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ELITES IN THE HOT SEAT:
THE RISE OF POPULISM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. VAÏSSE: Hi, everybody. We're going to get started. My name is Justin Vaïsse. I'm a senior fellow at the Center on the U.S. and Europe here at Brookings. I'd like to welcome all of you at Brookings this afternoon for a debate on the rise of populism in Europe and the United States, a debate that we have organized in partnership with our friends at the Heinrich Boell Foundation who have also been working on these issues recently.

The discussion on populism is both very easy and very difficult to introduce. It's easy because everybody can see that there is a populist wave on both sides of the Atlantic, and that it is indeed a very worrying development. If only one looks at the cover of *The National Interest*, the piece by Ian Kershaw on fascism returns -- or does it? -- on the wave of populism in Europe or one looks at Christopher Caldwell's piece on Marine Le Pen in the *Weekly Standard* of this week. There's a sort of evidence of this issue. Indeed, in France, it was a huge shock when a week ago Marine Le Pen, who's now the head of the National Front, appeared in first position in a poll for the first round of the presidential election, that is before current President Nicolas Sarkozy and most likely Socialist contender Dominique Strauss-Kahn with 24 percent of intentions of vote against 21 for each of them. And this, the National Front -- the *Front National* -- is a party which wants to take France out of the euro, which wants to take France out of the Schengen European Zone, out of NATO, also; establish national preference and deny welfare to immigrants, as well as put an end to family reunification; restore the death penalty; and re-localize jobs in France by favoring economic patriotism.

In the piece by Chris Caldwell, Marine Le Pen herself is comparing the *Front National* to the Tea Party Movement. She says this is a third force that represents, in her words, the emergence of, once again, a third force next to the two organized

powers. That is to say the Socialist Party and the UMP, the two main parties.

On the U.S. side, while there are indeed very serious policy proposals put forward by the Tea Party Movement, some of the supporters of that movement advocate the abolition of the Federal Reserve, a ban on driver's licenses in some states, not raising the federal debt ceiling, encouraging states to sign constitutional compacts among them so as to escape the implementation of the health care reform, revising the 14th Amendment so as to allow states to issue a separate birth certificate for the children of undocumented immigrants. So there's a sort of evidence of the issue and we see these forces rising throughout Europe, but also, to some extent, in the U.S.

Now, beyond this obvious rise which everyone can see, you know, it's sort of we know it when we see it, and the fact that it's worrying, the discussion is also difficult to introduce for at least three reasons. The first one is that the concept of populism itself is very complex. It's obviously not a political party. It's not even a coherent ideology. It can be from the right, it can from the left, or even from the center. Rather than an ideology, it's really a tendency; it's an aspect or a characteristic of otherwise pretty different political movements, such as the one we will discuss today, as opposed to the central doctrine of these movements.

Second, populism is not only a complex term, but it's also a loaded term because it was associated with distasteful movement in the past, especially in Europe, and it can be used as an epithet. As a result, any discussion of populism is politically sensitive. And indeed, academics and experts like us can all the more easily be accused of abusing the term, that they are precisely the type of elites that populists criticize for their patronizing attitudes vis-à-vis the people. What we call populist, they can call simply popular or the expression of common sense.

Third, comparing the U.S. to Europe is not self-evident. Each continent

has a rich history of populist movements, but obviously the European historical record of populism is ripe with horrible tragedies while the American one is not. When the Great Depression struck in the 1930s, populism rose on both sides of the Atlantic, but Roosevelt was elected in the U.S. while Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany. And on many counts, indeed, the Tea Party Movement in the U.S. is decidedly differently from the various anti-immigrant and nationalist political formations which have gained strength across Europe in recent years.

Still, they do have things in common. And in order to establish that comparison I would like to try to offer a definition of populism before asking our speakers to tell us their views. And I should say that I'm happy to be refuted by either of you.
(Laughter)

Populism is, I would suggest, about power, identity, and anger. It's about power because it attacks elites of all kinds, from technocrats to plutocrats and politicians and it exalts the power and the values of the common man, the forgotten majority, which are shortchanged and despised by these elites. But identity second. Populism hates globalism and emphasizes the role of natural or pre-political units, like the nation, the region, or the ethnic group. Third, populism is always the expression of a profound discontent with the current order and the way the social contract has evolved to the detriment of certain categories or certain classes. You know, the quote "I am mad as hell and I'm not going to take it anymore," to use the 1970s cry of protest. This protest often leads to the scapegoating of certain groups and institutions and sometimes even to conspiracy theories.

Let me now give the floor to our two speakers of today, and I will introduce them in the order in which they will speak.

Bill Galston here is a senior fellow at Brookings, where he holds the Ezra

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Zilkha chair in Governance Studies. He's a former advisor to President Clinton and also to various presidential candidates. He's an expert on domestic policy, political campaigns, and elections. But he is also, like Pierre, a political philosopher by training. He was previously a professor of public policy at the University of Maryland, where he specialized on issues of public philosophy and political institutions. I should add that he has also worked a lot in the past 10 years on the polarization of the American political landscape. And more recently he was the co-founder of No Labels, a political organization dedicated to restoring civility in politics and fight the negative effects of excessive partisanship.

Pierre Hassner is an associate research fellow at CERI, at Sciences-Po, the international research center at Sciences-Po in Paris. Pierre had a brush with some of the deadliest forms of Europe in populism himself since he was born in Romania in the early 1930s. He arrived in France as a student in 1948, and attended the *École Normale Supérieure* between 1952 and 1955, becoming a professor of philosophy and a disciple of Raymond Aron in the mid-'50s. He was a Rockefeller fellow in the U.S. in the two years afterwards, and then he's been with CERI since the end of the '50s and has also taught at Johns Hopkins University. His work in international relations as well as on democracy and totalitarian regimes and the role of passions in politics has been deeply influenced by this early experience and also of his being a student of political philosophy.

So, Bill, why don't you go first? The floor is yours.

MR. GALSTON: Well, thank you, Justin, for taking the initiative in organizing this meeting. Thanks, also, to the Center and the Foundation for making it possible. And I also have to say it's a pleasure to share the podium with a thinker whose work I have admired ever since I was a graduate student more than 40 years ago. And I look forward to discussing with you for the next hour and a half Kant's political writings.

Just kidding, Justin. (Laughter)

I want to make -- this is not a topic about which I've written previously, but I welcome the invitation to spend some time trying to think it through. And so the remarks that I'm about to make are very preliminary and I would say imperfectly organized, but I thought it would be useful to get them on the table and perhaps they can be perfected through objection.

