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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRESS

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MR. PICCONE: Welcome to Brookings. My name is Ted Piccone. I’m senior fellow and deputy director of the Foreign Policy program here and I’m very happy to welcome you on a wet, rainy, although it will get worse it sounds like day. Thanks for coming out for what I think will be a very interesting and timely discussion about the United Nations, multilateral engagement, and the Obama administration’s approach to those issues. We have an excellent panel and I will be introducing them as I proceed.

This issue of the United Nations in particular is one that brings a lot of emotion with it sometimes in this town. Sometimes we forget that the U.N. is actually a collection of nearly 200 very diverse states with both common and divergent interests. And the political will and national sovereignty of those countries still matter a lot. It is indeed an imperfect institution.

The Obama administration came in and acknowledged that very clearly up front. We know it’s an imperfect institution but we think we’re much better off trying to strengthen it from within because it’s in our interest to do so. It’s a way to pool resources and create and enforce international norms. But the debate on the role of the U.N. and what role the United States should play persists and seems to be getting louder. Some of us believe the U.S. should be a leader inside the institution. Others would like to see it be more of a critic or even a gadfly. Sometimes a bystander or all of the above.

Our national security strategy of the Obama administration lays out a very clear vision for U.S. leadership and working from within. Just last week we heard a different vision from the Republican leadership, particularly in the House of Representatives. They argued that the U.N. has failed to advance U.S. interests and values and want to withhold U.S. funding until reforms are adopted. We’ve seen this movie before and I think it’ll make for an interesting couple of years looking ahead.
That’s the context. I think today’s panel will really help us sharpen some of those issues, and I’m very happy to introduce three people who I’ve been very lucky to work with directly in different capacities over the years. And we’re first going to hear from Esther Brimmer. Esther is the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations. She was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in April of 2009, almost two years ago. Dr. Brimmer’s role is the key senior official in the State Department responsible for managing a wide -- you can’t imagine what a diverse range of issues she has under her belt, but I can think of no better person. She’s worked here on Massachusetts Avenue across the street at SAIS as deputy director and Director of Research at the Center for Transatlantic Relations. She spent several years at the State Department in the Clinton administration, including when we worked together at the Policy Planning Staff and before that around town on the Hill, et cetera. You have everyone’s bios. She’ll speak first.

Then we will hear from Bruce Jones. Bruce is the Director of the Managing Global Insecurity Project and a senior fellow here at Brookings. And he’s also the Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. Bruce is an expert on U.S. policy, on the global order, global governance, multilateral reform, international conflict management, and more. He’s also currently a senior external advisor for the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 on conflict security and development. He’s also been a senior advisor in the Office of the Secretary General during the U.N. reform effort leading up to the World Summit. So Bruce has very much an insider’s view of how the U.N. works.

We will then hear from Ambassador Tom Shannon. Tom has been U.S. ambassador to Brazil since very late 2009, just over a year. Before that he served as the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs for several years. He’s had
a long career at the State Department and at the National Security Council working on Western Hemisphere Affairs at the Organization of American States. So he might have some reflections on a regional view of multilateral organization. He’s also served in embassies in Caracas; in Johannesburg, South Africa; Brasilia, of course, and elsewhere.

So we have a very rich group here and we will proceed in hearing from Esther. Thank you. (Applause)

MS. BRIMMER: Thank you, Ted, for that introduction and for the opportunity to speak here today.

Before I begin I’d like to recognize the contributions that you and your colleagues here at Brookings have made on a wide range of United Nations’ issues. And you published many reports and talk about many important ideas in the U.N. system that we work in today.

Two years into President Obama’s first term we see an ever-growing need for effective multilateralism and recognize the impact on achieving U.S. foreign policy goals that effective multilaterals can have. We see it in the work to protect human rights in places like Iran. We see it in the work to ensure elections in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan, that these are free and fair. And we see it as we work to halt nuclear proliferation in Iran, North Korea, and Syria. Yet, despite important progress, we once again are hearing criticisms from a bygone era which ignore our successes at the U.N., as well as changes to the global landscape that make effective multilateral engagement more important than ever.

So our discussion today is a perfect opportunity to review the Obama administration’s multilateral efforts and progress and to look ahead at the challenges we face in the coming year. Today I’ll highlight how the administration’s engagement across
the U.N. system has benefitted the United States and how our work to revitalize the
United Nations is at the core of our multilateral priorities.

The rationale for heightened U.S. engagement at the U.N. is clear. In a
21st century world where threats don’t stop at borders, we tackle many of our most
urgent problems with cooperation and partnership and need shared solutions to common
problems. But as any veteran of multilateral diplomacy will tell you, the importance of
global response is often matched by the challenge in getting there. It is not always easy.
It is not always smooth. But U.S. interests benefit from our patient, dogged efforts across
the U.N. system.

This administration’s engagement at the U.N. is at the core of our efforts
to build a global architecture to address challenges of the 21st century. We’ve elevated
the G-20 to successfully promote economic coordination and respond to the world
economic crisis. We are renewing U.S. leadership at the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), multilateral development banks, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). And we’re working with important regional
organizations in East Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. Yet, the United Nations continues to
be the most important global institution, and our robust engagement across the U.N.
system remains essential to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals.

First and foremost, a capable and strong United Nations system
advances U.S. national security. Indeed, President Obama’s national security strategy
prioritizes multilateral engagement precisely because we cannot divorce core national
security interests from robust and sustained multilateral engagement. Dangerous nuclear
programs in Iran and North Korea, international terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq. Addressing
these national security challenges requires cooperation and our work in the U.N. system
is key to that common response.
So in the Security Council, Ambassador Rice and her team up in New York, working with our colleagues here in the Department in Washington, negotiated the toughest and most comprehensive sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government as part of our dual track strategy to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. By engaging multilaterally within the U.N. and with its members, we crafted a tough set of sanctions that all must implement, even the Security Council members who voted against them. Secretary Clinton noted recently that we are already seeing the effect of those sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program. The International Atomic Energy Agency has been invaluable in sounding the alarm on Iran’s nuclear activities and the IAEA’s performance is a reminder of the value of investment in international institutions.

The U.N. also plays an indispensible role in two countries of enormous importance to the United States: Afghanistan and Iraq. In both, the U.N. has established important political missions with real risk and danger and tragic loss of life of U.S. personnel. Missions work with the sovereign Afghan and Iraqi governments to strengthen democratic institutions and promote constructive political dialogue. We have close and active partnerships with the U.N. in both of these countries. And without the U.N.’s work in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. efforts to responsibly draw down our military forces as the President has committed to doing would be all the more difficult.

As both this administration and our predecessors recognize, the United Nations is also an important forum for counterterrorism efforts. Through Security Council sanctions regimes, we have put in place global asset freezes and travel bans on terrorists and their supporters. Such universality is needed for sanctions to be effective and the U.N. Security Council uniquely offers that capability. But our broader multilateral engagement on counterterrorism through the Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force, the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate, or on aviation security at
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), all of that helps us get there.

Let me turn for a moment to one of the most famous U.N. activities: peacekeeping. It is one of the U.N.’s most important roles and another area where the U.S. engagement directly benefits our national interests. As we all know, U.N. peace operations no longer are only deployed to separate warring parties. These missions address some of our hardest and most challenging security situations, including Sudan, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon, Congo, Liberia, and others. They are charged with preventing and ending armed conflicts, protecting civilians, supporting the rule of law, and helping to administer elections. To do so, U.N. personnel are regularly sent to dangerous situations where states cannot ensure basic security. Civilians live under the threat of violence and there is little peace to keep.

