THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

DEFENSE CHALLENGES AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES

THE 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE INITIATIVE'S SECOND ANNUAL MILITARY AND
FEDERAL FELLOW RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM

Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, March 16, 2011

PARTICIPANTS:

Welcome:

> PETER SINGER
> Senior Fellow and Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative
> The Brookings Institution

> PANEL 1: REGIONAL INSECURITY AND EMERGING GOVERNANCE:

Moderator:

> TED PICCONE
> Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy
> The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

> COLONEL TIMOTHY McKERNAN (USA)
> Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow
> "The Future of Iraq: The Bumpy Road on the Highway of Peace and Prosperity"

> LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRISTOPHER NALER (USMC)
> Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institution
> "Democracy's Guardians: The Role of the Military in Emerging Democracies"

> CAPTAIN LAWRENCE VASQUEZ (USN)
> Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institution
> "The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan"

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SINGER: Hello, I'm Peter Singer, the director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative here at Brookings. And on behalf of Brookings and 21 CDI, it is an honor and a delight to welcome you to the 2011 Military and Federal Fellow Research Symposium.

Today we're entering a period in national security that very strategic documents ranging from the QDR to the British Security Strategy have entitled an "age of uncertainty." And everything from the threats that we face to the resources that we might have to deal with them, we're often left grasping for some sort of guidance, something fixed to cling to, something to help us make sense out of it all. And it's times like these that policy and policymakers need most of all that all important but frequently misunderstood and often abused thing that we call research.

The official definition of research is the search for knowledge. It's the systematic investigation with an open mind to establish novel facts using a scientific method. That's the official definition of it. But noted strategic thinker, J.R.R. Tolkien of *Lord of the Rings* fame may have put it a little bit better. He said, "There's nothing like looking if you want to find something. You certainly usually find something if you look, but it is not always quite the something that you were after."

Today we're going to see the fruits of that kind of searching for something. Like a number of think tanks, Brookings has the honor of hosting mid-career military officers and leaders from other federal government agencies who spent time conducting independent research on issues faced by the defense and national security community.

Now, important to note for the media that's gathered joining us here today is that this research and the policy recommendations and the statements that these

folks are going to make today are not about espousing official policy; rather, this is a

research symposium intended to provide greater awareness of the valuable research

work that these leaders are producing on cutting edge issues. In particular on topics and

often with research methodologies that the bureaucracy in the Pentagon has found a

difficult time to deal with.

And that's why the subject of today's symposium, Defense Challenges

and Future Opportunities, is so apt. The symposium is going to feature panels on

everything from cyber warfare to maritime security to evolving alliances, regional

insecurity, emerging democracies. And what's striking is that every one of these topics

you would find if you opened up today's newspaper, but all of the fellows who will be

presenting on them set out on their journey to find the truth, to find the novel facts about

these issues many months ago. And that again points to the value of independent

research that's in a sense bottom up rather than top down.

And so in essence what we're about to enjoy today is an event organized

by military officers designed to highlight some of the best research today being

conducted by military officers. And so it's been an honor for us here at Brookings not

only to host the Federal Fellows Program, but also to put together this symposium. And

we very much appreciate all of you joining us here today.

And with that I'd like to invite our first panelists to join us up here on

stage.

MR. PICCONE: Good morning, everyone. My name is Ted Piccone.

I'm a senior fellow and deputy director for Foreign Policy here at Brookings. And I'm

honored to be part of this effort. I think in my short time here at Brookings I've been

really impressed, not only with Peter Singer's leadership and Michael Hanlon's of the 21st

century Defense Initiative, but to see the dedication that our federal executive fellows

have given to their research year and I've learned a lot along the way and I think you will

today as well.

The topic of our first panel is Regional Insecurity and Emerging

Governance. And in talking to the group in preparation for this morning, there's kind of a

connecting thread among these three presentations that you might note. They all have to

really do with the relationship between civilian and military sectors of governance. And in

different ways. But that's really at the core of it. And I will, as I introduce our speakers,

talk a little bit more about that.

We're going to start with Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Naler from the

Marine Corps. You have the bios in our packet. As you'll see, Chris has served the

Corps for over 25 years in a range of operations, conventional and special operations

units. He has served in Afghanistan and Helmand province. Also, in the Western Pacific,

Japan, Korea, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. The topic of his work is "Democracy's

Guardians: The Role of the Military in Emerging Democracies." And you can't think of a

more relevant issue right now as we see the transitions underway in the Middle East and

in other parts of the world. So we'll hear more about that as we go through the

presentation.

Our second speaker will be Captain Lawrence Vasquez from the U.S.

Navy. He is a naval aviator, a Seahawk pilot, and has deployed on various cruisers,

destroyers, and frigates, again, mostly in the Western Pacific. Also, counterdrug

operations in Central and South America. For today's presentation it is particularly

relevant that he was a commanding officer for a provincial reconstruction team in Farah,

Afghanistan. So he'll be speaking to that issue and kind of lessons learned about how

the civilian component of governance, particularly of the U.S. assistance world needs to

step up in how it tries to transition these states to more functional societies.

Our third speaker will be Colonel Timothy McKernan, who is proudly wearing his Irish heritage today, a day early. He is the secretary of defense corporate fellow. And he has been working in various deployments overseas, particularly Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait, as well as Korean and Honduras. And Timothy will talk specifically about the role of the private sector, another key factor in the way we do deployments these days, and particularly transitioning to civilian-led operations as we try to stabilize various situations but particularly in this case in Iraq.

So those are my short introduction words. And we're going to start at the far end and work this way. Chris.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NALER: Thank you very much, Ted. Thank you also for attending today. And as we start, for what it's worth, a slight movement of levity, this is our version of March Madness. So I'm going to give my support to the men and women basketball teams of UNC Chapel Hill. Go Tarheels. Good to go, Heather.

But thank you, Ted. And we do appreciate the opportunity to share it with you today. Just some highlights of our projects and research.

The scope and title of my research portrays what I believe, and current events in North Africa and the Middle East demonstrate, is the critical role of national military forces, so the success or failure of a nation attempting to transition from oppressive and dysfunctional governments towards democratic reform.

My interest in emerging democracies began on February 1, 2010, while flying from Afghanistan to Bahrain accompanying a senior Bahrainian officer who had concluded a three-day visit reviewing the progress of his unit's inaugural combat deployment to Afghanistan. As we discussed the current challenges associated with Bahrain's democratic aspirations. This led to my initial interest and further investigation on Bahrain's democratic reforms that were initiated by Hamad in 2001. However, in the

course of my research on Bahrain, I eventually expanded my aperture after reviewing

case study, theory development, and selected one country from each region or continent

that initiated or reinitiated democratization third wave of 1974 to 1990.

Additionally, I refrain from considering G-20 countries due to their size

and global attention, and limited my global attention to all but one of the 58 nations that

Collier refers to as his bottom billion. The selected countries -- Chile, Thailand, Georgia,

Nigeria, and Bahrain -- were examined through four -- examined through the lenses of

lenses of four interrelated questions. First, what are the roles, behaviors, and

characteristics of the military through the phases of democratic transition?

Second, what challenges evolved in the transition or formation of civilian

military-relationships. What reengineering of the military occurred during the

democratization process? And last, how did the U.S. Department of State, Department of

Defense, influence the previous questions through foreign aid and mill to mill

engagement programs.

By examining the transitions through these lenses, my goal is to identify

exportable trends and patterns for consideration and adoption by appointed or elected

officials serving in national legislative and ministerial positions within post-conflict or post-

revolutionary countries pursuing democratic transition. I examined a spectrum of

behaviors and characteristics of the military and their relationship to the National

Governing Institute that design national security and military strategy, allocate resources,

and issue orders and guidance for the employment or deployment of their military forces.

I want to briefly offer a few characteristics and measurements that I used

to examine the military's contribution to each country's democratic reform. The first,

whether the military was internally focused, externally focused, or a combination of the

two. Next, how professional the force was. And this does everything from recruiting,

educational infrastructure, overall infrastructure to support and sustain the force.

The next and probably one of the more interesting areas of each of the countries is the existence and design of national security strategy or national military strategy normally in the form of a white paper or some other strategic-level document. Also, what is the existence or the relationship in the sieve mill relationship? Does it exist? Is it a hybrid? Does the sieve mill relationship -- is it pure civilian or a hybrid with uniformed not only active duty but also retired military within the ranks? And last, is the composition of the ranks of the military? Were these indigenous forces recruited from the country? Or did you have forces recruited from abroad brought in to assist with the overall defense, whether that be security forces or the military?

I attempted to review all military echelons to determine what layers within the ranks exerted the most influence on government transition. Analysis of the military's internal and external behaviors were dependent on national command and control and their respective service leadership in their associated ethos. Not surprisingly, the most influential leaders or misguided culprits were the military officer corps.

The following are a few examples of my observations and potential trends as I complete my research. First, which I think is a very good example, Georgia's development of national military strategy and national security strategy through a bilaterally collaboration with the Netherlands Ministry of Defense provided a framework to design and employ the military in accordance with national priorities. This type of national policy development is one of the more critical themes illustrated in my research. It is imperative that policies developed and published and addresses five critical audiences.

First, the elected or appointed national leadership. Second, the military services and their officer corp. Third, neighboring allies and antagonists. Fourth,

international audiences desiring partnership or potential economic investment. And last,

national population which deserve insight and transparency on the role of their military.

Nigeria. Nigeria has demonstrated, particularly since the Fourth

Republic 1999 to present, their ability to deploy and support regional crisis in Sierra

Leone, Liberia, and Sudan demonstrates their regional influence and professional

development of this force to answer intercontinental challenges as a premier military

force on the African continent.

Thailand. Thailand's 78-year experience through 18 coups is the result

of entrenched active and retired military throughout the government institutions.

Improved checks and balances must prevail in order to achieve consistent and

meaningful democratic reform. Thailand's 83-year-old king is the world's longest serving

monarch and maintains his influence on the prime minister, the privy council, and

parliament. The military's increased power since the 2006 coup is an attempt to position

themselves for the eventual transition of the throne.

Number four, Bahrain. For those of you who haven't heard of this

country, Bahrain's military, like many Arab monarchies, is primarily internally focused on

preservation of the monarchy and less concerned with exerting influence beyond their

borders and territorial waters. Their participation in Coalition Task Force 1-5-2 or 152 is a

regional international effort to gain GCC and international credibility as a regional

maritime power. However, stalled democratic momentum in 2003 to 2006 has resulted in

a political U-turn effective 16 February 2011 as the military dealt a heavy-handed

response at the Pearl Roundabout. The recent introduction of Saudi Forces and the

king's declaration of a state of emergency will once again place the military on center

stage as this monarchy struggles to meet compromises with the opposition.

And finally, a little closer to home, and just for what it's worth,

simultaneous to this presentation on this particular topic, this testimony is also being

received right now on the role of foreign assistance on the Hill with regards to

accountability of our resources. And this goes really to the heart of one of my first

recommendations from a policy perspective. Yes, I know we're in belt-tightening times

and budgets are challenging, but we must sustain our foreign assistance. And in

particular in the foreign assistance I would argue that the role of IMET is critical within

overall foreign assistance.

I have been fortunate enough to train and serve with 25 different nations

at different schools throughout my 25-year career and I am convinced throwing money at

a problem is not the answer. It is about relationships. It's about the relationships I have

with the students. I had the opportunity to teach not only from Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi

Arabia. The opportunity to serve with and teach personnel, the first officer from Slovenia,

from Senegal. These are the relationships that matter and I think we have seen this play

out over the last two months in particular when we see not only Admiral Mullen and

others as they move abroad. They're going to see their friends and their peers and their

colleagues. Next, we must develop a comprehensive grand strategy that empowers all

applicable agencies with promoting democratic principles. We cannot be caught

flatfooted.

As I conclude my research and manuscript in the following weeks, I

expect to find additional similarities within the case studies and quantitative proof of the

value of foreign aid and military engagement return on investment. As reported last week

in the *Miami Herald*, the former Chilean minister visited Egypt and Georgian officials were

contacted by Egypt's interim leaders to collaborate on the next step in Cairo's democratic

transition strategy. The fourth wave of democracy is unfolding in front of us and the

results of this popular uprising generated by netizens through virtual assembly and

physical assembly of citizens will require patience and mentorship from consolidated

democracies as demonstrated by the former Chilean officials. I hope the results of my

research provide countries like Iraq and Afghanistan tangible tools to form and sustain

their government and posture their military to support national efforts to achieve

democratic reforms and their role as democracy's guardians. Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you very much, Colonel Naler. As you can see

from his topic it was broad ranging, comparative, and covers a lot of important issues.

And I'm sure we'll get more to it in the discussion.

Larry.

CAPTAIN VASQUEZ: Thanks. And I also want to thank Brookings for

obviously hosting the fellows and helping to put this together. It's been a great year and

the institution has been very welcoming. So thank you.

Also, I'm going to give a shout out to the Syracuse Orangemen for the

NCAA tournament. We'll see you in the East.

As Ted mentioned and gave a little bit of our biographies, you're probably

wondering what is a Navy commander doing on the ground in Afghanistan as a

commander of a provincial reconstruction team. And I have to tell you I wondered that

several times during my tour myself. If you had asked me as a young junior officer if I

ever thought I would get the opportunity to command on the ground I would have bet

significant amounts of money that that would never happen. But there I was last summer

in command of a reconstruction team. And it just goes to highlight what was true then

and what is true now, that the Navy has more personnel in the central command area of

operations on the ground than we have at sea. A lot of people don't know that but we

have over 13,000 folks on the ground in the CENTCOM area right now.

We had over 1,200 folks during my rotation. Of 12 PRTs, 6 were led by

Navy, 6 were led by Air Force personnel. A PRT structure, just to briefly cover, is about

80 to 110 personnel depending on the PRT. Half of those are our security force which

enabled us to go and operate in the province. Mostly manned by Army National Guard

units. The other half was comprised Navy and Air Force support personnel. Part of that

was medical teams, Army civil affairs teams, and least and for all I have three active duty

Army personnel that helped comprise my staff and just a handful of civilian personnel

representing USAID, Department of State, and U.S. Department of Agriculture. But of

the entire staff of 80 to 110, less than 20 percent was what I would consider my key

implementers. The balance was our enablers, our security force that enable us to move

within the province.

So for me in Farah, the fourth largest province in Afghanistan, it covers

about 18,000 square miles, one and a half times the size of Maryland and just had just

short of a million people, you know, 110 people doesn't go a long way. So I was very

happy to see some additional troops show up during the surge of last summer which I'll

talk about briefly.

Timeframe. We started training in February. February through June of

2009 and we arrived in-country in July of 2009 for a nine-month rotation. And we left in

March of 2010. We turned over -- actually, one year ago today I was in Kandahar doing

some of my out processing and it's been actually one year and three days since my

transfer of authority in Farah province.

So the focus of my research has been to give a view from the field of all

of the PRT commanders during my rotation because for all the services, the Navy and

the Air Force at least, when we redeploy, when we come back we have a series of

lessons learned that we compile. But for the Navy that lessons learned has not even

been released yet. Some commanders were not captured. I'm uncertain as to the Air

Force process but I think it's about the same. And many times some of the information

there is classified so it will never make it out into the public domain. And even what is in

the public domain, well, some of it is never even published. So I thought it was very, very

important to capture our entire experience, what was good, what was bad, and highlight

really obviously that Afghanistan is totally different in some areas. What I saw in Farah in

a semi-permissive environment was very different from what some of my counterparts

encountered in the east or even in the south.

So from 2002 when PRTs were established, unfortunately little has

changed in the structure and some of the focus of PRTs. And I think going forward we

need to tailor that to the environment in which the PRTs are operating the provinces and

tailor it to the conditions on the ground. All of us were honored to have led some of the

best men and women in our nation under very challenging circumstances and we are

making progress. Secretary Gates I think said it best recently when he was in theatre

and I'll just read you a short quote: It's encouraging on the ground, he said. It's been

encouraging watching it from Washington, but as you've heard me say before, I think the

closer you are to this fight the better it looks.

So I'll leave you with three points here that I think highlight some of the

challenges and as I move towards policy, recommendations in my paper. All of the

commanders were convinced that our teams made a positive impact on the province and

the lives of the Afghan people. We all partnered with our local government to tackle their

priorities. Not our priorities but their priorities. In Farah it was roads, water, and

electricity. And 90 percent of our projects were focused in these areas.

You may have seen news reports where the PRTs are kind of doing their

own thing and not really collaborating with their provincial governments. I didn't see that

and a lot of my peers said that whether there was effective governance we did partner

with them. We did look at the Afghan National Development Strategy. We made it a

point to involve them so that they set the priorities, which I think is very, very important

instead of us just going in there and saying I think you need schools or I think you need

health clinics. But they set the priorities which I think is very, very important.

On metrics, we heard a lot about metrics before we arrived in theater and

even while we were in theater. It's very important to look at our mission statement. And

our mission statement basically said our job was to assist the Afghan government in

extending its authority in order to facilitate security governance, reconstruction and

development. That was our mission statements and in many cases that was most of the

guidance that we received. And I would submit to you that if I took 12 people in this

audience and I told you -- put you through 4 months of training and gave you that mission

statement, the results after 9 months would be very, very different in each province

because of conditions on the ground.

And I think we need, and what my fellow commanders and I think we

need is a focus area in each province so that we have an ability to assess from a

performance standpoint instead of just a reporting standpoint. We reported on metrics

every week, sometimes every day. But the metrics tell you what you're doing but not

what you're striving for. Governance, as we know, is very hard in a combat environment.

So what do you focus on first? I would have very much liked to have had a focus area

supported by my regional commander who was an Italian one-star that said, Larry, I want

you to focus on rule of law. Within the next 12 months, these are the assets that you're

going to have and I want a weekly report on what you need and I'll get it for you. What

we had was go out and do governance or reconstruction development, work within the

rules, and we'll meet every three months and assess where we are. Very, very tough to

do and I think we needed a focus of effort within each province. It may not be rule of law

in Ghazi because maybe it wasn't as permissive. Maybe it didn't have -- there were

some underlying stability issues that didn't allow you to do that. But I think we need to

focus within each of our provinces on a line of effort moving forward.

Secondly, partnering and mentoring works. When I arrived in Farah, we

had 45 personnel of an embedded training team and their job was to help establish or

help the police and the army develop in Farah province. I mean, 45 people just could not

get the job done. It just wasn't going to happen. So they did weekly patrols but capacity

building was very, very challenged. In September, late August, we had over 800

personnel from 82nd Airborne show up and they got it right. They lived with and patrolled

with the police and the army, the Afghan National Army. And no surprise to us, security

got better. It improved. The people saw it and we saw it.

In September or October there was an operation in the Bala Baluk

district, in Shewan province, led by special forces with Afghan special forces and we

retook Shewan village which had been problematic and was hurting our efforts in the

Ring Road. Within a week of that successful operation I was with the governor when

reports came in that fuel prices had gone down by 50 percent just in town. The markets

were thriving where they weren't thriving before. So security obviously has helped and is

a key factor going forward.

But partnering and mentoring is not happening at that level in our civilian

personnel. The surge -- civilian surge that you may have heard about resulted in, at least

for me in Farah, just getting one additional USAID person. So I had three civilians on the

ground and now I had four. In a *Washington Post* article just last week it mentioned that

the civilian surge happened to be about 1,100 U.S. personnel but two-thirds of those are

in Kabul. I will tell you that I need a lot more. The PRTs need a lot more to be successful

out in the province. I would have loved instead of 4 to have 40 working on everything

from rule of law to governance to education. There is no shortage of need on the ground in the district and the provinces.

And lastly, NGO participation and collaboration. Again, shortly after arriving I was met by a team from UNAMA who told me that they thought Farah was unstable, that it was too kinetic for them to operate. That was not what we saw on the ground. We, in some areas it was very dangerous but in a large majority of the province we enjoyed freedom of movement and we were willing to partner with whatever NGOs would feel free to operate in that area. Unfortunately, we only had a handful and I think that hindered our efforts.

So we were doing some of the reconstruction and development that we would have liked to have seen NGOs participate in. USAID was obviously very, very active and with the help of the USAID person attached to the PRT I think we did some very great things but I would just ask that the NGOs really look forward -- take a much more forward-looking outlook and work with PRTs. And I was told quite frankly that some NGOs didn't even want to talk to PRTs, didn't want to have anything to do with us. And I think in that environment it is very, very hard to collaborate and do great work in Afghanistan. And the people need us to show up and help them.

So going forward in 2011 is a very critical year. And even looking at 2014. PRTs are a key effort if we are to succeed in Afghanistan and I believe require a much needed review if they are to remain a central part of our COIN strategy. I look forward to your questions.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you very much, Captain Vasquez. I think he gave a lot for us to chew on. It always helps to get real boots on the ground reality check on these issues.

Colonel McKernan.

COLONEL McKERNAN: Thanks for the introduction, Ted. And to my Army buddies out here I'm going to apologize if I'm not nearly as smart or well spoken and knowing that there's a Marine up there that kind of really hurts me. (Laughter)

On a serious note, though, let me start out by offering my condolences to the Japanese people as they deal with this great tragedy. However, seeing them and knowing many of them, I know that they'll emerge from this a much stronger nation.

We're only about three or four days short of it being the eight year anniversary of our invasion of Iraq. Since then, virtually all U.S. Government agencies, and particularly U.S. Armed Forces, have learned many hard lessons from some of the great missteps we made in Iraq. But gone are the day where our military sees interaction with the media, with Department of State, with other U.S. agencies and NGOs as verboten. We've needed to erase that legacy and today you see much more areas where our goals are nested with each other in support and particularly set out in the national security strategy.

Today, we embrace the state U.S. agencies as true equals in our quest for peace in Iraq and elsewhere. However, time and again the U.S. Government is where interagency cooperation starts and unfortunately ends. I'm talking about three key components of the national security strategy, that being defense, diplomacy, and the economic piece. And I want to draw your attention by reading a somewhat long paragraph from the national security strategy which I think is very important. It's entitled "The American People in the Private Sector."

"The ideas, values, energy, creativity, and resilience of our citizens are America's greatest resource. We will support the development of prepared, vigilant, and engaged communities and underscore that our citizens are the heart of a resilient country and we must tap the ingenuity outside government through strategic partnerships with the

private sector, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and community-based

organizations. Such partnerships are critical to U.S. success at home and abroad and

we will support them through enhanced opportunities for engagement, coordination,

transparency, and information sharing."

And so as you see, our national security strategy indeed draws attention

to the need for us to cooperate. And I come personally from the old school where I think

that the only way a country can indeed prosper and be stable and safe is through a

strong economy and the only way they can get that is through a strong investment from

the private sector. And that means that in order for the private sector to come into a

country the benefits -- and yes, that means profits -- must outweigh the risks. And in

order for that to outweigh the risks, this country has to be a safe and stable place.

And when I look at Iraq, sometimes I kind of see them in a Catch-22

situation. On one hand the people want safety and security. They want a better way of

life. But the security situation doesn't support it. Conversely, the private sector isn't

going to be able to come in without that. So how do we get that strong and stable

security? And I think that as we look back and we find the rub here is that there are a lot

of us out there, particularly folks in the military that have done multiple tours not only to

Iraq but throughout the Middle East where we've gained the insight on importance of

relationship building with our partners.

I'll be the first to admit that the situation, you know, as we took Baghdad

and liberated the Iraqi Freedom, the days of heady happiness by the Iraqi people for

being free, being quickly replaced by the insurgency and then the tide turning during the

surge, having been there firsthand to see that I kind of get struck with a simple statement

that was given to me by one of my Iraqi friends. And they said that what they really

wanted was simple things. They wanted just to be able to take their kids out for ice

cream without having to worry about being robbed, kidnapped, without having to go

through 15 checkpoints just to get there. So some of those things that we take for

granted, the Iraqis and the Iraqi government are still struggling with. However, clearly

they're doing a lot better and the stage is really set for our withdrawal at the end of this

year.

So in Iraq, the short- to mid-term solution to the semblance of economic

security can clearly only be done through a massive influx of funding from the private

sector, mainly throughout the infrastructure which, as we all know, has been decimated

by years of war followed by years of sanction and just deprivation that the Iraqi people

have lived through. And clearly, the only way they're going to have that economic boon

is through gaining additional revenues. And we all know that that's going to be through

revitalization of their energy, their oil industry.

So as we look at Iraq and we recognize that there is this huge need of

private sector investment, we here in the government sector, time and again we fail to

embrace the importance of this as I stated set out in the national security strategy. And

me, personally, I quit counting the number of times where I reached out to my comrades

in the military, to other government agencies, seeking more cooperation between us,

between the private sector, in order to help jumpstart the Iraqi economy because, let's

face it, that's good for everybody. Most people will just push back. They'll tell me things

like go see the State Department. Go see Commerce or Agriculture or simply, you know,

the best copout I saw was, well, that's just not my job. I personally say that really it's all

of our jobs. It's not only wrong to say that but in my mind it's a dangerous attitude.

And while state and other nonmilitary government agencies, they can

provide some modicum of support and they do their best. I personally think that the true

knowledge of the inner workings of Iraq lie in those of us in the military who have had the

greatest experience over the past several years there.

So my solution to this quandary and recommendations to address the problems are really short and easy to implement. First, as stated earlier, you know, with Congress debating things like our foreign aid and how we're going to do that, I say to Congress that they must fully fund U.S. Government agencies operation in Iraq and elsewhere particularly in areas where there's regional insecurity. The Department of State in particular must be resourced in a way where success becomes possible. And although our country is struggling economically, this is clearly not the time to reduce foreign aid and engagement with countries worldwide.

Second, the U.S. military, specifically U.S. forces and Iraq security assistance mission, which for those of you that don't know, that's our foreign military sales arm in Iraq, they must collect, publish, and distribute to our private sector partners the many lessons learned on how to be successful in Iraq. I personally have lived through several instances where a small incident became quite a large one that caused a lot of damage both in prestige and in the Iraqi's trust in us. So quite honestly, the private sector has the same possibility of making those mistakes. So instead, we need to share those lessons that we learned over the past eight years as we did our operations and kind of turn this operation around.

And finally, my last recommendation is that the U.S. Government must sponsor and resource the immediate establishment, at least three regional governmental-industry cooperation centers. And my recommendation is that they be initially in Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, but eventually elsewhere where there are large population centers. And there, in coordination with the U.S. Governmental agencies, they can have a safe place where they can everybody be in a central location, come and the Iraqis could come and present things like business propositions. They could settle disputes. And quite

honestly, where the average Iraqi could come looking to see how they can help to do better for their country through economic development.

So only time will tell whether we can look back at our time in Iraq to see if we got it right. I personally, you know, say that the clock is ticking. I mean, December 31st is going to be here shortly and we need to do something now. So the question is whether we're going to be able to put aside our parochial animosities and suspicious of interacting with the private sector and really just go out and help the Iraqi people. I personally remain very optimistic about our long-term success in Iraq and I certainly hope we get it right. I, for one, look forward to the day where I can go back wearing a business suit -- yes, with my Irish tie -- instead of wearing body armor. I tell you, it's a much better situation and those of you that have gotten to know the Iraqi people will attest that they're a wonderful people.

I want to close with a quote. You know, all Army guys, I think we have to have a quote. And mine, surprisingly for those that know me, is one by Indira Gandhi. And I think it's appropriate to our alliance. She said, "You can't shake hands with a clenched fist." And I think that that -- with that I recommend that each of us continue to extend that hand of friendship to the Iraqi people. And with that I'll close and I'll turn it back over to Ted.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you very much, Colonel McKernan. I think you can recognize that we're benefitting from this kind of practical experience that all three of them have had on the ground, but also kind of the way they're projecting ideas, particularly for the civilian sector, for civilian agencies, for the private sector, for NGOs. And I'm also particularly struck by the consistent thread around the importance of foreign aid and that Congress, hopefully, is listening to this as we get through this very difficult budget cycle.

If you think about the bang for the buck in terms of what we get in return -- and this is a consistent theme that you hear not only in the kind of military post-conflict stabilization role but also in other parts of foreign assistance -- if you think about education and foreign exchange -- exchanges of foreign students, the value that we have gotten from that over years is something that Secretary Clinton highlighted on the Hill just a couple of weeks ago as so important to our long-term kind of relationship building around the world. So it's something we need to continue to work on. So I kind of -- you guys seem to be channeling both Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton in pushing that theme. Of course, the content of the exchange matters as much as just the contact itself so that's to be kept in mind.

So we have lots of good ideas on the table. I would really like to open it up to the group for Q&A. We have about 20, 25 minutes for discussion. We've got a microphone going around. Don't be shy. Please, right here.

MR. NEWBERRY: Hi, Brian Newberry from the Wilson Center. Thank you to all for the great presentations.

My question is for Captain Vasquez. I was curious if you have any sense if our interagency partners were doing anything on lessons learned or were they just going back to their own agencies and taking their own lessons learned? Because obviously they're, as you mentioned, a very critical part of any PRT and any future effort that we'll do in the future. Thank you.

CAPTAIN VASQUEZ: Yeah, I'm not sure what the lessons learned process is. I know that the USAID person that I had attached to the PRT in Farah published a paper on an operation that we had that we thought was successful in bringing Afghan expertise into the province. Out of Kabul, boots on the ground, we took them into that Shewan area that I mentioned where we were in the hold and build stage.

And great ideas. I don't know if it was received well only because I think we in the

military, we think, hey, we've got a very bureaucratic kind of challenge and our chain of

command is very, very stringent and is not very flexible sometimes but I found that his

paper going forward was not well received because he didn't get it cleared in the

appropriate manner.

