when it was compared with the totalitarian regime in the

‘60s.

Another important aspect that I would like to discuss is the progressive political and institutional strength of (inaudible) history of Latin America. The concerns about the prospect of democracy in the land acquired an academic expression in the 1990s in the debate about (inaudible) democracy, a form of democracy where (inaudible) leaders, oftentimes outsiders with no previous experience in politics adopt authoritarian practice and a discourse against existing political institutions but were legitimized through the electoral process. In my view, there is no question that the degree of consolidation in Latin America, democracy nowadays is the only game in town, especially in the case of Brazil. However, I have growing concerns about the liberal versions of this democracy. There has been a renewed (inaudible) among (inaudible) and experts about the imbalance of powers in Latin America’s presidentialism. This is indicative of concerns that were pervasive in the 1970s and 1980s about these systems of government.

Nevertheless, while recent presidential abuse of power and interbranch conflicts in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador has attracted (inaudible) of attention. In some other countries, including Chile and Brazil, there has been much praise for them being on the road to good governance. In these latter countries, which in the early ‘90s were thought to be doomed to failure because of some (inaudible) flaws in their

constitutional design such as (inaudible) presidentialism, large effective number of political parties, and multiparty coalition, and (inaudible) among others, there has been paradoxically a stability or even an increase in the constitutional powers while delayed by presidents. By contrast, the council (inaudible) active in the region of the '80s, such as Venezuela and Bolivia and Peru have been the ones that have experienced greater instability and governability problems.

Presidents enjoying few constitutional powers have imposed (inaudible) resorting to an array of informal totalitarian practice and unconstitutional means thereby creating great instability, institutional instability in the region. So this puzzle, Ambassador, I believe, begs an explanation. The key issue in these discussions is the question of vulnerability and its institutional determinants. It seems that it is appropriate to reevaluate what is wrong, if anything at all, with Latin American political institutions. Are the political institutions adopted in the regions to blame for underperformance of democracy in the region? The (inaudible) of Latin American countries warns us against a generic problem with Latin American institutions. Many conflicts (inaudible) can be avoided when coalitions' strategies are successfully implemented and the rule of law is robust. This may be the reason why countries such as Chile and Brazil have outperformed others in the region in terms of functioning of political institutions.

The key, I believe, to the effective governance and democratic stability in Latin America is the combination of strong presidents, strong presidentialism, constitutionally strong presidents, and robust checks and balances and the rule of law. Indeed, why in the early '90s the institutional design of countries like Bolivia and Venezuela were seen as more conducive to democratic stability and good governance than Chile and Brazil. In the late 2000s, the opposite is true. Bolivia and Venezuela's institutional design in the early '90s combined narrow presidential powers with strong party leadership whereas the constitutional structure of Brazil and Chile rested on the strong constitutional power and weak party leadership.

It seems to me that the key to promote a sustainable democracy in the region is the success and establishment of a robust system of checks and balances. The latter involves media pluralism, the judicial system, and horizontal and accountability bodies such as public prosecutors, audit institutions, and robust mechanisms of parliamentary oversight. In other words, governability also requires that the three branches of government are strong. By exclusively focusing on executive legislation, (inaudible) fails to embed them in models of strategic interaction with the latter institution.

These preliminary comments and suggestions aren't deeply exploratory but aim to encourage you, Ambassador, to generate testable

hypothesis about the terms of good governance in Latin America and I would like to invite you to explore these issues in future versions of this paper. In particular, in the case of Brazil, the former President Lula, as you mentioned, tried to undermine the free press by what the government calls social control. Also, other attempts of decreasing (inaudible) of regulatory institutions, audit institutions, public prosecutors, federal police, etcetera. I suggest on the other hand an investigation of the (inaudible) and on the other the role of checks and balances in constraining presidential abuse. Perhaps where presidents are strong but at the same time constrained by other political (inaudible), good governance, and democratic stability may emerge even in a very fragmented environment. Thank you.

MR. ABENTE: Thank you very much, Carlos.

We're going to move quickly because we have little time for questions and answers. And I'm going to use my right to pose the first question very briefly or as briefly as I can -- as I could. There seems to be a tendency to present the promotion of the defense of political rights and liberties and the promotion and defense of economic and social and cultural rights as if they were mutually excludable; that you have to do either one or the other.

Celso Amorim, the former foreign minister of Brazil was here a few months ago when he still was a minister and spoke about this at

length. Why is Brazil not taking a more complementary approach defending both? Civil, I mean, economic and social and cultural rights as well as political and civil rights. Is it because of some problem with the complementarity of these or is it that -- and this is my undiplomatic question to a former diplomat, or is it because there seems to be a sector within the Brazilian foreign establishment, foreign policy establishment, fundamentally concerned with promoting the role of Brazil as a growing force in the international community as an emerging great power but only in terms of real politics without much interest in issues such as democracy or human rights. That is still quite influential in his writings and influential in the formulation of the foreign policy of Brazil. Because when I listened to your presentation and his comment, it looks like nobody disagrees about anything in foreign policy in Brazil. All Brazilians agree. Is that really the case or do you really have a more nuanced situation in the formulation of these priorities? And how do you balance this tension between ideational and material interests as it was put in the previous panel?

MR. ABDENUR: Well, thank you, Mr. Pereira, for your comments. Very constructive. I just wanted to make it clear that my paper is above all the testimony of not just a diplomat but a Brazilian citizen who being now 68 years old went through many of the things I described.

Secondly, I can really try and improve the paper but again in that case I'll have to be better paid to do that and then there's the risk that I might become a liar again. But I'll do my best to do that in an honest way.

Thirdly, I think that both of you mentioned the topic, Dr. Abente mentioned. I would say first of all you see from my comments that Brazil undoubtedly has been raising its voice on human rights in addition to the extraordinary progress on democracy and human rights inside the country thanks above all to a very vibrant civil society. And I would say what I consider to have been some deviations from Brazil's foreign policy or measures sometimes at variance if not in contradiction with Brazil's internal attachment to democracy during the previous government's mandates, they were never really that serious so they never turned away. As I said earlier, even in the worst times the military regime never lost sight of democracy as a reference as being the goal to go forward however reluctantly and however slowly.

Now, my opinion, which I didn't have the time to express to you, is that I think Brazil should elevate, should raise its voice in defense of democracy in South America. Now, President Dilma Rousseff is right now as we speak in China. I was ambassador to China for four and a half years from '89 to '93, and the nature of the relationship between Brazil and China these days does not allow Brazil. Brazil -- may I just tell you

something shocking for Brazilians? In my first year in 1989 as ambassador to China, the Brazilian economy was slightly bigger than China's. Two decades later China has a GDP of $6 trillion and Brazil $2 trillion. So a strategic partnership that began as one between -- in a situation of parody became increasingly asymmetrical and there is a qualitative asymmetry as well.

So President Dilma Rousseff cannot afford, unlike Hillary Clinton or President Obama, to raise the issue of human rights in China because our interests would not allow that. We do not have the surplus of power that the U.S. can display and that enables it to raise its voice more than many other countries. Neither have, I understand, many European countries raised their voice but in South America, Brazil counts. So my point is that Brazil should not interfere in the political process of the neighbors with exceptions of situations such as the one I mentioned in Paraguay in which it was not Brazil but Mercosur as a group on the basis of a constitutional clause of the integration process that Brazil has.

Now, the point, Professor Abente that you mentioned, Brazil is emerging only on the basis of real politics. Well, I would say frankly without lying, no, I don't think so. As you see, our voice in the multilateral fora is extremely active and Brazil went so far. I don't know how many countries accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American court and now we are having a serious problem. I'm staying at the home of our ambassador

to the OAS and he has been called to Brazil because the court, the Inter-American human rights court went too far in trying to prevent Brazil from building a huge dam which is of absolute necessity to the country if we are not going to have another, you know, blackout in the country because it affects some of the interests of the small indigenous community in the neighborhood. And the interests of those communities have really been taken into account so much so that the dam has been reduced in its proportions.

