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PARTICIPANTS:

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DIAMOND: It's a very great and sincere privilege and pleasure to be able to chair a panel in which these three extraordinary thinkers and writers about foreign policy and international affairs, including but not limited to democracy promotion, are able to engage one another. I'm not sure if the three of you have ever been on a panel together with one another at the same time. I know that you probably have done it in dyads a lot. But in any case, if this is the first time, we're very honored to be the sponsors of it.

And hopefully in some ways if this doesn't tie everything together it certainly will push things forward in terms of thinking not only about how these six states and maybe a couple others like them are relating to the challenge, responsibility, opportunity, possibility depending on how you view it, of supporting, assisting, and encouraging democracy in the world but also how their activities reflect. Kind of following on what Steve Stedman was saying at the end of the last session, the rather different world we're in now, and I'll let them ponder how it's different.

I won't introduce them at length. I think you know them well. I'll simply say that Tom Carothers is vice president for studies and director of the Democracy and Rule of Law program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where he's been for quite some years now and has authored or edited more voluble books on democracy promotion than any

other single scholar that I know or certainly that winds up on the syllabus of my course. But the others as well wind up on the syllabi of many of our courses.

You know, Robert Kagan is here at Brookings. He's a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and also a frequent writer about American foreign policy and historical and contemporary perspective, both in a number of prominent books and in his columns for the *Washington Post* and the *Weekly Standard*.

And finally, Moises Naim is, of course, has shaped many of these debates during his long and very transformative and distinguished service as editor-in-chief of foreign policy and continues to do so now as a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and chief international columnist for Spain's largest newspaper, *El Pais*. And it should also be mentioned he's a member of the board of the parent institution of one of the sponsors here, the National Endowment for Democracy.

So I guess they can speak in that order. Why not? When in doubt, just go with the program. So Tom, the floor is yours.

MR. CAROTHERS: Thank you, Larry. And thanks to the organizers for this chance to speak at this useful conference.

Underlying the conference is the idea that it would be a good thing for democracy in the world if rising democracies -- and I'm going to

use the term “rising democracies” rather than “emerging-market democracies” because EMD sounds like a medical device -- if rising democracies were to take a more active role in supporting democracy outside their borders and that the United States should urge them to do so and make it part of the policy of the United States Government to support such a change. I think for those in the Obama administration who would like to do this it reflects a reasonable instinct. It’s the natural part of the multilateralism that the Obama administration is putting forward on many fronts, and it’s a natural part of their effort to reformulate or recast the image, and if you will, the place of support for democracy in U.S. foreign policy and on the world stage generally by making it seem less U.S.-centric in the eyes of many people.

But underlying this question that animates the conference and also underlying the administration’s impulse to do this is a question or actually a puzzle. Do these rising democracies actually want to become more active? Or is this a fool’s errand on the part of democracy enthusiasts who just imagine a world which would be different and better in their minds than it really is? Somewhat jokingly, but I think also somewhat accurately, the Indonesian speaker this morning said that so far we had heard four nos: India, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa all saying essentially no, they didn’t want to play more of a role. And he would offer a maybe which he did and then I think the South Korean speaker offered a

we're not sure either. So there's significant hesitation on the part of these countries to the topic. And that's for familiar but reasons worth underlining.

First, a strong attachment to the norm of sovereignty or the principle of sovereignty.

Secondly, in many cases a preference for stability and a fear of reasonable disruption that might come from democratic change. For example, Turkey's relations with Syria reflect in some ways a concern that what might happen if the Syrian regime were to change drastically. So a preference for stability.

And third, sometimes said in the last day and a half, implicitly, sometimes explicitly, a deep, abiding suspicion of U.S. foreign policy and the association of democracy promotion with this U.S. geostrategic agenda that these rising democracies are still so skeptical about.

And this is a crucial point because I think some of the people around President Obama and his foreign policy team believed or at least hoped that his arrival to power would reverse the tremendous degree of skepticism about the U.S. geo-strategic agenda that was so present during the presidency of George Bush. And I think in some ways they've discovered that that attitude, although it may have concentrated its focus around President Bush, it's something much, much deeper and more

historical and is still very much present in the minds of people around the world even though President Bush is no longer president. And that they also believe that President Obama, being a unique U.S. president in various ways, would have a special ability to reverse these legacies. But they're discovering that that's not necessarily the case.

Now, this rather deep and somewhat reflexive aversion that I think policy elites at least have in many rising democracies pushes us to think, well, wait a minute. Where did the impulse on the part of the United States come from? And I think Bob Kagan is going to talk more about the U.S. role on this issue than I will. But in the case of the United States, certainly democracy promotion, as we know, calls forth or touches upon a number of deep elements in the U.S. thinking about itself in the world. First of all, the fact that our national identity or as a political community is in some ways defined by democracy. Secondly, by the fact that we have a powerful transformative instinct. At least one vein of our thinking about the world is that we're more comfortable in a world that we can remake in certain ways in our own image. And third, that we have a kind of global reach. By now, over the last 50 years many Americans have been socialized to think that our interests are very far flung in the sense that what happens politically almost anywhere in the world should be of importance to us and we need to care about the fate of democracy everywhere because it will directly affect us.

Looking at these three reasons we can kind of see why the rising democracies may not feel in sync with this. They don't necessarily share a national identity based upon a historic ideal of democracy. Many of them do not have a transformative instinct but rather feel themselves to have been the victim of others transformative instincts and they're rather wary of such instincts. And third, they don't see why the internal political life of a lot of other countries in the world matter all that much to them once you get beyond their immediate borders.

So you can see in a sense why they don't feel drawn to it. But if you applied the same test to all other states, actually nobody else would be interested in promoting democracy then. But that's not the case. Canada is actively involved. Germany is actively involved. Australia is involved. Spain is involved, Denmark, Slovakia, and so forth. And these countries are not transformative powers, unless Slovakia has a global plan they haven't told us about. (Laughter) They don't have expansive conceptions of national security and national interest. Yet, they're active in democracy promotion in the ways that I think many of us hope that India and Indonesia and others might be.

Why are the active? Well, that's an interesting question and one on which I think we could spend a lot of time. You might argue that it's self-interest but if you see, you know, Danish aid workers in Nepal working on constitutional reform and try to press them and say this must

be really important to Denmark that Nepal gets this constitution right, it's hard to see, you know, where the direct self-interest comes in or you see Swedes laboring away in Zambia on parliamentary strengthening. This is all about Sweden's self-interest.

I think it comes instead from -- and I think this is a very fundamental point in the contemporary world -- a tendency of democracies to feel that they have something worth sharing with others. That they feel that democracy is the best answer that they have found to how humans can govern themselves and respect the dignity of their own citizens. And they somehow conclude they'd like to help others encounter the same answer. And for most of these democracy supporters, their democracy-support work is closely tied in with their development work because I think it grows out of the same basic instinct, that it's essentially an idealistic enterprise designed to help others who they feel are worse off than they are because most democracies, not all, there are still a few -- France and Japan are major democracies which are not widely engaged in democracy assistance -- but basically almost all other well established, wealthy democracies are. Just as they are all engaged in development assistance. So I think the core impulse is actually a kind of sharing belief in the value of sharing what they have come to discover and make work for themselves.

And so in a way the U.S. reasons -- the national identity, the

transformative instinct, the global sweep -- are actually a kind of special variant of what is, I think, a much larger pattern of democracies tending to engage in democracy support. Yet, when emerging powers -- the Indian elite, the Indonesian policy elite, the South Africans -- are asked about democracy support or think about it, they immediately refer to the U.S. case and say, well, we're not like you guys. We don't want to transform the world and we're not neo-hegemonic and so forth. And what's puzzling is they refer to the one case that sort of is least like them as opposed to saying, we'd kind of like to be like Canada. Canada is a pretty good international citizen and they do this so why wouldn't we want to do this given that Canada does it?