But U.N. peacekeeping missions can mean the difference between stability and violence and can help transform a fragile ceasefire into lasting peace. And the civility these peacekeeping missions bring directly impacts U.S. national interests. We have learned all too well that an unstable country far away can pose a direct threat to U.S. national security. By working through the United Nations, we can bring security to countries where U.S. military operations aren’t feasible or desirable at a far lower cost to the United States and where U.S. leadership can leverage important contributions by other states.

These are all areas where we have worked within the U.N. system on important peace and security issues, but our multilateral engagement has succeeded in part because it has been deep as well as broad. To achieve American objectives and bring to bear the full weight of our international partners, we must mobilize and use our leverage across the entire range of multilateral institutions.

In short, engagement cannot be à la carte. So we have expanded the
number of U.N. and other multilateral entities who are actively and seriously involved, working across the broader United Nations system to support U.S. interests and universal values. That’s why we work at the IAEA to ensure that a nuclear lab half a world away is secure. That’s why we work at the ICAO to build reliable global passenger screening systems. That’s why we fight at the World Intellectual Property Organization to strengthen global copyright protection for innovative U.S. companies that are creating jobs at home. That’s why we’re ensuring at the World Health Organization that public health officials can work together to respond to the next global pandemic. We seek cooperation from others on issues of importance to us so we must remain engaged when these states raise issues of importance to them.

Now, some condemn our broad, multilateral engagement because some U.N. member states are, to borrow terms used recently, bullies, thugs, and dictators. But a key part of our work every day is standing up to our adversaries across the U.N. system. If we can’t persuade them to change their behavior, we’ll work to outmaneuver them. And we achieve results. We are tireless because we have to be. We know the consequences of disengaging. If we cede leadership at the United Nations, other states will rush in to fill that vacuum and they will not act in our interest. But engaging across the U.N. system is more than cooperating with our traditional allies and partners, important though that is, or standing up to our adversaries. It’s also an important element in our efforts to work with important emerging powers that are expanding their own international influence.

Indeed, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa are among many countries that see multilateral diplomacy as a key to their foreign policy. These countries send their best and brightest diplomats to postings in New York, Geneva, and other U.N. cities where they are formulating their outlook on the world. So to engage these states
effectively we must be able to understand and address their multilateral priorities.

Now, respect for universal values is an enduring American interest and one we have long championed at the United Nations. An important setting for these efforts is the Human Rights Council in Geneva. This administration, reversing the policy of the previous one, chose to run for and won a seat at the HRC in 2009. And since joining, we’ve become the most active delegation on the council, bolstering our engagement with a dedicated human rights ambassador in Geneva and a strengthened team working on the HRC within the State Department here in Washington.

But our expanded engagement does not mean we’ve dived in with our eyes closed. Now, are we frustrated with the Council’s substantive shortcomings? Deeply. Could the HRC do more to address pressing human rights issue? Far more. Of course they could. Does it continue an unfair and imbalanced focus on Israel? Sadly, it does. Will the upcoming session in March be tough? Yes, it will. But these criticisms, like many we face, tell only part of the story. They fail to recognize how the Human Rights Council and other U.N. bodies have improved as the result of U.S. engagement and how these bodies and what they do to advance U.S. foreign policy goals. And they ignore the reality that without U.S. engagement these bodies likely would be dominated even more by our adversaries.

Let’s look a little deeper at the Human Rights Council. What took place prior to the U.S. joining? Let’s recall what it was like before the U.S. was there: six special sessions on Israel in three years; a decidedly mixed set of special repertoires, including Richard Falk; flawed mandates, including the Goldstone Report on Gaza; far too many unbalanced resolutions singling out Israel; and far too few resolutions, special procedures, or other attention to the world’s most troubling and urgent human rights situations. And since the United States joined in 2009, the challenges continue.
But the Council’s improvement through U.S. engagement is undeniable: timely action in 2010 on human rights crises from Kyrgyzstan to Côte d’Ivoire; new U.N. special procedures on countries with serious human rights situations and for core rights like freedom of assembly and for the first time on discrimination against women; a strong statement by the Council and 56 countries on human rights in Iran. We defeated an attempt by Cuba to politicize the high commissioner for Human Rights and a proposal by Pakistan that would have restricted free speech. And since the United States joined the Human Rights Council, it has not held a single special session on Israel. But it has called a special session to address pressing human rights situations in Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire.

In short, the United States took seriously our engagement on the HRC and we’ve already achieved concrete results. We have more to do, but these accomplishments would not have happened without an American voice at the table.

Now, of course, the Human Rights Council is far from perfect, and so our hard work continues, session by session as we knew it would when we joined. And the upcoming March session will be a real challenge because Middle East issues will be raised. But at the end of the day, issues important to the United States will be debated and responses decided at the Human Rights Council with or without us. We’ve engaged the Human Rights Council because this administration cares deeply about international human rights because we believe the protection of human rights is far too important to be left to the human rights abusers.

I was proud to be the first American official to address the Human Rights Council as a member, and I remain proud of our continued engagement. The more I look at the HRC’s record, its resolutions, its actions, and outcomes, the more I’m convinced that the U.S. membership on the Council marked a watershed moment. And even critics who disagreed with this administration’s decision to join are admitting that U.S.
membership has had a positive impact.

You can actually see some similarities between our strategy at the Human Rights Council and our approach to U.N. management issues. Our policy towards U.N. management and reform issues has been to work in collaboration and cooperation with the United Nations toward renewal and increased effectiveness. All member states have a stake in a more effective U.N., but as the largest single contributor to the U.N. system, the United States is particularly interested in ensuring that our taxpayer funds are effectively and efficiently used.

Our management and reform accomplishments over the past two years can be roughly divided into three categories. First, we're working to improve the U.N.'s day-to-day administration, supporting initiatives that are having measurable impact. We want new standards that hold U.N. officials accountable for achieving real results. We led the charge to institutionalize the U.N. Ethics Office with an American at the helm, and we worked to protect the full mission of the Office of Internal Oversight Services to carry out audits, inspections, evaluations, and when necessary, investigations of U.N. activities.

Second, we are further increasing U.N. accountability and transparency. We led the establishment of new oversight bodies at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the International Telecommunications Union, and we fought back attempts to impose restrictions on oversight reporting.

And third, we are continuing to reinforce the U.N.'s effectiveness in key policy areas. We have led efforts to put into place the global field support strategy, to improve the U.N.’s capacity to maintain complex peacekeeping missions, and we were instrumental in establishing U.N. Women, merging four disparate U.N. bodies into a
single new entity to effectively and efficiently advance women's issues worldwide.

Now, these accomplishments may not grab headlines but they get results. Naming and shaming, loud and brash calls for tearing down the United Nations rather than building it up don't get us any closer to our goal of improving U.N. effectiveness. Instead, we work cooperatively to further embed and strengthen within the U.N. a culture of responsibility and transparency.

Now, there has been some talk in recent weeks about U.N. funding. There have been calls in some quarters for reducing our dues and withholding a portion of our assessments despite our legal treaty obligations under the U.N. charter. As someone who worked on multilateral issues in the Clinton administration, I feel a bit of déjá vu. These same calls were made 15 years ago, and then, as now, they were supposedly called “U.N. reform.”

Now, let me be clear. This administration takes seriously our obligation to guard taxpayer dollars. We are second to none in pushing for efficiency and an effective U.N. But gutting our assessments isn't U.N. reform, it's just paying less. And trying to avoid paying our bills hurts our ability to deliver results at the U.N. that the American people want and that the United States needs. The United States must be a responsible global leader, and that means paying our bills and working for real renewal at the U.N.