So again I'm not sure what their process is but you're right, it's absolutely

critical going forward that we learn those lessons so that our 9-month rotation instead of 9

years of involvement is not -- it's not 9 years, you know, it's 9 or 10 short 9-month

rotations and everybody is learning how to do this every time they go in theater. Again,

we spent about two, three months figuring out who is who in the province and what we're

doing. Another couple of months getting ready to go home and everything that that

entails. So we really only have about three months on the ground where everything is

coming together we hope and that we're really being effective. So all the projects that I

initiated I never saw. So I think it is a critical piece.

MR. PICCONE: I have a question right here.

MS. SCHADLOW: I actually had one for each person. Is that okay?

MR. PICCONE: Sure.

MS. SCHADLOW: Okay. I'm Nadia Schadlow from the Smith-

Richardson Foundation.

For Colonel Naler, I was going to ask how your model and thinking

applies to a country like Turkey or some of the more problematic countries where the

military has been traditionally a more secular force and now you have different sorts of

political parties emerging that some would argue are less democratic.

For Captain Vasquez, a little bit related to lessons learned but more

specifically. Are the PRTs exportable models that we should institutionalize between

conflicts? Or are they just going to be sort of gotten rid of after these conflicts? So

should we just recreate them every time or create some sort of institutional structure so

that they can be deployed in future contingencies?

And for Colonel McKernan, I was wondering from your talking to the

private sector, is there a sense from them of the specific sort of 10 main obstacles that

the U.S. Government is putting in their way and preventing -- essentially not facilitating

their investment? I know from talking to people in the private business world that they're

often very frustrated by the obstacles that the U.S. Government puts down on the ground

and makes it very, very hard for them to compete effectively let's say or in other

situations. And that might be an interesting sort of avenue also for your research where

the end of it sort of summarizes and says if these main obstacles are fixed essentially we

would do a lot better.

MR. PICCONE: Excellent questions. Chris, should we start with you?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NALER: Yeah, sure. Thank you, Nadia, for

the question.

I had four of the mentors, if you will, that I've consulted with throughout

my work. One, me and my director, Peter Singer and a few others had mentioned Turkey

as potential for research. And as I briefly looked at Turkey I think what, in the scope of

my research from a model perspective, I don't know necessarily how successful it may be

as a model, but I think at least the lenses and the ways that I'm looking at the problem I

would offer this. As Turkey is definitely -- as recommended by Larry Diamond to me on

the telephone during an interview, he goes, Chris, why don't you go after Turkey? And I

go, Larry, too big, too much, I can't handle it right now. And he goes, but it's a fabulous

example. And I think it is a strong example.

But once again, if you look at different measures and similar to the

discussion about metrics and measures of effectiveness and ways to gauge democratic

reform, it'll be very interesting to see what levels of sustainment Turkey is going to have

with their current changes and particularly as was conveyed to me, this is unprecedented

change in the last 100 years for Turkey to move to the relationship, particularly the sieve

mill relationship that they are pursuing and the role of the military within that land. So it'll

be very interesting but I think you've got to go back and you have to look at certain

tenets. And those tenets have to be able to sustain key dimensions of democratic

reform. And if they don't apply to those, then this is going to be a short lived experiment.

CAPTAIN VASQUEZ: I do think PRTs are an exportable model. When

you look at the bang for the buck and what you get for a PRT with not a lot of folks, and I

talked about the 20 percent of enablers, I think the Navy will, at last within the Navy,

we're going to be looking at some sort of capability to operate. And I think we've just

recently stood up a maritime civil affairs force and I think that's what we're going to focus

on. But in the maritime environment, in the lateral environment, and if I'm not -- I think

DOD has come out with a directive recently that said all of the services will come out but

we'll have the ability to create or to engage in stability operations. And I think each one

of them is interpreting it within their force.

COLONEL McKERNAN: Okay. I'll probably -- this is one place where I'll

say a little bit more because I do appreciate the question. I can tell you that probably

when I talk to people one of the -- in the military, specifically, asking them why we're not

helping private industry more. There seems to be a pervasive belief that there is U.S. law

that prevents us from sharing information with private corporations. And this really could

be further from the truth. The key is simply equal access. So you're not going to, you

know, try to help one aircraft manufacturer or weapon manufacturer or hydroelectric plant

manufacturer over another but you simply have to be willing and open to provide the data

that people are asking for, the advice that they're asking for on an equal basis. So really that's an education piece that could be fixed fairly quickly.

The other thing that I think that the private sector has issues with is just simply knowing where power lies within countries, how the country governments are organized. In the case of Iraq, I mean, we went from, you know, having no government really almost whatsoever after the de-Baathification to what's really a rapidly growing and expanding and, you know, changing organization. However, you know, folks in the embassy and the other U.S. agencies, as well as the military who has advisors throughout the Iraqi government as they get on their feet, we know how these organizations are. And more importantly, we know who the real power players are within those organizations. It might not always be the person at the top. It might be somebody that's on the periphery that's pulling the strings.

So just providing that to our private corporations that allows them to not waste their time drinking tea and forming a relationship with somebody that can't do that. I mean, in Iraq particularly, we as Americans find it difficult because we'll go in and want to put a proposal on the table and expect a signature and a contract to be signed that day. And those of you that spent some time in the Middle East know that that's just not the case. You've got to build that relationship first and gain trust and answer a lot of questions and go through a pretty strong bureaucracy.

The other thing that private sector looks for that we can help with are demographics. In the Middle East where tribal and religious affiliations are very important, it's also important that our private sector understand who they should be cooperating with so as not to go out and, for example, hire a subcontractor from an area outside that might be opposed to the locals. That could cause obviously some great issues.

Education is also a big piece. I think you'll find that most corporations that are trying to go into Iraq, into other emerging democracies, are going to try to hire as many locals as possible. And after years of the Iraqi government and the sanctions, their education system is somewhat declined as well. So just being able to find qualified engineers and scientists and some of the skilled technology personnel is just a little bit difficult. But I think a lot of them are doing a lot of great work to educate some of the Iraqi people so that they can return to help out their folks.

And then finally really is the labor force. We can help by -- and it kind of gets back to the demographics -- is by reaching out with those partnerships that we have gained over years and years to put these private sector corporations in contact with the right people, the right village elders, in order to provide a good workforce that is going to help out the local community and be better for the country as a whole.

MR. PICCONE: Excellent. Thank you. There are a couple of seats up front. People who are in the back, if you want to come forward. Some other questions? Matt, a FEF alum. Welcome.

MR. FRANKEL: Thanks. Matt Frankel, FEF alumni.

Question for Captain Vasquez and Colonel McKernan. There's been a lot written lately about the potential negative impact of vast amounts of reconstruction aid that have floated into Afghanistan. I think there were some parallels there for Iraq as well on the issue of fueling corruption, that having all this money there lends itself to creating this culture of corruption, kickbacks, having to buy your way through, as you say, a growing bureaucracy in Iraq, for example. And I'm wondering both through personal experience or through your research, if you could comment on the potential negative impacts that perhaps you saw on the ground in Afghanistan or have seen in Iraq of corruption as a real hindrance to this development. Thanks.

MR. PICCONE: Excellent question.

CAPTAIN VASQUEZ: I inherited a $1.7 million bridge in Farah province. Again, the PRT started out as the entity to implement quick impact projects. I had up to $25,000 of authority and then it went up to $50,000 for my brigade commander. So how I ended up with a $1.7 million bridge I'll never know. But you quickly learn that you've got to find -- you have to follow the dollars and where they're going.

We had some success in contracting in that again we involved the provincial officials, the minister of economy, to kind of vet some of the contractors that were bidding for some of these -- for the contracts. And they were very, very good in kind of sifting through some of the folks and some of their capabilities. And where we did see some form of corruption, whether it was taking some off the top or not delivering services, then they were quickly blacklisted and they could no longer perform or even bid on services that used SURP funding. So it's out there. We were aware of it and we took all the steps that we could to make sure that if they -- if we saw corruption, to try and at least mitigate it and then stop it where we could.

COLONEL McKERNAN: I look at it, I guess, a little bit different in that one of my concerns has always been, and I think that we're probably going to start seeing some of this in Iraqi, is the fact that through U.S. Government investments in infrastructure works and other things, we've really artificially inflated some of the local economies. And so what's going to happen now at the end of the year when we pull out and our efforts are scaled back dramatically. So I think that's going to be an issue. And really it gets to the heart of the matter that I talked about earlier about hiring locals.

I'm sure many of you out here are probably aware of the work of Greg Mortenson in the Central Asia Institute. In fact, I happen to be reading his follow-up to *Three Cups of Tea* called *Stones into Schools*. And I think that this is a model that would

really work well even in Afghanistan.

Throughout there is, you know, why hire a corporation and pay billions and billions of dollars if they're to come in and need to spend mostly on security and outside help when the locals are looking for work, they're looking for something that's going to help their country and their local community. Hire them to do that. I mean, it's, you know, when they can build a school for 1,000 kids for, you know, $50,000 or $60,000 and we would spend, you know, several hundred or probably several million dollars for that same type of facility, you know, the math is there. So there's other ways where we can do it more effectively. And that will really bypass a lot of the corruption that you may have within the government.

MR. PICCONE: Okay. Let's take a couple more questions. I have someone here and I'm looking for other hands.

MR. LEWIS: Thank you. My name is Tony Lewis. I'm with the National Guard Bureau. My question is for Captain Vasquez.

You said that much of your PRT was National Guard and I'm wondering what challenges did you face in terms of integrating the reserve component and active component soldiers. And was the difference in rotation times and boots on the ground time an obstacle that you faced?

MR. PICCONE: Before you -- are there any other questions that we can take a round? Okay.

CAPTAIN VASQUEZ: I was very fortunate to have a Guard unit from Guam. And they were phenomenal. I would go anywhere with them again. We did have challenges and it's something that I found during our PDSS -- it's called a Pre-Deployment Site Survey -- and we found this -- all the commanders found this very, very valuable. Early on in our training we deploy into Afghanistan and meet with the PRT

that's on the ground that we are going to relieve. And I found that the PRT there had

some challenges integrating the Guard, and especially a lot of the Navy folks who are on

the ground who thought they were going to go and be drivers and gunners in Humvees.

And they are actually trained to do this. But early on, boots on the ground, they got busy

and it was just the security forces that were going outside the wire and conducting

missions. And it really -- there was a sense of disenchantment within the Navy folks, that

they were not doing the things that they thought they were going to do. They were

manning guard posts and doing the communications in our communications center but

they weren't doing some of the other things that they had been trained to do.

So I made a point of making sure that we were integrated from the very

first day. And we integrated Navy folks so that they were trained to be gunners and

drivers and some of the first missions outside the wire, if someone was qualified to be a

gunner or a driver they were to be added to those missions. Now, I left it up to my

platoon leader, a very, very capable first lieutenant, to make those decisions as to who

went. But we integrated, again, from our training all the way through our time in

Afghanistan. And I think it worked out well for us.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NALER: I'd like to chime in on this, and I'll go

back to my 15 months that I commanded the battalion during the surge. During that time

I had 21 different companies working for me. I think all but three of them were Guard or

Reserve companies. And I will tell you that the capability that they brought really came

from the   fact that almost all of them were from a local area. They knew each

other. Many of them had been working for years and years. So there wasn't the

discovery learning that we have from a rapidly PCS and military force.

But one of the biggest things I think that you have anytime you

reintegrate, and particularly these units and the Guard units that had been maybe there

early on during the beginning of the operation and then came back is that situations

change. And so getting people to give up some of the old habits just simply by, you

know, 6, 8 months, 10 months into the surge as the violence dropped off, simple stuff like

sharing a road and not pushing people off and shooting their engine blocks if they got too

close to our convoys, that was a difficult thing to. You know, go ahead and instill in a unit

that might have been in some of the worst fights up in the middle of Baghdad, you know,

taking rounds every day. So a lot of that, though, I did find that through, you know, what

was really a -- whether you call it a family or a community-based situation with the Guard

and Reserve units I think made it actually a lot easier for me.

             MR. PICCONE: (inaudible)

             COLONEL McKERNAN: Yeah, I'm sorry, you asked about the rotation

times as well. Every commander during my rotation stated that we needed to be there for

at least a year, not nine months as is the practice right now. And you can't do that with

the Reserves because it's, as I understand it, 365 days from call up to when they need to

come home. And that training time counts. So that's why the Reserves, we can only be

on the ground as a unit for nine months. I think that needs to change. Again, when

you're taking three months up front to find out what's going on in your province, another

couple of months starting to work your way back home, you don't have that much time on

the ground, And we were told back in '09 that it was going to change for the subsequent

rotations.

             And I just had dinner with a couple of commanders who are just starting

their training track, haven't even met their teams yet and they are projected to be in

country for only nine months. So if I could change one thing that would be it, to allow the

Reserves to be on the ground for at least a year and then the training time would be in

addition to that. Or rotate units. Rotate our security force at some point but at least leave

the implementers -- the medical folks, the CA teams, the command team -- to stay on the ground longer.

MR. SUDDER: Pepe Sudder from Northrop Grumman.

With U.S. military being asked to do more with less in the future, are PRTs (inaudible) to do or should that gravitate more the State Department or some other government agency?

CAPTAIN VASQUEZ: You're right. I mean, mission creep is something I heard again as a junior officer and I don't know if we hear it as much anymore, but I think PRTs, the model, is an enduring model and I think each of the services is looking at how best to implement that. You get a lot of bang for the buck in a PRT, especially if you source them with the correct personnel.

Just a quick anecdote here. I was given three engineers to conduct my reconstruction and development projects. One was an actual Seabee. He worked on electrical components but the other two, one was a maritime engineer who knew diesel engines inside and out and the other one was a nuclear engineer from the Naval Academy who was used to driving submarines. So, you know, that's an incredible challenge when you're in charge of a $1.7 million bridge and I'm looking at a submarine officer and he's telling me, yeah, we're good to go. The bridge is solid. Well, how do you know? The cement is strong. Okay. I think I need a little bit more than that to go forward.

So we actually had to call out and try and get a bridge specialist from the Corps of Engineers to come down and luckily he looked at the bridge, looked at some other reports on the cement samples and we took him out to the site. And he said, yes, I am 99 percent confident when the first time you drive a truck over this thing it won't collapse, which is a good thing. And again, something that the special inspector for

Afghan reconstruction had looked at in the past was do PRTs have the expertise within

the teams to do what they're asked to do and what they're expected to do. And I would

say yes, if we're resourced properly.

But just, again, I think all the military services do this. When you're

asked to provide engineers and you've been doing this for six or seven years, at the end,

especially with the -- at least for the Navy, the up-tempo of the Seabees, you kind of run

out of folks. So now then the call becomes, hey, they need engineers so anybody who

has an engineering degree is an engineer. Again, I was supplied as a squadron

commander to provide one of my officers to go actually to Iraq to some engineering job

and I called him in and I was like, hey, you're on the short list. He was, like, what am I

going to be doing? I said reconstruction and development. That's exactly what it tells me

in the spreadsheet that I've got. He goes, sir, I was an ocean engineer. I'm like, you're

an engineer. You're going.

So again, if we staff them properly I think PRTs are an enduring model.

MR. PICCONE: We have time for maybe one more question or I can

ask. I've got one in the back. Great. Thanks.

ME. PENOTE: Hi. Steve Penote, Air Force, obviously.

Colonel -- my question is for Colonel Naler. Sir, in your research did you

look at the restrictions or additional contingencies that you put on military aid based on all

the developments that are occurring in North Africa and the Middle East? Should those

restrictions have been removed? And then also, what is the potential additional foreign

aid actually undermining or delegitimizing the populist perception within the countries?

This is a non-Western-influenced uprising. If you could just comment on those, sir.

MR. PICCONE: If I could ask you also, Chris, to comment on in the

cases that you looked at what role human rights played. Because I think it goes to

conditionality issues as well. A lot of them are human rights conditions and a certain

expectation that abuses of the past need to be dealt with. You know, transitional justice

issues. Is there a good case out there in your group that has something to teach us?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NALER: Okay. Yeah, Steve, thank you for

your question. Interesting you ask it. I think you're probably aware, maybe this is why

you're asking your question, but I think Friday an investigation -- last Friday an

investigation was opened on the foreign assistance that was provided to Bahrain over the

last four years and if any of the money used to train that security sector was used on the

special security forces. And this goes to the integrity of the aid. Same thing obviously in

North African and some of the other Middle Eastern countries. And I'll actually tie both

yours and Ted's question together. And Ted has actually been a good mentor, a great

mentor for me, quite frankly, on the whole human rights aspects of it because I guess

there's two ways when you look at the effectiveness of military and also maybe the

legitimacy of a democracy because there's a couple different ways to follow it. And Larry

alluded to this from his PRT examples. And one is you follow the money and two, you

follow how they treat their people. And 9 times out of 10, sometimes these converge but

they also have some independent paths as well.

What I thought was interesting is I pulled up some foreign assistance

numbers from the different case models, particularly Chile, which definitely had some

horrific times from 1973 to 1989 and extensive human rights violations during that period.

And I think from a case model a good example of how we balanced, if you will, kind of a

carrot on a stick. And I guess that's the way I see foreign assistance. Do you support a

country after they've demonstrated good behavior? Or do you support them while they're

slightly misbehaving in a hope that they're going to behave better? And it was

interesting.

I ran the numbers on three of my case studies and Chile was a good example that we definitely rewarded Chile for their behavior after quite frankly Pinochet. And I know that kind of sounds bad to say it that way but quite frankly from 1988 post-Placebit and the installation of the new government you saw rapid changes form '89 to '95 and even more importantly as you moved into 2000, 2003, the commissions that looked at the human rights violations.

Well, if you follow the foreign aid, it directly relates to shaping that. As they behaved and started cleaning up their act you saw an increase in the foreign assistance. Counter to that, and something a little closer to home and as far as time-wise a more contemporary model, this is one that really caught me by surprise. And I have an interview set up for the two former ambassadors of Bahrain to ask them this very question, Steve, to the heart of your question. As I looked at Bahrain from 2006 to 2011, it varied in foreign assistance between $18 million at a high point to $5 million at a low point. Ironically, of the five sectors of foreign assistance there was only one sector we applied any money to and that was security.

Now, as I look at that, and you know, I appreciate Mack's compliment about, you know, my speaking abilities and I am a marine. I am the dumbest of the six and I'm the leadoff batter. My job was just to get on base today of the 11 players. Okay? But I'll just present it to you this way. It doesn't take an economics or a financial degree to figure out or a political science degree, if you've got a country that has had human rights violations under investigation and they're an emerging, struggling democracy, why wouldn't you put some money into democratic and human rights programs? The total amount of money, and I'm only using from 2006 but those are critical years for Bahrain, from '06 to '10 and the request for 2011, the total amount of resources applied to human rights and democracy programs was zero.

Now, I don't understand that. I don't understand, and I had the opportunity because we have a few ambassadors on the staff here, former ambassadors, and I sat down with one yesterday and I posed the very question to him. I said, I said, and I asked him from a carrot and stick perspective, I said, sir, this doesn't make sense to me. Now, granted, I'm sure there's good reasons why, but that's the very question Steve I'm going to ask the two former ambassadors to Bahrain, Ambassador Neumann and also Ambassador Ereli, who are both here in D.C., why? If you knew there were problems, why? So I think this kind of gets to the overall how you use foreign assistance and do you apply it during the problems and hope that that will heal the problem? Or do you reward them after the fact?

Thank you for your question.

MR. PICCONE: Well, I think you would all agree that I think we've got three homerun hitters here. They did an excellent job and it's a great start to the day. And I really appreciate your questions and look forward to the continued discussion. Thank you to our panelists. (Applause)

MR. PICCONE: Is there a coffee break? Right? Coffee break for 10 minutes and then back.

(Recess)

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PANEL 2: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EFFORTS TO HARNESS CYBERSPACE

PARTICIPANTS:

Moderator:

ALLAN FRIEDMAN

Fellow and Research Director, Center for Technology Innovation
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JERRY CARTER (USMC)
National Security Fellow, Harvard University
"Can the Department of Defense Achieve Cyberspace Superiority"

COLONEL DAVID HATHAWAY (USAF)
Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institution
"The Digital Kasserine Pass: Command and Control of DOD Cyberforces"

BRUCE MacKAY
Defense Intelligence Agency Chair
U.S. Marine Corps University

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. FRIEDMAN: So the advantage of getting the panel before lunch started on time is one can then proceed to lunch, especially given our distinguished guest of General Robinson. But first, it is my pleasure to introduce this panel.

One of the more interesting things about technology policy is to understand how concepts that we're all familiar with and use on a regular basis have to shift and adapt as the technology changes. And, of course one of the most important areas where we're facing this challenge now is in the area of cybersecurity and information technology.

And we have a great panel today, with two excellent papers that approach really challenging problems of how we're going to take the models that we currently use and adapt them to the cybersecurity domain. And we have an excellent respondent with Dr. MacKay here.

So what we'll do is I'll just introduce the panel, and then we'll have the two papers, and Dr. MacKay will respond, and then we'll open it up to some questions.

So, first speaker, and I've been privileged to get to know here in his time as a federal executive fellow at Brookings is Colonel David Hathaway. Colonel Hathaway has served in the U.S. Air Force for 23 years. He as commissioned as a distinguished graduate in the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps. He's commanded F-16 fighter squadron, and most recently served as the vice wing commander of an F-16 wing. A graduate and former instructor of the Air Force Weapons School, and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Power Studies. He was also the architect of space and air power strategy for the operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom as the chief strategy for U.S. CENTA. Sorry

for the abbreviation butchering there.

Colonel Hathaway has a bachelor of science from Wisconsin, and his master in aviation science from Embry Riddle, and a master of military operational art and science, and a master of air power art and science from the Air University.

The second speaker -- who I also have the privilege to know -- is a national security fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Carter is a Marine Air-Ground Task Force intelligence officer, who recently served as the commanding officer in the Second Radio Battalion, Second Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Lejeune. In 2008 he deployed to Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom as the task force radio battalion commander in support of the Multinational Force West.

Lieutenant Colonel Carter has a bachelor of arts in banking and finance from Morehouse, and is a graduate of both the U.S. Marine Corps' Command and Control systems course, and the Joint Forces Staff College.

As our respondent, we have Bruce MacKay, who is the Defense Intelligence Agency chair for the Marine Corps University. He retired from the U.S. Army as a career intelligence collector, with operational assignments in Europe and Asia, and has served since 1998 in the Defense Intelligence Agency in a variety of capacities -- most recently with DIA as senior staff officer in the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center, responsible for assessing the effectiveness and viability of defense HUMINT worldwide.

He is also -- and we shouldn't hold this against him -- a lawyer. And in addition to a very distinguished private-sector career, spent some time on loan to the Special Court for Sierra Leone as a legal advisor in the war crimes tribunal they set up there.

He has a bachelor's from the University of Maryland, and a J.D. from Brigham Young University.

So now I'd like to invite David Hathaway to present a summary of some of the research he's been working on here.

COLONEL HATHAWAY: Great. Thank you very much for the introduction.

First of all, let me say that some of my comments will directly address the handout that was provided on the way in. It's a little bit easier to look at pictures of command-and-control diagrams than for me to stand up here and try to describe them to you.

But in North Africa, during 1941 and '43, the Allies struggled to gain momentum against the German forces there. It culminated in an Allied retreat in the area called Kasserine Pass in Tunisia. Things were looking pretty bleak for the Allies. The U.S. had not learned the lessons of centralized control of air power that the British and French had already learned. Aircraft were designated to primarily support specific ground units, and always operated in a subordinate role to those ground commanders.

This inefficient use of air power essentially relegated it to the role of flying artillery. No efforts were made to take out German airfields, logistics or command-and-control. They were not seen as the immediate threat. This strategy left U.S. air and ground forces vulnerable to the persistent and devastating effects of German aircraft.

After the Allied retreat through Kasserine Pass, revisions to a more centralized command-and-control structure allowed the U.S. Army Air Corps to capitalize on the flexibility of air power, and interdict German logistics, target airfields,

and eventually establish air superiority. This enabled the Allied ground forces to push the weakened German forces off the African continent.

What does this have to do with cyber in 2011? Well, today we're seeing a similar debate within DOD on the optimal way to command and control cyber forces. Just like the U.S. Army leaders failed to recognize the flexibility of air power in the early 1940s, today the DOD leaders fail to recognize the unique characteristics of cyberspace -- characteristics that warrant a unique command-and-control structure.

Let me start by saying that though Cyber Command was stood up and became fully mission-capable last November, the command-and-control debate is still not settled.

Before I get into my discussion of the command-and-control options, and my proposal, let me discuss some of the factors that influence the debate.

Cyberspace has some unique characteristics that impact the choice of a command-and-control structure. First is the speed at which cyber-operations occur. They occur much faster, exponentially faster than in any of the physical domains. In the time it takes you to blink, cyber-effects can transit the entire globe. It takes .17 seconds for cyber-effects to move around the globe.

The second is the lack of geographic relevance. You don't need to be in the same geographic location, as you do with physical forces, to produce an effect.

The reverse is also true. So just because you may be in a geographic region -- the European Command, the Pacific Command, African Command -- just because you're located in that region doesn't mean that attacks against your networks, and your command and control are all going to come from within that region. Through cyberspace, they could easily come from anywhere else in the

world.

And lastly is the viral nature of operations in cyberspace. As an illustration, we can take a look at the Stuxnet worm that attacked the Iranian enrichment facilities last June. While many characterized that Stuxnet worm as a precision weapon designed to attack that specific system -- and it was an air-gap system, by the way, so not connected to the internet -- that worm has been found in over 60,000 computers in almost a dozen countries. While antidotes have been found to basically negate the effects of that worm, the importance of the fact that it spread that virally, and that it was such a precise weapon, is just an example of the viral nature of anything that goes on in cyberspace.

Besides these characteristics, there are some constraints that impact DOD's command-and-control in cyberspace. First of all is personnel. It is a relatively small pool of cyber-experts within DOD. So trying to divide those up and place them all around the world dilutes the pool, and dilutes efficiencies.

Secondly, for the most part, personnel is a zero-sum game. If you want to create more cyber wars, you've got to take it from somewhere else. We're not going to expect to see an increase in N-strength within DOD, personnel N-strength, in order to make up a cyber force. While DOD may come up with some creative ways to bring on some civilians and Reserve Guard capability, there's still a cost there that will affect the choice of a command-and-control structure.

Next is the network architecture within DOD itself. A lot -- many people go, "Oh, it's '.mil'. It's one network." That is the farthest from the truth. We have about 15,000 networks within DOD, serving, at any point in time, about 7 million computers and telecommunications devices. Each service owns their own piece of the network. Pacific Command doesn't "own" their network. It's provided by the

Services. And each service has structured it in a way to best optimized to support the war fighters.

These different command perspectives -- I'm sorry, taking those things into account, and then applying the different command perspectives leads to differing command-and-control structures. Cyber Command, for example, their mission is to operate and defend the global information grid to conduct full-spectrum operations, then, as required. It sees these cyber threats as a global threat that easily traverses sovereign boundaries.

This global nature, tied to the speed at which cyber effects can occur, drives a more centralized control structure to create efficiency and capitalize on the inherent flexibility of cyberspace.

The other perspective I looked at was that of the geographic commands -- EUCOM, the Pacific, European, AFRICOM, for example. They are given their responsibility and authority over that reach for operations in that region through the Unified Command Plan signed by the President of the United States. They get assigned an attached force -- physical domain forces -- to execute regional plans from shaping all the way through kinetic contingency operations. They see cyberspace as another operational domain that they must integrate with the physical domains that they essentially own. So they see a more regional-focused command-and-control structure as necessary for cyber.

Many command-and-control proposals have multiple variations, but they essentially boil down to two: a centralized and a regional focus. The regional-focus model is the Special Operations Command, the SOCOM model. Whereas the more centralized model is the Transportation Command, or TRANSCOM model.

Let me describe each of these a little bit.

The SOCOM model -- the key feature on the SOCOM model is a regional cyber component. It's similar to the air component or the land component or the maritime component. It puts it on equal footing, and treats it very much the same. The primary relationship between the geographic combat-and-command, and the regional Cyber Command component is the strongest relationship. Just like in the SOCOM model, that's where the strong relationship is. It's a regional focus.

They will have at least operational control of the regional cyber forces and, thus, the networks. Cyber Command would assist the regional cyber components with interagency coordination and de-confliction. But, again, it's a regional mission. Cyber Command would also be responsible for any time a cyber operation would cross those regional boundaries, however.

In support of contingency operations, and the stand-up of one or more joint task forces -- the JTFs -- Cyber Command would reinforce this regional component, as necessary, to support this geographic component.

The advantages of this model is that it's a proven model. It's combat proven. Most recent successes have been touted in Iraqi Freedom, and are very visible there with the integrated and joint effort that happened between Special Ops and conventional forces in the Iraq theater.

It also treats cyber operations just like operations in the physical domains. Again, it's a cyber component. It maintains unity of command, and that's the big thing for the geographic component commands, because that, to them, provides the best opportunity to make sure they get an integrated effect.

The disadvantages -- as I've alluded to -- is that the SOCOM model is a regional model. And while that's a great fit for Special Operations, where nearly all of their operations are regional operations, cyber operations are just the opposite.

Most cyber operations are going to be global -- have a global effect. So, in that

respect, it's not a good fit.

It is also unlikely that we are going to see the authorities to execute

cyber operations delegated down to that regional component command, because of

the viral nature or the sensitivity of some of the techniques, as well as de-confliction

with the agency partners such as CIA, FBI, NSA, Homeland Security. Because of

that de-confliction and coordination that has to go on, again, it is unlikely you're going

to see a lot of the authorities delegated down.