So I think one of the minor paradoxes of how U.S. policymakers, if they do want to encourage these countries to play a greater role, is they have a rather subtle task which is they have to find ways to encourage them precisely by not focusing on the United States as the model of active democracy support because in some ways it's the least relevant to what might be persuasive and directly practically relevant to these countries.

And I think it also implies that the rising democracies will do more on democracy as they feel their democracy is worth sharing with others and as they make the larger transition to being wealthier countries that end up moving from being recipients of assistance to being donors in

a variety of fields. Further in this vein, I'd say that we also have to be very modest in our expectations because I think the democracy community here in Washington or the people who are most involved in democracy support have gotten into a habit of chronically overstating how significant a role democracy promotion actually plays in U.S. policy and in doing so create a false bar, an unnecessarily high bar in their minds from what they think would be a good place for democracy support in the foreign policies of other countries.

We are in the habit of talking a lot more about democracy support than we actually do it as a country. Yes, there are countless small- and medium-size activities that serve that goal but is democracy promotion central to the policy of the Obama administration in any of the main areas in which it's engaged -- in China and Russia and Pakistan and Afghanistan, in Iran, or even necessarily in the Middle East at least until two months ago, and even now that's still in debate. Yeah, it's an element. It's there. We try to make sure human rights are part of our dialogue with Russia and part of our dialogue with China, but it's not a central element. In fact, it fights for attention in all of these areas that I mentioned. And so why should we expect this to be different with India or Indonesia and South Africa and so forth?

The same is also true with consistency. It's very exasperating to see the South African government fail to pressure Robert

Mugabe to do better. And then you see South Africa playing a role in Cote d'Ivoire and you say if you can do that here, why can't you do that there? We say that as, you know, our officials then get on the plane and fly to Ethiopia or Angola and deal with a non-democratic government with which we're friendly and are cultivating relations for our own reasons. And then we say, gee, they're so inconsistent. And so, you know, again we have to start, I think, thinking more realistically about what level do we expect -- sort of what role do we expect it to play in their own policies? How consistent can we realistically expect them to be and so forth?

The final point I'll make in closing is there have been many references throughout the conference to civil society, that civil society in these countries must get involved and that it'll be through civil society to civil society linkages between us and them that this subject will move forward.

Samantha mentioned in her lunch address today that it is inevitable -- she said -- she used that word -- that in rising democracies -- that rising democracies will face growing pressure from human rights groups at home. Once these groups have pressed for human rights at home, then they'll turn on their government and say you have to do this as part of your foreign policy. That's not necessarily the case. France is pretty good at respecting human rights within France, but does not -- has not faced a lot of pressure over the last 40 years from French human

rights groups to take human rights seriously in its Africa policy, for example. Japan faces very little domestic pressure from rights groups in Japan to incorporate those issues in its foreign policy. So this assumption of a natural linkage which will inevitably be there I think has to be -- remains to be seen.

But what has really struck me in all the references to civil society is I think we've been lapsing into an extreme version of what I would call -- I hear all the time -- sort of civil society vagueness syndrome, which is we use the term civil society when we're being extremely vague about what we mean. And an Indian colleague pulled us up short on that and said, you know, the parts of civil society in India that are most active are the leftist anti-American groups who would pressure the Indian government not to move in this direction. So I think we should just be wary of these tendencies that say, well, civil society will fix the problem without being a lot more specific. You know, Indian civil society is hardly, you know, five organizations based in Delhi. It's a massive and complex part of Indian society and I think we're doing ourselves, both analytically and practically a disservice to continue to refer to the idea that civil society is in a sense the answer.

So to return to the central puzzle of do they want to be more active, I think the answer lies in saying let's compare themselves, them a bit less to us. Think about the broader question of why countries do

support democracy and in that answer I think we'll find some encouraging news even though we have to have very modest expectations about the role that we would like to see democracy play given our own experience with it.

Thanks very much.

MR. DIAMOND: Thank you, Tom, for laying so many issues on the table and for being so concise. So, Bob.

MR. KAGAN: Well, after Tom I'm inclined to be even more concise. That was a very brilliant exposition.

I wonder, just to throw it out there, in listening to your comparison of these whatever we're calling them now with some of the countries that you talked about whether it seems pretty obvious that historical experience and a perception of having been, you know, how you define yourself as a nation and a lot of these countries define themselves more as post-colonial or having been abused in some sense if you're in the western hemisphere by American power, that that is at least a competing narrative to whether you're a democracy or not. And it seems that a lot of the countries you list, you know, they don't have that. So I just wonder how much, you know, the post-colonial element of it is the dominant thing that prevents them from identifying themselves as democracies.

I was going to, I guess, talk a little bit more about the United

States and democracy promotion and how the United States approaches it. I would say that as a sort of -- you can go a long way back in history and find nations generally being sympathetic toward and attempting to -- when they have the power to do so -- set up like-minded regimes. If you go back to the struggle -- the long struggle between Athens and Sparta, when Athens made a conquest or influence in another smaller city-state, they generally set up a democracy. And when Sparta did, they generally set up an oligarchy. I think that in general you tend to trust the people who behave similar to you and you could go through all history and look at, you know, religious governments that were dominated by their religious identity tended to be sympathetic toward and setting up and supporting their side.

And so, you know, it's not as if there's anything new about expecting purely as an analytical matter nations that identify themselves as democracies to be generally in support of other democracies elsewhere. And I think the key is the question, are they identifying themselves as democracies primarily? And I think in a lot of these cases they're not, and that's not the most significant factor in their national existence at this particular moment, at least certainly they don't -- obviously it doesn't extend to their identity when it comes to foreign policy.

The problem with the United States -- I think Tom's point is very well taken how unique the United States is and why it is perhaps not

a model for other nations. And I want to just say a few words about how the United States approaches -- I don't even know if I would call it democracy promotion because I agree with Tom. First of all, the level of hypocrisy in American foreign policy is relatively high. The fact that the United States has historically had conflicting interests of which democracy has only been one can be seen. The degree to which American policy has been affected by racial considerations is very significant. There was a long period of time when it didn't bother Americans that they were dealing with dictatorships in a non-white part of the world because they didn't really think that those non-white segments of the world were really capable of democracy in any case. And that's a long tradition. I began with believing -- Thomas Jefferson believed that Catholics weren't capable of democracy, which is why he didn't really -- he and -- one thing that he and John Adams agreed on was that there could be no democracy in Latin America because they were catholic. So there is that hindrance.

And by the way, just to mention the most fundamental hypocrisy in American history, we're talking about the founders of a democracy who held slaves for the first eight decades. So, you know, there's no shortage of that in the United States. And I would think of America's democracy activities as acting more on a compulsion rather than any considered plan. And it's precisely the point that Tom makes, which is that the United States has no national identity apart from the

ideas of the Declaration of Independence. The only thing that makes someone American is a belief in fidelity to those principles. Other nations, like France for instance, you can be France under a monarchy. You can be France under a democracy. You can be France under some strange monarchic republic. But you're still French. But there's no pre-democratic American. And that's pretty much a unique situation.