How could we have won tough Security Council sanctions on North Korea and Iran if we were continuing to incur arrears? How could we have championed any of our management and reform achievements just over the past two years if we failed to keep current on our assessments? How can we work with other leading contributors to maintain U.N. budget discipline and hold down costs if we do not meet our own obligations? No longer can our adversaries at the U.N. change the subject to our arrears
when we press them on an important policy matter as they did for so long. The President’s decision to pay our U.N. assessments in full means that we have more political capital to galvanize support from allies, partners, and others for achieving our goals at the United Nations.

So given all this, let’s look out to the rest of 2011. Our multilateral work in 2011 will consolidate innovation and the advances we made in revitalizing the United Nations. On peace and security issues, we’re continuing to work to close the gaps that too often plague peacekeeping missions. Gaps between ambitious mandates and the U.N.’s capacity to carry them out, between the political support needed and that provided, and between the material needs of the missions and the resources provided to them.

We will also continue to work to ensure that the Security Council sanctions are respected and enforced by bolstering the capacity of key states and drawing attention to sanctions busters and peace spoilers. But as the first quadrennial diplomacy and development review made clear, we must continue to prevent conflicts and the atrocities before they arise. This includes further enhancing the U.N.’s capacity to anticipate and address crises before violence erupts through mediation, election assistance, political missions, and crisis response. And increasingly looking at peace building as a complement to U.N. peacekeeping missions.

But conflict prevention also means addressing human rights situations as they arise. I pointed earlier to some of our victories in pushing the Human Rights Council to play this role and we’re working to expand the Council’s timely action on pressing human rights concerns. The ongoing 2011 IHRC review is an important opportunity to move the Council closer to its envisioned role in defending universal human rights. We’re also working multilaterally on global development. We give more official assistance than any other country but cannot achieve the Millennium Development Goals unilaterally.
Although the first responsibility lies with people themselves, international support can help.

So from our $3.5 billion Feed the Future Food Security Initiative to our $63 billion Global Health Initiative, U.S. development strategy recognizes that by working multilaterally, American leadership and resources can leverage a greater global effort to address the root causes of poverty advanced through country-led plans.

Ladies and gentlemen, I began today by noting that we live in a changed world. It has changed from just 10 years ago and certainly changed from when the U.N. was founded in 1945. As Secretary Clinton said early in her tenure, if we didn’t have the United Nations we would have to invent one. Given the many areas I’ve outlined where the United Nations’ system is critical to U.S. national security and foreign policy, it’s a good thing we don’t need to invent it today. But just as we cannot hide inside our borders and disengage, nor can we address 21st century threats and challenges with 20th century tools, as the President has said. Our international architecture is buckling under the weight of new threats and new challenges.

So the United Nations does need to reinvent itself. And it is doing so to better meet the demands of our time. And in that effort, the United Nations will have no better partner than the United States. Our work in this area is ongoing but this administration is proud of our achievements to date across the U.N. system. Faced with tough challenges, we have chosen to lead, not retreat. And given the continued need to develop cooperative responses to shared threats and challenges of our time, we see no choice but to continue to work multilaterally to ensure that the United Nations is strong enough to bear the burdens we must place on it in the decades to come.

Thank you. (Applause)

MR. PICCONE: Thank you, Dr. Brimmer. And while she and I get miked
up here let me go ahead and turn to Bruce and hear from Bruce. Please.

MR. JONES: Thank you very much. And thank you, Esther, for that. I thought that was very well argued and well articulated and an important defense of an important organization by the administration.

I wanted to make a few points in three categories, two very quickly. One, where have we been? Two, where are we now? And three, where do we need to go?

Just one quick point on where we’ve been. I think that it’s easy to forget quite how messy and problematic this issue was as little as two or three years ago. The issue of the reputation of multilateral institutions and the reputation of the Bush administration on multilateralism was a kind of third rail of international politics for quite a lot of the previous administration and it had become a major thorn in the side of U.S. diplomacy. It was a major drain on American reputation and interests.

That was based on two exaggerations that we need to not repeat. One, it was based on an exaggerated critique by the Bush administration in its first term of the mendacity, corruption, ineffectiveness, and general badness of multilateral institutions. It was an exaggerated critique that was repudiated by the Bush administration itself in how it did business in its second term. And you saw a huge reinvestment in multilateralism by the Bush administration. Just one data point: when the Bush administration took office there were 20,000 U.N. peacekeepers in the field. When it left office, there were 100,000 peacekeepers in the field. Those weren’t the decisions of an anti-multilateralist administration. But its rhetoric in its first term was extremely critical and exaggeratedly critical of multilateral institutions.

The second exaggeration that happened was that there was an exaggerated critique of the Bush administration’s lack of multilateralism. As I just illustrated in peacekeeping, it was a distortion but it’s also a distortion in the following
sense. I think one of the points I’ll make a little bit later is that there is quite a lot of commonality between Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama, on the mix of formal and informal tools and multilateral instruments that are needed to meet American interests. The Bush administration was routinely hammered anytime it would say anything positive about or lead an initiative that was outside the formal structures of the U.N. The Obama administration has done similar things and received plaudits for them. So the kind of exaggerated critique of the Bush administration’s anti-multilateralism was matched by their exaggerated critique of the multilateral system and we need to not go back into that false debate.

Second point on where we’ve been, I found very little to disagree with the things that you said. I’ll disagree with one of them in a minute but I have very little to disagree with it. The only thing I would say, and this is kind of an unusual position to be in, I would actually think you didn’t go quite far enough on some of the accomplishments of the administration. And I would point to four issues where I think the administration really deserves major credit, especially given where we were just a couple of years ago.

The first, which you did touch on, is the extraordinarily swift and smooth adaptation of the global financial architecture to the crisis that we’re in. That’s not about the U.N. system per se, but it is about the multilateral system for the 21st century and the very rapid accommodation of the emerging powers into the G-20, into the Financial Stability World, World Bank reform, and the IMF Reform Agreement of the G-20. It has been a remarkably swift and smooth adaptation of the global financial architecture which is both important for the response to the Global Financial Crisis. We would all be an awful lot poorer now had that not happened in the last two years, but also in terms of relations with the rising powers on key issues moving forward. And it seems to me that positive relations between the major powers are the bedrock of any effective multilateral
system. So getting that right was a huge accomplishment.

The second issue I would point to is innovation in some of the security issues, and here again in informal modes more than through the U.N. The Nuclear Security Summit that Obama chaired a year and a bit ago was a masterpiece of political theater but also a very substantive effort to get real states to cooperate in real ways on improving safety of nuclear stockpiles and supply which matters a great deal to U.S. and trusts. There is a similar innovation going on now on counterterrorism. So there’s an awful lot that’s done in informal and innovative ways over the last two years to advance effective cooperation on key security threats.

The third thing, you mentioned this in the Human Rights Council, I would extend it into the U.N. as a whole: a huge improvement in U.S. relations with the member states at those organizations. I spent a lot of time in New York with my NYU hat on, and I spent a lot of time with the membership of the U.N. And the difference in the substance and the tone and the viability of the discussions and the policy debates between the United States and the result of the membership now to two years ago is night and day. It’s dramatic the shift. And that enables everything that you discussed. Right? All the things that we can get out of the U.N., all the advances we can make, all the resolutions that we need, et cetera, rely on that improvement with the relationship with the member states. And I think the administration deserves a great deal of credit for that.