The next -- and probably the most important -- is the significant

resources required. If you're going to stand up a regional component, cyber

component, in each of the geographic components -- all of the unified commands, for

that matter -- you now have to have a significant manpower pool, as well a

restructuring of the networks to create a regional joint operations area. And that is

not a small feat.

And, lastly, Cyber Command is still responsible for operations across

the geographic boundaries. So, since most of operations are likely to do that, again,

there is little -- there is a significant cost to generate a SOCOM-like model, for little

gain.

The other model is the TRANSCOM model. It's much more

centralized. In TRANSCOM, they maintain operational control of essentially all the

assets that support mobility operations around the globe. A few assets may get

chopped to a geographic commander, but those are for only intra-theater mobility

missions, and it's the exception, not the rule.

This centralized control allows much more flexibility in supporting

multiple customers and juggling global priorities, similar to Cyber Command and what

they have to do. But they -- so, in this model, Cyber Command would retain

operational control of all the cyber forces.

In this model there's a joint synchronization center that coordinates

cyber requirements for Cyber Command. It belongs to the geographic component

command and does that coordination. During contingency operations, you'd have a

director of cyber forces that would work for the Joint Task Force, and they would

coordinate cyber activities. And if you look at the diagram, there are a bunch of lines

out of that individual, coordinating all the activities for cyber for that Joint Task Force.

The common thread through all this is coordination.

The advantages? It's a centralized-control model. It works well for

Cyber Command to be able to shift effort, as required, for global priorities. It allows

Cyber Command to better coordinate and de-conflict operations. And a majority of

the Forces would reside where the authorities are expected to reside. It's the most

efficient use of a limited number of cyber forces.

The disadvantages are that there's no unity of command for the

geographic commander. It creates challenges to integration with the physical

domains. This is exacerbated -- because if you're not going to have unity of

command, you at least want unity of effort. But this doesn't provide that, either.

Because of the massive integration, or coordination that has to take place with the

TRANSCOM model, those lines are blurred and, really, prevents, or is a barrier to

having good unity of effort.

So neither model is a great fit. We need a command-and-control

structure that will enable global operations, while still facilitating regional integration

with physical domains.

My proposal and recommendation is a hybrid model. It capitalizes on

the advantages of both models. It has a TRANSCOM-like centralized command-and-control structure which enables missions and extensive interagency coordination, but it has a much more defined SOCOM-like component than TRANSCOM has.

The difference is that this component belongs to Cyber Command, not to the geographic commander. However, the geographic commander will have tactical control to direct operations within cyber, and make sure that their concerns are addressed. This avoids the massive coordination of TRANSCOM model, and facilitates integration of cyber-operations with the physical domain operations.

This structure ensures unity of command for a majority of cyber operations -- those at the global level -- while ensuring unity of effort at the geographic level.

While this hybrid command-and-control structure is the basis, DOD can avoid another, hopefully, Kasserine Pass, and proceed toward the goal of achieving cybersecurity.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you. That was very interesting, and excellent segue on the topic of how to achieve cyber-superiority, and what that might mean.

And so we invite Lieutenant Colonel Carter to talk about some of the work he's done on that.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARTER: Thanks, Allan. And, Dr. MacKay, thank you for being here. I look forward to your comments. And, Colonel Hathaway, it's a pleasure to share the podium with you.

And so, as we start our discussion to talk about our research and our walkabout -- I consider myself on a walkabout, on my journey at Harvard and away from the Marine Corps -- to think about some things that are typically perplexing to

the Department of Defense. And one of them is cyberspace.

And so one of the questions that I ask myself is -- and deeply troubling to me -- is about the notion of achieving "cyberspace superiority."

And so I want to start out our conversation by attempting to frame the problem by sharing a comment that was made by Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn in a *Foreign Affairs* article, really articulating what cyberspace means to military operations. He stated that "DOD data systems are comprised of approximately 3.5 million computers, running thousands of applications over 10,000 local area networks, on 1,500 bases in 65 countries worldwide, connected by 120,000 telecom circuits, supporting 35 major networks, over three router-based architectures transmitted unclassified, secret, as well as top-secret level information." And that all is just on the fixed-site profile.

So as we look at this problem, we can see that the same technological advantages that have transformed our military into what I would argue is the finest fighting force in the world, we also see that the adversaries have an opportunity to exploit our weaknesses.

So I go into my "Problem Statement" by setting the paper up and saying that since the official Department of Defense-designation of cyberspace as a war-fighting, or a separate and distinct war-fighting domain, the Department policymakers, Joint Staff, and particular some of the Service planners have begun to develop concepts and doctrines to achieve cyberspace superiority. But based on what we know about cyberspace, I asked, "Can that be achieved?"

Our research has two goals. And the first is to clarify what the term "cyberspace superiority" means, and second, to examine the ability of the Department of Defense to actually achieve cyberspace superiority. I base this on the

premise that cyberspace is a very complex operating environment, with unique

properties and characteristics -- which we heard from Colonel Hathaway's

presentation -- influenced by multiple stakeholders. And I would argue that it's

misunderstood by many policymakers as well as planners.

So we concluded that multiple factors will impede the Department of

Defense to actually achieve cyberspace superiority. I base this argument on the

following propositions.

The first one is the bureaucratic organization of the government is not

conductive to addressing the cyber threats.

The second, DOD policy and joint doctrine are still in very

developmental phase, and therefore inadequate to address military cyberspace

operations.

The third -- Department of Defense is tasked to protect national

security, and that's the ".mil" domain, but does not manage the assets to provide the

function that must be protected; i.e., they have no control over the .gov, .org, or .com

domains.

And, fourth, U.S. domestic law, as well as international agreements,

limit the Department of Defense from conducting cyberspace operations.

So, in terms of research methodology, our paper takes a systematic

approach at examining some of these problems. And we look at a number of things.

First, we examine cyberspace domain, its related components and associated terms,

to gain an appreciation for how complex cyberspace domain is.

And we take a look at condition versus capability. There's a great

debate whether cyberspace can be viewed as a "condition" within a new war-fighting

domain, or a "capability" that can be integrated into a time-tested military decision-

making process. In establishing terms of reference, operational planners are incline

to view cyberspace in terms of information warfare -- through an information warfare

lens, I should say, by simply replacing terms to gain an understanding of how

superior -- or the complexities of cyberspace. But I would argue that, in doing so, it's

a fundamental mistake that will lead to gross miscalculations, and also yield flawed

concepts to drive the planning process.

So there is an important distinction to be made between a "condition"

and a "capability." A "condition" refers to a mode or a state, and a "capability"

instead signifies the possession of necessary resources or power to achieve your

objective. Throughout our analysis, we view cyberspace, or cyber as a condition

which operational planners and joint planners need to achieve on the basis for

deciding further action.

So we, second, take a look at examining the challenges associated

with the Department of Defense efforts to transform cyberspace into a war-fighting

domain. Although viewed broadly by the Services in the earlier part of the 21st

Century, the term "superiority" -- or, I'm sorry, "cyberspace," we would argue, did not

become an official part of the DOD language until the release of the 2006 "National

Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations." Even the recent publication of "Joint

Terminology for Cyberspace" lexicon by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, we would argue that the terms and concepts associated with cyberspace still

remain very confusing and unclear.

This confusion contributes greatly to our inability to develop plans to

synchronize our actions and our efforts in cyberspace. We see the impacts of this

confusion as the Services begin to develop their own joint operating concepts for

cyberspace operations.

As a starting point for normalizing the terms and related documents, this document -- this lexicon that I referred to -- defines "cyberspace superiority" as "The degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operation by Force, and its related land, air, sea and space forces at a given time and sphere of operation, without prohibited interference by an adversary."

The concept of preventing "prohibited interference" does not mean that no interference exists, but that any attempted interference can be countered, or should be sufficiently reduced to have little or no effect on the success of an operation. And this is where we remain skeptical about the Department of Defense's ability to achieve cyberspace superiority.

Third, we examine cyberspace from a Joint Operation concept that was published by Joint Forces Command. Essentially, the document is the way that Joint Forces will go about cyberspace superiority. And the central idea of the concept is that the joint war-fighter signifies sufficient -- or requires sufficient security capacity and capability to successfully plan and execute missions.

When you analyze the separate components, the nature of the Joint Forces objective is twofold. The first part is to ensure freedom of action for friendly forces. And then the second component is to deny the adversary the same.

So we take a closer look at both to determine the impact of the Department's ability to achieve cyberspace superiority. And by examining the two components' superiority side by side, we see a strategic center of cyberspace superiority as the control for both data, as well as the infrastructure.

Much like Colonel Boyd's "OODA loop" concept, the intent of this concept, or this model from Joint Forces Command is to execute the process faster

than any adversary. Information technology conflict in a domain, Colonel Boy's

concept of the "OODA loop" contributes greatly to the war-fighter thinking about

maneuver warfare. However, because of the ability to, I would say -- for the

adversary to overcome the critical components of both time and space, we'd argue

that the concept is not an effective tool in cyberspace to determine our ability to

achieve cyberspace superiority, or freedom of action. In essence, cyberspace

operations can occur in milliseconds, as we've heard, and rarely will be based on

actions that can be attributed to a person, an organization or a nation-state.

        The key point is cyberspace superiority requires gaining and

maintaining military advantage by balancing the two freedom-of-action concepts.

Therefore, achieving cyberspace superiority, we assess, that the Joint Forces must

have sufficient capacity, capability, cognizance to gain and maintain military

advantages to successfully execute the cyberspace mission.

        And, finally, we examine the organization of our government as a

critical component of making decisive decisions at the speed of not only war, but at

cyber-war.

        So, our research indicates that the challenges the Department will

continue to face are directly related to the lack of any effective, purpose-built,

standing organization or process within the U.S. Government for developing policy, or

making decisions about cyberspace. Specifically, we point to a lack of

comprehensive cyberspace strategy, a lack of clear policy and authorities, and the

absence of an organizational structure to serve as the -- what I like to call the "forcing

function" to implement the policy. In our inabilities to govern effectively in cyberspace

is that it impedes Department's efforts to achieve cyberspace superiority.

        And to illustrate my point, I'd like to take a look at how China views

cyberspace. The importance of cyberspace is derived from China's concept of

strategy, which is based on the idea of a comprehensive national power. China's

cyberspace strategy is based on China's philosophy of chi, one of the three requisites

for global governance. Chi is established by identifying an adversary's vulnerabilities,

and then assigning and then assigning appropriate tools to exploit and then get after

these vulnerabilities.

So if the U.S. took a similar approach to cyberspace as the Chinese

competitors, perhaps policymakers would be inclined to create a comprehensive

strategy, based on fundamental goals and objectives that effectively shape the

international landscape, in accordance with our U.S. national strategy or U.S. national

interests.

So I quickly go to our findings. And there are four.

And that is the U.S. does not possess an enduring technical

advantage over the adversaries in cyberspace.

The second is the strategic DOD capabilities rely on the public as well

as the private infrastructure.

The third, the Services have a different perspective, I would say, of

cyberspace.

And then, four, the lack of system standards -- that's hardware,

software, as well as supply chain -- across the Services creates a vulnerability.

So, very quickly, I look at can this be done after analyzing the

complexities of cyberspace? And we have four things that we think are critical factors

that prevent the Department from achieving their objectives. That's capacity,

capability, cognizance, and then governance.

In assessing the four factors, we conclude the Department is unable

to achieve cyberspace superiority. So we include these into our recommendations.

And that takes us into the final portion of our paper, about the conceptual framework for achieving cyberspace superiority. And we conclude that the military has limited ability to address these four factors -- or three factors -- that I talked about up front. And it's going to take significant help from the U.S. Government to address the fourth factor.

And I'd say it all starts with a strategy. The U.S. must change the way it thinks about operational environment by taking a holistic, strategic approach to cyberspace. And our recommendations are essentially that broadening the U.S. view for strategic importance in cyberspace, taking some lessons learned, maybe from China, and looking at cyberspace as an instrument of national power.

The second one is develop a national security cyberspace doctrine. And many of you may say that this is nothing new, we tried this in Vietnam. And I'd say you are correct. But the challenge with the Vietnam piece is most of that doctrine was in the classified channels, and it never made its way out. And we can talk about that more in our discussion on President Bush's initiative that's slowly making its way out, as well.

The third one is modernize authorities for military cyberspace operations. Currently, we all know that U.S. Cyber Command does not possess some of those authorities to what I consider to be able to find, fix and finish threats within the domain. And so I'm essentially offering an opportunity -- or recommending an opportunity to develop an ability to hunt on a network.

Fourth is to mandate joint standards. I think it's easy to see, when we look to the Services, and how they field their systems down to the tactical and operational level, or fielding different systems. And if we're ever to -- if we're to

operate to Joint standards, interoperate at the Joint level, then I say that we ought to mandate some Joint standards across the global information grid.

The fifth is establish a common operating picture. And General Alexander has pointed to this many times that we don't have this, and we're going to have to rely on the public and private sector. In order to do that, I think we ought to exchange L&Os to build trust, as well as facilitate situational awareness.

And then, finally, as we alluded to earlier, we're going to have to grow the force. And when we talk about a capability, we're talking about people, training and equipment. And all of that, in my mind, would equal capacity.

So, in closing, the dawn of the 21st century presents strategic challenges for the United States. And our research has made it clear that achieving cyberspace superiority will be a bold endeavor. Sophisticated threats will require innovative solutions, and demand new approaches in order to mitigate that risk. In essence, the cyber threat environment will demand a new mindset to ensure agility and adaptability for new challenges.

Our national approach to cyberspace must adapt to meet these rapidly changing challenges.

Thank you.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Jerry.

So we have two bold endeavors in front of us. We have to figure out how to do, or how to think about, superiority in the cyber domain, and we have to understand the evolving command-and-control relationship in this domain.

I'd love your thoughts on how we can tackle these bold endeavors.

MR. MacKAY: Oh, to have bold thoughts.

By way of disclaimer, I'm here today as an individual who has an

interest in the topic. My comments certainly do not reflect the position of the Defense

Intelligence Agency -- although you will pick up some snippets of that as we go

through -- nor of the United States Marine Corps or the Marine Corps University.

I think that Lieutenant Colonel Carter may have given us the

understatement of the century when he said that the "terms are confusing and

unclear." Command-and-control -- I'm not even sure I know what a "cyber force" is.

When you think of conventional military forces, you think of, if you will,

the "doers," the war-fighters, and those who support them. They support them in a

direct war-fighting role -- weapons maintenance, aircraft maintenance, weapons

procurement, things of that sort -- or in a more generalized role, like in one of my

other hats, as an attorney.

I don't know that anyone has looked at the cyber world for that. We

have CYBERCOM. We have fill-in-the-blank Force Cyber -- Army Force Cyber, Air

Force Cyber (inaudible) Cyber, 10th Fleet.

Does DISA fit into that? The Defense Information Systems Agency?

Who maintains these systems? What are these systems? We don't even know what

we're talking about, ourselves. Secretary Lynn's comment kind of understated by a

factor of at least 50 percent the number of countries we do business in. My own

agency has computer networks operating in over 130 different countries. And that's

just one agency.

So we haven't learned how to count. We haven't defined terms in a

way that makes sense. What is "cyber conflict?" We don't know yet.

How do you "command" a civilian? Having been in uniform and now

in the civil world, I can tell you from my legal background, "controlling" civilians is

difficult enough, without trying to "command" them.

So we're talking about a command-and-control structure. That makes very good sense. We have identified cyber as a war-fighting domain. And, again, I'm not sure that I know what that phrase means. I know how it relates to the physical world. I understand, I think, John Boyd and some of his concepts. I've spent some time, now, with the Marine Corps, a little more time with the Army, have some nodding familiarity with the Navy and the Air Force -- and each of those military services is optimized to function within a specific physical domain.

But cyber, that has all of the characteristics of a physical domain in the sense that you can go there, you can play there, you can do things -- has characteristics that are absolutely unique. In the world of communications, for years and years and years, we've used telephones that are connected to a wire, that goes to a switching center, that goes out via a wire to another switching center, that goes out via a wire to a telephone in someone's home or office. And up until about 30 years ago, if you were to tinker with those wires, the owner would be very upset. And in some places in the country, you would actually face criminal sanctions.

Now, we have this thing called cyberspace where we have this patchwork quilt of providers. We have governments involved, we have private companies involved, we have universities involved. They all contribute to this thing, but no one of them owns it.

So if it's going to be a war-fighting domain, if it's going to be a place where we're going to exercise superiority, what is it we're going to own, and over what are we going to exercise this control authority? Lieutenant Colonel Carter made a very telling point in his paper, and in his presentation, identifying the mismatch between the defense mission and the reach of the population to be defended. For those of you that had seen the National Defense Strategy -- no, I won't say that. Who

knows, I might be considered for some appointed office at some point and it would

not politic to say the thought that just came to mind.

Let's be charitable. We'll call the National Cybersecurity Strategy

"aspirational." That's a fancy word that means hope. Some of you may remember

General Powell saying, "Hope is not a strategy."

We have a responsibility to defend, within this context, the

Department of Defense and its constituent elements. What are those? Well, it's kind

of easy to define the people who wear military uniforms. That works fairly well. Then

you expand it out to the next circle, for the people who work in military facilities, you

know, that are owned and operated by the Department of Defense. That's fairly easy

to define.

Where do we get our cyber toys? Mine come from Dell, because I

happen to like Dell. I use Cisco routers at home. Where is Cisco building its routers?

Not in the United States.

We have this giant industrial base that supports this domain that we

are going to attempt to control, but we don't have control over the components

therein. Historically, the United States has built its own weapons systems. A lot of

other countries buy them -- because, frankly, it's bloody expensive to build a weapons

system.

We haven't tried to build cyber weapons -- in the hardware sense -- in

any meaningful unclassified discussion. We buy the stuff from somebody else, which

means we've immediately lost control.

We have -- I'll put on one of my other hats for a moment, the law.

When I first came into the cyber side as an attorney most of my clients were people

with their hair on fire, and eating wastebasket-size containers of Tums. Because

what they wanted to do, what they needed to do, in order to be able to attribute and
act, we're not even going to characterize it as an attack yet -- and I'm not sure what
that means -- but to attribute an act to a location was prohibited by law.

        We have fixed some of that now. We do have white-hat hackers.
But, as is typically the case, law follows developments in society. Law typically does
not anticipate and structure for society. And the few times we've tried to do that,
historically haven't worked well in the U.S., which is, I guess, to put it nicely.

        At this point, I think I will wind down by saying the job of cyber is that
it gives us a domain that is probably unique in military history. Over the centuries
there has been a constant tug of war between -- if you will use terms poorly --
warhead and armor. And warhead always wins, because it's always cheaper and
easier to build a bigger warhead than it is to build better armor.

        We are now in the bizarre environment that Vince Lombardi, the late
head coach of the Green Bay Packers would recognize. He once stated that the best
defense is a good offense.

        In today's world, virtually the only defense we have is offense,
because the offensive capabilities in this world so far outstrip the defensive, that it's
not really worth having a meaningful discussion.

        And speaking of discussions, it's probably a good time to have one.

        MR. FRIEDMAN: I think so. So, I'm going to seize the moderator's
prerogative to pick up on the last point, which was actually the first point I wanted to
raise, is this tension between defensive posturing and offensive posturing. And I've
done a little work on trying to balance out how this would fit, both organizationally and
tactically.

        But I'd love to look at through a lens of both superiority and

command-and-control. Does this distinction of warhead versus armor, does it help us to actually undo some of the work that we've done in sort of binding together the defensive posture and the offensive posture through CYBERCOM.

Is that a useful distinction in helping to tease out some of these problems? Or does that lead us down the wrong path?

COLONEL HATHAWAY: I'll start. With respect to command-and-control, it is something that is easily simplified. And for discussion's sake, it's much easier to simplify it down to go you've got "provide, operate, defend, attack, and exploit" within cyberspace. So it's easy to put everything in nice little categories and leave it there.

The provide and operate? Yeah, that's what we've been doing forever with the Internet and, you know, .mil. That's the part that we were good at, and it is not par of what historically is thought of as a war-fighting role. It's a function, a support function that's been provided.

Now you get into defend and attack, and that's where it gets really mushy, especially if you try to delineate them out and go, okay, under this piece of command-and-control, we're going to have operate and defend -- provide, operate, and defend.

And then your attack and exploit are going to be your special -- your ninja guys are going to come in and walk in for a contingency operation.

The problem is it's not that clean. Because so much of defense requires to defend, to stop somebody from attacking you may mean you reach out and thump them through cyberspace. Well, that looks awful offensive to them.

So, the defensive actions while, yes, the antivirus software is important, patches are important. The patches usually occur because of a

vulnerability that was exploited by somebody that we found out. So all those things

are after the fact and reactionary. And it's usually the attackers have moved on to

something else because they know that once they pull a trigger on some offensive

tool, we figure it out and it's no longer a valid tool.

So, having the ability to reach out and do active defense is a key part

of being able to at least approach anything that resembles superiority within

cyberspace.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARTER: I'd agree with that. I'd certainly

agree. And I think we're generally out of balance with the way that we approach

cyberspace. And when I say "we," I mean as a nation, as the Department of

Defense. And part of that is the restrictive authorities that are placed against the

Department. Right now, I think we have a tremendous defensive capability, but the

offensive piece is the piece that I worry about and keeps me up late at night.

As we suggested, these authorities prevent us from doing some

offensive things which we know in the unclassified realm. But, more importantly, it

goes to, in my mind, deterrence. And that deterrence piece, you have to be able to

not only the active deterrence, but then be able to follow up with that punishment to

keep people in check.

So I do think we need to balance the two.

MR. FRIEDMAN: (inaudible) on the intelligence side?

MR. MacKAY: Actually, I was going to come back at it from your

original question. I don't know whether the distinctions are helpful, but they're

necessary.

Because as Lieutenant Colonel Carter has pointed out, and Colonel

Hathaway has alluded to, we have two completely different authority sets, depending

on which environment you're dealing in. If you're in an offensive environment, you

have one authority set. And we know how to trace that. If you're in a defensive

environment you have a different authority set.

In the world of cyber, you are frequently in an area that has attributes

of them both, but is clearly neither. And that is part of the confusion.

If we're going to have the ability to conduct offensive operations, we

need to be able to define what they are. There's still a lot of ambiguity there.

Intelligence plays into it. The difference between reconnaissance and an offensive

act may be little more than a keystroke or two.

Without some form of definition, we have no ability to move forward.

And one of the things we have to keep in mind is that if we're talking about warfare,

we're talking about people who have to be able to do things very, very quickly -- in

the world of cyber, as Colonel Hathaway points out, extraordinarily quickly. We don't

have time for the how-many-angels-dance-on-the-head-of-a-pin discussion. We've

got to have some bright guidelines for them.

MR. FRIEDMAN: All right, if, indeed, we have time at all to make any

decision, in human time.

So, turning it over to the audience, do we have questions out here?

Are there concepts that we can further break down and really just make sure we

know absolutely nothing about any definitions here?

Yes.

MR. DOWNHAM: Thank you for an interesting talk. I'm Gene

Downham from the Joint Warfare Analysis Center.

Most of the discussion from the panel seemed to be addressing the

domain of cyber conflict that was more the equivalent of hot war. I want to talk more

about the domain of ongoing competition for technological and commercial

advantage, and just get the opinion really from any of the panelists as to how we

should structure command-and-control in this sort of ongoing competition.

Is that the domain of the intelligence community? If so, is the

intelligence community structured properly to address it? What's the DOD role in

that? And what's the role of the private sector in that?

Thank you.

COLONEL HATHAWAY: There's no quick answer to that one.

I think we see when you look at where CYBERCOMMAND is located

in the NSA building, I think that goes to some of what you're getting at. I mean,

somebody may be sitting down and doing an exploitation job under Title 50, and then

go, okay, now I'll switch hats. Now I'm a Title 10 kind of guy. Send.

There is some dual-hatting that's going on with respect to that. And

so I think, just our structure that we have set up, I think is somewhat necessary.

Because, as Dr. MacKay talked about, some of the legal issues involved with a lot of

the things that go on in cyberspace -- and a lot of that is undefined still, I think, today,

how well we do in there.

I think what's going to have to happen is we're going to have to really

define out exactly what we want to do, and get those permissions, almost one by one.

And what that will take is a little bit of a bunny-trail here, but that's going to take, I

think -- as we do our war plans, our operational plans -- which include Phase Zero

operations, the steady state -- those things will have to be planned in and get pre-

approval. Because of the time constraint, you're not going to have time to go ask, in

many cases, ask for permission if you're trying to fend off an attack.

But that goes to another issue, and that's -- I mentioned the Phase

Zero operations. The stability ops that are going on in all of the geographic

commands around the world is that just because the physical domains are operating

in Phase Zero, many argue that cyber is already in Phase Two, seize the initiative.

          And so we see almost a different level of warfare, if you would, going

on in cyberspace already, in what we consider kind of a steady-state timeframe. So it

becomes very difficult and hard to comprehend

          That doesn't help much.

          LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARTER: I'll just take a quick stab at the

question. Very interesting one, and one I think we all ponder, about the intellectual

property, and where the U.S. stands in the world.

          I think we all know that we can't turn a blind eye to how China is

absolutely, some would argue, out-competing us in cyberspace. And so, in terms of

how do we remain one of the relevant superpowers on the international scene -- if not

the superpower -- it's going to take an interagency approach. I can't believe I'm

saying that, but it's true.

          I think, across the board -- we talked about how complex the domain

is. I think it's going to take the interagency -- that's both public and private sector, as

well as the federal government -- to come together to figure out this problem together,

as a nation, as we move forward, as opposed to, you know, the stovepipes that we

traditional have come to love, I guess.

          MR. MacKAY: We touched on briefly about the command-and-

control, and its relationship to the intelligence community.

          One of the overarching challenges we have in the world of cyber is

that every entity that looks at it tends to look at it through its own lens and see it in its

own environment. So the war-fighter wants to control the domain, because that's

where they're going to fight. The intelligence community will want to control the

domain, because that's where they will collect intelligence.

I would not give the intelligence community that responsibility for

several reasons. One is the possible lack of talent. Two -- you notice I wasn't smiling

there. Two, and perhaps more important, the intelligence community needs to be

perceived as, and actually needs to be, a neutral provider of data. Giving them

control of a domain, no matter what the domain is, immediately calls the reporting on

that domain into question.

MR. FRIEDMAN: The one in the middle there.

MR. NEWBURY: Brian Newbury, from the Wilson Center. Just real

quickly, a re-attack on the authorities question. I do always hear that is one of the

biggest stumbling blocks. This question is for any of the panelists.

Do you think, at the end of the day, it's going to take a cyber-Pearl

Harbor or a 9-11-type event to really get everyone's attention and cut through the

chaff, and start to get authorities out there for folks to do what they need to do?

COLONEL HATHAWAY: I think it is going to take some large event

that's really going to have to break some of this stuff loose. Because of the

sensitivities of unintended damage that you could have with cyber operations, I don't

see those things easily being released.

We do see some actions going on in some areas around the world,

whereas a fairly small operation that can be -- can be -- somewhat constrained in its

collateral damage. And those are being delegated down.

But for the vast majority, those authorities are being held very high.

Sometimes CYBERCOMMAND -- and many times CYBERCOMMAND doesn't even

have the authorities, that they have to go ask for them from much higher.

So, I think it is going to take something like that to bring the attention to these capabilities, and the willingness to put up with some collateral damage.

MR. MacKAY: If we're going to use cyber as a form of warfare, we're going to have to be able to fight it into the long-armed conflict. And the challenge we have now is that where we can measure effects of a weapon in the kinetic world, we still have great difficulty doing that in the cyber world, as Colonel Hathaway has pointed out.

We have great difficulty confirming the legitimacy of a target. We have great difficulty identifying the actor to be struck. We can put all the authorities we want downstream, but until we can solve the targeting issue and the collateral damage issue, we're not going to help ourselves. They come hand-in-hand.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Question in the back corner?

MR. BARTHOLME: I'm Jason Bartholme, U.S. Air Force. I guess my question is for the panel at large, and this gets back to a little bit of the definitions struggle we've been having.

It strikes me that, when you think of cyber, you have sort of the abstract flow of information across the internet and software, and sort of the soft side of it. But then you have a really significant brick-and-mortar side of it where -- the gentleman talked about components' being manufactured in different parts of the world -- and the tools that are actually being used to conduct attacks.

I guess the question I had is that do you all see a future where there will be a co-mingling of kinetic forces and sort of non-kinetic forces, where cyber, and the umbrella of cyber, embraces both the physical and kinetic targeting of these infrastructure targets, alongside the sort of ethereal soft side of things?

COLONEL HATHAWAY: I will tell you, that's where the geographic

want to go. I mean, that's their goal, is to be able to get to that ability, that level of

integration. That's a -- it sounds very easy, but it is not. It is extremely complicated

for all the reasons we've discussed, especially authorities, in that respect.

So -- but that is the goal. As you get this co-mingling of capabilities,

that you have a cyber effect enabling a kinetic effect, or maybe vice versa. For

example, the Israeli attack on the Syrian -- suspected Syrian nuclear facility that was

enabled, that was essentially a small raid by a few fights of their Air Force fighters

that could or that would have otherwise -- it was enabled by cyber. Cyber basically

disabled the Syrian air-defense system. So they were able to go in and strike that

facility and go out unscathed. The Syrians sat back and looked at blank scopes,

thought it was another quiet night.