The first point that I want to make is that elements of populism are very much inherent in what I will call the cultural DNA of the United States. The single most influential work of political writing in the 18th century in the Colonies was *Cato's Letters* by Trenchard and Gordon, which represented the distilled essence of the views of the Country Party, the party, the group opposed to the centralizations of power and the corruption of the court, and the precursor of what became the Whigs. And Trenchard and Gordon in *Cato's Letters* put together a highly appealing, if not entirely coherent, combination of liberty loving verging on libertarianism with classical republicanism. That this volume of letters, which it is said was on the house -- was on the bookshelf of 50 percent of American households by the 1770s, was not devoid of consequences becomes apparent in one of the great pieces of 18th century political rhetoric, namely Edmund Burke's second speech on conciliation with the American Colonies delivered in 1775. And here are a couple of outtakes which will give you Burke's understanding of the cultural DNA of the emerging United States.

He says famously, "All Protestantism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of dissent. But the religion most prevalent in our northern Colonies," that's the American Colonies, "is a refinement on the principles of resistance. It is the dissidence of dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant," religion.

And then farther down and even more pertinently for our current

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discussion Burke says, and I quote, "In other countries the people, more simple and of a less mercurial cast, judge of an ill principle in government only by an actual grievance. But in the American Colonies they anticipate the evil and judge of the pressure of the grievance by the badness of the principle. They augur misgovernment at a distance and sniff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze." And thus it has been for every iteration of populism in the United States since the founding of the Republic

Which brings me to my next point. That is, there have been cycles of populist upsurge throughout American history, starting with the Jacksonian movement; the Know Nothings; the Populist Movement and Party of the 1880s and 1990s; a kind of a left populism during the New Deal; the populism of post-World War II anti-internationalism; and then the latest populist way which, in my judgment, began in 1968 and has never completed abated since then.

The next point -- and here I agree with all of the spirit and much of the letter of Justin's opening remarks -- there are some persistent structural features of American populism from beginning to end. And as we'll see later on in my remarks, there are differences among the upsurges of American populism, but these, I think, are persistent features.

First, of course, anti-elitism. And in America, this consists in a brisk movement from the proposition I'm as good as you are morally speaking. All of us are created equal. Two, without passing Go, a suspicion of all social hierarchies, including hierarchies based on knowledge and expertise. The purest expression of this spirit in contemporary American politics is Sarah Palin, but in our lifetime, one thinks of George Wallace and his denunciation of "pointy-headed intellectuals," and what Ronald Reagan said on the eve of his first run for governor of California. And by the way, to avoid misunderstanding let me say I do not view Reagan as a populist, but I do view Reagan as

someone who was very good at drawing on the strength of populist sensibilities without succumbing to the ills of populism. If you're interested in my developed views on that, I'll be happy to share them with you.

At any rate, here's what Reagan said: "I am not a politician. I am an ordinary citizen with a deep-seated belief that much of what troubles us has been brought about by politicians and it's high time that more ordinary citizens brought the breadth of commonsense thinking to bear on these problems." Common sense, the wisdom of the people is good enough.

A second defining feature is particularism, a particularism that manifests itself in family and ethnic ties and also in loyalty to what is near and familiar. One of the consequences of that kind of particularism is mistrust of large and distant institutions, whether corporations or domestic political centers of power and, *a fortiori*, international institutions.

Which brings me to the next structural feature of American populism. It is a kind of irritable nationalism. It stands against international laws and institutions. Its spirit is summed up in the New Hampshire revolutionary banner, "Don't Tread on Me." It is not shy about self-assertion and it insists on American exceptionalism and harshly criticizes leaders who are seen as denying it or qualifying it in any way.

The next defining feature of American populism, a sense of power disadvantage, if not outright powerlessness, a sense of being beleaguered, a sensibility which at the extremes breeds a willingness to entertain conspiracy theories. For a good catalogue of this history I direct you to a famous essay by the historian Richard Hofstadter and what he called "The Paranoid Style in American Politics." And beginning with McCarthyism he works backward through the populist parties' belief in a gold conspiracy beginning right after the Civil War to anti-Catholic screeds against papal

conspiracies before the Civil War to an anti-Masonic populist panic that swept the United States in the 1790s based on the proposition that the Bavarian Illuminati were on the verge of taking over the country. And the Bavarian Illuminati continued to pop up from time to time in the conspiracy theories of Lyndon LaRouche, just to show you that no bad idea ever dies in the United States.

Another important ingredient of populism American style is what I will call a sense of dispossession. Let me define that. It is the sense that our country is slipping away from us or worse has been taken away from us. And we need to fight to keep it if it's just slipping or to take it back if it's been taken away. In that sense, though not in all other senses, American populism is always conservative. It is always backward-looking. It always says we want to preserve the good old ways against these alien threats.

Throughout the history of American populism there have been different categories of this sense of dispossession: the cultural and religious; the ethnic and racial; the social, focused on crime and disruption as foes of the social order that populists in America tend to prize; the political, state or federal power mobilized against community control or unelected judges wielding power against the majority of the people; and finally, the sense of dispossession can be economic as it was in the 1890s with the decline in the agricultural economy and as it has been since the 1970s with the decline of the manufacturing economy.

The next defining feature of American populism: a focus on individual liberty and the protection of individual liberty, which is not to be confused with outright libertarianism. So populists in the United States today are against the individual health care mandate, but not Social Security. They're against what they regard as federal intrusion, but they are hardly against all funded federal programs, as the new majority in the House of Representatives is about to discover.

American populists are characterized by a moralized outlook. Politics is a struggle of good versus evil with no middle ground and, therefore, compromise is a dirty word. Characterized by apocalyptic thinking. There is a threat to liberty. It is grave. It is immediate. And if we do not stand our ground and fight here and now, all is lost.

Which brings me to the final section of these introductory remarks, having to do with some of the special characteristics of the wave of populism that erupted in the late 1960s and has not really subsided ever since. And let me just offer some very brief brushstrokes here.

To some extent, this populism, one must admit it, was racially motivated, but I don't want to exaggerate that into a pervasive or dominant feature. And part of it took the form of opposition to elites who were seen as doing battle against homogeneous local communities. The great example of that is the school bussing controversy that erupted in Boston pursuant to a famous court order and which was described in, I think, a book of enduring value, *Common Ground* by Tony Lukas.

In part, contemporary populism is about the ethnic diversification. We all talk about the civil rights laws of the mid-1960s. Somewhat neglected but equally important was the fact that we opened the gates of immigration in the mid-1960s after having slammed them shut for 40 years, and that has produced a different set of anxieties which takes the form, for example, of a really poisonous debate about immigration policy.

Another important feature of contemporary populism is the depiction of taxes as a threat to liberty. And just to show you that there's nothing new, Ronald Reagan described California's Proposition 13 passed in 1978 as "a little bit like dumping those cases of tea off the boat in Boston Harbor."