And I would extend that then. You did touch on this as well into the way that the administration has used the Security Council. I think it’s very easy to take potshots at the sanctions regimen, et cetera, but not only was the sanctions regimen important in its own right, the fact of Security Council sanctions in Iran, the patient diplomacy with Russia and with China became then a platform on which additional U.S. and European sanctions could be applied, and little details like India complying, which is
incredibly important in the internal dynamics of Iran. There’s no way that India goes along with this without a Security Council resolution. It’s fundamental for them domestically. So the patient and careful diplomacy of the Security Council, not just for the outcomes in the Council itself but also for the broader diplomacy of how the U.S. handles key threats I think has been extremely effective during the first two years of the administration.

Where do we need to go? If I put on the following lens, at the end of four years, and I’m not ruling out a second term, but at the end of four years, if you wanted to look back and say have we left behind a multilateral system and a U.N. that’s stronger than we encountered it when we took office? What would you need to do between now and over the course of the next couple years?

I would mention a few things, and the achievements that you’ve made are already fundamental to accomplishing that outcome. I think consolidation of the G-20 has to be a continuing priority. If we see erosion in the cooperation on the financial and the economic issues for the G-20, everything that we’re talking about at the U.N. will become harder. And the multilateral system as a whole will be much less strong, as will U.S. interests.

The second thing I would say, and this is the one place where I disagreed with some of what you said, or at least I have a different take, is on the development issues. I think the U.S. administration -- the one place where I’d be critical of the administration on the G-20 was on its resistance to the G-20 taking up the development issues. They lost that battle. I’m glad they lost that battle. I think it’s a good thing the G-20 has taken up the development issues. We’re already seeing G-20’s development group, showing that there are common interests; there are ways of collaborating there.
I think that the place where I disagreed with your comments was when you talked about the engagement in the OAC and the multilateral development banks. You simply weren’t critical enough there. It’s a gigantic mess. The multilateral development architecture is a gigantic mess of overlapping competing interests, total lack of clarity, huge confusion, and massive inefficiency. And it’s been absent adult supervision for a very long time. The United States can’t provide that adult supervision by itself. It doesn’t have enough across those institutions, and it can’t be done institution by institution. We have to look at that system as a whole. I think the G-20 development group could do that. That would be a major contribution to multilateralism moving forward.

The third point I would make, you talked about peacekeeping and the important work that has been done on the Global Support Strategy, the new horizon issue. There were a number of ways the United States has been helping on this. But I would frankly be a little more critical there in saying that I think that has to go quite a lot farther.

The existing machinery for peacekeeping and for dealing with fragile states at the U.N. and beyond is premised on a model of civil wars that’s outdated. It’s premised on a model of a set piece civil war between two or three or four combatants that results in a negotiated peace agreement. And the implementation, deployment of peacekeepers, peace pullers, et cetera, all of which we’re starting to see is no longer the dominant pattern of violence in fragile states.

We’re looking at much more long term repeated cycles of diffuse violence and sub-regional, sub-national bases, penetration of organized crime, penetration of Chartis organizations. It’s quite an important change in the character of violence. And to the extent the United States continues to pursue its interests and the
broader international interests in managing that violence and protecting civilians, I think we need to have a much more serious look at adapting the peacekeeping and fragile states machinery to evolving forms of violence and conflict. It's not enough just to improve their delivery on the exiting model; we need to be rethinking some of the core elements of that model.

That then takes me into the U.N. as a structure and institution. And I would make four broad points about what we need to do on U.N. reform, to use that loaded term. The first is what I just said, adapting to new forms of violence. I think that the peacekeeping and humanitarian crisis is the bulwark of what matters to us at the U.N. and we need to adapt that to changing realities.

The second thing: I just wanted to echo very strongly what you said about a focus on delivery, not a focus on management reform in a narrow sense. I was in the Secretary-General’s office when the previous administration took up management reform in 2004-2005, and it accomplished one thing, which was it unified the G-77: the kind of constellation of developing countries that oppose many U.N. policies at the U.N. It’s a grouping which is splintering. There are huge new divides within the G-7. Seven has traditional champions, like India and Brazil became major players on the global stage. It’s splintering.

The Bush administration absolutely unified it by its approach to management reform and we need to avoid repeating that mistake. And I think you formed it correctly. It’s a focus on delivery, not just on cost effectiveness. If we focus only on cost effectiveness, we communicate. We don’t care about the U.N. We just care whether it’s cheap and every state that does care about the U.N. then wants to resist our policy, A.

B, when you get into the nitty-gritty of management reform, one of the
issues you grapple with is that small states of the U.N. actually have power on management issues. That’s uncomfortable for us but it’s a fact. And you can’t go into this debate and say “would you please give up your power on these issues because we’re so rich we need to be more powerful? Thank you very much.” It’s a total nonstarter as an argument and it failed totally in the previous administration. And it won’t succeed again. And a focus on delivery does play into very difficult politics in exactly the way you framed it.

I would also point you, by the way, to the forthcoming report of the secretary general on civilian capacities, which was very deliberately, if I’m a little frank here, very deliberately framed in ways to try to address some of the issues we knew would be on the agenda on management issues, but a way that is actually oriented towards the ability of the U.N. to deliver.

The third point in the U.N.: leadership. Enough said. (Laughter)

Fourth point in the U.N.: Security Council reform. I think that if we look back after four years and ask the question did the Obama administration make a genuine effort to build a multilateral architecture for the 21st century? Did it improve the multilateral architecture they found? And we haven’t done anything genuine on Security Council reform. We can’t honestly say yes to that question. I think Security Council reform is still vital to the health of the multilateral system as a whole. It’s an essential part of the emerging powers agenda. I think it’s vital to our interests as well. If we’re going to have an effective set of tools and an effective council to deal with challenges in the coming period, membership of the Security Council cannot be avoided, one.

Two, I think it’s easier than everybody thinks. When you talk to the main aspirants and the main blockers privately, not publicly, their positions are a lot less far away than their public positions would suggest. Japan, Germany, Brazil, and also India,
have all acknowledged privately that they’re not going to get permanent seats, which their
former rhetoric aspirates to. They want something short of that. China and others are
willing to accept things short of parenthesis, privately, not publicly.

It’s still complicated. It’s still fraught but it’s not as complicated and not
as fraught as some would have us believe. And I think that it’s worth pursuing. The last
point I’d like to make though is that even if we had a vote today in the General Assembly
for U.N. Security Council reform, the process involves two-thirds of the membership of
the General Assembly ratifying that change through their domestic procedures. That’s
years and years and years away. I don’t think we want to wait years and years and years
to begin establishing a new pattern of cooperation on security issues with Brazil, with
India, with Indonesia, with Turkey, with others.

The Security Council has to be part of that mix but it won’t be able to be the answer to that in the short term, and I think we’re going to have to again, bring in
informal mechanisms to complement the U.N. on building patterns of cooperation with the
rising powers on security issues. One of the reasons that we were able to respond with
the G-20 so quickly to the financial crisis is that in response to an earlier smaller crisis
and the Indonesian Financial Crisis, we established a G-20 finance minister’s
mechanism. And there were patterns of interaction and cooperation and knowledge of
people and relationships among those 20 countries at the finance ministry level that very
quickly enabled us to respond to the financial crisis at the heads of state level. I think a
similar logic applies on security issues. It’s not a precise analogy but it’s a close analogy.
And I think we need to start investing in the kinds of relationships with the Brazils, with
the Indias, with the Indonesias, the Turkeys, on security issues. Council reform has to be
part of the agenda but it won’t get us there up front. So some creativity and informal
arrangements and that space I think should be part of the mix of the strategy in the years
to come.