So that is just an example of the ability to integrate those two

capabilities, and really what everyone, I think, within DOD is after -- as well as

protecting our sown information. But that, again, is not easy to do with the

authorities.

MR. BUNNING: Scott Bunning. I'm a military fellow at RAND. I had

a question for Lieutenant Colonel Carter.

A lot of policy on cybersecurity, especially in the civilian sector.

There's also a term I heard of "cyber resilience." You know, in the military kinetic

forces we talk about "operating in a denied environment." I mean, if they're jamming

our radar, how do I work through that?

And I think also in the cyber forces, or in policy, especially from a

military-DOD context is cybersecurity or cyber resilience? Can you comment on

either one of those concepts?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARTER: Yes, thanks for the question.

And I think you're absolutely right, in terms of resilience.

I think we all know it's not about when we get hit, it's about how -- or it's when we get hit. And so we ought to, in my personal opinion, focus on the resilience. And that is the recovery, and then how do you get back to business?

And so I think a large part of our effort -- as we're talking about these defensive and offensive components, and freedom of maneuver, we have to absolutely focus on the resilience piece.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Yeah, the center, here.

MR. YOUNG: Zach Young from Harvard.

So, we're arguably more reliant on cyber technologies than other countries. And we're faced with these tremendous challenges and we don't know how to solve them. So kind of to hedge against the answer to these challenges, do you think it's wise to try to reduce our reliance on cyber devices?

COLONEL HATHAWAY: Good luck with that. (Laughter) I don't think you could convince anybody to stop buying the iPads or the iPhones or any of those other devices. Which really brings another spectrum in the case. And you're talking to all the electronic spectrum. And that goes to where does cyber end? And the confusion of, again, go back to the terms, defining "cyber" to begin with.

The Navy, in fact, has taken a different tack. They include electronic warfare, under 10th Fleet, which the other services do not. So a little side note there.

But I don't see us having the ability to stop our reliance. I mean, first of all, you go to the discussion that Jerry brought up, which is the OODA loop, Boyd's OODA loop. And if you want to stay ahead of your adversaries, and stay inside of their decision cycle, that's going to require even more reliance on these types of -- this type of technology.

So I don't see us going backwards.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARTER: Zach, I agree. And I don't think we should. We ought to embrace this technology.

And I go back to, you know, we consider cyberspace as a man-made environment. And so all these problems that we're having, I think that we can overcome. I'm confident we can. We just have to have the will and the patience to overcome some of these things.

So I certainly don't think we ought to go backwards. I think we ought to embrace some of the research and technology, get our acquisition cycle fixed to get ahead of some of these things. And then, really, the partnership -- I can't underscore that enough -- that the partnership between the private, public, as well as the government piece is absolutely key.

COLONEL HATHAWAY: If I could just add one other point, though, I think we have a duty to make sure that we understand the vulnerabilities, though, and that we make sure we have a backup.

Because we certainly don't want to be sitting back completely crippled because I can't get on the computer. So, therefore, we don't command and control, we don't execute. We have all this great technology that we can't use because it's been crippled. So, we do need to be at least aware of the vulnerabilities, and prepared to take backup actions.

MR. MacKAY: To be brutal for a moment, even if we did, no one else would.

Estonia has been there ahead of us. They are far more wired that we are. They've been terribly victimized by an anonymous attack coming from a country to their east.

And, as a result, they've taken defensive measures. They've learned.
So will we.

MR. FRIEDMAN: And I just want to point out that the way that you
change a relative disadvantage gap is you can make yourself less dependent, or you
can sell some more things to other people so that they're more dependent. Just
another option that might work well.

And there's, I think, for a number of the adversaries that we might be
talking about, we might have a strategic advantage there, if both of us are dependent
on systems.

I think we have time for maybe one or two more questions. So let's
take -- there was a question there. And if there's maybe one more, we can batch
them.

MR. HUNTSMAN: Thanks. Steve Huntsman from Equilibrium
Networks.

Colonel Hathaway, I'd like to pick up on the point that you just made,
where you talked about having a backup.

And one thing that you see a lot in viruses is polymorphic code, where
the virus itself, or the worm, will, you know, change its behavior autonomously, and
the code will, you know, switch between the different sections.

Now, there's no reason, in principle, that we can't do that with the
systems that we use in DOD, using the firm-ware on the routers, the software that we
use, have it be polymorphic. And there's going to be some overhead in the design of
that code, but DOD can mandate that if you're going to see to DOD, you have to
make this code polymorphic -- and open-source, moreover, so that we can take a
look at it and introduce our own capabilities into that code.

And what I think that might do is introduce an element of strategic ambiguity to an adversary, where they say, "Well, we're going to try and take this guy down, but we don't know if he's going stay down, because he can just switch stuff out."

And so I was wondering if you could comment on that.

COLONEL HATHAWAY: Sure. I think what you propose is a great idea. The problem is, since we've gotten away from, you know, in many cases, the "mil" standard that cost us a fortune within DOD to buy more off-the-shelf technology, you know, we have gotten away from the capability to do what you're talking about.

So -- and, again, with this mismatch of networks, and different routers and servers out there, it would be a long process to do that. But I definitely think it would be worthwhile, if we're really going to try to defend the networks.

And that goes a little bit back to the kind of the restructuring of the networks. I mean, cyberspace is a man-made domain. We built it, we can change it. It doesn't mean it's easy to change. But it can be changed over time to be more adaptive and reactive, without waiting on the man in the loop to try to fix it.

MR. FRIEDMAN: All right, I think we might have time for one more quick question.

Yes.

MS. MARCONI: Yes, hopefully, this is a quick question. Janice Marconi, Marconi Works International.

Different strategies, some of them tend to be stuck in the website browser mode, where all of a sudden things are changing so rapidly we're into an apps world.

Are we really -- are we falling behind? In other words, if you have --

anybody who has their iPhone, any one of the things, there's tens of thousands of apps that they're capable of.

Which means -- I finally bought a book that's -- what is it? -- *The Idiot's Guide to Developing Your Own Apps.* And I'm having fun doing that, which means -- and I'm not that capable. I just thought I'd go through the exercise. Which means people that are far more capable are developing apps.

How does that fit within a cyber strategy?

MR. FRIEDMAN: So, in two minutes, I'd like you to address the mobile threat. (Laughter)

MS. MARCONI: Sorry about that.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARTER: I'll take 30 seconds of it. I'm not sure we can address it.

But I would go back to one of my recommendations about growing this force, and keeping some of a resilient force that is capable of keeping up with some of these challenges. I'd go back to research and development, the acquisition piece of it, to try to stay ahead of this.

I don't have a solution today. But we have to grow, in my personal opinion, that professional force that is able to keep up with this technology as it continues to move forward.

COLONEL HATHAWAY: I will just say that the changing role -- I think we are, especially within DOD, lag behind, because of our acquisition process. And just the behemoth that that is.

I think transitioning to something like the apps, to where basically you're talking about more of the, almost the cloud computing, where you get the computer -- that I really don't need -- off my desktop. And I now have a thin client

that can access Zypper, secret Internet, top-secret, unclassified, all on one work station. And all I'm running is apps.

It makes it much easier to defend that, because the server is in one place, and it's only one -- I'm exaggerating. But it's much easier to defend something like that than the, you know, millions of computers sitting out there on desktops, much easier to keep them up-to-date, defensive-wise.

So I think that is a key leap that we need to make within DOD, which will help us significantly in our defense.

MR. FRIEDMAN: All right. And Bruce, very quickly, last word?

MR. MacKAY: I think what some might characterize as a vulnerability there, I would characterize as a strength.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, the repository of computer expertise in the United States was at the National Security Agency, because computers were big, they were expensive, and very few people had them. As a result, we hired people that were reasonably intelligent and then locked them in dungeons and fed them code until they became proficient.

We don't have to do that anymore. The world is full of people who are proficient in code. *The Dummies Guide to Programming*, you're doing it on your own. All we have to do is find a better way of capitalizing on the capability and putting it to work for us.

MR. FRIEDMAN: All right. I'd like to thank the panel for an excellent discussion, attacking some really hard problems. And also all of the fellows, for putting together this excellent conference.

So please join me in thanking the panel. (Applause)

SPEAKER: A quick lunch announcement. If you RSVP'd for lunch, it

will be found in the hallway to my left. And if you will just bring it back in here, Major

General Lori Robinson will be addressing us in about 20 minutes.

(Recess)

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Lunchtime Keynote:

MAJOR GENERAL LORI ROBINSON
Director, Legislative Liaison
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

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PROCEEDINGS

SPEAKER: It's my great pleasure to introduce Major General Lori Robinson as our lunchtime speaker. She is currently the director of Legislative Liaison in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. She brings with her a breadth of experience at the operational level of war as well as working strategic issues. She has served as an air battle manager, including instructing in and commanding the Command and Control Operations Division of the U.S. Air Force Weapons School.

Additionally, she commanded an operations group, a training wing, and an air control wing. She deployed as vice wing commander for the 405th Air Expeditionary Wing, where she led over 2,000 airmen conducting B1, KC135, and E3 missions and operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

She has held staff assignments as command briefer at headquarters, specific Air Forces, deputy chief of staff and executive assistant to the director of the Defense and Information Systems Agency, and executive officer to the commander of Air Combat Command. She has also served as a director for the Executive Action Group for the Secretary and chief of staff for the U.S. Air Force.

Before taking her current position, she served on the Joint Staff as the deputy director for Force Application and Support. But most importantly, in 2001 and 2002, she was a federal executive fellow here at Brookings Institution.

Please help me welcome Major General Robinson. (Applause)

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Thank you. I have to tell you, I was saying to Pete that walking in, I haven't been back since I left, so walking back in here brought an amazing rush of memories, and all of them awesome. I have to tell you the time when I got here I had just finished being General Jumper's executive officer when he was the commander of Air Combat Command. So, for those of you being an executive officer to a four-star, you don't have your own life, do you? I mean, it's their life. And so

after a year and a half of that, everybody wanting to know where Lieutenant Colonel

Robinson is, wanting to know how to -- how can I talk to the general, coming here and

being an obscure person was just Heaven on Earth. I loved every single second of it.

The other part that brings back huge memories is I lived on 21st and O,

so for me walking to Brookings every day was just awesome, and living in a brownstone.

In fact, we were early, so I made the folks that came with me, I said, oh, let's go find my

house. So we went and looked, and I lived on 21st and O.

But I think the thing that I appreciated the most of my time at Brookings

professionally was the ability and the way to start thinking differently. All of us that are in

the military, you know, we're very A to B to C thinkers. We demand structure and order.

We like orders and we like giving orders and we like following orders. Okay, I don't like

following orders, but I like giving orders. We crave regulations and instructions and we

like those things that bound our life because most of us are those kind of folks.

But when I got here and I had my first opportunity to take one of the

classes that Brookings offers, Inside Washington, and I had the opportunity to go around

and start hearing the way people think inside the Beltway that are not military, it was

fascinating to me. And then when I was able to do the class Inside Congress, to, again,

listen to the way those people think -- not good or bad, right or wrong, but just different --

it was really the first time I started thinking about how people think and think about

problems differently and how you communicate with people outside of defense.

I do have to say, though, if you looked at my bio, this place also struck

me very personally. I was here during 9-11. My husband and I had walked to the gym;

we'd done a gym sortie. We'd walked back home and I'd gotten out of the shower to

watch the first two airplanes hit in New York. I dutifully took my shower because, what,

you go to work, right? I mean, that's what you do, you go to work.

And I remember walking from my house to here, to Brookings, and about halfway through the walk my sister calls on the phone. And she said, Lori, Lori where are you? What are you doing?

And I said, well, I'm walking to school, you know. And she's like, no, seriously, Lori, what are you doing? And I said I am.

She said there's an airplane that's going for the Pentagon, you know. Go home, go home, go home.

Well, you know, I mean, I'm a dutiful officer and so I went to work. I don't think I got to work for more than five minutes and my husband called. He happened to be home that day and he said, I won't use all the expletives that he used, but the basic message was get home and get home now.

So, I got home and shortly before that is when the airplane struck the Pentagon. It was the most amazing for those of you that lived here during that time and lived in the District to watch the city empty out. It was the most amazing thing that night, living in my house, how absolutely quiet it was, where we could hear the fighters swap out and I could hear AWACs swap out. It was amazing to see a car with a gun, you know, out of the car in our city, in Washington, D.C. You see that overseas, but in our city.

So that whole experience compounded with the experience of starting to think differently really struck me on how I am as a citizen of the United States, but, more importantly, to try and make me a better officer in the United States Air Force. So when I was thinking about what do I talk about today and I looked at what the forum was all about, and I contemplate my new job as I deal with the Hill almost every day -- in fact, this morning I had the vice chief up talking to a couple of professional staffers; right after this I'm taking our Undersecretary up to talk to a senator; and tomorrow our Secretary

and Chief are testifying to the Senate, so I think about things like this a little bit differently.

And I looked at what the theme of the symposium was, you know, Defense Challenges and Our Future Opportunities, and I thought about how does this look through Congress' eyes? How does Congress think about this?

And I looked at all the different panels you had and the groupings that you had: Regional Insecurity and Emerging Governance, DOD Efforts to Harness Cyberspace, and The Changing Maritime Environment, and U.S. and Regional Powers. And I thought I wonder what Congress says about this? I wonder how they think about these areas. And what are the messages that Congress is thinking?

So, I would love to say I did a lot of research, but I do have to give the credit to my exec, Major Kenny. She did a lot of research for me, but I asked her to go back and look at two 2009, 2010, and 2011 National Defense Authorization Acts. You know, there's lot of places you can look, but I deal with the NDAA, so I thought that would be the place to look. And what has Congress said on these issues and what things has Congress asked us to do?

But as we were looking and as Major Kenny and I were looking through some of the data she had collected, what we noticed is there were a lot of reports. And for those of you that deal with Congress a lot, they ask a lot of reports. And I thought why do they do that? Why do we have reports? So we asked a couple of staffers. And what the staffers told us is reports and hearings are used to exercise their right of oversight, specifically reports force agencies to plan and document those efforts. And also, the PSM seek legislation for reports if, one, there's not enough details provided at the hearings; or, two, a program is moving quickly; or, three, there's not wide Hill support for whatever the topic might be or if it's a partisan topic; and last but not least, it's new and it's different.

So, you'll see some of that in here and it relates -- I've tried to keep it just in these general groupings. So, what I'd like to do is kind of read you some legislation through these. Now, I won't bore you with deep, deep, but just to hear what Congress thinks about some of the topics that you're talking about.

So, we'll start with Regional Insecurity and Emerging Governance. If you look at the 2009 NDAA, a report discussion, they want a report on the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Iraq, specifically -- okay, now I can show you I'm getting old -- "specifically matters that are to be included are a description of any conditions placed on the United States combat operations by the government of Iraq; a description of any constraints placed on the United States military personnel, civilian personnel, or contractor personnel; a description of conditions which the United States military personnel, civilian personnel, or contractor personnel of contracts awarded by any department or agency of the United States Government could be tried by an Iraqi court for alleged crimes occurring both during the performance of official duties and during such others times and the protections that such personnel would be extended in an Iraqi court."

There's another report requested in the 2009 NDAA on the strategy of the United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, "specifically the President shall establish and implement a strategy of United States-led PRTs, which embedded PRTs and provincial support teams in Iraq. And the strategies should include, as a minimum, a mission statement and clearly defined objectives for the United States-led PRTS; a mission statement and clearly defined objectives for each United States-led PRT; and measures of effectiveness and performance indicators for meeting the objectives of the United States."

In the 2010 NDAA, further instruction for Iraq. "Modification of authorities

relating to program to build the capacity of foreign military forces, specifically temporary

limitation on amount of -- for building capacity to participate or support military and

stability operations. Of the funds used to carry out the program not more than $75 million

may be used during Fiscal Year 2010."

In the 2011 Ike Skelton Act there was a modification of a report on

responsible redeployment of the United States Armed Forces, "specifically an element is

an assessment of progress to transfer responsibility of programs, projects, and activities

carried out in Iraq by the Department of Defense or other United States governments. An

assessment of progress toward the goal of building the minimum of essential capabilities

of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior of Iraq, such as capabilities both

extant and remaining to be developed; major equipment necessary to achieve

capabilities; the type and level of support provided by the United States to address the

shortfalls; and the level of commitment, both financial and political, made by the

government of Iraq to develop such capabilities, including a discussion of resources used

by the government of Iraq to develop capabilities that the Secretary determines are not

minimum essential capabilities for the purposes of this paragraph."

At the same time, in the 2011 NDAA, authority to build the capacity of

Yemen Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Force. "The Secretary of Defense may, with

the concurrence of the Secretary of State, provide assistance during Fiscal Year 2011 to

enhance the ability of the Yemen Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Forces to conduct

counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its affiliates."

Pretty interesting when you look at that in your context of what you were

looking at for your panel.

Cyberspace is also an emerging area of capability and of concern. In

fact, during the Fiscal Year '09 NDAA, there is no language at all about cyber. But

remember, this is just as we're beginning to start thinking about cyber. It's when we're starting about establishing CYBERCOM and all of that.

But when you go to the 2010 NDAA, the Department of Defense, organization and management, "authority to allow private sector civilians to receive instruction at Defense cyber investigations training, Academy of the Defense Cyber Crime Center. The Secretary of Defense may permit eligible private sector employees to receive instruction at the Defense Cyber Investigation Training Academy operating under the discretion of the Defense Cyber Crime Center. No more than the equivalent of 200 full-time student positions may be filled at any one time by the private sector employees enrolled under this section on a yearly basis. Upon successful completion of the course of instruction in which enrolled, any such private sector employee may be awarded an appropriate certification or diploma."

2011, it was amazing to me as we looked through this the amount of proliferation of congressional language in the NDAA on cyber. I'll just read a couple of them.

"The Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of the military departments shall jointly carry out demonstration projects to assess the feasibility and advisability of using various business models and processes to rapidly and effectively identify innovative commercial technologies and apply such technologies to the Department of Defense and other cybersecurity requirements.

"Pilot programs on cybersecurity required. The Secretary of Defense shall support or conduct pilot programs on cybersecurity with respect to the following areas: threat sensing and warning; manage security services of cybersecurity within the defense-industrial base; use of private processes of infrastructure to address threats, problems, and vulnerabilities; process for securing the global supply chain; and

processes for threat sensing and security of cloud computing infrastructure."

There's more language on continuous monitoring of DOD information systems, strategy on computer software assurance, report on the cyber warfare policy of the Department of Defense, report on the Department of Defense progress in defending the department and the defense-industrial base from cyber events. And finally, there's a strategy for acquisition and oversight, Department of Defense Cyber Warfare Capabilities. There's a strategy that's required. "The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the secretaries of the military departments, shall develop a strategy to provide for the rapid acquisition of tools, applications, and other capabilities for cyber warfare. The United States Cyber Command and the cyber operations components. It should have basic elements and it should be safeguarded to prevent the circumvention of operational requirements and acquisition processes through informal relationships among the United States Cyber Command, the Armed Forces, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the abuse of quick-reaction processes otherwise available for the rapid fielding of capabilities."

And finally, "the establishment and maintenance of test and evaluation facilities and resources for the cyber infrastructure."

If you look at the rapid proliferation of the language, and you think about if we go back to why do people write language in there? Why do PSMs write language? Why do members want language? Think about it. That's something that's brand new. And think about I'm sure you all talked about on your panel about how we're struggling with this, you know, with cyberspace and cybersecurity, how we think about that. Well, look at what Congress has asked us to do to keep their role of oversight in here and look at the depth of things that Congress has asked us to look into. So it's interesting when you combine those two thought processes.

And finally, the United States and regional partner, I'm sorry I couldn't find much maritime stuff. Sorry.

"The increase in amount of available for cost of education and training of foreign military forces under Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program. The amendment will take place October 1st, and shall apply with respect to fiscal years; year-by-year extension of reimbursement of coalition nations for OEF and OIF," so modification of authority for reimbursement. "Using funds described in the above section, the Secretary of Defense may also assist in any key cooperating nations supporting the United States military operations and Operation Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan through the following: the provision of specialized training to personnel of that nation in connection with such operations, including training of such personnel before deployment and connection; the procurement and provision of supplies that the nation in connection with such operation and the procurement of specialized equipment and the loaning of such specialized equipment to that nation on a non-reimbursable basis in connection with such ones."

And finally, in '11, the extension of authority for reimbursement of certain coalition nations, they extend it and they extend it from '08 through '12, so that they're following all of this all the way along.

So you sit back and you go, all right, that was an interesting congressional lesson, right? So what? What's the big deal?

I remember when I was running the House office and my boss and I then, Major General Dan Darnell, and we had gone into a member's office and we had sat back and we had approached a member about an Air Force problem. And when we walked out of there, you know, the Air Force position was not -- did not win the day. And, you know, in Colonel Lori Robinson's brain the Air Force was clearly right, right?

Absolutely clearly right. And I looked at General Darnell and I said, General Darnell, you know, I don't understand. How come we were right and yet we're no further than we were a minute ago.

And General Darnell said this. He said, Lori, not one person is going to take a football, run down the football field, and score a touchdown. We're all going to take a football together and we're all going to score our touchdown together.

So what does that mean? I read you all that stuff because it's interesting, but, more importantly, I read you that stuff so you hear where Congress is on these things. One of the things that I've learned in the job that I'm in now is that while the way I talk is interesting, it's not compelling to them, right? What's important for me as the person that's in charge of legislative liaison and to invite and talk to my Chief and Secretary about, it's important for me to listen to them. It's important to me to understand where the member is. Is this a constituent issue? Is this a national-level issue? Is this a personal issue? Is this a professional staff issue?

It's important for me to sit back and listen to what they have to say, digest why are they saying it. Are they saying this because it's a Republican or Democrat or Tea Party issue? Are they saying this because it's something that somebody has fed them? Why are they saying what they say?

And once I listen and once I analyze, then I can be a better speaker (inaudible). I can answer their question in ways that answer their concerns, answer their thoughts, answer what it is they want to know about.

So, I read you this stuff because if I wrote a paper on any of these things I would not go to the NDAA, the first. I wouldn't consider going to think what Congress thinks about this. I wouldn't consider what it was that Congress wanted to know about, what reports were being asked for. Why were the reports being asked for? Was it

because they weren't getting enough information? Was it because that they needed to

know where we were? Was it because it's something new? Was it because they were

concerned?

And the more that I understand why they wrote the report and who

requested the language, then the better I can be writing the report. The more that I

understand and listen to Congress, the more effective that I can be. So why would you

want to worry about what Congress thinks about some of the stuff that you're talking

about in your panels? Why would you care?

Well, I would tell you, I'm sure a lot of the stuff that you wrote, a lot of the

papers that you put together, all of the discussion items that you have, at some point in

time will have to be addressed with Congress, whether it's money, whether it's

authorities, or whether it's a written law. And the more that you understand the history of

where something has been, the more that you understand what has happened, the better

off you can be to score the touchdown together.

I will tell you, quite frankly, every office call that I have, any time the

Secretary and the Chief talk, every time we go to address an issue, what we talk about

with a member or with the PSMs -- professional staff member -- or even the military

(inaudible) come early, come talk to us early, so that we can be a part of the solution; so

that we understand what you're thinking; so that we can voice our concerns early; so that

we can do this together. Don't come with a decision. Come and let us help and be a part

of the oversight.

And you have to think about this. There have been several occasions

that people can cite that we have brought a decision, the department has. We have

brought a solution. And it has gotten better with the help of Congress.

Now, is Congress always right and we're wrong? Absolutely not. Are we

always right and they're wrong? No, that's not true either. It truly can -- it should be and is a partnership as you go forward.

So I would only present to you, as you think about the future of your projects, you think about the future of the things that you do and the folks in the military, I would encourage you to sit back every now and then and think about how we present information. We present information in PowerPoint slides. We present information with a lot of -- now, what are those things called when it's a whole bunch of letters written together?

SPEAKER: Acronyms?

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Acronyms, thank you. I'm getting old; I should put my glasses back on. With a whole bunch of acronyms, right? And sometimes acronyms inside of acronyms, right? And we present information that is not easily absorbable often and -- I'll speak for the Air Force -- often technical and often degrees of technicality. It's more important, I would tell you, to sit back and listen to what they have to say as you try to bring your issues forward, your efforts forward, and you think about the things that we just talked about.

I'll ask, did anybody do -- when you did your paper, go look at what Congress has spoken about any of these things? You did? Were you surprised at the amount of language? Yeah.

Were you surprised at the amount of language? I was surprised at the amount of language and the specificity of the language. And more importantly, and now in my hat as LL, who's writing those reports? And I hope they're on time. (Laughter)

Anyway, so I'm going to stop there because I think that's kind of where I wanted to end. And I will be glad to take questions for a few minutes because I know that's actually more fun than people sitting there listening.

So, can I drink this water? Okay, thank you.

So I'll take the first question. Anybody have any questions? It's great if you don't because I know you guys are a hard crowd. Yes, ma'am?

SPEAKER: I had a question about when they hold hearings. And what I've noticed when I look up the organization I'm looking at for my research here, you know, they'll have a hearing (inaudible) list. But what I also notice is that depending on who's holding the hearing, some of the witnesses skew one extreme or another. And so, you know, who puts together that witness list? Is it really the PSMs or is it really a member driving that depending on their agenda, or can it be any of that? Because sometimes it's not -- they don't get the full spectrum of ideas on the topic. It's really one way or another.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: I would tell you it's all of the above. The chairman has the last vote on who the witnesses are going to be and then the PSMs have a huge influence on that. In fact, I got a note from a PSM about a week ago and it said, hey, Lori, we're thinking about, you know, this hearing on this topic. We were wanting this kind of a person. Have you got any names you can think of that would be helpful in that? But the final vote goes to the chairman on who he or she wants up there.

And I would tell you, in full honesty, while maybe one hearing perceived skewed in one manner, you can watch another hearing and (inaudible) on the same topic and it's skewed in a totally different manner, so in order to get the whole story.

You know, I'll kind of diverge for a minute. One of the things I talk to, in the Air Force we have what we call a wing commander's engagement, where in the summer we have our wing commanders come and bring their command chief and airmen that have been over in the AOR. And there I go again, AOR. And so -- but we have them meet members from their states and their district and we have them meet members

from their home.

And one of the things I try to tell everybody is that this is a dialogue. This isn't an interrogation, although sometimes it feels like it. This is a dialogue. This is an exchange of ideas. This is a way to inform and listen. This is not, you know, this. Sometimes it obviously gets heated depending upon what the specific topic is and whether it's in a hearing or in an office call, but I try to have our folks think about it as a dialogue. And again, a dialogue because this language here, they didn't think of this language all by themselves. You know, they have input and they have things from military members, from other people. So the more you make it a dialogue and the more they go -- as an example, this morning the Chief and the Secretary met with the Senate Armed Services Committee majority and minority staffers.

One of the problems in the Air Force is we are over end-strength in our officer corps. One of the things that contributes to over end-strength in the officer corps is the amount of cadets we have out at the cadet wing in the Air Force Academy. We are 500 cadets over. So one of the staffers said really? That contributes to your officer end-strength. And the Chief said yes.

And he goes, well, talk with the other services, see if it does the same thing. And if it doesn't, or if it does, maybe we can write some language that it doesn't count for that.

So if you make it more of a conversation, they're also there to help you. What language do we use to help you with this problem? And so that's the other reason to make it a conversation so that the language that you want, the language of the things that you're thinking about with your projects, the language of the things that your bosses are trying to do, you know how to talk to them.

Now, will it always work? Absolutely not. But is it worth trying to

understand that? Yes, ma'am. So I would say on both sides.

What else? Yes. Uh-oh.

SPEAKER: Thank you again for joining us.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Yes.

SPEAKER: And welcome back to Brookings. I've been on you could

say two sides of this foreseen function; this perceived foreseen function that Congress

has when it requests reports. And think tankers and researchers usually feed into those

reports where staffers will say, you know, what questions should we ask, with the idea

that if we ask hard questions it will force a response, not just an answer to those

questions, but a policy shift on those issues by the agencies that's required to do them.

And the flipside is when I was in OSD we looked at those reports as

either a pain in the butt or something often to be ignored.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Right.

SPEAKER: So, I wonder, you know, as you spoke about the dialogue,

how effective is the forcing function in actually changing policy? And what are the ways

that perhaps it might be improved?

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: So, I would also add a third category

for the reports and that's don't tell them very much in the reports, right? First, how

effective is the dialogue? I have discovered -- because I ran the House office for a year, I

walked back into the Rayburn Building and I was getting hugs from folks. Oh, it's great to

have you back. It's so nice to have you back. I can pick up the phone and call almost

any PSM on the House side and we can have this dialogue. And we can have the

dialogue about, you know, hey, come in and talk about it. I'm still working on the Senate.

So I believe in the dialogue.

And I believe that the dialogue isn't just at posture hearing or not just at

markup, but you should have the dialogue all the time. You know, my schedule's been

crazy, but, you know, it would be great to be able to sit down once a week with PSMs or,

you know, and have those kind of discussions with the staff directors. Because I really

do believe it shapes the language. Now, again, there's lots of other input to language

and so -- but the shaping.

          The policy part I think is actually harder. And I think if I -- I think part of

the problem is the flipside of that is there's so many reports, right? And so -- in fact,

there's a report that's required this year about ISR. And the only reason I'm even halfway

sensitive because it took me about a day to read it about four or five times to understand

exactly what was requested. But what was requested was each service needed to talk

about their ISR, then you needed to talk about where it was. Was it in garrison or

overseas? Then you needed to go, okay, and what are we thinking about building? And

how does all that look architecturally? And then all of that gets rolled up to the Secretary

of Defense and it gets sent over. Okay?