So I think that Brazil's rise in the world, unlike China, unlike India, does enable us, does allow for more room and for a slightly higher voice when addressing the issue of democracy and human rights in South America and in Latin America, in the case of Cuba. Besides democracy we have to speak up about human rights.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible) University. Professor Abente made the comment that you didn't seem to think that there were any disagreements on the conduct of Brazilian foreign policy inside Brazil. I did read quite a lot of opposing views on Brazil's dealings with Iran along with Turkey, where I'm from. So first I'm wondering was that an illusion on my part that there was indeed disagreements, and second, what was the purpose of that intervention? I mean, I will try to explain why Turkey did what it did but on the basis of the elections of 2009, why a democratic Brazil did act in the way that it did to a certain extent to give legitimacy

also to a government which obviously should not (inaudible) terribly attractive to Brazil?

MR. ABDENUR: Well, the first issue, yes. There has been not exactly disagreement but there has been a difference between what -- mind you, President Dilma Rousseff in her youth was a radical leftist. She was an urban guerilla. She was tortured. Terribly tortured and kept in jail for something like three years. So she has a commitment to human rights that the former president didn't have. Didn't need to have.

With regard to Iran, I confess I don't know why. There was absolutely no objective reason, no Brazilian interest to justify the excessive -- sorry?

SPEAKER: (off mike)

MR. ABDENUR: No, absolutely nothing to do. There's no nuclear component. It was a political move by a president who was undoubtedly a man of great, enormous popularity in the world and had the wrong idea that he could enter any scenario and magically act as a mediator. But sometimes ignoring or overlooking the extremely difficult complex circumstances involving that particular country, and Iran was an extreme case. So right now we are going back, as I said before, there were some deviations from the mainstream, the basic trail of Brazilian diplomacy, and under the Dilma Rousseff government quite clearly things are coming back to this main track of our foreign policy.

MR. PEREIRA: May I add, there is a clear distinction as the ambassador mentioned, not only related to Iran but several other episodes. Honduras was another one in which somehow the Brazilian foreign policy deviated from its historical tradition. But now for the first signs and moves from the new administration, I'm a risk to say that Brazil is coming back to the original path of the traditional foreign policy. It was a slight deviation under the Lula administration but it indeed suggests a different view at least, a different perspective of the role that Brazil could play. And also the payoff that it could generate to Brazil acting in a different way under the Lula administration.

MR. ABENTE: I have four people and to optimize the use of time I will take two questions at a time. I have, yes, sir.

MR. FEINBERG: Thank you. Richard Feinberg, University of California and also from now the Brookings Institution.

Mr. Ambassador, let me take you -- keep you in Latin America but let me take you away from your immediate neighbors to Central America. This issue of whether or not geopolitics and the pursuit of democracy in human rights are complimentary or contradictory I think is on the table. And also the critical issue of efficacy, what works, in a particular instance.

I call attention to the situation in Nicaragua. Now, Brazil and Venezuela I think have been competing for interests in Central America.

Brazil is sponsoring -- but mostly in the economic area -- Brazil is sponsoring a large hydroelectric project in Nicaragua which directly competes with Chavez's thrust for influence through the sale of petroleum. But so far Brazil has been rather quiet in Nicaragua with regard to politics. Maybe it's a subtext but when there was a clear fraud in the municipal elections a couple years ago the Brazilian position as told to me by the ambassador there was, well, we're not really sure if there was a fraud and there was quiet. Maybe this is an example of the sort of diversion from traditional Brazilian foreign policy.

So my question would be as now we are looking to the presidential elections coming up this November in Nicaragua and the big issue for the international community is how hard should they push for transparent elections monitored by the international community? What do you think ought to be the Brazilian position on that issue?

MR. ABENTE: Wait a minute. I'm going to take the second question and then I have two questions here. Yeah, the lady there.

MS. SERNO: Thank you. My name is Camilla Serno. I work at Connectas Human Rights. It's a human rights organization based in Brazil, in San Palo. So it's been very interesting to be part of this debate, especially because at Connectas. we have a project called Foreign Policy and Human Rights. So we will be monitoring the Brazilian position, not only multilateral arenas like the U.N. and also in the Inter-

American system but also the bilateral relations of Brazil with other regimes.

So I think just to maybe (inaudible) the ambassador about the cautions of Brazil on foreign policy, talking about human rights and democracy in the region but I think these cautions also happen in the outside region. When we talk about other countries such as Iran, China, North Korea, Burma, and Zimbabwe also.

And these cautions translated in the Brazilian foreign policy I think in two ways. One is votes at the multilateral organizations such as the U.N. So Brazil has been abstaining in some very crucial resolutions, so this is an example. And another way that these cautions are translated is in the silence of the Brazilian government and its bilateral relations toward the situations.

So what I want to ask for is some comments. This was not discussed in the Brazilian society among Brazilian citizens, but now it seems that it has changed because it's part of debating the media and the press. The press is covering it. It's also part of the electoral discussions we had last year in Brazil. So if you could comment on this.

And just to show that at Connectas. we've been working to challenge some of these positions in Brazil and we've been using democratic tools to do this. So one was what the ambassador already mentioned, the constitution talks about the prevalence of human rights so

we've been using these questions and positions of Brazil on foreign policy. Another thing is to try to increase accountability, give visibility in the media, but also working more with the legislative branch on the checks and balances that Carlos Pereira mentioned. It deals more with foreign policy. And the last one was electoral debate. So we tried to include this debate even if it was very initial but we try to have these kind of discussions last year in the presidential elections. Thank you.

MR. ABDENUR: Thank you very much.

MR. ABENTE: Ambassador.

MR. ABDENUR: Yes. Well, Mr. Feinberg is a good friend. We worked together back in 1994 when I was deputy foreign minister and he was at the National Security Council or State on the preparation of the Summit of the Americas suggested by President Clinton which took place with success in December '94. Nice to see you here, Mr. Feinberg. You skillfully put me in a difficult situation.

I should say I agree with you. I agree with you. I think that Brazil is being too shy, as I said before, on the issue of democracy, human rights with regards to Cuba, and democracy in regard with the Bolivarian countries, including Nicaragua. There might be an economic reason for that as you said because of the major work we are involved in in Nicaragua. I wouldn't say that it is competition with Venezuela. I think the two countries in a way -- they're not competing and not working together.

Each does its way. And I should say that there are still -- there is still a tendency in Brazil's foreign policy. I suppose it will continue under the Dilma Rousseff to have the best possible relations with those countries. And you have to have in mind that there is a kind of parallel diplomacy running in Brazil.

Let me just tell you I was ambassador to Germany for over six years and Germany, in addition to the foreign ministry, has the political foundations of the Social Democratic Party, the (speaking in Spanish) which are like parallel foreign ministries. We don't have that in Brazil but the Workers' Party, President Lula's party, does have a sort of machinery for foreign policy.

It helped the election of the president of El Salvador. They are now helping actively the leftist candidate in Peru, Ollanta Humala. It's the Workers' Party. It's not Brazil's official policy but the two things are sometimes -- there are linkages between those things.

So yes, I agree. Brazil is shy -- has been shy on the issue of fraud but there are, you know, reasons of foreign policy for that. One has to strike a balance between values and interests and that is real politics. And as a former diplomat I had to apply real politics. Now that I'm retired I can raise my voice but it's a matter of nuance. I'm not preaching a change of course in Brazil's diplomacy but perhaps a slightly higher tone on the issue of democracy and human rights.