Contemporary politics in contemporary populism government is regarded

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as inept, corrupt, dominated by the special interests against the people's interests, and by overeducated bureaucrats against the public's common sense. It is a government that is regarded as regulation run amuck with environmental regulations and other regulations as a threat not only to liberty, but to livelihood. It is a populism, as I said before, defined by a sense of the decline of the manufacturing economy and of the kind of social ordering that a robust manufacturing economy had made possible and had sustained in large portions of the United States. And that has meant that over the past 40 years the industrial working class, and in particular the male industrial working class, has been the single biggest loser in this period of economic and social transformation and, understandably, stands at the heart of the contemporary populist movement.

And finally, looking at the distinctive features of the populist upsurge that has occurred really since the beginning of the Obama administration -- which I see as continuous with, but in some respects distinct from, the one that dominated the 1970s -- it is, first of all, a fiscal populism with not just taxes, but also spending regarded as a threat to liberty. It is a form of populism in which racial resentment is a lot less central than it was 35 or 40 years ago. I say that despite the rhetorical treatment that has been meted to the President of the United States in some quarters. Racial resentment is less central, in part because racial attitudes, I think, have loosened very considerably and in part because a President that I worked for -- Bill Clinton -- took a lot of racialized populist issues, such as crime, welfare, and even Affirmative Action, off or largely off the table.

Finally, the political manifestation of populism in today's politics, its core, as I mentioned, is the white working class. The white working class leans conservative. Forty-three percent of the white working class calls itself conservative versus 38 percent of all Americans. Nineteen percent call themselves liberal, substantially less than the portion of Americans as a whole who think of themselves as liberal. Only 36 percent of

them think of themselves as Democrats, 50 percent regard themselves as Republicans; a much lower figure for Democrats and higher for Republicans in the country as a whole. The white working class makes up 22 percent of the Republican -- rather 39 percent of the Republican Party, but only 22 percent of the Democratic Party.

The white working class has no love of corporations, but its opposition to government is more intense. And so I think it is a fair judgment to say that the contemporary populists are more opposed to the government bailout of financial corporations than they are to the misdeeds of those corporations themselves. For that reason, among others, I venture the following judgment: Unless or until the record mistrust of government that is now manifested in the United States abates, a mass populism of the left is extremely unlikely to arise.

Thank you very much.

MR. HASSNER: I think I don't have much left to say except kind of a description of -- a very rapid description of populism in various European countries because the picture is very diverse. But on the basic issues I think that both Justin and Bill have said everything which can be said, so I'll obliquely allude to some of the differences or resemblances between European and American populism, but basically I agree with everything.

In Europe, I would like to start with two of the recent, newest one which was (inaudible) Marine Le Pen being in front. I think the second thing with Strauss-Kahn she's no longer ahead. The first one was a result Strauss-Kahn and (inaudible) with Aubry and Sarkozy. But it's very important to the second one, which appeared in last night's *La Monde*, which I think is very symbolic. She's going to go to Lampedusa, which is a place where the migrants from Africa arrive, in the company of Mr. Bulgari, who is from the Northern League, and who has been indicted before for beating up a 12-year-old

vendor of something and coming from the south or perhaps it was a rumor, and for giving fire to an asylum of immigrants. So it shows (inaudible) Marine Le Pen her success as opposed to her father, much greater than her father was, that she has been very much sanitizing her message, saying she's for (inaudible) secularism, and no longer the old traditional Catholics. And inventing something which one could call compassionate racism because she says these poor migrants from Africa and so on, I want to accept them and they're in a terrible condition and so on. I pity them and so on. In a much less aggressive tone than her father, but, at the same time, going there with this man Bulgari that's a lot.

So I'll start with France and Italy because of this association because, also, there is another aspect in common is populism associated to government in the sense that Sarkozy, like Berlusconi, are embracing populism; are in a way an incarnation of that and that's the present political program in France. Sarkozy said in 2007, if we don't have Le Pen's voters, we are done for; if we have them, we have won. And to a certain extent it worked, but now it works in the other way around. The more he takes subjects which come from Marine Le Pen, the more she gains more than he does.

And she said recently I'm at 20 percent, but now is going to have a debate on Islam, and there is a certain kinship between that and the hearings on the radicalization of Islam here. After the debate I'll have 25 percent instead of 20. And they had the debate on identity, which, again, profited to Marine Le Pen much more than to himself.

And the same with Berlusconi. Within the Berlusconi coalition I think it's another league which is going up at most. And both also in post-war European populism have a historical claim. In Italy it even went into the common language. There was in '44 a brief party called the *Qualunquismo*. Journalist Gianini and (inaudible) *uomo*

qualunque, the common man. And the slogan was, “*Abassa tutti.*” “Down with all of them.” It’s the same title with the attempted left wing populism in France, former Socialist Melonshon, who now is stronger than the Communist Party. His book is *Clisse en Eituse, Let Them All Go Away.*

And that was the slogan of the Peujard movement, the *tous putride*, “all are rotten.” *Sorte les sortons*, kick the present people out. And Peujard, the first book of my friend and colleague Stanley Hoffmann, was about the Peujard movement, which was a movement of shopkeepers protesting against the decline of the little shopkeeper and the invasion of the big supermarkets and the big firms and so on, but, at the same time, more than usual, against taxes. And the end of the introduction of Stanley Hoffmann’s book says every time a social category is losing in France, it accuses the state and accuses taxes. And that certainly rings a bell in the American case.

So that’s France and Italy with the Lega Nord having something specific which it has in common with (inaudible) blocking in Belgium. That is localism, regionalism, and also some parts of the former Yugoslavia, we are the (inaudible) productive men and people and everything goes to the bureaucracy in Rome and to these immigrants from the south. So it’s strongly localist at one point. It was pro-European in saying our deal, the compatriots, are the Catalans and the people of the more dynamic regions in Europe or (inaudible) to be called the new banana. Now they are anti-European because they are, above all, against the migrants, against the (inaudible), against the Romanians, which they identify with gypsies and which they want to expel, and so on. So there is the localism, but there is also a feeling of revenge that they were the people who were despised by the bureaucrats and intellectuals of Rome, and now they are richer and they have their revenge.

At the same time, they feel they are again the dispossessed of their land

because they have much unemployment and much immigration, so it's turning more and more, above all, against people from the south, against immigrants, against foreigners. And in general, France also has coined the word "national populism." It's more and more that aspect.

If I talk about other places, in the Scandinavian parties started as being anti-tax parties with the huge extremely progressive tax there. And increasingly, it becomes anti-migrant parties and particularly against Islam, particularly since the single (inaudible) of Malmø and what happened afterwards in Denmark and all of Scandinavia. So it's very diverse, but there are these common themes.