And so it's almost -- it's impossible, and I always feel like democracy is a kind of burden that Americans would love to unload if they possibly could because they are constantly being measured against their own principles which they cannot escape. They were measured against -- they tried very hard to escape it for a long time in the question of slavery, and they try very hard in the case of foreign policy to escape it. And if you actually -- nevertheless, as a purely factual matter, the period of American ascendency in the world from 1945 to the present has been a period of enormous explosion of democratic governance. And you could say, and sometimes I think Tom thinks this is purely coincidental because the United States has not been engaged in the democracy promotion business. I don't think it is coincidental. I think that it's pretty typical for whatever the largest and most powerful nations in the world happen to be that there is a lot of that spreading around and, you know, you could see that whether it was fascism or communism and then democracy.

But if you look at the way the United States has engaged in

democracy promotion, there are some basic ways in which it has been true. One is as a result of war. The United States has this -- part of the sort of understanding of how the world works, which is embedded in the American philosophy, the American psyche almost, is that when nations are aggressors against the United States, the problem with them is that they are not democracies, whether this is true or not, by the way. I mean, ultimately Woodrow Wilson couldn't decide whether he wanted to go to war. He didn't want to go to war with Germany, but once he decided he had to go to war with Germany it was because Germany was an evil oppression dictatorship. And, therefore, that needed to be fixed. You know, the problem with the Soviet Union was that it was an evil totalitarian dictatorship that needed to be fixed. And so the problem with Japan was that it was, you know, an imperial dictatorship that needed to be fixed.

And so the American response to dealing with its conflicts with other nations is they need to be cured. It's not enough to defeat them; you then need to cure them by turning them into democracies. So one way the United States has spread democracy is by going to war with other nations or being attacked by other nations. I mean, the two most important elements of American democracy promotion are Germany and Japan.

But then there are the cases where the United States intervenes for reasons that have nothing to do with democracy. But once

the United States has intervened it doesn't feel quite right about leaving anything behind other than a democracy. Or at least for a while, at least while we're paying attention.

So contrary to much mythology, the United States did not invade Iraq in order to promote democracy. They invaded Iraq -- the United States invaded Iraq for other reasons. But having invaded Iraq, they were obviously going to have to set up a democracy. The same could be true about the United States invaded Nicaragua for reasons that didn't have much to do with Nicaraguan politics but Henry -- but Stimson felt he had to leave behind a democracy. He said this. You know, what kind of country are we if we don't leave behind a democracy? That's another way.

Another circumstance which we've seen more recently is the exposure of American hypocrisy. So we are perfectly content to support a dictatorship in Egypt or any other place in the Arab world until it's sort of brought up to our attention that we've been doing this and then we find it intolerable, or at least we can find it intolerable, to be living with this hypocrisy. And it usually requires some movement in those countries to appear and say we are democrats and you're supporting the dictator, at which point the United States goes through a whole crisis of conscience and in many cases, pulls the rug out from under someone who we've been supporting for 40 years, much to the surprise of that someone.

So all this together is not a policy of democracy promotion, and it is not that the United States is, in fact, in a crusade. There are Americans who would like to promote democracy actively but the country as a whole does not engage in active promotion of democracy as Tom says, and yet it actively promotes a great deal of democracy. So that's the puzzle. But then -- so if you get to what should these other countries be doing? I don't think you should say you should be just like the United States because it would seem to be extremely difficult to follow that model.

So, you know, I don't know where that leaves us exactly. I mean, what can you say? I guess I would say that I do believe, not just as an American but as a democrat, that the world is safer for democrats when there is more democracy and that there are trends in the world. And that one thing we know for sure is that autocracies are actively engaged in the defense of autocracy. And they do have a sense that autocracy endangered over there can affect this autocracy right here. They feel under some siege in the modern fundamentally liberal and democratic world and they, therefore, feel that if those democracies are able to topple this dictatorship, that we're next.

And so there is a kind of sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit, recognition and bonding together of autocracies. And I would think that -- I wouldn't say this was a direct cause and it may have only been one part of what's going on, but it has perhaps something to do with the fact that

democracy has been in retreat.

And so the question is if autocracies are a little bit more active than democracies in defending their, you know, if their Spartans are defending their oligarchs more than our Athenians are defending our democrats, is the net result of that to begin to undermine, you know, whether to put democracy in a slightly more fragile situation? And so I wonder if it's possible ultimately to convince these -- especially these new democracies that maybe at the end of the day they do have some interest in the survivability of democracies like them when confronted with possible autocratic challenges.

I think I'll leave it there because Moises, I believe, is about to address this very question, at least in the case of South America.

MR. NAIM: Thank you. And thank you for inviting me to this interesting early conversation.

I think that in a decade or so we are going to talk about these conferences having been too early in the game of a trend that is going to be with us but there is certainly an early to the game kind of feeling to the conference.

As I was reading the papers and as I was listening to the brilliant explanations, I could not help but think of how dependent is this conversation on time and place. Imagine that this conversation and these papers would have -- first, instead of being in Washington we'll be in

Bonn. And instead of going through a situation where emerging markets are growing fast, the last -- the most recent economic crisis would have hit them and would have derailed the growth. So instead of having booming emerging markets we would have emerging markets really trying to restore growth and grapple with difficult economic situations that would not leave a lot of space to think big thoughts about democracy and the world.

And think about the fact what I said. How American is this conversation? This conversation has a very strong sense of Americanism that you would not this conversation, at least not in the same vein with the same emphasis with the same subjects if you had these exchanges anywhere else. If you don't like imagining being in Bonn, imagine being in Japan, in Tokyo, or in any of the capitals of the papers, of the countries where there were papers addressed in this conference. So that's one initial remark I want to make.

And it's very apparent that we are very early in our conversation by how intellectually primitive is the conversation. We don't have very strong analytical anchors for dealing in a lot of the things. A lot of what we have is storytelling anecdotes, feelings, sentiments, hopes, aspirations, things that happen or could not have happened, or could have happened and didn't. So the whole tone of the papers and the conference is very anecdotal, is very primitive in terms of the intellectual anchoring of the claims.

And it cannot be -- I'm not blaming the authors. I just think that there is not enough intellectual foundation for what we're talking about. It's very early in this conversation. That's the point I want to make.

And this becomes extremely apparent when we think about what's the unit of analysis. We don't even know how to call what we're talking about here. Is it emerging democracies? Is it the BRICs? Is it the emerging powers? Is it -- you called it, Tom, emerging --

MR. CAROTHERS: Rising democracies.

MR. NAIM: -- rising democracies. So what is it? What is analytical category? What is a unit of analysis? What -- how do you recognize one of these countries when you run into them in the street? What does a country have to have in order to belong to the category of countries that we're discussing here?

It's a very -- if that's a controversial question, then imagine how difficult it is to extrapolate what is their behavior? We don't even know what unit of analysis we are trying to describe, predict, or distill. And so at this point, you know, I was thinking so what do they have in common? Do they have values in common? No. The culture -- is culture something that unifies and binds them? No. Is it ideology? No. So is it economic interests? No. The only thing that binds all of the countries we're talking about is fast growth in the last decade. So if you take away the fast growth, you end up with a group that is not really a group. So

essentially, these are countries that are growing very quickly, that are being very successful economically, that have weathered the financial crisis better than the rich countries, that are witnessing rich countries that were traditional players being crippled by economic difficulties, that see them in a model of difficulties and they watch debates about the American decline and Europe disappearing from the map and becoming even more irrelevant, and surging China. So they start thinking that there is space for them. Why? Because they have been growing very quickly. But not much more than that.

So that's one of the first points I wanted to make in order to illustrate my point about the urgent need to develop some more refined categories and more refined ways of thinking about the phenomenon that brings us here.