As for your questions, I salute your organization and hope you develop more dialogue with Congress and the Brazilian foreign policy establishment. But I should remind you that I didn't have the time to read out my whole text but in my text I said that those attempts to mediate regarding situations of, you know, scandalous violation of human rights in North Korea and Sudan and Myanmar during the civil war in Sri Lanka and so on and so forth, they failed and this led to abstention and this caused a certain loss. You know, in foreign policy you have to have credibility and Brazil attained credibility thanks in part or mostly to the success in the economy. And partly I should recognize thanks to a very active and creative foreign policy which achieved fantastic results. But you need also to have respectability and I think respectability involves those values, a higher defense of those values. But I think that mind you Brazil -- after this love affair with Iran, Brazil now voted in favor of the installation of a special rapporteur on the human rights situation and Iran voted in favor of the suspension of Libya from the Human Rights Council. So the position towards other countries.

Now, I spoke about China before not because I was ambassador to China but because China, being such a huge power and being such a special kind of regime, it wouldn't really make sense for Brazil to antagonize China right now. There is a real political element inevitably. We cannot just be champions of values without acknowledging

certain underlying circumstances and underlying interests.

MR. ABENTE: Two last questions.

MR. PEREIRA: I'd like to comment and suggest that despite a huge power that the Brazilian president holds, the constitutional powers, the (inaudible) power, budgetary powers, you know, and the Brazilian president intervenes all the time in the Brazilian congress and controls the agenda of the congress. And most of the attempts during Lula's administration to decrease or to undermine the role of checks and balances of several of those institutions failed, which is a very positive sign and that, you know, those institutions are very alive. So the regulatory institutions are a very good example. At the beginning of Lula's administration, have a committee to reshape and to dramatically decrease the autonomy of those agencies and the government suddenly, you know, lost the debate and these proposals were filed.

Concerning the media at the same time, once in a while it comes back. So which suggests to me and to some degree of optimism regarding the capacity of several of those institutions created by the new constitution to constrain and limit the power of the president, which I believe is the key for the success of Brazil nowadays.

MR. ABENTE: Two questions. Marc and Bruce. Marc first, you second.

MR. PLATTNER: Thanks. Marc Plattner. I was going to

raise the question of Honduras. Carlos Pereira already briefly mentioned it and suggested that it was part of a kind of aberration of the Lula period but I wonder if you could tell us a little bit more about it. Was it a case of applying -- an attempt to apply principles of human rights and democracy? Were there other economic or security interests? What was it that drove that policy? Was it Lula and his party principally? How did the rest of Brazilian society react on that issue?

MR. SMITH: Bruce Smith, Brookings.

I'm engaged in writing a biography of my late friend and colleague here from Brookings, Lincoln Gordon. Now, I'm told by my friends who are experienced biographers proceed chronologically. So I'm back in World War II right now, the war of production board. But I know that Linc, the most critical in his mind part of his career was his experience as ambassador to Brazil and in particular the contention that he engineered or the U.S. engineered the coup. And I have read his, I think quite careful defense in his 2002 Brookings book. He had an addendum on that but I wonder if you colleagues could share your thoughts. What were the facts of '64? Was the U.S. culpable in that coup? And I think the point has been made very effectively that the Brazilian military is a little different from other military but was there torture in Brazil and how -- I need your help on that matter. Thank you.

MR. ABDENUR: Well, with regard to Honduras, I wouldn't

call that an aberration. You see, if you have a constitution or elected president taken in pajamas forcefully under the threat of a gun from his home, put on a plane and sent abroad, this looks very much like a coup. Right? So Brazil unfortunately found itself in the middle of an imbroglio that it didn't plan, it didn't want, but it could not fail to receive -- the name of the president is Zelaya. Zelaya at the embassy. The problem is that we lost control and Zelaya took over the embassy and used it as a platform for political statements and so on and so forth.

Where I disagree with the Brazilian government is that later there was an election that was fair, that had been planned. It was an election held according to the constitution. So what Brazil has been doing is that it has failed, it has refused to recognize the newly elected -- democratically elected government because of its attachment to Mr. Zelaya, which I think is excessive. But if I am updated on the news, apparently some arrangement is being made for Mr. Zelaya to go back without detriment to the stability of the country hopefully with which I think Brazil, however belatedly, will recognize the new government.

With regard to your questions about Lincoln Gordon, let me tell you my own memoirs. I had two very, very unpleasant encounters on the street with tanks. Tanks, military tanks, boom boom. One on the first of April of 1964. I was already a diplomat and I went to the streets of downtown Rio and I saw the finishing touches in the military coup. And I

was on one of the major avenues in Rio. Those who know Rio, Avenue de Rio Blanco, when three tanks came and we had been foolish enough to approach the so-called military club where military offices were showing their guns to the crowds downstairs. When the tanks came, fortunately they didn't shoot but the guy who was manning the machine gun turned it towards us so I never ran so fast. I would have won an Olympic medal.

And later, much later on the streets of Beijing, on (inaudible) Avenue on the sad days of the third and the fourth of June '89. I saw people dying on the streets in tanks and later I had no less than 25 tanks parked around the (inaudible) complex where our diplomats and other officials of the embassy lived. So my recollections are very bad.

I don't think the U.S. engineered the coup but the U.S. was enthusiastic about it. Why? Because it was part of the Cold War dispute and the risk, however remote of Brazil turning communist, if Brazil had become a communist country the whole of the region. Because mind you, although also the military coups in Uruguay, in Argentina, in Chile, would have taken place without any Brazilian participation. There was an underground clandestine support from the hardliners in Brazil to the coups in those countries. And likewise, if Brazil on the other hand would have become a communist country it would quite clearly have been a platform for the expansion of communism in the region. So the United States then -- what was important for Lincoln Gordon was to support the coup and the

ensuing regime. But then when Carter came into the picture in ’74, ’75, the situation changed and there was a clash between the U.S. and Brazil precisely on human rights and democracy, which fortunately was overcome because the president then (inaudible) was already -- had already launched the process of redemocratization and he was brave enough to at the same time sort of contain the opposition but contain even more drastically the hardliners of the regime by which time Lincoln Gordon, of course, was not there anymore. Is he still alive?

MR. SMITH: No, he died in ’09.

MR. ABDENUR: In ’09. I’m sorry. I mean, in those days I was just a junior diplomat so I only looked at Lincoln Gordon from a distance. But I have respect for him as a diplomat. He was doing what was best for his country, even though I didn’t like what the Americans did back then. And I am sure -- I can be sure I will never meet a tank in a Brazilian street other than in the National Day parade.

MR. ABENTE: Well, thank you very much. And with this we’re a little late so we’re finished with this panel.

(Applause)

(Recess)

MR. PICCONE: Okay, we're going to turn now to another part of the world, Turkey, and turn the floor over to Fiona Hill, who is the director of our Center on the U.S. and Europe. Fiona?

MS. HILL: Thank you very much, Ted and first of all thanks to everyone who is still here because I know we're the last panel of the day, and it's a beautiful day out there. It's just with all if the curtains are closed, you can't see how nice it is. But anyway, I think we can promise you a very good and exciting end to the day.

I'm delighted to introduce two colleagues, in fact, of mine, which is always very nice. Our main speaker today, Soli Ozel, who is currently a professor at Kadir Has University, but you also see from his bio, that he has many different guises and professional activities. He's also a columnist at *Haberturk Daily.*

He also is an advisor to TUSIAD, the Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen's Association, and TUSIAD, in fact, a major partner of ours here at Brookings in crafting a series on Turkey that's been going on now for a number of years. And so we're very grateful to have Soli here today, and as you'll see from his bio, he has done a number of other very interesting things over the years.

Omer Taspinar, here on my right, is actually the director of our Turkey project here at Brookings under the series that TUSIAD works with us in partnership, but he's also a full-time professor at the National Defense University where he lectures on the whole range of national security strategy issues and also at SAIS across the road.