Switzerland is a very interesting case because, in general, they are protectionist. They are against the destruction of the textile industry, about everything by the Chinese and so on. They want protection. But in Switzerland, its first party now and a party named Blocher, who is a great head of a kind of a multinational, who is very much for free trade, but very much against the immigrants. And above all, there is this theme against the (inaudible), against the new mosques, like in France against the burka, which is forbidden, the veil. All these things, it's concentrating, I think, more and more into an anti-Islamic movement.

And finally -- and then there are also with the impact of the immigrants and this feeling which you had very much, for instance, in the South of France, this is (inaudible) and people in Marseille and so on, it's no longer our city. It's full of Arabs. We don't recognize our habitat and our customs and so on.

And that leads also to the discussion around multiculturalism, which is now the great enemy. The Germans and the British, there was a French model of integration and the German and British model of more communitarism and multiculturalism. And Ms. Merkel has said officially multiculturalism was a big failure.

And there is, more or less, also, this kind of revision in Germany, in Britain. And the idea of a *Leitkultur* that the old French idea was you -- anybody can be a Frenchman. We are not ethnic in the sense of racial, but a famous thing which the French historian (inaudible) had written, but you have to forget your tradition, you have to forget your culture, and you have to venerate Joan of Arc and Napoleon and so on to acquire a new culture. And the trend was that precisely. The Muslims are less prone to adapting that way than were the waves of Italians and Poles, although there were assassinations and riots when they were coming into France at the beginning of the century. But still, that is also a theme.

Finally, Eastern Europe is interesting, also, because a few years ago the country which was giving the greatest worry to European institutions and to liberal circles was Austria with Haider. And still his party collapsed, but still they are the first party in Vienna, if I'm not mistaken. And it reminds one a little bit there is a remarkable book about Hitler's Vienna, about the reaction against the cosmopolitanism and the people coming from Russia and so on, and Jews in particular and so on. And there is something like that again. There is a feeling of being invaded in a big city like Vienna.

But now it's Hungary. And Hungary, of course everyone brings his own claim to being a victim and Hungary has, after World War I, lost two-thirds of its territory and that's a curse which always comes back. And now there is a really Fascist Party which marches in uniform and which organizes expeditions against gypsy villages and is anti-Semitic, also, and so on. And the government is also using, like Sarkozy, the fact, well, we are stealing their fire and hence we are protecting you against them, but it's by adopting part of their program.

There is a little bit something like that in Bulgaria, whose tradition is not at all right wing (inaudible) Romania or Poland. They have now a party called *Ataka*, who is more anti-Turkish, anti-gypsy, and anti-Semitic. (inaudible) little, but they have a

president who is fighting against corruption -- and he's a real fighter because he was a bodyguard of the Communist Prime Minister Zhivkov -- Borisov. So he's a former fighter and he leads the fight against corruption, but not in a way which one would -- which inspires much confidence.

And in Eastern Europe, here I come a little bit to the general problem; it's a particular case where there was no real political debate. The -- at least in Poland and in Hungary, the former Communists have become social Democrats and from social Democrats, the warmest proponents of capitalism, of NATO, of -- and everything else. And the great thing was the European entered into the West, NATO, European Union, and to adopt that. So there was no real political debate.

And I remember writing an article in the winter of '89/'90, when people in France were saying social democracy may be -- will be -- the third way will be the way of Eastern Europe (inaudible) the social Democrats, and it was the opposite. And it was normal that after having had the Communism (inaudible) super authoritarian police in the state, they looked at Reagan-Thatcher complete capitalism kind of dismantling of the state, but it was foreseeable that that would be only a time. Inequalities increased, the working class was rather the loser in that while the intellectuals were the winners.

And I think a big question is what will come afterwards? Will it be a kind of a compromise between planned market and so on? Will it be a return of the Communists or will it be a fascist temptation thing? It's the fault of the foreigners or of the Jews or whatever. So it varies from country to country.

Poland, which seemed to be with Brother Kaczynski the most traditionalist and nationalist, now has a perfectly reasonable, right of center, capitalist but open government. But in Hungary and in the Balkans you have this and you have a disaffection with this enthusiasm for the European Union as well as for the West and

even for America, which was a great hope on their side.

So a very diverse situation, but the predominant things, it seems to me, are two things. The consequences, social and economic consequences, of globalization on the one hand and the cultural and psychological feeling of dispossession and the search for scapegoats against that. It seems to me, if I may end with a little something more general, there is something in populism which is always a possibility of democracy. Because there is -- democracy, as we understand it, constitutional democracy, works when the institutions work, when there is mediation between the elite and the people. The two temptations can be either oligarchy -- people who are in the name of the people, but don't consult the people and in the name of the people look at their own interest -- or, on the other hand, the populism -- the search for a direct power of something ill-defined, which is the people, and which is defined negatively against the elites or against the foreigners; which is, in a way, wants to be unanimous, but, in a way, restricts the feeling of solidarity.

And it seems to me very often that we don't have really politics. That there is a crisis of representative democracy of the institutions and hence the two -- one has more attitudes. Technocracy, (inaudible) in the name of constraints, a market, and so on versus populism and particularism -- national, ethnic, and so on -- all globalism, cosmopolitanism, and so on. And there can be different combinations. They may be different in Europe and in America to some extent.

So secondly, this is increased by globalization and by the economic tensions which are created by that. And basically that was a case in the (inaudible) period that the working class was more to the left -- Communists, Socialists -- and the decaying middle classes produced fascism. Now we have the (inaudible) middle class, but also as has been emphasized, in France, also, most of the workers who vote for Le

Pen, many people who went directly from Communism to Le Pen.

And in America, it's very striking. Again, I was struck by that theme which Bill had at the end, that at the beginning, with AIG and so on, you had the mainstream against the -- Main Street against Wall Street and a scandal against the bonuses and so on. And, in fact, this has more or less vanished and it's against the government, against the spending, and against, again, the immigrants or the people are welfare, against those who work. And so it's an interesting displacement, perhaps even more in America than in Europe, to see the enemy and the cause of the scapegoat, depending on one's own analysis, against the greater inequalities. One looks more to -- against the people who are outside or who are below them to the people are prospering when one loses one's house or one's living. So that, I think, indicates some of the common things, but also perhaps some of the differences which will surface in the discussion.

Thank you.

MR. VAÏSSE: Great. Thanks, Pierre. (Applause)

Before we start the discussion I have two questions. The first one is for Bill. At the beginning of last month, Pastor Terry Jones, the one who wanted to burn the Quran on the anniversary of 9-11, was refused entrance to the UK. He wanted to take part in a conference or a protest movement against the Islamization of Europe in a sort of international that included, in particular, Geert Wilders, the Dutch politician.