The second is closely related to this and is my statement in praise of hypocrisy, inconsistency, and double standards. I liked very much your point that was made in the prior session about purposeful inconsistency, the notion that countries have a very hard time being perfectly consistent. And there is a list of inconsistencies and double standards that we repeat and parade all the time. You know, how can the United States support, you know, what's happening in Bahrain at the same time that they did what it did in Tunisia? How does -- how is it possible that it has close links and relationships with Viet Nam and still

has an embargo on Cuba? Why? How do you explain that? How do you -- on and on. And we know the Myanmar-Saudi Arabia inconsistency. And there is a long list of contradictions and so on.

So it's very common and I think very facile and unproductive to just call for perfect consistency. And, therefore, say a country has to have a foreign policy that is always consistent, that is principled, that is rooted in values or at least a calculation that combines vales and interests, and, therefore, the country should -- foreign policy makers should always apply those principles to be consistent and we denounce inconsistencies.

Well, it doesn't happen that way. The United States is the best example of that. But almost any country -- pick a country and I can give you a list of inconsistent foreign policies that are pursuing. So inconsistency, double standards, and very often hypocrisy. If you want to be more elegant you can call it strategic ambiguity. (Laughter) But at the end of the day it is that you do something in one case and you do completely the contrary in a case that in theory ought to be singular. But that comes with foreign policy and that is something that these emerging powers, emerging democracies are going to discover.

And I think it's good that we have these inconsistencies. I would have to have a strongly-principled, rigid, absolutely untouchable and unadjustable foreign policies that regardless of what happens we have some blinders that can either be ideological or driven by some sort of

calculation that would not let us consider episodes, incidents of phenomena that were not included in our original thinking.

Well, having some flexibility, it's very important and most countries recognize that and at the end of the day that's what we see. The problem, of course, is when that strategic ambiguity and hypocrisy becomes confusion. And becomes a complete model in terms of what to do. And there is another point that was made before that sometimes these hypocrisies and double standards don't come as a result of some reasoned examination, well informed examination or what the situation is but just, you know, lack of information, prejudice, stereotypes, or other forces at work. And I will go back to the forces at work in shaping this in different countries. And I will also be -- I will also share some of the points about skepticism about the role of civil society in all of this.

The point I wanted to -- I wanted to use some examples, and I will be brief. I wanted to use the example of Brazil to illustrate some of the issues here. Brazil is one of -- certainly one of these fast-growing countries. He is one of these fledging powers that has its success -- its economic success has now broadened its appetite to become a regional and indeed a world player.

Brazil, as the paper presented here reminded us, Brazil has in its constitution a very specific, very explicit, very forward-looking statement in terms of human rights and the defense of human rights. And,

you know, it could have been written by the NED. It's the sort of statement that you don't find often in the Indian constitutions.

And then there is a government. It was the government of President Lula that this left of center government is a progressive government led by a union organizer that fought against the military dictatorship, that is surrounded by like-minded collaborators that fought -- one of the collaborators of President Lula, the chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, is now the president. Dilma Rousseff was a fighter, was an urban guerilla fighter. She was tortured by the military. Marco Aurelio Garcia is one of the leading influencers in foreign policy. So you would expect that a government that is deeply democratic -- there's no doubt that Brazil is a vibrant, important democracy. There is no doubt that the government is a progressive government. There is no doubt that the people in charge know what it means to be the victims of violations and abuse of human rights.

And then you look at the track record of President Lula and his government. And I have called him in public several times an economic giant and more a pygmy. And we have plenty of evidence of that. If you look at President Lula, he had the bad luck of landing in Cuba at the same time that Mr. Zapata, who was a prisoner, was in a hunger strike that eventually took his life. Well, President Lula just had the thought to say, well, you know, everyone that has hunger strikes is

probably -- these are criminals. Hunger strikes don't take you very far. And in fact, he was very dismissive of something. Forgetting the fact that when he was a labor organizer, he did have and he did undertake several hunger strikes when he was a young activist. He also has been -- his silence about what's happening in Venezuela has been incredible. Venezuela, I think there is no need for me to dwell on what's going on there. In eight years, the only statement that President Lula made about Venezuela is to praise Venezuelans for having elected President Chavez as the best president the country has had in 100 years. You know, these are verbatim statements by President Lula.

In Cuba, in Colombia, one day president Chavez decides to impose a unilateral embargo in Colombia because the Colombians discovered his deep involvement with the FARC guerilla groups. That caught all Colombia companies out of the Venezuela market. Again, this progressive government in Brazil was completely silent except that it organized a trade mission of Brazilian companies to go to Venezuela to replace and take over the markets that were lost by the Colombia companies. Then we have his role in Iran and, you know, his deep association and admiration for President Ahmadinejad and his more recent decision concerning Libya. All I'm saying is that this is just an example of how double standard contradictions and consistencies are not the prerogative and the exclusive domain of the United States. And I'm

saying is that this case study, this very brief vignette I gave you, just illustrates several lessons.

There are several -- and I will finish here -- first is, of course, the role of ideology and civil society in all of this. There is no doubt that what drove Brazil to behave in that way whereas the regional -- the origins of the president and his collaborators played a role. It's very interesting how they played a role outside the country. Inside Brazil there were capitalists and the liberals and adamantly non-socialists. On the other side of the country they were very enthusiastic cheerleaders. For governments that pursued policies that were completely opposite to what they were pushing their own country.

The second is a role of the private sector. It's very interesting how in the case of Brazil you had both politicians in the left and private sector on the right, shaping the policy towards the case of Venezuela, for example. The Brazilian private sector is extracting huge benefits from the closeness to the Venezuela government. And Brazilian companies have had immense contracts awarded to them in a way that is nontransparent, that has excluded all the competitors. And so there is a close link between Brazilian companies and the ministry of foreign affairs of Brazil. And at that point certainly there is a clash between the economic commercial interests of the country and whatever democracy promotion impulses may linger in Brazil. So on one side you have the

private sector and economic interests and on the other side you have this romantic arrangement to the notion of a leftist government that wanted to support another leftist government in the neighborhood.

And the third is that Brazil is learning. And this is perhaps a central lesson that I want to bring. And it brings me to my original statement of how early is this? Brazil is learning that playing in International Affairs at this level is not costless. It has consequences. Brazil has paid international costs and prices for each behavior. But that was a surprise. And I think now with President Dilma Rousseff, they are beginning to recognize that these inconsistencies have to be not eliminated but have to be taken into account. And that playing at that level internationally is not free.

Thank you.

MR. DIAMOND: Great. Well, I've chaired a lot of panels over the years and this is the first time I can remember where each of the panelists spoke exactly the amount of time they were asked to speak without the slightest bit of prodding instruction constraint or even intention of it on the part of the chair. So I'm now going to shamelessly exploit their lucidity and self-discipline to offer a couple of remarks very briefly that are not prepared remarks, simply a way of organizing what's been said.

First, I'd like to respond to Moises. Actually, I think -- at least I have conceived of this grouping as not so much -- not so much sharing

the common phenomenon of, you know, extraordinary economic dynamism in recent years as the fact that -- and here I think there's kind of five that are more similar and one that's a bit the odd man out. I mean, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa are all really the dominant democracy in their region or sub-region. They're major regional players that are, you know, pretty clearly democracies. South Korea is a little bit different in that, you know, it doesn't really -- it isn't so much a kind of clear, defined region or if the region is Northeast Asia it's peering out at Japan and China which are much larger.

Now, the key question this panel I think has sought to address is what then are the determinants of whether a country at least has some emphasis on democracy promotion and its foreign policy? So I'll just kind of in a way summarize from my own perspective what I think our contributors have said, which I think are very important. This has already been an extraordinarily productive session and I imagine in a moment when you ask your questions and raise your comments it will get more so.