And Omer is also originally from Turkey, so we have two great panelists here, and I will turn over without any further introduction to Soli to really address the question of whether as Turkey is moving forward to its own political evolution, democracy promotion, and that human rights have been a major feature of its foreign policy.

MR. OZEL: No. (Laughter)

MS. HILL: So now we can go outside and enjoy the sunshine. (Laughter)

MR. OZEL: But there is always a "but."

Well, good afternoon. It was truly very instructive for me to listen to the two panels on India and Brazil as well, because I think a lot of important questions have been raised, and particularly on the India panel I could substitute Turkey for about 75 percent of what Mr. Mehta has said and basically make similar arguments. And, in a way, this is not really, or the EMDs, the new-coined acronym, the EMDs are no different than major

powers in terms of how they define and pursue and implement their foreign policies.

So all the problems that the democratic countries faced in terms of their hypocritical approach to the issue of democracy promotion or human rights promotion are necessarily, since we live in a world of states, true for emerging democracies as well. And I think both in the case of India and in the case of Brazil we've seen that this held true.

Now, the difference, again based on what I have heard so far between the other four countries and five countries and Turkey perhaps is the following:

we are living in world whereby the pity-theory has not arisen and is challenging the western-created institutional world order, and therefore there is a lot of distrust and miscommunication and what have you, Turkey itself is part of that revolt, if you will, but like none of the other countries, like any of the other countries, Turkey also happens to be, at least constitutionally, part of the institutional framework that the West has created.

Turkey is a member of NATO, is a candidate member of the European Union, and therefore it is part of that community, western community or the Atlantic community, or community of interest that is

presumably being challenged by others. So it finds itself in a way in this dilemma of being both part of the established order institutionally and actually challenging that established order, or at least elbowing its way in order to get more space for action in its own fields.

And in a way you can say this is part of Turkey's ongoing, what everybody discusses, its identity problem or one of the identity problems that Turkey has as well.

Our starting point, because I have written or -- I haven't submitted it but I've worked on this paper with a colleague of mine, Gencer Özcan, and our starting point is that of at the end of the day, if since we live in a state system, stability and security will almost always trump human rights and democracy promotion.

And that equation may be wrong since in the long run authoritarian systems do not have the requisite legitimacy to go on, and in an, especially in an age when democratic demands are voiced by all peoples in the world, and modern communications clearly have a forceful demonstration effect, again, unlike the other countries that are going to be presented here, Turkey now happens to be again, once more if you will, in the eye of the storm. Since -- certainly since January -- in a wave of

revolts, if you will, or uprisings that have caught it by surprise just as they did every other country, it seems, in the world.

We've seen in Libya that even -- but again although I claimed or I suggested that state interests would always trump human rights and whatever -- the existence of a world community whereby such values are at least adhered to in theory leads, as reluctant a party as the Obama administration to actually intervene in Libya as well in order to avoid Benghazi, which could have been perhaps a repeat of Srebrenitsa, and personally I was teaching Srebrenitsa to my students just the day when Qadaffi's forces found themselves on at Benghazi's gates. Therefore, there is a tension, and there is obviously the will or the sentiment of the world community when it comes to human rights and democracy as well, and the states will have to operate between those pressures and the expediency of state interest.

Turkish -- the parameters given for us for this paper were, what are the contours of the foreign policy debate? What groups have strong positions either for or against giving higher priority for support for democracy and human rights? What's the current balance of forces, and how might they shift in the future if a new government comes to power in Turkey?

First of all, Turkish foreign policy has historically been amoral and focused on state interests, therefore always privileged stability and security. Whenever the Turkish governments played the human rights card, this was played with a particular state interest in mind.

For instance, back in 1989 when the Bulgarian regime was forcefully trying to change the names of its Turkish cities, or of its citizens of Turkish origin and put a lot of discriminatory laws into effect and put pressure on them, Turkey obviously played the human rights card, accepted the immigration, and then raised, if you will, hell in world fora.

At about the same time, Saddam Hussein gassed 5,000 Kurds in Halabja, and in 1990 Soviet armies entered Baku. On both those occasions Turkey remained basically silent in spite of the fact that these were again happening in its vicinity, and they were clearly violations of human rights, much more violent, in fact, than what was happening in Bulgaria.

Although for the right to, for understandable reasons Turkey would prefer to work with democracies, its policy does not entail exertion of pressure on friendly regimes to move in that direction, the driving force of today's foreign policy in Turkey is, in my view, economic relations and economic integration with all the surround nations. In fact, if Brazil has 10

neighbors with which it has been in peace for a, what, a hundred years, Turkey has nine neighbors and as late as 10 years or 12 years ago it was still had -- it was still confrontational relations with six out of nine.

The aim of this current government is to make Turkey, as they call it a central country, which has the goal of having zero problems with all its neighbors -- a policy that in my judgment is inconsistent with realities -- a wise country which would be -- and again in their terms, an order builder. This is the theme of Turkey's return, if you will, to global politics definition of Turkey as a regional power with global aspiration, a power that sits in Afro-Eurasian geopolitical space in which it can play an important role. And add to this again, perhaps something that other countries, say India perhaps, did not have an attribute, and that is Turkey happens to be the legatee of an empire. And in some sense that really is weighing on it, particularly after the collapse of the wall, the end of the Cold War, and, if you will, the solution of the Leninist regimes.

This foreign policy of Turkey asks for more egalitarian relations in world politics, more room and space for minor actors to play in the world system, and it also claims that in its relation with all its neighbors it actually prefers an egalitarian rule, respect for multiculturalism all around it, and that it wants to engage in conversations rather than dictate what its

preferences are going to be. In that sense, Turkey and I suppose just like India and Brazil, and probably the other countries that we're going to be discussing, is promoting democracy in the world system, presumable it is enhancing its own democracy, but it is not in the business of promoting democracy in the neighborhood if the neighborhood countries do not have the desire to do so themselves. Okay.

So one significant exception during AKP's term about Turkey's emphasis on human rights and democracy is notable, and I think I should mention it. And it is also interesting that this happened when Turkey's drive to become or to start accession negotiation with the European Union was at its height, that is the then foreign minister Abdullah Gul is -- presently, currently our president -- speech given at the Annual Conference of Foreign Ministers at the Organization of Islamic Conference in Tehran back in 2003 when he specifically mentioned and stressed the inadequacies of Muslim countries when it came to educating women, women's rights, human rights, democratic deficits, and respect for citizenship rights. To this day that particular speech remains the main reference point for the Turkish government as well.

Now let me get to some of the examples that I believe illustrate the fact that Turkish foreign policies primarily are realpolitik-

driven foreign policy that democracy and human rights promotion take at best a secondary place in the conduct of that foreign policy, and, obviously, there are problems that I see as a citizen in the conduct of such policy.

Let's take our neighbors, Iraq. In Iraq, and whether or not it is recognized elsewhere I'm not quite sure, Turkey takes a position that is ecumenical, if you will. What I mean by that is the following: We face a problem in our neighborhood that perhaps other -- I mean certainly the United States does nothing, in that sectarian strife is a reality in our neighborhood in Yemen, in Bahrain, certainly in Iraq, and possibly in Syria, and the sectarian divide between Shia and Sunni primarily is something that will be getting deeper and creating a lot more problems.

In that particular framework, Turkey has consistently since the beginning of the war in Iraq taken a position whereby it presented itself as a Muslim country and not a Sunni country. So the Turkish prime minister's most recent visit in Iraq about two or three weeks ago whereby he was the first Sunni head of anything visiting Najaf, visiting the spiritual leader of the Shia in Iraq and I guess elsewhere in the world, Ali Sistani, had symbolically been extraordinarily important.