It seems, and Pierre mentioned that in his presentation, that anti-Islam feelings are common to each and every populist movement in Europe right now, pretty much the same way that anti-Semitism in the 1930s was common to absolutely all, at least right wing and sometimes left wing, populist movements. What is the situation on the U.S. side? Until the summer of 2010, there was not many signs of this and then there

was the New York mosque controversy. Of course, now there are the, you know, legitimate hearings on the Hill, but which raise questions on how they are sort of presented and framed. And it seems that this theme of anti-Islam has been picking up in the U.S. So how do you assess that element of current American populisms?

MR. GALSTON: That is, from an empirical standpoint, a very complicated question. I've begun to take a look at American public opinion vis-à-vis Muslims, and it is a variegated picture. I do know this, based on very recent surveys, that anti-Muslim feeling is more pervasive right now on the right than it is on the left in the United States. But I would speculate that the recent events in the Maghreb and in the Middle East may have a very positive effect over time on America's attitudes towards Muslims and the Muslim world because of the public face that those movements have presented to the United States and the world. I mean, these are people who are speaking a very, very familiar political language, who are not at least publicly, you know, mounting an insurgency in the name of Islam, in the name of the installation of Sharia law.

The absence of anti-American slogans in Egypt particularly, where one might have expected them during that entire insurrectionary period, was really striking. All right? Would that my own political party were capable of as much message discipline, you know, as the hundreds of thousands of people, you know, who went through Tahrir Square. I mean, it was extraordinary. And I can only believe that they weren't saying it because it wasn't really uppermost in their minds. Right? They may not like the relationship over the past three decades between Mubarak and the United States. They may not like our stances in the Israeli-Palestinian controversy or our support of Mubarak in no small measure because he helped sustain our position in that controversy. But they didn't give voice to those sentiments. That has not been the dominant stance throughout

the Muslim world during this period of promising, you know, if indefinable and unpredictable, political change.

And so I think it is at least possible that, you know, American populism will manage to avoid what Pierre neatly defined as the trifecta, you know, of anti-Islamic sentiment, anti-gypsy sentiment, and anti-Semitism that's characteristic of many European populist movements.

MR. HASSNER: Yeah, I agree with you, but being a natural pessimist I think the -- I was struck, like everyone else, by what you just described in the demonstrations. And I think that is something really which has changed, including for myself, for the view of the Arab world, that there is a class, particularly young people and influenced partly, also, by the diasporas, by communications, and so on, which are people like us who want the same like us and so on. On the other hand, you already had now a fight between cops and Muslims, and a church burned and 13 deaths here and there. This can be transformed. And, you know, many people who are anti-immigrants are beginning to be (inaudible) even more than against these categories because they look like us, but, in fact, they are not like us. And one sees already people saying, oh, all that, it's sad because it was the Muslim brothers who were behind it and they imposed that discipline and so on. I think that's false, but it may very well be that the image with the next terror act and so on or the next disorder in the countries, that these reactions will still be there.

And in general, I know (inaudible) Stein, our mutual friend Olivier (inaudible) are very optimistic about the integration of the Muslims. I think so, also, but -- for the majority, but in most revolutions and so on minorities who want to inflame scenes are as important as good feelings of the majorities. And I think on both sides there are enough people who many sabotage and blur this positive image which has come

recently.

MR. GALSTON: Let me just offer a very brief cultural commentary on a very interesting point that you just made. You described the fears that, well, they may look like us, but they're not really like us. There was a famous American film from the early 1950s, *The Invasion of the Body Snatchers*, you know, during the height of the anti-Communist hysteria, which was on exactly that theme: They may look like us, but they're not like us. (Laughter)

MR. VAÏSSE: I had a question for Pierre. So if populism is anti-elitism and the feeling of being dispossessed of political power and the power to affect one's destiny, certainly the rise of technology and the availability of information and the increased transparency of governments should have helped, but it doesn't really look like that. So what's the relationship between technology on the one hand and populism on the other hand?

MR. HASSNER: Well, basically I think in a way it helps spreading the populist movement because, in a way, it's part of democratization that you don't have to listen to the elites. You don't have your information checked and prepared by newspapers or by experts. You have the Internet. I was seeing yesterday a statistic about the great multiplication of hate groups in America. There's my Internet, anybody, any crackpot say anything he wants on the Internet and serve as a media, the people who, like Glenn Beck, say that Obama has an innate hatred of white people or that what happened there was a result of a conspiracy of al Qaeda plus liberals and so on to get rid of the United States or anything like that. It can be reproduced enormously. So the Internet had a great effect, particularly Facebook and so on, on what happened in Egypt and Tunisia, but it really goes both ways. And that's a feature of our world that information can be much less controlled.

So I see what you mean in the sense that one sees the rest of the world, one cannot be as parochial as before. But it's interesting that the more there is globalization, the more one can have contact with -- instant contact with everything. It works very well for a stock exchange and so on. It works we've seen, also, for a revolution, although in 1848 it spread through Europe with different motivations before the Internet and so on. But in general, if you look at the foreign coverage in the newspapers, including *The New York Times* or *Le Monde*, in general the more people are exposed to the whole world, the more they want to retreat on their problems of their vicinity and of their category and so on.

When you look at television besides the specialized channels, like BBC World or so on, you are struck by very often how much local news or human interest news are more than (inaudible). So I can only say there are some categories which are encouraged and they can be people who discover their common preoccupations or -- I want to say the word "value cycles"; my education forbids me -- but the (inaudible) and attitudes and beliefs. But the more also it produces a retraction in other categories.

SPEAKER: (inaudible) something?

MR. VAÏSSE: Okay, there are still many other questions that I would like to ask to Pierre and Bill. For example, the comparison between, you know, anti-Washington sentiment which is a feature of American political culture in general, but, in particular, populist groups and anti-Brussels rhetoric among all populist groups in Europe, and if you think the two are perhaps comparable even though they don't necessarily come from the same political culture. Or the role of nationalism in the American and European populist movements and many other interesting questions.

But I think it's more fair now at this point to leave the floor to you for questions, which we'll probably take by rounds of three. So please, you know the rules.

Identify yourself and make sure there's a question mark at the end of your sentence.

We start with Emiliano over there at the back of the room.

MR. ALESSANDRI: Thank you. Emiliano Alessandri from the German Marshall Fund. Thanks for the very comprehensive presentations.

There are three points that I haven't really heard in your presentations. I understand that they would require long answers, but I'll be satisfied with whatever you can provide.

One is the relationship between these populist movements and history. You know, they have been presented by both of you as in fundamentally backward-looking movements. I would add to that that they look at the past. They try to restore a past that probably never was because they can't really face a future that they will never accept. My question is did they ever win? Did any of these movements ever win or they just delayed processes of change?

