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AN UNFINISHED GLOBAL REVOLUTION

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. SIERRA: Good afternoon and welcome to Brookings. My name is Kathy Sierra and I'm a senior fellow at Brookings here in the Global Economy and Development Program and it's my great pleasure to introduce what's going to be, I think, a very interesting and proactive dialogue and the launch of a very good friend's book, Lord Mark Malloch-Brown's book, *The Unfinished Global Revolution: The Pursuit of a New International Politics*.

It's especially pleasing to me to be able to moderate today's discussion because were colleagues when Mark was at the World Bank, as was I.

We're going to have a lively discussion and we're going to have an opening by another very good friend, Nancy Birdsall who's going to introduce the book and its author. Nancy is the founding president of the Center for Global Development, as you know, across the street. In that capacity she informs on many issues on the policy debate, on global development, on institutions, and really has lived through many of the events that we are going to be seeing in this book.

Prior to founding the CGD, she served as executive vice president of the Inter American Development Bank and spent 14 years in policy research management positions at the World Bank including director of the Policy Research Department.

Nancy, please join us to welcome the book. Thank you.

MS. BIRDSALL: Thank you very much, Kathy. It's really a great honor and really more than an honor, a pleasure, to have this opportunity to talk briefly about Mark Malloch-Brown and what is a fantastic book. I just told Mark, it's really -- for anyone who wants to feel that he or she is a citizen of the world, a global citizen, this is a book to read, because it's readable, it's fun, and it gives you a real picture over the last several decades of where the world is going and not going on the unfinished revolution.

So, let me start by saying a word about Mark. First, Lord Malloch-Brown -- first I'm going to tell you what you can read in the official bio and then make a few comments that go beyond that.

Prior to his current role in the private sector, Mark was a Minister in Prime Minister Gordon Brown's cabinet, working on Asia and Africa especially, as well as the international system. He was, before that, the Deputy Secretary General and Chief of Staff to Kofi Annan. Before that he was the Administrator of the United Nations Development Program. Before that he was a vice president at the World Bank. After these things he was vice chairman briefly, maybe too briefly, of the World Economic Forum, the Davos thing, and vice chair of George Soros' fund and foundation, and most important of all -- Lord Malloch-Brown will laugh -- he has been a member of the board of the Center for Global Development.

Now, what you'll learn if you read the book is that -- other

things about Mark, which I found really heartwarming and important in where his head has been and where he has helped take the world in the last several decades. You find the real Mark, in a way, as a young journalist at The Economist who sees the opportunity to go work for the UN -- UNHCR, the -- what is it? -- High Commission for Refugees. At the border -- he's at the Cambodian-Thai border working with refugees at the moment when the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot -- he's proud that he helped write, as a result of that and subsequent work for UNHCR, the Emergency Handbook for UNHCR that lives on, in a sense is still kind of the bible for disaster response. He's worried that the United Nations humanitarian work is getting -- was politicized and tainted in many ways because of the war in Iraq. He's there in this book with his heart and his head, so you get that combination of passion and thoughtfulness about the great need to build more of an international system around some of the great global challenges.

Mark was also the lead partner in -- the lead person in Afghanistan after the 9/11. He's the one who brought the idea that there ought to be -- I don't know if this is in the book, I haven't read every page, but I do remember how important he was in saying, look, we have to support the government and that might involve paying civil service salaries. This was, you know, a radical idea in the aid world in 2001 and 2002. He was the vice chair, with his wife, of Refugees International, that's back to the heart part. And much of his views of the world were

shaped by his participation as a political consultant that does, you know, what we think of as the polling and focus groups, but he was there trying to ensure that people like Cory Aquino would be elected, trying to lock in the democratic transitions and the consolidations of democracies that we're hearing so much about now in the Middle East.

Now, before we turn to the real substance here from Mark, I wanted to make three quick points, kind of exploiting the fact that Kathy gave me eight minutes. I think maybe I've taken six.

Okay, the first is -- they're kind of comments on the book, but not exactly. The first comment, or not exactly comment, is that one of the things that I like about the book is it describes, very eloquently and elegantly, the nature of a key problem in the world. There is no real effort to say what should be done about it. That might be the next book, it might be ten years before Mark can write the next book, honestly. I think it's actually important in the sense that, you know, Al Gore's movie described a problem, that's the function of this book is to have more people in the world who are intelligent readers and want to understand what's going on in the global system, to see the challenge, the nature of the challenge. Mark is passionate about the problems at the United Nations. He's very eyes-wide-open what those problems are. At the same time it comes through how much he cares that that system be made better.

So, that's -- it's the problem of not having a global social contract, which he comes to near the end of the book. We have a world of

sovereign nations in which, as citizens, we join together and use our government to engage with each other through a social contract, a domestic social contract, and we don't have that at the global level. We have a global economy without a global polity. You'll hear about this better -- in a better way from Mark himself.

But this idea that it is presenting the problem, I think, is very important, and so I don't want to see the reviews of the book say, but what are you proposing to do about it. That -- you should push back on that, Mark, if that comes.

Second point I wanted to make is about the role of the United States, which Mark touches on in many different places. He goes into how, in the immediate post-war period, there was a tremendous spirit of bipartisanship around the creation of the Bretton-Woods institutions and the United Nations, and there was tremendous leadership from the U.S. I think we're really in a dire state right now because the U.S. is no longer able or willing to play that role, it is no longer the super power. The uni-polar moment has really passed, and so we're adjusting, as a world, to a system which is more dangerous because when there's a super power in charge where values and interest in global prosperity and security are very well aligned -- of course there was the Cold War, but fundamentally we have had for 50 years, at least, a world in which we could count on the U.S., with some warts and with some problems in places, but we could generally count on the U.S. to be making a better world because it was not

only reflecting U.S. values, but it was in the interest of the U.S. which is what happens when you are the most powerful and the largest economy.

And so today with the U.S. feeling beleaguered, in many ways we're entering a more dangerous period where the message of Mark's book is all the more fundamental.

And the third point I wanted to make is about development. Those of you who come from the development community will be familiar, perhaps, with the fact that there's been a lot of discussion in the last couple of years about the future of the aid system, are we at the end of ODA in the traditional sense, and we have been raising, from my center, the issue of global public goods and this book is another contribution, in my view, to the reality that in a multi-polar world, with the raise of China and India, with tremendous growth in many other emerging markets, we are moving from a world of rich countries and poor countries to a whole different set of challenges that are much more there at the global level, climate being the most obvious but certainly not the only one.

So, let me finish by saying I hope you all read this book so you will all become more deeply felt and more passionate global citizens like Lord Malloch-Brown.

(Applause.)

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: Well, Nancy, that was very, very touching, and thank you. And I certainly count my membership of your board as right up there with the other things I do and follow with

pride, even when I'm not here in Washington, the reports and all the other activities of the Center for Global Development.