Well, first of all, if they are stable and liberal democracy and then you have added, Tom, of which they are proud, I think that's a very interesting formulation. The only really stable liberal democracy on this list, and I underscore the word liberal here, is Korea. South Korea. And if you look at the Asian barometer public survey data, which I've been doing

for about 10 years now, they're not proud of their democracy. They have actually very big doubts about it, astonishingly low ratings of it, severe disappointments surrounding it. So, you know, that puts some things into context. But it does suggest that as democracy becomes more liberal, more deeply institutionalized had consolidated, and then perhaps if that other condition arises that might propel then in a certain direction.

Second, lurking in what some of you have said is the possibility that a high level of economic development, and if I can just add, education -- the spirit of Marty Lipset is here so I might as well put it squarely on the table -- you know, that that might play a role. And then if I could kind of round it out. Well, if a country has reached a mature and in a way secure, comfortable stage of national development, they not kind of striving for position. I mean, Sweden is not kind of maneuvering to become dramatically richer or, you know, more powerful than it is now. You know, that could be a facilitating factor.

Third, Tom, you mentioned having -- I hadn't even thought of it. It's the most obvious thing maybe: having a foreign aid program. If you have a foreign aid program then there is a kind of gravitating, you know, a certain natural gravitation toward having a democratic assistance element to the foreign aid program.

Fourth, kind of extrapolating what's been said over the last day and a half, having a secure set of borders and basically relative

national security. I mean, India has got so much going on in its borders. Turkey and so on. Well, you could say South Korea with North Korea. They are really serious complicating factors. On the other hand, if a country is in that circumstance but sees a clear moment when national security and idealism -- realism and idealism converge -- then that could change the parameters.

Fifth, getting to what Bob said, some national myth, self-conception, national identity that propels a country in that direction. And, of course, there are strong respects in which it's rooted in American exceptionalism but that it emerged, you know, maybe a little bit later with the consolidation of democracy in Western Europe. And maybe we could even say that the kind of crystallization of the European Union as a union where democracy is such a profound common principle has had an element in the European Union promoting democracy. We haven't even talked about that. Then there, you know, kind of following on that is the possibility that if a country is embedded in a democratic alliance or organization where the common shared awareness of and commitment to democracy is a key founding principle and motive of that regional grouping that may play a role. And Tom, I wondered when you were talking about this, if the distinction between France and Japan isn't that France is in the E.U. and Japan has no membership in a similar type of organization.

And finally, Moises really put his finger on the obvious, you

know, leadership. It does vary by the commitment, personality, priority of people who are making foreign policies. I mean, you don't even have to compare. I don't even think it's most fruitful to compare and I think you will agree on this, Bob, the political party. I mean, compare Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter. Compare Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan and you see the difference leadership can make in the United States. I have trouble imagining, Moises, Fernando Enrique Cardoso going to Iran in this current context and doing what Lula did. I'm not saying national interests don't drive to some extents but the personalities and political origins of the two leaders made a difference.

And I'll just note so I can get the attention of my colleague, Don Emmerson in the back of the room there, you know, that there was this moment, and maybe we should lay this on the table in terms of ASEAN in the future, there was this moment -- actually, Don gave a very provocative paper that wound up going into a book a few years ago about this, when it looked like Thailand under more -- before it fell into the tragedy it's fallen into of polarization; the Philippines kind of before you had the succession of President Estrada and then Macapagal-Arroyo. And then an emergent democratic Indonesia began to be a kind of -- one could see the possibility of a set of democracies reinforcing one another in ASEAN. It was around that time that Thailand had a foreign minister who is now the secretary general of ASEAN, Surin Pitsuwan, who was really

kind of pushing this in a way and, you know, had the potential to make a difference.

Anyway, all of that is by way of provoking all of you to say or ask whatever you'd like to now in the remaining time we have. Bill.

SPEAKER: Well, Tom Carothers made directly, and Moises I think indirectly, a point that I think is important enough to be dragged back into the discussion because I think it has a significant impact not only on the foreign policies and foreign behaviors of the countries that are subject -- that are the subject of this conference but also for American foreign policy. And Tom, you said, and I think rightly, that many, if not all of the countries being discussed, have at the very least a deep skepticism about American power and its uses rooted in different facets of different national histories. And Moises, I couldn't help noting that what, you know, Castro and Chavez and Ahmadinejad to blatantly have in common is that they all use the United States as their favorite whipping boy, and vice versa.

So I guess the question is how important is this factor deep, and in some cases sort of emotional skepticism about the uses of American power in shaping not only the current stance of these countries but also their likely future trajectory as agents and not merely the sufferers of foreign policy?

MR. DIAMOND: Well, given where we are in a calendar that

I pay attention to annually, I'm going to take questions in groups of four. So Mark, you're next.

SPEAKER: Thanks. I wanted to respond to Moises also since I'm partly responsible for the choice of countries to say something about the logic behind it, which is members of the G-20 that are not advanced democracies but are democratic, that yielded eight countries altogether. The two that are missing from our group which we didn't have room for are Argentina and Mexico, although they are less in the way of regional leaders than the others. And the other fact about them is that they're large countries. It's not just that they're growing fast. There are small countries that are growing fast but they have a real weight in the world. And again, these things can change. I'm wondering what you meant by saying it's too early for this.

Right now the economic and demographic trends make it look very much like these countries are growing in importance. One certainly feels when one is there or from the representatives here that these are countries that feel that the future is theirs and by comparison the existing advanced democracies are growing slowly. The United States and Canada and Australia are slightly different in this respect but certainly Europe and Japan, again, when one speaks to people from those countries or visits them, one gets the sense that countries that are tired, that don't feel that the future is theirs, from that point of view I think. And I

think this is part of what motivated me at least in gravitating toward this subject, from the point of view not so much of U.S. policy as the future of democracy, the future health of democracy, its strength in the world, is going to depend to a great extent on the six countries that we brought here. Now, these things can change, just as Japan and Germany in the 1980s looked like they were the future and now they're looking like they're the past, perhaps this will change, too, but I wouldn't bet on it.

MR. DIAMOND: Okay. Go back to the back to Don Emmerson.

MR. EMMERSON: Well, I can't resist since Larry embarrassed me, so I have to say something. Here's what I would like to say. I, too, am a little bit bemused by the notion that we're too early. I won't discuss whether we're primitive, but the question of whether we're early or not is a fascinating one. And I would argue exactly the opposite. I would say we are too late. And what I mean by that is that the whole notion of nudging countries along the democratic road is, if I may put it this way, an upstream idea. Right? It's something that strikes me as rather appropriate in the case of Myanmar but obviously not appropriate in the cases of the countries that we selected to discuss here because they are already moving downstream, otherwise they wouldn't have been chosen for yesterday and today.

And now it seems to me the phase we're in is the quality of

democracy. It's not sort of -- we're not just counting countries. We're looking at those numbers that Freedom House kept racking up for us year after year and saying what's actually going on inside the black box that we label free? And how come it's sort of lapsing down into partly free?

And this addresses Larry's comment. I think the quality of democracy in Southeast Asia, the examples you mentioned are excellent. In Thailand, you know, ripping itself apart in the name of, what, democracy? The Philippines, the most popular sort of noun, if I may say this -- I just came from Honolulu where the Association of Asian Studies had a very large meeting. And the buzzword there was not "democracy." It was "autocracy." It was autocracy, the spread of autocracy. Okay?