Second question is the leadership of these movements, I'm from Italy, Berlusconi was in this respect. It strikes me that, you know, some of these populist leaders are not really the common man. I mean, Berlusconi presents himself as a common man, as a friend of the moderates, but he's definitely not a common man. He's the richest or one of the richest men in Europe and he's definitely an extremist when it comes to moral behavior and in political views in many ways. So, you know, are there similarities throughout history in the way these populist movements select their own elite? And are there similarities among elites?

Which leads me to the third point, possible international alliances of these movements given that this is a transatlantic discussion on populism. My opinion is that, you know, these movements are often focused on domestic issues and they're kind of parochial, so they're not interested in building bridges with other similar movements

that have similar but separate agendas. But are there connections internationally? I think we're seeing that in the European Union because, of course, in the European Parliament you have all these different groups that may agree on some stances, but, again, how would you assess the possibility of cooperation among these movements?

MR. VAÏSSE: Thanks. (inaudible) here in the middle here, Carey. The gentleman with the beard and then his neighbors.

MR. REINSTEIN: Hi. My name is Clark Reinstein. I'm retired.

I had a question on why all these populist movements are conservative as opposed to being on the left. And a corollary to that is why the working class turned conservative versus more left wing.

MR. VAÏSSE: Next to you, Norman.

MR. BIRNBAUM: Yes, I'm Norman Birnbaum. Thanks for this terrific *tour d'horizon*, but I've got two quick questions for each side of the Atlantic.

For Bill, we had phenomena like Upton Sinclair, Huey Long, who scared Franklin Roosevelt very much, Father Coughlin's people used to sell the publication called *Social Justice* on the streets of New York. In other words, we had different forms of left wing, anti-capitalist, populism and at the moment it's quite true that the Tea Party Movement and associated movements certainly endorse their own version of capitalism. But given the economic crisis is it possible that there might be another American variant of populism?

And for Pierre Hassner, what about Sarkozy is terribly afraid of the Le Pen candidacy. But don't the Socialists and the parties of the left have equal reason to worry? That is to say that she's fishing in their reservoir of votes. And could not one envisage in Europe a strong nationalistic, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, anti-capitalist party with, as you say, the focus on Brussels as the site of all malevolence?

MR. VAÏSSE: Thanks. I think the last two questions in particular had strong coherence and then with the three questions put out by Emiliano, so why don't we start with this? Maybe Pierre, you could start.

MR. HASSNER: Which ones, the first ones or the last ones?

MR. VAÏSSE: Your pick.

MR. HASSNER: Well, just now the last ones, I think partly we -- you mentioned that, but to me, as I was saying a little bit, there is something very slightly mystifying, too. In my opinion, the kind of regulated capitalism which was out of fashion in general, and a little bit before the crisis everybody in France and in Germany was talking flexibility and (inaudible) in taking America as a model, but it has, to a great extent -- or should have -- suffered from the crisis. Greenspan said as much that he was flabbergasted. He thought the market could regulate itself and it didn't happen that way. So I think this view was right against Communism, was right against unfettered, unregulated capitalism, but yet is nowhere profiting from the crisis (inaudible) more towards ripening populism.

And in a way it's a mystery to me. The inventor of the Southern strategy for the Republicans, Kevin Phillips, he changed his mind and he kept writing books about the politics of rich and poor, saying the inequalities have gone so much and we've become a nation of borrowers and so on. (inaudible) there must be a reaction and it doesn't come. It looked a little bit like that.

As I said, at the beginning of the crisis there was outrage against the bonuses and that, and now, as Bill said very rightly, there has been this shift, following an old American tradition, which -- about government being the problem and not the solution, and about taxes and so on. So this is a difference with Europe. The Europeans don't very often -- in Greece and in Italy (inaudible) they don't pay their taxes, but they

are not against the taxes. It's a matter of principle. So it is a difference.

This famous book, *Whatever Happened to Kansas?*, apparently was wrong in the specific analysis of the results. But saying this has been another -- if you want, this is a left wing conspiracy theory -- the capitalists have succeeded in turning the anger not against themselves, but against the government or against spending for the unemployed or whatever rather than against the endorsers of the degradation which has produced the (inaudible). There is something like that, but there is very much also that Socialism and all that has been discredited by the Soviet experience, the social Democrats who have been among the first victims of the Communist regimes, but somehow have been tainted by the defeat of socialism and have nothing to offer but a little bit more regulation and so on. I think that will be -- yeah.

MR. VAÏSSE: Bill, do you want to reflect on that?

MR. GALSTON: Well, why don't I just, you know, briskly run through my answers to the questions on offer?

MR. VAÏSSE: Good.

MR. GALSTON: At least some of them, just to be fair to all.

With regard to the first questioner, do I expect a populist international -- a "pop intern" (Laughter) -- to take shape, you know, any time soon? No, I don't for the very simple reason that because populist movements tend to be particularist not only in their ideas, but also in their sentiments. There can be contagion effects and there may be occasional exchange of ideas, you know, but as an organized international political movement I doubt it. I doubt it very much.

Ever victorious? Well, reflecting on some of the populist struggles in the United States in the 1970s, for example, against school bussing, that's an example of a particular and partial victory, but where one where people representing local

communities, many of which, to quote then-candidate Jimmy Carter, "were ethnically pure," were able ultimately to defend themselves against what appeared to be an overwhelming, you know, phalanx of legislature, executive, and even the courts.

You know, with regard to a future for left wing populism, Norman, question mark? In my remarks I did note that the populism of the 1930s was a populism of the left. Let me give you a much brisker answer than your question deserves.

It seems to me that any left movement, to some extent -- to some considerable extent -- must be a movement or a party of government. And so I simply repeat what I said at the end of my remarks. Unless and until the public's regard for government rises very substantially from the near record lows which it now stands, I think a populism of the left is inconceivable. Or to put it slightly differently, as long as people reflecting on the offenses of corporations and the offenses of bureaucrats say, with great reluctance, I choose the offenses of the corporations, as long as that prevails, no.

With regard, you know, in a way to the flipside, you know, the question from the gentleman in the aisle seat, why has populism in the United States in the past 40 years principally been a conservative phenomenon, not entirely, but principally? Answer: Because the forces against which the populists were fighting, starting from the late 1960s on, were seen as forces unleashed by a new kind of liberalism. And so they defined themselves against that, you know, whether it was a movement from a growth economics to a very aggressive economics of redistribution, whether it took the form of laws and regulations enforced by courts against local majorities. I could go on and on. And, you know, to say nothing of the fact that many of the most prominent and I would say epic defining social movements of the past 40 years, you know, have been ones that not only offered very little to the traditional manufacturing and working classes, but in some very real respects defined themselves against those classes.