He then went on to visit Arbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, and given the history of Turkish relations with Iraqi Kurds or any Kurds anywhere, that obviously was a sign of Turkey recognizing those divisions and basically presenting a position whereby it is for the territorial integrity of Iraq without denying the rights and freedoms of the constituent elements in Iraq.

And, mind you, in doing so Turkey also engaged in a good bit of realpolitik because going to Najaf and meeting Ali Sistani, whose theses are antithetical to the these of the Iranian regime was obviously a good sign to the Iranian regime that it was not going to help Iraq to its own when it wanted to, in terms of influence.

Second, Syria. I think that this government -- and it's not just this government, by the way, I think successive Turkish governments since 1998 when Syria finally let Abdullah Ocalan, Turkey's enemy, public enemy No. 1 go, successive Turkish governments actually made it a point to protect Syria from strife. In 2005, at its loneliest, the Syrian regime benefitted from Turkey's protection in the aftermath of Rafic Hariri's murder. And in spite, in spite of American pressure for it to actually break relations with Syria, to the contrary Turkey acted along with Syria.

One reason for it was, of course, the fear of Kurdish cessation in Iraq for which we also -- Turkey also cooperated with Iran, but another thing was that Turkey did not want instability in its southern border yet in another country. Again, later on, the Syria policy became, if you will, the central point, the core goal of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East in the sense that in terms of economic integration and in terms of Turkey's self-defined role as mediator in all conflicts anywhere in the world but mostly in the Middle East, Syria was obviously the most important, the most important element. Therefore today, with Syria on the brink of God knows what, the Turkish government actually finds itself in a very acute dilemma.

On the one hand, ideologically, this government is much closer to the Muslim Brotherhood than it is to the regime; on the other hand, it has invested so much in that regime that it -- and it is so afraid of any instability in Syria which will have repercussions certainly in Turkey but elsewhere in the region as well, that it is trying to actually walk a slalom if its way between these two conflicting urges, if you will. And, obviously, in that sense the stability of Syria certainly trumps whatever ideological proclivities they might be. There might be -- I'll get back to that later on.

On Hamas. I think the Hamas policy is the one policy whereby it is very difficult to explain the policy of the Turkish government solely in their politik terms. There is an ideological component there because it isn't just -- it isn't a defense of Palestinian rights that is guiding the policy, but it is really the defense of Hamas' rights. In that sense you can say Turkey's a democracy promoter. It was in favor of holding elections in Palestine with Hamas' participation; then it demanded of all its allies that they respect the result, which was actually made sense, to respect the results of these elections. And when these election results were not respected, Turkey found itself at the crossroads, and in that sense who is the democracy promoter and who isn't becomes as very ambivalent point to say the least.

Now, the most egregiously awful, unacceptable, embarrassing position, of course, was on the Sudan. Now, and Sudan was an important entry point for Turkey's very ambitious Africa policy. We had heard on the India panel that Africa was going to be an important part of India's foreign policy as it is anybody else's foreign policy for that matter, and therefore Turkey wanted to be part of it. It was already present there with its missionary activities, if you will, the Gulen movements schools followed by grocery stores, then biscuit factories,

textile factories, what have you, and obviously Turkey wanted to be in the Sudan for construction, for energy deals, and what have you, but did it really have to invite Omar al-Bashir twice into Turkey and a third visit was finally cancelled because the Turkish Civil Society really raised hell and made it impossible for the government to actually greet him in Turkey.

But the prime minister, for instance, took a position saying that he did not really witness genocide in Darfur, and ultimately ended up saying since Islam was a religion of peace, Muslims could not just have committed genocide.

Now, that, of course, goes against the grain of the logic of Turkish foreign policy, which I said is very materialistic, so to say. But in that particular sense, the investment in domestic politics constantly trumped, if you will, or make us more confused.

Finally, one country in which, towards which Turkish foreign policy has been consistently in favor of human rights was obviously Israel. Israeli behavior in Gaza, Israeli behavior towards the Palestinians and all that, reflecting societal mood as well as political positions of the government again were very clear, and they mince no words.

Whereas they had been pretty critical of Israel, the government had really nothing ever anything to say on Iran. So when in

June 2009 Iran at best had some controversial election, the Turkish government had the dubious honor of congratulating Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his reelection even before Ali Khamenei. (Laughter)

Now then, of course, that particular image of Turkey almost ideologically siding with Iran is wrong. We seem to be too cozy with the Iranian regime, it's true, but the realpolitiks of Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran in the region is more a matter of competition more than cooperation on an ideological basis. One can questions whether or not Turkey could have taken both a critical position vis-à-vis Iranian elections in 2009 and yet still continue to engage Iran because Turkey doesn't want to see a nuclear Iran, obviously, but it doesn't want war against Iran either. That remains to be seen, but this is more a choice of methods, perhaps, than it was an essential choice.

So the current abundance of forces on these issues in the country is that we care more about business than the public, that is, than human rights, the absence of human rights or democracy, in our neighborhood, but the upheaval in the Middle East in my judgment sends the country back to the drawing board.

First of all, Turkey will have to deal with a region in a way that it has not been accustomed to. Contrary to what many people think,

Turkey primarily is a status quo power. The only relation in which it wishes to change the status quo is in terms of Israel's position within the region and Israel's relation with the United States. In my judgment, Turkey would like to be as a western ally, institutionally, the major player in the Middle East that plays along with the West and in that sense replace Israel. That is not denying Israel a place, obviously, in the Middle East. But apart from that, Turkey has been for practical purposes a very status quo power, and this is why it did not adopt a discourse of -- a moral discourse already scored for democracy promotion or human rights.

My final point, on the other hand the absence on the part of the government of a moral discourse does not mean that Turkish society does not work along those lines. In fact, in the past 20 to 25 years, Turkey's civil society organizations based on mostly on either ethnic affinity with peoples living in our neighborhood -- let's say, Ophaz in Georgia, Turkomans in Iraq or others, have been putting a lot of pressure on successive Turkish governments to defend the rights of their kin in those countries.

Lately, Islamic organizations have joined the fray, and when you look at the for some famous, for others notorious IHH that was responsible for organizing the Aid Flotilla to Gaza, its humanitarian

activities in many parts of the world that are not necessarily Muslim either, is truly remarkable. In that sense, there is this understanding of human rights that is not based necessarily on individuals' rights vis-à-vis the states, but in terms of helping the downtrodden to actually be able to live a decent and respectable life. And that, too, happens in mostly Muslim countries as well.

Another organization, Muslim there, which was founded as a human rights organization to defend the rights of Islamists within Turkey has grown into more and more international institution, international organization, and it has begun to adopt a language that is not exclusively a Muslim solidarist language, but increasingly makes reference to universal values on human rights and democracy. And it is on this last point that we can discuss whether or not a new government would change the approach of Turkey in human rights in the sense that will another government which is not necessarily as engaged, ideologically, with matters pertaining to the Muslim world be as supportive of these organization.

And second question about this is, do we have -- are these organizations totally independent of Turkish state policies? It is very difficult to tell, but given the fact that IHH organized one operation in Egypt

to break the blockade of Gaza, in that particular organization there were several AKP deputies as well, and until the last moments some AKP deputies were even going to participate in the Aid Flotilla. Therefore, even if there is no organic link, there is certainly a link in terms of the values that they cherish.

Finally, Turkey's neighborhood today is different. The issue, the question of the Turkish model, whether there is a Turkish model that can be emulated, which Turkish model? All these questions are going to be raised I think insistently in the next -- in the next two years, and Turkey will have to adjust itself to the new realities and at the end of the day promoting a language of human rights and the language of democracy as the current government as actually begun to do, may be necessary as part of Turkey's realpolitik in distinction from earlier periods when these two were actually separate.

Thank you.