Now, Moises, you and I don't know each other and I must say your comments about methodology are well taken. You know, as a social scientist that's critical, you know. And it's easy to bring us back to the clarity we need in terms of definitions and categories and so forth. There's no question about that. But I have a rather different -- not complaint but really, I suppose, horizon to mention. And that is why not have a conference on emerging market autocracies? And see what comparison you can make across them. And I can't resist before I give up the mic, Hu Angang, who I've never heard of until just a few minutes ago, this is a book you can buy next door in the Brookings Institution. It's called *China in 2020*. And the subtitle is -- this is the key -- *A New Type of*

Superpower. Hu Angang is a professor at Tsinghua University in China and he mentions, what I mentioned earlier today, the Beijing consensus. And he said something sort of very similar to the distinction that I tried to make between projection -- actually, it was really Rizal Sukma -- between projection and promotion. And what he says is no, let's not talk about a Beijing consensus but, you know, China is really unique and it's got some really good stuff going for it. So let's talk about the Beijing proposal. I'm quoting from this book. And he says, you know, you don't have to accept it. Right? But we're kind of unique. It sounds sort of like something that might have been said at this meeting, right, except from a Chinese perspective.

And so what I'm trying to suggest is that I think we need to broaden the discussion to include very much the quality of existing democracies. Not simply nudging them downstream. And second, to take a look at what's happening as it were on the other side of town where the only game in town, insofar as there is one to date, is actually autocracy.

MR. DIAMOND: Okay. We'll go to Art Kaufman and then I'll come to you in the next round. Okay?

MR. KAUFMAN: Thanks very much. Art Kaufman, World Movement for Democracy.

There was a question that's been on my mind actually through several questions, but Larry, your comment at the very end of

your remarks I think actually provokes it even more. Two terms have been running through my mind while I've been sitting through these sessions. One is -- and I'm not sure who said it first, it may have even been Aristotle and people in this room would know -- but the term was: politics is the art of the possible. And that went through my mind because there was a lot of discussion about configurations of interests among nations among which democracy is one. The other term or actually a word that was going through my mind is "courage." And I've always had a rather strong impression about the amazing courage displayed by democracy activists around the world day-in and day-out, the asymmetry between that and what I've always considered to be a rather lack of courage on the part of governments.

And by "courage" I don't mean sacrifice. I don't mean countries going to war on behalf of ideals and the sacrifice that they make. What I mean is a president who, at the end of the day, after looking at the configuration of interests, goes before those who elected him or her and knows that they are either going to re-elect him or her or not and says I've looked at all the interests and it may seem to you that this will go against all those other interests but this is what I think we need to do and I'm going to lead the country to do it. That's the kind of courage I'm talking about.

And my question is, is that really a naïve idealism that leads

to exaggerated expectations? Or am I just oblivious to examples of that? Because I'm hard pressed to think of any, at least in contemporary times. So is it the art of the possible? Has it really just come down to the configuration of interests that lead to certain opportunities? So we say, okay, in this configuration of interest, yes, we can actually push for democracy in this situation; in that configuration of interest we can't. Or is courage really an important factor here? And if so, and here I'm talking not so much about day-to-day democracy advancement, promotion, assistance, whatever you want to call it, but in those critical times, in those critical moments. The gentleman from the French embassy asked this question about this distinction. Is courage an important variable? And if so, it would be great to know what the examples would be. Thank you.

MR. DIAMOND: So let's start at this end and work backwards. Moises, why don't we start with you?

MR. NAIM: Why are we too early? Because we are talking about the kind of policies that are very incipient. The notion that countries like Brazil or Indonesia or South Africa will get engaged actively in democracy promotion and will make that their important priority is not here yet. They may have statements to the effect. They may have even people in charge of it but that's not a priority. And the best example to support -- by that I didn't mean to say that this is a fruitless exercise. I agree with you that perhaps it's a very good thing that we are early on

beginning the conversation and push it forward. I am in favor of developing the conversation. And what I said earlier, I did not mean to say, therefore, we shouldn't do it. I actually welcome the notion of starting early, but recognizing that we are talking about a very incipient trend.

And let me then connect that to your point about selection criteria. Selection criteria begins -- your first thing is members of the G-20. Right? Then large and democratic, important democracies. So the G-20 would have not existed were it not for the financial crisis. The G-20 was created in the late '90s. It was dormant. And if you look at the configuration of the G-20 you will see that it reflects the world in 1997, 1998.

Why is Argentina there? Because at the time Argentina had a very close relationship with the United States and Argentina was even included as a member of NATO and there was a special category of membership of NATO and Argentina was included. Why? Because the two governments and the two presidents got along fine. If it were not for that, Argentina did not belong there then and does not belong there now. Then it disappeared. Nobody cared about the G-20. It was one of these zombie international organizations. They exist but they do not have really a life.

And then the financial crisis hit and there was no one in charge. And you couldn't go to the IMF. You couldn't go to the G-8. You

couldn't go -- you need to find something. And they discovered that there was this thing, that the G-20 was there on the shelf. They took it and made it and at the time it did a lot of good because the world had a sense that finally there is someone in charge. Remember, the first meeting of the G-20 was a very important stabilizing factor because it was all of the -- you had the images of all of this Saudi Arabia meeting with the Chinese, meeting with the Americans and the Brits and everybody. There was a sense at the time that there was panic everywhere. There was a sense that finally there is someone in charge. That's the G-20 for you.

Then as the emergency and the panic disappeared, the political will to do things to the G-20 has also declined and dwindled. So today the G-20 is there. They meet and everything else but, you know, they're having a very hard time having the relevance that they had in the past. So I don't know that 10 years from now the G-20 is going to be an important organization. I don't know that the membership of the G-20 will justify a selection criteria. I understand that at some point you need to find a collection of countries and analyze them, but at the same time that we're discussing this there was a meeting of the BRICs in China where Brazil, China, India, and Russia were meeting. And the foreign minister -- if you want to look at these things and I welcome the notion of having a conversation about emerging autocracies, that meeting and the BRICs meeting, there is far more coordination between the BRICs and these four,

you know, these four countries are working together in a much more systematic organized way than others. I don't know that that's a category that you can hold together in the long run because again it's very sensitive to the economic performance. But those countries are trying to develop a joint role in world affairs and the great paradox is that they're following a moniker invented by Goldman Sachs.

MR. DIAMOND: Tom.

MR. CAROTHERS: I'd like to address Bill's question about the anti-American strain and its depth and longevity. I think, Bill, I tend to see it as one part of a much deeper syndrome which is that -- is the power of the sort of post-colonialism legacy and the thinking of people and politicians and policy elites in developing countries. And I think it's been very difficult for Americans to appreciate this for a long time for various reasons and that the anti-American sentiment is an extension of an anti -- there's sort of a feeling about the experience of larger powers mucking about in their societies.

And it's always been striking to me over the last 20 or 30 years traveling to countries when you have conversations, the depth of the anti-colonial or whatever one calls it exactly, mindset as a way of shaping people's thinking is just startling. I mean, I was in Algeria a couple of years ago giving some lectures and doing some meetings and all we talked about was colonialism in a way. That's just, you know, long after

the French had left that was just so much, you know, for them the 20th century, that's in a sense what it was about. And the Cold War in many developing countries was just an overlay on the post-colonial narrative, whereas for the United States it's sort of our idea of the 20th century. At least the second half of the 20th century was that was the framework that shaped people's thinking about the world. That wasn't.

And so I think, you know, when you're describing Lula, what you're seeing is the continuing reverberations of them thinking that at home, you know, we're developing and, you know, actually taking the Washington consensus seriously and pursuing it, but abroad we're still, you know, it's still 1963 in Bandung and the non-align movement. You know, they're still playing politics that to us sound like echoes from something so far in the past. And the question -- one of the questions, you know, for the 21st century international political stage is to what extent does that narrative finally begin to slip away and be replaced? And will the famous multi-polarity that is supposedly emerging be a replacement for that?