So it is no accident, comrade, that the populism of the United States in the past 40 years has been principally a populism of the right. And I expect that to continue for quite some time.

MR. VAÏSSE: Okay. Since I don't want to be cast as a "lame-stream" elite, an illegitimate one, and I don't want a populist revolt in the room, I will take more than three questions because there are many of you who want to ask questions. And so I will ask you to make your questions very short, but we'll really go around the room and leave a bit less time for Pierre and Bill to answer.

Can you start with the gentleman here and then go around?

MR. SMITH: Bruce Smith, Brookings, retired.

I've been reading this very interesting book, Harold Perkin, *The Rise of Professional Society*, in which he recounts sort of the transition -- to make it quick -- from first landed aristocracy, capitalist order, and to a kind of professional order, rise of the middle class education, higher education, universities, wedded to the welfare states. Now, he says in his 2002 preface to the edition, well, now how do we account for this sort of -- you know, the split within the meritocracy? Well, his view is it's the right wing, as Pierre was saying a moment ago, that's challenging the government class. So it's the right wing meritocracy challenging the left wing meritocracy.

But I have a different query for the colleagues. Is this perhaps an exaggeration? And what we're really talking about -- and I think Dick Hofstadter used to argue with him; he's my colleague -- the paranoid style in American politics was a vast exaggeration. So maybe the populism we're seeing now really is an invention of the left to try to rescue the government party and blame the populists for challenging government.

MR. VAÏSSE: Okay, on this side. You can start with the gentleman here

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with the (inaudible) shirt.

MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yeah, Kenneth Rothschild, Independent.

My question basically is around could we be approaching a period where governance itself becomes really problematic? When you're in a great period of change, whatever, you look at France, you look at Russia, you look at anyplace, there oftentimes is a lot of disruption in the transition. And out of the disruption oftentimes comes a very authoritarian wave, like Stalin and people like that, who basically settled things down, so to speak.

So my question is what do you see coming and what level of just lack of ability to govern well could be coming in the future? And where do you see that going?

MR. VAÏSSE: Thanks. Could you pass, the gentleman behind you?

MR. DERDKA: Thank you. Deiter Derdka, Georgetown University. Question for Pierre and maybe also a comment from Bill Galston. He might know something about that, too.

How much do you think the anti-bailout populism in Europe can become a real political force and a real risk for European integration? You could see it a year ago in Germany before the May elections and (inaudible) failure. The CDU was pretty much penetrated by, you know, an anti-bailout populism. You can see it now in Scandinavia, in the Northern European countries. Wait for Finland and the electoral results in Finland. And you could see that there's something brewing that could really I wouldn't say endanger European integration, but set some limits of decision-making and, you know, lead to some sort of paralysis of, you know, the institutional makeup of the European Union. Thank you.

MR. VAÏSSE: Thanks. Could you pass to the lady behind you with the green jacket? Thanks.

MS. SERAYO: This has been a wonderful presentation. This is Elaine Serayo. I'm a Franklin Fellow at the Department of State. And so I have sort of a two-part question, one for each of you.

So, given the pressure of the populist resurgence in the United States and its effect, as we've just seen, on the electorate of our U.S. Congress, and this coupled with our fiscal crisis, do you see any serious movement of the press to provide pressure to Congress to significantly reduce foreign aid in all areas but the most catastrophic humanitarian assistance?

And then second, what would that mean globally to our relations with our other bilateral donors?

MR. VAÏSSE: Could you pass it to the back of the room, the gentleman standing over there?

MR. FRADKIN: Thanks. Hillel Fradkin of the Hudson Institute.

I guess I want to pursue Bill a little bit on your notion that it would -- populism is going to remain on the left most likely. And I was wondering in what --

MR. GALSTON: The right.

MR. HASSNER: Of the right, you mean.

MR. FRADKIN: I'm sorry, of the right. But I was wondering what you -- in what category you would put, for example, the most recent demonstrations in Wisconsin and what relationship that would bear to your scheme of populism.

And the other thing, you reminded us of the book, *The Paranoid Style*. And has often been observed, we paranoids are occasionally correct. There are elites that hate our guts. And what's made it so much more aggravating is their apparent incompetence, whether of government or corporations. I mean, the crisis of 2008, where bankers who we were told were the most conservative and scrupulous people there were

turn out to be quite foolish, if not downright idiots. And, you know, political leadership also seems to be very weak.

So, you know, when you treat populism as simply a kind of -- simply irrational, but it seems to arise in this particular case -- and probably some others -- from objective circumstances that support it.

MR. VAÏSSE: Okay, on the back, the gentleman here.

MR. PRIVITERA: Alex Privitera with German TV N24. My question is basically a follow-up.

How much of this recent populism is merely linked to the economic crisis that we're witnessing? And how much of that will likely recede once growth rates, particularly in this country, will reach a level that can absorb a substantial amount of unemployed people?

And maybe a comparison with a European situation, where this populism -- this recent populism seems to have been around for slightly longer. Where is this likely to go? How will it develop? And is it also a reflection of the somewhat stagnant economy of the past 10 or 15 years?

MR. VAÏSSE: Or 30 years, yeah. (Laughter) I mean, the *Front National* arose in 1983, after all.

Here. Could you stand up and identify yourself?

MS. GAREHART: Sorry. Anda Garehart, a French researcher (inaudible) of the Tea Party Movement.

I just have questions regarding -- and it touches on what Pierre Hassner said. The idea that at least in the United States there seems to be a conflict or the notion that the special interest, a conflict of interest between corporations and government is a big theme on the left traditionally, but hasn't been taken up at all. And could you

comment on this?

MR. VAÏSSE: Thanks. I think we can take one last question. And there's no more questions? Yes, there is, here.

MR. GALSTON: If you ask for one, you'll always get one, Justin. First law of moderators.

MR. REY: My name is Carlos Rey. I'm from Spain.

And I would like to ask what do you think about populist movements of Latin America, like Chavez and so on? Because, well, they are considered populists, but they don't fit exactly in the definition of populism you have made. For example, they are expansive.

MR. VAÏSSE: Thanks very much. Okay, so we have a wealth of interventions and questions. And obviously, we won't be able to do justice to all of them, especially because there are only two minutes left, but I suggest we stretch a bit the time and go until 3:35. And I would like to let each of you a chance to answer by cherry-picking the questions that you'd like to answer. Maybe Bill, you want to start?

MR. GALSTON: Well, as a sort of liberal I would prefer to be fair to each and every question rather than cherry-picking, but I probably won't be. So, let me begin by answering the ones that I can answer pretty easily and then move on to the ones that'll be more much difficult.

Foreign aid is indeed a target and it's not simply confined to populists. It's been a target for a very long time. And in these circumstances, I think you can expect very substantial cuts. I will not venture where they'll fall, but I think, you know, I think that it will be substantial.