Let me also -- I mean, Kathy, thank you, for hosting this and thank you to Brookings for organizing it. You know, I can't really think of a better place to be because while Strobe is not here today, he's been a sort of friend in much of this and if Strobe Talbott's book on global government is, if you like, the great theoretical sweep from the Greeks to today, mine is intended very deliberately as the counterpoint to that, the much more personal, intimate account of globalization. And I reached that point because actually sitting at the center at Yale that Strobe was the founding director of -- I was -- a young researcher helped me sort of look up how many books and articles were being written about globalization and it was a daunting number, and it left one with the clear impression that perhaps the contribution that someone like myself could make was to try and offer a kind of personal dimension to this great set of changes that we loosely bundle together and call globalization. And, you know, as Nancy has touched on, I was lucky enough to be in many of the right places to see those changes. As a young man growing up in Britain, I saw what happens to a country that's lost its way economically, but perhaps more significantly, saw when Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister, that countries have second chances. The dramatic change in the economic performance of the country was extraordinary to behold, and it's sort of stayed with me through my years of running UNDP and being at the World

Bank, this sense that strong leadership with a clear, strategic vision for a country can make an enormous difference.

And, of course, with the kind of Thatcher generation of leadership came not just this focus on democracy, but before it, even, the focus on economic liberalization and I think one saw how intertwined the good and, occasionally, worse these two trends were, and I saw them as a political consultant, I saw them as working at the World Bank. But then, of course, what we began to see was that even as these changes were kind of sweeping out the cobwebs of so many parts of the world -- Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, parts of Asia -- all returning to democratic forms of government at the same time that they were liberalizing their economies. One also began to see that whole model running up against buffers and limits and most particularly that, you know, as countries settled into the sense that they had won back some degree of national accountability, that they were growing better government at the national level, the phenomenon of globalization in some ways which had come out of the national economic liberalization of the 80s and early 90s, sort of brought a whole new dimension to bear because suddenly as we integrated our economies, we had, as Nancy touched on, created a moment of -- created a moment where we have this huge new degree of integration, of markets, communications, but at the same time it's left us, perhaps, more ungoverned than ever before because those problems have migrated to a global level, whether it is economics, finance, public

health, security, immigration -- you name it -- all of them demand an element of global solutions. We have failed to build the kind of global institutions that could address those problems, and that's, in a sense, where this book is. It's written by somebody who's, you know, been lucky enough to kind of sit in the sea suite (?) of those international institutions -- at the top of the UN, as a vice president at the World Bank, as head of UNDP and ultimately, in the British cabinet. So, this is -- you know, if you like, this is a kind of ringside seat on all of these changes that have occurred.

And, you know, behind it lies this sense that I think was captured by Nancy in her first comment, which is that it's not clear where it will all end. What is clear from the experience we've already seen is that, you know, you're not going to move to some model of global development. In many ways states are stronger and more anxious and jealous of their privileges than in a very long time. We're seeing a highly competitive world at the moment and states are allying with their kind of national champion. Corporations in many parts of the world too, kind of secure strategic resources and commodities that they need for the future of their economies. It's a time of real, sort of, collective scramble in a region like Africa. I mean, it's -- you see some of the efforts to secure natural resources as not being that different to the race by European paths 100 years ago. I mean, that's a slightly provocative thing to say, but the struggle to control energy in West Africa and commodities in the Congo

has real analogies to that earlier period. So, it's not as though suddenly people are going to step back and we're going to see impeccable global institutions come in and manage the sharing of these assets and resources in a kind of fair-minded global way; it's going to be a very different evolution of global organization to that.

And I talk a lot about how the experience that one must come away with if one's lived part of ones' life in the NGO sector and part in the international public sector, is the sense that this -- coalitions of the willing, if you like, which involve not just countries but NGOs, foundations, key businesses, who share common interest in finding solutions to certain critical issues, and the examples I talk about in the book are the extraordinary groups of networks of organizations from commercial to activists who came together around fashioning solutions to the spread of HIV/AIDS, the coalition that led to the formation of the Global Fund, the role, not just of a handful of current political leaders in that, but, you know, most strikingly an ex-president, Bill Clinton, the role of certain parts of the pharma industry in having the statesmanship to come forward and move on the issue of better pricing, the formidable role of NGOs in pressing for that, and of public health activists in the gay community who all combined in different ways to force change in this area. It's not the kind of model of inter-governmental negotiations around a horseshoed table or in the -- or of the 192 member states in the General Assembly of the United Nations. It's a kind of much more spontaneous, ragged, informal, sort of, mini-

lateralism which is forming, but I think, you know, I describe it because it seems to me that increasingly so many of the actors who matter are individuals, people like Ted Turner or George Soros, Bill Gates and Melinda Gates, all of whom walk through the pages of this book. And that unless one can understand that, in a sense, politics is going out of the formal inter-state structure into these new, somewhat inchoate, hard to generalize about forms, one's never going to catch and see the new form of international organization that lies ahead.

So, I'm going to stop there, I mean, except to say that -- as I began by saying -- this isn't your normal book about globalization. This is deliberately a much more personal account by somebody, who, as I say, was lucky enough to have that front row seat. So, I hope you'll all enjoy it. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MS. SIERRA: Well, I wanted to join Nancy in basically saying that I personally enjoyed reading this book a lot. You're going to be hearing a bit more from the panelists. I was a junior member of the team when Mark was at the World Bank and reading a little bit about what was going on behind the scenes in this and other things that you've worked through in UNDP and the UN was quite interesting. I think that the personal account really adds quite a bit to give credibility to the remarks that you made here, but also the conclusions of the book.

We're going to be hearing from two panelists, David Gordon

and Ted Piccone and they're going to give commentary on your book and maybe probe a little bit on some of your conclusions.

David Gordon is the current head of research and director of global macro analysis as well as a member of the management team of the Eurasia Group. He's worked at the highest levels of U.S. government serving as Director of Policy Planning under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, as well as with the National Intelligence Council and the CIA. His leadership, at the highest levels of the U.S. government, on global issues is quite notable, and I'm sure that he will find himself, I believe, even maybe in some of your guises in this book as well.

Following him will be Ted Piccone, a colleague here, a senior fellow at Brookings, deputy director of the Foreign Policy Group at the Brookings Institution. He counts on over 20 years of experience in government, law and research. We just helped him form his own expert views on the issues of democracy, human rights, international organizations, and U.S.-Latin American affairs.

So, to start us off with our distinguished panel, let me ask David, if you can give us a few remarks. Thank you.

MR. GORDON: Great. Thank you very, very much. It's a great pleasure for me to be here today to talk about Mark Malloch-Brown and his book, "The Unfinished Global Revolution".

When I read this it struck me as an unusual kind of 'present at the creation' book, a memoir about a system and a new force for global

governance that's really in formation, so it's a memoir, but it's a prequel, in some sense, of -- from an individual who was involved from the very early days in the beginnings of this new form of global governance and is still very, very, very much in formation and faces, frankly, I think as Nancy said earlier, some challenging times right now.