And I’ll end on that note.

Mr. PICCONE: Great. (Applause) Thank you very much, Bruce for touching on so many important points and priorities, both in the recent past but also looking ahead.

Tom, from your vantage point now in Brasilia with the ascendance of Brazil and other states, how does Brazil look at it and how do you look at it in helping them convey the Obama administration’s views in the Capitol?

AMBASSADOR SHANNON: Well, thank you very much, Ted. It’s a pleasure to be here. I’m kind of the odd guy out. I’m the bilateral ambassador and I don’t pretend to be an expert on things multilateral, although I did spend some time within the Inter-American System. And I acknowledge our great multilateralist within the Inter-American system who is sitting here with us.

I thought that I would start with just a brief historical note. As many of you might remember, the first time a secretary of state traveled outside of the United States for diplomatic purposes was in 1906 when Elihu Root went to Rio de Janeiro to participate in a Pan-American Union Conference, one of the predecessors of the Organization of American States. And he did so at the behest of the Brazilian ambassador at the time, a man named Joaquim Nabuco, whose 100th anniversary was celebrated in Brazil this past year, one of the great leaders of the abolitionist movement in Brazil.

But one of the consequences of Root going to Rio, and he also visited all of the capitals of the American republics that could be accessed by sea afterwards. One of the consequences of that is that the Hague Conference of 1906 was postponed until 1907. That was one of the conferences that created the Court of Justice, International
And because of Root’s participation in the Pan-American Conference, he decided that it was important to bring the republics of the Americas to The Hague for the 1907 conference. And he did so. And one of the immediate consequences of that was that a U.S.-European effort to create a weighted voting system in the International Court was defeated by Brazil and other countries who insisted on the quality of nation states. And that set a precedent that has continued through all of the international political organizations. It is not continued through international financial organizations.

And one of the immediate conclusions you might draw from that is that finance ministers are better negotiated than foreign ministers because there is weighted voting in some of the international financial institutions. However, another conclusion would be that foreign ministers had a further vision, a larger vision than finance ministers, in the sense that they recognize that the only way you can hold small and weak nations in an international organization is to insist on a quality and give countries that otherwise would not have an ability to express themselves or to make their views heard, a forum in which they would be treated as any other.

Which kind of brings me to my next point. Brazil is in a unique moment in its history. It does not see itself as an emerging power. It sees itself as an emerged power, as a country which especially through this latest economic crisis, international economic crisis, and its ability to get through that crisis cleanly, and its emergency in the G-20 as an important player. And its role with informal institutions, such as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) has created a space and a role and a voice for itself, unprecedented in its own history.

Brazil has participated in all of the iterations of organizations, beginning with the International Court of Justice. Unprecedented in its own history but also uniquely
suited for a moment in history that is very challenging for all of us. And what I mean by that is Brazil is the first country of continental size that has sought to push itself under the international system only through soft power. It has no atomic weapon. It has no border disputes. It doesn’t have a military capable of projecting itself far beyond its economic exclusion zone. And it’s only international engagement militarily is through U.N. peacekeeping forces where it does very important and notable work, especially in Haiti.

But as Brazil attempts to create a new way, a new means of asserting itself into the world, it is doing so within existing international structures to the point that it has claimed for itself a future permanent seat on the Security Council. That is significant because the last time countries the size of Brazil emerged in the world -- Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, Italy -- the result was World War II. And these countries all sought to assert their role in the world militarily and through conquest.

And the reason I make this point is because I really do think that we are at an interesting moment in time and in history in which a country like Brazil, which is democratic, which has a commitment to markets, which has a commitment to regional integration and to globalization, which is a member in good standing of the United Nations, a member in good standing of the Organization of American States, but also a country which has determined that independent of those organizations it is going to construct a series of informal organizations, like the Union of South American Nations, the South American Defense Council, the BRIC construct, and also the IBSA -- India, Brazil, South Africa -- construct, that will allow it to play beyond the formal boundaries of institutions, but always in a multilateral context. Always in a context in which it is attempting to match its power and influence with other countries of similar size and similar ambition. But that is unique in the structure because of its long-term engagement with us and its broad commitment to interests and values that we share.
And so from this point of view, Brazil sees itself as a worthwhile partner of the United States and a country that we should be engaging with on broad issues of international organization reform. But also a country that’s made very clear to us that if we’re not prepared to engage it will continue forward. It will continue to construct its relationships, its alliances, in the larger Americas, among countries of the southern hemisphere, but also elsewhere in the world where it can find likeminded countries to pursue its broad effort to push itself into a global leadership position.

And this is something we need to take seriously, not just because of what it means for our own interests in these institutions but also because of what it means for us if for whatever reason we decide to step away from these institutions because, as Esther and others have noted, there are plenty of people waiting to take our place. There are plenty of people intent on providing global leadership at this point in time. And here in the comfort of Washington we should not be fooled.

In Brasilia there is a place called the Praça dos Três Poderes, the Plaza of the Three Powers, which sits between the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the Presidential Palace. And in that plaza there is a bust of Juscelino Kubitschek, who was the Brazilian president who created Brasilia out of nothing 51 years ago. This bust kind of looks like an Olmec statue from Mexico. It’s very striking in its view. But there is a saying by it that describes Kubitschek as somebody of enormous energy, self-confidence, and audacity. I think those three words describe Brazil today. I think they describe many countries today. And this is something that we need to keep in mind. This is something that we need to understand because these are countries that want to work with us. These are countries that want to find a way to reshape and refashion international organizations with us, but which are very capable of moving ahead without us if for whatever reason we decide to step aside.
And in that regard, it is also worth noting that this year is the 50th anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. Now, we all understand the Alliance for Progress is something that John Kennedy announced in the White House 50 years ago, but it’s really something that Juscelino Kubitschek thought of and sold to Kennedy. And Kennedy made it his own. The United States made it its own. And it’s become a centerpiece of how Latin America has understood its relationship with the United States over time.

So I would argue that we should pay attention to our friends. We should pay attention to our allies and work with them. Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: Excellent. (Applause) Thank you very much, Tom. It really helps I think to get that kind of perspective, Brazilian view or an American’s view of Brazil in this case. But it opens I think the door to an interesting topic that you really put your finger on that I’d like the panelists to reflect on a little bit. You know, it is a changed world and we are talking about these rising confident or emerged states, many of whom are democracies. And yet some commentators have looked at the balance sheet and looked at how the states have actually behaved in international institutions and have raised some questions about are they ready for prime time. In the words of Jorge Castañeda, are they really going to play a constructive role?

From a narrow U.S. point of view, I mean, if when you’re facing the inquisitors on Capitol Hill asking you how are these states really going to help us on things that matter most to us, how does that really shake out? And I’m wondering if you could reflect on, you know, particularly we talk -- the Obama strategy talks a lot about rights and responsibilities of the states, including for example, burden sharing and dues. At some point they will need to step up in raising their contributions, for example, to the U.N. That might be one area of importance to the United States.
So are they going to be constructive players? How much is their role really animated by an anti-U.S. ideology because it plays well back home? These are all kind of complicated issues and I'm wondering if you have some thoughts on it.

Esther?