MS. HILL: Thank you very much, Soli. That was some very interesting things that you said there, and I hope that Omer will be able to pick up on some of them.

There's one point that I wonder if actually Omer would like to comment on. I mean, you made it very clear that this was a policy of

realpolitik to use the human rights and democracy card at a number of junctures, and then left open the question of whether it might have to be picked up further. And yet among all the examples you give, the Sudan one certainly stood out for where something different happened, where civil society for reasons that perhaps weren't to surface with any particular ethnic groups or any religious ideology pushed it
to change, And that seems to be the one example that stands out, out of all of them.

So perhaps, if you'd like to comment on why that was the case, then we'll Omer to pick up on some of the other issues,

MR. OZEL: And I have to add that some of the strongest statements opposing a return by Omar al-Bishir came from Islamist writers. In that sense, it was basic -- I suppose it was basically repulsion that here was a guy who was indicted by the international criminal court because his first two -- his first visit was before the indictment. I think the second was after the indictment, but the third one was just too much, and truly there was an uproar, and that really blocked his arrival.

I must say, by the way, I forgot this on Syria o this dilemma. Last week the leader of the Syrian Brotherhood was in Turkey as a guest of Muslims there and spoke both (inaudible) and in Istanbul. The foreign

ministry immediately disassociated itself from it. I mean again that shows you that when you no longer have visa restrictions for Syrians to come to Turkey, then the society-to-society relations can deepen independently of original intentions of the government. Therefore this is now becoming a situation that no government or no center can control totally. And then, obviously, the Syrian regime must have had its eyebrows risen as a result of that visit.

MS. HILL: And I think that that's one of the issues that clearly the organizers of here are trying to bring out about how much that opening up of societies, not to mention opening up borders, and each society-to-society contacts starts to change some of the political positions of the government. So, Omer, I wonder if you could pick up on some of these.

MR. TASPINAR: Sure. I'll try to be brief so that we have room for questions. The job of a commentator is always a difficult one, especially after Soli, and it's doubly difficult if the commentator is your former professor. And Soli was my mentor at SAIS when I was a Masters student in the mid-1990s, and I can say most of the things that I learned about Turkey I learned it from him.

And I won't disagree with most of the points he made. In fact I think he provided us a very sophisticated picture of Turkey which captures all the paradoxes, because on the one hand there is this unbelievable emphasis in the last couple of months on the Turkish model, what's going on the Arab Spring with the Arab world opening now. You cannot read an article in the western media or the regional media without references to this Turkish model. And one would expect that a country that is being referred to as the model would have less status-quo-oriented pro-democracy/pro-change-oriented foreign policy message.

This is not the case. I agree with Soli that Turkey traditionally has been a realpolitik status-quo-oriented country. One thing that I can, I think can explain this paradox is the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Turkey has always been insecure about this Achilles heel of the system. The Kurds makes Turkey very nervous. When the former administration, the Bush administration, had the freedom agenda, one of the major reasons why Turkey immediately showed negative reactions to this was that freedom in the Middle East would mean self-determination for some oppressed minorities. And the Kurds, as often argued the largest ethnic minority in the region without a state, would be the main

beneficiary of this freedom agenda. And what we saw in Iraq made that real.

And Turkey was very much concerned since the 1990s about this Kurdish problem. So if you want to understand this Turkish DNA about aversion to change, border changes, systemic changes, there is the sense that the status quo is important, that borders are important, they're sacrosanct. And this is very much part of the Ataturk vision, Kemalist vision. Ataturk was a revolutionary at home, but he was not a proponent of adventures in foreign policy.

Today's foreign policy in Turkey is often referred to as neo-Ottomanism, and there is definitely a revival of the kind of imperial vision and imperial horizons. There are new countries emerging, and there's this post-Cold War era. And definitely there's a certain clash, I would argue, with what the current government is doing in terms of its mediation effort, efforts in all the conflicts in the region, its activist foreign policy, sometimes adventurous foreign policy, and you can cast a kind of contrast with the Cold War Turkey where Turkey was truly status quo and not willing to engage in any kind of foreign policy adventures.

This started to change, I think, before the current party with Ozal, through Ozal, the first of the neo-Ottomans, if you will. And in that

sense the transition started with Turkey opening its economy and looking for new markets and discovering that there is all this southern and eastern horizon that was left out during the Cold War when Turkey followed an exclusively pro-Western pat.

So on that point, too, I agree with Solo that a major driver of Turkey's foreign policy has been economics, the private sector looking for markets. So there's a level of mercantilism in how Turkey looks at the region. And when you want to do business with the neighbors, the last thing you want is to destabilize the neighbors because you have vested interest in their private sector. You have vested interest in their political system so that you can cut deals and have a sense of predictability in their system. So that, too, runs counter to the kind of change mentality.

So the main paradox that I see here is that Turkey is referred to as the model, and a model for democratization, a model that combines Muslim identity, secularism, and democracy, yet it is not willing to export this model. It's not really talking about exporting this model. In fact the current government doesn't like being referred to as a model; they find it too ambitious, they find it sometimes that it's -- it can perceived as America's model in the region, the good Muslims against the bad Muslims, against the bad models of the region. They don't want to really preach

others, but the reality is that deep down they know they're a success story, and deep down they know that compared to the region, what Turkey has achieved is remarkable.

I will give you just one example that may give us a good idea of what Turkey is doing despite its status-quo-oriented realpolitik. Just last week Ahmet Davatoglu, the foreign minister, was in Damascus, and apparently he had a two-hours private meeting with Bashar Assad where the main discussion was Turkey's transition to democracy in the 1940s and '50s. And (inaudible) probably lectured. He probably lectured Bashar Assad about the importance of creating institutions, the importance of allowing dissent.

And we know that some of the conversation, thanks to the fact that he shared the conversation with some of the Turkish journalists, and he probably also preached about the importance of the time that you live in, that sometimes it is impossible to avoid change, that that time of change has arrived and that Bashar Assad has two options: that he can either become the leader of change, ride the wave of change, go with the flow, or resist the change. And the second alternative would be violence.

So it remains to be seen what Syria will do. It remains to be seen whether Turkey's messages to Syria, which is I think a change

message, will be effective or not. When a regime is fighting its own survival, I don't think they will be listening to what the neighbor is saying; they will be fighting for their survival.

But there are good intentions there, and I think Turkey is, despite itself, serving as an example because of what it has achieved itself for this whole model business. And we may disagree on what the Turkish model is. In fact, coming here with Soli we're talking about what is the Turkish model because different people have different interpretations of the Turkish model.

When Tahrir Square was happening, there were many articles in *The New York Times* talking about this Egyptian revolt as something that could lead to a Turkish model, and they were not referring to a Muslim Brotherhood, ala AKP, coming to power; they were referring to a military coup. The military coup could be a Turkish model, too, because Turkey had an abundant amount of military coups, and, in fact, one reason which makes Turkey very paradoxical is that one reason why Turkish Islam is so moderate, why we have such a moderate political party is because the Turkish military has been so active, and the Turkish Islamists learned the red lines of the system, and they adapted themselves.

So one can argue that this Turkish model is not really this liberal Jeffersonian-Rousseauist democracy but it's a democracy where you have a very illiberal political culture where the military is in the habit of taking power and opponents actually have to adapt themselves to a life with the military. And a life with the military for the Islamist meant accepting secularism, not talking about Sharia law, accepting the European Union. In fact, it was a very clever strategy when you think that Turkish Islamist, reformed Islamists as they were, became the most enthusiastic advocates of the European Union. Why? Because the European Union wanted civilian supremacy over the military from Turkey. That's one major element of democratization, and that's music to your ears if you're an Islamist, civilian supremacy over the military.