Now, I had the great pleasure to be present at the creation of Mark Malloch-Brown's career because Mark and I were in graduate school together in the 1970s studying African politics at the University of Michigan, and in fact it was very interesting for me because one of the last issues that I worked on as policy planning director for Secretary Rice was the aftermath of the Kenyan election where I had spent many years in Kenya and I worked with Mark when he was in a key role in the UK government, and, you know, the outcome has not been horrible. It's not perfect, but it could have been a lot worse.

So, even when I was interacting with Mark in formation, Mark as a young man, he -- it struck me that this was an extraordinary individual, a man of giant intellect, great curiosity, great passion and empathy, but the biggest thing that interested me about Mark was he was both very, very much a thinker and a doer, that these -- that thinking and doing were one and the same in Mark as a young man, and I think that's been the whole trajectory of his career, is thinking and doing, doing and thinking, and he -- I describe Mark as a veritable personal 'do' tank.

But the second thing is, Mark is a great linker. He's a great

linker of different communities and at this moment, I think that's exactly what the current global context calls for and I think you heard just in his comments a vision of NGOs, empowered individuals, new governments, multinational corporations, global agencies, working together in this new unfixed geometry that we're moving towards, and again, I think that -- you know, obviously the past is not a complete predictor, but it -- I recall very, very much Mark introducing me to friends from completely different fields and I'm thinking, oh, my god, how can he know all of these people, but he's a great linker and that's been exceptionally significant because I think that Mark Malloch-Brown, along with a couple of other individuals, really was one of a handful of the most important international civil servants who have begun to put in place this new way of thinking about the world and he did this mostly as a doer, but as he was doing, he was always thinking and he always had this strategic vision. In any of the organizations that he worked within, Mark was always involved in providing strategic vision, both for the narrow task and for the broader task. He caught Kofi Annan's attention at a very young age and established a lifelong relationship with Kofi that led ultimately to Mark being the number two in the UN, but I think Kofi recognized Mark as a man of strategic vision who could help him work through, in his own practice and in his own political way, a strategy for supporting these issues.

So, in his book, I think, Mark expresses, you know, guarded optimism that we're in an inexorable shift towards greater international

cooperation in this century and the rudimentary foundations of that are formed in the Millennium Development Goals, the international Human rights movement, the responsibility to protect doctrine a whole set of other individual elements, but then it's matched by the increasingly shared dilemmas of the issues of politics moving to the global stage, be it on energy issues, environment issues, global poverty issues, and that over time, this is likely to expand nations' tolerance for international cooperation. I think that's right. The dilemma here is the "over time" is a big challenge, and that part of the creation of this broader world order that we're seeing taking place now with this extraordinary shift in the dynamism of the global economy towards Asia and the Pacific region, is also a shift in the growing significance of countries whose international perspective is still very, very much dominated by nationalism and the nation-state.

So, it's a dilemma that the very expansion of global governance to include new actors is a constraint on moving towards the kind of shared responsibilities and shared commitments that Mark is talking about, and that's why he emphasizes that the world will need "a shift in the compass points of political culture to embrace global responsibility and to meet global objectives". And I think that's something that's true both for the countries that are already well represented in the global corridors of power, and the new countries and the new nations that are stepping on the stage.

In the short-term, I think that what we're seeing is a moment, as Nancy said, in the aftermath of the waning of U.S. power, when some of the traditional organizational motivations for cooperation, the existing of a strong global leader, are being tested now and are being tested at a moment when shared global responsibility is not the dominating element in the way most nations bring these issues to the table.

But I also think that Mark highlights in this new world, in this new world of modern communications, in this new world of broader interest by a very, very wide range of actors, in the ability of technology to undertake the kind of linkage activities that used to be dependent upon individuals, there the creation of a new political dynamic is out there for the taking. It's up to all of us to make sure that we grasp the nettle.

Thank you very, very much for a wonderful book, and I'm extremely honored to be here in your presence.

MS. SIENNA: Thank you, David. Ted?

MR. PICCONE: Great. Well, let me add my words of congratulations and thanks because I really, really enjoyed this book and I think it really is required reading for anyone who's interested in international politics today.

I mean, as you've already heard from the previous speakers -- and I swear we didn't compare notes before walking into this room -- so, we came to some very similar conclusions after reading this book, and I'll try not to be too repetitive. But, you know, Mark is someone who has

actually really earned the ability to comment on what's going on today, you know, after hours and plane rides and meetings and summits and conferences, he's really shown that -- you know, tells us how the world works in a lot of these institutions and I think exactly what you just said, David, about combining the characteristics of being a doer and a thinker is something I wrote myself and I think that really comes through in the book.

I appreciated this book at many different levels. As we heard, knowing that he speaks with real authority given that he's had such a unique experience in so many different endeavors, you know, from journalism to politics and global governance and he gets, intuitively, the notion that we've got big problems that require big solutions, but at the same time very realistic in his critique. I mean, you know, at some point you think, oh, you know, is he too much of an advocate for the UN or -- but then he'll throw in a zinger about, but this is really how it works, and we know -- we have to be realistic about this, so I appreciate that. I think he's a real pragmatic optimist throughout the book.

I also value where he's coming from because it's clear in the book that he's a genuine small 'd' democrat who sees and looks for the opportunities for making the world a better place and then pursues them strategically and methodically and relentlessly and that really comes through in the book.

It was also just really fun to relive some of the ups and downs of the last 20 years and, you know, be reminded of some of the

debates that we've lived through, that have been so fascinating and also very frustrating, and then to consider where we might be headed, and I would point out in particular your role at UNDP around bringing the democratic governance agenda into UNDP, that it really begins with political reform if we want to deliver development goods to poor people around the world, and finding that as the niche that was different from the World Bank.

I remember years ago meeting with you when you were at the World Bank and trying to understand, why is it that we could not use the 'd' word, meaning democracy, at the World Bank, and Mark always kind of understood what was possible, but then when he got to a place like UNDP where he could really do something about it, boy, did he, and if you think about the Arab Human Development Report, which he talks about interestingly here, and it's really prescient. I mean, that was ten years ago, right, and that report exactly put its finger on what ails the Arab world that we're seeing erupt right now, and Mark was in a position to make that happen and to get it the visibility that it deserved.

So, I really can't say enough good things about the book, but I do want to raise a few questions, and I think they go to the core of your thesis, and I don't really have a clear sense in my own head about what the answers are, but I did want to raise some things as kind of a constructive skeptic, because I agree with your general essential points.

So, you lay out a very ambitious agenda for how the

international community should tackle the compelling needs of the 21st Century. We need more resources to combat poverty. Wee need to create a global safety net -- I'm not sure what that means. We need more regulation of international commerce. We need to implement responsibility to protect. And I think you correctly put your finger on the real dilemma, the tension between globalization and nationalism. That's really the core problem we face in building a strong international system that's fair and legitimate and can carry authority around the world, and I think central to his analysis are his worries about, you know, the inevitable decline of the nation-state, and its inability to cope with all these mounting challenges, and I think correctly predicts that business and civil society will continue to play a growing role in managing such problems.