          That's pretty complicated, I think, you know. And what behavior -- really

the real question is what behavior is that trying to change, right? What is the behavior

you're trying to get at with that? I think the more that we understand it as the way it was

described to me, the reasons why that we have these reports, the more we can ask what

behavior are you trying to change, the better you can answer the question and then get a

better policy shift, I think. But I don't think we look at it like that yet. And this is just Lori

thinking. I think we look at it more as answer the questions, don't get us in trouble, you

know, get it off your desk and move on. And I think very rarely does it end up with a

policy change unless it's a significant, you know, very loud, a very public discussion.

          So that -- and I'm with you. I track reports every week. I mean, I watch

reports every week and we do what we call "murder boredom." You know, pay attention,

everybody gets together and make sure we can answer the questions that needed to be.

But yes, we don't get to that very often, I don't think. I haven't seen it.

SPEAKER: If I can ask a follow-up.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Absolutely.

SPEAKER: So if you were to take your hat off and move into the role,

say, of advising PSMs, what would you advise them in the crafting of report requirements

that would make them more likely to be answered in the way that they're looking for?

Because you sort of see it going in both directions.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Yeah, yeah. So the way I would do

that is I would acknowledge the work that has been done, you know. Acknowledge that

there is a position, the department has taken a position in something, and don't ask for

work that we've already answered three or four or five times. It's just worded differently.

Let's -- if we want to pick up the football and move down the field a little bit, acknowledge

the work that's been done. And now how do we look forward, right, to where we want to

go versus rehash some of the stuff that's been done?

I mean, here's a classic. On the Joint Staff the last two years I had the

privilege of being part of the bomber study, right? The long-range strike bomber study.

And so from the first study to almost the end; I moved right beforehand. Well, in the 2011

National Defense Authorization Act, you know, there's a question that we've already

answered a couple times. Well, what have you been doing, Air Force? What did you do

that for, you know? What have you been doing the last two years? Why? You know,

that kind of thing where we had that dialogue already.

So if you've got a new one, let's just move out on the new one. That

would probably be the one thing that I would say.

The other part, though, that I have to continually remember is, especially

for the professional staff, they've been there forever. Right? They've watched the ebb

and flow of almost every single issue of significance. They can tell you the history of

everything. And so as of just today, when we -- the Vice Chief was over, was talking

about the bomber. And it was like, well, let me tell you what you said back on the other.

Now let me tell you what you're saying today. Nothing's changed. So what's different?

So I think that's part our message, right? We need to work on our

message better. But the other part is it's done, let's move on. The Secretary of Defense

made a decision.

Yes?

SPEAKER: The big issue of the day seems to be the federal budget.

What Air Force-specific issues dealing with that are you sort of having to get your arms

around and explain to Congress or actually seeking, you know, help during this dialogue?

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Right. So I would tell you, every office

call that the Secretary, the Chief, the Undersecretary, the Vice Chief, any of the members

of the United States Air Force, independent of the committee that they're serving on, the

first thing that they talk about is the Continuing Resolution and what it's doing. And

knowing that, you know, the only people that can do anything about it is the

appropriators, but knowing that it's definitely a whole of Congress problem.

The things that the Chief and the Secretary talk about often are a lot of

programs that we can't put contracts to, right: F18 (inaudible) radar, some of the

MILCOM that we can't put money to, some of the issues in our long-term what-are-we-

going-to-build, those kind of contracts from an investment standpoint. From an O&M

standpoint, right now we already know that we won't be able to pay our members in the

month of September. So those are the kind of things that we talk about when they go talk

to the members of Congress.

What else? Yes, sir.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BURTOLE: Ma'am, Lieutenant Colonel Jason Burtole, ma'am. One of your fellows this year.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Oh, so, okay. You know, one of my fellows. Be careful what you ask. (Laughter)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BURTOLE: Yes, ma'am. So this should be a softball.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: No, no, no.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BURTOLE: Okay. My question is about earmarks. So there's a moratorium on earmarks. And my question, ma'am -- I've been meaning to ask you, but I thought this would be good -- do you see any potential opportunities and threats to some of the things that we've been talking about today with the moratorium on earmarks?

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: So, now, I haven't seen anything in writing and I don't know anything official, but I am hearing that it'll be called something different. (Laughter) And I forget what the word is, but I do believe that we will have an earmark by a different name, you know, because it's one of the things that the members feel very strongly about, especially because it's some way that they can take care of their constituents or their state. But I heard that rumor; I don't know that for a fact.

Now, let's say -- let's put that aside and say it is pure rumor because I really don't know that for a fact. Let's say that we don't have earmarks. For the military specifically I can tell you as a wing commander, one of the things that I enjoyed doing the most was being able to know that I had things in my major command budget that was below, you know, the actual funding line and to be able to talk to members of Congress about the things that my installation needed and their ability to help with that outside of

our budget.

I will tell you, also, that there will still be pressure from the Congress to support. It'll just be different pressure now. And so we'll see how some of that will play out.

But it was one of the things that I know that the members of Congress, both on the House and the Senate, enjoy doing -- and I'll just speak from a military perspective -- to help a military installation and that would make them something that they could go, hey, look at what I did and what I was able to do to help them.

So, what else? Yes? Another fellow.

SPEAKER: I'm not one of (inaudible).

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: I know.

SPEAKER: Thank you. Good to see you, General. Thanks for speaking with us.

I am doing a defense fellowship at the State Department. And I was wondering if you could comment on Congress' seemingly increasing role in foreign policy, whether it's the amount of CODELs that travel overseas, whether it's' calling for certain leaders to step down, you know, suggesting military tactics such as no-fly zones, et cetera. It seems to me that that is increasing, at least historically, and I wonder if you could just comment on that as you deal with that.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: You bet. So let's talk about CODELs for a second. I had the privilege to travel on a could of CODELs with Speaker Pelosi right when Congress flipped. And, you know, after a while, at the end of the day, when you're sitting down and you're chatting with the members' staff, and I'm like -- and, in fact, I went and had the privilege to go on a trip that went to Damascus, Syria. And so -- to meet with the President. And if you all recall, that was a big hullabaloo, you know. I mean,

remember, you know, the President and what's the hullabaloo? And, I mean, it was just huge. And it was right up until the very end that we knew for a fact that we were going to go to Syria.

So, at the end of the day, you know, sitting in the delegation room, chatting with a couple of the staff, I was why are we here? You know, why do you -- why are we here, you know? I'm trying to understand. And it goes back to their oversight role and responsibility. And so that's why you see CODELs go to the places that they go.

The other thing, though, I would tell you this year that's a little different of something that I've seen was the House Armed Services Committee decided, because it -- remember, now we flipped back to Republican with a lot of new members on the HASC, and so Chairman McKeon made a conscious decision to do a couple of educational sessions and a couple of educational CODELs. And he took them, a whole bunch of new members, over to Iraq and Afghanistan, so that they could see -- eyes -- of what's happening up close and personal as they are trying to make decisions about this upcoming year and this upcoming -- the questions and hearings and all that stuff. So I thought that was a little different, you know, still the oversight part, but also the question.

I would tell you, quite frankly, the other part, like no-fly zones and all that, in Lori Robinson's opinion that's politics. You know, that's politics and that's not just trying to say, hey, we want to run the department. That has, to me, a much more political overtone than a CODEL with its oversight responsibilities. So I would kind of delineate it that way. That's just me, though.

SPEAKER: One more quick question.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Okay.

SPEAKER: Question.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Oh. I was like, ah, I thought you were

seeing a hand I didn't see.

SPEAKER: So did I. But thank you. That was (inaudible).

COLONEL LIVINGSTON: Thanks. Good morning, ma'am. Colonel Doc Livingston and I'm a fellow as well and I'm with Congressional Research Service for the last year.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Awesome.

COLONEL LIVINGSTON: So I've had a lot of exposure with the Legislative Affairs folks. In the -- the associates that I've been dealing with over the past year, the sense that they have as far as why they mandate a lot of reports is that the services -- I won't put it to the Air Force specifically -- are not to that level of detail of describing their ways and means, whereas they describe objectives. We will provide capability to the combat and commander without saying we'll provide X-number of Y to do Z. Could you address how we as a servicer are dealing with that or if that's intentional to give us latitude left and right?

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: I would tell you a couple things. It's interesting to me to watch our leadership kind of think through some things not in a report context, but more in a hearing context because that's kind of the same thing in a much constrained environment. It depends on, I think, often where we are in a decision, where we're going with a decision. As an example, if we're going to move force structures someplace, you know, when we make the decision and how we approach Congress with that decision is different. So I think part of that is in the report.

Are we ready to show everything? Are we ready to kind of lay out A through Z branches and sequels? We might not be ready to do that yet in a written form because maybe decisions aren't made all the way.

The other part, I would also say, is, again, sometimes we don't

understand why the report's being asked for. And if we don't understand why, you know,

is it because we didn't give the full disclosure? Is it because we didn't go down the road

of A through D ways and means? Then sometimes we answer the question we want to

and not the question that's being asked.

So I guess I would couch it in those two ways and things that I think

about with all of that, so.

SPEAKER: General, no behalf of Brookings and the federal executive

fellows, thank you very much for your time and insight.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you very much.

Thank you. That was fun. (Applause)

SPEAKER: A quick break and then we'll start our next panel scheduled

at 1:20.

(Recess)

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PANEL 3: THE CHANGING MARITIME ENVIRONMENT:

Moderator:

COMMANDER SCOTT BUNNAY (USN)
RAND
"Maritime Disorder and Governance of Ship Registries"

Panelists:

COMMANDER JOSH HIMES (USN)
Navy Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies
"Somali Piracy: Follow the Money"

COMMANDER JEFFREY RANDALL (USCG)
Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institution
"America's Leatherman Tool: The Coast Guard's Law Enforcement

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. MURPHY: Well, good afternoon again. My name is Martin Murphy and it's my great pleasure to introduce what some of us on this panel, at least, would argue the most important subject of the day, what is going on in the maritime environment and going on at sea. After all, you know, the sea has been important since the dawn of time and continues to be important now. One thing it is definitely not is manmade.

But I think there was something that the Major General said which sparked my interest and the interest, I think, of anyone who is connected with the sea, the fact that when she looked she could find no reference to maritime issues. Although it covers, what, 80 percent of the world's surface, it carries 90 percent of the world's trade; it is a remarkably invisible medium and one that people have commented on by calling those who do not see it "sea blind."

It's a naturally unforgiving environment, but it always has been politically challenging and the three speakers are going to talk about those challenges today.

Now, we're going to take it in the order of Commander Bunnay will be talking about maritime disorder and will be focusing particularly on the issue of ship registries and open registers. Commander Josh Himes will be talking about Somali piracy, again, a subject you cannot get away from. And Commander Jeffrey Randall will be talking about the role of the Coast Guard.

So, just quickly, you've got the bios but Commander Bunnay is currently assigned to the RAND Corporation, he was a naval aviator, served in both the United States and Vicenza, Italy. Nice town, Vicenza, that must have been a nice assignment. He's also done his time in Iraq. He's a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, has done his time in the Pentagon, and also holds a master of science degree in management technology from the University of Virginia.

Commander Himes, also in the Navy, a fellow at CSIS, he served in the Pentagon at the director of Intelligence and on the Joint Staff, and serving as the deputy director of intelligence at the National Military Command. He's also served overseas in Afghanistan and at the Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth. He's also served at sea, and he told me just before we climbed on the podium, that his next assignment is in the Gulf with the Bush carrier strike group. I think in a couple of months, is it?

And finally we have Commander Randall, who's from the Coast Guard, and he will -- he is serving here at the Brookings Institution, served as the commanding officer of two Coast Guard vessels, the Staten Island and the Walnut, and he's done extensive work in fisheries and law enforcement. He's a graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and he undertook his postgraduate education at the University of Washington.

So, Commander Bunnay, you are first up.

COMMANDER BUNNAY: Thank you very much. Thanks to Brookings for hosting this and inviting some folks from some other places to come in and at least have our say, if you will. I spent a lot of time, almost 20 years, in the Navy flying and admittedly, a lot of what I've done before focused on power projection, one of the Navy's core missions, core capabilities, and been to Iraq a couple times, never flew over Afghanistan, and in coming to RAND, one of my goals was to kind of branch out and maybe get back to the core of what the Navy is about. So, that's why I -- I looked at maritime security partnered with -- on an ongoing RAND project that was self-funded on maritime security and wanting to get smart on a little bit of the things that the Navy does or that the maritime forces are concerned about outside of aircraft carriers off somebody's coast line, and as I've learned, there's a whole lot more to it.

In *Sea Power: A Guide for the 21st Century*, Geoffrey Till boils the sea's contribution to human development to four main attributes. He says it's a source of power and dominion, which the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps are pretty familiar with. He also talks to the resources it contains -- fisheries and oil, if you will, and we have dwindling fisheries, Deepwater Horizon, and the oil challenge/energy challenge to the future is going to come and potentially be solved from the sea. For its utility as a means of transportation and trade, already said that about 90 percent of the world's commerce applies to the world's oceans. And for its importance as a means of exchanging information.

And for the last bit I would say what the Navy is involved in right now off Japan, of humanitarian relief, what we did in the previous tsunami in Indonesia, it's just a way of exchanging ideas, helping other people, helps our nation, helps our Navy, and helps us move forward.

To address these last three issues that are not power projection,

destroyers and cruisers off coast line conducting battle at sea, the cooperative strategy

for the 21st century, the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard combined strategy

statement lists maritime security among the six core capabilities of the maritime forces.

Maritime security targets, the commons that enables commerce,

promotes stability, guarantees freedom of navigation, all while squelching, or attempting

to, elicit activity. To achieve this, we need much more than, again, cruisers, destroyers,

aircraft carriers, submarines plying the world's oceans. Instead, a framework that

addresses broad factors. The project I'm involved with at RAND addresses governance,

society, economics, and the interactions, and just again, these broad factors -- broad

factor analysis enable a comprehensive view of the dynamics that shape maritime

behavior and provide a foundation -- or a better foundation for globally inclusive solutions.

The closest focus of my work has been on the governance problem and

more specifically flag registries. What I've got out of the research I'll talk to you some

high points now and then touch on it again in summation. One is illicit activity is viable

and profitable where governance and accountability are weak. Second point is maritime

forces must remain committed to fostering and sustaining relationships with international

partners. And the last piece, kind of a resultant of the first two is persistent disorder will

drive maritime forces to continually engage associated actors to diffuse threats and

counter illicit activities.

For those of you unfamiliar with maritime environment flag registries, not

to be confused with flags of convenience, where the project originally started was the

derisive term, at least from an industry perspective, of flags of convenience where I can

go out and get a flag or register my vessel anywhere in the country at the cheapest rate,

and that -- you know, we were going to point the finger at flags of convenience for driving

disorder and the project has morphed from where we started to what I'm going to talk

about today.

So, what are flag registries? Under the rules and accepted practices of the use of the sea currently codified in the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLS, flag state emerges as the vehicle for governance at sea, so if you want to do governance at sea, flag states are going to do it, they can sign the treaties, they enforce laws and regulations.

This arrangement is historical. It finds its roots in the inextricable link dating from the 13th century between ship registration, flag, and nationality. Article 92 of UNCLS says, "Ships shall sail and be registered under the flag of one state only." The process of flagging a vessel provides the ownership, acts of rights -- rights of access and protection afforded by the state, but they also tax upon that ship the benefits with commensurate levels of oversight and responsibility. This relationship between individual owners and state forms the basis -- fundamental basis for denoting accountability and maintaining order at sea. In general, the flag registry system as it stands today assumes and is best equipped for participants that act in good faith, and most do.

A look back in history lets us know that the flag registries have changed over time. Command economic policies of the European monarchies provided preconditions to establish closely governed systems, not the world economy that people talk about today. Maritime, and maritime commerce in particular, form tight, inseparable system in which naval power protected the maritime assets that were the ultimate source of its effectiveness.

The traditional closed flag states of old governed through accountable relationships, possessed both the jurisdiction to enforce its will over the entire system and the ability to impose costs for deviations. Then, as now, in addition to legal accountability within the court, many other kinds of accountability were used in the governance process

to include peer and reputational accountability.

The practice of open registries now accounting for approximately 55 percent of the world fleet was established in 1916 when Panamanian corporations with foreign owners were allowed to register their vessels (inaudible) the distinction. Closed registries traditionally is an American-owned company -- or to register your vessel in America today you have to have American ownership to go under American flag. Open registries means you can -- the corporation or the owner of the vessel can live anywhere in the world and register their vessel in Panama, for example.

The United States was an early adopter of the open registry movement and with its close ties saw Panama as a very good solution. Businessmen and nation-states partnered to exploit the doctrine of sovereignty that has traditionally served to protect states from external accountability. Recognized the sovereignty of flag states, Article 91 of UNCLS affords nations the latitude to fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to its ships. So, again, no single standard, but also expects there must be a genuine link between the state and the ship, so at least there's one standard that UNCLS puts upon states who grant its flag to a vessel.

John Mansell in his book *Flag State Responsibility* postulates, "A nation-state, in exercising its sovereignty, can make the conscious economic decision not to exercise certain aspects of its authority as a flag state in order to attract tonnage if it either does not or cannot conform to acceptable standards." In other words, they can lower their standards because they want the business. So, again, those are the flag states that have weak lower levels or weak levels of governance.

He goes on to state that "ironically, the sovereign act of a grant of nationality through registration can be a negation of sovereign responsibility," so as a sovereign nation they can choose to ignore whatever they want. That's partially what

sovereignty means, that's not what people want it to mean, though.

So, the protection of sovereignty enables flag states to ignore UNCLS responsibilities. As flag states can also fix the requirement needed for a genuine link, the weak open registries often dictating few restrictions and no nationality ties, present criminals and unscrupulous actors the opportunity to exploit weaknesses and to escape accountability for transgressions in the global system that is equipped for participants to act in good faith.

While open registries change the mix of rights and responsibilities from a fixed set of operating conditions to more of a business proposition, open registries are neither inherently weak nor do they automatically contribute to disorder. Instead, the combination of complexities in the open registry system, when accompanied by weak governance, facilitate maritime disorder in this singularly unique global environment. Merchant ships, I assert, are the most independent objects in any industry and although flagged, may operate without any allegiance to nation or cause.

Now, why exactly should the Navy -- U.S. Navy or maritime forces care about open registries? I return to my opening points. First, illicit activity is viable and profitable where governance and accountability are weak. The open registry system will not change, so we're probably going to have to live with weak registries. So, if we truly seek maritime security, we must confront the (inaudible) disorder at all levels. Kind of the partnering -- a bit of partnering, what we've heard about today, diplomatically through the interagency process, the U.S. is not a signatory of UNCLS, maybe that could be our first step. We need to partner with nongovernmental organizations, again, a recurring theme from, I think, the first presentation today.

With no global government, global governance involves strategic interactions amongst entities, all entities exercising influence, and there will also be

traditional military operations. If we do those three, it provides the best chance to minimize disorder and from a navy perspective or military perspective, we want to be able to focus our resources and engage with the more powerful threats and adversaries out there.

Second part, the maritime forces must remain committed to fostering and sustaining relationships with international partners. Again, it's vital that engagement addresses governance. It's not just training their forces, it's from a nation perspective, how do they govern, how do they govern their economy, how do they govern their maritime industry. Some of our partners are strong open registries and we should work to bolster their efforts. Others may need help improving their registries.

The message we want to get across, if partner nations want any hope of enhancing security, promoting regional trade, and preserving the environment along with dwindling resources off their coastline, they should progress towards adopting and enforcing international best practices, but the U.S. can't come in -- or Western powers can't come in without understanding the security challenges of our partners. West African nations don't have the resources, they don't have the perspective or history that we have, and if we try to shove our ideas down their throat, probably not going to be very successful. But I would say historically naval interactions and security cooperation efforts have a long history of forward overall international relations, so sailors have been ambassadors for a very long time.

Lastly, as disorder will persist in localized pockets throughout the globe, maritime forces will continue to receive tasking to counter associated threats and illicit activities. Josh is going to talk to you in a minute on piracy; so again, this low level threat that's very real is probably not going away. We need codified rules of engagement reflecting the full spectrum of a military warfare that leverage vetted and practiced tactics,

techniques, and procedures to best prepare our forces to prevail in combat and also the ever-growing court of public opinion.

To finish where I started with another thought from Geoffrey Till, "The maintenance of good order at sea requires an improved level of awareness, effective policy, and integrated governance."

Thanks.

MR. MURPHY: Scott, thank you very much. Jeff.

COMMANDER HIMES: (inaudible) for being here. Commander Josh Himes, Navy over at CSIS. Going to touch on Somali piracy. Frankly, this wasn't a topic I intended to look at when I came here to CSIS and it's -- the walkabout analogy I thought was a good one because it's kind of the same way I feel.

As an intel officer being at CSIS I feel like I'm at an Asian buffet lunch every day. There are so many things to look at it's kind of hard to focus on one thing. So, this has become kind of a secondary topic, primarily out of some pent up frustration and emotion going back to 2005 serving in Bahrain at Navy Command there and kind of the first time where the Navy was more or less directed to try and deal with this is we saw the spike in the Gulf of Aden off the east coast of Somalia, so my intent, basically, was to try and look at the problem maybe from a different perspective and determine what needs to be done that hasn't been done over the past five, six years to really have an effect here.

In addition, as Dr. Murphy mentioned, I'm on orders to head out to a strike group that will be operating in the Gulf this summer and I'll be responsible for the intel equities that are working down there, at least on the U.S. side, so as the saying goes, what my boss finds interesting, I find fascinating. So, that's where we are.

I'm going to try and break this into three pieces. You know, first my goal

was just to scope the problem because, believe it or not, there's really not a lot of

consistency on defining the actual breadth and depth of the problem, look at what I call

the off shore triad of solutions which have been really the core of what we've been doing

the past few years, and then look at what are the things ashore that need to be

addressed, perhaps to really affect this.

So, that's where I've been going in the process, really, not a finished

product until probably April, hopefully something for proceedings but I have to report at

this point I'm more frustrated now than I was back in 2005 when this started and I'll give

you a couple examples of why that's the issue.

I'm not the only one who's frustrated. A couple of comments, just recent

comments just this month in March out of the State Department. Assistant Secretary

Jose Fernandez, who has economics, energy, and business, used the then "clear and

present danger to international maritime environment" to describe piracy. The next day

Secretary Clinton, in front of the Senate Appropriations Committee, in pretty emotional

language basically said, hey, I'm fed up with this. We need to do more to make it clear

that everyone else needs to get on board.

So, there's definitely, I'd say, a growing level of frustration with the lack of

progress. And a couple of data points just to -- you know, to expand on that. Somali

pirates now hold 30 vessels, I believe. If you look back to the middle of last year I think it

was 20. Hostage numbers have gone up into the 600s. Last year they were down in the

mid 300s. And we've seen increased concerns about violence, not just the Quest, which

obviously made headlines, but threats against the Indian hostages, anything from South

Korea that comes by just because of interdiction efforts and success at interdicting folks

at sea.

Ransom levels, back when this really spiked in 2005, $150, 200K, now

we're talking averages upwards of 5-, $5.5 million per ship. So, frankly, the return on

investment if you're a Somali pirate has never been better getting your share. I know

PowerPoint was -- not criticized, but addressed as a military only thing -- but if I could

show you a picture of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, it really gives a great

example of where a problem that was 200 nautical miles off the cost has gone to 1,300

nautical miles off the coast in a span of five years, and you really get a sense of just how

much this has grown in time. We even have folks like INTERTANKO now which runs the

association that owns the majority of tankers saying, if this isn't dealt with in a different

way, they're concerned, the potential for oil flows coming out of the Middle East between

Asia and the West are going to be disrupted in a way that actually affects commodities.

We've seen new sophistication and efficiency using mother ships. I think

a few years ago there were maybe two, three, now numbers -- a little bit varied -- but

somewhere upwards of 15 to 20 mother ships. Practical impact there, typically in

January, for example, when you have monsoon season, not a huge capability to get out

in the Indian Ocean. I think there were seven incidents back in last January. This

January the number is 37. So, clearly you've got a problem that's not going the right

direction and now you have a pretty good agreement, I think, that you've got at least in

the south, linkages to Al-Shabaab, perhaps just a tax, protection tax, but it looks like

although that's been discussed with the intel community and for many years dismissed, it

looks like that's probably a pretty reasonable assessment.

Having said that, not everyone agrees that this is really a problem that

we need to be dealing with.

A couple of estimates on the total cost of piracy to the international

economy, 7 to 12 is what's been thrown about of late, 7- to $12 billion. But some would

argue that's just the cost of doing business when you're talking a, you know, trillion-dollar

maritime shipping industry value, and frankly, if you look at the numbers, there's 25- to

30,000 ships that transit through that area annually. We're talking less than a third of a

percent that actually are attacked and actually hijacked. And frankly, a lot of the ships

that carry the international commerce we're concerned about are not vulnerable to

Somali pirates whether they're moving too fast or just too large and not at risk.

The other piece you could look at is the money involved, different

numbers but 150-, $200 million in ransoms if you look at '09 or '10, but if you look at

what's coming in from the Diaspora and remittances into Somalia, you're talking 1- to

$1.5 billion. They're coming in that way, so just in the scope of what's arriving in country

you could also argue a much smaller fish than other things that we need to be looking at.

And lastly, not to give too many examples, but even just the breadth of

the problem within Somalia, you have reporting that indicates that you've got external

relationships in the UK and Dubai and Minnesota, other places where they're providing

funding, possibly training, from Al-Shabaab and other elements. (inaudible) reported that

back in 2008. Just in this February in commentary talking about organized militias with

informants in foreign ports, networks of negotiators, money launderers, arms runners,

again, collaboration with the militant Islamists and so on, and quite a bit of reporting along

those lines, but at the same time, UK's SOCA, the Serious Organised Crime Agency,

provided some briefings just two weeks ago at an ad hoc meeting on Somali finances

and frankly came up with the fact that they don't have really any good solid evidence that

indicates there's either an international or Diaspora connection of any substance that

really is driving this business model.

Even looking at the construction in Nairobi in Eastleigh, in Little

Mogadishu that everyone talks about, the number of actual linkages you could make

back to people with money in Puntland or otherwise is pretty minimal.

Steig Hanson, another individual who spent a lot of time on the ground there, came up with the same conclusion after his interviews in 2009. So, even just coming to terms with how difficult the problem is is not really bound at this point.

The offshore triad I mentioned, really three pieces that have been the focus of effort up to now, Navy task force, task forces that are out there, attempts to improve maritime best practices, and legal prosecution of those that are actually captured in the act or potentially in the act of piracy.

We can talk about those in Q&A just for the sake of time, but those are things that at this point are being tweaked and adjusted to be improved upon, but suffice to say, based on the numbers that I mentioned earlier, not really having the desired effect.

So, I would say, at this point, it's probably not a stretch to say that the offshore solution and the efforts that have been ongoing are getting to the problem. So, what I was hoping to get at, really, was what needs to be done or what could be done potentially ashore to address this. And as I mentioned before, there's a lot of frustration on this and we've gotten to a point -- you know, I was talking to someone yesterday even at CSIS who -- you know, an announced pacifist who said, why don't we just get these guys and shoot them when we catch them? And she's not the only one who said that. We had a Norwegian shipping magnate just last month who was roundly criticized in his home country for basically saying the same thing. Even the CEO of the Naval Institute, General Wilkinson, has come across mostly saying that that is probably something that needs to be done. I think his quote was, you know, "Taking the offensive, killing pirates at sea, in the harbors where they dock their vessels, and what are now their safe havens and homes in the coastal areas of Northern Somalia."

So, that's a common frustration, in fact, to get a maritime quote from the

Senate, Senator Mark Kirk, who is also a naval reservist, in that discussion with Senator

Clinton -- I'm sorry, Secretary Clinton, commented that, you know, his proposed solution

was putting a round in the rudder and when they run out of food and water, too bad.

So, I think that talks to the need to get to a different solution. We've

started to see some initiatives on the beach that I think are getting to where we need to

go. Puntland right now has started to develop an anti-piracy militia using outside, non-

state entities, not necessarily aligned with the crisis group, though, but folks like Serason

and others who have a history working with mercenaries.

The TFG was going to do this as well but it doesn't look like they've

decided that's a good idea based on international pressure, although Puntland appears to

be continuing with this. There's been reporting of a marine force that's starting to be built

and I suspect the incident last week where there was an attempt to recover the Danish

hostages probably included some of those elements.

Obviously there are some concerns that we can talk about in the Q&A, if

anyone wants to go there, about having militias working independent and without the

transparency of international coordination, but you can see how that would potentially

have an impact on the other hostages, the 600+ that are currently held, as well as NGOs

working on the ground and other things that would complicate that.

So, what that really leaves us is, how do you effect the actual business

enterprise and at the end of the day that's really what this is. There was just a quote this

week which I thought was pretty remarkable where a pirate out of Haradara basically

said, "We need to free ships within a shorter period of time instead of keeping them for a

long time and incurring more expenses in guarding them. We have to free them at a

lower ransom so that we can hijack more ships." It reminded me of basically a car

salesman trying to get his last year's inventory off the lot because he had new things

coming, and so the fact that that's kind of the calculus ongoing right now, I think, is

another example of a lack of progress.