And so I think it's not coincidental of the six countries that we looked at -- the four nos and the two maybes -- the two maybes came from Asia. Because where you have the economic dynamism in the developing world you tend to move more quickly out of the post-colonial narrative because you have something to replace it with. And our

Indonesian speaker this morning said Indonesia's concept of itself as a country is changing and we're starting to think less of ourselves as a post-colonial country and more as a successful democracy. And that is almost like that's painful. You know, you have to give up things if you embrace new things because there's pleasure in that old framework, victimization and a sense of assigning a responsibility and so forth.

And so I think it's not a coincidence, like I say, South Korea and Indonesia are in a different place psychologically than South Africa and Brazil and India and so forth. And so I think that's really a deep question. So I think when Moises is saying it's too early, he's saying we're really early in the 21st century because this is probably a century-long evolution away from the last century's framework of psychological organization of power in the world.

MR. KAGAN: Right. And I mean, a Latin American power is going to be the last one to overcome anti-American animosity and have that be the narrative it seems to me because it's not just a recent narrative. That's a 200-year narrative. By the way, it took the United States a long time to get over being the colony of Britain. I mean, they were still anti-British in the 1890s even. So, I mean, these things do take time.

I'm a little bit more optimistic about India. I think India is beginning to define itself. First of all, they've had a strategic reorientation

which helps and they also are beginning to define themselves more as a great power democracy. And they felt -- I don't know. When I was last in India they were a little bit embarrassed about their position on Myanmar. That doesn't mean they're going to do the right thing but embarrassment -- as I say, for America embarrassment is a big part of the game, you know. If you're embarrassed, that's good. That's progress. I don't know what the psychiatrist would say to you.

But overall, you know, I guess I'm fairly pessimistic that any -- because of the reason I said, that America has this compulsion. I don't think many other countries -- if any other countries are going to have this compulsion because of the unique circumstance of the United States. And I mean, one test that you can ask yourself as a hypothetical, if we really were in the post-American world, if the United States really were declining and you had the mix of powers that you have now, would you have a large democracy promotion activity going on in the world? I really tend to doubt it. Most countries don't have that impulse. Everybody is selfish. Everybody generally looks out for what's good for them at that immediate moment.

Even traveling around Europe, the E.U. has got big tests of its democracy promotion tendencies and abilities right on its borders right now. It's got Belarus. It's got Ukraine. It has Russia. And you know, I don't see a tremendous coherence and force behind the E.U.'s efforts.

They have engaged in some sanctioning of Belarus. The notion of sanctioning Russia is almost inconceivable. They've kind of been slightly involved in Ukraine. And this is this great organization which is all about democracy. You can't be, you know, the E.U., its definition in a way is democracy and yet look at the difficult time when the United States itself is sort of marginally involved.

So I really -- I'm unfortunately of the view that the United States is in a pretty unique position. And again, I think it happens to be a good position but it doesn't have -- it just is the nature of the beast and I'm not sure who else would be like that.

MR. DIAMOND: Okay. I have on my list Peggy Hicks, Soli Ozel, Ted Piccone, and then you've had your hand up. Yeah. Okay. Go ahead.

MS. HICKS: Thanks. The discussion took me back eight years to when I lived in Washington and we used to have lots of debates about democracy and human rights and like what the relationship between the two was. And I was hopeful that that was a product of the Bush administration focus on democracy in a particular context and that by today we're to a place where human rights had a more central stage. I didn't see that in the discussion here.

And Tom, your point about what is, you know, what does the U.S. have? What is the resonance that we have in these places? I think

part of it is the universality of human rights. And I do think that you all are missing a beat if you don't bring human rights into your conversations about democracy more substantially than it has been in this conversation. I mean, if you look at the post-colonial legacy that you just talked about, we have to remind ourselves that that's something that's still being lived by people in Mubarak's Egypt, who saw the tear gas canisters that had "Made in the USA" on them and, you know, the continuing budget bill has another 1.3 million in military assistance with no, you know, further conditions yet we don't know where Egypt is going. So, you know, those things are continuing to be lived.

But at the same time I'd say that the strongest voices in favor of the types of engagement that we've talked about are, you know, Egyptian activists talking to, you know, these countries. So it's the people on the ground who are now able to say to countries that it is in your interest to look to what the majority of the population wants and needs and, you know, for anybody who things that those are imposed values, you know, you do need to look to a country like Chile or someplace where, you know, people that have suffered under an oppressive autocratic regime that engaged in routine torture are not going to, you know, see those issues as being relevant and are not going to ultimately support those that help that oppression in the way that we'd like. So that's where the interest calculation comes in.

MR. DIAMOND: Very good. Soli.

MR. OZEL: I don't know why we're either late or early for anything. Or the primitivism of the thought. We're talking about states. States do what they do. I mean, if the West was a democracy promoter, the foreign minister of France was proposing to send police to Tunisia when the Tunisian population was up in arms trying to finally get rid of the post-colonial order. Therefore, I mean, as you said at the beginning, hypocrisy, double standards and all that is part and parcel of how states relate to one another. And these states are basically seeking a spot for themselves in a redistribution of power in the world order and they will do what states do under those circumstances. If they need to get rich in order to gain power, they will engage in Venezuela to get their companies rich. Therefore, their capacities are going to be increasing. This is what everybody else had done. Was Libya a democracy? Can Libya ever be a democracy? No. Not in my lifetime anyway, I suppose.

Therefore, what I think these countries do is exactly what other countries have done before. The difference maybe is that their reference point today -- and Mr. Kagan made that distinction in his latest book about capitalist democracies versus capitalist authoritarian systems, and their reference points just happen to be democracy, whether or not they are going to be abiding by it. That's number one.

Number two, I do agree with you that maybe we ought to

separate democracy from human rights. I personally see democracy regressing on certain aspects in almost every country that I know. Is Italy really a democracy today? We talked about Thailand. When is Thailand a democracy? When the middle classes are in power it's a democracy; when the popular classes are in power it's not. Where do the middle classes stand on any given occasion in any given country? If their rights and privileges are being challenged, they're going to turn against popular classes. On the other hand, what we're seeing in the Arab world today is popular classes want dignity. That's the key word now. That means they want human rights. They want certain liberal standards to apply whether or not they are democratic in the way you and I may understand it in an Anglo-Saxon or any other way.

So I think the issue is far more complicated than we have made it out to be perhaps. States do what they must. Societies demand what they can in a world where everything is playing out in your living room. And, therefore, this is a debate that engages not just the rising powers in my judgment but it also engages established powers who unless they make room for the rising powers and democratize international order are going to cause another type of accident and I don't know what the consequences of that are going to be.

MR. DIAMOND: Okay. Thank you for that passionate and challenging intervention. Ted.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you. Building up on some of these same points and comment in particular on Moises points about, you know, why these countries. I mean, I think the point that they're a fast growing group misses a key element that they are also democracies. That they were able to achieve those levels of growth while at the same time they were democratizing and accomplishing real progress in terms of, you know, building up new institutions and checks and balances and all those things. That's a remarkable achievement that stands in the face of other models that are out there, the authoritarian models that we see that are also doing very well on one side of the ledger but not on the other. And I think the model example that some of these states present is really powerful and one of the reasons that at least I, you know, they resonated with me.

The hypocrisy element, all of you raised that. It implies that there is a moral element to foreign policy. Yeah, there are always tradeoffs and you're never going to have a perfect principal policy. But at least there's some morality involved and I think that does certainly represent a sense of American history and a sense of values. But I really don't think it's just unique to America. I mean, I think if you -- there's no way to explain the role of so many other countries around the world that have contributed something even minor to a democracy agenda that, you know, don't have our history yet they're very much at the table.