So, I got that far, but then you, kind of, gingerly open the door to a discussion about the idea of a global executive, a global parliament, and you sketch out some issues about what that might tackle, and that's where I kind of hit the pause button. You know, I think for all the problems of nationalism and the power of sovereignty to, you know, put up walls and to interfere with respect of basic, you know, human rights norms, I think we need strong nation-states if we're to have strong international institutions to tackle these common problems. In other words, the international system is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain, so we really ought to focus our energies on shoring up the weakest states.

And when I say, you know, how do you shore -- how do you make strong states, what I particular -- and Mark would know this from my own work on democracy -- I do mean democratic states that are transparent and accountable to their people. If you think -- I always go back to the radical notion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government”. So, government’s authority depends on the will of the people expressed in periodic genuine elections, universal voting, et cetera. And this is a core concept that’s not really reflected in our current politics and it should some day, I would like to see, be the litmus test for the legitimacy of any state in the international system. I mean, we know that it’s not, but why not hold this out as an essential element of any future system of global governance? Because any -- you know, the constituent elements of any global architecture need to be rooted in, I think, the notion of democratic accountability and that must start, first and foremost, with the nation-state.

So, we have a long ways to go in turning that particular vision into reality. In the moment, right now, of the Arab spring, one can certainly hope that the trend is moving in the right direction, but lest I get carried away by such naïve notions of accountability, let me just add a cautionary note to where that would lead you, you know, and Mark talks about this in the book. The growing demands of societies to live a life of human dignity will naturally lead to greater and greater pressure on the

planet, on limited resources, and I think that democratic politics, by their nature, are only going to reinforce and heighten the demands of the people for more services, for more goods, increasingly forcing politicians to protect the nation from competition from abroad and, you know, in order to stay in office. And Mark, you talk about this dilemma very well in your experience as minister in the United Kingdom with Gordon Brown when he was facing the economic recession and what to do about it. You know, the voters -- you know, Gordon reached high for some ideas that brought him to international solutions, but the voters didn't really want to hear that. And we learn, in the course of the story, that Brown, in the end, did pursue some useful international solutions to the problem and I think it resulted in some real, you know, progress toward bringing us closer to a new level of, kind of, international cooperation, but it cost him the election perhaps. I mean, I would be interested in hearing your views on that.

And so when you think about the Gordon Brown story, it's precisely this kind of enlightened leadership that we're going to need to manage the competitive dynamics we face now, and political leaders are going to need a whole new style of discourse and governance that goes beyond just, you know, governing for short term gain, and it's not just, you know, presidents and prime ministers, it's, you know, mayors and congressmen as well, and it's going to take a lot of education of citizens and voters that, you know, what is in our long-term interest requires certain steps now that, you know, might be painful, but it's where we need

to be headed in the future.

And I would just comment, just thinking about here in the United States, if you think about the 2012 Presidential election, it will be very interesting to see how far President Obama is willing to go in this direction because he has, on the one hand, really been a supporter of multilateral approaches to solving international problems, but as we heard in the State of the Union, he's also raised this flag of winning the future that just seems to underscore more traditional notions of American superiority and this could exacerbate rivalries. I mean, if everyone is starting to tout that line, we're going to create even more competition. And where is that going to go? Is that going to go in a peaceful direction or is that going to go in a military conflict direction? I think that's really one of the big questions we face looking ahead.

So, just to end on that note, I mean, I think, Mark, you write that it's probably -- you know, that we should build on what we have in terms of trying to reform the international institutions and try to reflect these new realities, but it's probably going to take a major crisis to galvanize the key actors to make it happen.

One last thought is that you might think about the book not having the 'r' in the last sentence, in the last word. So, it's really, I think, an evolutionary process we're talking about. Thanks.

MS. SIERRA: Thank you very much, Ted. So, is it evolution or revolution?

Ted, I'm going to ask Mark to maybe push back on Ted's pushing back a bit. He says he became skeptical when he heard or read in the book about the need for global institutions, global governance, and said, gee, is there really that tension between globalization and nationalism or do we actually need stronger democratic nation-states if we're going to get where we want to go? So, is there a contradiction in those points of view, or can you thread the needle, Mark?

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: No, I mean, look, first, thank all three of you for wonderfully supportive remarks, and, you know, all three of you have been part of different chapters or experiences in this book so it's great to hear an endorsement for much was there. I think I probably should just delight in the mood for a moment and say that when David and I were working together on Kenya, you know, it is strange when you find your fellow graduate student, you know, sitting in another government and you can never quite take each other as seriously as you think you should because you still remember when you used to drink beer at Ann Arbor together. But there was one particular moment, David wanted to meet me very early in the morning in London and the great -- and I think to this day he doesn't really believe this story, but at least my wife here, she will affirm that it is true. We had Gordon Brown, to lure us back to the UK -- we didn't have a house in London, we had lived in America for 20 years -- gave us Winston Churchill's apartment for the two years we were in government, but what he didn't tell us was that nobody had done anything

to it since Winston Churchill.

So, very early one morning I got into the elevator to go and meet David, with my red box, that great, sort of, bit of British ministerial life that you still have which has your kind of confident -- not usually -- is meant to have your confidential letters in it. I think most ministers probably keep their lunch sandwich and a clean tie in it or something, but anyway I get in and the damn elevator breaks and finally they come to rescue me and all they want is the red box. Minister, we can get the red box out. We can't quite squeeze you out.

(Laughter)

Anyway, and our seven-year old daughter, by this point, couldn't go to school and was peering down at her father and he's trying to give his red box to the security men, lived through this. But at the other end was David, pacing around at the Foreign Office waiting for me and completely unbelieving of why the red box showed up without the minister.

(Laughter)

Anyway, let me come to this core issue which really, not just Ted raised, but David as well, which is this, you know, caution about just how far is the development of global institutions going to go, and here let me push back in the following ways: first, I do think Washington is out of sync with the world, in a sense. You know, this is evidently a time when the U.S. is, in many ways, licking its wounds at the loss of global dominance. I think it is -- and let me just caveat that with one thing, that I

think this can often be overdone. You know, frankly, in Egypt, Tunisia, and a number of other countries which are clearly going to be under challenge, the key outside country, in terms of moderating behavior, steering this thing to a safe landing, remains the U.S.

I haven't -- you know, I don't think Beijing's been calling Cairo. And so I think it is just, you know, important to put that caveat in, but nevertheless, you know, the whole of the American body politick is seized with this sense of a diminishing power in the world. And that, in the thesis of my book, makes a country sort of prickly and nationalistic. And I think the U.S. is in that mode.