So those are some of the elements of Turkish, the Turkish system that creates different types of models. In that sense, I think Turkey is a very interesting case to study. I think one area where I may slightly disagree with Soli is that, yes, it is a status quo power; yes, it is realpolitik oriented, but it is becoming an agent of change in the region despite itself.

It is becoming an agent of change thanks to what it has achieved, not thanks to its own narrative about preaching the Turkish model because people are looking at Turkey and trying to learn from it.

And that's the kind of passive role that Turkey is playing, and it's not because it's a voluntary role that the governments are playing, but it's basically this focus on Turkey, what it has achieved under a Muslim party, under an Islamicly-rooted party. It's a fascinating example of democratization, and, of course, there are still strong illiberal traits in Turkey. I think it's still an illiberal democracy.

It was an illiberal democracy before AKP, and it is an illiberal democracy with AKP. And with Soli we often discuss in Turkey whether one type of authoritarianism is being replaced by another. That's also potentially there, but one thing is certain: Turkey is an experiment. And it's a really interesting experiment and is probably the most relevant experiment for democratization because it involved the Islamist party that managed to do certain things that was not expected from an Islamist party. And the fact that the Turkish secular parties, the Turkish more systemic parties, were not able to become agents of change but that the Islamic party was able to become the agent of change in itself is an interesting phenomenon.

I'll just stop here and we can --

MR. OZEL: (off mike)

MS. HILL: Yeah, please, please do so, and then I'd like to get to the audience.

MR. OZEL: The issue of Turkey is a model, by the way. It's, as you live longer, there is really not much left that you haven't seen. Back in 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved and all these new republics were created, Turkey was also presented at the time as a model to the Central Asian Turkey Republics. It took upon itself, and it was given the role of integrating them into the system. And to the best of my recollection. Turkey represented some of those countries at OSCE until they themselves could actually do it for themselves.

And, in fact, the foreign minister at the time, Hikmet Cetin, once said the expectations of those republics with whom we share common values obviously is not coincidental. Democratic, secular, and or republic which is democratic and secular and respectful of human rights and our economic and social development level may turn Turkey into a center in this new changing world conditions.

Twenty years later a different geography, same message, same expectations, and same position.

MS. HILL: Thanks, and this look-back for 20 years is, really underscores the remarkable nature of the shift. And Brookings and

actually Carnegie next door are about to enjoy their centennial of being think-tanks. And if we'd been having these discussions either at Carnegie, which was founded in 1911 or Brookings a few years later, we'd have been having a very different discussion about Turkey as the Ottoman Empire then.

Turkey was then the sick man of Europe, and everybody was talking about the Balkan Wars of the 1900s and what would then come out of this disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. So in many respects with still 100 years on, passing our way through, thus we keep moving from the Balkans and back again to Central Asia and some of the furthest outposts of the Ottoman Empire's reach, although they're not part of the Ottoman Empire. And now the Arab world. We were creating the first modern state as a result of the ends of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and World War I. So it really is a quite remarkable journey that we've been on for this last 100 years.

I'm not expecting anybody here in the audience to remember the beginning of that period 100 years ago, but certainly somebody who was sitting somewhere in one of these buildings at one point was working on this.

MR. TASPINAR: The difference now is that Turkey now is the healthy (inaudible)

MS. HILL: That's right, and I was going to say that Turkey is the only healthy one of Europe props at this particular point.

But anyway, if other people would like to join in the conversation, we have a microphone here, and, sir, the gentleman here would be a top, and then the young lady over here. Thank you. And please identify yourselves.

MR. EMERSON: Yeah, Don Emerson, Stanford University. Building on your comment, Fiona Hill, it seems to me striking if this term "neo-Ottomanism," which I would like the panelists to comment on, stands on the one hand Turkey today, which is post-Kemalist but harks back to a pre-Kemalist Turkey and a pre-Kemalist situation.

So my question is first of all, is neo-Ottomanism just one of those buzz words that becomes inflated and loses meaning? And, or if not, what is its content? Can you specify its content?

And then, finally, is it Janus-faced term insofar as it implies certain domestic trends and changes in priorities at the same time that it projects a foreign policy image? Because, of course, we all know that in the "Muslim world," the Ottoman Empire has a particular position.

MS. HILL: That's a great question, thank you.

The lady here?

SPEAKER: (off mike), American University. I understand that economic interests are the main drivers of Turkey's current foreign policy today, but considering the degree is trade [sic] between Turkey and Israel after the election of AK party, do you think a key piece is Islamic roots have an influence on that? If, yes, do you think that this is a threat for Turkey's Democracy?

MS. HILL: Thank you. Another question is this lady here, please. And then we'll come back to Soli and Omer.

MS. BACON: Yes, Pauline Bacon, Fund for Peace. Picking up on the conversation that we had in the Brazilian panel, could we hear your version of why Turkey took its position on Iran?

MR. OZEL: Thank you. First of all, after the Flotilla raid last year, Turkish trade with Israel did not diminish. Actually, it increased by a third last year. There are still at least two or three flights daily of Turkish Airlines between Istanbul and Tel Aviv, and there must be at least one flight by El Al as well, and there is a lot of Israeli investment in Turkey. These may not be as big in volume as Turkey's relations with many of the other countries especially developed lately, of course,

In 2000, Turkish trade with Arab countries was only 12 percent of its overall trade; today it is 24 percent of its overall trade whereby whereas its trade with Europe was at 57 percent in 2000, and it is now down to 42 percent. But there it will stay, I think. Europe is not going to decline any further. So in that sense we did not have a really much of an adverse effect on Israeli-Turkish trade; the adverse effect was mainly on Turkish-Israeli military relations and then military contracts.

On the neo-ottoman thing, the thing is everybody talks about it and everybody denies it. What I think is happening, I mean, of course, we like labeling things like, is this Arab Spring, is this Arab 1848, is this Arab 1989, is this -- because we want to be able to make sense by referencing it to something that is already comprehensible to us. So I think neo-Ottomanism is that kind of thing, although especially the foreign minister in his more careless moments make people think that this is what he's talking about,

But what is happening is as a functional at least two developments: 1) the end of the Cold War and the opening up of that enormous space between Europe and Asia. And because of globalization borders that were established a hundred years ago, or 85 years ago, are basically at least in economics terms disappearing. That's issue number

one. No visa requirements between Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Lebanon, incredible movements of people unprecedented, especially during the Cold War or under colonial regimes. So in a way these spaces that were natural economic and social spaces under Ottoman Empire are reopening with - it's not just, by the way, it's not just Muslim countries. Croatia, Serbia, until they become members of the European

-- Russia, okay?

So this is and in a way to try to define this from strictly a western perspective may not be right.

Second, Paul Witek, I think a British historian of the Ottoman Empire makes the point which I believe is very correct that whoever rules the Anatolian Peninsula has to be Janus-faced. You cannot be exclusively Western-looking, you cannot be exclusively Eastern-looking. Then the problem becomes how do you manage it?

Okay, if a part of the problem today were Turkey's example or not an example or a model, part of our attraction, if we are a democracy more respectful of human rights than others, and if in our worst we are still a regime of rule of law and all that to a certain extent, it's partially because we are attached to the European Union with their accession process. And

we seem to forget it from time to time that is that goes, part of our attraction goes as well.

So it is, in a way, everybody is trying to adjust themselves to this reemergence of the economic and social space. Whether you name it neo-ottoman or not is a different matter. The problem for the Turkish government or any Turkish government is how do you manage it. Because if you overdo it and start talking about a commonwealth of Ottoman nations, Bashar Assad then says, "Come again." (Laughter)

On Iran, why did Turkey do it? I mean first, as I said, Turkey does not want war, and Turkey did not want economic sanctions, and the Turkish government believed that it was cooperating with the American government in doing do. Now, the stories are very different from in Washington and in Ankara, but I think one major point was that this Turkish government wanted to prove that it could actually pull off something that no other could. And, quite frankly, when I look back, we have a letter.