MS. BRIMMER: Thank you first to Bruce and Tom for your comments and many interesting points that one could pick up. But I'd like to pick up just a little bit of some of what you might look at as you look at as you say the emerged powers and some of the things that they're doing internationally and how do you think about being a responsible international actor. And I would suggest there are actually several different things we look at, particularly the U.N. context. One of course is the central role that peace and security issues play in the U.N. system. And I would suggest that one of those areas is looking at particularly support for international peacekeeping. There are of course countries that are important payers for national peacekeeping. We are one. Obviously, we pay the large sum out for it. But there are also many states that play very important roles as significant contributors of peacekeeping troops. And I will note as Ambassador Shannon has already, the role that Brazil plays as important provider of peacekeeping troops, particularly in Haiti, an area of particular interest in our region.

I'd also note that there are several countries that also -- I'd say both Brazil and Argentina, even Chile -- play a role in training peacekeepers. If you look at my travel schedule you'd see that I both go to visit countries that are active in the U.N. and this summer I was actually looking at some of the peacekeeping training centers because these are the way the countries are actually helping in real ways to deepen the expertise available to the international system.

I think some of the other areas you might look at are international development assistance. And it's interesting to note, correct me here Tom, that Brazil is
now actually expanding its own development agency. It's no longer a recipient of becoming a donor. India, as well. India, of course, as you know, is also a major contributor of peacekeeping troops and also one of the states that is thinking constructively about how we offer ways to improve peace and security mechanisms within the U.N. system.

I would think also that -- I think it's important that those countries that increasingly becoming larger donors, that they on the volunteer side, also I think over time we want to see states pay more of their fair share. As they become wealthier, that overtime -- this is not 1945, this is not 1960 -- the relative economic situations have changed over time and one needs to look at that as well.

So I think there are many different measures of being important contributors to international issues, whether peace and security, development, and some of the other issues that the U.N. works on.

MR. PICCONE: Bruce, any comment?

MR. JONES: Well, I didn't disagree with any of that but I think we also have to be clearheaded about the fact that we are going to disagree with the emerged and emerging powers on a bunch of issues. And that's just a reality. The question is whether we agree or disagree with them inside negotiating rooms or outside negotiating rooms. Right? And my approach to this is a kind of Johnson. Better to have them inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in. Right? Remember that old phrase? Excuse my language.

The reality is that these countries wield substantial influence in their regions, exactly in the way that Tom described. That's true of India and its region. That's true of China and its region. Whether or not we factor them into our negotiation strategy, they wield that influence. The odds that they will work with us on finding a solution, I
think we have a track record that that goes up if we incorporate them into the negotiation strategy, rather than simply saying, hey, we and the Brits and the French, and the Russians sat down or decided and now you have to implement. It just doesn’t work in the real world.

So I think it’s simply a reality. It’s true in economic issues but it’s also true in political security issues because of the weight that they play -- that they carry regionally. It’s not that they have huge military capacity. It’s not that they have global political power. It’s that they have huge regional political influence. And we either tap into that or we lose. It’s as simple as that.

MR. PICCONE: Tom, is Brazil able to bring along all the other Latin American states when it wants to?

AMBASSADOR SHANNON: No, it’s not a hegemon yet. But -- yet. But obviously it has a lot of influence, especially in South America where countries are very intent on constructing positive relations with Brazil because of its economic power and commercial power. They listen very closely to what Brazil says but what’s interesting is, you know, countries like Brazil, when they aspire to something like a permanent seat on the Security Council, they don’t do so as a Latin-American representative. They see themselves as independent of Latin America in the same way we see ourselves as independent of North America. They see themselves as global players and that’s also something we need to understand.

MR. PICCONE: Excellent. We have about 20-25 minutes or so, so let me open it up to the audience for questions. Please identify yourselves. I have a gentleman right here in the hallway here.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Thank you. I’m Leon Weintraub, University of Wisconsin, Washington Semester, International Affairs.
Assistant Secretary Brimmer, you spoke about management reform. I believe both of us were in the State Department in the mid-'90s when we worked in the United Nations to introduce the Office of Internal Oversight Services that was seen as a great step ahead. I recall seeing some articles in the media recently you may be familiar with about some pretty serious problems with this institution which we were instrumental in developing that, in fact, they were from possibly some ethical improprieties in this very same investigative office. I wonder if you might speak about that and how we might be satisfied or disappointed with its recent importance.

MS. BRIMMER: Leon, thank you. First, it's good to see you. And indeed, the creation of the Office of Internal Oversight Services -- OIOS, to use the jargon -- in 1994 was an important structural contribution to U.N. form, an office within the U.N. secretariat that would work on these critical issues. And indeed, we've been very concerned with how the office has actually been run since then. Indeed there are, as you know, numerous concerns raised in recent years and we have been quite vocal and vocal internally about the need for the continued independence of that office for it to be able to continue its important investigations, for it to be staffed fully. We think that’s absolutely crucial.

And to that end we're very glad to see the new head of OIOS, who was just appointed, Ms. Lapointe. She is actually a Canadian. She has 20 years of experience in this type of work so she comes with real serious credibility. I think she was -- I took office in mid-September. I think I was the second person to go see her from the Capitol. Her Canadian colleagues were welcome during office and I was right behind them because we think it's an absolutely critical office and I wanted her to know that the U.S. was going to be a strong supporter of OIOS. We have a lot of work to continue to do to make sure that it can be effective but I'm glad to see the new heads in place and
moving ahead on some of these concerns.

MR. PICCONE: All right. This gentleman. Yes.

MR. ENHOLM: I’m Bob Enholm, Citizens for Global Solutions.

The United States is a democracy. When I say that it’s obvious but from that I observe that there are limits to how far, you know, we can extend the United States without having the rest of the country follow. Okay? And so while we have great consensus perhaps in this room about the importance of international institutions, in the work that I do I see an awful lot of American politicians who are quite comfortable in their belief that those institutions are irrelevant or worse. And that comes from, you know, they have political support when they see that. What are the prospects for educating the broader American public and broader American leadership on what I think most of us would agree it seems self-evident to me that the world has changed. That international institutions are essential and that the United States has an important and undeniable and unavoidable leadership role to play and yet at times we seen to shrink from that and not recognize it.

MR. PICCONE: That’s a great question. Do you want to tackle it?

MS. BRIMMER: Thank you very much for your question. I would suggest that there’s a probably even more subtle issue to address, that indeed that interestingly enough the overall public support for working in multilateral institutions remains fairly high. There are numerous polls that say over 70 percent of the American public supports working in the U.N. and multilateral organizations. And many individuals may care about this aspect or that aspect. They may care about human rights issues. They may care about environment. They may care about development issues.

One of the challenges is that too often individuals have seen the opportunity to score a short-term political point on being critical about a particular
complex issue. We’re critical, too. This is, you know, there are lots of things that need to be approved. But what we think is important is helping I think a wider community understand the absolutely crucial nature of what we work on in the United Nations system, areas which are absolutely fundamental to national security issues, long-term interests and dealing with emerging powers and other areas, understanding what needs to be improved and how best to do that. And looking at what sort of institutions do we want in the future. And looking at how can we work best as the United States to get there. And I think helping work through what members of Congress care about, what members of the public, many members of the media, care about, and understanding how our multilateral work complements that. It’s part of our longer term approach.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you. Will Davis from the United Nations Information Center.

One of the reform proposals that is back in vogue these days is to make all contributions to the United Nations voluntarily. I’d welcome the views of the panelists as to how well that might work.

MS. BRIMMER: Thank you. I will --

MR. PICCONE: Jump again.