But I think there are some other countries which are going in a very different direction. I would say that the big emerging economies -- China, India, Brazil -- even rather smaller ones like South Africa, find themselves in a situation broadly analogous to what Roosevelt and Truman found the U.S. in in 1945 which is the rest of the world was turning to America and saying, right, the world's problems are yours now. And, you know, I argue that the real sort of driving rationale for the foundation of the United Nations was not the idealism of Eleanor Roosevelt and human rights as much as it was the pragmatism of her husband and the need to find a way to burden-share global security after the Second World War, and I think you now have a group of very powerful stakeholders in the global economy, such as China or India, who feel that they are now being similarly put on the spot and asked to take a role for

which they are not yet ready to do in terms of their responsibility for global security and development. These are countries whose own political leaderships feel they've got a very big unmet agenda at home, thank you very much. And so I think you will see them inevitably reach back to international institutions as the vehicle for burden sharing their enhanced role in global security.

So, you know, as the U.S., I think, will go through a period of skepticism about these institutions and about multilateralism, I think others will rediscover its value, actually.

And I think the second point to say is that the reason that you both detected a kind of caution about how far I think the development of global institutions will go is because like you both, I do think it will be founded on strong states. I do not think that the nation-state is on its -- is in its death throes yet. I think, you know, strong nation-states, though, are going to have to learn to pool sovereignty for the solution of global issues that they cannot solve alone, and strong nation-states are also going to have to accept the presence of other non-state stakeholders in much of this dialogue.

But I want to be very clear, I'm not one of those who thinks that there will be a global parliament or a global, you know, executive, if you like, in a kind of monolithic sense. I think we are going to see a kind of thousand flowers bloom period of a lot of different initiatives around different international public policy issues, many of them once a coalition

of the willing have found some kind of agreement will then be taken to the UN for kind of endorsement and being turned into something that the whole global community adopts.

But, you know, I think we're much more in a period of experimentation and spontaneous solution-finding to global problems than we are the great architecture of some great, kind of, new global institution to sit astride us. I completely agree. I just don't think the world is ready for that, and perhaps ever ready for that. And hence to this just final point that again was picked up, I mean, I do really believe that this sort of tension between globalizers and nationalists, you know, will be the great organizing principle of 21st Century politics. It will, in many parts of the world, you know, assume religious or ethnic dimensions as well, but just as kind of class was the organizing principle of 20th Century politics, even though it too often got overlaid by religion or ethnic identity, you know, I think this will be the driving dynamic and, you know, the hard bit is that actually at the moment, whether it is Britain or the U.S., you know, parties are not yet reorganized in that sense. You've got plenty of globalizers and plenty of nationalists in both the Republican and the Democratic party, and in the UK, you know, I struggle to see exactly where it will go, but what seems to happen in the UK, as a kind of nation which depends above all else on being a trading nation and a great beneficiary of globalization, is that when you're in office, you're the party of globalization, and when you're out of office, you're the party of nationalism, and so, you know, the

Tories were against Europe, against pretty much everything abroad when in opposition, and then now, actually, with the advantage of having liberal democratic partners which allows them to excuse it to their own back benches, you know, are about the most gracious globalists you can imagine. David Cameron, you know, has fit right into the world of (inaudible) and meetings in Brussels and looks as though he was born to it, and so, you know, it's a strange adjustment but I think, you know, over time we're going to see this thing being the big driver of party reorganization in both countries.

MS. SIERRA: So, let me turn it back, and with each a minute for your favorite Mark anecdotes, since Mark was able to get his minute for the red box. If we're going to have this world with lots of bottom up activity, lots of messy coalitions coming, which I certainly see -- I work a lot on climate change and that's the world that we're in right now -- you know, are there things, however, that leaders and policymakers should be doing to try to get some outcome out of that so that it's not just a bazaar but is actually moving towards, and again, I'll turn to the work that I do on climate change. It's great to have all these initiatives, but if in the end we don't have deep reductions in greenhouse gasses, we're not going to get to where we're going.

So, are we going to see, when we look back, as the last line of the book says, the revolution, in our lifetime, or are we going to be in for a very long period of competition, of swirling coalitions? What's your

forecast, David?

MR. GORDON: Yeah, so, I mean, I think on this the key -- the key dyad here is what happens between the United States and China, frankly, and I think that the Obama Administration came in with this very ambitious China agenda. They didn't use the term G-2, but that's what they were really talking about. The Chinese basically said, no, thank you, we're not ready for this, and the whole G-2 has become demonized in China as a mechanism for the United States to hold China back. But at some point, as the two most significant state-based stakeholders in the global system, there's going to have to be some kind of a rapprochement.

I think right now the ground isn't prepared for this, but I think the role of leadership here is to make sure that current tensions don't get out of control and that we go on a pathway back towards getting something like that because I do think that heading into the world that Mark describes in making and what needs to be done, will, at the end of the day, need some kind of an either formal or, more likely, informal, but practical set of arrangements between the U.S. and China.

I'm, frankly, not pessimistic about this. I think in the short-run, we aren't going there, but I thought that President Obama and President Hu both understood what was doable and what wasn't coming out of the last meeting. They both have a tougher time, though. China, you really have resurgent nationalism in China. Here in the United States I think you have this danger of turning inward and protectionism. So,

there's a lot -- politically, there's a lot of hard work.

I think that's going to be the key driver of this. Over the medium-term, I'm optimistic.

MS. SIERRA: Thank you. And Ted, on this question, but also from your vantage point on the institutions that we do have -- the World Bank, the UN, the IMF -- do you see hope in the kind of governance movements, albeit slow, that we're seeing in those institutions?

MR. PICCONE: Yeah, I think going back to Mark's point about burden sharing, that really goes critically to whether those international institutions are going to work, because India and Brazil and China are going to need to step up. I mean, whether they're ready or not. I mean, if you think about the U.S. in 1945, we were very generous in how we proceeded in taking on that role even though we were all about burden sharing, we remained a very generous contributor, and we're not seeing that from China and India and Brazil, and yet their economies are booming and they certainly seem to have the resources to contribute.

And so, yes, they have their own internal problems, but so did we coming out of the Depression and after, you know, World War II. And so I think whether they are ready mentally to take on that step is really a big question, and I don't think you're really -- you know, it might be that we're heading toward this grand bargain where they say, okay, we're ready to step up once we have a bigger voice and participation in the governance of these institutions, so come back to us when we really have

a deal on the UN Security Council expansion and then we'll come up with some additional resources. I think that's -- I'd be curious to know, Mark, whether you think that -- because, you know, they clearly want in, right? They're saying, we want to be part of the management of the global institutions, but we want to have more of a say. It's just, we do have a free rider problem.

MS. SIERRA: Any comment on that before we open it up?