The letter says if Iran deposits 1200 kilograms of enriched uranium in Turkey, then we win the game. Now, to claim, then, as Washington did, oh, well, the letter was only one part of thinking; other parts, you know, we didn't really like what you've done, it just doesn't work.

I think this is what the Brazilians also got encouraged with as well, that there was a letter signed by the president of the United States which stipulated certain conditions under which it would be acceptable to have a swap deal, and as far as the Turks and the Brazilians were concerned these were satisfied.

Maybe the language of the agreement wasn't really that satisfactory, but there was certainly an accident of communication, obviously, and Turkey wanted to prove that it could pull it off. It wanted to present this as a confidence-enhancing measure. This was not the way Washington was going to see it. Washington probably didn't expect that anything would come out of that meeting, like nothing comes out of any meeting with the Iranians, and something did, and we found ourselves at an impasse.

We worked at cross-purposes, but that is really in that respect that we worked at cross-purposes. Otherwise the real thing for Turkey is engage Iran commercially, take part in the investment process, and certainly avoid war and economic sanctions because it's our neighborhood. And that, then, of course, appears Turkey is covering for Iran, but, as I said, in Lebanon, to a certain extent in Gaza, most certainly in Iraq, Turkey is basically competing with and is balance -- trying to

balance Iranian influence. It's a very -- it has been in historical terms a very complicated relation.

One final point, if you'll allow me. When the United States waged war against Iraq, toppled Saddam Hussein, probably inadvertently, but it should not have had the luxury of doing so, it broke a balance of power that existed since 1624 in favor of those who were in the Sunni world. Now we all have to clear up that mess.

MS. HILL: Well, 1624, that's definitely a mess then to break up.

Actually, one thing I wanted to press you on, Soli, because you didn't read (inaudible) your question, but I think you set about a kind of a miscommunication or an accident of communication. I think from the western or the U.S. perspective, probably the imagery of that final agreement was probably the most egregious. I mean you talked about the image of, you know, Omar al-Bashir coming to Turkey and how about displeased the civil society, but it's the image of Ahmadinejad and Erdogan clasping hands and putting them aloft. I'm sure it didn't play all that well particularly in Brazil or for Brazil.

But I think it was the imagery that surrounded the props job the most in the U.S.

MR. TASPINAR: I think if Turkey -- in my judgment Turkey made a mistake by voting no at the U.N. Security Council. If Turkey abstained in the Security Council, and we are -- you know we accuse your president for having chilled out on our Prime Minister -- if Turkey abstained, then perhaps we could have forgotten it. But, you know, three things came in succession in three weeks' time: the swap deal, the Mavi Marmara incident, and Turkey felt, in my judgment rightly, enraged that its citizens had been killed and that its allies were not by its side. And the no vote at the U.N. Security Council, and that really did it.

MS. HILL: Ted, I know that you need to wrap up very soon. Do you have a final question yourself, or --

MR. PICCONE: No.

MS. HILL: Well, then, I'll ask Omer to make a final comment, and then I'll turn it over to you because I know that people are looking at their watches, and the sun is still shining.

MR. TASPINAR: On this question of neo-Ottomanism, sir, you framed your question very correctly referring to a post-Kemalist Turkey and a pre-Kemalist Turkey. And I think what is going on internally in Turkey could be also interpreted as a kind of revival of Ottoman social contract.

Turkey is rediscovering its Muslim identity and is rediscovering its multinational identity, too. There is a huge sense of nostalgia now for a more cosmopolitan Istanbul, a huge sense of nostalgia for a time when Turkey was more multicultural. And I think this debate on the head scarf in Turkey which puts on the one hand the Kemalist camp, on the other the more conservative camp is also about a kind of Ottoman debate.

What is the role of religion in Turkish society? This government, similar to Ozal, wants basically a different type of secularism in Turkey. They're not against secularism but they're against French-style secularism. They're against (inaudible) radical anticlerical type of secularism. They want a more moderate secularism. I don't think they want radical Islam, but they're against radical secularism, and the debate, as I tried to explain, it's not about bringing Sharia back to Turkey; Turkey was never really a Sharia state. The Ottoman Empire was always a state where canons, the laws were more important than religious dogma.

This government, similar to the Ozal government has also tried to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem, not very successfully but they're trying. They did more than the Kemalist establishment in terms of emphasizing the political, cultural identity

dimension of this issue. In that sense, we're not paying enough attention to the meaning of Ottomanism domestically in Turkey, and I also agree with you and Soli that this is Janus-faced. Ozal in 1987 applied to the European Union for Turkey's membership. He wanted Turkey to have very good relations with the United States and very good relations with the European Union, but he was also the first Turkish president or prime minister going to (inaudible) as he was in office.

So he was really a Janus-faced political character, and Erdogan, we may question whether he really believes in the European Union project. You know, the secularists in Turkey have discovered this term "takia," that basically you don't really show your real colors until you achieve what you want to achieve, and he may be engaged in dissimilation, maybe he's using the European Union to weaken the military. We don't know, but all the things that he has done, including on Cyprus to compromise, to basically force out Denktash and to lobby for a reunification of the island tells me that he genuinely wanted Turkey to be part of Europe.

Now, I think that he still wants Turkey to be part of Europe. This is also a very Ottoman attitude. I mean Abba Khan was not a neo-Ottoman; Abba Khan was an Islamist more a la Muslim Brotherhood. But

these guys are. They have one eye in the West, and as Soli said in his remarks, they benefit from the fact that Turkey is represented in NATO in western institutions, in the Transatlantic camp, but they don't know exactly how to match their position because they also have this narrative of victimization.

They have discovered Orientalism, you know: Everything's about Orientalism now in their eyes. When there is this criticism of Turkey or Islamization in Turkey, they say, oh, this is such an Orientalist approach. They just anti-Islamic, Islamophobic, not understanding that they are themselves often engaged in Occidentalism. They're basically monopolizing and creating a monolithic West and blaming the West for everything. So they have their own conspiracy theories.

Well, but definitely this neo-Ottomanism, I think more than a catch word, it is something that needs to be studied sociologically in addition to just foreign policy dimension.

MS. HILL: Thank you, Omer. And just as we're turning over to Ted, one quick anecdote. I mean there's been a lot of reference to Turkey's early outreach and Turgut Ozal to the old Turkey lands far to the East. And you'll probably remember this as well.

There's a story from that time when Turgut Ozal went on his first trips to Central Asia. When the Central Asians greeted him and the Turkish delegation and said, "You know, you left here a few thousand years ago on horseback, and you've come back, and you look a little bit different." (Laughter)

So anyway, everything changes, and everybody looks different from a different perspective.

MR. PICCONE: Well, we've gotten a great scope of history on the table this afternoon, and we've covered a lot of ground. And I just wanted to very briefly point out a couple of the common threads and note in particular that there's a certain sense of, you know, this pragmatism, this prudence, a mediating role that these particular states want to play favoring the status quo and certain passivity that runs through their foreign policies.

But if you think about what's happening now in the Arab world, it teaches us that change is constant, and the question is what kind of change is in one's national interest. Is it the kind of change that will lead to more autocracy and authoritarianism, or a change that, even though in the short-term could be very unstable, would lead toward a kind of democratic stability where rule of law is privileged over, you know, more

authoritarian styles of governing, or where there's greater economic progress, where there is more internal peace, more interstate cooperation rather than conflict.

I think this is really the critical question that's in front of us for the rest of our conference and going forward. It's going to be I think granting a really fascinating period of time.

I want to thank all of our panelists, particularly our last panelists for their time and contribution, and we'll continue tomorrow. You have the agenda. We're going to start at 9:00 a.m. with South Africa, Indonesia, and then South Korea.

Thank you. (Applause)

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