So, as I looked at this what I really wanted to find out was whether the

business model that's been going since 2005, you know, has kind of led to a McPiracy, if

you will, or a franchise kind of environment that has gotten so broad and so vast that you

can't really address it either at sea, which obviously we haven't really done, or even

ashore because of the number of nodes that are out there. EU NAVFOR previously cited

over 70 piracy camps that hold the pirate action groups. I've mentioned the number of

mother ship that are out there. But really the question is, at the higher levels of the

organization, is there still a -- what we would call a high demand, low density, construct

that you could actually somehow influence?   And it appears that there still is some room

there for maneuver.

There's some debate but it appears somewhere between 14 and 20

investors that really fund the core of this industry, maybe 50 pirate leaders who then are

contracted out from those investors to the different pirate action groups which number in

the 100s and then we get to the large numbers of foot soldiers, in the 1000s.

Additionally you have a limited number of professional negotiators,

somewhere under 20, that are really the ones that provide the core for that negotiation

and interpretation to those working the ransom negotiations.

So, in light of that is there a mechanism, (inaudible) process or

otherwise, that can be used to influence this model? And from what I've seen, I would

say yes, there is, but it's certainly not a silver bullet and it's certainly not a quick solution

that's going to get you there quickly, and it's certainly not going to be done without

regional and even local coordination.

And I would say three aspects of this, and I'll wrap up with this, there's a

legal aspect that needs to be expanded. Right now the focus is on prosecuting the foot

soldiers at sea. Until we get to a point where, one, you can take those foot soldiers and

then build a case against those back on the beach that had them there and make that

linkage between the event at sea and the coordinated business enterprise that's driving

that, and somehow plea bargaining or other -- get back to those folks, you're really not

going to have a successful legal piece.

Two, security aspect -- and I mentioned Puntland starting their own

militia -- other initiatives that they have ongoing that are a little more coordinated with the

crisis group and the UN that have some promise. We can talk about concerns about

corruption but for the sake of time I'll leave that to the side -- that discussion has changed

a bit in the past year or two as well.

And then, most importantly, I think, is this third financial aspect in which

there's some initial efforts in the region to create financial intelligence units out of, you

know, Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen, Seychelles, where you have elements that can actually

start to build, you know, a forensic capability to address the environment within Somalia.

It really needs to be extended to Puntland and Galmudug specifically but I don't think

we're there yet, but that's really where this needs to go. And hopefully within the next 6

months to 12 months, that's where things will be going because, frankly, you know, as

long as you have a cash-based business cycle, you really can't get to the problem unless

you're on the ground in that area.

Just two concluding thoughts. First, and this kind of goes back to the

more kinetic recommendations, and part of this comes from Stephen Carmel, who's one

of the senior vice presidents over at Maersk who said, "It's worth remembering, there's far

worse business models than the current one that the Somali pirates use." And the

concern about unintended consequences, if you take and change the crew from an asset

to a liability, for example, in how you deal with this, if you look at the Southeast Asian model, crew really was kind of disposable and it was the cargo on the ship that is where you made your money. We certainly wouldn't want to see that kind of transition happen and we certainly wouldn't want to see Shabaab become the highest bidder for folks as a way of pirates making money either, so just one concern to keep in mind is how you effect that model.

But at the end of the day, you know, without something else other than that offshore triad to provide effective solution, I don't think we're going to get any further than we are right now.

MR. MURPHY: Josh, thank you.

MR. RANDALL: Okay, thank you, Scott, Josh, for making those presentations and, Dr. Murphy, it's a pleasure to have you here as well.

I'll go ahead and start because I end up being the one that ends up dealing with all these problems in the maritime domain generally. I am a career Coast Guard person and my background is in law enforcement and I unfortunately end up dealing with the outputs of some of these other issues that -- and maritime disorder that we have. And I think it's clear that, you know, from the previous two presentations, it's not always tranquil on our oceans and while maritime issues may not be -- well, while maritime issues may be about as popular as the tuna salad sandwiches that were out there at lunch, I think it's -- you know, it's not registering a large blip on the political radar in the Washington, D.C., area, but all I have to say is, you heard the statistic, but let's shut down the ports for a day and see what happens.

And I think if you did something like that -- it's the same way if you had it cyber right there. If you had any kind of cyber incident, all of the sudden you'd get a lot of national attention directed on the issue. And unfortunately, this problem doesn't have a

lot of salience until something actually goes wrong, and in the Gulf of Aden, we don't see it so therefore it's not necessarily as big on our radar as it should be.

But as the trends toward globalization continue, some of these nefarious actors are going to continue to expand and integrate their networks and their criminal enterprises on -- and utilize the oceans for those enterprises, and we, as the maritime forces, are going to have to deal with that.

And for about 200 years, the Coast Guard's been dealing with that. You know, from back -- we were going to avoid the reference to the Barbary pirates, but ever since the days of the Barbary pirates, you know, we've been dealing with issues on the ocean, and the Coast Guard has been a national police force, national maritime police force, and more recently, an international maritime police force dealing with a lot of these issues as we see more resource extraction, food and energy extraction, and then competing uses of our oceans.

And despite our relatively small size, our organization fills a pretty unique niche because not only can we have good mil-to-mil with DOD, we also have good mill to civilian relationships with our other interagency partners, and we work pretty seamlessly back and forth across that.

However, as the complexity of the maritime environment increases, some of these criminal enterprises and some of these actors that are going to be on the oceans, are going to take a little bit -- it's going to take a little bit more of an introspective look at our organization to prepare ourselves to deal with these threats that we're going to face in the changing maritime environment of the future. And, you know, my good Marine Corps friend here says, you know, you guys are like a Leatherman tool, you can reach in there and one time you might need a screwdriver, the next time you might need a pair of scissors, the next time you might need the pliers or whatever, but you guys

always have the right tool for the job.

And we're like 11 agencies in 1, but one of the things that we need to recognize as an agency moving forward is that our role in the maritime law enforcement realm is going to be in higher demand and what we need to do is we need to prepare for that by raising our capability, raising our proficiencies, and doing a few other things that I'll speak to as we go through this.

Fortunately, up to this point, we've been able to pull out the right tool, the tool has worked, we've been able to get through incidents like Katrina, the Haiti earthquake, Deepwater Horizon, with the tools we have in our toolkit. I just don't think, looking introspectively and having been involved in this business for almost 18 years now, not only as the guy who's jumped over the rail carrying the pistol, but as the guy putting forces over the rail on other vessels, both dealing with drugs, migrants, fisheries, across the whole realm, we're going to have to make some fundamental changes to our organization to deal with these, especially when you start dealing in the counterterrorism realm.

However, producing this is not going to be an easy task for us because, you know, when you have 11 different statutorily required missions, it's hard sometimes to get the right attention on a specific mission that you may need to improve when there's other competing demands out there. Deepwater Horizon is an example, very focused on our oil pollution response right now, probably a little less focused on some of our maritime enforcement responses. However, you know, as we move forward, I think you're going to see three trends that are going to affect the whole global maritime environment. First one is you're going to have increasing disparities around the world that are going to create pockets of disorder. The second one is, you're going to have increasing competition for the use of, and activities on, the ocean.

And then overlaid on top of that is going to be a constrained U.S. fiscal environment and a Coast Guard that's trying to recapitalize its fleet, cut personnel, and a lot of attention on spending internally that may dampen, if not lower, our desire and our zeal to kind of go after some of these things.

And for those of you who don't know, you know, we talk about recapitalization for a little bit. Right now we have ships that are aging, we're trying to procure new ships, some of those procurements have been put off, but there is a persistent and increasing demand signal coming from the U.S. Government on providing forces, providing a maritime presence to counter some of these threats we're seeing.

And so what I did over the course of my time at Camp Brookings, I will call it, with the guidance of our camp counselors over there, I took a careful and fairly close examination of actually the study of crime and the study of a criminal's decision whether or not to commit a crime, and then various policing models, and I said, okay, how do I take these three things, kind of compact them all together, look at these kinds of trends that are going to be overarching in a global environment, and come -- move forward with something that the Coast Guard can use to retool itself a little bit to prepare for this changing maritime security environment.

And so, what I've done is I've identified kind of four areas where we can make some improvements, and these four areas are: technology, partnerships, training, and organizational culture, and let me touch on each one for just a couple minutes.

Technology. This isn't just buying gadgets. This isn't buying UAVs and this isn't doing this, this is just getting smarter about there are technologies out there that can help us be smarter in how we do business and I'll give you an example. When I was out in the Pacific there's some commercial oceanographic products that help you identify good fishing areas. You take that information and you overlay some vessel monitoring

data on there it tells you where fishing vessels are, and then you can start so see

patterns.

And so for our intel folks, this is basically pattern analysis and anomaly

detection and so going back to the piracy example, you're trying to combat mother ships.

If you have a fishing vessel that's acting as a mother ship and all of the sudden he's in an

area that's not -- that doesn't look like it's supposed to be a good fishing are but there's a

vessel there, now you have anomaly detection and that might be something you need to

go work at.

The other thing is, is if you have the Pacific Ocean and you've got 80

percent of the earth's surface covered with water, in the Pacific alone you have 14 million

square miles of ocean. If you can narrow down how many square miles you have to look

to a few thousand square miles, you've greatly improved the efficiency and at $3,100 an

hour to run a cutter or $10,000 an hour to run an airplane, you can get -- and in a

constrained fiscal environment, getting more efficient is going to be absolutely necessary.

Second one is training. Within the Coast Guard we need to move from

qualification to proficiency. This is something that's been echoed by our commandant in

his recent Commandant's Direction, but this is something I felt for many years not only in

weapons training but in just our law enforcement training. Post 9-11 we created a lot of

high-end law enforcement capabilities. Unfortunately, now the atrophy of vigilance has

set in, people are asking questions why are you maintaining this capability. What we

may need to do is actually convert some of that capability into more deployable

capabilities that we can put on navy ships, foreign naval vessels and even on our own

Coast Guard ships to go out and combat some of these threats.

Third, we're going to need to build and improve partnerships. This isn't

just within the interagency, but this is international and this is down to the state and local

level. Now, the Coast Guard is fairly unique. We reach from the international level at the

IMO and all these international organizations, all the way down to our state and local first

responders on a daily basis. We provide tremendous value in that aspect, but we need

to work on those partnerships because there is some perceived disparity in the kind of

law enforcement qualification that we get under Title XIV that these guys get under their

Title XVIII authorities, and so we need to bridge some of those gaps through partnerships

to kind of help move us forward.

And finally, we've got to make some changes to the organizational

culture, and this is the hardest part because we need to fully embrace this maritime law

enforcement role moving forward and understand that it's going to play a greater role in

our organization, and for some people, that's going to be a challenge, but we need to

start thinking about it, we need to start planning for it, and we need to start preparing

ourselves to do that, and unfortunately, law enforcement tends to lag what actually

happens in the criminal world, but through the application of intel-led policing models,

through the application of some technology, through some partnerships and

improvements in training, we can at least posture ourselves so we're not standing around

after the event happens, whether it's a terrorist attack, whether it's increasing piracy,

questions about why -- fisheries depletion, and asking ourselves how did we let this

happen.

Instead, we can get ahead of the curve, try and get more proficient, more

professional, and be ready to tackle these challenges, and because detecting, deterring

and disrupting these complex criminal enterprises is going to require a proactive,

professional, and highly capable Coast Guard law enforcement force.

And so with that, I'll go ahead and conclude and that way we can give it

to our moderator and open it up for questions.

MR. MURPHY: Jeff, thank you for finishing off three splendid

presentations.

Questions now, but before we open it to questions to the floor I've got a

couple of questions I'd like to ask the panel if I may. The first one, I think, is really for

Scott and Jeff, and the third question really is specific to Josh.

Scott, you talked about, you know, you didn't like the phrase "flags of

convenience" but everyone understands what you mean if you'd used it. They're not

entirely responsible organizations and you also said the United States is going to have to

live with them.

But there are levers that any state and the United States can use to, if

you like, discipline these people. I mean, what do you see as the role of port-state

control in terms of raising standards in the merchant marine and winnowing out under

performance?

And two, second question to Josh to give you a few moments maybe to

think about it, to my mind dealing with the problem in Somalia is really about rebalancing

the incentives and the disincentives for piracy. And you talked a great deal about the

levers we can use to disincentives the behavior, but as I said, I think it's about balancing.

What incentives would you recommend -- would you suggest might be available to us to

change our behavior?

So, Scott and Jeff, if you could answer my question first.

COMMANDER BUNNAY: I'll talk to you -- Port State Controls, and that's

a concept of, in the U.S., if you want to pull into the Port of Long Beach or the Port of

Baltimore, you know, you need to have a track record, they're going to look at your

vessel, do you have a good safety record.

If it's the first time you've ever been there and you're from a flag that's --

from a nation that's on a list that traditionally has poor safety records, they might do an

inspection several hundred miles out and look, you know, for documentation and they're

checking to see, before you come into U.S. waters, if they have a reasonable expectation

if you're carrying anything -- any contraband or if nothing else, if you're going to leak oil

into the Chesapeake Bay oyster beds. And I think that's a good way of protecting the

U.S. and it's a good way of -- and the U.S. is going to have -- we have not necessarily our

own rules, but we have our way of doing business.

There's a Tokyo and Paris memorandum of understanding, which is

where nations have partnered, again, to raise the level of the entire industry. I think that's

good at a local level but the challenge is in, you know, these pockets of disorder, whether

it's in Southeast Asia or off Africa, are those nations part of the Tokyo MOU or Paris

MOU? So, I think Port State Control is a good way to protect our waters or out to our

economic exclusion zone, but as a nation or Coast Guard as a maritime force, when

we're out, you know, far away from home in somebody else's waters, how do we help

them -- and I -- you know, is it -- if a Paris MOU or Tokyo MOU is an industry best

practices, how do we partner and lobby and help countries of Southeast Asia, countries

of Africa, adopt these same high standards and then when a ship pulls in, are they

actually going to turn that ship away?

So, I think the challenge is that those are good solutions, but again, the

engagement piece is the best way to help these countries kind of adopt these practices

and I don't -- I don't know how far along we are on that piece from a global scale.

COMMANDER RANDALL: Port State Control, I think, all it takes is, you

tell a ship -- you put a cap -- a port hold on a ship and you'll start to get the kind of

compliance you want as a Port State.

I think a good example is OPA 90. When we started mandating double

hulled tankers, we went at that kind of unilaterally as the U.S. and then it didn't take long

when we started saying we're not going to let single hulled tankers come in, for

everybody to start getting in line with double hulls and then it became an (inaudible)

standard.

So, I think Port State Control is an effective mechanism when used

properly. I think to the flags of convenience issue, I think through our role in the IMO, I

think it's important for us to work with those type of registries to try and attack the

problem from within because we don't need to go into all the reasons why people

maintain flags of convenience, but I think through IMO and through some of those

international partnerships we can get there and through Port State Control programs you

can reinforce the behaviors.

MR. MURPHY: Thank you, Josh.

COMMANDER HIMES: This is a tough one, the incentives to change

pirate behavior. You know, the UN's kind of approached this with three different legs, it's

the deterrence piece, which is most of the offshore things we're doing, the security and

law development, which we're starting to see onshore, and then the development piece

of providing alternative livelihoods. And they've even gotten to a point working -- I think it

was private sector and the UN and I think TFG involvement, coming up back in May of

last year with kind of six key areas that they needed to develop to provide the right

economic framework within Puntland to really provide alternatives for people to go into.

Fisheries obviously was the first one since that, at least in theory, is what started this

whole problem in the first place, providing an environment where you had a legitimate

fishing industry. Transport infrastructure, livestock exports, telecommunications,

alternative energies, and a banking sector, kind of, just pieces to building that

development piece.

My concern with that -- or not concern, but my hesitance with that is those are really mid- to long-term solutions, that that's not going to provide a lot of near-term fixes, and certainly at the end of the day the return on the investment is not going to be near the same for the average Somali as the current options are. But certainly that needs to be part of that incentive solution over time.

You know, having just been in Afghanistan last summer I've got a little bit of baggage with sub national governance and trying to find a right answer instead of a quick answer, and this is, I think, a similar problem where this is a decades kind of solution, not anything near-term.

MR. MURPHY: Thank you. Questions, please from the floor? A forest of hands go up. Well, one.

MR. DOYLE: Hi, John Doyle with the 4GWAR Blog. It's been said already that the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, are too vast to patrol effectively. Some of the other solutions talked about today like the Puntland militia sound like they have a lot of moving parts that rely on a lot of players.

A simplistic question, but I've never really gotten a satisfying answer, what about using the existing naval resources, the international task force, for a blockade of the area? I realize blockade is sometimes seen as an act of war, but can you commit an active war against non-state actors in a failed state? And is it a feasible solution? Are there enough ships, enough air resources to even try something like that?

COMMANDER HIMES: I'll provide another unsatisfactory answer for you. The problem -- I mean, it really is a tyranny of distance just from whether it's feasible. I mean, you're talking Maine to Miami if you want to do a comparison with our eastern coast, and now you're talking upwards of a circle that's 1,300 nautical miles off the coast. You know, if you drew a line straight down from Karachi in the middle of the

Indian Ocean, I mean, that's how vast we're talking. So, you know, an armada of 30

ships, I think, is perhaps realistic and, in fact, it's had in the Gulf of Aden, if you look at

2009 compared to 2010, the number of attacks dropped by over 50 percent, but that's a

very small corridor that we're looking at.

So, the number of assets to do what we need to do now, it just doesn't

exist. I mean, you could put the top five, six navies together and look at the assets and

you can't get there from here, so it's just not feasible as an alternative.

As far as whether, you know, the act of war aspect of that and the legal

piece, I think frankly from UNCLS and now the translations to domestic law, you've got

enough legal backing to be able to do some of these things. You know, since you start

with pirates as the enemy of all mankind, I think is the UNCLS quote, so I think you've got

legal positions there, but you certainly don't have a technical solution.

MR. MURPHY: I think there was a question here.

MR. McKERNAN: Hi, Mac McKernan, SECDEF corporate fellow.

Seventeen years ago, when I was in Somalia on the ground and then I look at it today, I

see one striking similarity and that is just a lack of governance. What I've heard today is

a lot of talk about what we can do from the seaborne side but can any of you really talk

about how we could solve the land-based side? I'm a firm believer that until we have rule

of law and the people understanding and following that rule of law, that you're not going

to have this end, particularly the piracy issues, and in fact as you talked about, the

business model is too lucrative for them not to do so. You start shooting people there's

going to be 10 others waiting to come out there.

So, if any of you could give us your thoughts on what we can do from a

land-based side to build that rule of law.

MR. MURPHY: Josh, this looks like a natural for you --

COMMANDER HIMES: Sure.

MR. MURPHY: -- but maybe the other panelists would like to contribute?

COMMANDER BUNNAY: Yeah, I completely agree that, you know, it's a land-based piece that is where we need to go. I would argue, though, that it's not -- you know, the phrase thrown out, complete lawlessness, really isn't completely accurate. I mean, certainly at a national level if you look at the TFG and their inability to control anything outside of Mogadishu or some other aspects, there's not an overarching central government control, but if you look at the local level and even at the regional level, you've got governance that to some extent is working and functioning, and I think that's where the partnerships need to be.

I mentioned that Puntland is setting up this marine force that is, you know, in coordination with a group that has some baggage from previous mercenary activity, but they're doing some of those things with a level of rule of law that may allow that to be successful. Now we need to, I think, put that in a better framework so that it's got a little better international backing, but there's elements there. Jack Lange is working at the UN setting up basically kind of the legal structure for ashore that needs to happen and so they've talked about additional prisons that will be funded from external entities and some additional legal capacity in Somalia, in Puntland, even in Tanzania where they're looking at doing an initial startup, that will get you some on land solutions, that get you some rule of law and security, but again, it's not quick and it requires a commitment that extends for a period of time, I think, to get you there.

COMMANDER RANDALL: I'll add one other comment and I'll just say piracy equals drug smuggling equals human smuggling equals all those. They're all connected, right, but the source of them, whether you're dealing with piracy at sea or you're dealing with drugs at sea or human smuggling at sea, it all comes from a source,

and the source, whether you want to call it rule of law -- you can call it rule of law in a

place like Somalia, but in other cases if you look at like Guatemala, Venezuela,

Colombia, and countries like that, it may not necessarily be rule of law, but it may be lack

of economic alternative because there may be a functioning government -- there's a

functioning government in Mexico, but you still have cartel problems.

So, it's not a rule of law problem, it could be that there's -- it's a better

economic opportunity than what else is available, and so you have -- I mean, it's a drivers

question. What is the drivers of the behavior? And so you have to basically peel back

the layers of the onion until you get back to the core an it may not smell so good what the

problem is.

You still have to attack the problem at the seaside because maybe we

don't want that -- those nefarious actors, but once you start squeezing it, the balloon just

expands and then goes somewhere else. We put a lot of pressure on Colombia, now

where's the problem? Venezuela -- for drugs -- so, you know, it's not an easy fix and as

you -- as the world becomes more aware of what's out there but you don't have any

increase in economic opportunities in these countries, the problem just simply moves.

So, you have to attack it from both sides. You have to attack it on the

shore side, you have to attack it on the water side, but the water side's far more

expensive and far more resource intensive like trying to set up a picket, then maybe --

you know, you heard our folks this morning talking about foreign assistance. So, the

answer is a combination of all of them. You've got to have all three. You have to have

foreign assistance, you have to have, you know, governance, you have to have the

enforcement on the sea to make the international rule of law apply to everybody.

MR. MURPHY: There's a question over there.

MR. EVANS: Hello, Steve Evans. I'm the acquisitions editor for Marine

Corps University Press. I guess my question is mostly for Commander Himes. Recently

the United States Department of State now has a dual-track policy towards what used to

be Somalia where we can actually interact with the effective governments in the

independent region of Somaliland, Hargeisa, and the autonomous region of Puntland.

What kind of impact do you see -- or benefits do you see that are going to be derived

from this new policy insofar as trying to cut down on the amount of piracy?

COMMANDER HIMES: Yeah, that's, I think, a key -- when Secretary

Carson made that speech -- I think that was back in December -- about the dual-track

approach, I really thought that what we were getting to was not putting all our eggs in the

TFG basket, but actually looking at these other governments that are frankly much more

functional and starting to provide some, you know, cooperative opportunities to build their

capacity, and frankly, that's most of the piracy is in those other regions.

But I haven't just -- and I think we had someone from State here who

may have another answer, but I haven't -- since that speech I have not gotten a positive

sense that there's practical movement forward to really get down to that level of

coordination. It may be coming, but I just haven't gotten the impression that the State

Department is really pursuing that aggressively.

Now, the UNODC in their capacity and the monitoring group efforts have

started to go down that route, but I think there's still a lot of concern, frankly, about

corruption from some of these other governments, complicity in the piracy business itself.

I mean, back in '08 you had reporting that six of the ministers themselves that were in

Puntland's regional government were, you know, on the books. You had certain towns

where the piracy entities were probably paying the police force that was there because

they weren't getting paid by the government.

So, I think a lot of that's changed and I think you see from Puntland more

of an effort to be part of a solution instead of being complicit, you know, whether that's

because -- I don't want to sound cynical -- whether that's because there's a better payoff

by aligning with the international community long-term than there is with pirates or

whether they realize that, you know, there's not a good end game, it seems like -- and I

think the UN said this in some of the reporting lately that Puntland is definitely coming on

board better to combat this problem.

So, I'd like to think the dual track approach is going to go somewhere,

but I just haven't seen it materialize yet.

MR. MURPHY: You, sir.

MR. COHEN: (inaudible) Steve Cohen, Brookings, actually 21CDI, also.

I spent a couple of days in Maldives last year, late last year, and it wasn't -- they asked

me, they weren't sure themselves, the Maldivians, what command -- U.S. command that

covered them whether it was CENTCOM or PCOM and I'm not sure myself. But the

larger question is, are the way in which the regional command structure -- AFRICOM,

PCOM, CENTCOM, does that complicate this business of dealing with piracy or is this

like cyber warfare where the organization is less important than other things?

COMMANDER BUNNAY: You know, I haven't heard that as an issue. I

think because you have a pretty -- at least on a tactical level, because you have the

taskforce, you know, CTF 151 set up and the other, you know, European elements that

are operating, at least from a maritime aspect I think it's pretty well -- the command and

control works pretty well.

Most of the non-naval efforts, whether it's, you know, the legal jurisdiction

or, you know, the security-building efforts, most of those aren't really, I don't think, going

through the COCOMs so much, so I don't think that's really an effect either, but I'd have

to look a little bit closer at that.

MR. MURPHY: Next question. Please don't prove to me that sea

blindness exists. Ah, sorry, I beg your pardon.

CAPTAIN VASQUEZ: Good afternoon. Captain Larry Vasquez, a Navy

fellow here at Brookings. I'm interested as to what the commercial companies are doing

to protect their own interests and do they need to do more? And if they're not doing

more, why aren't they doing more?

COMMANDER HIMES: Yeah, I kind of glossed over the kind of the

existing piece and there may be some other thoughts on this, but the impression I get --

kind of two answers. One, you know, there's actually some good news stories, frankly, in

the piracy piece in that, you know, the international cooperation at sea, frankly, this has

probably been the best engine to do things that we probably would have never done

otherwise -- you know, coordinating with the Chinese, for example, greater coordination

with the Indian Navy -- so, there's been some goodness, frankly, in this problem. One

other area I think there's been some good advances have been in best practices for the

maritime shipping industry.

You know, you've got more or less consensus on what ships should be

doing when they go to those areas, whether it's a certain speed, you know, visible

deterrence, lookouts, other practices that have been promulgated by the IMO that are

being followed by most -- some debates about armed guards, which we could go down

that if you want, but I think in general shipping companies have gotten a little bit more

aggressive in doing their practices.

Having said that, back in February, the IMO still said that there's an

unacceptably high number of shipping companies that continue to ignore its

recommendations because this point, that's what they are, they're recommendations. It's

not as if it affects, I think, insurance rates, although there's probably some nuance there,

and best practices aren't being followed by some companies.

So, there's probably room for improvement but I would say compared to where we were three or four years ago, there's been a marked improvement in those efforts.

MS. MARCONI: Yeah, Janice Marconi. With the Colombian narco subs there seems to be like a pattern of getting more modularized in their development to going from semi-submersible to almost totally submersible, to going further out. In fact, supposedly a couple years ago one was off of Italy, I mean, that's how far they've gone. Is there a similar technical trending or evolution on capability? Not necessarily speed but, you know, something?

COMMANDER RANDALL: I guess the best answer I can give you is we're working on it. You know, these things are made out of fiberglass and typical acoustics don't necessarily -- pinging them is not easy. You can do some other things to try and find them, but then you get in -- it's kind of like this goes back to the cyber question. Then what do you do? How do you force them to the surface? Can you force them to the surface? And then what does that entail?

So, you know, this is kind of like some of those -- the rules of engagement haven't necessarily been defined in all situations for those type of things, and so I think it's an evolving process. I know the legal frameworks are evolving constantly and there's a lot of discussion on how we're going to deal with that emerging issue or threat because the next question is, is are they going to start showing up in San Diego.

MR. MURPHY: We have time for one more question.

MR. SNYDER: Thank you. Chris Snyder Brookings. I'm just interested to have three sailors up there particularly about some strategy if you will. We have

offshore balancing, obviously CNO pitching that. I know Jeff just -- from being your office

mate, you're working on some strategy and vision for the Coast Guard. What you're

presenting, and not just necessarily from Commander Himes, but I think for all three of

you is, you know, what we're faced with from a maritime perspective is, you know, you've

got a, whether it be a littoral insurgency all the way to high sea insurgency, call it piracy,

whatever the term is. I mean, I think counterinsurgency is kind of more of a -- I guess a

sexy term this day and age -- is this -- is the Coast Guard or the Navy, are they looking at

this as just a problem, a tactic, or is there a, no kidding, energies to develop strategies to

counter this? And I'm talking more than just, you know, an operation, build a taskforce,

things of that nature. But my assumption is this is not something that's going to go away.

It's been around for many years and it looks like it's proving to be quite lucrative, so

there's obviously a great business model here.

What is the Navy and the Coast Guard doing to counter that potentially?

MR. MURPHY: Scott, do you want to start?

COMMANDER BUNNAY: I'll start. I think one of the challenges, at

least, this is from my perspective in the Navy is, you know, there's a high end threat out

there wherever you want it to be, and we build cruisers and destroyers to do ballistic

missile defense, are not cheap assets to either to operate, maintain, and to buy, and do

you buy 313 or 326 fairly high-end pieces of theater gear and the equipment that we're

buying is huge overkill for -- and I want to say, it's not low end tasking, but it's to go out

and counterpiracy, you don't need an HS class destroyer or cruiser, and it may even

make the challenge harder to do it, so I think the -- as a service, in my opinion, we have a

high end threat that we can't ignore and that we need to be able to counter and deal with,

and then we're going to multitask those same pieces of equipment into a mission that

they're not necessarily built. I think what's going to -- what's coming in the Navy is a

littoral combat ship, which is maybe by name designed to work in the littoral waters --

smaller, more maneuverable, and maybe a better platform that's going to be able to

partner and some of the more constabulary law enforcement roles granted fairly far away

from home.

So, what I would see happening is, you know, the threat to deal with

maritime security is coming, and again, from a materials solution we're buying new pieces

of equipment that will probably -- are better fits for the mission that we're doing, and I

think tactics and doctrine will kind of follow once we see what those pieces of equipment

can do.

COMMANDER HIMES: Really good question and I'm not sure the

Navy's fully thought it through. I think the platform piece is important although I'll tell you,

just expanding past the maritime insurgency, if you will, I mean, even just looking at --

and I go here because this is kind of my focus this year -- looking at the Iranian Navy and

the mismatch in assets we have there, there's other places where the high end assets

maybe aren't the right ones to deal with the problem and maybe make it worse.