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: Well, look, Kathy, one comment on your climate change point. I mean, at one level this should be the issue where the kind of creative new multilateralism I'm talking about should be in its element and clearly it's not. And, you know, I think that has something still to do with the difficulty of an issue in any political system, whether it was a national issue, global issue, or just a local community issue, it's just very hard, always, in politics to get people to act preemptively around a problem in the future. And twice -- triply hard when it's at the global level

And so, you know, I actually -- I mean, just to give an example of my kind of mini-lateralism -- I think one of the most interesting things that has happened is this Copenhagen-Cancun process that's, you know, meandered on without conclusion. You've seen one of my little coalitions of the willing, the government of Norway, the President of Indonesia, George Soros, McKenzie, a couple of banks, combining to go after the problem of the Indonesian rain forests which, I think, correct me if

I'm wrong, you know, are, because of the nature of the soil that's exposed when the trees are removed, which kind of doubles the impact -- it's not just you lose the sink effect of the trees, it's that that particular soil sets off extraordinary gasses. You know, it's something like -- am I right in saying that it's almost the sort of third biggest emitter after the --

MS. SIERRA: It's the third -- Brazil and Congo --

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: So, you know, here a group of people not just dealing with one small rainforest knowing that you've got to do 100 other ones afterwards, they've focused on, you know, a key thing which will make a discernable difference to the global trend and they're kind of getting it done while everybody else sits around in inconclusive discussion.

So -- and I think now the U.S. and the UK are coming in. I think the Millennium Challenge money for Indonesia is going to be deployed to this. So, you know, there's an example of this strange coalition of individuals, organizations, for-profit, not-for-profit, combining to make it happen.

I think the other thing I have to say that on this one I'm an old-fashioned sort of market-based guy. I think that there's going to be nothing better than $100 a barrel oil for a long while to kind of start moving this issue to where it should be. Let me stop there.

MS. SIERRA: Great. Thank you very much, and thanks to all. So, now we're going to turn it over to you. We have time for some

questions from the audience. I'd really ask people to raise their hands. I'll call on you. Please identify yourselves and staff will get you a microphone.

MS. REISER: Hi. It's a pleasure to hear all of you. My name is Mindy Reiser. I work for the UN. I also worked as a journalist. And I wanted to ask Mark Malloch-Brown to reflect on journalism and coverage of international issues. You started your professional life as a journalist, so you've covered events and now you are the one that is covered. We've talked about the rise of the internet, citizen journalism, and the concern that with so much information awash, how do people who are not experts make sense of this? So, I'd love to hear your reflections on journalism and globalization.

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: Yeah, it's a rather sort of sad reflection, to be honest. You know, I mean, when I first myself wrote about development as a journalist, I was part of an active community of people who kind of felt they knew a little bit about development and put their time in to cover the stories, and there was some real expertise.

Now, if you look in a country like the UK, and I think it's the same here, in that particular niche, which after all combines the costs of a foreign correspondent, because the story is all over the world, with the need to have journalists with some sort of background in economics and stuff, there are very few people doing it -- very few people doing it. And so there is a real loss of professional depth which shows up in an area like

international affairs or development and, you know, citizen journalism and all the rest really does not make up for that. I mean, I find myself at the very old-fashioned end of the argument on this, just really ruing the loss of high-level coverage.

And, you know, you look at the United Nations when, you know, Kofi Annan was a sufficient sort of celebrity Secretary General, there was a quite strong press corps there. It has pretty much all drifted away now. There's a handful of journalists covering the organization and, you know, and I think it will be very hard for another Secretary General to kind of get them back. I mean, keeping journalists in New York City is an expensive commitment.

So, I think we are -- we're struggling with this, and, you know, I devoutly hope that as we arrive at new models of business models for journalism, it will start to correct itself because I think, you know, the only good news is, as the things I'm talking about in the book happen and you get more global governance, it is going to have more impact on the lives of people and therefore presumably as citizens and as businessmen, they're going to want to read more about it.

So, you know, I hope it will correct over time, but for now it's not a happy place.

MS. SIENNA: Thank you. Gentleman in the beige jacket back there.

MR. TIPSON: Fred Tipson representing UNDP in

Washington. Mark, I join the others in commending you on writing an important book and I know that you compare UNDP to Avis, the bank being Hertz. If the budgeteers in many countries have their way, we're going to feel more like Rent-A-Wreck, I'm afraid.

But I was reminded reading your book of what an important contribution you made in emphasizing the interplay of democracy and development, a courageous contribution, I would say, because it was something I'm sure you had fight uphill on. But how do you apply those insights to what we're now seeing in the Arab states? UNDP obviously did very important think work about diagnosing the issue. How should the international community be organizing itself to be of assistance to these countries now?

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: Thank you, let me just say that, you know, you will have noticed in the book, as I hope everybody else who works for UNDP will notice, that I describe it as the best job on earth, leading that organization, and, you know, one of its high moments was those reports we did on the Arab world, and it was interesting because the UNDP I took over actually really was of no significance in the Arab world at all. The World Bank was a much more powerful institution there with, you know, a major lending program and a very important role as advisor on economic reform to many governments in that region, and I found a UNDP which had -- because, you know, as many of those countries are not very low income countries, but middle income countries, which meant

in the UNDP funding formula that we didn't have very big programs in most of those countries, and it seemed to be devoted to kind of being almost sort of a slush fund for the governments of the day to get in experts they wanted. I mean, it was -- when I say slush fund, I mean, it was perfectly properly run, but it was, you know, it was the most, sort of, passive kind of technical assistance program imaginable and, you know, I had an extraordinary woman, Rima Khalaf-Hunaidi, who had been Deputy Prime Minister of Jordan, a Palestinian who just sort of actually had been recommended to me by World Bank friends as someone to bring in as our bureau chief for the Arab states, and she and I agreed we were going to come back in that region, it wasn't going to be by kind of incremental increases in our spending, it was going to be by hitting at what we both saw as the real, sort of, ceiling on development which was this extraordinary serfdom -- of intellectual serfdom that the region was captured by, this astonishing lack of a strong secular education tradition, the democracy deficit, the extraordinary, sort of, under deployment of women in the region, all of it leading to, you know, potentially threatening levels of youth unemployment, et cetera, and, you know, it was one of those things where you realize that the power of an organization is not necessarily going to be the programmatic size of its footprint in a particular country, it's can it, you know, gather the courage to challenge its clients around the -- and find the real kind of locks which are holding them back, which will undo those chains. And it was -- you know, it was an

astonishing risk, it was a risk in all kinds of ways because while it was a million copies downloaded in Arabic almost immediately, you know, which made it, by standards of the Arab world, a runaway best seller which has not been seen on that scale, perhaps -- I mean, for a very long time -- and yet, you know, while it was a powerful book about the need to report about the need for the Arab world to stop blaming Israel for all its wrongs and to kind of get real about its own internal failings, it nevertheless had a few -- took a few swipes at Israel.