Which leads me to my third point which is, in 2002, Bobby Herman -- I don't know if he's still here -- and I did a 10-year survey looking at the trend of where democracy fits into foreign policy of these countries, both developed and developing democracies. And it was actually pretty encouraging. What we found was that as countries democratized internally, they also began to reflect democratic and human rights values in their foreign policy. Even if it's just rhetorically. And if you compare that to even the recent past of the '60s, '70s, and '80s, that was really a change. And I think it's that trend that we're trying to understand better, see where it's going, what's on the horizon. It is early, I think, because these are young democracies. I think this is a long story to unfold but I think it's an appropriate question to ask.

MR. DIAMOND: Okay.

MS. CURRIE: Kelley Currie from the Project 2049 Institute.

For most of the past year or last year I was doing research that was comparing, among other things, India, South Korea, and Indonesia and their efforts -- their involvement in promotion of democracy and human rights in the region. So I just wanted to add a couple data points to maybe some of the things you heard.

One of the things that struck me in my research was the degree to which Indonesia, in particular of these three countries, does have an almost American or Eastern European attitude about its

democracy, its democratic identity and its democracy promotion activities. Now, they're not there yet in terms of the mechanics of it and they don't have an aid -- they're not economically able to move forward with the aid packages that you can link it up to which I think was a very important and very insightful thing that Tom Carothers brought out. But the aspiration is certainly there and I think that was very clear in Rizal Sukma's presentation. But it's there.

And the other thing that struck me was that there is still a post-colonial hangover with South Korea and Indonesia; it's just directed toward Japan. It's not directed towards us and that does affect regional cooperation in Asia on these issues. So those are just a couple of points that I thought you might want to consider as you think about these issues.

MR. DIAMOND: Good. Well, I think we're about ready to close with the final round of observations. Maybe we'll go in reverse direction this time. And so you should not only answer the questions, whatever ones of them that you wish that have been asked in this round but say anything else you want to say in conclusion. And I apologize profusely that I'm not going to be here to hear it. I have to go catch a plane but I hand the chair, the gavel, the fictional gavel over to my esteemed and long-time colleague, Marc Plattner.

MR. PLATTNER: I call this meeting to order. Who would like to begin his final remarks? Bob?

MR. KAGAN: Well, I'll just -- I'll be very brief. I mean, you could say the whole -- we're all in a young period. I mean, this entire largely democratic world is a very young phenomenon. The United States is in a learning process when it comes to -- and by the way, we're having stateological conversation like, you know, we're all heading toward UN, but even the United States, as opposed to being in a cycle which is another question, but even the United States has gone through an evolution. Now, we always sometimes seem to have to relearn the same lesson over and over and over again but I think the United States is still in the process of deciding how it wants to handle these kinds of issues. And so it's hardly surprising that these somewhat democracies who are now coming on the world stage are still finding their way.

But I guess I remain to be persuaded that while it's true there are other countries engaged in this activity, I just, again, I try to picture a world in which the United States is, you know, one among many or even has let's say disappeared. You know, I don't know what the state of democracy in the world would be just because it's the nature of the international system that, you know, when a very, very powerful nation, in some cases the most powerful nation, is of a certain kind of regime type, it's not surprising to see that regime type replicating. And so, but that doesn't really address the motivation of these countries but I guess I'm a little bit on the skeptical side.

MR. PLATTNER: Tom.

MR. CAROTHERS: Let me just address, Peggy, the comment you made and Soli, also about democracy and human rights.

I agree. I think there's a tendency of the democracy community to say democracy and human rights but then really to focus on democracy assuming that, you know, it's really all one agenda in the view of the democracy community. And it's true that for many developing countries the human rights agenda or human rights sort of discourse at the multilateral level is something they're more familiar with and more comfortable with in many ways. Yet, I think the democracy community tends to be a little bit wary of it because there's also been a lot of corruption of the multilateral human rights process at the U.N. and other places. So they'll sort of say if that's what we mean is sitting through more Human Rights Council meetings being denounced by Libya for our human rights practices, we don't want to do that. Or we don't want to encourage countries to do a lot more of that. That's not what we're talking about. We're talking about something different.

And so the democracy community tends to discount what they see as that side of multilateral engagement on human rights issues. But it certainly is the case that it's much easier to find consensus or sort of entry points as people are talking about for human rights norms and human rights talk than it is if you just go say are you promoting democracy

to a foreign ministry of a developing country. Whereas if you say are you concerned about human rights on the international stage, of course they're concerned. There's a whole, you know, they would immediately say, oh, no, we're deeply engaged in that.

And so I agree with you. But bringing it together is hard. You know, you talk about eight years ago people were talking about if you come back eight years from now, it's been an uneasy fit for a long time. But one of the challenges is the democracy community gets interested in all this as how to blend the two here a little bit more artfully and make sure it doesn't take second place. That's my last remark.

MR. NAIM: I like and agree with the notion of linking human rights from protection and promotion from democracy. My only question is that we have seen many instances where you push too much on human rights and it's very easy to then include the democracy promotion. So the linking is maybe analytically desirable in terms of practices but it's hard to imagine that you do a lot of human rights protection and you don't bump into the democratic -- the larger issue, the surrounding violations of human rights. It's very difficult to just completely link it and it takes you there.

On Soli's point, it's an old debate, the notion that states do what they do. And that means that they will just blindly pursue economic interest and more power. That's a very old debate. We have here some of the leading exponents and protagonists of that debate. I think, yes,

that's true but we are increasingly witnessing situations in which countries include other the factors beyond power and beyond economic interests in their behavior. And that, it may be, Soli, that the 21st century -- and this is me becoming too idealistic perhaps, who knows? Maybe the 21st century will be a century where blind pursuit of power and economic interests will be more constrained by the pursuit of more universal values.

SPEAKER: But my point was not to deny what you just said. My point was that big countries, established democracies have done it. None of the others are doing it. So there is no -- we don't need other terms to explain what they're doing. And it is true that the reference to a set of values does put constraint on them at least from their societies because societies are more vocal and more participative.

MR. NAIM: Except that I have a hard time always bringing historical experiences. I am sure that what happened in the United States in the 1890s has some relevance but I also believe that the 21st century has conditional circumstances and realities that are not just easily transportable. So the historic experience is important but we are leaving in conditions and circumstances that are quite unique in a variety of ways. But that's a long story and a long debate.

And then I liked Ted's point about the fact that these are not just democracies but democracies that have been economically successful. And that's a very important criteria to include in the

conversation. So I like that. My problem continues to be what happens if they crash. You know, emerging markets are like teenagers. They are prone to accidents. They, you know, they break a hand, they fall, they, you know, get trashed. So, you know, these countries may have an accident. It's very likely. And then they will not be successful. They will not be economically successful. And if that happens both democracy at home and their appetite to go outside and promote it is going to dwindle.

MR. PLATTNER: Let me thank you all on this panel and the previous panelists as well, especially those speakers who traveled here all the way from the faraway countries that were the subject of this meeting. And thanks to all of you in the audience who stayed through this very beautiful day outside. I also want to give a special thanks to Ted Piccone and Brookings Institution for helping us to organize this conference and for hosting it in such a gracious way here. And finally I especially want to thank Melissa Aten at the National Endowment for Democracy and Emily Alinikoff at Brookings who did just a marvelous job of taking care of all the details that made this meeting possible. So let me ask for a round of applause for them and thank you all for coming.

(Applause)

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