But I think kind of the bigger strategy piece that the Navy has really

pushed, and this is part of, you know, cooperative strategy of the 21st century is having

the right partnerships and alignments in a region so that it's not necessarily about what

our platforms are but it's who we're working with who maybe bring better platforms to the

fight.

I think a lot more discussion, for example, in the Gulf of Aden, needs to

go into, you know, what's the Saudi Navy doing? What are the Omani's and the UAE

doing? The Indians have come on board to a certain extent, but they're still kind of not

aligned as far as C2, so I think that that partnership -- and I don't want to say the global,

you know, 1,000-ship Navy because I don't know if we're using that terminology anymore,

but that idea, I think, comes into play on these lower end persistent problems that have

been discussed that, you're right, they're not going away any time soon.

COMMANDER RANDALL: Chris, you give me something to work on

when I go to the Pentagon this summer. Work on the CNO stuff. I have a feeling that

you're baiting me there.

I think -- here's how I'd answer that question. Are we working on it?

Probably not as vigorously as we should. I think here's how we do work on it. I think we

work on it by we've seen increased outreach, increased interest from the combatant

commanders reaching down to the Coast Guard saying, these countries have navies that

look like your Coast Guard. Come help us partner with these folks. Come help us work

with these folks. Come be our -- come be the -- bringing a Coast Guard ship into one of

these ports is a lot different than bringing an Aegis cruiser. It's a lower profile, lower level

and there's a lot more interaction there, and so I think that's where we're headed.

The problem that we have faced as the Coast Guard in doing that is it

often doesn't come with any additional resources and so when we're looking at going

from 12 high endurance cutters to 8, and maybe -- and fewer offshore patrol cutters than

what we have in our medium endurance cutter fleet now, it's going to be tough, and so I

think we can go there, but I think it's going to have to be resourced and it's going to have

to become more of what we do to manage these global insecurities.

MR. MURPHY: Jeff, thank you very much indeed. All good things must

come to an end and this session is now ending. All that remains is me to thank the

panelists and ask you to join with me in showing your appreciation for their efforts. Thank

you.

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PANEL 4: THE U.S. AND REGIONAL PARTNERS

Moderator:

> FIONA HILL
> Senior Fellow and Director, Center on the United States and Europe
> The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

> COLONEL JOHN ANGEVINE (USA)
> Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institution
> "Self-Reliance Defence of Australia: Creating a Dependent Australian Defence

Force"

> JULIE BOLAND
> Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institution
> "Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization"

> LIEUTENANT COLONEL BUTCH BRACKNELL (USMC)
> Marine Corps Fellow, The Atlantic Council
> "Naval Expeditionary Force Contributions Among Latin American Allies"

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. HILL: I'm Fiona Hill, the director of the Center on U.S. and Europe

here at Brookings in the Foreign Policy Program. And I also have the privilege of sharing

our corridor with our esteemed members of the Federal Executive Fellowship Program,

so I see a lot of these guys on a daily basis.

I don't, however, see very often the gentleman here on my right, Butch

Bracknell, who has joined us from the Atlantic Council. Although Butch and I find now

that we have something rather strange in common that he just told me coming up to the

stage. My first name is Fiona and apparently his nickname is Shrek. And any of you who

have a small child in the audience, I have a four-year old who just -- I have immense

street cred from the fact that there is a Princess Fiona out there. Although it is a little

disappointing to know it's only in the form of an ogre. But anyway, never mind.

But anyway, I think that that gives a certain personal connection here on

the panel. So, Butch, although this is the first time we've really met, delighted to have

you here. And of course I'm just very pleased to be able to introduce to you our other

Federal Executive Fellows. John Angevine and Julie Boland, who I see pretty often. And

in fact, in one of my other positions as the National Intelligence Officer for Russia and

Eurasia at the DNI's National Intelligence Council, I actually saw these two quite

frequently there as well. And I'm very pleased that they're here at Brookings with us for

the year.

You all have biographical information, or should you, on most of the

people. John has had a very varied career that covers some of the areas that I'm

interested in, Russia and Eurasia. Also, a sting, like many of the other people here in the

room, in Iraq and elsewhere. But he has turned his attentions since he's been here at

Brookings to the new special relationship that used to be with Britain, but now clearly

seems to be with Australia. Not that I'm jealous of the former colonies.

But in any case, it's clear to the -- Australia is now the new UK for the U.S. and it's

Asia perspective. And I was very pleased that John has decided to -- seems to be

focusing here on the new regional partners for the United States to focus on Australia

and its reforms in defense, which obviously have a lot of implications to the United States

in looking forward to the Asia Pacific region.

Julie Boland, who has been a senior analyst and manager in the

intelligence community for many years is one of the few people who has paid particular

attention to other developments elsewhere in Asia. Central Asia, which tends to get

forgotten unless it's in relation to Afghanistan, getting back to the topic of this morning's

panel. And has spent a good deal of time looking at the Shanghai Corporation

Organization, which also raises a lot of questions about where this is going to be heading

in the next decade, whether this will have the salience that it had in the last, for both

Russia and China as well as the Central Asian states. And how this might also affect

U.S. perspectives on longer-term dynamics in Asia.

And finally, Butch -- a.k.a. Shrek -- my new colleague will talk about

something that also tends to be really neglected, but not here at Brookings, which is Latin

America. And in fact, the whole point of your paper is, in fact, to point out the risks that

we face, at the United States and elsewhere, by not taking due consideration of the

strategic perspectives in Latin America. So we're very pleased that in fact, all of our three

colleagues will be putting a spotlight on regions that tend to be ignored to some degree in

the current preoccupations with the Middle East and elsewhere.

So, I'm turning over first to Colonel Angevine, then to Julie Boland, and

then to Lieutenant Colonel Bracknell for your perspectives. And then we'll move

straightaway to discussion with you. And we'll try to wrap up as close as we can to 4

o'clock, and I'll then turn the floor back to Peter Singer to make some final words.

So, John. Thank you.

COLONEL ANGEVINE: All right, thank you, Fiona. I really appreciate it.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for taking time from your busy

schedule to hear about our work at Brookings 21st Century Defense Initiative. It's a

privilege for me to briefly discuss the research on Australia's defense policies, strategies,

and capabilities articulated in the Australian Defense white paper 2009, which I will refer

to as "Defense 2009."

During the course of the past several years, I've had the honor to work

with our Australian ally jointly addressing crisis around the world and collaborating on

future plans for both U.S. and Australian defenses. My interest in this research began

several years ago when I realized the Asia Pacific region would become more and more

important to the United States. The U.S.-Australian alliance is quickly emerging as the

cornerstone alliance for continued security and stability in the Asia Pacific region.

It's important for the United States to not take its defense relationship

with Australia for granted, and to take time to understand the implications future

Australian defense policies and planning will have on the alliance.

What my research determined is the current vector that the Australian

Defense white paper -- Defense 2009, that is -- sets for the Australian defense forces

modernization does not correspond with the realities of Australian's security situation.

The policies and strategies set forth prepare the ADF for contingencies that are least

likely to happen, and tie up limited resources on missions that exceed the ADF's

capability to deal with alone.

Four key points of my argument include the following. First, the

Australian Defense 2009 white paper reaffirms the defense of Australia's doctrine based

on the perceived rise of China and raises questions over the reliability and utility of the

U.S. alliance. From an American's perspective, the heart of Australia's defense debate

centers on whether or not Southeast Asia and the Pacific region, including Australia, can

continue to rely on the United States as a guarantee and underwriter of the defense -- of the regional defense and security.

Second, the centerpiece of the proposed defense 2009 capability priorities, or acquisitions, are high-end maritime and air battle platforms. And in Canberra's effort to shift from today's predominant counterinsurgency and counterterrorism types of operations to the higher end of the continued military operations, Australian defense policymakers overcompensated, allocating the preponderance of their resources to capabilities least likely until 2030, and consequently generating gaps to the lower and center portion of the military operations continuum.

Third, this focus on high-end maritime and air capabilities would leave the Australian defense force exposed to atrophying low-end expeditionary capabilities. Falling into the same intellectual trap as U.S. defense policymakers of the 1990s, Australian defense planners have erred in assuming defense 2009 capabilities that are exceptionally suited for operation of the higher end of the spectrum of war will suffice for lesser contingencies on the spectrum. Essentially, they've designed an Australian defense force for 2030 that will be designed to sit on the shelf until it's called on to conduct operations at the higher end of the spectrum. But that will also be too weak to support these higher-end operations on its own.

This will weaken the ADF's capability to serve as a credible means to build regional partnerships and create flexible options for the -- to secure Asia Pacific security and stability. In order to use the ADF for the low -- the more likely low-end contingencies, Australia defense planners will have to resort to expensive and time-consuming ad hoc restructuring.

And last, regarding the implications for the United States, the U.S.-Australian alliance, and the region, the white paper plan leaves Australia incapable of

being self-reliant. As Australian defense policymakers strengthen the ADF's 2030

capabilities to become self-reliant at the higher end of the military operations continuum,

they make the ADF 2030 more dependent on U.S. military assistance in order to perform

the low- and mid-intensity operations.

The likely result will be an inadequate, ad hoc, and weak multilateral

response which would necessitate a direct U.S. involvement in stabilizing a crisis with

more resources than if the issue had been addressed early on with the right mix of

capabilities and cooperative security unity.

The consequences for the United States would either be to accept the

increased U.S. burden for the operations on the lower and middle continuum of military

continuum within the Asia Pacific region, or to retrench from the region if the United

States does not accept the added burden.

To maintain the alliance with the United States offers maritime and air contributions

that are significant to the ADF's order of battle. However, they remain only token when

compared to the United States' contributions. And Australia misses the opportunity to

support regional cooperative security arrangements, which both Australia and the United

States needs to manage China and other security threats.

While pressing for constructive and -- they're missing this -- excuse me

for a moment here. Ah, I stand corrected. Third, the focus on high-end military --

maritime, air capabilities would leave the Australian defense force exposed to these

weakened capabilities. However, the -- in order to use the ADF -- the more likely low-end

contingencies, the Australian defense planners will have to resort to expensive, time

consuming ad hoc structuring. And regarding the implications for the U.S., the Australian

-- and in the region -- the United States will have to provide that added support at that

lower and mid-intensity operation level.

The likely -- in summary, the -- or correction. To maintain an alliance
with the United States, Australia offers that maritime issue. And again, to address the
China and other threats. To make the U.S.-Australian alliance more effective in providing
both nations' security needs, the United States Defense Department should support, one,
publicly discarding the Guam Doctrine in conjunction with the establishment of a U.S.-
Australian defense industry committee. Establishing -- two, establishing joint basing for
submarine repair, maintenance, and training facilities. Three, endorsing a Southeast
Asia and South Pacific regional multilateral cooperative security arrangement to address
regional security and stability challenges while pressing for constructive and a
transparent China participation in regional security matters. And last, urging the U.S.
Department of State to draft defense trade cooperation treaty rules to publicly create a
seamless U.S.-Australian defense industrial community. And DOD shepherding this
concept in support of the future joint U.S.-Australian operational activities.

Australian policymakers, for their part, must tie the Defense 2009 and
future white papers' objectives into the Australian foreign policy in the Asia Pacific region
as part of a broader hemispheric system. Clearly establishing a framework approach for
multilateral and cooperative security mechanisms to deal with such regional issues as
disputed island claims in the South China Sea, maritime resource claims, mass
migration, conflict resolution, and conflict prevention with corresponding confidence-
building measures.

A capacity-building and defense modernization transparency. Australian
policymakers should recapitalize unaffordable and excess air and sea capabilities into the
ground and amphibious capabilities to deal with the more likely middle to lower-intensity
regional scenarios in the continued military operation. A shift in Australia's defense
capabilities toward greater utility in the most likely regional contingencies would

significantly contribute to stability and security in Australia's primary operational

environment, as well as making a valuable contribution to the U.S.-Australian alliance.

Since 1918, the United States and Australia have fought side by side,

and the alliance has developed into one of the fundamental building blocks for continued

stability in the Asia Pacific region. And consequently, the health of this alliance cannot be

taken for granted. To do so would put the alliance at risk.

A greater understanding of one another's defense security needs will

lead to mutually supporting capabilities to collectively manage the regional challenges at

hand. By complementing one another's strengths, the U.S.-Australian alliance will

remain vibrant, adaptable, and capable, acting in concert with other allies in the region of

jointly facing any future challenges.

Thank you.

MS. HILL: Thank you, John. Before we move on to Julie here --

perhaps to give us a little bit of a segue into looking into Central Asia. I mean, you

mentioned Australia fighting side by side with the United States in 1918. And of course,

that means that some of the most famous operations of World War I -- you know, Gallipoli

springs immediately to mind -- we saw Australia operating far out of its region. I mean,

you couldn't get much further away from Australia's primary area of operations that

you've been stressing now.

But it seems that about your description from the Australian Defense

white paper that Australia's focus has been much more narrowly defined in spite of,

obviously, Australia's larger security interest and much broader foreign policy perspective

in areas far outside the South China seas or the South Pacific. Is this one of the

problems that you see as the most sever? Because it certainly sounds from the

recommendations and the issues that you were highlighting that this is a very much more

narrow focus in the immediate Pacific area around Australia.

COLONEL ANGEVINE: Yes. Australia has a tendency to, between peacetime and wartime, having to decide where they're going to do a forward defense or a continental defense, defense of Australia. And they are vacillating whether they should have an expeditionary operations or not. And -- or a combination of those three.

And in peacetime they have a tendency to fall back onto the continent itself and then in wartime, they become very expeditionary and will send forces to and fro. And have fought with the United States since 1918 in every major conflict.

So in that sense, their defense policy is a little bit schizophrenic in terms of wanting to participate and have equities, particularly in the interdependent globalized world where they're partnering with a great power that has global interest. At the same time, they're trying to contribute to that alliance maintenance.

The issue that I see Australia running into is that they are -- there's a number of fears driving them, and one of those is where the U.S. is going to stay or not in the region. At the same time, they've got to deal with their economic model that they've created with China and their defense security model that they have with the United States. And sometimes they think they have -- the pundits think they have to choose between one of the two, and they're not necessarily mutually exclusive.

So, in the event that the U.S. would get distracted to another issue in the region or with retrench, then the acquisitions of their current portfolio -- acquisition portfolio -- is such that they can do this high-end operation with their equipment that doesn't necessarily -- is fungible to the middle-, lower-end, where the issues are more likely to occur. Be it peacekeeping, building, mass migrations. And so they leave that gap in their capabilities while they try to build this deterrent in the event that the U.S. would part the shores of Australia.

MS. HILL: How has Afghanistan played into this?

COLONEL ANGEVINE: Well, first of all, the Australians are absolutely committed to Afghanistan, based on their public statements and, more importantly, based on their actions both in terms of blood and treasure. They see the war and terrorism directly affecting their security in Australia and their interest around the world. And it's a UN-sanctioned operation, which of course has been endorsed by Australia itself.

So, they are -- the Australians are fighters. And if you mess with them, they'll body slam you. Not to take anything from the viral video that's been going out. But they're most certainly are very capable of protecting their interests around the world. And so -- but that's the here and now. The question is, how do they posture their force and their means in the future to allow them to either keep being able to contribute to some of these global security issues, which they almost have concentric rings -- although my understanding is that they don't -- some of the policymakers don't like that description. You know, the continent, then they work out toward their -- near or broad and then to the Asia Pacific region at large, and then the global security. If their interests are threatened, then they most certainly are going to look for a way to protect those.

MS. HILL: Thank you very much, John. I mean, that does actually provide a good segue into what Julie's going to talk about, because the Shanghai Cooperation Organization also faces these same sets of dilemmas. Here and now challenges, which was actually not a military one at all, but was in fact about how to resolve border disputes among all the regional states. And then has turned into a long-term prospect. And how does this organization that was set up for other purposes deal with long-term security challenges in a similar manner to the dilemma that the Australians face.

So, Julie, we'll turn over to you now. Thank you.

MS. BOLAND: Thank you, Fiona.

As Fiona said, I chose to concentrate my research here at Brookings at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. I call it the SCO. Some people have never heard of it that way, they refer it as the S-C-O. But it's a multilateral group focusing on the Eurasian region.

And just out of curiosity, because I get a lot of, you know, empty stares when I mention the SCO, a show of hands just of the audience here. Who has even ever heard of the SCO? That's a very informed audience. I wouldn't expect anything else at Brookings.

But there are several reasons I wanted to look at this group right now. Like my federal fellow fellows, it's an interesting cast of characters in the SCO. But they're all countries important to the U.S. And it's also, like my federal fellows, got an agenda of important topics, also topics of concern to the U.S.

And so, surprisingly, to me at least, the U.S. has not really interacted with the SCO very much at all over the last 10 years, despite this important cast of characters and despite the important agenda. And despite a push by this administration, in particular, to work with regional groups.

And finally, I think it's a timely topic because the SCO is marking a milestone event this year. In June, they'll be celebrating their 10th anniversary in ASEAN at their heads of state summit.

So some key questions I've been looking at in my research here are, first, has the SCO used this past decade to make any progress as an effective organization? Some of the critics that engage in the SCO in the past 10 years have asserted that the group hasn't really done anything. You know, it's just a talk shop so, you know, why should the U.S. make the effort to engage?

And secondly, are the reasons why the U.S. might now consider the opportunities as well ask the risks of better engagement with this organization? And then lastly, are there some steps the U.S. could take to begin to take a move towards a relationship and move it forward if it chooses to do so?

So, I know you're a well-informed group. But just a little background on the origins of the group. As Fiona said, the SCO -- it began as the Shanghai 5 in 1996, and it really was focused purely on defining China's borders and deepening military trust with those post-Soviet states. But then by June 2001, just a few months before 9-11, the Shanghai 5 welcomed in Uzbekistan, which doesn't border China. And then they institutionalized this new group as the SCO.

And its philosophy is the so-called "Shanghai Spirit," which is harmony, working via consensus, respect for other cultures, non-interference in others' domestic affairs -- which becomes important -- and non-alignment. Meaning, they didn't see NATO as their foe, or they didn't want to be considered a block.

The SCO's comment focuses working cooperatively against the three evils, they call it. And those three evils are terrorism, separatism, and extremism. So, the SCO -- this is their interesting cast that includes China, Russia, and then four of the five "Stans"; that's Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Those are all the full members. So that includes about a quarter of the world's population, three-fifths of the Eurasian landmass, two key UN security council members, a fledgling democracy in Kyrgyzstan. States who border Afghanistan or who actively enable the coalition's effort there through things like the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan, or the Northern Distribution Network effort. So those are your full members.

And then in Mongolia in 2004, joined as an observer. As well as the next year, India, Iran, and Pakistan. Again, a set of challenging or at least challenged

countries critical to stability in Eurasia.

Afghanistan has been participating since 2005 in activities with this group through a contact group, and it was just reported this week that Russia has invited Kabul to apply for observer status. So we'll see what happens at this year's summit.

And then rounding out this cast of characters are Belarus and Sri Lanka. They were approved as the organization's first dialogue partners in 2009, and that's an interesting development in and of itself because it showed the organization developing a new level of association with the group to kind of manage aspirant countries who wanted to cooperate with the group but who may not have been ready to actually do join or who the group actually was not ready to have them join.

So, quite a collection of countries. But, again, all are concerned about a tough subject in this Eurasian region, things that the United States is worried about, too: instability, terrorism, drug trafficking, infrastructure and economic development, resource management -- especially water, hydro management -- and so on. So, topics Washington is concerned about, too. Supporting the Afghanistan effort right now, of course, is our main priority. But all of those other issues I talked about fit squarely in the U.S. goals for this region, too.

So despite this confluence of interest, there's been little interaction between the U.S. and the SCO, at least to my understanding. And as I said, some of us asserted that part of this reason is because they've perceived the SCO to be just a talk shop, not worth the U.S. time and effort to engage.

But my research here, at least, suggests that in these last 10 years of existence -- and remember; only in the last 6 years has the SCO even had a functioning secretariat and counterterrorism group -- in these last 10 years, the SCO has developed its organizational structure. It has expanded its formal ties with other states and other

multilateral institutions. It has taken steps that I think are concrete, although I admit,

incremental, to try to broaden and cement its regional impact and influence. Not always

have they been steps the U.S. prefers they would have taken, but action nonetheless.

So, to address the organizational development first and just briefly, the

SCO developed from two standing bodies, the secretariat and the regional anti-terror

structure, which carries the unfortunate acronym of RATS. So they moved from these

two standing bodies and regular heads of government and defense and foreign affairs

ministerial-level meetings to broaden out to department-level joint councils on topics

ranging everything from agriculture and culture, education, health, judiciaries, and

legislatures. Between the participating states and, in some respects, also beyond just the

membership but including most recently the observer states. And all of these meetings

culminate in an annual heads of state summit.

But while working on its own organizational structure, the SCO has also

worked to establish relationships, as I said, with other multilateral organizations. And this

provides further legitimacy to the group, recognition outside their own region, as well as

opportunities for cooperative projects. And just increasing situational awareness for them

of what, you know, global plans others might have.

So for example, the SCO has formal cooperative agreements with the

UN and various UN bodies underneath it, like the Office on Drugs and Crime and the

CIS, Commonwealth of Independent States; ASEAN, the Eurasian economic community;

and the CSTO, among others. The SCO continues to develop links with the EU and with

OSCE, also. For example, it attends EU and OSCE forums, particularly on Central Asian

security issues.

And then on the security front, the SCO has moved from -- as Fiona had

mentioned earlier -- the border agreements to actually conducting multilateral security

exercises. And then developing its counterterrorism and counternarcotics coordination

efforts. And putting forward, most recently, a cybersecurity agreement.

But in the interest of time, I'm just going to provide a little more detail on

one of these, and that is the multilateral security exercises. Conducted since 2002, it's --

these attract the most attention of any of the SCO's activities. Largely because of the

media coverage, you can actually find them on YouTube. So when you all get home or if

you're bored there in the audience, you can check it out. Just, you know, put -- search on

Shanghai Cooperation Organization and it will show you all kinds of action-adventure

shots.

But it's also not just the media coverage, but the powerful participants

involved. So for each exercise, you have either Russia or China and sometimes both

participating. And in the scope of effort, it's not unusual to have thousands of troops

participating, especially in the larger peace mission-type exercises.

And the focus of these exercises have broadened over the years, too,

from just working together on the planning and logistics and the command and control,

and the conventional and special-ops types of maneuvers, to working with corporate

entities. For example, in 2008 the SCO exercise was -- the scenario was to defend a

Lukoil refinery in Russia.

And then also, involving WMD. In Tajikistan in 2009, they had an

exercise focused on defending a chemical plant. And in Uzbekistan in 2006, there was a

nuclear facility that they included in their scenarios. So you can see how that scenario

has broadened, as well as their capabilities, or at least their thinking and planning to have

those capabilities.

In addition to the security issues, the group has also devoted attention to

economic issues. So it's not purely a security group.

And economic issues, particularly as it contributes to social stability. So, efforts to enhance trade, move forward on investment projects, enhance bank cooperation between participating states, and to improve transportation infrastructure and other infrastructure -- energy infrastructure, for example.

China, predictably, is doing much of the heavy lifting on this economic cooperation within the SCO. Late last year, the Chinese proposed to provide $8 billion of the suggested $10 billion price tag that's going to be needed to help finance and move these SCO joint projects forward. And they've also granted billions of dollars worth of loan credits to members underneath that SCO umbrella, such as $900 million worth in 2004 and $10 billion worth in 2009, intended to help the members weather the global economic crisis. So besides security and economic steps, the SCO has, since 2005 in the Kyrgyzstani parliamentary elections, they've moved to impact the political scene in the region, too, by providing election observers to members' electoral contests.

And these monitors have been known to declare such elections as free and fair, even when other international monitors have not. So, this may be an example of where, you know, our values do not necessarily coincide. But again, at least it shows progress development on the SCO's organizational front.

So despite these steps on security and economic and political fronts, the SCO faces constant challenges as it moves forward, like any multilateral organization. It has divergent member goals; you heard the recitation of the cast of characters. There's bilateral tensions within the ranks, just pick any two members and they've got some grievance against each other. And regional instability that really brings into question the SCO's policy of non-interference.

For example, some have painted as failures the SCO's lack of endorsement to Russia's military action in Georgia in 2008, and the subsequent

recognition by Russia of the breakaway regions in Georgia, the South Ossetia, and the Kazan regions. Or they called it a failure when the SCO failed to intervene in response to the 2010 unrest in Kyrgyzstan, which resulted in violence and actually a changing government.

But these reactions really should not be surprising to anyone, not called a failure given the SCO's focus on the three evils. And really, the SCO's prime directive, I would call it, against interference and others' internal affairs, which is what they considered both of those incidents.

So despite these challenges, the last decade has, I would say, been a predictably slow, evolving time period of an institution that is building and an institution that is increasing its outreach in incremental steps forward. And as it looks now, the SCO's survival in the future, I think, likely will be aided by what I see as rising exceptions of regionalism as part of a solution to these global challenges, like Afghanistan.

And it will be aided with China and Russia's interest in utilizing the group to their own advantage. And other country's interest in understanding or deepening their relationship with it for their own benefit. I see most recently an article in a Turkish paper on -- advocating Turkey to become associated with the SCO for just one example.

Thus, the SCO's central focus on combating terrorism and separatism and extremism. It's geo-strategic siding in a region of the world where the United States has been fighting wars, along with its coalition partners, for the last several years. It's developing focus on economic issues to increase stability in the region. And its inclusion of countries with which this administration has sought to reset or reorient relations suggest there should be opportunities for cooperation between Washington and the SCO. But the U.S. has really had this cautious approach.

There was a nadir, I would call it, in relations around 2005 when the U.S.

was viewed by countries in the region as promoting regime change through those so-called color revolutions. And then on the other hand, the SCO was seen as partly responsible for the closing of a U.S. airbase in Uzbekistan, Karshi Kanabad, which had been, up until then, supporting coalition efforts in Afghanistan.

And this is when the SCO issued a call for the coalition to set a deadline for the withdrawal of coalition troops from the theater. But you have to remember, 2005 was a different time period. Things were not as they are right now in Afghanistan, and of course the color revolutions heightened the SCO countries' concerns of regime change hitting them, too.

The Obama Administration efforts call for more regional input into and burden-sharing for complex problems like Afghanistan. And it agreed in 2009, for the first time, to U.S. participation at a SCO event. It was a SCO-sponsored international conference on Afghanistan. It was held in Moscow, and attended by a State Department official -- mid-level official. But from what I can tell, that appears to be it as far as interaction.

And I asked myself, why? Why is that? And all I can think of is that -- you know, several reasons. Washington, likely, is concerned that -- especially now, particularly in the post-Mubarak era -- you know, engagement with the SCO could be portrayed as legitimizing the SCO's authoritarian states and their actions.

The U.S. also could be concerned that, you know, if they had an overture for engagement it could be rejected publicly. Or, maybe, you know, the concern is that Washington could end up as a kind of in-name-only partner and really sidelined from any significant activity or input into the organization.

So given these kinds of concerns, I conclude that official membership in the SCO, probably, is neither preferred nor attainable by Washington. But going forward

I see three options for a future relationship, at least. And that is, either the U.S. can choose to adopt a position of active opposition to it or benign neglect towards it, or begin to move towards a more active partnership based on common interests.

So, active opposition or benign neglect would seem to contradict at least this administration's support of regional groups, and its desire for regional solution in Afghanistan. And while the U.S. has bilateral relationships with each of the SCO's participants -- although, I admit, distant ones in the case of Iran -- senior officials in this administration appear to be open to engagement with this multilateral group to enhance -- to complement the bilateral relationships.

For example, just a -- some senior official statements that have gone out about the SCO in particular that U.S. participation in the March 2009 SCO-sponsored conference was highlighted in joint statements by the U.S. and Russia presidents, and anyone who has worked on those kinds of issues know how hard it is to get any kind of mention of items in a presidential statement. So, that's an achievement.

And Secretary of State Clinton publicly remarked last year that the U.S. hoped to be able to participate actively in many of the new regional organizations, including the SCO. And her deputy, James Steinberg, told a conference audience last year that he thought it was important that we continue to interact with the SCO and cited, you know, there are different ways in which non-members can engage.

So to end, if a decision is made by the U.S. to enhance engagement with the SCO, I think there are several bureaucratic and policy steps we could start within the administration, including establishing arrangements across bureaus in the State Department and across different agencies to better create opportunities to interact with the SCO. Because all of these countries, the way the silos go, the way we organize our State Department and Department of Defense, the countries fall within various and

different bureaus. They are across several field commands and Pentagon desks, and as everyone knows, sometimes organization dictates policy. So these things complicate policy coordination and collaboration. So maybe what we really need is some kind of a working group that we can use to make sure that we have a coherent policy.

And secondly, creating specific action plans with tangible short- and long-term goals and deliverables. And I think particularly if we could start with something in Afghanistan, which appears to be not only the most critical issue right now, but something of definite common interest. And this would help build trust and a productive relationship in this region where U.S. interests look to endure.

Thank you.

MS. HILL: Thank you very much, Julie. A couple of questions, again, to try to move us -- which may seem a bit difficult -- from here to Latin America.

But I mean, it really sounds from what you're describing here that the SCO is trying to take an even broader regional approach than certainly first envisaged in the Central Asian context. I mean, the fact that it has brought in at least as dialogue partners Sri Lanka and Belarus suggest that it may have broader regional aspirations. I mean, clearly Belarus technically still is in this purported union-state partnership with Russia. We'll see, of course, where that ends. And Sri Lanka, of course, has close proximity to India, although not any kind of subordinate political relationship by any means.