And so I was expecting an explosion from Washington. I was expecting Arab governments to be outraged, and they were. There was a meeting of the Arab League where I think Rima and I were lucky to escape with our heads. But, you know, actually the reaction was very different and I'm sorry to go on about this but I think it is an interesting point in a way. I mean, the reaction here in Washington was astonishing, President Bush downwards, you know, endorsed this book. I described how, actually, Rima called me furious one day and she said, "God damn it, they've ordered another box of the reports for Washington. I'm going to start charging your office for them. You know, you tell me I have to do everything Washington asks." You know, it was quite extraordinary and we found they were going to the war college so that, you know, everybody was reading this -- Bush and Secretary -- well then Secretary Powell and Condi Rice, everybody was hugely supportive.

Of course the moment, unfortunately, of divergence came

when, you know, a fundamental thing about the report had been change must come from inside these societies, it must be a homegrown democratic transformation, and when suddenly the report was used as an argument for Iraq, we found ourselves in a very, very difficult position and our Arab authors found themselves in a very difficult and unanticipated position.

But I think the lesson I take out of all of this was, you know, now the present Secretary General, others have started quoting the report again as, you know, look, ten years ago the UN warned of these problems. But of course, you know, despite the huge critical support it got from here, from Brussels, from London, the fact was it didn't change policy in terms of policy towards the region or the behaviors of governments in the region, in any particularly discernable way. And interestingly Bahrain appointed a few more women parliamentarians as a result of the report, but I think appointed is the word, not elected, and, you know, so one has to wonder about how you can sort of do something which hits the bulls eye in terms of its analytical power, but where of course still the kind of geopolitical interests and stability trump it and you're not successful in moving the needle in terms of the kind of incremental evolutionary changes that might have occurred, which might have made some of what's happening now less necessary.

MS. SIERRA: Gordon and Ted, did you have any comments on that?

MR. GORDON: No.

MS. SIERRA: No, that's fine. We've got a question here and then I'll move on to that side of the room. Yes?

MR. MCDONALD: Thanks very much. Lawrence McDonald, Center for Global Development. Mark, congratulations. It's a terrific book and I want to refer back to the first speaker mentioning journalism because, you know, you're an inspiration for me that somebody who's a journalist and a communications guy actually then has a world -- a role in the world of substance and leadership, and I think a lot of us in communications and former journalists aspire to that.

My question has to do with what I see as sort of the core contradiction of your book and the challenges we face, and Ted sort of touched on both of these because he said, maybe the title would be better without the "r" meaning evolution. Then he said maybe what we need is a crisis, and of course we have a crisis and that's the climate challenge that Kathy mentioned. And if it were only, you know, fisheries depletion or war or genocide or poverty we could mess about and slowly find our way towards global governance to go along with globalization, but we don't have that luxury because we're already seeing very rapid runaway climate change. And so I've been puzzling about that and I'm interested in your references to the role of the NGOs including direct action people who led to progress on AIDS, on poverty, but through very non-diplomatic means -- by getting out on the street. And my own sense is that we don't have a

sense of crisis around climate because the people who care about it would rather talk than act, for the most part. And I would just -- maybe related to that I have a bad case of UK envy and I envy two things, one is your direct action people in climate, and the other is your conservatives, and if we had conservatives like that here in the U.S. we would be in much better shape.

But I wonder if you have advice for people who are trying to decide about the role of direction action in creating a recognition of a sense of crisis in the climate debate, which sadly seems to be lacking in both national and international discussions about the issue.

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: Lawrence, thanks. And, you know, look, the first point to say is that, you know, in an earlier answer I displayed my concern about the politics of climate change, this difficulty in kind of bringing it home as an immediate crisis. So, you know, one half of the answer is, you're right, it's crisis that makes change. In 2007 when I joined the British government there were only two members of the cabinet who believed the G-20 would be turned into a top level sort of head of government instrument, and that was the Prime Minister and myself, and everybody thought it -- and in that way it was sort of reviewed as our mutual folly, and, you know, yet by the end, the financial crisis meant that the most unlikely inventor of this new G-20 was President Bush. This was a Begin goes to Egypt moment, in a way, wasn't it? Because, you know, he had the absolute credibility to do it but the clear-sightedness to

recognize that, you know, that financial crisis needed a lot more than the G-8 around the table. He needed to get 85 percent of the world economy at the table if he was going to stop the financial wrought.

And so, you know, there is no doubt that crisis does it. Now, you know, how you generate that moment of crisis on climate change, I don't know. I fear it will be the growing propensity for natural disasters that we are seeing, for crop failures that we are seeing, which is going to kind of, you know, in a sense, drive home the point. Now, whether direct action can accelerate that or not, I don't know. I wonder what you've got going on in that mind of yours.

Clearly -- clearly, you know, you've decided, long enough as a communicator.

SPEAKER: (Off mic)

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: Well, exactly -- well, look, knowing you and, you know, remembering some of the direct action we were mutually the victims of at the World Bank, I'm sure you've got something very creative up your sleeve. I'm just glad Nancy isn't here to hear what her director is planning.

MS. SIERRA: Okay, we're going to go way to the back, the lady in the blue, and then the scarf -- gentleman, you had a question? No.

MS. ROSETTE: Hi, Mark. I'm a member of the New York UN press corps you miss from Kofi Annan's days. Claudia Rosette. Could I ask you, now that there's a chance to ask a question, in the role

that the UN is going to play as you see it, what is to be done about the continuing problem, if you agree there is one, of incredible failures of oversight of the problems that led to the “Cash for Kim” scandal that matured at the UN Development Program on your watch? The promises you made for Freedom of Information Act, which never materialized? The ethics office, which proved toothless? The reform of the Human Rights Council, which now has Libya on its -- et cetera. Appreciate your thoughts on that.

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: Well, Claudia, glad you’re still following the UN. And let -- look, I mean, let me take -- you know, first the book, if you read it, you’ll see is no whitewash of UN performance, quite the opposite. It expresses huge frustration about the weakness of different UN institutions, about the competence of parts of the UN system. It’s a reformer’s book. It’s a book about trying to reform and strengthen the organization. And whether it is -- I mean, I’m not going to go through the list one-by-one of the things that you mentioned, but, you know, this is an organization, the UN, which has also, you know, come under violent partisan attack and, you know, the efforts to make it close its office in North Korea were one very, very clear example of that. You know, it’s enormously important that the UN is a universal institution. It’s enormously important that the closed minds in North Korea are not unlike some of the things we were trying to report on on the Arab world ten years ago, continue to be addressed, and I make no apology for that and

continue to be as combative as ever about those who, I think, engage in, you know, really reckless, ideologically motivated efforts to try and damage and destroy the institution.

MS. SIERRA: Thank you.

MS. MCNEAL: Hello, my name is Mary McNeal. I'm with the World Bank Institute's Governance Practice and I was a young information officer when you were at the World Bank, so it's great to see you.

I have a question about the centrality of the U.S.-China relationship in terms of determining the world order as we move ahead, or even the status of our multilateral institutions. I think Mr. Brooks put that out as what he saw as a major concern and I am very much interested in your comments on that.