MS. BRIMMER: Thank you for that question. First off, I will note as many people are aware, that our contributions to the United Nations come in two forms. There are assessed contributions, which are our treaty obligations, which we say pay a certain percentage for the regulator budget and a higher percentage for the peacekeeping budget. We also make voluntary contributions to different parts of the U.N. system, particularly to the funds and programs. And I’ll note that many of those who talk about trying to change everything into voluntary funds may miss some key structures issues. The first one is they often draw examples from our funds and programs, which
we are doing important work on service delivery, providing particular programs in the field. Add a little more or add a little less, you can influence a fuse.

I would suggest that that’s actually not a relevant way to think about how you manage the structural parts of the system, how you actually pay for the administration of the organization. That you have core funding in order to be able to plan. And I would suggest that actually some of the talk inhibits good planning. And I would say that in terms of working on trying to convert it all to voluntary that would probably not have the effect I think some advocates might suggest. That instead that even in places where we provide voluntary funding, this idea that somehow you could add a dollar, pull a dollar back, day-in, day-out, would actually provide change I think doesn’t actually look at how organizations plan and organize themselves. I would suggest we actually are much more effective meeting our obligations, talking constructively about what our long-term views are and what we want to promote in the U.N. system, and then having good budgeting, good accounting, so we know how dollars are spent and we’re able to hold institutions to good management practices.

MR. PICCONE: Bruce, did you want to comment on this?

MR. JONES: A couple of quick things. One on the previous point; one on this.

On educating the public, I think one of the things we don’t do very well is we don’t give much visibility to some forms of cooperation that we have through multilateral institutions, including with, you know, countries like China. Counterterrorism, counter-piracy, we’re actively cooperating with China on counterterrorism and counter-piracy. But when a politician wants to take a slap shot at currency issues or human right issues, if it was visible that we were also working with China trying to contain al Qaeda, it would be a little bit more difficult for them to score public points. Right? So you have to
acknowledge the bad side but there are also positive sides. And we need to do, I think, quite a lot more to put the greater visibility on where we’re cooperating with people on tough security challenges that matter to us sort of balances the equation.

On the voluntary funding issue I’m going to agree with what you said. I do think it’s worth being clear that the U.N.’s financial management and human resource management systems are very badly broken. They were designed to support conference services when conferences of member states in New York as what the U.N. did. They were not designed to support 100,000 troops in the field at all. They need gut reform. The issue is the political framing, and I agree with everything that Esther said about this in her speech. If we frame it as we need to reduce costs, we lose the vote of just about everybody on this issue. So, and short of abrogating the San Francisco Treaty, we don’t have the option of going to, you know, volunteer funding. So we have to have a smart, political process for this. But it is a real issue.

MR. PICCONE: Additional questions? Yes, the gentleman in the back.

SPEAKER: I’m a counselor at the Turkish embassy.

After we heard your views on Brazil and India, shall we expect a public declaration from President Obama to support Brazil’s aspiration to be a permanent member when he visits in March? And the broader question is what is the U.S. policy on U.N. Security Council reform? Thank you.

MR. JONES: I’ll leave the second question to Esther and I’ll leave the first one to President Obama. (Laughter)

MR. PICCONE: But it’s an issue that’s getting some attention in Brazil certainly in terms of President Obama’s visit to Brazil in March.

MR. JONES: Well, it’s not just President Obama’s visit. It’s Brazil’s ambition. But what’s important to note is when President Obama went to India and
announced U.S. support for an Indian permanent seat on the Council, the Brazilian response was very positive. And it was positive because the Brazilians said that this was the first time an American president had spoken so clearly and so emphatically about the need for Security Council reform. And so they took that as a very positive sign. And that was the right sign to take from this because Security Council reform, as everybody in this room knows, is absolutely necessary but almost impossible politically, which doesn’t mean it won’t happen. But that it’s just really, really hard. And so the Brazilians responded appropriately.

MS. BRIMMER: As you know, the President, the Secretary, Ambassador Rice, and many of our colleagues have talked about key elements of how we approach Security Council reform. And just to respond to your question, there are several elements that we’ve talked about. First, indeed, the United States has said that it favors a modest reform of the Security Council, an expansion of permanent and nonpermanent seats. It is also said that -- I stress the word “modest.” We wanted to continue to be an efficient Security Council so size will matter.

We have also said that it’s important that whatever expansion might come focus on specific countries that have made a serious and are making a serious contribution to international peace and security. There are many ways to do that but that means specific seats for specific countries as opposed to regional seats. And the United States has been clear that we do not favor the expansion of the veto. But we are looking at what are the frameworks. We have been very active in the conversation up in the General Assembly. As you know, there’s been a process there looking at different elements of Security Council form. And those are the main themes that we’ve raised in those conversations in New York.

MR. PICCONE: I see a hand in the back. Dick Rowsen.
MR. ROWSEN: My name is Dick Rowsen. I'm with the Council for Community of Democracies.

You will recall, Esther, that the U.N. Democracy Caucus was formed by the community about seven years ago. Most people gave it not much mind until last year when the caucus met before a panel of seven women presidents and five women prime ministers on the subject of women as governors in advancing democracy.

My question concerns democracy as something that we're seeing developing in Tunisia, Egypt, we hope. It's becoming a major element in strategic sense in U.S. foreign policy. So what do you see as the role of this caucus in advancing democracy and advancing some of the principles that you've discussed in your introductory remarks.

MS. BRIMMER: Thank you, Dick. First, good to see you. Thank you for the question.

That indeed, that democracy and human rights issues, but I'll focus particularly on democracy, are actually central issues that the administration works on, both on the bilateral side. I want to acknowledge lots of work by my bilateral colleagues and bilateral masters and those working on those issues here in Washington. I'll just focus on the multilateral side of it and that looking at how you can use the mechanisms for advancing rule of law, encouraging political empowerment. These are the nuts and bolts of actually strengthening democracy in member states.

And a lot of what the U.N. mechanisms are, often good things not in the headlines but that help states that want to look at how you increase political participation. For example, how you reach out to civil society, include civil society groups. We're usually the vocal ones talking about the importance of having civil society and multilateral gatherings. The importance of speaking to your own people when you talk about your
own human rights situation is something we did when we were in Geneva. So we see this as a very central point.

We also continue to be contributors to the U.N. Democracy Fund, something we’ve maintained as well. So we think these are very, very important areas and we acknowledge, I know you worked well in the role of the council and particularly we see that having democracies willing to work together and support key issues in the U.N. system is very helpful. You want those countries that are deeply committed to democracy to be working together. So we think that’s an important element.

We also think it’s important to reach out to states that are new democracies, emerging democracies, to talk about how they support -- how they support those values as well.

MR. PICCONE: Well, Bruce might have something to say on this. But before he does, I’m glad Dick raised that question. I mean, this is an issue that I’ve been working on for some time and I think while there are a couple of bright spots, and I would note the U.N. Democracy Fund as one of them, which is a good example going back to Bruce’s point about how the Bush administration exaggerated its criticism but then actually worked quite effectively within them in some cases, the Bush administration took the lead increasing the U.N. Democracy Fund, along with India. And India has put in quite a bit of money. The U.S., and a range of other states, into a fund that under the U.N. rubric is supporting civil society, grassroots groups around the world, and doing everything from election monitoring to getting women, political leaders more involved, et cetera. So it’s a concrete manifestation of an activity among the democracies within the U.N. umbrella.

But there’s not much else to say beyond that. And if you actually look at the way democracies vote at the Human Rights Council or at the Third Committee in the
General Assembly on human rights issues, it’s very disappointing. There is, you know, very little common voice among the democracies and particularly among India, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, et cetera. These states are not onboard with the European or western view on these issues. And it’s really, I see, the fate of the democracy and human rights agenda and the international order rests on these states changing their voting behavior or else we’re just going to be constantly fighting an uphill battle against the states that are much more organized than non-democracies.