Is contemporary populism a fiction, you know, produced by the partisans of government to defend government? I would hesitate to describe the Tea Party as a

fiction created by the partisans of government. I think it is a fact created by the actions of government, but that's a very different thesis.

You know, with regard to populism Latin American style, you know, in Venezuela and elsewhere, there I think one has to look at the way governing elites in Venezuela and elsewhere conducted themselves when they had a power -- when they did have the power to create more inclusive social policy and for whatever reason -- shortsightedness or self interests or some other reasons -- chose not to, generating a substantial pool of resentment, which provided, we must confess, a mass base for the Chavezes, you know, which is not to defend him. I am, you know, vehemently opposed to him and all of his works, but there were historical antecedents to the rise of Chavez.

As to your question, sir, about the challenges to governance as a whole, speaking as a senior fellow in governance studies I couldn't agree more that that question is very much on the table. You know, how can modern mass constitutional democracy successfully govern themselves in the circumstances that we now face? I think we'll come up with answers, but we are in a period in which existing governance structures are not functioning very well. And if I had a few more hours, I'd explain, you know, why I think that.

And finally, you know, to my old friend Hillel Fradkin's very interesting intervention, you are not the first to speculate that events in Wisconsin could be the harbinger of a somnolent union movement at last waking up and doing something to protect itself against complete obliteration. I have an e-mail file now full of e-mails that I've gotten in the past week raising some version of that question. And, you know, I will give you the classic journalistic answer: Time will tell. (Laughter)

You know, I will say this, given the template that I brought to the analysis of the whole thing, you know, populism tends to arise when people are afraid that

something they care about very much is about to be taken away from them. And for organized labor, collective bargaining rights are that thing, you know.

And clearly, if you look at some of the public opinion surveys, while Governor Walker and others receive strong majority support for the idea that public sector workers should give back something while everybody else is making such sacrifices, an equally strong supermajority -- a 2-to-1 supermajority -- opposes the idea that government should take away collective bargaining rights from organized labor. So this is clearly, to that extent, an overreach and overreaches tend to produce political reactions. How pervasive they turn out to be, I can't tell you.

With, you know, regard to paranoids and real enemies, I couldn't agree more. And the analysis that I gave of populism in America was not intended to be reductionist in any way. And I invoked Hofstadter's essay for a very distinct purpose: to point to a fringe phenomenon where conspiracy theories take over from legitimate grievances, however they may be articulated. And I will say this, and I don't intend this as a partisan comment, I think the birther fringe of contemporary populism fits Hofstadter's definition.

I think the thesis that, you know, that Obama is basically a secret Kenyan who hates white people, a thesis that's been articulated not only by Glenn Beck, you know, but in the pages of an elite journal that you and I have both been known to read, you know, this -- you know, I do not take this as manifestations of a legitimate populism. Right? It's something else entirely, and that's something else entirely that I pointed to. Indeed, I think I went out of my way in my presentation to emphasize that the populism of the past 40 years rests on real phenomena in the economy and real grievances and so the reverse of reductionism, it seems to me.

MR. HASSNER: And I'll answer directly on Europe and, if I may, I'm in

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danger of extending even over the 35 minutes and end up, also, in my way, where (inaudible). Yeah.

No, I don't think that there will be a kind of an alliance of xenophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-everything overcoming Europe. But I think the tendencies are strong and I think the European integration, because of that among other things, is in real trouble. There is a renationalization of politics and the examples which you quoted are particularly from Germany, but there is -- now with the extension there is a greater diversification in the economic level and economic interests of various countries. And very normally, the Germans who are in the best situation are sick and tired of why they have (inaudible) as having been (inaudible) paying for people who haven't paid their taxes and have lied about their statistics and so on. So there are these divisive things.

And in general, I think the great enemy of populism is complexity. And European Union, Sarkozy is trying a little bit now, as Mitterrand succeeded in '88, to present Europe as a protection against the hazards of globalization and so on, but it's not taken like that. It's taken like the Trojan horse of globalization. It let free movement so all the gypsies of Romania and Bulgaria come into France. And they are hesitant on their economic policies; some are pro-capitalistic, some are protectionist. But basically, the European Union is distant, bureaucratic, and I think it's really in trouble because of that.

There is collaboration more than has been said between these various movements. I started with Marine Le Pen and the man from the Northern League going together to Lampedusa, and she is going to go in all kinds of countries. But basically, an alliance of nationalisms is always difficult because they (inaudible) antagonism.

Now, my last word is twofold. One, well, Europe and America, I think Europeans certainly don't have a right to lecture Americans because America has saved -- not only saved Europe, but has saved itself in the sense that it didn't have -- it was

spared both Communism and Fascism, Nazism, most totalitarian movements. And as Justin was quoting, I always say the crisis of '29 gave Roosevelt in America and Hitler in Germany.

But this being said, today there is a level of pure craziness and conspiracy theory which I cannot see an example in Europe among the most extremists movements. And among the people who have the greatest audience in the States, how many millions has Mr. Beck with three sessions about the secret puppetmaster George Soros or about what has been quoted or about what happened in Egypt as part of this conspiracy and so on. And there are many examples like that.

Or I myself, so Mr. Pat Robertson, who has a very dignified (inaudible) saying that I have a research group and don't quote me, make me say more than I say, it's only 19 percent from our research. It's not yet definitive, but 19 percent of our research is that (inaudible) the tornado which now is ravaging Florida is due to the number of abortions in the United States. But it's not definitive. Our research really seems to show that. That is unknown in Europe. So each of the two has to reflect.

But the common thing is this contrast between populism (inaudible) simple answers and who is essentially mechanistic and the complexity of the world, some of you may have seen the recent article by Walter Russell Mead in *Foreign Affairs*, which says after all it's better than after the war, one had to exaggerate the Communist conspiracies that produced McCarthyism, but essentially they were isolationists. They went along with what the enlightened leaders (inaudible).

But on the one hand, the world was much less complicated and, on the other hand, through Internet to all these other -- also the special interests behind them, there is a much greater latitude, which is good because people -- when we like it we say it's the people in Facebook has helped the people in the Arab countries. When you don't

like it, you would say it's very hard to govern that way. And the basic thing, the crisis of representative institutions, including in particular (inaudible) the country which has the greatest number of responsibilities, America, the way Congress functions is rules and so on. The risk of paralysis and so on are more and more serious. And the same thing for European integration.

So in an age of complexity I think populism has still a great future and it's a future which looks towards the past, but which may influence the future in a unpredictable but dangerous way.

MR. VAÏSSE: Gentlemen, that was a great conclusion. Please join me in thanking both Pierre and Bill for a great discussion, and sorry for running over time.

(Applause)

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2012

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