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: I mean, I think -- and maybe we should get you guys in on this one -- in fact, maybe you should go first. I've done quite enough talking.

MR. GORDON: No, I mean, I gave my view. I think this --

MS. SIERRA: Do you agree or not?

MR. GORDON: -- I think that this is going to be a big determinant, not the only one, but I think it's a big shaper.

MS. SIERRA: Ted?

MR. PICCONE: Well, I tried to get at that by saying it's more than just U.S. and China, I think, it's really, you know, Brazil and India and

some of these other states. I'm particularly fascinated by, you know, the role of the emerging democratic powers, so leaving China slightly off to the side you have Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey, Korea, India, that are all coming under increasing pressure as part of their democratic politics for demands for delivery of certain services at home that, again, will, I think, put more and more pressure on issues of resources and that will have to be managed at a more global level. And whether those political leaders in those societies will see that and recognize that, I think is one of the big questions.

China may or may not be constructive in that configuration. I think one of my colleagues here, Bruce Jones, is very concerned that when we start thinking about issues of democracy and human rights in the U.S.-China dynamic, we're picking one of the hardest issues and elevating it and naturally, you know, raising tensions, and that we really should focus on areas that cooperation is happening already, I mean, the kind of mini-lateralism you were talking about, Mark, whether it's cooperation to deal with piracy or on counterterrorism. There's a lot going on that we don't read about in the newspaper, but it's happening and those are things to build on, and let's work on the areas where there's the most need for common solutions and then build out from there.

MS. SIERRA: David?

MR. GORDON: I think the challenge, from an American perspective, on this is that, you know, we want to engage China, we want

China to have a larger role in the multilateral system, the G-20, the IMF, but the problem here, I think, are twofold. One, when we view China, we view the world's second largest economy. When the Chinese view themselves, they view a country that stands between 90th and 95th in per capita income. So, that dichotomy is really important.

Secondly, we come up with concepts like responsible stakeholder to shape the kind of a relationship that we want, but the rules that we're asking China to conform to are still rules of our making and I think we've got to take -- we have to find a way to take those two things into account a little bit more in getting there. The Chinese have to -- I mean, they have this very, very powerful narrative of nationalism that puts us at the center as a bad guy and unless they get beyond that, you aren't going to get progress here. So, I think that there are domestic -- important domestic changes on both sides, but I do think that China will be particularly important because of all the states, Ted, that you mentioned, China is the one whose actions will play a large shaping role. They're the only other country in the world that really views the world in a global way, that everyone else is a regional player, in some sense, except the U.S. and China. So, that's why it seems to me that that relationship is going to be so important in moving forward.

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: Now, I just had -- and it also allows me to answer Ted's earlier point that I didn't answer. I mean, you know, in terms of are these countries as most notably China, going to step

up and burden share, you know, China, after all, is already a member of the Security Council, so it should have that incentive in place to step up and certainly economic -- in terms of its financial contribution, it resists doing so.

It is, you know, however, starting to get involved in peacekeeping and, you know, actually has more peacekeepers deployed than the U.S. or the UK does in terms of UN peacekeeping operations --

MR. PICCONE: That's a low bar, at least for the U.S.

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: But -- so, you know, I think that's a little bit evident. I think also just to echo David's point, I mean, I was very struck in the preparations for the G-20, you know, going to Beijing and finding a think tank community discussing -- you know, engaged in the international economic issues equivalent, almost, to Washington and certainly way ahead of anything that you would find not just in India, but even nowadays, frankly, in the UK, probably.

So, I think, you know, there is that -- they are stepping up in a lot of -- a lot of ways, and we've just got to encourage that process, and I certainly don't think it's a given that we'll get there, but I think it's hugely in our interest to get these countries to step up and play their role.

MS. SIERRA: Great. I think we have time for one last question. This gentleman has been very patient here.

MR. BIRNBAUM: Yeah, I'm Norman Birnbaum from Georgetown, but I'll modestly claim journalistic credentials. I'm the oldest

living contributor to The Nation who's also compos mentis.

There's another group interested in your -- this set of problems which perhaps takes the word global revolution much more literally than many of the other participants, namely the kinds of the -- the enormous -- it's an enormous spectrum but it's still a spectrum and a set of groups represented at the social forum who reach, let's say, from the American Trade Union Federation, AFLCIO, Brazilian Labor Party, German Greens, groups which are much more self-consciously revolutionary, if small, sectarian, and miniscule, but they still do harness a great deal of ideological energy around the world, attach themselves to other movements, and certainly have a large, and certainly, vociferous, role to play in the future. How do you think this tradition fits in?

LORD MALLOCH-BROWN: Well, I think the social forum has been a fascinating experiment and the way it has brought together, you know, disparate groups who found common cause, you know, is a very powerful force because, you know, I think one of the sub-dimensions of globalization is the extraordinary marginalization effect on certain groups, be it organized labor as we're seeing happening in the U.S. at the moment, to indigenous peoples in much of Latin America, and therefore, in a sense, to form a conclave of the marginalized, to demand, as a group, improvements in the global model, to kind of make space for their issues on the agenda strikes me as, you know, just exactly part of the sort of political reorganization that I have in mind, and, you know, I think it's

important just to say that the reason I use the term “global revolution” is, in a sense, this particular man’s journey from believing that by getting democracy at the national level, I was meeting my aspiration to help people have more control over their lives, and then suddenly finding, woops, it’s not enough because the problems have migrated to the global level.

And so, you know, while undoubtedly I’m guilty of doing it from a bourgeois point of view, I, you know, in a way, kind of -- I think I’m on the same journey as those groups, even if, from a, you know, undoubtedly a different position, and it is just this business of how do we make globalization a force for more control over our lives rather than less, and left ungoverned, it will become one of the less because it will be the randomness of market mechanisms and corporate behaviors which will determine outcomes rather than good, strong, decent public policy.

MS. SIERRA: Very good. Well, with that I’d like to close this afternoon’s session. First, I want to say thank you to Nancy Birdsall for opening, to Ted and David, for giving us, really, your very personal but also pointed views on this book. I want to thank you, Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, I can use the official title, I guess, more (inaudible), not just are you a friend to many of the people that are in this room, those that you picture in the book, but you’re a leader. You’re a leader because you’re passionate, because you’ve got humor, because you are that doer, but because you’re also very thoughtful. And in the end, that thoughtful --

thought leadership, is what we're going to be taking away from this book.

For those of you that lived through the period of time that's covered in the book I really urge you to read it. You will go down memory lane and find and remember things that you had been part of or wish you had been part of and you can say you were part of after you've read the book, and those of you that are maybe the younger generation that want to see a little bit towards the future, I also think you should read it because there's a lot of wisdom. It's available outside and I'm sure that you will enjoy it, as did I.

So, thank you very much, Mark, for joining us, and thank you to my panelists. Good afternoon.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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