See whether it’s under different rubrics of the G-77, the NAM, the OIC -- Organization of The Islamic Conference. They’re very well organized and coordinated. They send their best people to Geneva and New York, and they fight very hard on these issues. So this is one of those additional challenges we have ahead of us.

MR. JONES: Just two cents on this. I’m a skeptic on this as Ted knows well. A couple points.

India. Made an important break from nonaligned movement positions on the issues of protection of civilians this year and the U.N. and General Assembly negotiations and voted with a nonaligned movement on human rights issues and Human Rights Council. Right?

Brazil. Very strong defense of nonintervention policy even under the new Brazil and votes with the nonaligned movement and the Human Rights Council.

China has voted for 54 U.N. peacekeeping operations that have democracy promotions, elections, and human rights components. It’s simply oversimplified to say that it’s only the democracies that are part of the process of generating democratic reform in countries and the other way around. It’s more complex than that. I think we run some risks when we try to consolidate around the democracies. I think that actually pushes some of the democracies back into their sort of more
traditional nonaligned moment more than it does bring them out. I think a much more interest-based discussion, rather than an organized around democracy discussion is more promising.

MR. PICCONE: Tom, do you have any comments? We have time for a couple more questions and we’ll take them together. Yes. Right here. Yes.

MR. BISQUASNE: Thank you. My question is regarding the metal powers that are also the allies of the United States. I wanted to hear perhaps the Obama administration’s strategy towards, you know, the Turkeys, the Canadas, the South Koreas of the world, and how they can contribute to multilateralism efforts.

MR. PICCONE: Can you identify yourself?

MR. BISQUASNE: My name is Aton Bisquasne, and I’m a graduate student here and also an intern.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you. And in the middle. Yes.

MS. CALABIA: Dawn Calabia, Refugees International.

Last year the Center for Foreign Relations Committee voted out two State Department authorization bills and each one was a component saying that the U.S. needed to do a much better job of training its diplomats, orienting them to work in international organizations at the U.N. The legislation never got enacted into law. There wasn’t much on the QDDR to address this. I wonder what you’re planning to do, Esther, to get our best and brightest.

MR. PICCONE: Esther?

MS. BRIMMER: Yes, thank you. If I may take both those. First off is that one of the delights of working the multilateral system is precisely that many states bring their own expertise and strengths. The three countries you just said are all actually close U.S. allies. We are delighted to be able to work with them in the multilateral
system, working the U.N. System Security Council also. We are not always going to agree on everything. Good friends don’t always agree. I think there are times when we will vote differently, but we always talk together, work together very closely. And we think that some of the most interesting things now are the roles that other states are playing in the health of the system as a whole, whether it’s as participants in development issues, that other states -- it doesn’t always have to be the United States. And sometimes there’s this view that nothing will happen unless the U.S. will push. Actually, happily there are many states and those that you cited in particular -- Turkey, South Korea, Canada and others, have long histories in the U.N. system. Canada and Turkey have long contributed to peacekeepers, peacekeeping. And different parts at different times over the history have been very active.

We think that’s really good, that more states are bringing their strengths to the system as a whole and bringing their expertise and are taking greater responsibility for the system. That’s a good thing.

And in terms of training diplomats, we actually -- I’m not surprisingly wearing my former university professor hat, that we’re big, big proponents of thinking about how do you strengthen the multilateral skills within our larger diplomatic community, whether Foreign Service, Civil Service, State Department, and AID.

And indeed, actually, the QDDR actually does give you some indications of some of the areas that will be particularly important. One is looking at the formal training of diplomats and we’ll start working very closely with the Foreign Service Institute, all in their multilateral diplomacy program. Myself and many of our colleagues in the International Organizations Bureau and other parts of the department have gone and lectured there. We’ve actually done a pilot program which would expand the multilateral diplomacy area. And it’s an area where we think we will continue to work with them on
the actual curriculum to make it particularly relevant in the future.

We’re also looking at more opportunities for people to actually spend time in other multilateral missions. We’ve talked a lot about the specialty of multilateral affairs. Last year I was honored to convene the first Multilateral Chief Submission Conference where we brought together ambassadors who are at different multilateral offices. I should note two of my colleagues who are here in the front row, Besser Beneke, who’s at U.N. Geneva; and Joe Murphy, who’s at the U.N. Nairobi; and many of our colleagues, from the OAS and others. And what we tried to do at that session is we brought together our colleagues who were ambassadors to the OAS. Our ambassador to the African Union, to try to talk about the commonalities in our approach and how we have lessons learned from each other.

So I think these are really concrete ways to really strengthen the specialty and skills related to multilateral diplomacy.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you, Esther.

Bruce and Tom, final comments?

MR. JONES: Two quick points. On middle powers, I would go even farther. If you look at the evolution of the multilateral systems since the end of the Cold War, it’s actually been middle powers much more than major powers that have driven reform. And that’s an important role.

One place where I’m actually a little critical of the administration -- the current administration -- I don’t think that the administration has done as much as it could to reach out to those middle powers, especially the new middle powers, to discuss with them what areas they might want to lead on. And this could be a more productive dialogue there I think than there has been, rather than just waiting for people to take initiatives or filling in gaps. But the middle power role there is very important.
On the training of diplomats, I was reflecting on something that you said up front when you introduced yourself. You were being modest and you illustrated the falsehood of what you said by your remarks. But you stressed that you were a bilateral, not a multilateral diplomat. And it is the case that in a lot of capitals you’ll hear ambassadors say that and mean that. And really not engage on multilateral issues when they’re posted to Beijing or to -- and I think breaking that -- breaking down that distinction is going to be extremely important, especially as big global issues -- climate, finance, et cetera -- become much more important in the bilateral relations. The divorce between what is foreign policy and what is domestic policy and what is bilateral and what is multilateral is going to -- that divorce is going to be come untenable. And breaking that down.

The QDDR goes some distance in that. I don’t think it perhaps goes quite as far as it could.

MR. PICCONE: Tom?

AMBASSADOR SHANNON: Now that I’ve been declared a purveyor of falsehoods -- (Laughter)

MR. PICCONE: Only by yourself.

AMBASSADOR SHANNON: Just a comment on training. We don’t do multilateral diplomacy well in a training environment and there’s a very simple reason for it. We’re the most powerful nation in the world. And we have relationships with almost every country in the world. And if you’re a young diplomat you want to exercise power. You want to be at the far end of the lance in tough positions where you can bring the full weight of the United States to bear on problems. And it takes us a while to understand that while that’s important, that there is a multilateral environment that is just as important but it really does require us to kind of twist our brains because it’s a very different kind of
work than the work we do in the field. I mean, being the head of a PRT in Afghanistan or Iraq is very different than working in Geneva at the International Labor Organization. You tell me what’s more exciting.

MS. BRIMMER: Just on that point though. One of the other things we’re also doing is also encouraging Americans to have careers in organizations and to try to look at opportunities to both have careers in your national foreign service and international organizations. And we’re trying to encourage people to do that as well because you can actually have a fascinating career path putting together many multilateral pieces. And I think that’s part of the future.

MR. JONES: As long as you avoid the ILO in Geneva. (Laughter)

MR. PICCONE: I think this last exchange shows that the world is indeed changing, including for U.S. diplomats. It’s going to be an interesting brain-shifting exercise ahead.

Thank you all for coming. Please join me in thanking the panelists.

(Applause)

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

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