I mean, India, Iran, and Pakistan, given their proximity and the stress on Afghanistan, certainly made some sense. But these attempts to go further afield raises a lot of questions.

I mean, do you see the SCO hanging -- I call it S-C-O rather than SCO, but anyway, the -- whatever we want to call it, this grouping moving in a direction of trying

to be something more like ASEAN or OSCE, where anyone theoretically can join? The

OSCE which is focused on Europe, of course, has Canada and others in affiliated -- old

relationships, the old idea of Europe going from Vancouver to Vladivostok, which almost

brings it around to Latin America. But how do you see this shaping up from your

perspective?

MS. BOLAND: Well, I do think they have aspirations to be something

more like ASEAN, you know, the organizational structure. ASEAN has dialogue partners

as well.

I think a lot of this is to not only manage, as I said, aspiring countries that

maybe not all of the members are agreed upon, because they do work by consensus. So

maybe they don't all agree to have these countries be observers or members, but they do

fully understand the global impact and the publicity involved when they admit certain

countries.

For example, when they agreed upon Belarus, they made sure to include

in their publicity about it that this was the first European nation to be so formally

associated with the SCO. And of course, Turkey. That would be an interesting milestone

for them, considering the EU's indecision about Turkey right now.

So, I think it's an interesting aspiration for them, and I think that it is

definitely something they're going to continue.

MS. HILL: Thanks. I mean, if they are aspiring to ASEAN kind of

starters, then of course it could bring in a lot of other states well outside the region in to

observe the status that ASEAN has. And that does raise some questions about Latin

America, so that we can move over to you, Lieutenant Colonel Bracknell. Because China

and Russia, the key players in the SCO, clearly have very distinct interest now in Latin

America.

We've seen the Russians, Mr. Putin in particular, reaching out to Chavez in Venezuela and creating at least a semblance of an alliance even if there's not a great deal of substance there, as most people are aware in the audience. And China increasing rather dramatically its economic footprint. And in critical investments in Latin America. So maybe Venezuela might be another candidate country -- Brazil, perhaps -- for the SCO.

But, I mean, you've had a very, yourself, distinguished career often in the legal field. So you know thing a two, perhaps, about the treaty negotiations and the kinds of legal steps that one takes in these regional settings. You've also served, as many others have, in Iraq and Afghanistan, which gives you a pretty distinct perspective.

But Latin America, of course the United States may be able to have benign neglect towards the SCO in the coming years, but we certainly cannot afford it at all in the Latin American case. So, how do you see things shaping up here? And clearly you want to put a spotlight on Latin America for some very important reasons.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: Very good, thanks. Benign neglect is a term that I actually incorporated into my paper, and I appreciate you using that because it's exactly sort of the paradigm that I think the United States has engaged in over the past decade with regard to Latin America.

First, before I get started I want to thank Brookings for having us here. Thank Dr. Hill, Peter, for having us. And of course, you know, what we refer to the lance corporals in the Marine Corps. The lance corporals of Brookings for helping support this thing. We appreciate that a lot.

I also want to thank the prior panel for providing unsatisfactory answers, which is a precedent for my, by setting low expectations. I know that I'll never disappoint.

And the last thing is, I want to endeavor to end on time. I know that Jerry

and Chris are both aiming on getting out of here and going to happy hour, which from

looking at the crowd as a result of daylight savings time, apparently starts at 3:30 now

instead of 4:30. (Laughter)

MS. HILL: Oh, it's already time. (Laughter)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: No, I was telling a friend over at

the Atlantic Council, he said, what are you doing Wednesday? I said, well, I'm going over

to Brookings. He said, what are you talking about? I said, Latin America. And he said,

Latin America, but you're at the Atlantic Council. And I just didn't have the heart to break

it to him that the Atlantic Ocean actually extends down past the equator. (Laughter)

They're very Euro-centric there, I guess.

But anyway, the point of my paper is that since 2001 and the game-

changing events of 9-11, virtually every combatant command except the U.S. central

command has sort of gotten short shrift in terms of resources and strategic attention.

And no combatant command has suffered that any more than U.S. Southern Command

and no region more than Latin America.

Now, my contention is that Latin America has waited patiently, but as

Iraq force commitment has reduced to very manageable levels -- and by manageable

levels people say, oh, manageable levels in Iraq, now what does that mean? At our peak

from 2003 to 2009 we averaged just over 25,000 Marines in Al Anbar, and in other places

we had a handful of Marines in Baghdad or maybe we had a handful of Marines in

(inaudible) as liaisons. But the bulk were in Al Anbar and Multinational Forces West; just

a hair over 25,000, down to 159 Marines in 2010. So we've gained some -- we have --

the Marine Corps, at least, has gained some force savings there.

Now as the conflict in Afghanistan starts to off-ramp to the next few

years, more force even should be realized and it should be reinvested in renewing

military-military relationships in some neglected regions. For example, in the news this

week -- and it might have been even today -- I saw that the Marine Corps has 20,000

people, more or less, in RC Southwest and scattered throughout the country. But the

bulk of the force offering in RC Southwest, of course. And that there were some

predictions that the 98,000 combat forces that the President will use to off-ramp about

3,000 this coming July. Now, what mix of that will be Marines, I don't know. The most

you could probably expect would be a battalion given a general one-third, two-thirds ratio

of combat forces from Marine Corps to Army in Afghanistan.

But the point is, we're going to realize some force savings in the coming

years, and we need to -- instead of sitting back on our laurels and catching our breath,

the fact of the matter is we can't afford that anymore. People talk about reset, and there's

going to be an opportunity for that. But we also need to reinvest.

Now, the Far East has gotten a lot of attention from the Obama

Administration, but my contention is we ignore Latin America at our own peril. Now,

why? Why, you ask? First, let's consider the relative merits of Latin America vis-à-vis

other regions in terms of integration with the United States.

Two of the top 5 and 4 of the top 10 exporters of oil to the United States

are in Latin America: Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia. The region covers 16

million square miles, and that includes nautical miles, that are covered by U.S. Southern

Command, of course. Sixteen million square miles in our backyard with a population of

nearly 590 million people, or expressed differently, six-tenths of a billion. Do the math in

terms of the world population from the Mexican border south: 590 million people.

Mexico is America's third largest trading partner and not by much. It

doesn't give up just a handful of percentage points in terms of trailing the number one

and number two trading partners. Forty-eight million Americans have cultural roots in

Latin America, based on the 2010 census. And Latin America has -- is home to the

fastest-growing emerging world power, Brazil, which has become an economic

powerhouse in its own right with an average GDP in the five years prior to 2008 -- sort of

the market meltdown. But it's high watermark of growth of 7.5 percent GDP growth per

year over the previous -- the 5 years prior to 2008. That's pretty tremendous. Eighteenth

in the world in terms of real growth over the same period, but most of those 18 countries

above them were really, quite frankly -- they're minor players in the world security

environment. Brazil, in terms of overall GDP, is about eighth in the world. So we're

talking about a fast-growing and major ascended power.

Now, my strategy for attacking this issue or analyzing this issue was to

take a look at a comparative analysis of strategic capstone documents. I looked at the

national security strategy from 2010 versus 2006. The QDR report from 2010 versus

2006, and the national military strategy of 2011 versus the national defense strategy of

2008 and the last before that, the national -- last national military strategy, which was

published in 2004.

When you go through and you look at the language in there and sort of

count the number of references, if nothing else, as a metric towards concentration on

Latin America, there's a very clear trend in guidance from menial lateral action towards

partner-based actions and a very clear trend in specific mentions of Latin America as a

regional security partner of interest to the United States. In fact, the 2006 National

Security Strategy doesn't even mention Latin America at all. The 2010 National Security

Strategy mentions Latin America or a country component within Latin America five times.

So, you know, can you extrapolate meaning from that? Yes, probably.

These guys -- the people who write these things don't just stick words into these things.

They do them for a reason, and that is to express the strategic intent of the United States.

You will also see a similar trend when you take a -- do a comparative analysis of the

QDR reports and the national military strategy and national defense strategy. Okay. So,

what?

Now, you can't forget the fact that there's a war ongoing in Mexico, which

so far has claimed between 22,000 and 50,000 casualties. 50,000 casualties in the war

on drugs in Mexico. That's a number approaching our war losses in Vietnam, which was

kind of an emotional event for the United States.

Here in Washington, it sort of gets drowned in the noise of Afghanistan and some

of the other high-end stuff, and you know, NATO conference -- I mean, the NATO Lisbon

summit and missile defense and everything else. But the closer you get down to the

Southwestern border -- and, you know, it's admittedly not a very scientific example. But I

was in Tucson a week and a half ago. The closer you get to the Southwestern border,

the more important it is to those folks. And they -- it's more towards front page above the

fold news for people in the Southwestern United States. And in fact, the *Los Angeles

Times*, in all my research, it's pretty clear the *LA Times* leads the nation in terms of the

reporting. It's a salient issue to the folks who live in the Southwest.

I was talking to the moderator from the prior panel about sea blindness. We also

need to make sure that Washington isn't Mexico blind in terms of the strategic importance

of what's going on on the other side of that border.

The criminal cartels threaten government authority and civilian

populations, Mexico, and threaten to overwhelm the government's claim to the monopoly

on violence. Mexico is politically stable, but the war against cartels is a volatile issue for

the Calderon government. And so is Mexican sovereignty, which poses a real obstacle to

outside assistance, particularly by foreign armory soldiers on Mexican soil.

Now, I don't want to sell this issue short. It's a big deal for foreign

soldiers to be on Mexican territory. I don't know how to stack them up in terms of

sensitivity to foreign soldiers on their soil, but it's apparent to me that it is a major issue.

We need to examine ways where we can cooperate on the margins without offending

notions of Mexican sovereignty and upsetting the political apple cart in Mexico.

Today's *New York Times* -- I believe it is the *Times* or the *Post* -- had a

story about drone attacks. I mean, you know, not attacks but drone ISR over Mexico,

which has actually resulted in some major tactical successes for the Mexican army and

the Mexican security forces. You know, did anybody really think we weren't -- didn't have

drone activity going on over in Mexico? But there it is in the front page of the -- I think it

was the *New York Times.* Peter, you're nodding, is that right? Was it the *Times*? Yes.

I think this environment provides an opportunity for Naval expeditionary

forces to assist in a turning of Mexican security forces, and several locales as an add-on

to the Merida Initiative, which one commentator labels Mexico's Plan Colombia, which is

not a popular term as in Mexico City, of course, for some obvious reasons that are -- if

you know anything about Plan Colombia, there's some baggage there.

Being seaborne, Naval forces are seen as less permanent than foreign

Army units. And moreover, they're sufficiently flexible. They will be able to move from

place to place to conduct training at several places, including third country hosts such as

Colombia, which has actually offered -- other countries has been thrown into the mix as

possible sites for training Mexican soldiers. For example, El Salvador, which is probably

sufficiently stable and has the infrastructure to assist with that.

The training needs to be done competently and quietly. It has sort of

always seemed to me that two thirds of the activities we do with foreign states,

particularly in terms of security cooperation, are done so that we can crow about it as

Americans. It think that this is an initiative that we should downplay a little bit and do

passively.

The press coverage is going to result. It's not like we're going to do it in a clandestine training mission of the Mexican forces, but we just need to manage the way it's perceived in the international press. And not -- sort of control the public affairs officers and have them not generate press releases on this stuff at a rapid rate.

But the fact that no matter how we manage the public communication piece, there's an inherent need for us to get more involved in the training to bring Mexican security forces up to and increase the level of competence. That's not to suggest that they're particularly incompetent now, but the fact of the matter is we spent 10 years and a whole bunch of lives and money developing a pretty good expertise in Iraq and Afghanistan which, I got it. They're different and it isn't Latin America. But we have spent a lot of time, money, and lives and political capital and emotional capital in developing some niche expertise in counterinsurgency, and it would be a shame to see it die on the vine without being able to contribute some of that expertise to Mexico.

Now, third, naval expeditionary forces. Which, quite frankly, I'm using as code for Marine Corps. But I chose this term deliberately to ensure that we get, you know -- so we get Navy pregnant with the problem and facing the fact and committing some resources to this thing. Because the fact of the matter is that the reason the Marine Corps is special is that we're seaborne. I chose the word "naval," not "Navy" because, as any Marine officer will tell you, we are naval officers with a small "n" and not referencing the middle part of your body, but naval as in seaborne, from the sea.

By the way, this is -- that being in mind, we are not part of the Navy, okay? (Laughter) I get so tired of people coming up and going, well, the Marine Corps is part of the Navy because we share a common secretary. That's not -- doesn't -- we're not part of the Navy. They're a separate service. Yes, exactly. You know, we have an

equal seat on the joint chiefs as they do. So, we're not part of the Navy, but naval

officers nonetheless. (Laughter)

MS. HILL: I think we've got it.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: So, naval expeditionary forces

such as the Marine Corps security cooperation, Marine air/ground task force, or security

operation MAGTF, are uniquely positioned to South comm. and reestablishing a

meaningful exercise and engagement program aimed at strategic ends, more than just

placing random events on a calendar to keep the access program alive.

As naval expeditionary forces are realized, more force savings over the next three

or four years, we are practically morally obligated to let hard-won counterinsurgency and

regular warfare expertise languish. Rather, engaging SOUTHCOM with an aggressive

security cooperation, security forces, system plan as an economical way to keep our

forces close by yet shipboard, returning to our naval roots, and while investing in partners

we have not paid much attention to for a while. And you have some pretty important

strategic concerns.

Finally, outside the realm of purely naval expeditionary forces, I believe

U.S. force planning should consider the merits of warm basing in Latin America on the

task force East model in Romania and Bulgaria.

Warm basing represents an extraordinary compromise between the fiscal and

political expense of constant forward deployment of forces, and the requirement to have

well-developed and ready equipment and supplies for exploitation as demands arise.

The sort of model I had worked out in my head, without a whole lot of rigor to it, was to

have three: one based in the Andean Ridge that would be focused on

counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and regular warfare requirements; another based

somewhere in Central America, maybe in -- one of our more reliable partners, maybe El

Salvador or some other sufficiently stable democratic republic that could probably use the

money and attention that this thing would bring, that would have a similar regular warfare

but also humanitarian assistance equipment set; and then a third base in the Caribbean,

perhaps in Jamaica or the Bahamas, or even Puerto Rico, which would have an almost

exclusively humanitarian assistance and disaster relief bent there. So, just a thought that

could be shaped in a bunch of different ways.

But in some, Mexico begs for attention in terms of training their forces to

deal with the drug war and their borders. And naval expeditionary forces provide

flexibility and economy in assisting with this training imperative and mitigate political risk

to make, you know, leaders.

The entire region is ripe for naval expeditionary forces, engagement in

security cooperation, and security force assistance missions. Thanks.

MS. HILL: Thank you very much, Lieutenant Colonel Bracknell.

I just -- before we turn over to the audience and before everyone rushes

off for happy hour -- look, they're already leaving. Maybe they're going to get a coffee.

I'd like to ask you a couple of questions. And we actually here at

Brookings, including in 21st Century Defense Initiative that's been hosting the fellows

here, we have a number of fellows who are looking very closely at the problems that we

face in Latin America. Vanda Felbab-Brown, one of our permanent fellows in the

initiative, is one of the top U.S. experts on the narco trade across the world.

We have a Latin American initiative with a number of senior experts, including

some former Latin American officials who are, you know, looking at the region's long-term

perspective. And of course, our former head of the Foreign Policy Studies program,

Carlos Pasquale, is now the U.S. ambassador to Mexico and very much in the hot seat.

So, we're paying particular attention to this.

And I guess --

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: He is in the hot seat.

MS. HILL: Yes, he very much is in the hot seat. Now actually, you know, I've read about him all the time in the hot seat, you know, following what he's doing. It does raise a lot of questions here, and, you know, many of the meetings that we've had on these topics here at Brookings about really the legitimacy of a U.S. role.

I mean, you're positing here really quite an ambitious agenda that's first -- focused, first of all, on Mexico. But clearly, the problem is well beyond Mexico, as you've sketched out in the end, with your proposal for, you know, different basings of various counterinsurgency humanitarian efforts. You mentioned the Andean Ridge, Central America, and the Caribbean.

We also know from a lot of the research that's being done and, obviously, the reporting in the press and even anecdotal experience from many of us here that this problem is reverberating well beyond Mexico. I mean, obviously Colombia has been battling with this for some time. The problem has been displacing itself for many of the states. The fact that Colombia has had such an effective series of programs to combat the insurgencies, the FARC, and the narco traffic is, in many respects, exacerbated some of the issues in Mexico.

The Caribbean, now, has been wracked by the displacement North of some of the drug violence. Jamaica is a case in point. We've all seen the various reports about the difficulties in the Jamaican police and law enforcement trying to tackle this.

Bermuda -- I was just in Bermuda in October, and was shocked to hear of Jamaican gangs now and the sleepy idea of Bermuda is rapidly fading by their penetration there. And then when you talked about El Salvador and now there's a great deal of concern that as the Mexican government starts to get to grip with the struggle with

the narco traffickers, it might displace further Honduras, El Salvador, much further down

into Central and even Southern America. And of course, there's always the perpetual

problem of Brazil dealing with the problems. And the future concerns of the security of

the Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games.

So, we've got a lot on our plate here. But the issues that we've seen

very frequently -- the recent concerns that Calderon has had that came out of WikiLeaks,

and many other issues. Questions about the role of the United States, the statements

that have been purported to be made by Carlos Pasquale and various others raise a lot

of questions as whether the U.S. can be seen as part of the solution to the problem, and

not part of the problem. And we get a lot of concerns expressed in these auditoriums and

others that, you know, one of the main drivers of this problem, of course, is domestic

issues in the United States. Our own failures to come to grips with the role that drugs

play in society.

So, how do you see this playing out? Because you've put together a

very provocative presentation, I think, here. And the real question is, can the U.S. -- I

mean, I have no doubt that the Marine Corps can actually tackle this issue. But can the

U.S. itself be seen as a legitimate actor in solving these problems?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: That's a great question. I am

disappointed to hear this is provocative. I was hoping I would lull everyone to sleep and

you'd let me leave.

But -- no, but fair enough. And in fact, the President and Secretary of

State have been out front lately, even admitting that the United States is part of the

problem in terms of consumption and in terms of gun flow from North to South. And the

Mexicans have been all over us about that, and yes. I mean, that's a powerful political

dynamic there.

So, you know, by some measures the NRA is probably the most effective and the most powerful lobby in the United States. And they are very interested -- they're not as concerned about the national security ramifications of guns moving over the border as they are whatever their personal agenda is, which is, you know, sportsmanship and shooting rights and so forth, and drawing a bright line in the sand. So, it's virtually an intractable problem in terms of that.

Nevertheless, it's hard to argue that even though the GAO has come out and sort of criticized Plan Colombia as not meeting its own goals and metrics, right? Yet, it's been enormously effective in terms of reducing drug supply and restoring some semblance of the rule of law there. Colombia is a very different place than it was 12 or 15 years ago. You know, I hadn't considered this issue about Bermuda, but, wow, there sounds like a pretty nifty research trip there, in October, huh?

MS. HILL: Yes, it was a good time to go.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: But Colombia is -- by any measure, regardless of whether Plan Colombia has reached its own internally driven metrics, the fact of the matter is they've achieved some measurable progress. Whether they met their own goals or not, that's unfortunate. You always want to meet the goals that you set for yourself. But the fact of the matter is, they have made progress. They have spent a lot of money. But more importantly, they've actually made measurable progress in Plan Colombia.

The utility of my proposal, I think, is the fact that you just described a swath of land where these problems exist that meets exactly what I was talking about: 16 million square miles and 589 million people. We're flexible. You know, we can go a lot of places, we can go where administration sets priorities year to year. We can stay there for a while. We can look -- unlike the Army, that when they come places they look like

they're going to stay there for a while, when the Marine Corps comes ashore from naval

shipping, we can stay a while or we can stay a long while and we can be self-sustaining.

And we can stay for three weeks to do trading or we can stay for three months, whatever

the political environment will entail.

So, that's the best answer for -- yes. U.S. boots on the ground almost

anywhere, but particularly in Latin America, it's a pretty darn sensitive issue. As it is in

Africa, as it is in South Asia, as it is in Southeast Asia. But that is one way to mitigate the

risk, I believe, that is posed by American presence there.

MS. HILL: Thank you very much. Now I'll turn over to others in the

audience. Please, sir. And we have a microphone coming.

SPEAKER: (inaudible) topic. I'm a U.S. Army (inaudible) fellow at the DEA.

And my question is, well -- or maybe it's more of a statement. The U.S. has really -- the

troops along the border right now, the 1,200 National Guard troops are a drop in the

bucket, literally. And they're hindered so much about what they can do, when they can

do it -- they can't do anything, really. Posse Comitatus is ineffective, and they really can't

do anything.

Anyway, my research is on that. And you're asking -- or you're proposing

to send Marines to train a cartel that is 100 percent fed by the 93 percent of the drugs

that come through a 1,900 mile border that we feed. And that's how they're fed.

I think your idea is great, but until we couple it with a fence along the

border to stop them being fed from, you know, the money for the -- from the drugs and

the money buys the guns, and yadda, yadda, yadda, I think that should be a two-pronged

approach.

I do not see this administration making any kind of decision of a wall

along the border. It has been talked about until it's blue in the face, and it's not going

anywhere. But again, I never thought of taking Marines and training them. I think, good

idea, because they need it. But if we can stop the money flow that is supporting the

cartels, it would be a win-win and much more successful proposition. So, your comments

on that.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: We don't build walls -- no, but

I'm just kidding. But yes, your point is well taken. I am only purporting to address a

solution of -- a portion of the problem. But you're right, that is part of the intractability of

the problem is, that it -- you know, money and guns going South and drugs going North,

not just over land but by sea as well. You doubtless have seen the pictures of the

disposable submarines. Jiminy Crickets, disposable submarines. I mean, you know.

God bless the ingenuity but, you know, it's very difficult. So, thanks.

MS. HILL: We had a question at the back, and then Chris.

COMMANDER HIMES: Hi, Commander Himes from CSIS. If I may, a

two part. Ms. Boland, are you able to characterize the Iranian agenda within the SCO?

Is there anything in your research that kind of pointed what they're looking to get out of

that?

And then for my naval brother, had you looked at all about -- you touched

on kind of the key issues there. Post-Castro Cuba contingency crisis planning initiatives

that maybe part of what needs to be done down there as well?

Thanks.

MS. BOLAND: Sure. Iran and Pakistan are the only two observers who,

so far, have applied to be actual full members. So, you know, it's -- so it's obvious that

Iran wants to be there to stay.

Just last year, the SCO actually made a decision about membership

regulations. Actual member to be a member. And one of the conditions it put on it was

that the country must not be under -- currently under UN Security Council sanctions.

Ding. So, but even despite that, I mean, that kind of kick to the head, Iran still came out

with statements saying they still wanted to be an observer and still wanted to -- still had

aspirations to become a member some day.

So, I mean, just to put it very succinctly, I think their agenda within the

SCO is access, influence, and legitimacy. They -- you know, between counterterrorism,

counternarcotics, economic influence -- all of these things are of influence to them, for

one reason or another. Perhaps again, not on our agenda and our value scale. But

certainly they see it as an avenue for them to wield some kind of heft and get outside of

the current system of sanctions and kind of persona non grata that they're currently in

with the West, so.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: In the big paper, not just a

précis that I sort of prepared here, I identified 14 U.S. strategic interests in the region.

Number eight on my list is preparing for Cuban transition to post-communist

governments. That's right, it's an issue. I didn't choose to address that as the most

salient point because we've been waiting 52 years for post-communist transition. There's

no telling whether it's going to happen in a year, 4 years, 10 years, or 40 years. They've

managed, quite frankly, they've managed to transition to Castro's governance pretty

effectively. And it could be seamless for another 20 years.

So, you know, we could plan until we're blue in the face on that, but

there's -- as you know, you have to commit resources to the most likely and most

dangerous courses of action and stuff. Well, that's not -- we don't know how likely that

course of action is. We know damn well that Mexico is going to explode if we don't help.

You know, with all the attendant problems; mass migration across the borders. I mean,

violence in the United States, a dead DEA agent within the last -- I don't know, when was

that?

SPEAKER: It was actually in the border patrol --

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: Border patrol. Yes, I am sorry.

SPEAKER: It was three weeks -- I was there when it happened. It was an absolute mess. They devastated the border patrol. But anyway, they -- and there's a lot of government of Mexico officials being shot at any -- we don't hear a lot about that. And we're going crazy when it's one of ours, but -- and I don't think -- and the comparison to Vietnam is excellent. And if that doesn't wake the American public up, I don't know what's going to. So. But we have to help, absolutely.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: Well, as I said, out West -- the Western part of the United States, it's hilarious -- it's not hilarious. It is striking to me that it could be such a big deal to the Western part of the United States, but somehow that bell doesn't ring all the way back to Washington as loudly as it does if you live in Tucson or Santa Fe or El Paso.

MS. HILL: Well, I hate to say that it will ring when it hits all the Caribbean resorts, which is where we're heading. In fact, people's spring breaks will be greatly curtailed -- and this isn't trivial -- because that's when you start to have the effect. It's when, you know, a bunch of U.S. students on spring break in Cancun end up like Mexican partygoers beheaded or, you know, other horrific things happen to them, just as is happening all the time right now in Mexico. I mean, you're absolutely right to point this out.

We've been trying to highlight this here at Brookings in our various initiatives. But it's going to take that kind of wakeup call. And unfortunately, it's those kind of high profile but maybe smaller impact events that gets people's attention rather than the ongoing carnage that's happening right on the border.

Chris, you wanted to come in.

SPEAKER: Yes, I just wanted to ask Butch -- and I appreciate your question. Don't get me wrong. Good semper fi, you know, getting down there in Central and South America. But I would be interested if you'd looked at two particular maybe waypoints.

One, the approval of OEFCCA. So for those that may not be aware, there's 21 different OEF and OIF operations, and OEFCCA actually hit the above the line mark in 2007. So I'm interested, one, has that had any impact?

And second, if you maybe had looked at the impact of essentially the extraction, for lack of better terms, of taking the special forces group that is habitually aligned to Central and South America and now retooling them to Pashtun and Arabic and sending them to Iraq and Afghanistan. What that impact was in the exact same time period? Because when you timeline it out, the spike in atrocities, quite frankly, from 2001 to 2010 -- it almost lines up minute to minute, day by day, year to year to the extraction of these forces and retooling them to send them into the fight. I was just wondering if you had had a chance to look at any of that data.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRACKNELL: On OEFCCA, no. But I knew there was a reason I came here today, and I appreciate that. I will go take a look at that. Just -- it hadn't occurred to me.

On the second issue, yes. That -- what you're postulating about those BSF group, that's a fair point. But I think the problem is bigger than -- you know, that may have been coincidental timing in terms of -- rather than what you're suggesting, which could be a cause-and-effect relationship in terms of -- I just think the problem has gotten bigger than what an SF group would have been able to cure. And, you know, I'm talking about sending down security operation MAGTFs of a couple thousand Marines that can --

it's just a more robust capability than what an SF group is able to affect.

I'm not discounting it. I mean, God bless them. They've been doing yeoman's work down there for a long, long time. And your point is well taken. That is, capacity that we've taken away rather than adding back. But so, no, I haven't analyzed it. I probably should. It just strikes me that that's just not a significant enough force offering than what we're talking about here.

MS. HILL: Well, unfortunately we have to wrap up now. And I would like to hand back over to Peter Singer. But I think that all of this discussion here and all the various questions just shows how critical these issues are for us to address in-depth.

And I just personally want to say that I'm really thrilled that we've had so much important research being done here by our Federal Executive Fellows. People have just got real, on-the-ground experience. And practical perspectives on this. So it's not just our fellows here who are looking at these issues.

So I want to thank all of you on the panel, and hand over to Peter, who has got quite the agenda himself for the future of the 21st Century Defense Initiative to think about.

MR. SINGER: Well, I'm going to be very brief in ending because it does seem that it's getting close to folks' happy hour.

First, a comment, and this actually connects back to our lunchtime speaker. Occasionally the value of these military fellowship programs are questioned. We have a force that's under stress, does it make sense to take out leaders -- accomplished leaders and move them into positions like this for the year?

There are two models of these fellowship programs. One is to treat them as free labor at the institution that they're at, to assign them to pre-existing projects, to treat them as staff assists for folks in those offices. I can't speak to the value of that approach.

You've seen the value of the other approach here today, which is to allow them to conduct independent research on issues of importance to the nation. And I think you've seen the value of that research, not only to understanding the topics themselves but raising the level of understanding in the D.C. policy community, raising the level of understanding among the research institutions, as well as among the public. And all of these papers that you're hearing talked about today are very soon going to be published either by Brookings or by the journals of the services that folks are in. But I think today you've seen the value of this kind of research.

And the second thing I wanted to do is essentially do three levels of thanks. The first is to you, the hardy few who have stayed here throughout the day attending and listening to all of these sessions. We very much appreciate you coming out to this.

The second is to thank the staff that put this together, particularly Heather Messera, who -- you know, you gave her the field rank of lance corporal. And in our organization it's more like four-star general. So, very much appreciate all the work that she's put together.

And then finally, to the speakers themselves. Not only for the great job that they did here today, but really at the end of this, what we need to remember, the service that they've shown to our nation. Not only this year, but the years before that. So, please join me in a round of applause. (Applause)

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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